From Ibn Khaldun: Discourse of the Method and Concepts of Economic Sociology

© 1983Abdel Magid Al-Araki. ISBN 82-570-0743-9. Disseminate freely with this header intact.

[Pages: 70 – 103]

Chapter one: Method of analysis

[70]

Historiography occupies a very important place in Ibn Khaldun's culture.Most of the arts and sciences produced within the Islamic civilizationoriginated from the attention given to history.

However, at the time of Ibn Khaldun, the 14rhcentury, historical writingshad reached their utmost decay. Historians, says Ibn Khaldun, went tothe extreme of being satisfied with the names of kings, without anygenealogical or historical information, and with only a numerical indicationof the length of reigns. No credence can be given to what they say, saysIbn Khaldun. "They are not considered trustworthy, nor is their materialconsidered worthy of transmission, for they caused useful material to belost, and damaged the methods and customs acknowledged to be soundand practical by historians" (I, p. 5 A; p.10 E)

Ibn Khaldun's greatest challenge was to restore to historiography itsproper place. His endeavours led him to the discovery of a new methodof analysis and a new science. These in turn paved the way for a newconception of history and added consciousness to its usefulness.

The present chapter will first elucidate this socio-conception of history.Thereafter follows a discussion of the method of analysis, embodied inthe new science of civilization1, the basic requirements of the method,its procedure and its originality. Ibn Khaldun talks about his method asan action researcher. He does not explicitly explain his methodologicalthoughts. However, scattered methodological aspects and analysisundertaken by the author himself have inspired us to deduce andconstruct and reconstruct this methodological thought.

1.1. Ibn Khaldun's socio-conception of history

The writings of Ibn Khaldun's predecessors could, at their best, revealwhat he terms the "surface meaning of history", of which he says: "...onthe surface history is no more than information about political events,dynasties, and occurrences of the remote past, elegantly presented andspiced with [71] proverbs. It serves to entertain large, crowdedgatherings and brings to us an understanding of human affairs. It showshow changing conditions2 affected (human affairs), how certain

dynasties came to occupy an ever wider space in the world, and how theysettled the earth until they heard the call and their time was up" (I, p. 2 A;

p.6 E)

This is history as perceived by the "surface reader". It is the "how-conception" of history the writing of which depends on plain transmissionof information and on description of happenings.

Ibn Khaldun, however, claims that he had managed, through his methodand critic of sources, to renovate this "how-conception" by adding to itthe "why-conception" of history.

Among the renowned historians Ibn Khaldun refers to we encounter al-Tabari (838-923) and al-Mas'ūdi (died 956), though not without criticizingtheir methods and correcting their conception of historiography.

Al-Tabari (838-923) is being described as: "Modest, unselfish, and simplein his habits, he diffused his encyclopaedic knowledge with an almostsuperhuman industry. During forty years, it is said, he wrote forty leavesevery day. His great works are the Tā'rikku 'l-Rusul wa-'l-Mulūk, or'Annals of the Apostles and the Kings,' and his Tafsīr, or 'Commentary onthe Koran.'" (Nicholson, 1969, p.351)

Al-Mas'ūdi (died 956) is known for his great historical work Muruju'l-Dhahab. Niclson says that although we possess only a small remnant ofAl-Mas'ūdi's voluminous writings, no better proof can be desired of thevast and various erudition gathered not from books alone, but also fromlong travels in almost every part of Asia, as to the motives, which urgedhim to write. "Mas'ūdi declares that he wished to follow the example ofscholars and sages and to leave behind him a praiseworthy memorial andimperishable monument. He claims to have taken a wider view than hispredecessors." (Nicholson, 1969, p. 353)

Al-Mas'ūdi was of great help in Ibn Khaldun's understanding of history.Ibn Khaldun, praising Al-Mas'ūdi, says that the works of the latter:"became the basic reference work for historians, their principal source forverifying historical information" (I, p. 52 A; p. 65 E) He further says thatMas'ūdi has "...commented upon the conditions 2 of nations and regionsin the West and in the East during his period which was the threehundred and thirties (the nine hundred and forties)." (I, p. 51 A; p. 63-64 E)

Inspired and fascinated by Mas'ūdi's authorship, Ibn Khaldun means thatsomeone should systematically set down the situation of the world amongall regions and races, as well as the customs and sectarian beliefs thathave changed for their adherents, doing for Ibn Khaldun's age what Al-Mas'ūdi did for his. Such a work should be a model for historians tofollow. This is the project Ibn Khaldun wishes to realize in hisMuqaddimah.

Ibn Khaldun borrowed from Al-Mas'ūdi his encyclopaedic vision, as well ashis study of the conditions prevailing during his age. Otherwise, he

depended on his own observations of the actual societies in which helived or had visited. The information he collected and the outcome of hisanalysis not only helped him in revealing [72] the "inner" or "the why-conception of history", but also constituted the cornerstone for his newscience of civilization, the science of al-‛umrān.

Ibn Khaldun formulates this conception of the inner meaning of history bysaying that it: "involves speculation and an attempt to get at the truth,subtle explanation of the causes and origins of existing things, and deepknowledge of the how and why of events. 3 (I, p. 2 A; p.6 E)

This conception of history complies with a similar idea of R. Aron whodescribes history a dialogue between the past and the present in whichthe present takes and keeps the initiative (Aron, 1961). Ibn Khaldun alsowants the present to take the initiative; thus allowing the past to deliverits unreported explanations.

A dialogue between the past and the present is useless without historicalrelics, preferably reliable ones. But whatever the validity of these relics, itis necessary to have a solid understanding of the conditions prevailing inthe present so as to be able to deduce the differences and similaritiesbetween them and those reported from the past.

Ibn Khaldun's conception was challenging, compared to the understandingof history up to his time and to the historical traditions where hebelonged. He not only broke with the classical viewpoint, both within andoutside his culture, but he also elevated history to the level ofphilosophy. He says that History is firmly rooted in philosophy anddeserves to be accounted a branch of it. What is then the utility of thiskhaldunian conception of history? He says: "It should be known thathistory is a discipline that has a great number of different approaches. Itsuseful aspects are manifold. Its Goal is noble. History acquaints us withthe conditions 2 of past nations as they are reflected in their nationalcharacter 4. It makes us acquainted with the biographies of prophets andwith the dynasties and policies of rulers. Whoever desires may thusachieve the useful result of being able to imitate historical examples inreligious and worldly matters." (I, p. 8 A; p. 15 E)

This is what Ibn Khaldun wants from history. A history regarded as partof philosophy and serving as a reference and as a reservoir of experience.It stands as the ultimate "teacher" in evolution. It does not only conveyconditions which once prevailed, but also how they were conceived aspart of a specific culture and a national character. Conditions musttherefore be agreed upon as to their relevance and envisaged in theirproper context.

