CHAPTER IV

INDIA ANC THE IN8IAN OCEAN

- ~~ ...

The present Chapter seeks to examine India• s

responses and reactions to the developments and

dynamics in the Indian Ocean in terms of strategic

importance and security perceptions from 1972 to

1979. The present effort is to trace the evolution

of India's security perspectives on the Indian Ocean

as a strategic arena and the relevant priority this

region was accorded in its security considerations.

As mentioned earlier, the Indian victory in the

1971 war provided a new security perception of the

surrounding geo-politicnl environment among the Indian

policy makers. The victory considerably elevated the

stat us and posit ion of India as a dominant power in

South Asia. But the new found pl:lsition also compelled

India to consider a broadened security scenario and

a widened strategic spectrum. One of the major

dimensions in this context is the Indian ocean region

and the volatile dynamics in this area from 1972 to

1979.

By the turn of the seventies, the Indian

ocean acquired a vital focus in the major pbwers•

strategies, particularly those of the United States

and the Soviet Union. The British withdrawal from

East of Suez in 1968, the United States naval

fleet movements in this region,· the creation of

the British Indian Ocean Territory (BlOT), khe

Diego Garcia issue, the Soviet naval build up tc1 counter

the moves of the United States- all these indicated

the growing_

- 136 A -

ac.eAt-1

importance of the Indian in A

International Politics in Politico-strategic

1 terms.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the sub-

sequent oil-embargo flared up the tensions in the

crucial Persian Gulf and led to the inexorable

involvement of Great Powers in this region. The

United States had been increasingly involved,

particulary since 1973, in the affairs of the

InJian ocean region and of the littoral states.

The involvement of one super power automatically

provided opportunities for the other thereby ~aking

the region a focal point of intE::rnational attention. 2

The grouing relev<mce of the Indian

ocean in internotional politics dreu inexorably the

littoral and hinterland nations into the whirlwind

1.

2.

For a study on these developments, see T.T. Poulose, "The Indian Ocean Problems", Foreign Affairs Reports, val. 23, no. 4, April 1974, pp. 59-63; see also K.P. Misra, "International Politics in the Indian Ocean", Orbis, val. 18, no. 4, Winter 1975 pp. 1088-1108; G.G. Thomson, ''Problems in the Indian Oceanrt, Pacific Community, val. 3, no. 1, October 1971, pp. 126-41.

R.C.Shrma, 11 International and ~~egional Focus on the Indian Ocean 11 , Pacific Community, Val. 7, no. 3, April 1976, pp. 433-57; Klaus Terftoth, ''FuturE of the Indian Occan 11

Stratagic Digest, vol. 6, no. 6, :une 1976 pp. 13-18; "Indian Ocean : A Area of Potential Crisis'', ' 1ikrant, val. 10, no. 12, Sopt.cnber 1980, PP• 11-17.

- 137 -

of Great Power politics. India, one of the

largest of littoral countries, having 7,500 Kms

of coastline, had genuine reesons to be concerned

about these dave lop men ts that were taking p 1 ace

in this strategic arena. In the intial years as

mentioned earlier India had paid mimimal attention

towards the Indian ocean. But the situation changed

quite substantially by the advent of seventies,

for Indie, not only because of the aforementioned

international developments but also due to the

1971 war in which the Indicn navy played a very

crucial role. After 1971, the newly found strength

of India reflected itself to some extent in its

widening security perspective. The favourable

balance of power after 1971 war made it both

necessary and expedient for India to focus more on

the Indian ocean and the related developments. 3

The 1974 atomic test also furthered India's

security concerns over the Indian ocean region.

While nuclear capability substantiated India's

status already raised in the \Jake of victory in

the 1971 war, it also enhanced considerably India's

3. for a relevant account of impact of 1971 war on the balance of power in the Indian Ocean region see Ravi l<.aul, "Indo-Pak War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean 11 , u.s. Naval Institute Procoedino.; (New York), val. 99, no. 843, fV'tay 1973, pp. 17 2-95.

- 138 -

stakes in its wider surroundings which obviously

included the Indian oceen. For the first time,

India achieved a transitory, if not permanent

stability on its borders- lsndwise, with the

obsessive Pakistani threat cut to size and China's

relaxed response to India's overtures for recan-

ciliation of relwtians. India increasingly per-

ceived the need for consolidation of its overall

-4 position and strengthen its maritime front.

In the new scenario, two tJeak points of

India were its n~vy and its vulnerability on the

sea-front. Strategic analysts projected that in

the new circumstances, the thrent to India, as one

of the major littoral countries, could cams mostly

from tho sea-lanes and an impending maritime conflict.

