Chapter Twelve Pricing and Advertising. © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 12-2...

45
Chapter Twelve Pricing and Advertising

Transcript of Chapter Twelve Pricing and Advertising. © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 12-2...

Page 1: Chapter Twelve Pricing and Advertising. © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 12-2 Topics Why and How Firms Price Discriminate. Perfect.

Chapter Twelve

Pricing and Advertising

Page 2: Chapter Twelve Pricing and Advertising. © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 12-2 Topics Why and How Firms Price Discriminate. Perfect.

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Topics

Why and How Firms Price Discriminate.

Perfect Price Discrimination. Quantity Discrimination. Multimarket Price Discrimination. Two-Part Tariffs. Tie-In Sales. Advertising.

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Nonuniform pricing

nonuniform pricing - charging consumers different prices for the same product or charging a single customer a price that depends on the number of units the customer buys

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Price discrimination

Price discrimination - practice in which a firm charges consumers different prices for the same good

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Why Price Discrimination Pays

A price-discriminating firm earns a higher profit from price discrimination because: it charges a higher price to customers who

are willing to pay more than the uniform price, capturing some or all of their consumer surplus

it sells to some people who were not willing to pay as much as the uniform price.

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Table 12.1 A Theater’s Profit Based on the Pricing Method Used

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Who Can Price Discriminate

Three conditions: a firm must have market power. consumers must differ in their sensitivity to

price, and a firm must be able to identify how consumers differ in this sensitivity.

a firm must be able to prevent or limit resales

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Not All Price Differences Are Price Discrimination

Not every seller who charges consumers different prices is price discriminating.

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Types of Price Discrimination

perfect price discrimination (first-degree price discrimination) - situation in which a firm sells each unit at the maximum amount any customer is willing to pay for it, so prices differ across customers and a given customer may pay more for some units than for others

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Types of Price Discrimination (cont).

quantity discrimination (second-degree price discrimination) - situation in which a firm charges a different price for large quantities than for small quantities but all customers who buy a given quantity pay the same price

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Perfect Price Discrimination

multimarket price discrimination (thirddegree price discrimination) - a situation in which a firm charges different groups of customers different prices but charges a given customer the same price for every unit of output sold

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Perfect Price Discrimination (cont).

reservation price - the maximum amount a person would be willing to pay for a unit of output

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Figure 12.1 Perfect Price Discrimination

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Perfect Price Discrimination: Efficient But Hurts Consumers

A perfect price discrimination equilibrium is efficient and maximizes total welfare.

Perfect price discrimination equilibrium differs from the competitive equilibrium in two ways: perfect price discrimination equilibrium, only

the last unit is sold at that price. perfectly price-discriminating monopoly

captures all the welfare.

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Figure 12.2 Competitive, Single-Price, and Perfect Discrimination Equilibria

p, $

pe

r u

nit

E

D

CB

A

Q, Units per dayQs Qc = Qd

MCs

Demand, MRd

MRs

pc = MCcec

esps

p1

MC1

MC

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Figure 12.2 Competitive, Single-Price, and Perfect Discrimination Equilibria (cont.)

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Application Botox Revisited

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Solved Problem 12.1

How does welfare change if the movie theater described in Table 12.1 goes from charging a single price to perfectly price discriminating?

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Solved Problem 12.2

Competitive firms are the customers of a union, which is the monopoly supplier of labor services. Show the union’s “producer surplus” if it perfectly price discriminates. Then suppose that the union makes the firms a take-it-or-leave-it offer: They must guarantee to hire a minimum of H* hours of work at a wage of w*, or they can hire no one. Show that by setting w* and H* appropriately, the union can achieve the same outcome as if it could perfectly price discriminate.

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Solved Problem 12.2

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Quantity Discrimination

Most customers are willing to pay more for the first unit than for successive units: the typical customer’s demand curve is

downward sloping.

block-pricing schedules - charge one price for the first few units (a block) of usage and a different price for subsequent blocks.

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Figure 12.3 Quantity Discriminationp1,

$ pe

r un

it

30

50

70

90

Q, Units per d ay

20 40 900

m

(a) Quantity Disc rimination

Demand

A =$200

C =$200

B =$1,200 D =

$200

p2,

$ pe

r un

it

30

60

90

Q, Units per d ay

30 900

m

(b) Single-P rice Monopoly

Demand

F = $900

G = $450

MR

E = $450

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Figure 12.3 Quantity Discrimination (cont.)

