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CHAPTER- IV

INDIA'S DIASPORA POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE

TO MALAYSIAN INDIANS

India's Diaspora Policy: A Case Study oflndians in Malaysia Chapter-IV: India's Diaspora Policy With Special Reference to Malaysian Indians

CHAPTER-IV

INDIA'S DIASPORA POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MALAYSIAN INDIANS

The Indian Diaspora ranks third after the British and the Chinese Diaspora. People of

Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRis) are present in all parts of the

globe. While the history of the Indian Diaspora dates back to the pre-Christian era,

large-scale emigration of Indians took place mainly in the 19th and 20th centuries that

can be divided into four phases The colonial period witnessed unprecedented

emigration of indentured and other laborers, traders, professionals and employees of

the British government to the European (British, French and Dutch) colonies in Asia,

Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. However, it was only in the post-World

War II period that the most far-reaching emigration of Ihdians took place, mainly of

professionals, to the developed countries namely England, U.S.A., Canada, Australia

and New Zealand. The oil boom in the 1970s and 1980s saw millions of Indians

migrating to the Gulf and West Asian countries. In today's globalised world, Indians

in various sectors like IT, Medicine, and Trade are finding opportunities abroad,

which also include a large number of students seeking admission in developed

countries, thereby adding to the numbers of the Diaspora.

The chapter will recount the brief history of the Indian Diaspora and also trace· the

evolution of India's Diaspora policy. It examines the pre-modern period, the colonial

and pre-independence policies concerning Indian Diaspora. In order to understand

contemporary India's policy towards the Diaspora, a survey of the developments of

the Nehruvian Diaspora policy is undertaken. The aim is to analyse and explore

Nehru's effect on India's Diaspora policy, keeping in mind that India in the 21st

century has undergone tumultuous change. _In past six decades since independence,

Indian population has more than trebled and fresh energies and innovation have been

unleashed into what is acknowledged as India's success as a fast growing economy.

The chapter focuses on following broad themes; pre-modem period, colonial/British

period, India after Independence and the proactive period of cultivating the Diaspora

which began in the 1990s and continues. This chapter critically analyses the impact of

India's Diaspora policy on ethnic Indians in Malaysia. This chapter seeks to answer

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the following questions: What bearing has India's contemporary Diaspora policy had

on the Indian Diaspora in general and on Malaysian Indians in particular?; What is the

fallout of "India's Look-East Policy" on the Indian Diaspora in Malaysia?; and Does

India differentiate between the "old" and the "new" Diaspora in the sharp societal

cleavages in countries like Malaysia?

4.1.: Emigration in the Pre-Modern Period

Indians have had a long history of emigration to other parts of the worl& India's links

with Europe dates back to the lOth Century BC with ships moving between the mouth

of the river Indus and the Persian Gulf. The Old Testament records that ivory, apes

and peacocks were used for the decoration of the palaces and temples of King

Solomon. Even the Queen of Sheba 1 brought spices as gifts to King Solomon and the

pepper of the Malabar Coastwas known to ancient traders (Abraham 1993: 269).

Fifty years after Buddha's death (483 BC), his disciples went to the neighboring

countries to spread Buddhism and settled there. The Mauryan Empire spread through

the Indian sub-continent and North up to the Hindu-Kush Mountains. King Ashoka

(268-239 BC) embraced Buddhism and sent monks to Central and East Asia to spread

Buddhism. For the first time, entire South Asia, and beyond, was brought under the

influence of one unified political and religious system (Tinker 1990: 7). King

Kanishka (1st century AD) was another champion of Buddhism and during his rule .

Buddhism spread to southern India, Eastern Iran, Central Asia, China, Greece,

Kandahar (now in Afghanistan), and Southeast Asia (Motwani, Jyoti 1993: 33).

Indians settlements were in existence in north-eastern Africa at the time of Alexander

the Great (356-323 BC), when Alexander was advised by Aristotle to establish a

colony of Greeks in Sokotra Island off northeastern Africa. Alexander's army

conquered the island in which Indians were living (Pankhurst 1979). The famous

work Periplus of the Erythrean Sea (a 1st century Greek guide for sailors) mentions

that the Indian ships were arriving along the east African coast. Several Indian gold

1 Sheba was a southern kingdom mentioned in the Jewish scriptures (Old Testament) and the Qur'an. The actual location of the historical kingdom is disputed between southern Arabia and the Hom of Africa. The kingdom may have been situated in either present-day Ethiopia or present-day Yemen, or both.

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India's Diaspora Policy: A Case Study of Indians in Malaysia Chapter-IV: India's Diaspora Policy With Special Reference to Malaysian Indians

coins were found at Dabra Damma, dating from the 3rd century, established evidence

of the existence of trade relations between Ethiopia and India (Narayan 1998).

India had a long-standing mercantile connection with the world as a part of the

ancient network of the Indian Ocean. Geographical proximity facilitated by the

monsoon winds made India, for over two thousand years, a ·very important central

market for gold, ivory, and slaves and the most important source for cotton, cloth,

beads and sundry manufactured articles (Desai 1993: 118). The Greek also mentions

India's trade relations with Rome, Malay and China. Arikanedu in Tamil Nadu was a

Roman settlement where muslin was made for exports to Rome. It was also an entree

spot for the ships to Malay and China carrying Indian goods to Rome. Romila Thapar

attributes the Roman use of this port from the first century BC to the early second

century AD. The imports from India were luxury items like spices, jewels, textiles,

parrots, peacocks and apes. Initially, trade with Southeast Asia was mainly due to the

demand for spices which. sent Indian merchants as middlemen to Malaya, Java,

Sumatra, Cambodia and Borneo which were a treasure-trove of various spices. Larger

trade developed when Indians settled in Southeast Asia; with South Indian traders

dominating the trade together with prominent merchants from Kalinga and Magadha.

During this period, trade with China also increased with the use of Chinese cloth and

bamboo in India. The routing of Chinese silk through the northwestern towns, Taxila

and Broach· added to the prosperity of northwestern part of India. Thaper traces the

colonisation of the Irrawaddy Delta in Burma and various parts of Java to the

Kalingans; and the introduction of Indian/Hindu culture to Cambodia to an Indian

Brahmin named Kaundinya who married a Cambodian princess (Thapar 1966).

There were permanent settlements of India~ traders along the coast of East Africa.

The other dominant trading community was of the Arabs. Arabs developed

Mogadishu and Mombasa as great trading centers. Indian traders, manufacturers and

clove cultivators were concentrated in Zanzibar Island. They were both Hindus

(mainly Vaishyas) and Muslims (Ismailis ai1d Bohras) (Narayan 1998). The Venetian

traveler Marco Polo has a word of praise, for the Gujarati and Saurashtrian merchants

on Africa's east coast, "the best and most honorable that can be found in the world"

(Travels of Marco Polo written in 1260 A.D). Vasco de Gama touched East Africa on

his historic voyage to India. He reached Malindi in 1497 A. D. and found Indian

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merchants in Mozambique, Kilwa and Mombasa. He hireda Guajarati mariner named

Kanji to take him to the shore of India. Indian traders had also settled in Aden and the

Persian Gulf (Tinker 1977 :2).

Indian presence on the east African seaboard was quite substantial up to the beginning

of the 16th century when the western maritime powers arrived in the Indian Ocean.

The use of Indian system of weights and measures, the use of Indian cowries as

currency, and a great demand for Indian goods points to the fact that Indians were

playing a key role in the area. However, there is nothing to indicate that they had

penetrated into the interior or made contacts with its Bantu state systems. Indian

traders, laborers, adventurers and junior administrators took part in the Portuguese

penetration into the interior (Desai 1993: 119).

India has more than two thousand years history of cultural and commercial relations

with Southeast Asia. Commercial relations had a longer history than cultural contacts.

According to Brian Harrison "from at least the sixth century BC onwards Indian

traders were sailing to those lands, and down through those islands, in search of gold

and tin" (Harrison 1966: 1-0). Java was colonised by the Hindus between the 1st and

7th century. In the 7th century; the Javanese converted to Hinduism and an elaborate

Hindu culture developed by the lOth century. The Hindu kingdom (8th-13th

centuries) covered much of Indonesia (New Webster's Dictionary 1992). The Chola

king Rajaraja the Great (AD 985-1018) conquered South India and extended his hold

over Ceylon. Under his son, Rajendra (AD 1 018-35) the Chola power reached out to

threaten the empire of Sri Vijaya in Java and Sumatra. (Sri Vijaya kingdom was

founded in Sumatra before the fourth century AD, it rose to prominence towards the

close of the seventh century AD). The Cholas were expelled from Ceylon in 1070

(Tinker 1990: 12). In the fifth centUry AD Hindu kingdoms were formed in Java

(Majumdar 1988). The people of Java came to share with the·Indians their· religions;

languages; art and architecture; cultural mores; and legal and political ethos and forms

(Arora 1982: 119). This area was exposed to "the heaviest Indianisation" (Wales

1951: 195). Majority of the people of Bali Island still practice Hinduism.

Brahminical and Buddhist influences spread through the intervening culture areas to

islands of Borneo as well as Mindanao and the Vaishyas in the Philippines. They

gradually penetrated even to the northernmost island of Luzon. There are traces of

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Indic influences in the languages, literature and social customs in the Philippines (Rye

1982: 144). In Indochina the kingdoms of Funan, Champa, Karnbujadesa

(Kampuchea), Angkor and Laos were greatly influenced by Indian culture and

civilisation. From the beginning of the Christian era, the Indian merchants,

adventurers, princes and priests, spread the Indian language and literature; religion

and philosophy; art and architecture; and customs and manners in these countries.

The deep imprint of which is visible even today. Later they grew into small kingdoms.

Within two to three hundred years nearly the whole of Indo-China and Indonesia,

comprising Burma, Siam, Malay Peninsula, Cambodia and Annam in the mainland

and the islands of Sumatra, Java, Bali, Borneo, Celebes and perhaps many others were

scattered with a less organised kingdoms and settlements. Some of these kingdoms

like those of Funan and Champa grew very powerful. These contacts lasted for more

than a thousand years (Reddi 1982:155; Sardesai 1997).

The migration from India in the early stages to Southeast Asia involved limited but

important movement of priests and traders. These people were not part of any massive

wave of population movement. Instead, by their command of specialist knowledge,

they carne to fill vitally important roles in the emerging South East Asian states

thereby able to implant the Indian cultural contribution to Southeast Asia's historical

development. However, the South East Asian classical world does not seem to have

been one marked by large-scale voluntary migration. A limited but highly important

number of Indians settled in the area (Lal2006).

Afghanistan had mainly Hindus and Buddhists followers. It was ruled by the Hindu

kings till the end of the seventh century when the Arabs conquered it and people

embraced Islam. The Banjaras (Gypsies) migrated from India in the lOth century to

several European countries. Their language Romani has a resemblance to Indian

languages. It is spoken in widely varying dialects (Narayan 1998).

Romani is spoken by the descendants of a population which left India at the end of the

first millennium AD and made their way into Europe via Persia and the Byzantine

Empire, arriving there some time during the thirteenth century. The identity of the

first population and the circumstances of their exodus have been the subject of

scholarly debate since the 1780s. Late 20th century research, some of it being

undertaken in India, suggests strongly that the original population consisted of

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different Indo-Aryan descent (in particular Dravidians and the Pratihara migrant

population who had settled in India from north) who formed part of the Rajput armies

to resist the Islamic incursions into India led by Mohammed Ghaznavi. As these

armies moved further west, they were again caught up in, and displaced by the spread

of Islam as it overtook the Byzantine Empire. It was the westward movement which

pushed the Romani population up into Europe. The common name for Romani

population is Gypsy (like Gitano in Spanish) originates in the misassumption that the

population had come from Egypt (Hancock 1993). The Gypsies are spread all over in

Europe. Their population in Europe was about 8 million in 1993 (New York Times,

May 5, 1993), of them 2.5 million lived in Romania and five hundred thousand in

Hungary (Motwani 1994: 3).

The Chettiyars who were bankers and traders of south India and Ceylon from

medieval times, gradually extended their activities to Burma, Malaya, Thailand,

Indonesia and Mauritius (Tinker 1977: 3). Before the Portuguese arrival in the Indian

Ocean, the merchants of Gujarat, Malabar, Coromandel, and Bengal looked to the

east, to the Indonesian archipelago, for direct voyages organised with their own

shipping and capital. From the sixteenth century, the orientation was suddenly

reversed and turned westwards, towards the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Hindu

merchants were to be found all through the Middle East in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries. The Sikh empire was spread up to Peshawar and Khyber. The

Gurkhas of Nepal carried out a sub-montane Himalayan empire which stretched from

Da:tjeeling to Shimla. The emigration that took place from India to various parts ofthe

world did not result in any significant permanent settlements (Narayan 1998).

According to Indian Diaspora report (2001), early Indian migration is a subject of

debate among scholars. There is, however, a general agreement that it took place both

by land and sea routes. Different views have been expressed about the causes of

Indian migration to the other parts of the world .. There is considerable merit in the

view that the primary motive for migration was economic. Initially, the mineral

wealth of different parts especially Southeast Asia appears to have been a major

attraction for Indians. The deep imprint of intense interaction is visible even today in

the language and literature, religion and philosophy, art and architecture, customs and

manners of the whole of Indo-China, Indonesia, Burma (now Myanmar), Thailand,

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Malaysian peninsula and other part of the world. The famous Angkorwat and other

Hindu temples in Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, etc. are well

known. However, it is not so well-known that the first royal Shiva Linga in Southeast

Asia was established at Mi-Son near Da Nang in Vietnam, the oldest Sanskrit

inscription was found in a village named Vo Canh near Nha Trang in the southern

part of Vietnam and Hindus are visible in Indonesia's Bali Island.