Alternatively there could be Grant Power conflict

and the fall-aut effects of this conflict would

have to be borne by the littoral cauntries. 5 Given

4. Far an analysis of India's builc-up on its defence, see Pushpender Singh, "India's Defence Perspectives and the Armed Farces», Asian Defence Journal, October 1982.

5. For this projection, see Geafferey Kemp, "Threats from Sea: Sources far Asian Maritime Conflict", Orbis, val. 19, no. 3, Fall 1975, pp. 1037-57.

- 139 -

thi~' ;nojccUons l'J' str:'Legic analysts, it 1..1as

quite nutural thBt India shoul:::. h<:ve reformulated

its policy towards the Indian ocean as a strategic

arena.

As mentioned earlier, the 1973 Arab-Israel

war, oil crisis and the 1974 nuclear te3t by 1'1dia-

all these events clearly indicated that the region tJas

the potential arena for power politics. The new

found wealth of oil, minerals, sea-bed resources

in this region added to the existing stratogic

importance of the Indian ocean. Thus both in terms

of geo-politics and socio-economic factors, this

region was fast emerging as centre of impending

. f l't' 6 crlses o pOLJer po 1 l.cs.

Ever since the development of sub-marine

launched Ballistic l~issilos (SLBf·lS), the mobility

and attack-range of the ~reat Powers depended on

6. For relevant discussion, SEw, Auguste Roussiant, Shifting__~9.~F Bala9ces ,ir~iTthe IndianJLs_~, pp. 3-14; T.B. l·hilar, '~-

P.O li ~is~.-en.9..J.,li.li. tary~~~Q te ~+£~ Po tr-m ti al, pp. 63-80; ShJ.nsaker ogen, ' he Present State of the l'1dian Ocean~, pp. 379-92, in A.J~ cQTtr0If-and-R;n;-8urroll, eds, The Indiru:t Ocean ; Its PoLit~ca~,__t:conomi~!].£ ~lilitary.)·!]Qortan.ce, (New York, 1972}. See also William L. Dowdy and R.B. Troqd, ..I.!:ll!, Indian Ocean Pers ectivos on a Strat~ ic Aren~ Durham, 1985, iJP• 3-26, 63-78.

- 140 -

their con-.:rol of sea-lanes and oceanic power.

The strategic location of the ~choke pointsa in the

world uatorways fu:;:-thor added siQnificance to the

control of ocoanic watoruays. The Indian Ocean

region tJas increasingly p.L1gued by Great Power

involvement mainly due to three major factors •

(a) the prevailing instabilities within the r3gion

"hich them salves were a pro duet of complex fa rca s,

(b) the crucial importance attached to the Persian

Gulf and surrounding strategic locations by the

United States and the Soviet Union in their efforts

to gain mastery over these vital areas and (c) the

intra-~egional elites• perceptional di 1Jergences.

matched by extra-regional interests leading to

external forces' involvement and intervention.7

For the purposes of the present analysis,

it may be pointod out that only the Super Powers

i.e. the USA and the USSR, have an capability of

severe security threats to some or all of tho littoral

7. For some accounts on the Great Powers' invol•Jement in the Indian Ocean region, see K.R. Singh, Politics of the Indian Ocean

(New Delhi, 1974), pp. 57"-124, 177-19; Ashok Kapur, "A Challenge to Super Power Global Condominium : Middle Powers and Militarization in the Indian Ocean", in W.L. Dowdy and R.a. Throod, The Indian Ocean ; PersJectives on a. ~tratogic Ar~~ (New York, 19SS , pp. 63-79.

- 141 -

countries' combined strength. So India's responses

and policies need to be examined in the context

of the naval build-up of these two powers, rather

than by relating it to that of the wholo ather

Estern pouers like the U.K., France or West Germany I

or a country likE? China tJho have so far had only

marginal naval strength :::omparod to that of the

two Super Pat.ters. More important is the fact

that b-; the sheer wide range of interests and

capacities, it is the juper ~ewers alone which pa

play a vital role in this region. 8

Whatever may be the rational explanation I

for the naval build-up in this region of the two Powers,

twa things are unassilably acceptable s (a) the

naval build up bf the two Powers in the period

understudy was on ascending level, (b) As a conse­

quence of this, the region was increasingly becoming

a h a t be d a f ..SU p e r P a tJ e r p a 1 i tic s an d a p a s sib 1 e

h t n f t• • d • 9 t rea re or con ronta ~ons, maJOr an m~nar.

fJ, For an identical perspective, see U.S. Bajpai, nrndian View ; A Dangerous Situation''• I.Jorld Focl!§t. val. 2, no. 1, January 1981, PP• 17-20.