[73] This is history resulting from the analysis of information in search ofits inner meaning. All the different aspects of society, each within itscontext, can to be considered useful when undertaking such analysis. Thegeographical, the socio-political, the economic, the cultural, thepsychological and many other aspects are useful in such a conception of

history

Yves Lacoste claims that Ibn Khaldun's conception is closely affiliated withideas that developed in Europe at the end of the 19th century due to theefforts of research in the economic and social domains. He further praisesIbn Khaldun's conception as being richer than that of Thucydide, SaintAugustin, Machiavel or Montesquieu. He says "...les oeuvres des autresanciens historiens, même s'il s'agit de celles des plus grands, Thucydide,Saint Augustin ou même Machiavel ou Montesquieu, traduisent desconceptions de l'histoire qualitativement beaucoup moins riches que celled'Ibn Khaldoun." (Lacoste, 1978, p.14)

Ibn Khaldun's socio-conception of history and some of his methodologicalthoughts originate from a specific tradition of history and historicalanalysis within the Arab-Islamic culture.

The method itself, however, is an independent and insightful exercise. Itis a curious fact that those who studied Ibn Khaldun's epistemology andmethod have not been curious as to how the author himself applied hismethod in his writings. Aziz al-Azmeh raises this question in hisannotated bibliography (1981, p.274-276).

1.2. The method: Basic requirements andoriginality

At the beginning of the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun says that: "It takescritical insight 5 to sort out the hidden truth; it takes knowledge 6 to laytruth bare and polish it so that critical insight may be applied to it." (I, p.

63 A; p. 6-7 E)

Critical insight refers her to the method of analysis. Knowledge refers tothe information we acquire or deduce from a certain context and on acertain phenomenon. Both critical insight and knowledge arecomplementary and are necessary for the analysis of information. Criticalinsight helps in sorting out the hidden truth. We penetrate the material inour possession. Meanwhile, reflexivity (cf. Pillow, 2003) and criticalinsight would not be reliable unless combined with contextual knowledge,which allows us to lay truth bare and polish it.

Ibn Khaldun was also conscious of the importance of beige informedthrough experience, observation and proper sources, [74] beforeundertaking any analysis. He says: "The writing of history requiresnumerous sources and greatly varied knowledge. It also requires a goodspeculative mind and thoroughness.7 Possession of these two qualitiesleads the historian to the truth and keeps him from slips and errors." (I,

p. 8 A; p. 15 E)

The first requirement here is to have "encyclopaedic" knowledge, both of

the past and the present. The past alone would normally not suffice forthe reconstruction of a meaningful history. Acquiring proper knowledge,also about the present, will indirectly lead to clarify the past. The moreknowledge we acquire, the wider becomes our insight into the past. Theacquired knowledge should, apart from being comprehensive, also becritically learned and structured. It is knowledge that differentiatesbetween the general and the particular. The general is that whichconstitutes the formation of the scholar himself, whereas the particular isthat which is revealed by the phenomenon under study.

The second requirement is the possession of a good speculative mind andthoroughness. In both the citations discussed above, the second quality,i.e. possession of a good speculative mind and thoroughness - is oncereferred to by the expression "critical insight" 5, and then by theexpression "a good speculative mind and thoroughness" 7

The use of one's critical insight, speculative mind and thoroughness, whenbased on good intentions and reliable sources, refer to establishedclassical method called "reflexivity" (Pillow, 2003). In figure IV, theseterms are combined to indicate an important step of analysis, namelystep 5.

1.3. procedure of analysis

Ibn Khaldun mentions seven principal reasons for the occurrence ofdeficiencies and faults (I, p. 56-58 A; p. 71-73 E):

1. The spirit of partisanship;

2. Blind confidence in the sources

3. Failure to understand the intention of the reports

4. Unfounded credulity

5. Ignorance about how to apply conditions make them conform toreality 47

6. Interest in gaining favour with the powerful and the influential

7. Ignorance of the true nature of conditions in civilization 8

8. The failure to understand events in their proper contexts, (the lawof change)

Ignorance [75] of the true nature of conditions in civilization8 is hereconsidered as being the most important cause of error. This will bediscussed later.

Looking at his criticism as a whole, one should bear in mind VincentMonteil's words that Ibn Khaldun is about a half century in advance of the

European humanists of the Renaissance to whom one generally attributes- with the Declamatio de Orenzo Valla, in 1440 - the merit of havingfounded the modern historical criticism. (Monteil, 1967, p. 340)

Ibn Khaldun illustrates his critics by mentioning different stories under theexpressive title: "The excellence of historiography; an appreciation of thevarious approaches to history; a glimpse of the different kinds of errorsto which historians are liable; why these errors occur?" (I, p. 8-55 A; p.15-

68 E)

The historical records criticized under this title are arranged depending ontheir contents, but also according to principles of priority based on IbnKhaldun's theory of thinking, i.e. the differentiating intellect, to theexperimental intellect and the theoretical intellect:

1. Records which are of general acceptance but where historicity isaffected by errors and fantasy. These are differentiated fromothers.

2. Records of false stories, which could not be considered as havingto do with history at all. There are proven to be false by referenceto recognised historical relics and traditions.

3. Other erroneous stories caused mainly by ignorance of theimportant and implicit principle of change. These are theoreticallyweak having not being able to consider the "Law of Change".

These are the documents selected, classified and estimated necessary byIbn Khaldun for the illustration of his method of analysis. A carefulcontent analysis of these stories would not only enlighten Ibn Khaldun'stheory of thinking which he uses as methodological tool, but alsoenlighten his method of analyses as illustrated in the steps of figure IV(See figure 5).

When confronted with a dubious piece of information, Ibn Khaldun usedto pose himself the question of the reliability or the unreliability of thematter. He always stats his hypothesis at the beginning of the relevantdiscussion, followed by proofs and argumentations as could be seenthroughout the sections of the Muqaddimah.

[76] Under the title previously mentioned, Ibn Khaldun says thatscholars accepted events and reported stories in their transmitted formand without regard for their value: "They did not check such events andreported stories against the constitutive principles underlying them 9, nordid they compare them with similar material 10; also, they did not probemore deeply with the yardstick of philosophy 11, with the help ofknowledge of the true nature (or attitude) of what exists in civilization 12,and with the help of speculation and critical insight 13 in (historical)information." (I, p. 8-9 A; p. 16 E)

It is not necessary to be more precise and clear than what is expressedin the citation above. It is illuminating to read and reread the passageabove and to reflect on its implication. This is in fact the key citation forunderstanding Ibn Khaldun s method of analysis. It consists of fivesteps:

1. To check events and reported stories against the constitutiveprinciples underlying them

2. To compare events and reported stories with similar material

3. To probe more deeply with the yardstick of philosophy, i.e. logic

4. To probe more deeply with the help of knowledge of the truenature (or attitude) of what exists in civilization

5. To probe more deeply with the help of speculation and criticalinsight

Ibn Khaldun does not tell us how to check events, how to compare orhow to probe. He does not describe his steps of analysis the way we dotoday. He gives us instead examples and cases where thesemethodological principles are embodied. It is therefore our task tounderstand these principles in their contexts, envisage their differentapplications and then deduce their methodological outline for further use.