India did not show any political ambitions or expansionism in neighbouring Southeast

Asia and other part of the world hence the Indian culture, religion and philosophy

were welcome. Mostly because of the above mentioned reason, after the extensive

emigration during the pre-modem period, India did not have any policy or certain

provision related to their emigrants. One of the most important reasons is that during

the per-modem period India was divided in small kingdoms and each of them

followed their own individual goals therefore in the pre-modem period. Their existed

a high possibility of assimilation of the Indian emigrants in the countries of the

adoption. Due to the movement of people and ideas, Indian influence was important

throughout Asia and Europe before the 19th century. However, it was in the 19th and

20th centuries that the large-scale migration from India across the world took place. It

is from this migration that the Diaspora was formed.

4.2.: The Colonial Period

The British colonial rulers invented an ingenious. method of recruiting much needed

plantation labor, popularly known as indenture system, following the Abolition of

Slavery in 1833 and the emancipation of African slaves. The unscrupulous ways of

labor recruitment by fraud & by force and the treatment meted to them, both during

the long journey and in plantations is best described as "A System of Slavery in

disguise" {Hugh Tinker 1993).

Despite the voices raised by freedom fighters in India against the indenture system,

the practice continued unabated for nearly a century from 1834 until January 1, 1920.

Gopal Krishna Gokhale, the most critical among the Members of Imperial Legislative

Council in Delhi, stated that the "worst feature" of indenture system was that the

plantation labor was "placed under a special law, never explained to them before they

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left the country, which is in a language which they do not understand and which

imposes on them a criminal liability for the most trivial breaches of the contracts, in

place of the civil liability which usually attaches to such breaches. Thus, they are

liable under this law to imprisonment with hard labour, which may extend to two and

in some cases to three months, not only for fraud, not only for deception, but also for

negligence, for carelessness and - will the Council believe it? - for even an

impertinent word or gesture to the manager or his overseers" (Report of The High

Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora 2001).

Thus, the poor and helpless left the shores of India in thousands, undertaking long

journeys with uncertainty and hope to be the victims of such horrendous system of

labour under the British planters. The worst sufferers of this treacherous system were

the migrants from the Bhojpuri region (Bhat 2003: 17).

Though the Colonial Government enacted a few legislative directives for the

protection and wellbeing of the indentured laborers in plantation barracks, they were

only violated rather than followed. The Colonial Government of India had persuaded

the Secretary of State for Colonies to appoint a few Commissions of Inquiry in order

to seek justice against discrimination and exploitation of Indian labour but the reports

of various commissions rarely mitigated their plight. Some of these Reports were so

damning that they were not made public for fear of shame (e.g. West Indies Royal

Commission 1940). The only policy that the government followed was to export

sufficient low paid work force to run the plantations. The British encouraged the

indentured laborers to settle down in their island colonies following the ban on

indenture system, to serve essentially the interest of British plantations, a better device

than the damning exploiting indenture system. The British left most of their colonies

with the legacy of hatred between the descendents of emancipated African slaves and

the Indian indentured labour that they called "coolies" (Bhat 2003: 17).

The British Empire had favoured and even encouraged the migration of Asians for

labour or commerce~ The Indian Diaspora in Africa represented only a small fraction

of the total local population (2.3 percent in Kenya; 1 percent in Tanzania and

Uganda), yet the fortunes of the Indian community in East Africa along with those in

South Africa have loomed large in the politics of the Indian subcontinent, in a fashion

that has quite overshadowed the troubles of Indians in Ceylon or South East Asia

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(Twaddle 197 5: 16). Although the troubles faced by the Indian Diaspora in South East

Asia were directly related to their difficult working conditions, the community in East

and South Africa were more of a political and social nature. However, the deportee

Asians in East and South Africa were more an urban, middle class element, capable of

complaining whilst the Indians in Asia remained manual, agricultural labour, and

were not so vocal about their problems.

Before 1860, the Indian interest in Africa had been limited to the economic interests

of the merchants in the coastal cities, who traded spice in Zanzihar, Dar-es,.Salaam

and Mombassa. In 1860, the first indentured labourers reached Natal, and with this

started an extensive Indian settlement in South and East Africa (Grover 1992: 33).

This was also the start of an interest throughout India in political and social

developments in Africa. The overseas Indians became a part of the imperialist system

where white settlers had established their superiority over the indigenous population.

From relatively small beginnings they developed a vast network of trade throughout

the region. The protection of the British administration led to the recruitment of a

large number of Indian immigrants and allowed them to expand into the interior of the

country. The rapid growth of the white settler community in the first two decades of

the twentieth century posed a fundamental challenge to the Asians residing there.

Soon questions emerged about residential rights and other aspects of racial

segregation. The two settler communities lived uneasily next to each other, but could

not do without each other (Lall 2001: 77-78).

Indians went through three contradictory phases: first, they aspired to become like the

whites, claiming to be British citizens in Africa. Secondly, they relied on mobilising

the support of the Indian government through Indian nationalism. However, the

Colonial office strictly opposed both moves. Thirdly, they were pressured to become

citizens of the places they had chosen to live in, something which was unacceptable to

most of them. The Indian government paid attention to all the difficulties and

grievances experienced by the Diaspora and most of the efforts to help them were

undertaken at the beginning of the twentieth century. The domestic public opinion and

Indian nationalists were particularly critical of the indenture system, which brought

with it as many problems as it did economic benefits. It became a big issue both for

the public and the politicians. It is noteworthy that between 1914 and 1948, Indian

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interest m Africa was purely nationalistic, concerned solely with the fate and

problems of the Indian overseas community. No effort was made to include the

African community in the fight for equality (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971: 301).

According to the High Level Committee Report on Indian Diaspora 2001,

discrimination against Indians was particularly harsh in South Africa. There had been

a split between the Union government and the British government when the

authorities in Natal openly sided with the colonists and planters at the end of 1880. In

1894, the Natal government disenfranchised the Indians and in 1906 the Black Act

made registration and carrying registration papers for Indians mandatory. Gandhi

started a protest movement (Satyagraha) to draw local and imperial attention towards

the plight of the Indian population. Gandhi was concerned not only with the problems

of the South African Indians, but with the lot of Indians all over the world (Letter to

Gokhale 18.10.1898).

Gokhale made two trips back to India during which he wrote the 'green pamphlet' and

addressed the Indian National Congress, the Chambers of Commerce and other

organisations to rally support for their Indian countrymen, especially in South Africa.

Gandhi's campaign in South Africa had the objective of bettering the fate of the

Indian community there. During this time the Indian government maintained pressure

on the Union government as well as on the Colonial authorities in England to improve

the treatment of the South African Indians (Indian Diaspora Report 2001: Chapter-7).

In 1914, the Smuts-Gandhi agreement was signed, promising equal treatment in the

future, but interpreted by the South African Government as a guarantee that most

Indians residing in South Africa would return to their country of origin. In the eyes of

the South Africans they were only temporary residents, despite the fact that earlier Sir

George Gray had clearly stated that the Indian families would remain as settlers after

their term of indenture was over. In fact, the Government of India would not have

allowed Indian emigration to Africa had there been any suggestion that they might be

transported back to India against their will (Ghai 1970: 247-274).

The Indian position was that the immigrants had acquired rights in their new country

and that on top of everything else they were 'British nationals' in South Africa long

before the Dutch and the Germans became nationals (Joshi 1942: 303). The Indian

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government responded to Smut's view by stopping indentured emigration to South

Africa and subsequently abolishing the entire system. This was due to unrest in

Bombay (now Murnbai), which was becoming more and more intense, resulting in

resolutions and memorandums to the Viceroy (Grover 1992: 35). The last emigrants

left India in January 1917 (Twaddle 197 5: 17).

In the East African region, the problems resulted first from discrimination imposed by

the Colonial authorities, then by the antagonism between Africans and Indians. They

were denied proportional representation in the legislative, executive and municipal

councils and were subjected to inferior transport, medical, prison and educational

facilities (Grover 1992: 37). The agitation for equality in East Africa started at the end

ofthe First World War. An East African Indian National Congress was set up and a

list of grievances was sent to the local and imperial governments. A deputation was

sent to India to enlist the support of the Congress and the Viceroy. The expatriate

Indians felt that they were backed by nationalists back horne, some of whom, such as

G.K. Gokhale or Mrs. S. Naidu, advocated an Indian protectorate in German East

Africa, Tanganyika .

. .. East Africa is one of the earliest legitimate territories of the Indian nation going so

far back as the first century of the Christian era. . .. East Africa is therefore the

legitimate colony of the surplus of the great Indian nation, whether they went forth to

colonise these unknown lands from an economic point of view or to satisfy their

desire for venture ... (Sarojini Naidu 1924).

Several political parties, one of them being the Jana Sangh, claimed to establish a

little India wherever there were people of Indian origin. The fact that the Indian

Diaspora in East Africa might suggest that India administer their region, greatly

alarmed the European community in East Africa (Ghai 1970: 331).

Before 1914, the British government was neither consistent nor united in its attitude

towards India's problem in Africa. The Wragg Commission reported in 1887 that

Indian traders had a right to go to any part of the British Empire, since by trading even

in the most remote areas they were providing the white population with a useful

service. The report also noted that the majority of white settlers wanted Indians to be

indentured for as long as they stayed in the colony. They were afraid that the Indians

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would provide fierce competition in both agriculture and commerce (Ghai 1970: 281).

In general, the governors and other officials in the colonies had the interest of the

white settlers at heart, but the colonial office in London had to juggle with pressures

coming from the India Office and the Government of India as well. Some Secretaries

of State such as Chamberlain supported the European interests, whilst others such as

Lord Granville pressed Indian claims (Grover 1992: 35).

During the passive resistance struggle in India the Viceroy, Lord Harding, criticised

the South African racial policies, and was almost recalled to Britain. Yet in upholding

Indian interests, the Viceroy had the support and approval of the India office (Lall

2001: 81).

The British position was that the Indians were simply citizens of whichever colony

they lived in. When India later applied to appoint agents in the West-Indies and Fiji to

help monitor the grievances of the Diaspora, the Colonial Office refused on the

grounds that the Indians there were permanent residents 'enjoying harmonious

relations with other sections ofthe local population' (Twaddle 1975: 21).

But soon Britain found itself caught in an inter-imperial quarrel, where white settlers

were pitched against the Indian population. There were also differences between the

Indian government with other colonial governments and the Foreign and India office.

In response the Foreign Office determined that in Kenya, as in the rest of East Africa

'the interests of the African natives must be paramount and that if, and when those

interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail' (Grover

1992: 309).

This was spelled out in the 1923 White Paper, also known as the Devonshire

declaration. Yet the White Paper also denied the Indians equality of status with the

Europeans in Kenya, causing outrage back in India. By 1923, racial friction was out

of control and the European settlers threatened to secede from the empire if no action

was taken (Grover 1992: 38).

Subsequently, a bill to regulate immigration and employment was introduced into the

Kenya Legislative Council in 1923. It gave wide powers to the immigration

authorities and prohibited the entry of all persons who were unable to produce a

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certificate of employment before landing. However, the white population demanded

controls andrestrictions on continuing Indian immigration. (Khilnani 1984: 58).

The colonial Government of India's position in the 1911 Imperial Conference India

made sure that the overseas Indians problem figured prominently on the agenda. India

did not gain full representation until 1921, her membership having been debated at the

Imperial War Conferences of 1917 and 1918. India also raised the issue of

discrimination against overseas Indians at the Imperial Conference of 1917. The

reciprocity act (Resolution XXII of 1917) ensured that the governments of the British

Commonwealth should enjoy complete control of the composition of their own

population by means of restriction of immigration and that British citizens domiciled

in any British country should be admitted into any other British country for visits and

temporary residence (Lall 2001: 81-82).

After the First World War, India became an independent member of the League of

Nations, and with it, several other League and para-League organisations (although

until 1929 the Indian delegation was led by non-Indians). The government of India

used its voice at all international meetings to protest against the treatment of its

overseas population. In 1919, at the Amritsar Congress, it was declared that this

Congress is of the opinion that the anti-Indian agitation now going on in East-Africa

is utterly unscrupulous and trusts that the government of India will safeguard the right

of free and unrestricted emigration from India to East-Africa and the full civic and

political rights of the Indian settlers in East-Africa including the East-African territory

conquered by Germany (Purshotamdas 1971: 24).

At the Imperial conference of 1921, the Indian Government lobbied for the overseas

Indian population living in the Dominions, to be granted equal rights with the British.

Although New Zealand, Canada and Australia were ready to accept Indian equality,

especially in view of the enormous contribution to the war effort, the British did not

support the proposal. In 1923 L.B. Shastri appealed against the colour bar in the

colonies, but no to avail. The Indians were continuously denied the right of settlement

in the Kenyan highlands which were reserved for the white population. At the 1923

Imperial Conference, the issue of discrimination in South Africa was again taken up

by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. In the case of South Africa the principle of reciprocity was

not respected and the Government of India wanted to send an agent to South Africa to

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protect Indian nationals there. The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa

explained that in South Africa-it was not a question of colour, but that a different

principle was involved, namely 'that the attitude of thinking men in South Africa was

not that the Indian was inferior because of his colour or on any other ground - he

might be their superior.- but the question had to be considered from the point of view

of economic competition'. In other words, the white community in South Africa felt

that the whole question of the continuance of western civilisation in South Africa was

involved (Ollivier 1954: 15).

The British imperial authorities were not particularly interested in helping, the Indian

communities who were being discriminated against. It became evident in the case of

the Canadian Sikh community in 1908 when the British government upheld Canadian

legislation to limit Indian immigration into Canada. It was therefore left to the

Government of India to fight for the rights of overseas Indians. Since India was not a

national government, it could maintain an interest in the welfare of the overseas

Indian community, but could not do more than lobby with the Imperial powers or ban

the export of labour to the Dominions. India's lobbying at the Imperial Conferences

had some success as it overcame a reluctance to discuss the problem of emigrant

Indians in general and made it one of the Conference's major issues. It seemed that the

empire could no longer lightly dismiss the problem, even if that did not lead to any

dramatic results (Fraser 1978: 155-166).