9. R.Go Sawhney, "U.s. - Soviet-Chinese Relations ; Strategic Imp act on the Indian Ocean 11 , China ~Q..U, val. 12, no. 1, January-February 1976, pp. 42-49.

- 142 -

The Super Powers' naval build-up in this

region was not a sudden product of seventies.

But in the seventies, the naval rivalry between

the United States and the So,, ie t Union peaked up

in the Indi2n Oce~n r''gion. By the end of 197Js,

the United St~~Es had 32 combat and support vessels.

Importantly, this fi:;ure is in exclusion of N.HO

ships in the . 10

re gJ.on. The Unit..cd States has vital

naval bases at subic bay, Cdark air base in

ph ill ipp ins s, Die go Garcia in the Indian ace an and

stretches its ranQe of activities from the tip of

South Africa across Bahrain and f•lasira in thB

11 Persi.sn Gulf upto New Zealand coast in the east.

The So"iet Union has also maintained a

con si sten t and in ere a singly felt presence in the

Indian oceon since 1968. By the end of seventies, ~(..

the strength of Soviet naval forces was estimated (\

to be around 21 ships consisting of wide variety

10. r~.T. Kaufman, 11 Build-up in the Indian Ocean:', Strategic Digest, val. 11, no. 6,. June 1981, p. 501. For some related details on the u.s. 6uil-up see Dieter Brown, The Indian Ocean ; Region of Conflict or Peace Zone? (Delhi, 1983), pp. 27-47.

11. Richard Hass, 11 Naval f\rms Limitation in the Indian Ocean 11 , Survival, val. 20, no. 2, r·1 arch/April 1978, p. 53-55.

- 143 -

of naval forces 12 till 1977, the Soviet· Union

had its base at Berbera. It has also acquired

the naval install2tion at Socotra in the Arabi8n

sea, the Ethiopie Jahalak archipelago and perim,

the Aden Port of South Yemen. In 1979, the Soviet

Union is reported to ha\'e the Cam r anh 8 ay from

1'ietmam. The Soviet Union also reportedly tried

to acc:uire the ::;an bnse from Hal::Jives and the

Diego Suarez from Madagascar, but could not 1 ~

succeed. ,)

The setting up of the u.s. Rapid Deployment

Force (R.o.F.) resulted in increased tensions in

the region. The slim chancos of success of the 1977-

78 Naval Arms Limitation talks (NAL T) faded away

in the wake of the developments in the form of

Ethippia- Somalia conflict, the fall of Shah of

Iran and the Soviet entry into Afganistan. 14

II

India put up a stiff resistance to the

introduction of Super Power politics and regionalization

1 3.

14.

For related accounts of Soviet build up, see A.J. Coiit.roll ~nd R.ri. Burrell, 11 Soviet-U. s. Naval Comp~ti tion in the Indian Oca~n·• • Orbie~, val. 18, no. 4, Winter 1975, pp. 1109-ZB.

For details see Dieter Biaun, The Indian Ocean ; Region of Conflict or Peace Zone? (New Delhi,

1983), PP~ 21-71 and 115-71.

- 144 -

of global rivc:::lry in the Indian, Ocean region.

Particularly India very sharphy reacted to the

u.s. role in the proliferation of insecurity

and destabilisation in the region. Repeatedly

India issued appeals and declarations to the

United States to keep away from the Indian Ocean

region, in terms of naval forces' concentration

15 and presence.

During the period under study, India voiced

its concern at the Super Power rivalry, the resultant

tensions and instabilities affecting the peace and

security of the region. India's apprehensions mainly

lay in the inter\!entionist postures of the two

Super P01·}ers. India was not merely concerned about

its own security p8r se; instead, it considered

any threot to its su~ roundings as potential dangers

to its own position as these would ultimately

percolate deeply influencing its strategic environment. 16

To counter the super power politics in this

region India's approach was two-pronged: (a) On the

15. See for an account of India's perception and response in this regard, Binay Ranjan Mishra, ~u.s. Strategy in the 1ndian Ocean : India's Perception and Response'1 , ASIA, Pacific Community, no. 18, Fall 1982, PP• 64-79.

16. For an assessment of intervention prospects in this region see P.K.s. Namboodri et al, Intervention in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi, 1982), pp. 88-99 and 129-220.