1.3.1 The first step: To check events and reported storiesagainst the constitutive principles underlying them.

This is the most important step of Ibn Khaldun's method of analysis. It isthe base upon which his methodology is built and his new science isstructured. The explanation of this step is to be found in the expression"constitutive principles" 14. What exactly does this term means?Etymologically, the word means: the origin, the prime of a thing, theprincipal, purest, best, the choicest part thereof.

[77] In another citation we find that Ibn Khaldun criticizes historians whopresent their information as "...knowledge that must be consideredignorance, because it is unknown how much of it is extraneous and whatis genuine." Therefore, continues Ibn Khaldun, "...their informationconcerns happenings 15 the origins of which are not known. It concernsspecies the genera of which are not taken into consideration and whose(specific) differences are not verified." (I, p. 4 A; p. 9 E)

The word 'uṣūl in the above citation refers to two parts: inherentprinciples and extraneous principles.

In a citation to appear later (I, p. 57 A; p. 73 E), Ibn Khaldun gives atwofold definition of the phenomenon to be analysed. These two parts ofthe term 'us&middto;ūl are as illustrated here:

'uṣūlPrinciples

'uṣūl ḏātiyyah

Essential inherentprinciples

'uṣūl ‛arḍiyyah

Essential extraneousprinciples

Figure I

Each phenomenon therefore has two sides. The first constitutes thephenomenon in itself, i.e. as seen through its essential inherentprinciples. The second constitutes the phenomenon as seen through itsessential extraneous principles, i.e. through principles which areattributed to it.

Suppose, now, that we want to analyse or verify a phenomenon called A.

We would first discuss the phenomenon "A" as an isolated matter, withoutconsidering its interaction with any context whatsoever.

Second, we [78] would analyse the phenomenon "A" within its propercontext.

The following figures illustrates both steps:

Step 1a: analysis of the phenomenon's essential inherent factors.

Essensial inherent factorsA.Magid Al-Araki 1983

It is when we displace a phenomenon and take it outside its context thatwe manage to define the essential principles that underline it or areproper to it. In this phase of analyses we should not occupy ourselveswith the extraneous principles underlying the phenomenon in question.

Step 1b: analysis of the phenomenon in relation to essential extraneousfactors.

Essensial extraneous factorsA.Magid Al-Araki 1983

It is when we replace the phenomenon or place it back in the contextwhere it belongs that we start revealing the extraneous principles. It ishere that analysis becomes interesting. It is here that truth and falsehoodcan be generated according to Ibn Khaldun.

The differentiation above between the parts of a phenomenon into "thething in itself" and "the thing in its context" is as old as philosophy itself.We will not discuss this here.

Step 1a above conveys a "primitive" type of knowledge, in the sense thatit does not necessitate anything more than judging every kind of situationby its innate particularities, while disregarding everything extraneous. Insuch situations, says Ibn Khaldun, a person's judgement "...is notinflected with analogy and generalization. Most of his speculation stops atmatters perceivable by the senses and he does not go beyond them in hismind." (III, p. 269 A; p. 310 E)

[79] In step 1a the object of study is analysed based on «al-'uṣūl al-ḏātiyyah», i.e. the essential factors underlying the object. The onlycondition here is that one's choice should appear as plausible as possible.

This is a kind of definition that permits the researcher to limit preciselywhat he or she intends to analyse or to study. It is not a contextualdefinition and alone not sufficient for formulation of hypothesis. Itdepends on perception by the use of the senses. To use one's perceptionand judgement depends certainly also on one's earlier acquirements. Buthere the question is to concentrate on the "thing in itself" as thefundament for further study.

Ibn Khaldun means that among the things that are harmful to the humanquest for knowledge is the large variety of technical terminology neededfor purposes of instruction. (III, p. 248 A; p. 288 E) It is sufficient here tobring in mind the complexity of terminology of our time and itspedagogical implications. Ibn Khaldun had to invent new concepts so asto explain his science of al-‛umrān. Most of them are dichotomous. Theyhave an inherent meaning that conveys commonly accepted ideas whenperceived isolated. But they also express specific ideas when in constructform. Thus the concept of «al-‛umrān» expresses the idea of social

prosperity when it stands alone. But when composed with ordinalnumbers, as for instance, «al-‛umrān al-awwal», i.e. the first phase ofgrowth, it becomes a contextual tool of measurement.

Step 1b, i.e. analysis of the phenomenon in relation to essentialextraneous factors, refers to factors that originate from the context wherethe phenomenon exists or manifest itself, contrary to the preceding step.

A context can offer an innumerable group of variables. If we within acertain context suffice ourselves with only four main categories ofvariables, this could lead to an enormous ramification or chain ofvariables. Not all variables under a certain category are directly relevantto the phenomenon under analysis. A precise selection of factors istherefore the most essential thing to do, whenever well-tailoredinvestigations are necessary.

To appreciate the importance of this selection, it would be sufficient hereto use the khaldunian categories of contextual variables called "aḥwāl"(«donditions»} (see note 1). Depending on the richness of the context inquestion, numerous variables could be revealed under each category.

Ramification of contextual variablesA.Magid Al-Araki 1983

[80] The power of analysis lies in being able to choose correctly amongthe variables that constitute the context of the phenomenon under study.One must limit oneself to the most relevant and significant factorsunderlying the phenomenon under study. The selection of such factors

must in all cases, be predetermined in order to limit investigation.

On the other hand, the order of things is also important, even though itdiffers from person to person. It is a curious fact that people in their dailylive understand the relation of dependency between things. But wheneverone talks about dependency among variables, it becomes difficult forsome to think it out rationally. This is may be because dependencyamong things in daily live is easy to perceive because simplified byfactual happenings.

When dependency among variables has to be deduced theoretically, thepossibilities are numerous and complicated. One has therefore to reason,decide and choose the order of things or the dependency among them. Bydoing so one simulates factual happenings.