Despite the creation of the separate department of overseas Indians under an Indian

member of the viceroy's executive council, there was no substantial enlargement of

the role of the Government of India. The separate department of overseas Indians had

at its head Dr N.B. Khare.2 He declared with reference to the Pegging Act and other

anti-Indian measures that: 'Some means must be found for maintaining the dignity

and prestige of Indians and the government of India even in wartime. . .. Had India

been independent she would have considered this a casus belli against South Africa'

(quoted in Twaddle 1975: 22). The sanctions, which India could apply, were of

2 Dr. N. B. Khare was an Indian politician. Before India's Independence, he served as Prime Minister in the flrst elected government of the Central Provinces and Berar in 1937-1938. He resigned at the request of the Indian National Congress leadership. He served on the Viceroy of India's Advisory council from 1943 to 1946. After Indian Independence, he served in the Lok Sabha from 1952 to 1955. He also worked for the welfare of overseas Indians.

170


marginal value (Bahadur Singh 1979: 57-58). This, it was felt encouraged the

Dominions to maltreat the Diaspora (Sundaram ·1944: 231 ).

It was only in 1943 that a Reciprocity Act was passed enabling Government of India

to 'institute counter measures'. However, it was to prove not very useful in practical

terms. In fact, India retaliated by issuing a notice that the rights of South Africans

residing in India would be reduced in the same way as those of Indians in South

Africa. After the war in 1946, the Pegging Act in South Africa was reconfirmed and

the Indian population was still represented by Europeans. Subsequently, the Indian

government decided to terminate the Indo-South African · trade agreement, and

announced a trade boycott. This was meant to harm South Africa economically,

especially, since during the war India had become South Africa's third most important

source of imports. In fact, India was exporting five times high as they earlier

importing, but a major item being imported was coal from Natal which was already in

short supply (Appasamy 1943: 61-80).

Despite this, the trade boycott came into force. Direct relations between the two

countries came to a halt after nearly fifty years of negotiations on the Indian Diaspora,

numbered 282401 in 1946 (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971: 305).

It is noteworthy that India raised the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa at

the United Nations before the advent of Indian independence. At that time the

Diaspora was still very much in the picture of Indian politics. India also raised issues

with respect to the discrimination against Indians for a number of years before calling

for the abolition of apartheid as a system, which then included the blacks and

coloured in the anti- discrimination campaign. It is also notable that India did not raise

the South Africa issue at the Commonwealth meetings in the early years of

independence. Nehru was aware that if he challenged South Africa m

Commonwealth, he would give Pakistan an excuse to raise the Kashmir issue, as this

meant raising domestic matters, which might threaten the integrity of the association

(Jha 1984: 97).

There was a major change in policy, as the issue of South Africa had regularly

featured on the agendas of the Imperial conferences, which were the predecessor of

the Commonwealth meetings (Miller 1974: 129).

171


Shastri became the spokesman for India at the League of Nations. He primarily

presented the Indian case for equality, but soon found that the Indians were also

dedicated to an emphasis of African interests. Shastri agreed to assert that Indian and

European claims should yield to the interests of the African population. In this aspect,

he agreed with the Devonshire declaration. Yet the reiteration of the segregation

policies this document also contained made him and Indian public opinion furious. To

him putting African interests first did not mean continuing discrimination against the

Indians. The 38th Indian National Congress annual session in December 1923

declared that unless India became independent, the grievances of the Indian Diaspora

could not be properly remedied (Raj 1979: 63-66).

As far as the nationalists' claims in East Africa were concerned, they were not

advocated by the Indian government, yet it still stood up for the rights of the overseas

coinrimnity when it· came to the discriminatory land and franchise policies in that

region. Indian agitation secured the end of certain policies of segregation in 1922, but

restrictions on residence of non-Europeans on European owned plots remained in

force till 1945. The Indian government did not intend to use the Diaspora as a fifth

column to support anti-Imperial movements in the British dominated African and

Asian countries. Yet right from the start of India's own independence movement India

felt it had to lead a new blockof states and Nehru hoped that the Indian Diaspora

would play a significant role in bringing about de-colonisation (Grover 1992: 570).

Before the Second World War, India maintained a nationalist policy. The Government

of India recognised that it bore responsibility for its overseas population, and used its

voice in all forums to propagate this claim. It also recognised the Diaspora as being

part of the nationalist movement, which was to free India from colonialism. To this

end the Government of India sent deputations to various parts of the .Empire. This

policy remained constant until independence in 1947. Various missions were sent to

different parts of the Empire to report on particular problems concerning the Indian

Diaspora(Lal12001: 85).

172

Sr. No. I.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9.


TABLE: 4.1. Missions of Congress Members to the Colonies

Persons deputed Country Year Purpose of mission GcK. Gokhale South Africa· 1910 To discuss the Indian question with South

African Authorities. C.F. Andrews & South Africa 1916 To investigate conditions oflndian Labour. W.W. Pearson &Fiji C.F. Andrews & Malaya & 1923 To examine Indian immigration Ill all its B.D. Chaturvedi Ceylon aspects. M.A. Arulanandam, Ceylon 1923 To investigate into the conditions of life to A.V. Dias, which the South Indian labourers in Ceylon Periasundaram, were subjected. L. Muthukrishna Sarojini Naidu & Kenya 1923 To attend the Indian Congress in Kenya; to George Joseph study the situation and to advise the Indian

Community there on the steps they should take in carrying on their struggle against the insults and injustices heaped on them.

Shridhar Ganesh Kenya 1924 To inquire into conditions oflndian Settlers. & B.D. Chaturvedi C.F. Andrews Zanzibar 1934 To study conditions oflndian settlers. Jawaharlal Nehru Ceylon 1939 To confer with the authorities and

representative associations and individuals on behalf on behalf of the Congress Working Committee and do all that may be possible to effect adjust and honourable settlement.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Ceylon 1939 To assure the Ceylon Indian Congress of the C.Rajagopalachari, full sympathy of the Congress for the cause of A. Aryanayakam & Indians in Ceylon and to take necessary steps to G. Ramachandran secure redress for their grievances by

investigating the matters in dispute. Source: Reports of Annual Sess10n of the Indtan National Congress and Proceedmgs of the All Indta Congress Committee, 1885-1947, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.

These missions, especially the ones in the 1920s and 1930s not only checked on

specific problems of the Diaspora, but also rallied them to the cause of Indian

independence. At the time of independence, India had to review its position in several

areas. This included its future relationship with the former colonial power Britain, its

membership in the Commonwealth and the Diaspora, which was mainly located in the

Commonwealth. At independence India debated whether or not to dissociate itself

from the Commonwealth in their fight against racial discrimination. For decades there

had been in India a widespread and standing grievance against racial discrimination,

especially with regard to People of Indian Origin (PIO) in parts of the British Empire

Commonwealth. An association with an organisation where such racial discrimination

prevailed could be considered an affront to the national dignity of newly independent

India. However, in 1947 the Indian leaders came to feel that by joining the club of the

five white nations, they were actually converting the Commonwealth into a new

multi-racial association, thus enabling other non-white nations to follow later. As a

result of this move the relationship between India and Britain was also fixed, since by

173


joining the Commonwealth, India implicitly accepted Britain as a friend and ally

(Rajan 1990: 20).

While discussing the legacy of Mahatma Gandhi it becomes apparent that the initial

response of India on Indian Diaspora was directed towards PIOs. South African

Indians, for whom Mahatma Gandhi struggled in South Africa, a cause, India took to

the UN even before becoming independent and sacrificed its substantial trade relation

with South Africa, was a very special issue for India. Discriminatory treatment in

racially structured society of South Africa had drawn Mahatma Gandhi into active

politics when he had gone to South Africa in late 19th century. Because of Mahatma

Gandhi's struggle for the betterment of overseas Indians in South Africa the colonial

Indian Government and the Indian Government after the independence give more

attention to the plight of ethnic Indians in South Africa than anywhere else in the

world. Later Indian nationalists of all shades had demanded improvement in working

and living conditions of Indians settled abroad. Indian settlers protest began to be

articulated in East Africa also. The East African Indian National Congress, based on

model of Indian National Congress was founded in 1914. A.M. Jeevanjee had started

voicing the grievances of Indian settlers in East Africa. He had gone to the extent of

advocating "the annexation of African territory" (Tangynika) to the Indian Empire

"arguing that it had been an Asiatic kingdom in ancient times".

Indians in Africa formed middle section in three-tier society, whites at top and blacks

at the bottom. However, their presence was more apparent to Africansas they came

directly in contact with them through their retail shops and business. At the same

time, they were aggressive in commercial sector. Similarly, in Mauritius and Fiji,

Mahatma Gandhi had sent Manilal Doctor, while coming back from South Africa, to

mobilise them for education and for giving very high importance to educate their

children (Tinker 1974: 226-43). But more importantly he advised them to actively

participate in local politics and demand legitimate share in the governance and

economy of their new home. Indians also used nationalism to mobilise the Indian

Diaspora around the world to get Indian independence. They were ·exhorted to

identify with India cause as 'only a free India could hope to protect and safeguard

their interest'. Since most of them were taken under a coercive colonial rule, they

were visualised by Gandhi as a segment of emerging Indian independence where they

174

India's Diaspora Policy: A Case Study oflndians in Malaysia Chapter-tV: India's Diaspora Policy With Special Reference to Malaysian Indians

will share the· socw cultural space within India. Therefore, it was a policy of

identification and association but it was by and large Gandhi's view. Nehru who since

1930 became official in-charge of foreign policy of India within Indian National

Congress had different views (Dubey 2003: 117-145).

4.2.1.: The Indian National Congress and its Leadership on Indian Diaspora

India's Nationalist Leadership first turned its attention to the issue of Indians overseas

as early as the 1890s. Several founding figures ofthe Indian National Congress (INC)

travelled abroad to study or work and many of them experienced first-hand, the

disadvantages that overseas Indians faced. Racial discrimination and restrictive

immigration policies in the colonies aided the forging of an emotional bond between

Indians overseas and the emerging nationalist leadership. Both groups came together

as they were engaged in opposing colonial regimes (Lal 2006: 82).

As early as 1896, the INC in its Calcutta session recorded 'its most solemn protest

against the disabilities imposed on Indian settlers in South Africa, and the unpleasant

and humiliating distinctions made between them and the European settlers; at the

Ahmadabad session in 1902, it noted 'with regret' the 'Imperialistic spirit of the British

colonies'; and at the Madras session in 1903, it viewed with grave concern and regret

the hard lot of His Majesty's Indian subjects living in the British colonies in South

Africa, Australia and elsewhere. The INC also registered its outrage 'against the

treatment of Indians by the Colonies as backward and uncivilised races'. 'In view of

the great part the Indian settlers have played in the developm_ent of the Colonies', it

called for 'all the rights and privileges of British Citizenship in common with the

European subjects' to be granted to Indians. The Benares session in 1905 upheld 'the

great constitutional importance of the principle of equal treatment of all citizens of the

Empire anywhere in the King's dominions,' and called for a ban on indentured labour

emigration; the ·Calcutta session in 1906 recorded 'deep regret and indignation' at

Indians being· 'subjected to harassing and degrading restrictions and denied the

ordinary rights of British. citizenship in His Majesty's Colonies'; and at the Allahabad

session in 1910, the INC leadership admired 'the intense patriotism, courage and self

sacrifice of the Indians, in the Transvaal, Mohammedan and Hindu, Zoroastrian and

Christian who, heroically suffering persecution in the interests of their countrymen,

175


are carrying on their peaceful and selfless struggle of elementary civil rights against

heavy and overwhelming odds' (as recorded in the Reports of Annual Session of the

Indian National Congress and Proceedings of the All India Congress Committee,

1885-1947)-

Subsequently, the first decade ofthe 20th Century marked the beginning of a vital

ideological link between Indian political leadership and Indians overseas, · a

relationship that would only strengthen in ensuing decades. In its annual sessions in

1911 and 1912, the INC asserted its solidarity with Indian settlers in Africa. At

Karachi in 1913, its leaders expressed 'warm and grateful appreciation of the heroic

struggle' being waged by Gandhi and his co-workers, and called upon 'the people of

this country of all classes and creeds to continue to supply them with funds.' Indians

responded generously to the South African struggle: the donations included Rs.

25,000 by J. N. Tata. In 1915, at its Bombay session, the lNC demanded the swift

abolition of indentured emigration, condemning it as 'a form of slavery which,

socially and politically, debases the labourers and is seriously detrimental to the

economic and moral interests of the country.' In 1916 at Lucknow, it expressed its

'ever-growing sense of dissatisfaction at the continued ill-treatment of Indian settlers.'

By then, sympathy for Gandhi's decade-long campaign for the cause of Indians in ·

South Africa was spreading. Gandhi had attended the 1901 session of the INC as a

delegate from South Africa. His personal contacts with Indian nationalist leaders,

most prominently the veteran, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, encouraged the INC to show

solidarity with Indian communities not just in South Africa but also in Zanzibar, Fiji,

Malaya, Burma and Ceylon. Gokhale contributed decisively by galvanising Indian

public opinion in support of Gandhi's struggle, mobilising funds and directing

Empire-wide publicity for Gandhi's activities. By touring South Africa, Gokhale

signaled to the South African authorities that the weight of Indian political opinion

was·solidly behind Gandhi. This helped· to bring Gandhi's South African campaign to

fruition (Reports of Annual Session ofthe Indian National Congress, 1885-1947).