- 145 -

one hand, to tackle the issue on the political

front by issuing statemGnts and raising voice at

all the available fora-national, regional and

internationi:!l. In this context, Indian moves

for declaring the Indian Ocean c:s a zone of Peace

(IOZOP) can be mentioned as a significant example.

(b) Second, India tried to strengthen its own na,·al

forces from time to time by augumEJnting its naval

strength through relevant technology - thereby

developing the hitherto neglected and ignored

17 Navy as a self-reliDnt and strong fighting force.

India's policy toward~ the region was

underlined by the basic assumption that it had 6

vital stake in and around its neighbourhood and

to keep it freo and away from cold or hot wars and

power politics of the Great Powers. ~t consistently

maintained that the military presence or build-up

of m.ajor Po~1ers around its shores was quite against

it basic core of national interests. Following the

same lines of argument, India advocated strongly

for the implamentation of the peace zone proposal

in the Indian Ocoan.

17. For an analysis of India's responses a:-~d policy posture, see P.K. s. I'J amboodri, J.P. Anand and Sreedar, n. 20, particularly the Chapter titlod 11 India's Response!', PP• 221-48.

- 146 -

Proceeding fu~ther it is necessary to grasp

the fun dam an tal imp lie at ions of the Zone of Peace

18 proposal. By tho implementation of the Zone of

Peace proposal, the following elements would come

into force • (a) ~iarding off of external attempts

to influence or to gain control over the affairs

of the hinterland and littoral countries, {b)

establishment of denucl2arised region with no out-

side military or nuclGar vessels stationing or

passing through the waters of the Indian Ocean,

(c) denial of ··•· naval bases or port call facilitiAs

for military or r--.latod purposos to any external

Pot.Jer, particularly to the Tl.JO Super Pot.Jsrs and

(d) ovolu~ion of an i~fra-ocoanic co~~unity to

protect ~he peaco, stability and maritime interests

19 of the region 'Jis-a-vi~ the external forces.

Even though it was Sri Lanka which moved the

United NEtions Gen2ral Mssembly resolution calling

18.

19.

Here, the attention is mainly centered on the security implications and interests of India, in SupiJO rt ing IO ZOP proposal. Hence, the legal and related proceedings at the U.N. are not elaboratod.

For a su~mary on the Zona of Peaco proposals, see B. \livekanandan, 1'Tho Indian Ocean as Zone Peace: Probloms and Prospoctslt, Asian Sur~e_x., vol. 21, no. 12, December 1981, PP• 1237-49; P. K. s. N am boo dri, 11 E ssence of Peace Zone Conceptn, Stratq,g,ic Analy§~~' vol.3, no. 12, r~arch 1980, pp. 467-70; India 8ackg,roundor, urndian Ocean As Peace Z~nou, vo!; 2, no. 34, 21 N o v em b e r 1 9 7 7 , p p • 9 0 5-11 ; K • P • M i s r a , ltindian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: The Concept and Alternatives 11 , India Quarter!x_, val. 33, no. 1, January- l'larch 1977, pp. 119-8.

- 147 -

for the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace {vide

U.l~. General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI),

16 December 1971), it was India that staunchly

spearheaded the initiatives for such a concept.

By the turn of the seventies, India viewed

with greater concern the naval build-up and

military bases establishmant by major Powers.

India's opposition to military and naval bases had

been expressed even earlier when the British Indian

Ocean territoi"y (BIOT) was created at the fag end

of the sixties. Speaking at the Lusaka Summit of

Non-~ligned Movement, Mrs. Gandhi commented, nwe

would like the Indian Ocean to be an area of peace

and cooperation. ~lilitary bases of outside pouers

t...•ould creal:e tensions and great pouer rivalry''· 20

When the United l<ingdorrJ alloJed some of its former

colonial to:rritori::;s to be used for military purposes,

India strongly protested against this. Speaking

in this regard, in the U.N. Seneral Assembly, ... India's chief representative, Samar Sen, said 11 the

action of British Government detaching certain

islands from its colonial territories to form the

so-called British Indian Ocean territory for

20. Quoted in J.P. Anand.l "Eliminating Indian Ocean Basesa, India ijackqrounder, val. 2, no. 31, 31 October 1977, p. 882.