Ibn Khaldun says: "...thinking perceives the order that exists among thethings that come into being either by nature or through arbitraryarrangement. When thinking intends to create something, it must, for thesake of the order that exists among the things that come into being,understand the reason or causes of that thing, or the conditionsgoverning it." 36 (II, p. 366 A; p. 414 E)

Reason, causes and conditions are the principles (mabādi') that help todetermine the length of the causal chain. Ibn Khaldun continues sayingthat some people are able to establish a causal nexus for two or threelevels. Some are not able to go beyond that. Others may reach five orsix. (II, p. 367 A; p. 416 E) He goes on to say "...when man, in his thinking,has reached the last principle on two, three, or more levels, and startsthe action that will bring the (planned) thing into existence, he will startwith the last principle that has been reached by his thinking. Thus, thatlast principle will be the beginning of action. He, then, will follow thingsup to the last element in the causal chain that had been the starting pointof his thinking activity." (II, p. 366 A; p. 414 E)

Borrowing an Aristotelian example that illustrates this order of things, IbnKhaldun says "...if a man thinks of bringing into existence a roof toshelter him, he will progress in his mind (from the roof) to the wallsupporting the roof, and then to [81] the foundation upon which the wallstands. Here, his thinking will end, and he will then start to work on thefoundation, then (go on to) the wall, and then (to) the roof, with whichhis action will end. This is what is meant by the saying: 'The beginning ofaction is the end of thinking, and the beginning of thinking is the end ofaction.'" (II, p. 366 A; p. 414-415 E) In other words, theory and practice arecarried out in opposite direction. It is in this way that the arrangement ofthings, as a specific thinking phenomenon is important to Ibn Khaldun.

The question which here presents itself is that of the nature of the itemto be analysed. Ibn Khaldun believes that even though a social orhistorical phenomenon does not possess fixed attributes (as in physics),one could let it simulate them. Care should therefore be taken to singleout such attributes and, when analysing, make them as far as possible

figure as indisputable.

Once both inherent and extraneous constitutive principles ('us&middto;ūl)are selected and decided upon as in Figure III above (step 1a + 1b), theother steps of the procedure follows as in figure IV below.

Figure IV: Procedure and steps of analysisA.Magid Al-Araki 1983

1.3.2. The second step: To compare events and reportedstories with similar material

After exposing the phenomenon under study to its constitutive principles(step 1a + step1b), one should compare the phenomenon or theassumptions underlying it to similar materials.

Analogical comparison, or comparison with similar material,275 shouldprimarily be used to compare related and familiar events. When utilizedwith non-parallel events, for instance, one from the past and the otherfrom the present, it could also give explanation and clarity. Ibn Khaldunconcludes one of his reports saying: «Comparison with observable presentday and well-known nearby facts proves the assumption and report to beuntrue.» (I, p. 11 A; p. 19 E)

Comparison reveals similarities and differences between compared items.This may lead to further investigation that [83] clarifies the causesbehind similarities and differences and justifies or discredits the item

analysed. In so doing theories and general laws may be discovered.

The scholar must therefore "...compare similarities or differences betweenthe present and the past (or distantly located) conditions. He must knowthe causes of the similarities in certain cases and of the differences inothers" (I, p. 43 A; p. 56 E)

Data gathered from step 1 and step 2 can be made more comprehensiblethrough the use of matrixes that visualize possible combinations andpermit a multiplicity of relations and impacts. Ibn Khaldun was familiarwith such matrixes as helping techniques.

He says: "It is obvious that it is from the reciprocal relation (al-tanāsub)existing among the data that one finds out the unknown from the known.This, however, applies only to events occurring in the world of existence23 or in science." (I, p. 219 A; p. 245 E)

The matrixes Ibn Khaldun used were based on different geometricalfigures: "They may be of one dimension - the line; of two dimensions -the plane- or of three dimensions -the mathematical solid. Thesemeasurements and what is set forth regarding them 38, either bythemselves or in combination with each other 39, are what is studied ingeometry." (III, p. 87-88 A; p. 112 E)

He further says that "Geometry enlightens the intellect and sets one'smind right. All its proofs are very clear and orderly. It is hardly possiblefor errors to enter into geometrical reasoning, because it is well arrangedand orderly. Thus, the mind that constantly allies itself to geometry is notlikely to fall into error. In this convenient way, the person who knowsgeometry acquires intelligence." (III, p. 102 A; p. 130-131 E)

The use of such matrixes for the juxtaposition or combination of differentfactors and variables make easier the discovery of existing relations.

[84] However, such manipulation of data depends on speculation andinsight and can best be allied to "reliable" information. Would it not thenbe unsuitable when applied to distantly located conditions in the past?

Ibn Khaldun is not against manipulation of data, provided they help tosecure us clarity and discovery of hidden arguments. He says that aperson should look at his sources and rely upon himself. With a clearmind and straightforward, natural common sense, he should distinguishbetween the nature of the possible and the impossible. Everything withinthe sphere of the possible should be accepted, and everything outside itshould be rejected.

Further he says: "We do not have in mind 'possible' in the absolute senseof what is intellectually possible. That covers a very wide range, so that itcannot be used to determine what is possible in actual fact. What wehave in mind is the possibility inherent in the matter that belongs to agiven thing. (I, p. 329 A; p. 371-372 E)

This brings to mind Descartes Discourse de la Method (1637), where hesays: "N'admettre aucune chose pour vraie que je ne la connusseévidemment être telle."

Ibn Khaldun says: "When we study the origin of a thing, its genus,specific differences, size, and strength, we can draw conclusions as to thepossibility or impossibility of the data in connection with it. We adjudge 16

to be impossible everything outside the sphere of the possible, in thissense." (I, p. 329 A; p. 371-372 E)

1.3.3. The third step:To probe more deeply with the yardstickof philosophy 11

Verification with the yardstick of philosophy (logic) also applies to thepreceding steps. Here, it stands as an independent technique greatlyrelied upon for refuting doubt. The term "al-sabr" means "to probe moredeeply".

[85]yardstick of philosophy refers to logical principles, argumentationsand mental verifications that confirm the conclusion reached by thesubsequent steps. (The term "yardstick" is also encountered as being oneof the appellations used for logic in the influential and widespreadwritings of al-Ghazali (1058-1111)

Logic, according to Ibn Khaldun should reveal knowledge about the realworld, and therefore is mainly useful as a methodological tool.

Among the intellectual sciences mentioned in the Muqaddimah logic takesthe first place. Then comes mathematics, which begins with arithmetic,followed in succession by geometry, astronomy and music. Thereaftercome physics and finally metaphysics. Our author says that logic is "...ascience protecting the mind from error in the process of evolvingunknown facts one wants to know from the available, known facts. (III, p.