Gandhi's return to India, on 9 January 1915, and his growing stature in Indian politics

increased awareness of the anti-racist struggles of Indians Overseas. The INC became

more receptive to their plight and showed greater affinity with their cause. The work

of Charles Freer Andrews and other activists brought into sharp focus the situation in

176


various colonies. Between 1915 and 1920, strong public sentiment developed within

India, leading to demands for the abolition of the indenture system in Fiji, followed by

other British colonies. Abolishing indentured emigration could not have been possible

without strong, sustained support from the INC leadership. In the early 1920s, as the

INC revamped itself into an effective mass nationalist organisation, it also formalised

its links with Indians overseas. It affiliated with Indian organisations in other

countries, enabling them to participate in and contribute to the deliberations at its

annual sessions. Among its early beneficiaries were the British Indian Association of

Johannesburg, the British Indian League of Cape Town and the Point Indian

Association ofDurban. By the late 1920s, several such groups enjoyed INC affiliation

(Reports ofthe Indian National C~ngress, 1885-1947).

Soon, the consciousness of an organic link between Indians overseas and the anti

colonial struggle in India grew. In his presidential address to the 1926 Gauhati

Congress, Srinivas Iyengar declared "The lineaments of our great ancestry reveal

themselves in the today ... the adventurous spirit of early India which built up long ago

a greater Bharat Varsha to the East and to the West, to the North and to the South is

not extinct. It is now seen in the greater India which our brethren, in humble and

laborious fashion, are building for us in far off lands against unparalleled odds. The

status of Indians abroad, whether in South Africa or Kenya; in Fiji or Guinea (sic:

Guyana), in Ceylon or Malaya, in America or Australia, depends inevitably upon the

status of Indians in their own land; and the Swaraj for India depends in its tum upon

the brave and unfaltering spirit of our kith and kin across the seas" (Reports of Annual

Session of the Indian National Congress and Proceedings of the All India Congress

Committee, 1885-1947).

Iyengar, noted with satisfaction that 'with patience and perseverance, our brethren are

solving me question of racial equality all over the world. We can help them only by

winning Swaraj for India.' He even suggested that the INC hold an .annual session in

South Africa to reinforce its solidarity. For the INC leadership, the cause of Indians

overseas was an extension of the anti-imperialist struggle in other parts of the Empire

and presented an opportunity to highlight colonialism's underlying racist dimension.

In 1929, the INC institutionalised this aspect by setting up an Overseas Department

under Jawaharlal Nehru, who showed a special interest in international affairs. The

177


department would stay 'vigilantly aware of all the legislations and enactments that

adversely or otherwise affect Indian settlers abroad'. Among the prominent leaders

who undertook visits and study missions to report on the conditions of Indians

overseas were 'Charlie' Andrews, a close associate of Gandhi, who visited South

Africa and Fiji in 1916; Hridayanath Kunzru, who visited Fiji in 1923; Sarojini Naidu,

who went on a mission to Kenya in 1923; V. S. Srinivasa Sastri, who visited Fiji and

Australia in the 1930s; and Nehru, who visited Malaya, Ceylon and Burma in 1936

and 1939. Political leaders with non-INC ideologies also identified with the cause. In

1929, E. V. Ramaswami Naicker 'Periyar', founder of the Dravidar Kazhagam and the

Self-Respect Movement in Southern India, visited Malaya and Singapore to spread his

message among Tamil migrants. Similarly, Communist leader A. K. Gopalan visited

Malaya in 1939 (Lal 2006: 83).

Though much of the nationalist leaders' concern was focused on migrant indentured

labourers, miners and plantation workers, it also extended to merchant and trading

communities w~o featured prominently in the Diaspora. In the 1930s, when European

interests discriminated againstlndian clove traders in Zanzibar, INC leaders raised the

issue in the Central Legislature and called for a boycott on cloves, forcing the

authorities in Zanzibar to end discrimination. In the early 1940s, INC leadership took

up the cause of the Chettiar and Marwari merchants when their substantial business

interests in Burma were affected by discriminatory trade agreements in 1941. Gandhi

himself took up the issue, compelling colonial authorities to retract the unfair

proposals (Reports of Annual Session of the Indian National Congress and

Proceedings of the All India Congress Committee, 1885-1947).

In the 1940s, World War II and its adverse effects on Indian communities in

Southeast Asia elicited widespread sympathy. Subhash Chandra Bose's formation of

the Indian National Army (INA) and his call to Indians overseas to take up arms to

liberate the motherland boosted the patriotic sentiments that Indians at home felt with

regard to the overseas communities. After independence, B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, a

veteran INC leader and official party historian, observed, 'Indians abroad, it may look

like a paradox to say so, paved the way really for Indian emancipation. It was the

gospel of passive resistance that was conceived, developed and implemented in

Transvaal in 1908 ... [that] paved the way for the development of non-cooperation,

178


passive resistance, civil disobedience and satyagraha ... We therefore owe all that we

are to the initiative, the originality, the daring and the sacrifice of the Indians abroad'

(Consolidated Annual Report on the working of the Indian Emigration Act: 1922,

1934-1940, 1944-1950, 1953-1957).

4.3.: Evolution and Impact of Nehru's Diaspora Policy

After India's Independence Jawaharlal Nehru, became the first Prime Minister of

India. India's participation in Asian affairs in the 1940s and 1950s was inspired as

much by the sentiment of common identity, as by the hope of keeping the region free

from external interference. The Asian Relations Conference, the Conference on

Indonesia and the Bandung Conference, recognised the necessity of cooperation

among the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia, He had long ago visualised

the clash of interests of Indians overseas and local inhabitants. In 1957, Nehru stated

"Indians abroad always should give primary consideration to the _interest of the

people of those countries; they should never allow themselves to be placed in a

position of exploiting the people of those countries; in fact, we have gone thus far and

said, if you cannot be, and if you are not, friendly to the people of that country, come

back to India and do not spoil the fair name of India. " This quote reflects the

importance that he attached to the positive role the overseas Indians could play by

assimilating themselves in the host countries. He did not wantthe presence of these to

become a negative issue in India's relations with the host countries. Although, the

involvement was more with Indians who had migrated to Burma, Malaya and Sri

Lanka, initiative was taken by Nehru for evolving a general policy towards Indians

settled abroad including those in the Caribbean· and Africa. As ·way back in 1927,

when he was appointed secretary of the All India Congress Committee (AICC), - he

prepared a paper titled 'A Foreign Policy of India' for AICC. In this paper for the first

time, he categorically outlined the policy of INC regarding Indian settlers in other

colonial countries, the role India wanted them to play in their country of adoption and

the kind of support they could expect from India. He asked the most vexed questions

in the paper, "What is the position of Indians in the foreign countries today?"

Providing an answer he stated that Indian overseas went, as "a hireling of exploiter"

i.e. British government and he wanted this position to be changed. Regarding the

complex relationship between the overseas Indians and the host countries, in a

179


persuasive argument he suggested that "an Indian who goes to other countries must

co-operate with people of that country and win for himself a position by friendship

and service ... The Indians should co-operate with Africans and help them, as far as -

possible and not claim a special position for themselves" (Selected Works of

Jawaharlal Nehru 1972: 353-68).

However, there was no consensus in the INC, another stream of Congress comprising

of C.F. Andrew, Srinivas Shastri and HN Kunzru, M.M. Malaviya, B.G. Gokhale

were mainly concerned with discrimination of Indians in Africa and other places and

wanted for them a parity with white settlers. Many of them visited worker

recruitment centres and talked to them about their problems. The agitation of

Mahatma Gandhi in South Africa was also confined to the betterment of Indian

settlers cause. In succeeding years, the issue of discrimination of Indians in South

Africa became a sentimental issue for Indian nationalists, as Mahatma Gandhi was

very closely associated with it. Nehru represented the left wing tendency in the

Congress. He differed with the conservative wing whose demand was confined only

for betterment of Indian overseas. Nehru believed in cooperation between Indians and

Africans, however until late 1940, his sympathy and worry were also confined, only

for Indians in South Africa. This contrasted with his general policy of Indian support

to combined struggle of Indian settlers and Africans in which African cause was

paramount. Nehru's special support to Indian settlers in South Africa was very

obvious. In a message to INC of South Africa, Nehru wrote in 1939, "India is weak

today and cannot do much for her children abroad but she does not forget them and

every insult to them is a humiliation and sorrow for her and a day will come when her

long arm will shelter and protect them and her strength will compel justice for them"

(Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru 1976: 618). Those days still appear distant! It is

this duality between Nehru's policy and the presence of two wings (conservative and

left) in Congress, which help us to understand the change and continuities in Indian

support to Indian settlers in Africa. However, by early 1950's it was Nehru policy

towards East African Indians that ultimately prevailed even in South Africa and other

countries. Congress had set up an overseas department in 1929 and a slender contact

was established with local Congress organisations in South and East Africa. Nehru

took over foreign relations when an interim nationalist government was formed under

him on 2 September 1946. He took the issue ofindian discrimination in South Africa

180


beyond Commonwealth to United Nations. After independence, Nehru expressed his

views on the position of Indians in Africa and other places in free India. Speaking in

the Constituent Assembly on 8th March 1948 he said, "Now these Indians abroad

what they are? Are they Indian citizen - are they going to be citizen of India or not?

If they are not, then our interest in them becomes cultural, humanitarian and not

political... either they get the franchise of the nationals of the other country or treat

them as Indian minus franchise and ask for them the most favourable treatment given

to an alien". He advised Indian immigrants, "If you cannot be, and if you are not

friendly to the people of that country, come back to India and do not spoil the fair

name oflndia" (Selected WorksofJawaharlal Nehru 1976: 618.)

An immediate question that arose after independence was related to citizenship. A

statement by Nehru prior to independence illustrates the change that carne about on 18

March 1946; Nehru arrived in Singapore for what was considered a historic visit.

Addressing a crowd of over 10,000 Indians, and referring the nationality issue, he

promised, 'When India attains independence, she would immediately decide who her

nationals were and Indians overseas would be Indian nationals unless they choose to

be otherwise.' Nehru and other leaders had of course not foreseen the Partition of

194 7 and the large-scale uprooting of minorities and forced migration it would entail.

Before 1947, Nehru's view of citizenship hinged on a loose, undefined notion of the

affinity of individuals to the motherland. Following the Partition, the Indian concept

of citizenship was framed on the basis of territory. The 'country of birth' criterion

could no longer be applied as millions had been uprooted from their birthplaces to

become citizens of India or Pakistan, based primarily on religious identity. India's

Constituent Assembly had to frame the nation's citizenship laws under such

extraordinary and troubled times. Due to Independent India's need to cultivate a more

bounded sense of itself as a nation, the framing of citizenship became an issue. The

Indian Constitution of 1950 merely laid down the principle that all those born in

undivided India, or those with parents born there, could claim Indian citizenship;

leaving to parliament the actual task of formulating citizenship laws, and in doing so,

not ruling out the possibility of dual citizenship. However, citizenship laws in

independent India could not be framed for the first eight years. Meanwhile, the

government invited Indians overseas to register with their nearest missions,

instructing the missions to register all Hindus and Muslims, whether born in Indian or

181


Pakistani territory, as Indians if they expressed the desire. This left the legal status of

Indians overseas undecided, causing much uncertainty and anxiety, as in the case of

East Africa, where several Indians registered for citizenship with Indian missions. In

the early 1950s, when they were offered British Commonwealth citizenship, they

assumed that India would allow dual nationality. The Indian envoy in Nairobi

reportedly assured them that they 'would not lose their Indian citizenship by acquiring

that of the UK.' However, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955 specified that anyone

who had 'voluntarily acquired the citizenship of another country should cease to be a

citizen of India.' By disallowing dual citizenship, India had disappointed overseas

Indian communities. The overseas Indians became aliens like any other foreigner and

the Government of India restricted their rights in buying/owning property and

investing in their country of origin. In a single stroke, the Indian state cut itself loose

from its Diaspora (Report of The High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora 2001:

507-534).

Post-colonial India;s policy towards the Diaspora was deeply informed by Nehru as

the country's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Convinced that it was in the best

interest of overseas Indians to integrate into their host societies, he repeatedly argued

for them to 'identify themselves with and integrate in the mainstream of social and

political life of the country of their domicile.' There were many reasons for India's

policy of disengagement and distancing. In the Cold War era, India's foreign policy

was based on ideas of neutrality from the 'great power blocs' and solidarity.with the

'Third World', in which friendship with newly liberated Africa and Asia was highly

valued. Nehru's aspiration to propel India onto the world stage through its leadership

of the Non-Aligned Movement depended on the goodwill ofAfro-Asian countries,

which hosted many Indian communities. Accordingly, India cultivated good relations

with Asian and African states, though it meant neglecting the Diasporas interests. It

did not adopt an interventioirist policy on behalf of overseas Indians, lest India be

seen as interfering in the domestic affairs of other states (Lal 2006: 86). It culminated

in the Panchsheel, a declaration of world peace and cooperation. This was to unitethe

Asian and African Nations under a common foreign policy, which was described by

Nehru as the recognition of sovereignty and integrity of a: country, non-aggression,

and non-interference in other countries either for political or ideological reasons,

mutual respect and peaceful coexistence (Grover 1992: 43). In the long run this was to

182


consolidate Nehru's aim of an Afro-Asian voice and voting bloc in the UN. In fact,

had Nehru's government pressed on expatriate Asian rights and privileges, it would

have disrupted possible future cooperation between India and the relevant host

countries (Heimsath and Mansingh 1971: 289).

From 1950 onwards, under Nehru's influence, India followed an economic model of

planned development aimed at reducing income disparities, curbing the concentration

of economic power, regulating private capital and encouraging reliance on the state.

The goal of national self-sufficiency led Indian policy-makers towards the framework

of a closed economy, which did not value links with Indian mercantile communities

overseas (Lal 2006: 86).