- 148 -

military purposes cannot promote peace but only

ten sian. 1121

Y .a. Chavan, the then External Affairs

f•1inister, speaking at the Lima Conference of Non-

Aligned Foreign f1linisters on 21 August 1975 demanded

the big Powers ~to leave the Indian Ocean in peace

and not to introduce an arms race in the area to

serve their narrow, national or strategic interests

and ambitions.a22

Even when the Janata Government came into

power in 1977, India's stand continued to remain

same regarding the issue of the Indian Ocean as a

Zone of Peace. In a Statement, Samerendra Kundu,

the then r•1inister of State for External Affairs

dec 1 a re d on 3 0 0 c to b e r 1 9 7 8 t h at " I n d i a i s keen to

ensure that the Indian Ocean which is of poten~ial

tensions, is kept free 2~

frJm and of great powers. 11 ..:l

A.a. 'Jajpayee, the then External Affairs f'1inister 1

clearly put fortJard the Indian view, when he stated,

in march 1979 that 11 the increased military and

21. Quoted by Anand, N.20, p. 882.

22. ibid.

23. Indian Ex~ress (New Delhi), 31 October 1978.

- 149 -

naval presence in the area (the Indian Ocean) and

fear of invol·,ement of great Pouers can have

adverse political and economic consequences ~hich

would not ease but only fldd to the -censions .in

this vital ::-egion, which has already seen dram a tic

upheavals is still seething t..Jith tensions and

uncertainty. 1124

India also oppo3ed the construction of the

u.s. Base on Diego Garcia in this regard. It was

felt in some circles in India that the u.s .. presence

posed a potential security threat which could act

as an in tc rvcm tion ary source in any future conflict

situation follouing the precedent set by the United

States 7th fleet lk_~~·. EnterRr~ entry into Bay

of dengal in the Indo-Pak war of 1971. 25

24.

25.

Quoted by P.x.s. Namboodri, UNew u.s. Moves in the Indian Ocean Politics11 , FOREIGN NEWS AND F~ATURC::S (:~etJ Delhi), Vol. X, No. 7, 17 ;"larch 1979.

For this view, see Tapan Des, ''Threat from Diego Garcia'1 , Mainstream, val. 15, no. 7, 16 October 1976, pp. 27-31; for some other related details, see s.K. Ghosh, 11 Diego Gr-:rcia and Arms Race in the Indian Ocean:', I:JSA ~e.us Review on Science and Techno.l.£.ID!., April 1976, pp. 158-61; J.P. Anand, rioiego Garcia 8ase'1 , IDSA Journ2l, vel.. 12, no. 1, July-September 1979, pp. 58-85; J. Clementson, rroiego Garcia 11 , U. S.I. Journal, val. 126, no. 2, June 198·1, pp. 33-39;

- 150 -

Expressing concern over the Jiego Garciu

base and the implications of militarization of

the lndiun Ocee:n Region, r1I's. Gandhi put forward

the Indian view point cadidly, "We feel that

one presence attracts another and that military

builtl-up by some single pot.Jer sets in motion a

. . . 1 a26 v~c~ous c~rc e.

Even at the United Nations, India tool< a

leading role in pleading and arguing for the

27 concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

The Indian representative at the First Committee

of the United i'Jations on the lndic::n Ocean spelled

out the Indian view-point that ·'India, together

with all the Non-Ali~ned countries has subscribed

to the concept of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peuce.

My ~elegation ~ill look forward to holding

consultations and n''gotiations LJith variouE: parties

26. Cited by /\nand, N. 20, p. 882.

27. For an account of the United Nations efforts to convert the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, see "United Nations initiatives in Making the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace" NEW PERSPECTI'fES, val. 10, ~Jo.1, January 1980 PP• 34-35.

- 151 -

to achieve the objective that would eventually

result in the Indi2n Ocean being constituted

28 into a zone of peace.u

India as a Member of the United Nations

Ad-hoc Committee to observe the progress of

achievement of the Indian Ocean as a zone of pe8ce

repeatedly voiced its views for the elimination

of Big Power presence and bases. But in the

process, it had to face dive~gent opinions also.

within the South Asian region itself.29

Ever

though Pakistan and Sri Lanka voted in favour of

the United N,_tions proposal for zone of peaco in

the Indien OceEn, there was not any unanimity in

terms of threat perceptions among India, Sri Lanka,

and Pakistan. Those differing perceptions certainly

did not strengthen the Indian campaign for the

speedy rcalizotion of the United Nations proposal.30

28. Quo~:Jd by I<.S. Sidhu, The Indian Ocean, A Zone of Pecce ; f..\ Study of Indian 1Jiewpoint (Ne~ Jelr.i, 1983), p. 81.