87 A; p. 111 E) Further, he maintains that the use of logic enables one todistinguish right from wrong in the "...study of the essential andaccidental perceptions and apperceptions."42 (III, p. 108 A; p. 137 E)

The somewhat obscure and unverified awareness, attained by the help oftasawwurāt perception, becomes clearer when reach I the state ofapperception. 41 This is why it is necessary to probe more deeply with theyardstick of philosophy Because the science of logic, says Ibn Khaldun,concerns "...the norms enabling a person to distinguish between right andwrong, both in definitions that give information about the essence ofthins, and in arguments that assure apperception." (III, p. 101 A; p. 137 E)

The study of logic was widespread in the Islamic World. In its early phaseof development it was distinguished from the philosophical sciences as"...a norm and yardstick for arguments and served to probe the

arguments of the (philosophical sciences) as well as those of allother(disciplines)." (III, p. 41 A; p. 51 E)

[86]

Ibn Khaldun says: "As far as we know, this science has only a singleadvantage, namely, it sharpens the mind in the orderly presentation ofproofs and arguments, so that the habit of excellent and correct arguingis obtained." (III, p. 219-220 A; p. 257 E) He considers logic as a science anda tool of argumentation. He does not accept the formal Aristotalian logic,which was adopted by other Muslim thinkers. Ibn Khaldun "...rejects thebasic presuppositions of the Muslim neoplatonists, essentially al-Farabiand Ibn Sina, on religious grounds. Their doctrines of emanation, theirontology, their theory of knowledge, and their theory of human felicityare entirely groundless.... insofar as they fly in the face of empiricalevidence, which should guide us in our search for knowledge." (Heyes,1976, p. 61-62).

however, logic cannot be completely trusted to prevent the commission oferrors, "...because it is too abstract and remote from the sensibilia. 43

Logic considers the secondary intelligibilia 44. It is possible that materialthings contain something that does not admit of logical conclusions andcontradicts them, when one looks for unequivocal truth and conformity 45

between them and the facts of the outside world. It is different withspeculation about the primary intelligibilia 17, which is less abstract. Theyare matters of the imagination and pictures of the sensibilia. They retain(certain features of the sensibilia) and permit verification of theconformity of (the sensibilia to the primary intelligibilia) " (III, p. 270 A; p.

310 E)

The application of logic, in our analysis, helps in sharpening thearguments and conclusions previously reached. But since logic cannot becompletely trusted, we then have to concretise our analysis andargumentations. In other words, we must look for unequivocal conformitybetween our theoretical findings and the facts of the outside world.

[87]

1.3.4. The fourth step: To probe more deeply with the help ofknowledge of the true nature (or attitudes) of what exists incivilization12

Acquirement of a specific type of knowledge stands here as amethodological tool. The term "true nature" means 18 natural dispositions,particular quality, either by creation or by habit. In the khaldunianterminology, it refers to something persuasive, plausible, credible or wellgrounded that it can be taken as "natural".

The expression "what exists in civilization" or the created things, is awide and general term which refers to all what exists in the world of

creation, Ibn Khaldun himself defines this terms and says: "It should beknown that the world of existent things 19 comprises pure essence 20,such as the elements 21, the things resulting from their influence, and thethree things that come into being from the elements namely, minerals,plants, and animals." 22 [Animals here includes both human and otherbeings].

Ibn Khaldun says further that the world of existent things comprises also"...actions proceeding from living beings, that happen through theirintentions, and are connected with the power that God has given them.Some of their actions are well arranged and orderly. Such are humanactions. Others are not well arranged and orderly. They are the actions ofliving beings other than Man" (II, p. 365 A; p. 414 E) [compare this to hisdualistic definition of the even, phenomenon or action p. 91 below]

The further implication of the term "al-kā'ināt" ("what exists incivilization"), reveals that the term envelopes two main categories ofoccurrences in society:The first has to do with events 23 (I, p. 219 A; p. 245 E)The second has to do with customs and conditions 24. Customs refer toway of [88] life, character qualities, religious schools, sects and the like;whereas conditions refer to the socio-economic, political and secularcultural manifestations. A composite term for the two categories ofoccurrences is: 46 events and conditions in the world of existence andtheir requirements. (I, p. 56-61 A; p. 71-77 E)

When Ibn Khaldun says that one has to know the true nature of whatexists in civilization, he means that one must know the realities of things25 or perceive (or picture) the existence as it is, 26 (II, p. 365 A; p. 413 E),both with its events, customs and conditions.

How do we attain such a well-reasoned and structured knowledge ofsocial occurrences? Either we acquire this from other sources (such as forinstance Ibn Khaldun's science of civilization), or we reconstruct it fromour own observations, surveys or measurements. In both cases obtainingsuch knowledge enables us to concretise our theoretical analysis bymaking it conform to reality.

1.3.4.1.The criterion of conformity

Ibn Khaldun underlines that to establish the truth and soundness ofinformation about factual happenings, our analysis has to conform withreality.

Knowledge about events, customs, and conditions in civilization 12

composes our only real "cadre de réference" by the help of which wequestion conformity.

The criterion of conformity is a key principle in the methodology of Ibn

Khaldun. He says: "...to establish the truth and soundness of informationabout factual happenings a requirement to consider is the conformity." 28

[89] The scholar therefore has to be armed with practical plausibleknowledge about the facts of the outside world in order to considerconformity in his writings. Ibn Khaldun says further that this criterion ofconformity is more important than, and has priority over, personalitycriticism 27, because: "...the utility of the factual happening can bederived from it, itself, and from external evidence by checking theconformity." 28(I, p. 61 A; p. 76-77 E)

It is possible that sometimes the analysis of some phenomena or certaininformation will not conform to the facts of the outside world becauseconformity has its proof mainly through observation and study of existentthings.

1.3.4.2. From constitutive principles to the true nature of things

Once the analysis of the constitutive principles 14 underlying thedichotomously defined phenomenon has reached a certain degree ofanalysis and verification, the terminology of Ibn Khaldun changesaccordingly in search of conformity with reality. The analysis proceedsfrom constitutive principles to true nature or attitude of things.12

The true nature or attitude of things refers to two types of principles.Inherent, or essential principles 29 and arbitrary, or contextual principles30. This means that the dichotomously conceived phenomenon, whenperceived through the preceding steps of analysis, should result in theknowledge of the true nature 12 underlying the phenomenon, i.e. findingout its factual principles.

The distinction between "constitutive principles" and "factual conclusions"is primordial for understanding Ibn Khaldun's thoughts throughout thewhole Muqaddimah. The factual and plausible knowledge underlying acertain phenomenon is a function of the analysis of the constitutiveprinciples that earlier were deduced as and agreed upon as pertaining tothat phenomenon.

[90] In the Muqaddimah one reads several times that one of the reasonshistorians were not capable of reliable interpretations is that they had noknowledge of the true nature of what exists in civilization.

The following story is an example: Ibn Khaldun says: "Genealogists whohad no knowledge of the true nature of existent things 12 imagined thatNegroes were the children of Ham, the son of Noah, and that they weresingled out to be black as the result of Noah's curse, which producedHam's colour and the slavery God inflicted upon his descendants." (I, p.