Nehru made it clear in 1950, "In many parts of Africa-East, West, South- there are

considerable number of Indians, mostly business people. Our definite instructions to

them and to our agent in Africa are that they must always put the interest of

indigenous populations first. We want to have no vested interests at the expense of the

population of those countries". He emphasised the same view repeatedly. He said

about Indians abroad, "if they adopt the nationality of that country we have no

concern with them. Sentimental concern there is, but politically they cease to be

Indian national (Nehru's reply to debate on foreign policy in Lok Sabha 2 September

1957). Nehru asserted in 1953, "About Africa and Indians there, I may tell you, the

policy we have pursued for many years .... We have told them very definitely and

precisely that we as government do not encourage or support them in anything they

might want and which goes against the interests of the Africans. We have made that

perfectly clear". Nehru was very clear that any overt move by Indian government for

PIO would do more harm than good to them. He was not against people-to-people

contacts or non-governmental association. Nevertheless, Nehru also talked· about

double loyalty of Indians overseas. "During Indo-Chinese war India welcomed

contributions from Asians of East Africa to help boost its defence efforts. When

questioned on this Nehru told to a foreign journalist that- "Indians overseas have dual

loyalty, one to their country of adoption and other to their country oforigin" ·(Gupta in

Twaddle ed. 1975: 134).

The one exception to the Nehruvian policy was the case of Ceylon where Nehru quite

unsuccessfully tried to haggle out a deal for the Indians resident in this neighbour

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India's Diaspora Policy: A Case Study of Indians in Malaysia Chapter-JV: India's Diaspora Policy With Special Reference to Malaysian Indians

country. India strongly protested against the Ceylonese Citizenship Act which decreed

that nationality could only be claimed by descent or registration (registration requiring

continuous residency since at least 1946 or earlier) which excluded most of the

Ceylonese Indians. Ceylon wanted India to take back a sizeable portion of their

emigrant population. The fate of the Burmese Indians was quite similar, yet in this

case India did not put any pressure on the Burmese Government and even signed a

Treaty of Friendship in 1951. Needless to say both cases became quite messy over

time and because of their geographical proximity could not be ignored and found their

way into Indian politics frequently (Tinker 1976: 339-342).

Malaysia was another controversial case where the attitude of the Government of

India shortly after independence was not altogether consistent: the Nehruvian message

of expatriate Indians identifying with the country of their adoption had not been

clearly communicated to the Malaya Indians during Nehru's visit in 1946. When given

the choice of Malaysian citizenship most Indians chose Indian citizenship although

half of them were eligible for Malaysian citizenship (Tinker 1976: 351-352).

Nehru. also stood for primacy of Africans if there interest was to clash with Indian

settlers, however, when Asian Relation Conference was organised, two South African

Indian leaders - Y.M. Dadoo and G.M. Naicker were invited but there was no black . .

participants from South Africa. Even during Nehru's Prime Ministership when the

issue of racism in South Africa was taken up in U.N., it was only the case of Indians

discrimination in South Africa that was India's concern, though soon India had to

change its policy to include black Africans also. This caused great misgiving in

Africans. During 1960-66 the vacuum between India and Indian settlers abroad

widened as India came to believe that Indians were more of an obstacle than an asset

in its diplomatic relations with Africa. In urgency after Chinese attack, it seemed a

matter of smaller consequences if PIOs were to face some degree of discrimination

(Dubey 2003: 138).

When Nehru formulated India's position on Indians overseas, most of the countries in

the Third World were under colonial rule. Before independence, the Indian concern

about the treatment of Indian settlers abroad was with the intention of making British

rulers of our country responsible for the welfare of overseas Indians and securing for

them fair treatment and justice in relation to white settlers. The assumption that such

184


responsibility continued was occasionally expressed in Parliament and the media.

Immediately after India's independence, the Government of India was not in a

position to assist India settlers in their quest for full justice. Moreover, the leaders of

white settlers in Kenya and South Africa had seen Indian independence as a threat to

British rule in Africa. They called Nehru, a Hindu communist who wanted to replace

European rule by Indians.3 Their propaganda about sinister Indian designs on African

colonies, where Indians were in substantial number and the image of Indian settlers in

Africa as an exclusive community, whose only interest in Africa was economic

exploitation, made Indian leaders very sensitive on question of Indians overseas. The

condition of Indian migrants in neighbouring countries like in Burma, Malaysia, and

Uganda were ignored. In fact the problem of PIO indifferent countries were so

diverse, the positioning and status so different and the reach of India so varied that a

nascent Indian state did not find itself equipped and strong enough to address the

Diaspora issues head on beside this Nehru had other priorities like mobilisation of

Afro-Asian countries to keep them away from cold war rivalries. Nehru's policy of

exhorting Indians to identify themselves with locals in Asia and Africa was not based

only on his ideological commitment. In Kenya, the presence of Indian settlers was

larger than European community and Kenyan European wanted to keep Kenya as

Whiteman's country. A strong anti-Indians campaign was being pursued by Whites in

Africa and several riots broke out in Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa involving

Indians and Africans during 1944-49. If African's struggle· was to be weakened and

divided, there was every likely-hood that White Kenyan settlers could have extended

South African model· in East Africa. Therefore, it was necessary that Indian settlers

joined hand with blacks in opposing white settlers even sacrificing their short-term

gains. The Caribbean Indian was so far off that knowing their problems and

marginalisation by black Diaspora community as· well as by Colonial rulers was

ignored. Unlike the problems of Indians in Ceylon or in Burma or in Malaysia or even

in Africa, it created little pressure from Indian leader and masses at home. Therefore,

it was the distance, the absence of connectivity with India that led to the maximum

neglect of the Indian Diaspora in the Caribbean by Nehru and Indian leaders (Report

3 Group Captain IR Brigg, the conservative White settler leader in Kenya asserted about India that they want to squeeze us out and make it an Indian colony. The Times, (4 August 1954: London). Again South African High Commissioner in London had stated in 1954 "IfNehru.could weaken European influence in Africa then it will mean Africa for Indians." V. Me Kay Africa in World Politics (New York 1963)p,170.

185


ofThe High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora 2001).

Nehru said in the Constituent Assembly on 9th August 1948, "The Indian Commis

sioner will not be entitled to discharge consular function in respect of Indians who

may not be considered to be (Indian) national, that is permanent resident in those

territories or to act as spokesman of such Indians''. When Mau Mau rebellion 4 (1952-

60) broke out in Kenya, very few Indian settlers in Kenya sided with the British and

they were accused of being with rebels. "There were few Europeans in Kenya who do

not insist that New Delhi through its official and non-official representatives in Africa

has encouraged and added the rebellion of Mau-Mau" (Michael Blundell New York

Times 19 July 1953). Aba BPant was charged in the British Parliament for fomenting

Mau-Mau trouble.5 Unlike what it did in South Africa, India took a softer stand and

recalled Pant under pressure. During late 50s, Indians were considered as hurdles in

consolidating Indo-African relations and this continued even after the India-China war

of 1962 when Indian isolation was exposed. Mrs. Indira: Gandhi in her capacity as

official delegate toured- African- countries in 1964 and continued to emphasise that

Indian settled in Africa must identify themselves completely with the African people

and make their fullest contribution to the societies in which they lived. However, as

seen by her tour programme in Africa, besides her official engagements, she made it a

point, not to neglect Indian settlers, leaders and members of the community though

only in certain small location where the numbers did not even exceed fifty (Gopal

1984: 15). She also called Indian settlers as 'Ambassador of India' in Africa.

Similarly while touring Fiji, Mrs Gandhi sai<:l that "I feel like a mother concerned

about the welfare of a married daughter who has set up home far away' (Thakur 1985:

356). It shows a subtle departure from Nehru policy, as Indian settlers became now a

useful instrument for generating goodwill for India. Their position. as ambassador of

India' implied that they were no more excluded from policy considerations of India.

4 The Mau Mau Uprising of 1952 to 1960 was an insurgency by Kenyan peasants against the British colonialist rule. The core of the resistance was formed by members of the Kikuyu ethnic group, along with smaller numbers of Embu and Meru. The uprising failed militarily, though it hastened Kenyan independence and motivated Africans in other countries to fight against colonial rule. It created a rift between the white colonial communit)r in Kenya and the Home Office in London that set the stage for Kenyan independence in 1963. It is sometimes called the Mau Mau Rebellion or the Mau Mau Revolt, and, in official documents, the Kenya Emergency. 5 Lord Alport raised the question concerning "the contribution made to prevailing conditions of transition and unrest in Kenya during Mau-Mau rebellion by the staff of Indian High Commission office". Alport demanded that government of India should be asked to withdraw its staff from Kenya Britain: House of Commons Debates, Vol.518, and 29 July 1953.

186


These shifts became more noticeable in many areas when Mrs. Gandhi became the

Prime Minister of India. However in 1972, when Uganda's Idi Amin expelled Indians

from the country, the Indian government continued its policy of non-involvement, not

offering any effective help (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs Annual

Reports 194 7 -1995). This perceived apathy evoked widespread criticism within India.

4.3.1.: Pro-Diaspora Policies in the 1970s and 80s

East Africa: In 1967, government of Kenya started the Kenyanisation of its

economy when all non-citizens, largely Indians, were asked to take work and

residence permit. It allowed them to trade only in restricted areas and items. Though

it was a purely internal policy measure of Kenyan government, India advised them to

surrender British passport and get local citizenship. Indian diplomats mobilised PIO in

favour of this move but not many responded to it. For PIOs, accepting the advice to

mix with African meant giving their daughters in marriage to local Africans. PIOs

were not willing to migrate to England because of social insecurity and degeneration

of their children in western culture. Going back to India and being trapped in vicious

trap of poverty, filth and unemployment was out of question (Gupta in Twaddle ed.

1975: 130). Partly Indian policies also did not allow them to forget their old links as it

appealed to them thrice in two years, for financial. help for defence fund to contain

China and Pakistan. A large number of visitors from India, religious leaders, fund

collectors for charity and politician kept coming and made contact with PIO. All these

were strengthening the feelings of mutual dependence. When they were in crisis this

time India did not react in the same way as it used to do.6 The Indian Parliament

discussed the issue at length and Mrs. Gandhi made Intervention during debate to

assure the members that government was monitoring the situation7•

The then Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, B.R. Bhagat was sent to

Nairobi carrying personal message of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to Kenyatta. Bhagat when

returned to India accepted in parliament that there was rampant rumour in Kenya that

India was going to interfere in internal affairs of Kenya because "he was going there

6 Nehru used to say that if they are not ready to become citizen and not welcomed there they should

come back to India. 7

Indian parliament was told that there were 186,000 people of Indian origin in Kenya. Out of this, 130,000 were British citizen, 44,000 Kenyan and only 4,000 were Indian nationals.

187


to ask them to slow down their policy" (India Lok Sabha debate 25 March 1968).

Bhagat had a prior appointment with President Kenyatta but the latter cancelled the

appointment when Bhagat reached Nairobi. Bhagat met vice-president and other

officials but came without delivering Mrs. Gandhi's letter to Kenyatta. Indian

Parliament felt that cancellation of Bhagat's appointment was to snub India. New

Delhi suspected British hand as Britain was propagating that India wanted to interfere

in Kenya's internal affairs (ibid). Public opinion was raged in India as well as in

Nairobi. The Times of India on 26 March 1963, wrote "But if the implication is that

president Kenyatta fell into a trap laid for him by a third party, it does little credit to

his political acumen". Justifying the cancellations of appointment Daily Nation

(Nairobi) criticised Bhagat's decision to not hand over the message for Kenyatta to

somebody else and called his conduct as bad tempered. 8 The, then, Indian High

Commissioner, Prem Bhatia narrated the incident in his book later. "My opposition

made no difference. I was informed that the move was based on political decision and

that it had already been announced as a government commitment. In the event I had

no alternative but to prepare myself to make the best ofa bad job" (Bhatia 1973: 130).

Nevertheless, Government of Kenya extended the permit to non-citizen for a longer

period varying from one to two years with prospect of renewal.

The Indian govel11111ent had started economic initiatives at bilateral level to bring

Indian settlers in Kenya within the policy framework of India. It proposed to establish

Africa-India Development Corporation with Kenyan PIO and Indian capital, its aims

was to seek integration of the Indian co111munity in the economic life of Kenya, thus

fortifying the foundation of a multiracial society (AICC Economic Review Review

October 1966). Finally it could not materialise, due to the reasons of Indian

disinterest, but it did show the shift, which was coming in Indian policy for PIOs in

Africa.

Uganda was another country in East Africa where India's policy on Indian settlers

demonstrated the shift. When Idi Amin came to power in January 1971 in Uganda, he

8 Daily Nation wrote - "The head of state is a busy person with many calls on his time and Mr. Bhagat should have been quick to appreciate this fact. Cancellation of the appointment however did not imply refusal to receive the message. He declined, preferring to return to India, with the message. He may argue that he was right in his decision. That is-his right We respect it. We feel that his decision was wrong and his conduct bad tempered." Daily Nation (Nairobi) 27-3-68 reproduced in Africa Diary Vol. VIII, No. 20, 1968, pp. 3921-2.

188


wanted to put the entire Ugandan economy in the hands of Ugandans of African

origin. He said that 80,000 Asians in Uganda were sabotaging the economy and

encouraging corruption and therefore there were no rooms for them in Uganda (Africa

Digest 1972: 96). All PIOs who were Kenyan citizen, British and Indian passport

holder had to leave in 90 days before November 8, 1972. Amin called the expulsion

ofPIO "as part ofthe war ofliberation". Indian Deputy Minister of external affair said

in parliament, "We are in touch with the Ugandan authorities and I can assure the

house that we shall do everything we can to protect the interest of Indians there". The

Indian president while in Lusaka denounced the expulsion and stated, "The

happenings in Uganda have a heavy cloud of doubt and uncertainty over the minds of

many people of Indian origin in several countries of Africa, ... The pernicious doctrine

of racialism may permeate even free Africa" (quoted in Gupta 1974: 322).

Though public opinion was aroused in India, it refuted strongly and ridiculed Amin's

allegation that India was planning to invade Uganda along with Tanzania and Zambia.