29. For a study on the litto.ral countrios' response· at the U.N. see I<.P. f'iisra, 11 Developments in the Indian Ocean Are8 : The Littoral Response 11 , International Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, January-March 1977, pp. 17-35.

30. For a presentation of sub-continental difference.-. see, K.R. Singh, 11 Sub-Continent: Differing Perceptions", World focus, val. 2, no. 1, January 1981, pp. 21-25; Samina Ahmed, 11 Indian Ocean Peace Zone Proposaln, Pakistan Horizon, vo~l. 12, no. 1 & 2, 1979, pp. 98-141.

- 152 -

As far as the I.Jestern Powers' reaction is

concerned, it was mostly negati11e. U:ihenever any

international initiative was moved for the Indian

ocean as a zone of peace, the west led by the

United States opposed it. Particularly, the United

States did not like the Indian complacency in

condoning the Soviet Naval presence in the region,

while at the same time virulently attacking t~e

western naval build-up.< 31 ) Only the Soviet Union

showed sympathetic albeit partial support for the

Indian moves. ( 32 ) Thus India faced strong opposition,

in its objective of making the Indian ocean as a Zone

of Peace, from the Great Powers because of the

latter's vested gsa-politico-economic interests.

It is not difficult to assess the dismal progress

of the proposal of zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

But if IOZOP is even partially realised, it would

imply definitely cutting the size of major Powers in

the Indian Ccoon. That is why, the negotiations on the

successful realisation of the IOZOP never came through

( 31)

(32)

For L.Lestern perspective of the Indian Ocean, see S.Dov, Zakheim, 11Towards a Western Approach to the Indian Ocean~, Survival 1 Vol.22, No.1, January-February 1980, PP• 7-14.

For some Soviet perceptions, see A.Alexeyev and A.Falkovsky, nFor a Peaceful Inrlian Oceanrt, International Affairs (:1oscow) No.2, February, 1981, pp.85-91; A.Cheernyso\t, "Peace <.md Security for the Indian Ocean 11 , ibidq No.12, December 1976, pp.42-50; N Mishin, "Towards an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace 11 ibid., No.6, June 1979, pp. 87-91.

- 153-

as all the major powers one way or ather side diluted

the substance of the proposal or complicated it so

that no implementation would be possible in the near

future. As tho strategic-politico-security interests

of major powers would be deeply hu:bt by this proposal

they were not willing to see through the proposal for

IOZOP. India many a time criticized the nobstructionist»

forces and "Conservative and Colonial" tendencies that

came in the way of the Indian Ocean being a zone of

peace. ( 33 )

India also tried for alternati\ie ways of

reaching the ideal of zone of peace. For example,

India also voiced its support for the Indian Ocean

Community both for the purposes of (a) cooperation

and (b) as a conciliatory machinery. This was at

the Belgrade Conference of NAM in 1978. This is

just an indication of India's commitment for an

establishment of region which could be insulated

from the influences of major powers.

( 33) For the limitations of regional powers, see G. S. Bhargava, ''Indian Ocean ; A Rolo for Regional Powersa, Far Castern Economic Rev i 81:!_ .z.. V o 1. 9 8 , N o • 4 8 , 2 De c 8mb 8 r 1 9 7 7 , p p • 30-34; for accounts of the stalled Indian Ocean as a Zone of.Peace Proposal, see Robert J. Hanks, 0 Indian Ocean Negotiations: Rocks and Shoals", Strategic_ Q.i..u..q,st 1 Vol. B, No.9 September 1978, pp. 25-36; C.S.R. Murthy, 11 India and the Dead-locked Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocoan 11 , IDSf'\ Journal, \fol. 17, No.1, July-SeptombcT1§'84, pp. 87-100.

- 154-

India being virtually part of the Indian

ocean, having a lengthy coast-line exposed from

three sides on the maritime front, its economic

development and security are defined by the politics

prevailing on the maritime front. The Indian view

of concept ~f peace Zone is a blond of the idealism

of its anti-colonial struggle, and tho pragmatism

of protecting its national interests. India remained -

alive to the maritime threats to its economy,

territorial security stability and peace- on the

whole its \Jery survival- because of its peninsular

geo-political location and stood committed to the

elimination of the external presence which posed a

serious threat to India's security.< 34 )

III -As has been QOinted out earlier, after the

1971 war, India started paying increasing attention

to the status and development of its naval forces.