151 A; p. 169-170 E)

This curse of Noah did not permit the genealogists to find other

explanations. Ibn Khaldun says that if those scholars had knowledge ofthe true nature of existent things, they would not have dared to assumethat Negroes were the children of Ham. He says further: "To attribute theblackness of the Negroes to Ham, reveals disregard of the true nature ofheat and cold 31 and of the influence they exercise upon the climate andupon the creatures that come into being in it." (I, p. 151 A; p. 169-170 E)Here both the heat and cold, as essential extraneous factors, determinethe color of the skin. The influence of the climate as observed throughcolour was not connected to genetic factors, or inherent factors, in spiteof Ibn Khaldun's knowledge of genealogy. However, Ibn Khaldun does notmake race the unique determinant of colour in line with modernanthropological thoughts.

We notice here that to have knowledge of the true nature of existentthings stands as a methodological tool. This also means that the concept[91] of true nature or natural disposition 18 is of many shades,depending on the nature of each phenomenon to be analysed. Wheninvestigating each phenomenon, we should discover its "natural"particularities. Hence, there is, according to Ibn Khaldun, true nature orattitude of the state 32; true nature or attitude of various conditionsarising in civilization 12; the true nature of heat and cold 31 and theMuqaddimah does not fall short of such terms.

It is important in this connection to examine carefully Ibn Khaldun'sdissection of the event or phenomenon to be analysed in the followingdefinition. He says: «Every event (or phenomenon), whether it comesinto being in connection with some essence or as the result of an action33, must inevitably possess a true nature (or attitude) peculiar to itsessence 34 as well as to the accidental conditions that may attachthemselves to it»35.(I, p. 57 A; p. 169-73 E) (Cf.. step No. 4 above wherethis dualism is detailed.)

The term event or phenomenon in the above definition refers toeverything which is existent and which earlier was non-existent. It iscomposed of two things: the self, both corporal and non-corporal, as wellas the action or the doing. Events or phenomena can therefore eitheroriginate from the world of essence or the world of action, and in bothcases each has its particular nature (or attitude).

An important thing when conforming our findings with what exists in thereal world, is to notice that conditions are in continuous change and newrealities 18 thus born should be taken into considerations when looking forthe true nature of what exists in civilization.

1.3.4.3 From micro- to macro-consciousness

Ibn Khaldun considers research and consciousness a continuous dialecticalprocesse from which information is gradually accumulated and from whichthe art of correct argumentation is obtained.

The resultant "micro-outcome" illustrated in Figgure IV p. 82 denotesconclusions based on the analysis of a single [92] phenomenon. Thismicro-outcome should constitute our knowledge of the true nature of thatphenomenon; the reasons, the true causes and conditions behind it, orthe true 'us&middto;ūl thereof.

Information accumulated from the analysis of different phenomena could,by an inductive method, be further structured in a similarly well-reasonedway. This would permit the development from the level of knowledge ofthe particular to the general, i. e. the stage that permits us to haveknowledge of the true nature or attitude of "all" what exists in civilization.In figure IV, this is called the "macro-consciousness". It is, in fact, thesum of all the micro-consciousness that may be expressed by thefollowing "inductive" formula:

A.Magid Al-Araki 1983

This formula symbolises the attitude of Composing ones own theories andlaws, while renewing or actualising old ones. This would be the case whenknowledge about 12 the true nature or attitude of what exists incivilization is available but unstructured, or when it is completelyunavailable.

1 3 4 4. The true nature 12 of what exists incivilization: Principal part of the new science ofcivilization. 1

The concept of "the true nature of what exists in civilization" in step 4 offigure IV, p. 82, referes to analysis that conform to reality. It is alsoconceived at the beginning of the same diagram as part of "Ibn Khaldun'sscience of civilization". At this stage the science serves as a backgroundfor analysis, in the sense that the reasoned and analysed [93]information it furnishes can be conceived as true nature12. The "the truenature of what exists in civilization" is the final target of any analysis.One of the main tasks behind the khaldunian science of civilization is todiscover the reality of existent things 12 based on the study of theconstitutive principles 14 that underline happenings, events andphenomena

Ibn Khaldun mentions, in addition to the totality of his science ofcivilization, a sort of a general media or paradigm of constitutiveprinciples on which one can base analysis. Of the general body ofinformation included in the new science of civilization, the most importantis what concerns the true nature of existent things.

As previously mentioned, knowledge about the true nature of what existsin civilization envelopes all customs and conditions in society. Conditionsrefer to the four most fundamental aspects of society: the political, thetwo economical aspects (earnings and profit) and the aspect of activities(handcrafts) as well as the cultural aspect.

This typology of political and socio-economic media that constitutes theessence of the integrity of the Khaldunian science of civilization, iscomparable to media proposed by modern authors like Talcot Parsonsand Niklas Luhmann (Cf. Chernilo, 2002). Though Ibn Khaldun does notexplicitly call them media or paradigm of differentiation. They representthe main model on which he based his rediscovery of old constitutiveprinciples or the deduction of new ones when analysing differentphenomena.

1.3.4.5. Inverse function

To discover anew the endogenous and exogenous principles 14 whichearlier had been used in certain analysis is what we may call the inversefunction. This means that consciousness of earlier plausible findings or 18-true nature of things - when concerning a phenomenon analysed earlieryield new information and ideas. Deduction of the plausible analyticalfindings of an earlier phenomenon may underlie or be similar to those ofthe new phenomenon we are interested in.

[94] Since consciousness, as conceived in p. 92, results from theanalysis of the constitutive principles underlying a certain phenomena,

then the deduction of the principles of an earlier phenomenon (xi) is afunction of the understanding of these analytical findings - true nature ofthings - in their generality, and those of a newer phenomenon in

particular, (yi) as could be seen from the figure on page 82, and thefollowing illustration: Figure V

A.Magid Al-Araki 1983

The deduction of the indigenous and exogenous factors particular to acertain phenomenon can furnish us with "historical" data. This data, whenwe intend to renew it, use it for comparison or other research purposes,would necessitate the discovery of similar and comparable data from the

core of the present. Our study, which may result in other micro-outcomes, could therefore secure us new types of awareness

The fourth step (to probe more deeply with the help of knowledge of thetrue nature or attitude of what exists in civilization) is the most importantstep or the core of the methodology of Ibn Khaldun.

1.3.5 The fifth step: To probe more deeply with the help ofspeculation and critical insight 13

This is a general attitude of research. In the procedure of figure IV, p.82,we call it the "continuous empirical theoretical" attitude. This attitude ofresearch is both a continuous and a final one. Continuous in the sensethat it is relevant before and during [95] all the steps of the procedure ofanalysis of figure IV; and final because its importance increases duringthe last stage of the procedure. Before and during analysis it allows us tojudge the quality of the information we receive, or deduce from it thefacts we need, for instance the underlying constitutive principles. Herelies its importance. By the end of the procedure, it stands however as anattitude which leads to the formulation of hypothesis, theories or finalconclusions as to the event or phenomenon under study.