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Multimarket Price Discrimination

The most common method of multimarket price discrimination is to divide potential customers into two or more groups and set a different price for each group.

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Multimarket Price Discrimination with Two Groups

A copyright gives Warner Home Entertainment the legal monopoly to produce and sell the Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban two-DVD movie set, which it released in November 2004. Warner engages in multimarket price

discrimination by charging different prices in various countries because it believes that the elasticities of demand differ compared to the U.S. price

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Multimarket Price Discrimination with Two Groups (cont).

π = πA + πB = [pAQA − mQA] + [pBQB − mQB]

pAQA = revenue from American customers

pBQB = revenue from British customers

π = American and British profits

Warner sets its quantities so that the marginal revenue for each group equals the common marginal cost, m, which is about $1 per unit.

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Multimarket Price Discrimination with Two Groups (cont).

Because the monopoly equates the marginal revenue for each group to its common marginal cost, :

MRA = m = MRB.

Therefore, using price elasticities:

B

BB

AA

A MRpmpMR

1

11

1

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Multimarket Price Discrimination with Two Groups (cont).

From previous slide:

and rearranging,

B

BB

AA

A MRpmpMR

1

11

1

B

A

B

A

p

p

1

1

11

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Figure 12.4 Multimarket Pricing of Harry Potter DVD

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Solved Problem 12.3

A monopoly drug producer with a constant marginal cost of m = 1 sells in only two countries and faces a linear demand curve of Q1 = 12 − 2p1 in Country 1 and Q2 = 9 − p2 in Country 2. What price does the monopoly charge in each country, how much does it sell in each, and what profit does it earn in each with and without a ban against shipments between the countries?

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Solved Problem 12.3

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Solved Problem 12.3 (cont’d)

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Identifying Groups

Two approaches to divide customers into groups: divide buyers into groups based on

observable characteristics of consumers. identify and divide consumers on the basis

of their actions

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Welfare Effects of Multimarket Price Discrimination

Multimarket price discrimination results in inefficient production and consumption. As a result, welfare under multimarket price

discrimination is lower than that under competition or perfect price discrimination.

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Two-Part Tariffs

two-part tariff - a pricing system in which the firm charges a customer a lump-sum fee (the first tariff or price) for the right to buy as many units of the good as the consumer wants at a specified price (the second tariff)

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A Two-Part Tariff with Identical Consumers

A monopoly that knows its customers’ demand curve can set a two-part tariff that has the same two properties as the perfect price discrimination equilibrium. the efficient quantity, Q1, is sold because

the price of the last unit equals marginal cost.

all consumer surplus is transferred from consumers to the firm.

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Figure 12.5 Two-Part Tariff

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Tie-In Sales

tie-in sale- a type of nonlinear pricing in which customers can buy one product only if they agree to buy another product as well.

requirement tie - in sale a tie-in sale in which customers who buy one product from a firm are required to make all their purchases of another product from that firm

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Tie-In Sales (cont).

bundling (package tie-in sale) - a type of tie-in sale in which two goods are combined so that customers cannot buy either good separately. bundling a pair of goods pays only if their

demands are negatively correlated:

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Table 12.2 Bundling of Tickets to Football Game

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Advertising

A monopoly advertises to raise its profit. A successful advertising campaign shifts

the market demand curve by changing consumers’ tastes or informing them about new products.

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The Decision Whether to Advertise

Even if advertising succeeds in shifting demand, it may not pay for the firm to advertise. If advertising shifts demand outward, the

firm’s gross profit must rise. The firm undertakes this advertising

campaign only if it expects its net profit (gross profit minus the cost of advertising) to increase.

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Figure 12.6 Advertising

Pri

ce o

f C

oke

,pc

,$

pe

r u

nit

B

Q c, Units of Coke per year

0

19

17

5

Q 2= 28 68 76Q 1

= 24

MR1 MR 2 D 2D 1

p 2 = 12p 1 = 11

e 2

e 1

1

MC = AC

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Figure 12.7 Shift in the Marginal Benefit of Advertising

Mar

gina

l ben

efit,

mar

gina

l cos

t, $

per

uni

t

A1A2

Minutes of advertising time purchased per day

MB2 MB1

MC

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Cross-Chapter Analysis: Magazine Subscriptions