By the end of the sixties itself, India had felt

the need to take a fresh look at, for the long time

(34) For an Indian perspecti·,e, intent and policy postu~e on the IOZOP, Seo K.S. Sidhu, The . ln rJ~.g~_o!l.~ C!f!..L. _ _LZonQ__Qr _'=.!l ~£~~ Stu et:Q.f Indian 'Jiew Point (NelJ Delhi, 1983) pp. 72-90; See also Alford Jonathan, "Strategic Developments in the Indian Ocean Area 11 , Asian Affairs (New Series), Vol. 12, No.2, June 1981, pp.144-54; P.R. Chari, 11 Indian Ocean: Strategic Issues'1 ,

International Studies, Vol.18, No.2, April-June 1979 '·-iJi)."'-:1'74:6. ---·--

- 155-

neglected naval wing of the Indian Ar~ed Forces. P

Perhaps the sixties fan be termed as the decade of

increasing ,awareness on the part of India about the

dimensions of its naval expansion. It was during

this period only, there began an open discussion

about strengthening the maritime component in the

Indian ~li1i tary strategy. ( 35 )

Befo:e the 1971 \Jar, India was not verY mJch

concerned about :..he nnval build-up and its expansion.

It can also be argued that because of the economic and

resource constraints, India could be hardly be overly

concerned abou: its naval forces. India's obsession

with land based threats from Pakistan and China

coupled by the assumption that the Indi~n ocean was

the ~British Lake"- had made India's approach towards

its naval forces complacent. ( 36 )

As a keen an a l y s t had p u t i t , " In d i a' s ou n

maritime heritage •••• ~as never been one of the

( 35)

( 3G)

For an account of India's na\lal build-up upto 70s see Lorne J.Kavic, Indi~ 1 s UuesLfE.E.. Sec~itx: JL_St~~L~\!. __ g~~~.LPol!,sJ.£.2 Werkeley, Los Angeles, 1967}. See tf!e chapter anti tlod 11 Indian iJa1Jyn, po. 116-25; see also R.G.:.Thomas,

11The Politics of Indian t-.Javal Re-armament 1962-74" Pacific Com·1unit:,', Vol.6, No. 3, April 1975, pp. 4:52-72.

C."·'.I·Jedungagi, 11 N~Ced for Expansion of the Indian Navy Exaggorated 11 , Stztc§.~§..12(:\lew Delhi), 18 June 1969; see also D.i<.Palit, Hindustal1 Tines (New Delhi), 27 and 29 :)ocember 1969. Fo·r an earliest Insider argu~ent for a better treatment of Indian \lavy see, N.:<rishnan, 11 Strategic Concepts of Indian Naval Expansiona, lL:_S.I~· Journal, Vol.BB, No.327, July-September 1958, pp.212-22

- 156 -

domination of international oceanic highways. Indien

Naval strategy has always been .strictly coastal and

shore based. What is required today, is an objective

analysis of the overall threat to India - - not an

isolated single service appreciation of putative

sea-borne threat or one heavily influenced by an

exaggerated concept of our maritime responsibilities

in the Indian Oceann.< 37 ) (emphasis added).

But the role of navy in the 1971 war had

brought about anew perception of naval forces' role

in India's defence calculations. The nesd for a

stronger navy commensurate with and suiting the

growing needs of a rising Power like India, was keenly

felt in India around this time. A former high-ronked

military official has commented that in wake of 1971

war, "India0 s navy shot into the limelight with success

so spectacular that they leave one gasping. Inclined

to be treated as the Cindrella of the Armed Forces,

the Navy has virtually overnight dispelled doubts

about the justifiability of the money that has been

on her. She has proved that she is not just the

show-piece that people were inclined to believe she

(37) Maj.Gen.D.K. Palit, "Naval Strategy; future Line for Thinking, ibid., 29 December 1969, p.9.

- 157 -

was. She has demonstrated in no uncertain terms

and manner that she is capable of inflicting serious

damage to ·ships and harbour installations when

required to do so.u(3B)

After this important turning point, the

allocation for navy in the defence budget shot up ( ~·9)

automatically. J From 8 percent of Defence

capital budget in 1965-66, the Navy's share had

dramatic ally risen to alma st 49 per cent in 197 3-74.

So by the end of 1974, Navy was no more a lingering

appendage to the Indian ~ar Machinery, often left

ignored. Since the seventies, it has grown a long

way and became an indispensable as pact of India's

defence policy and strategic postures following a

deliberate re-ev alu at ion of the In dian Navy. In

the context of changing Strategic scenario in the

~ersian Gulf, South China sea and the Indian O~ean

0 (40) reg~on.