To understand what speculation and critical insight could mean, we willdiscuss. The human mind, as conceived by Ibn Khaldun, is supposed toundertake such mental procedures. This discussion will, on the otherhand, confirm some of what is said in the preceding steps.

In chapter VI, section 1 of the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun says that manis distinguished from other animals by his ability to think. He says furtherthat perception and consciousness "... is an awareness, finding place inthe innate of the person who perceives, of things that are outside hisessence." 48 (II, p. 364 A; p. 411 E) Further he says: "This is somethingpeculiar to living being 49 to the exclusion of all other beings and existentthings 50.... Man has this advantage over the other beings that he mayperceive things outside his essence through his ability to think (al-fikr),which is something beyond his senses." (II, p. 364 A; p. 411-412 E) Afterthis, he defines the ability to think and says that "It is the result of(special) power placed in the cavities of his (man's) brain, With the helpof these powers, man takes the pictures of the sensibilia, applies his mindto them, and thus abstracts from them other pictures. The ability to thinkis the occupation with pictures that are beyond sense perception, and theapplication of the mind to them for analysis (or deductions andsynthesis)." 51 (II, p. 364 A; p. 412 E) But Ibn Khaldun does not agree thatthis [96] ability to think be applied to theological or metaphysicalmatters.

The ability to think is divided by Ibn Khaldun into three intellectualdegrees, each one leading to a higher stage. He says: The first degree isman's intellectual understanding of the things that exist in the outside

world in a natural or arbitrary order, so that he may try to arrange themwith the help of his Own power. This kind of thinking mostly consists ofperceptions. 40 "It is the Discerning Intellect, 52 with the help of whichman obtains the things that are useful for him and his livelihood, andrepels the things that are harmful to him." He continues saying that thesecond degree of intellect "... is the ability to think which provides manwith the ideas and the behaviour needed in dealing with his fellow menand in leading them. It mostly conveys apperception, 41 which areobtained one by one through experience, until they have become reallyuseful. This is called the Experimental Intellect" 53 (II, p. 464-465 A; p. 412-

413 E)

In the third place comes the theoretical or speculative intellect 54 whichIbn Khaldun claims to represent: "...the ability to think 55 which providesthe knowledge 6, or hypothetical knowledge56 of an object or a finding 57

beyond sense perception 58 without a practical activity going with it. Thisis the speculative intellect 54. It consists of both perceptions 40 andapperceptions 41 which are arranged according to a special order,following special conditions 59, and thus provide some other knowledge ofthe same kind, that is, either perceptive or apperceptive 60.

Then, they are again combined with something else, and again providesome other knowledge. The end of the process is to be provided with theperception of existence as it is 26, with its various genera, differences,reasons, and causes 61.

By thinking about [[97] ] these things, man achieves perfection in hisreality and becomes pure intellect 62, and perceptive soul 63. This is themeaning of human reality." 64 (II, p. 365 A; p. 413 E)

The third degree, i.e. the speculative or theoretical intellect, concordswith the inner logic of the procedure of analysis (cf. figure IV above). Itis, in fact, a combination of the first and second degrees of intellect, asrevealed by the expressions "perceptions and apperceptions", mentionedabove. The theoretical intellect implies the use of a special arrangementand the respect of certain conditions, on an ascendant and combinatorylevel. Thus higher and better conclusions than those reached through thefirst and second degrees of intellect are ascertained. The goal of thespeculative intellect is to provide us with the perception of existence as itis, with its various genera, differences, reasons and causes. It should leadto a kind of "complete" consciousness of human reality. This is an activeconsciousness obtained mainly from practical research and theoreticaldialogue.

When describing this third degree of intellect as a higher combination ofthe two others, we discover that Ibn Khaldun, in his methodologicalteachings, refutes the pure theoretical intellect. To him, writing, which ismainly the task of the third degree of intellect, is counted as one of thecrafts; because it should also develop through contact with actualconditions in society. He says that the transformation of the rational soul"...from potentiality into actuality is effected first by new sciences and

perceptions derived from the sensibilia, and then by the later acquisition(of knowledge) through the speculative power." 81 (II, p. 362 A; p. 406 E)Later he says that the writer "...always goes from one symbol to another,as long as he is wrapped up in writing, and the soul becomes used to theconstant (repetition of the process). Thus, the soul acquires the habit ofgoing over from the symbols to the things meant by them 295. This iswhat is meant [98] by intellectual speculation, by means of which theknowledge of hitherto unknown sciences is provided. As the result ofbeing accustomed to this process people acquire the habit of intellection,which constitutes an increase in intelligence and provides an additioninsight into affairs and a shrewd understanding of them." (II, p. 363 A; p.

407 E)

Ibn Khaldun ascribes the pure theoretical intellect 62 to scholars whomake their universal ideas conform, only in their minds, to the facts ofthe outside world. Thus, they do not permit the facts of the outside worldto participate in the formulation of their theories and conclusions. He saysthat "All their conclusions and views continue to be something in themind. They come to conform to the facts of the outside world 28 onlyafter research and speculation has come to an end, or they may nevercome to conform to them." (III, p. 268 A; p. 309 E) [cf also (III, p. 214 A; p.

251 E) for his criticism of the philosophers]

He Continues differentiating between the facts of the outside world andthose in the mind: "The facts of the outside world are merely specialcases of the (ideas) in the mind. For instance, the religious laws arespecial cases derived from the well-known (texts) of the Qur'ān and theSunnah. In their case, one expects the facts of the outside world toconform to them, in contrast with the intellectual sciences, where, to(prove) the soundness of views, one expects those views to conform tothe facts of the outside World." (III, p. 268 A; p. 309 E) Here Ibn Khaldunclearly distinguishes between intellectual and religious matters.

The three degrees of intellect discussed above, i.e. the discerning, theexperimental and, the speculative intellect, permit us to appreciate thetype and limits of the attitude of speculation and critical insight 13 whichIbn Khaldun recommends as the fifth step of the procedure of figure IV,p. 82. It is a continuous empiric-theoretical attitude of research.

[99] The procedure of analysis of figure IV above is composed of fivesteps: To check events and reported stories against the constitutiveprinciples underlying them; to compare events and reported stories withsimilar material; to probe more deeply with the yardstick of philosophy orlogic; to probe more deeply with the help of knowledge of the true natureor attitude of what exists in civilization; and, to probe more deeply withthe help of speculation and critical insight.