However, India made it clear that it was going to support any international move,

which would persuade Amin in extending the expulsion deadline. India did not take

the tougher line because Indian move against a purely racial issue would have been

interpreted as Indian interference and designs in Africa. Indian support for Afro-Asian

solidarity was another constraint. But the main consideration of Indian in not taking a

tougher lime on the issue seemed, since "there is nothing to be gained by using strong

words, if they cannot be backed by meaningful action in Uganda, any show of strong

sentiment may trigger off an anti-Asian wave" (Times of India 6 October 1972).

Years later India faced same constraints when Bavadra government was dismissed in

Fiji and anti-PIO moves started there (Kaul 1991 ).

Ugandan crisis made India realise that the leadership and political system of African

states vary considerably from country to country and Indian support to Afro-Asian

solidarity had to be qualified by longer national interests. These expulsions brought

home another point to India. Despite Indians consistent support to African

decolonisation and Afro-Asian solidarity, none of the African countries, howsoever,

friendly to India and opposed to Idi Amin's action, offered to accommodate expelled

Indians even in small number as a gesture to sympathise with India. As far as India

was concerned, it was never its policy to debar entry of PIO if they wanted to resettle

189


in India with their saving and assets. Government of India made special provisions

and gave inducement for Asians to resettle in India with their saving and assets.

Despite such offer, none of them opted to return to India. The restraint approach of

India, however, succeeded in getting Amin agree to pay compensation for business

and properties ·of Indian passport holders, which was not given to Indians of other

nationalities (Dubey 2003: 130-131).

Sri Lanka: Newly independent Ceylon wanted to get rid of nearly 800,000 Indians

Tamils in the country. India took the stand that it would accept only those Indian

Tamils who qualified for citizenships under Article 8 of the Indian Constitution.

Those who did not qualify would be treated as stateless and would be the

responsibility of Sri Lanka where they domiciled. The then Prime Minister Lal

Bahadur Shastri changed the policy and entered into an agreement with Sirimavo

Bandaranaike in 1964. India agreed to take 50,025,000 stateless Indian Tamils and Sri

Lanka agreed to grant citizenship to 300,000 of them. In 1974, Indira Gandhi and

Bandaranaike agreed to take fifty per cent each of the remaining 150,000 Indians. The

two agreements could not, however, be implemented because of the reluctance of

Indians Tamils to move to India. The ethnic violence in Sri Lanka thereafter halted

the process. The Sri Lankan parliament eventually passed legislation in 1988 to

enable all Indian Tamils to get Sri Lankan citizenships. Therefore the Government of

India faced severe criticism (Sharma 2008: 7).

Fiji: Subsequent to East African, experience was the expenence of Fiji. The

changing attitude of the Government of India got reflected in 1987 military coup in

Fiji. The changing Indian attitude was visible in media. The issue of overthrow of pro

Indian Fijian government was aggressively reflected in press and other media. India

did not have capacity to forcibly change the situation. It decided to mobilise the

regional powers like Australia to side with India in its effort to change the situation in

Fiji. The NAM Summit, the Commonwealth group, the UN and other forum were

utilised by India to highlight the discrimination and injustice to Indian Diaspora. This

was in clear contrast to what India was doing so far on PIO discrimination issues

(Kaul 1991 ).

South Africa: Indian settlers in South Africa had been a separate case for India.

190


Long before Mahatma Gandhi used his tactics of non-cooperation, civil disobedience,

satyagarh and peaceful protests in Indian freedom struggles in 1920 he evolved and

made maidenuse of many ofthesemethods in South Africa in late nineteenth century.

The personal insult heaped on him in South Africa and his strong feeling against

racial discrimination of Indians in South Africa became a sentimental issue for the

followers of Gandhi in the Indian freedom struggle. The racial discrimination of

Indians in South Africa received constant condemnation from Indian leaders and the

cause of Indians in South Africa always remained high in Indian foreign policy

consideration (Dubey 2003: 126).

The Asiatic Land Tenure Act also known as Ghetto Act became law in June 1946. It

was directed against Indians confining them to specified areas alone. On 3rd

September 1946, in the United Nation General Assembly session started, the Indian

representative Chhagla articulated Indian concerns in the UN subcommittee. He

condemned South Africa's "discriminatory treatment of Asiatics in general" as a

denial of human rights and the Ghetto Act, both of which impaired friendly relations

between India and Africa. The Franco-Mexican resolution supported by India - calling

for treatment of Indians in South Africa to be in conformity with international

obligations and charter of United Nation was passed. Indian approach of special

support to Indian settlers in South Africa lasted until late 50s. Till then resolution of

Indian National Congress used to articulate and strongly support Indian settlers cause

in South Africa though it used to express support to South African non-Indian

sufferers also but in general terms (Indian National Congress Resolutions on Foreign

Policy 1946-66).

Once India raised the issue of South African Indian settlers exclusively within the

U.N. based on human rights clause; it soon realised that it was not possible to keep the

issue confined to Indian settlers alone. Because of the provisions of non-racial

treatment, India had to extend support to all groups and communities subjected to

racial discrimination in South Africa. Further, the policy of exclusively supporting

Indian settlers was in contrast to Nehru's policy of advising Indian settlers in other

parts of Africa, where he counselled of African cause and advised Indian settlers to

integrate themselves with African cause and aspiration and not to seek special

position or privilege. Meanwhile the Group Area Act of 1950 had formally

191

India's Diaspora Policy: A Case Study oflndians in Malaysia Cbapter-IV: India's Diaspora Policy With Special Reference to Malaysian Indians

institutionalised the Apartheid policy affecting Indians as well as Black Africans.

These considerations started a shift in Indian approach on South African issue. India

started associating discrimination of Black and Indians together. Indian President Dr.

Rajendra Prasad in his address explained the shift to Parliament in 1952. He said,

"The question is no longer merely one of Indians of South Africa; it had already

assumed a greater and wider significance. It is question of racial domination and

racial intolerance. It is a question of Africans more than that of Indians in South

Africa". India mobilised twelve other countries, raised the question of racial conflict

in South Africa resulting from apartheid policy, and succeeded in appointment of a

U.N. commission to study the racial situation in South Africa. From then onward, the

issue of Indians in South· Africa was merged with larger issue of apartheid policy in

South Africa, which involved both Indians as well as Black African. Indian policy

then worked for establishment of majority rule in South Africa and merging of Indian

settlers cause with that ofBlack Africans" (Dubey 2003: 126).

During interim Prime Minister Ship in March 1946, Nehru recommended termination

of trade agreement and breaking up of diplomatic ties with South Africa. Lord

Wavell, the Indian viceroy did it immediately.9 This strong step was taken when India

was though free in foreign relations but not free internally. The stakes involved were

high. India at the time of independence needed economic support from all quarter but

this decision deprived India 5 percent of its trade. India's PIO remained the main

concern until late 50s. The defeat of India in 1962 India-China war and its isolation in

Africa changed Indian priorities. Diplomatic support vis-a-vis China and Pakistan

became the most important consideration. By the time India overgrew its inferiority

complex by becoming self sufficient in food, creating Bangladesh, detonating atomic

bomb and launching satellites, it also emerged as country having third largest skilled

and trained manpower. Its economic consideration became paramount in third world

countries like Africa where its technology and skills can be sold at very competitive

prices. The South-South umbrella suits India to sell its manufactured and value added

goods in Africa. The issue ofPIO has receded to background since it does not fit in or

helps in contemporary concern of India. The current euphoria of India on the end of

apartheid is not just, because Indian settlers and Blacks have become free from

9 Indian High Commissioner did not returned to South Africa since 1946 when Ghetto Act was passed But India used to maintain a small office in Durban which was finally closed in 1954 and thereafter all direct link between Indian and South Africa ceased.

192


racialism. It is also largely because India wants to convert its goodwill for South

Africa, this time, into economic favour by having a favourable access to its large and

strong economy. Whether this expectation will be reciprocated or not is a different

question but this time India does not expect as return of its contribution to struggle

against apartheid, a favourable treatment to South African Indian settlers (Lal 2006).

Both domestic and international changes have altered the priority and agenda of

India's policy towards PIOs. The major concern of India during colonial rule in Africa

was to see to it that the colonial government gave equal privileges to PIO compared to

European settlers. It advised PIO to join black Africans in freedom struggle and to

become one of them without seeking special privilege or status. With abolition of

colonialism, both internal and external, such imperatives do not exist. Second, in post

colonial phase of Africa, India by its experience realised that expectation of 'dual

loyalty' and inclusion of PIO in policy framework neither wins them over for Indian

investment or other economic needs nor does it pleases African governments . who

have to deal strongly with PIO according to domestic imperatives and pressures. Even

the PIO after their experience in Zanzibar, Uganda, Zambia and other countries have

realised that Indian support for their protection is going to be limited because India's

own capacity to intervene is limited. Even during their crisis, the PIOs themselves did

not respond to Indian offer to come and invest in India and get Indian citizenship.

Thirdly, PIOs have historically and politically become a part of African states and the

issue of PIO has receded as major concern. Therefore, it is not surprising that in

aggressive diplomatic and economic initiatives of Indian government during 1970s

and 80s the issue of PIO hardly got an important place. Perhaps India learnt through

its East African experience that it is unrealistic and counterproductive to expect extra

care for South African Indian settlers from South African government as a reciprocal

gesture for Indian contribution to struggle against apartheid. The real test of this

policy will come when Indian settlers may have to share the burden of economic and

social restructuring programme in South Africa. Such pressures and demands from

black groups have already started surfacing openly. However, because of the long

isolation ofSouth Africa from India they will not have, unlike East African Indian a

'dependency' attitude towards India. Therefore, India does not have to respond to a

non-existent expectation of PIO. But it does not mean that PIOs have no place in

Indian policy (Dubey 2003: 133-134).

193


The Dollar Reliable Diaspora in the Gulf region: The oil boom of 1970s enabled a

large number of Indians rushing to the Gulf region. They remained employed for a

long period though they had no chance of getting settled or acquiring local

citizenship. As a result, they have to repatriate all their earning and savings to India . .

under compulsion. This benefited India's foreign exchange reserve, which was a very

scarce resource. The government of India strongly moved on this aspects and created

better banking & other facilities for repatriation of foreign exchange. It raised the

., interest rate on foreign exchange deposits. It took up the issue of welfare of its

migrant workers in west Asian countries. It came out with policy and enactment to for

compulsory registration of recruitment agents of labours to avoid exploitation and

deportation of the work force. Recently Indian Government under its changed

Diaspora policies announced special insurance scheme of Indian Diaspora in the gulf

region (Lal 2006).

4.3.2.: India's Policy towards Indian Diaspora in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia did not play a major part in India's Foreign Policy calculations during

the 1960s, a period when India was facing major security threats from Pakistan and

China. The exigencies of the Cold War, political and economic considerations at

home had a hand in the shaping of India's policy towards the region. This occupation

with its immediate neighourhood held· back India from formulating a policy towards

ethnic Indians. The Indians in Southeast Asia do not evoke the suspicion and hatred of

the indigenous peoples. They are small in number, politically they do not have much

influence and most of them belong to the weaker economical society.

TABLE 4.2.: Population of Indian Diaspora in Southeast Asia

Country Population NRis PIOs Stateless %of the population

Brunei 331,000 7,000 500 100 2.3% Cambodia 11,340,000 150 150 Nil Negligible Indonesia 200,000,000 500 50,000 Nil Negligible Laos 5,100,000 107 18 NA Negligible· Malaysia 22,890,000 15,000 1,600,000 50,000 7.3% Myanmar 46,500,000 2,000 2,500,000 400,000 5% Philippines 76,000,000 2,000 24,000 12,000 Negligible Singapore 3,160,000 90,000 217,000 Negligible 9.71% Thailand 62,000,000 15,000 70,000 Nil .07% Vietnam 78,000,000 320 Nil 10 Negligible

Source: Report of The High Level Committee On .the Indian Diaspora (2001), Indian Council of World Affairs: New Delhi, p. 253.

194


Prof. V. Suryanarayan briefly illustrates the two examples that are given below to

examine India's policy towards Overseas Indians in Southeast Asia. The first relates

to the status of Indians in Burma, where, unfortunately New Delhi attached greater

importance to the improvement of state-to-state relations rather than protecting the

legitimate interests of the Indian community. Soon after independence, the Burmese

Government initiated radical land reforms, which hit the interests of the Indian

Chettiar community. A total of 27 lakh acres of land, 14 percent of the total cultivable

land in Burma, was nationalised. The market value of the land was estimated at Rs. 70

crores. Despite t~e excellent equations between New Delhi and Rangoon, India could

not persuade Burma to pay adequate compensation to the landlords. According to

informed estimates, by the end of 1961, only Rs. 1.75 crores had been paid as

compensation. During the second wave ofnationalisation in the 1960's under General

Ne Win, in furtherance of the Burmese Way to Socialism, Rangoon nationalised the

petty retail shops owned by the Indians- 12,000 shops with assets worth Rs. 15 crores

were taken over by the government. What is more tragic, the Indians were not even

allowed to repatriate their savings. The repatriates complained of demonetisation of

currency notes, expropriation of properties, confiscation of valuables and

unimaginable humiliations. According to a Policy Note issued. by Government of

Tamil Nadu, from June 1963 onwards, 1,44,353 repatriates from Burma have returned

to India. Even after a lapse of forty years, the compensation due to these people has

not been settled. New Delhi's official stance had been that nationalisation was strictly

a matter of domestic jurisdiction (Suryanarayan 2003: 80-81).

The PIOs who had to flee Burma were very disappointed with the government's

policy. The hard reality was that India was hardly in a position to provide any reliefto

them in the wake of the 1962 conflict with China. Indian also needed Burma's help to

tackle the Naga Insurgency. Military intervention was not an option and the

isolationist General Ne Win was not concerned about international opinion (Sharma

2008: 7).