( 38) L.P. Sen, 11 The Rise and Rise of the Indian .Navy 11 ,

Hindustan Standard (Calcutta), 9 December 1971. For some more appreciative accounts see lnder Nal­hotra, "Indian Navy's Finest Hour", Times of India (New Delhi, 15 December 1971; ~dhari, nsravo Zulo, Keep on Hitting 11 , Hindustan Times, 30 December 1971.

(39) For an analysis of economic and budgetary consider­ation on India's naval build-up in this period, set Raju, G.C.Thomas, "The Politics of Indian Naval Rearmament, 1962-1974", Pacific Community, Vol.6 No.3, April 1975, pp. 452-72.

(40) For a sum-up on the growth of Indian Navy in 1970s see Raju G.C.Thomas, 11 The Indian Navy in the Seventies", Pacific Affairs, Vol.48, No.4, Winter 1975-76, pp. 500-18.

- 158 -

To illustrate the growing importance of the

Navy in India's strategic perspectives, particularly

in the period from 1972 to 1 979, the reliable

indicators to be observed are the level of defence

expend! tu re on the Navy, the relative and comparative

share of navy in the defence budget of India. In

the years 1972 to 1979, the Navy's share was consist­

ently on the rise and there were minimal fluctuations

in the hike-up of its share in the budgetary alloca­

tions compared to that of the Army and Airforce.

rrom a mere 69 crores of rupees in 1971-72, Navy's

share in the defence went upto a whopping size of

206 crores of rupees by the end of 1979, representing

nearly a three times increase over a period of ten

years. It may be noted here that by comparison in

the same period both Army and Air rorce"registered

a two times incre ose only. (Vice Appendix I I I).

In terms of manpower commitment, another

important indicator, Indian Navy strength increased

greatly from a mere 28,000 in 1971-72 to 47,000 by

the year 1979. In the Army and Air force by

comparison during the same.period, the rate of

increase has been marginal. (Vide Appendix IV).

- 159 -

IV -Despite its low profile policy vis-a-vis

the Indian ocean in the early years of independence,

India consistently evinced a policy of protecting its

interests in the region. It was fully ali11e to the

fact that India has inalienable and inherent interests

and rights in thes region as the Indian ocean provided

not only a life-line to the bull< of India's external

trade but also gave completeness to the strategic

location of India in international politics. That way

India kept the Indian ocean in its strategic priorities

albeit at a low lovel, in view of contextual immedialy

and security expediency.( 41 )

The complacency of India towards the maritime

strategy was gradually shattered first with the

conflict with Pakistan in 1965, wherein Indian Navy

participated in actual war proceedings, the 1968

British declaration of withdrawal of East of Suez,

the Soviet naval fleets' movements, the Indo-Pak

war of 1971, the u.s. 7th fleet movement (with the

~.s. E.!J.ier~u:!.§..~) into Bay of Bengal, the 1973 oil­

crisis, Arab-Israel conflict, the 1974 India's atomic

(41) For an historical description of India's association with the Indian Ocean, see Commander Xoithara, ''India and the Indian Ocean 11 , U.S.I.Journal, Vol.440 July,September 1975' Allain Laballe, 11 Infu and the Indian Ocean'', Vikrant, Vol.8, No.9,January 1978, PP• 16-24. .•

- 160 -

test, the base building exercises of the United

States and the Soviet Union in this region - all

clearly showed that India had to play a more

active role in the Indian Ocean and in the strategic

region that it constitutes.

An analytical study observes in this context

in a very succint manner, 11 since 1971 substantial

funds have been dedicated to the Indian Navy,

resulting in its emergence as a blue water fleet.

This force expansion is intended to increase New

Delhi's ability to (a) defend its coasts, sea-lanes

of communication and island possessions, (b) project

military power throughout the Indian Ocean, (c)

influence the policies of the states along the

Indian Ocean littoral, (d) inhibit the activities

of extra-regional Powers in waters adjacent to the

sub-contin~nt~,< 42 ) coupling all these in concert

with the the diplomatic initiatives like IOZOP,

supporting the move for the resrocession of Diego

Garcia base from the United States to l"lauritius

and so on.

(42) J.F. Elkins and B.Fredericks, •sino-Indian Border Talks: The V isw from NeW Delhi •, Asia~_§~~ Vol.23, No.10, October 1983, P• 1137.

- 161 -

Throughout the period under study, India

remained alive to the changing trends in the

security environment in and around the Indian

Ocean and made concerted efforts to revitalize

its naval forces as also worked assiduously for

the elimination of the external power presence and

rivalry in the region.