It should be obvious that the first twofold step is here intensified fromone phase of analysis to the other. The term "constitutive principles" 14,

which underlines the dichotomy of the first step is therefore composed ofessential inherent principles 29 and contextual 30 or essential extraneousprinciples. This being so, the remaining steps of the procedure intensifythe analysis and provide the fundamentals of a methodological discipline.Furthermore, the order of these four steps is optional.

It is worth noticing that the term "constitutive principles" is a generalterm. Similar terms that are encountered in other places of theMuqaddimah differ from the general term by their degree of precisionbeing the end-product of analysis. Hence, the terms "matters" 65, "rules"66 or "beginnings" 67 that express nuances in accordance with thequiddity of the item analysed and the certainty of analysis.

When Ibn Khaldun analysis the causes of superiority in wars, weencounter the application of his important dichotomy regarding theconcept of "constitutive principles" 14.

He says that there is no certainty of victory in war, ever when theequipment and the numerical (superiority) that causes victory exist.Victory and superiority in war come from luck and chance. "This explainedby the fact that the causes of superiority are, as a rule, a combination ofseveral factors There are external factors 68, such as the number of bravemen, (skilful) arrangement of the line formation, the proper tactics, andsimilar things. Then, there are hidden factors 69. These may be the[100] result of human trickery, such as spreading alarming news andrumours to cause defections (in the ranks of the enemy); occupying highpoints, so that one is able to attack from above, which surmises thosebelow and causes them to abandon each other; hiding in thickets ordepressions and concealing on self from the enemy in rocky terrain, sothat the armies (of ones own side) suddenly appear when (the enemy) isin a precarious situation and he must then flee to safety (instead ofdefending himself), and similar things..." (II, p. 76 A; p. 85-86 E)

Here the dichotomy is between the extraneous factors and the hiddenfactors. The different Arabic terms - as opposed to the term "constitutiveprinciples", are here subtly distinguishable depending on the character ofthe phenomenon discussed and the outcome of analysis.

It should be noticed that the dichotomous terminology of Ibn Khaldunbecomes distinguished, not only before and after the investigation hastaken place, but also in accordance with the nature of the analysedphenomenon's proximity to or distance from the ideal observable thing.

According to Ibn Khaldun, if one were not aware of the decomposition ofthe phenomenon to be analysed into its inherent and extraneous factors,one would misunderstand the methodological function of his new science.This could result in that one presents knowledge that may be consideredignorance.

"...the student, thus, has still to search for the beginnings of conditionsand their order of priority 260. He must himself investigate the reasons

why these conditions were interpreted as it appears, or the reasons whythe conditions succeeded each other. 261 He must search for a convincingexplanation as to the similarities or the interrelations between theseconditions." 262 (I, p. 5 A; p. 10 E)

When considering the first twofold step and its further analysis, one findsthat the criticism of a phenomenon is in itself a rational operation havingits proper dialectics. [101]

1.4 Originality of the method

At the time of Ibn Khaldun one method was predominant. This was themethod of personality criticism 27 used by Muslim Scholars both forreligious and worldly matters.

Aware of the misunderstanding that could arise regarding the field ofapplication of his new method of investigation, Ibn Khaldun compares anddistinguishes between the two methods. He characterizes the analysis byhis method as superior, in its field, to investigations that rely uponcriticism of the personalities of transmitters.

He says of personality criticism that it "...should not be resorted to until ithas been ascertained whether a specific piece of information is in itselfpossible, or not 70. If it is absurd, there is no use engaging in personalitycriticism." 27 (I, p. 60 A; p. 76 E) This limitation, says Ibn Khaldun, isbecause critical scholars of religious matters "...consider absurdityinherent in the literal meaning of the transmitted religious information ,or an interpretation not acceptable to the intellect, as something thatmakes such information suspect." (I, p. 60 A; p. 76 E)

Therefore "...personality criticism is taken into consideration only inconnection with the soundness (or lack of soundness) of Muslim religiousinformation. Because this religious information mostly concernsinjunctions (in accordance with which the lawgiver enjoined Muslims toact whenever it can be presumed that the information is genuine. Theway to achieve presumptive soundness is to ascertain the probity 71 andexactness of the transmitters." (I, p. 60-61 A; p. 76 E)

Ibn Khaldun underlines further and says that "...religious injunctions (al-inšāa') derives its utility only from itself," (I, p. 61 A; p. 76-77 E), 1.e.hastheir own inherent value, namely religious. [102]

When Ibn Khaldun criticizes the authority quoted by transmitters asunsuitable for purposes other than for religious information, he, in fact,breaks with the old epistemological tradition and proposes amethodological separation between the two different domains: thereligious and the worldly.

The method of personality criticism could normally not be applied until

information is acknowledged as being in itself possible or not. This makesacknowledgement a prior step to analysis. Here knowledge is byreference to faith, something which implies the interference of religiousauthorities.

The method of Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, has its proper field ofapplication: i.e. worldly matters. It applies the criterion of conformity toinvestigation.

Ibn Khaldun has borrowed the raw material for his method from thenatural sciences of his time, his dichotomous definition in particular.

The old logicians used to define the natural science as the science whichsearches in the body of the universe and in what this body becomesexposed to of conditions such as motion, motionlessness and change 72

(al-Ghazali (1058-1111) by Faris, 1974). There are two distinct phases inthis definition: The one which searches in the body of the universe assuch; and the second which searches in the conditions or the behaviourof this body, apart from its inherent qualities. Whether it is movedbecause movement is inherent in it, or it is moved because somethingelse causes its movement. [103]

Ibn Khaldun depends on a simple and easy to apply method. Aphenomenon is tested against many different criteria in a sincere trial tojustify or condemn it. Whenever possible, he does not hesitate to supporthis analysis with statistical or descriptive data. In this manner, heproduces a list of taxes collected in the 9th. century by the treasurer ofBaghdad, and undertakes demographic investigations and interviews. Heis thus able to discuss phenomena, such as fiscal fraud and shrinking ofobligations, both still current in today's society.

In this chapter we have seen that empirical data should be gathered andanalysed both deductively and inductively so that particularities ultimatelyreverts to generalities, all conceived on a spiral continūm.

The whole procedure of analysis and its implications point towards amethod of social sciences. The method has two qualities which areimportant for any investigation: The first is the necessity of having an"encyclopaedic knowledge". The second is the importance of possessing aspeculative mind and thoroughness. The latter has already beendiscussed in this chapter. The former, i.e. the Khaldunian concept ofknowledge, will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter one: keywords

Civilization al-cumrānFundamental aspects of civilizationConditions and customs.

ConditionsApperceptionConformityDiscerning intellectExperimental intellectKnowledgeLogicNature of thingsPerception

A complete copy of this research can be obtained from the Library of the University ofOslo, Faculty of Social Sciences, under ISBN 82-570-0743-9.