A crisis in Malaysia on the question of work permits was averted by New Delhi,

thanks to the behind the scenes diplomacy by the Indian Government. In order to

solve the acute problem of unemployment, the Malaysian Government in 1968

introduced the system of work permits for non-citizens in specialised categories. In

195

India's Diaspora Policy: A Case Study oflndians in Malaysia Chapter-JV: India's Diaspora Policy With Special Reference to Malaysian Indians

1969, Kuala Lumpur announced that the work permits would not be renewed, which,

for all practical purposes was a warning to non-citizens to quit their jobs. If the

Government had strictly enforced the rules, 55,000 Indian labourers would have lost

their jobs. The Government of India and the representatives of the Malaysian Indians

were able to persuade the Government to make modifications in the regulations.

Kuala Lumpur agreed to speedily dispose-off the applications for citizenship; those

who applied for citizenship would be given employment passes. Those who were

eligible for citizenship could also apply for it during the work permit period. If the

citizens were not forthcoming, non-citizens could continue in their jobs. The last

concession was a boon for the Indians, because Malays at that time were unwilling to

work in the plantations. A few months later, the Malaysian Government extended the

work permits of all those who had applied for citizenship. However, the communal

violence, which took place in Malaysia in May 1969, had a traumatic impact on the

minority groups. Nearly 60,000 Indians voluntarily returned to India during this

period (Suryanarayan 2003: 80-81).

A. Mani argues in his new released book on "Rising India and Indian Communities in

East Asia" (2008), that Thailand and the Philippines; the Indian migration was mostly

from the Punjab and the Sindh. As non-Muslims from these areas were extremely

conscious of their ethnicity vis-a-vis Islam, they preserved their religious identity as

Hindus and Sikhs after migration by maintaining close kinship ties, points out A.

Mani. But Tamils in Thailand have been assimilated into Thai society through inter

ethnic marriage as they were small in number and felt no compulsion to zealously

protect their Indian or Hindu identity.

4.3.3.: From Active Disassociation to Active Association

In 1977, when a non-Congress government led by the JanataParty assumed power,

the first signs of an official rethink vis-a-vis the Diaspora appeared. That, official

policies strike a balance between safeguarding India's foreign policy interests and

show legitimate concern about Indians overseas was clearly a priority. There were to

be changes in the entry laws allowing overseas Indians to return to the 'motherland',

even if they were foreign nationals. The government sponsored a seminar on overseas

Indians and declared that henceforth· the Indian Council for Cultural Relations would

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get involved ..... The new policy seemed to be a seeking of balancing of interests of

India while at the same time expressing legitimate concem about overseas Indians

(Dutt 1981: 296-297).

The concem was pertinent as by this time Indian workers were employed in the Gulf

region and their remittances brought in significant foreign exchange, especially for

states such as Kerala. Indian parliamentarians raised questions about the welfare of

Indian workers in the Gulf, obliging the government to adopt a more proactive policy

towards the Gulf States so that it could effectively safeguard the interests of Indian

communities there. Remittances from the Gulf also made Indian policymakers more

aware of the economic potential of Indians overseas and so they formulated a range of

investment incentives for them, hoping to channel foreign exchange eamings into

state-sponsored savings schemes. Limited banking reforms were introduced to

facilitate foreign exchange inflow. In fact, it was in the early 1980s, when the volume

of remittances grew, that the term 'nonresident Indian' (NRI) increasingly entered the

official lexicon. Terms such as 'Indians abroad', 'person of Indian origin' (PIO), even

'expatriate Indians' also continued to be used, but were not clearly defined, However,

the overall investment framework was still not entirely conducive to Indians overseas

as Indian policy-makers were still hesitant about the role NRis could play in the

national economy. Even so, it was clear from the 1980s onwards that economic

imperatives rather than ideological considerations would unmistakably shape the

changing dynamics of the motherland and it's Diaspora (Lal2006: 86-87).

Although the Janata government did not remain in power for very long, the debate on

expatriate Asians had restarted within the Indian government. With regard to the

problems conceming the rights to own property in India, to be able to reside there and

to invest, policies varied over ·time. Although by law they were aliens, some

difference between them and non NR1s were made by the government with regard to

the above areas. NRis already in the mid 1980s were allowed to buy and own

property, although only in specified areas. NRis had to pay for the property in foreign

exchange, could own no more than two at a time, which again were subject to a three

year lock-in period before resale, and could use the property for personal residence or

renting out only. If any of these properties were rented out the proceeds could not be

repatriated, yet if the NRI wished to sell the property after the lock in period, he could

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repatriate the original investment from the sale proceed, 'but capital gains calculated

at the rate of 20 percent of resale consideration shall not be allowed· to be repatriated'

(Economics Times: 1.8.1988).

These guidelines had been set up during the 'liberalisations' of the early 1980s. The

news was that NRis with Indian passports did not need the approval of the Reserve

Bank of India to buy property, which was still a requirement for other foreigners,

foreign companies, or NRls with foreign passports. Allowing NRls to own properties

it was hoped, would fuel investments flowing into the country, yet despite this, there

were few investment proposals as the procedures for granting approval to the NRI

project was intensely cumbersome (Goswami 1988).

Other facilities which were developed or improved in the same period were the

holding of stocks and shares, and the holding of bank accounts in India. Any NRI

could invest in Government securities and units of Unit Trust of India and the

National Savings Plan Certificates of the Government of India through an authorised

foreign exchange dealer. The acquisition of shares was subject to approval of the

Reserve Bank of India, who allowed it only 'if the non'-resident investor furnishes an

undertaking binding himself, his heirs,' executors, successors, and assigns not to seek

repatriation of capital invested or income earned thereon, irrespective of the manner

of payment ofthe investment' (Lall2001: 101).

When Rajiv Gandhi· became the Prime Minister in 1984, definite signs showing the

government's shift in direction foreshadowed an imminent, larger policy shift. The

government built up its agencies for dealing with the Diaspora. In 1985, it set up a

Special Coordination Division in the Ministry of External Affairs as a nodal point to

manage actions relating to Indians overseas. In 1986, ·it established a Consultative

Committee for Non-Resident Indians, comprising representatives from different

ministries, trade and industry, and a dozen NRis from across the globe. It also

attempted to develop a database on Indians overseas and formed an lndo-NRI

Chamber of Commerce and Culture to promote investment and foster trade links in

1987.

That same year, when a political crisis erupted in Fiji, Indians were deeply interested

in reports of ethnic discrimination against the Indian community there. India's official

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response this time was proactive, in marked contrast to the Ugandan crisis of 1972 or

racial riots in Malaysia 1969. In 1988, an Indian official delegation, led by Shankar

Dayal Sharma, who was then the vice-president, visited Guyana to participate in

celebrations marking the 150th anniversary of the arrival of Indians. The delegation

also visited Surinam and Trinidad and Tobago to strengthen cultural and emotional

ties with Indian communities there. The Indian government showed further support

when the first Global Convention of Overseas Indians (New York, 1989) pioneered

efforts to bring together people of Indian origin on a single platform, 'to discuss

common problems and issues.' In 1990-91, when over 150,000 Indians were stranded

in Kuwait and Iraq following the Gulf War, the Indian government promptly arranged

for their evacuation. All these events were signs that 'India' was taking note of 'India

Abroad' (Government of India, MEA Annual Reports 1947-1995).

4.4.: Proactive Period Since 1990s

Contemporary attitudes shape the identity of the "new Diaspora", and old notions of

what constitutes a community are being constantly challenged; therefore adjusting in

various countries has not been a problem for the Indian Diaspora. No longer does the

new Indian immigrant feel he is in exile, nor does he need to cling to his community

for assurance. The stereotype images do not apply to the highly professional Indian

Diaspora and the "one size fits all" approach is not applicable to them. Today, global

identities are being forged, especially by second-generation migrants in the antipodes

and elsewhere. It is these Indians who are benefiting from the transnational networks,

which gives them a platfonn to forge links with other Indian immigrants spread across

the globe. However, "Indian identity" is no longer inward looking, new Indian

immigrant is now more like Pico Iyer's description of the woman fi:om Australia

whose first name was Spanish, her last name was Hungarian but was born in Italy,

and was travelling to India. (Pico Iyer, 2001). Thus notions of identity cannot be

based on the assumption of a single identity, thus as aptly described by Amartya Sen:

"The same person can be of Indian origin, a Parsee, a French citizen, a US resident,

a woman, a poet a vegetarian, an anthropologist, a university professor, a Christian,

a bird watcher, and an avid believer in extraterrestrial life and of the propensity of

alien creatures to ride around the cosmos in multicoloured UFO 's. Each of these

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collectivities, to all of which this person belongs, gives him or her particular identity"

(Sen 2005: 350).

India's re-engagement with the Diaspora really took off only after 1991, when the

Indian economy faced an unprecedented crisis arising from the bankruptcy of its

foreign exchange reserves .. As is well known, the crisis triggered a process of

economic reforms as India prepared itself to exploit the opportunities and counter the

threats arising from globalisation. There was now a deep realisation that India needed

to reinvent itself economically for it badly needed investment in infrastructure, which

neither the Indian state nor private business had the capacity to mobilise. If India

intended to develop economically and remain competitive in a swiftly globalising

world, it had to aggressively pull in foreign direct investments and readily allow for

the infusion of new technologies. It was in this new context oflarger policy shifts that

India re-engaged with its Diaspora in the 1990s. 'NRI' became a buzzword in India in

the 1990s as overseas Indians and their lifestyles captured popular imagination.

However, though Indians at home became increasingly receptive towards the

Diaspora, domestic political instability decelerated the pace of official policy changes.

But the Congress government of India was cautious and slow towards this segment.

Because of its historical position, it was over cautious in inCluding PIOs under overt

policy framework. When Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power Indian policy

changed very fast for this segment. Historically Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh

(RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Pari shad (VHP), a support base for BJP, had maintained

very close people-to-people contact through its branches among Hindu overseas

settlers. In contrast to Nehru's policy of active dissociation of PIOs from Indian

foreign policy objectives, BJP stood for active and overt association of PIOs for

foreign policy objectives of India (Dubey 2003: 141 ).

In 1998, the government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, with Atal Bihari Vajpayee

at its helm, announced the introduction of a 'PIO Card' for Indians settled in specified

countries, promising visa-free travel and privileges in matters of investment and

education. In 2000, the government set up a High Level Committee on Indian

Diaspora chaired by L. M. Singhvi, a parliamentarian, jurist and former diplomat

responsible for assessing the issues concerning Indians overseas, suggesting new

policy and organisational frameworks, and recommending a country-specific agenda

200


to intensify India's engagement with its Diaspora. In 2001, the Indian Prime Minister

formally inaugurated the 6th Convention of the Global Organisation of People of

Indian Origin (GOPIO) in New Delhi. On the recommendation of the Singhvi

committee, the government implemented numerous novel policy initiatives, including

the decision to celebrate the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas and institute the Pravasi

Bharatiya Samman. Perhaps the most significant initiative was the Indian

government's announcement, at the inaugural Pravasi Bharatiya Divas held in January

2003, of sweeping changes to the country's 48-year-old Citizenship Act, granting

Indians living in Britain, Canada, Australia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands

and the US the privilege of claiming dual citizenship. The restriction of dual

citizenship to only one constituency of the Diaspora the NRis settled in affluent

Western countries-led to widespread criticism from other NRI segments, especially

from the West Indies and countries such as Fiji, South Africa Malaysia and Mauritius,

where Indian communities are not well..:endowed. In 2004, when an Congress-led

coalition spearheaded by Manmohan Singh assumed power, it adopted two significant

measures: it established a separate Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs; and at the

Pravasi Bharatiya Divas held in January 2005, it declared that dual citizenship would

be extended to all Indians overseas who migrated after the inauguration of the Indian

Union on 26 January 1950, subject to the laws prevailing in their home countries, thus

eliminating the basis of criticism of the earlier policy. However, dual citizenship

would be granted without voting rights (Lal 2006: 82-89).

India's engagement with globalisation has been a cautious one. Triggered by an

unexpected crisis, this engagement has been marked by anxiety and uncertainty in

dealing with the dramatic forces that globalisation might and does unleash. Decades

spent behind a closed economy, together with a deep sense of commitment to the idea

of swadeshi and national self-sufficiency, have played major roles in shaping the

mind set of Indian policymakers, making them look upon multinational corporations

(MNCs) and foreign capital investors with distrust. There exists the fear that MNCs,

once they invest in a big way in the Indian economy, may attempt to dictate the terms,

undermine national sovereignty and negatively influence Indian culture. The Indian

state's attempts to cultivate the Diaspora must be seen within this context. It is widely

perceived that Indians overseas are better endowed with investments, technological

know-how, and entrepreneurial and managerial skills. It is also believed that they are

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capable of greater commitment to the cause of India's. development. Furthermore, as

the nation embraces globalisation, Indians at home have come to realise that Indians

overseas are more compatible in cultural terms and more attuned to local sensitivities

than they assumed.

The Indian political leadership's engagement with its Diaspora has come full circle. In

its nationalist, anti-colonial phase, the leadership showed genuine sympathy towards

Indians overseas. After 1947, post-colonial India developed a more bounded sense of

itself as a nation state as it framed its citizenship laws. Its foreign and economic

imperatives dictated a policy of disengagement from the Diaspora. Now, as India

reinvents itself as a global economic player, the state increasingly looks upon Indians

overseas as assets. At the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, a leader from India Inc. said,

'the overseas Indians would scout opportunities, represent 'Brand India', network for

Indian initiatives. They would be the flag bearers. They will help India shift from

being a local player to being a global leader'. Contemporary attitudes shape the

identity of the "new Diaspora", thus notions of what constitutes a community, is being

constantly challenged, the stereotype image do not apply to the highly professional

Indian Diaspora. India's is one of the leading countries having finest IT professionals

in the world. It is acknowledged by experts that India is 'probably the most successful

developing country attracting ICT - enabled services'. India's software industry is

'growing strongly'. Describing the Indian model for growth in ICT, it has been

observed: "The second model, followed in India, involving having low-cost, high

quality engineers to attract outsourcing work from global players in the industry,

competing in the labor-intensive, cost-sensitive areas of coding, testing, web services,

and technical support. This model is increasingly difficult to follow as more countries

and regions attempt to compete ... Nonetheless, East Asian countries with a strong

base of human capital and low wages, such as China, may choose to emulate it"

(Yusuf2003: 338.:343).

In such changed scenario, the proactive interest of India in 90s does not have any

element of imperialist design or racist preference as was likely to be construed during

Nehru period.

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4.5.: Malaysian Indians in India's Diaspora Policy and India's Look· East Policy

Moreover, the presence of the ''new Indian Diaspora", which consists ofhighly skilled

people has enhanced India's image in Southeast Asia. The Government of India is

taking great interest in the Indian Diaspora, which is evident from the Report of the

High Level Committee. Increased growth in trade and investment between India and

ASEAN has had a positive effect with a surge of skilled workers, professionals and

business people to almost all the countries of ASEAN. There is a great demand and

respect for these Indian professionals who are so different from the Indian immigrants

who went to Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century, especially under the indenture

system. The Indians who came as indentured labourers were no better than slaves.

There was no question of their having political rights: they were used as tools for the

advancement of British commercial interests. They were loyal and industrious and

gave no trouble as long as they were allowed to live as separate entities, maintaining

their links with "Mother India" (Kaul1982: 23-24).

As previously discussed, after independence India followed the policy of

disassociation related to its Diaspora. The basic principles of India's Foreign Policy

were laid at Independence under the Prime Ministership of Nehru. Subsequently there

was noticeable continuity and change which subsequent governments blindly

followed Nehru's path. The proactive Diaspora Policy or from 'active-disassociation'

to 'active-association' started especially after 1991, when the Indian economy faced

severe crisis arising from the bankruptcy of its foreign exchange reserves. The crisis

triggered a process of economic reforms as India prepared itself to exploit the

opportunities to counter the threats arising from globalisation and liberalisation. There

was deep realisation that India needed to restructure itself economically and needed

investment for infrastructure restructuring, and neither the Indian state nor private

sector had the capacity to counter the drastic situation. If India intended to develop

economically and remain competitive in a swiftly globalised world, it had to

·aggressively pull Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and the infusion of new

technologies. In this context, the larger policy shifts appears in the re-engagement of

India with its Diaspora in the 1990s because only affluent section of the overseas

Indians i.e. Non-Residential Indians (NRI's) can became a safeguards for the Indian

economy in the 1990s. This was the same time when India also initiated its 'Look

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East Policy' under the P. V. Narasimha Rao's Congress Government. The Rao's

proposal had instant and successful fallout with India becoming a sectoral dialogue

partner of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nation) in January 1992 and full

dialogue partner in December 1995. In July 1996, India became a member of ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF). As a result, it interacts with ASEAN in various bodies and

meetings, which now includes the ten countries of Southeast Asia (Kaul 2001: 41 ).

When India's initiated its Look East Policy towards the Southeast Asian Countries

then the large presence of the ethnic Indians in the region are unquestionably in the

minds of the foreign policy makers but unfortunately India could not explore its

Diaspora aspects in the strengthening bilateral as well as multilateral relations with

the ASEAN countries. India also missed the opportunity to constructively engage its

Diaspora and gratifying its aspiration and inspiration of the Diasporic community.

As history speaks itself, the Indian leadership totally ignored Indian Diaspora but

occasionally with their 'own-convenience', they addressed few oftheDiaspora issues.

The recent example of Malaysia's unrest, on 25th November 2007, when HINDRAF

internationalised the wretched condition of the ethnic Indians in Malaysia, the

Government of India's initial response was tight-lipped but after the opposition

leaders like L. K. Advani and Rajnath Singh of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)

expresses concern over the plight of Indians. "The BJP has taken a serious note of the

incidents and seeks immediate diplomatic intervention from the UP A government on

this issue. The government should register its protest with the Malaysian envoy in

New Delhi and also convey its displeasure on the developments in Malaysia. The BJP

expresses its solidarity with the people of Indian origin (PIO) in Malaysia and hopes

that their struggle against the injustice and inequality would reach to a logical

conclusion. The BJP statement said the party believes that India has a moral

obligation to take up the case of injustice and persecution of Malaysian Hindus and

PIOs with the authorities in Kuala Lumpur. The UP A government cannot shirk from

this responsibility either out of its commitment to anti-Hindu pseudo-secularism or

under the pretext that this is an internal matter of Malaysia". An ally of the UPA, the

DMK has expressed its concern over the plight of the Tamil Malaysians and

demanded the centre's intervention in the matter. In fact the exodus of Tamils from

Malaysia has united the parties across the spectrum in Tamil Nadu. The AIADMK

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leader J. Jayalalitha and MDMK leader Vaiko have also asked the centre to take up

the matter with Malaysian government. Hindu Rights Action Force, an apex body of

30 organisations, has approached all political parties pleading for support but Waytha

Moorthy, only got the chance to meet the leader of the Opposition, L K Advani. (as

appears in the various Indian newspaper in the month of November and December

2007).

Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi wrote a letter to Prime Minister

Manornhan Singh (Appendix-6), expressing deep concern over the treatment meted

out to ethnic Indians in Malaysia. In the letter, Karunanidhi said that the people of

Tamil Nadu are disturbed over the happenings in Kuala LUUipur, and pointed out that

Tamils constitute the largest percentage of the Indian minority in Malaysia.

Karunanidhi added that he was much perturbed that the Malaysian police used water

cannons and tear-gas shells to disperse the Indian/Tamil demonstrators. Karunanidhi

said, the Malaysian police had detained 240 ethnic Indians. The protesters were

carrying poster-size pictur~s of Mahatma Gandhi, he pointed out. The Chief Minister

urged Prime Minister Singh and the central government to take appropriate action to

end the sufferings and ill treatment meted out to Malaysian Tamils (Hindustan Times;

Indian Express; The Hindu 27th-28th November 2007).

In a statement by the Minister of External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee in the

Parliament on November 30 2007, said, "Government remains deeply solicitous for

the welfare of People of Indian On gin living abroad. As members are aware, there is a

large community of People of Indian Origin in Malaysia who are citizens of that

country. We have friendly relations with Malaysia and we are in touch with the

Malaysian authorities in the related matter", ·(press release of MEA, GOI on 30

November 2007; Appenix-7).

Indian Prime Minister Manrnohan Singh said New Delhi was disturbed by reports

about the use of force against the protesters in the multicultural Islamic country. "This

is a matter which does concern us," Singh told a joint news conference with European

Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso in New Delhi. "Whenever Indian citizens

abroad or People of Indian origin living abroad run into difficulties, that obviously are

a source of concern to us," he added. "The matter is being taken up through

diplomatic channels," junior Parliamentary Affairs Minister Suresh Pachouri told

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India's Parliament, where MPs have accused Malaysia of mistreating ethnic Indians

(www.malaysiakini.coril Accessed on 1 December 2007).

In the seventh Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD), 7-9 January 2009 held at Chennai, the

Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) circulated a fiery report on the plight of

Malaysian Indians. It urged the Indian government to slap trade sanctions on

Malaysia, including a boycott ofthe country's palm oil, until Malaysia's government

stopped discriminating against the Indian minority. The report couched its demands in

the same rhetoric invoked by the Indian government, appealing to the shared heritage

of Indians. But commori descent does not translate into common cause. Before the

day was over, Datuk Seri Samy V ellu, the President of the Malaysian Indian

Congress, called a press conference of his own to rubbish the report (The Economist,

14th January 2009).

During the 9 March 2003 incident, when nearly 300 Indian citizens, mostly IT

professionals in Kuala Lumpur, were 'maltreated' and 'interrogated' by the Malaysian

authorities, the Indian government reacted sharply and warned that any repeat of such

incidents would affect bilateral ties. The Government of India indicated that it would

re-examine bilateral agreements and other trade related concessions given to

Malaysia. Foreign Regional Registration offices (FRROs), including the one m

Bangalore, were ordered to verify the credentials of Malaysian nationals registered

here. India also expressed its inability to host Malaysian Health Minister towards the

end of March 2003. During the visit of the Malaysian Entrepreneur Development

Minister, his talks with Indian Ministers were confined to the harassment of Indian IT

professionals, instead of the proposed agenda. Similarly, the Ministry of Sports in

consultation with the External Affairs Ministry ordered a last minute pull-out of the

Indian hockey team from the prestigious Azlan Shah Cup hockey tournament that

year (Singh 2007).

If both the incidents of March 2003 and November 2007 are compared, in each case

the Indian government acted as a mute spectator of the whole episode or just involved

only in lip-service as the recent protest (November 2007) involved PIOs and the

pervious one (March 2003) was related to the affluent NRis. The Indian

Government's biasness and dissociation policy towards the PIOs was once again

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witnessed. The same issues also haunted the Indians Government especially in the

Pravasi Bharatiya Divas.

Shekhar (2007) argues that Southeast Asia is the home of the largest number of Indian

Diaspora and Malaysia has the largest presence. Malaysia is the India's second largest

A SEAN trading partner but remained out of the central focus of the Look East Policy.

Given Malaysia's preference for an Islamic outlook in its foreign policy, there is a

need to approach Malaysia as the second largest 'Muslim democracy' in the world.

Such an approach can help in removing the misgivings between the two countries,

facilitate greater people-to-people contact between the two countries and also connect

the Indian Diaspora with the mainstream host society and economy.

Lal (2006) notes, the Indian community has divided views on the Indian

Govemment's current policy of developing links with wealthy and successful overseas

Indian communities and its celebration of Pravasi Bharatiya Divas. In 2003, MIC

President Datuk Seri Samy V ellu was awarded. the Indian Diaspora Award, but some

Malaysian Indians feel that poorer overseas Indian communities have been neglected.

Likewise, the Indian government's dual citizenship policy for non-resident Indians is

sometimes seen as restrictive and confined largely to Indians residing in affluent

Western countries. The economic and technological rise of India brings benefits to the

Indian Diaspora, especially those who have been neglected long time. The rise of

India has provided powerful linkages for selected groups of Indians situated outside

India but it remains to be seen how this new global Diasporic exchange will benefit

the whole Indian community. The time has changed; hence, a more pro-active

Diaspora policy is required. India has the moral duty to address the concerns of the

ethnic Indians anywhere in the world, without jeopardising the relations with the host

countries. Ohly then, the condition ofPIOs as well as India will improve globally, as

PIOs constitutes more than 75 percent of the Indian Diaspora.

From January 2003 onwards India hosted seventh Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) but

it seems just only a yearly ritual because during the initial age of PDB there is plenty

of expectation from the Indian Government especially towards the plight of People of

Indian Origin in the host countries and the report of the Singhvi Committee is also a

imperfect document on Indian Diaspora. The Indian Government action and reaction

related to the concerns of PIOs in the host countries is a great need of the hour

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India's Diaspora Policy: A Case Study oflndians in Malaysia Chapter-lV: India's Diaspora Policy With Special Reference to Malaysian Indians

however that does not, as of now, seem at all likely. These kinds of trends also

appears in the recent racial attacks on Indian students in Australia where the

Government of India watched the whole episode just as a mute spectator and engage

themselves only in lip-service to pressurise the Australian authority.

The fact that the overseas Indians had been economically successful in some societies

does not mean that they were a success everywhere they settled. In general they had a

difficult life. The expatriate Indians of Fiji Guyana, Malaysia and Uganda were the

victims of state oppression and, fierce racist policies at different points in time in the

past (namely early 1960s Guyana, late 1960s Malaysia, 1971 Uganda, and 1986-87

Fiji). There were a number of reasons why in some cases the story of the Diaspora

ended in tears: first they did not integrate with the local population and they were not

organised in a way to collectively fight repression. Amongst themselves religious and

caste differences were prevalent, and caused internal schisms; they were not a

homogeneous group in language, cultural traditions or religious affiliations. They also

felt that first they had done so much for the development of their country of residence

and then they had fought side by side with the locals against the white oppression.

They felt that there was a certain amount of injustice when they subsequently became

targets of discrimination and oppression by the local population. In fact they had

simply become the victims of rising local nationalism. As early as 1965-6 the Indians

in East Africa had come to realise that their days were numbered, 'but . they were

willing to wait and see how fate shaped their destiny' (Twaddle 1975: 132),

In fact it was the lack of integration, which caused both the rift with the host society

and the problems with the newly independent India. The Diaspora could easily blame

the colonial organisation which had kept them segregated from the local population,

yet their internal social structure did not allow for Asian-local relations to go beyond

the shopkeeper-customer or master-servant level. The economic barriers one can add

the deep. differences in culture· and ways of life, which did not encourage informal

social contacts between the Indians and the Africans. TheDiaspora saw its way oflife

in a pluralistic society that did not require the radical process of assimllation: In that

sense the African and Asian publics were usually at odds with each other: one group

demanded 'cultural fusion', the other 'cultural separation'. As a result they were seen

as foreigners, even legacies of the British imperial system, which made them an

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unwelcome segment in the host societies. Younger Indians knew that the future would

lie in cooperationwith the local population, not in the hope for protection from either

India or Britain (Ghai 1970: 218-272).

India's Diaspora Policy is not static. It has evolved in during various political phases

India's political history, the sensitivities of the nationalist struggle, the winning of

independence, and the trauma of partition and the creation of the Republican

constitution of the Indian Union, engendered important changes in India's relations

with the Diaspora. A concern for the treatment of Indian migrant labourers during the

nationalist phase was replaced by post-colonial disavowal after independence of any

lingering responsibility for those who were now part of a separate nation 'overseas',

and later, a tendency to view the skilled migrants who left India as a brain drain.

However, by the last decade of the century, during the period of rapid economic

liberalisation, the value of the Diaspora was rediscovered, and India adopted a

constructive approach towards the Indian Diaspora.

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