CHAPTER-IV

THE ROLE OF BILL CLINTON IN THE ISRAELI-P ALESTINIAN PEACEMAKiNG

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CHAPTER-IV

THE ROLE OF BILL CLINTON IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACEMAKING

The United States devoted remarkable energy and resources to the Israeli-Palestinian

peace process during the tenure of Bill Clinton. Peacemaking in West Asia became a

major focus for Clinton ever since the historic handshake between Vasser Arafat and

Yitzhak Rabin in his presence at the White House lawn on 13 September 1993. I

Subsequently,Washington became a regular venue for bilateral and trilateral summits

that brought Clinton and Arafat and successive Israeli prime ministers together.

Following the election of Ehud Barak as Israeli Prime Minister in 1999, both

Palestinians and Israelis were optimistic about Clinton's personal involvement in their

negotiations.

During the last years of Clinton Administration (2000- 2001 January), the US

came out with a series of peace proposals with three major initiatives:

1. Camp David Talks, 11 July 2000.

2. Sharm Al-Shaykh Summit, 16 October 2000.

3. Bill Clinton Proposals, 23 December 2000.

President Clinton holds office in January 1993 with a strong admiration and sympathy

for Israel. Indeed Bill Clinton was viewed by many Israeli observers as the most pro­

Israeli President in history.2 However, as a non-confrontational politician, he had been

reluctant to press the Congress over Israel. Even the Vice President Albert Gore's

outlook bad been oriented to Israel's perspective. None of his Secretaries of States,

Warren Clrristopher and Madeleine Albright, had taken any interest in the details of

Israeli-Palestinian policy. In that atmosphere, the Palestinians were not accepted as

equal contenders for policy maker's attention during Clinton's regime. The working

assumptions that guided American negotiators tarnished their credibility with Arabs

as honest brokers.3

I Samuel W. Lewis (1999), "The United States and Israel Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance," Middle East Journal 53 (3): pp. 365-378.

2 Norton, Augustus Richard (2001), "America's Middle East Peace Crisis," Current History, 100 (642): pp.3-9.

3 Christison, Kathleen (1998), "Bound by a Frame of Reference, Part HI: U.S. Policy and the Palestinians, 1948-88," Journal a/Palestine Studies, 27 (4): pp. 53-64.

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4.1. Camp David Talks 2000: Constraint and Perspective

This section attempts to discuss the Camp David talks weighing the Israeli and

Palestinian position and perceptions, critically analysing Bill Clinton's Camp David

parameters. It tries to diagnose the factors leading to the failure of the talks.

As Clinton approached his last year in office, he was keen on striving for West

Asia peace. During the first two years of his second term, Clinton pressed on his

contacts with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu, 4 in order to bridge the gap between their positions. As William B. Quandt

has said, "Clinton had opted for 'summit diplomacy'S as a last resort, not out of

confidence that he could produce a deal.,,6 But there was no bright prospects, both

Arafat and Barak were under considerable domestic political pressure, and it was by

no means clear that either one was prepared to make hard decisions to win peace. 7

However, Clinton pushed hard for a three-way summit at his meeting in Washington

with Arafat on 14 June 2000.

In June 2000, Clinton sent Secretary Albright and Dennis ROSS8 to West Asia

with the purpose to discuss the possibility of convening a trilateral summit in the

United States and to work out a final status agreement between the Palestinians and

Israel. However, Arafat argued that Palestinian Authority (PA) was not ready to jump

4 Benjamin Netanyahu - soldier, diplomat and the ninth Prime Minister of the State ofIsrael June 1996 to July 1999, Foreign Minister of Israel November 2002-February 2003 and was Finance Minister ofisrael until 9 August 2005.

j Summit Diplomacy-The tensions of the 1930's revived conference diplomacy, which continued during World War II. Thereafter, summit meetings between heads of government became the norm as technology again quickened the pace of diplomacy. In the 1930's statesmen began to telephone each other, a practice that was characterised in the 1960's by the Soviet-American "hot line." Heads of state or government or foreign ministers meet bilaterally or multilaterally. Encyclopaedia Britannica, (2006), [Online: web] Accessed 18 April 2006, URL: http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-233753/diplomacy.

6 For more detail see William B. Quandt (2001), "Clinton and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Limits of Incremenwlism/' Journal of Palestine Studies, 30 (2): pp. 26-40.

7 Three nationalist parties in the ruling coalition withdrew their support for the government, complaining that it failed to consult the parties over the extent of the concessions that Barak would be prepared to make at Camp David. Despite the Knesset vote of 'no confidence' the Israeli premier narrowly survived prior to his departure for USA. Both Barak and Arafat announced to their respective constituencies that any agreements on a permanent status would be sub)ect to national referendums. See Europa (2005), The Middle East and North Africa, Europa, 51 S edn. London: Europa Publication, p. 20.

8 Ambassador Dennis Ross is the Washington Institute's counsellor and Ziegler distinguished fellow. He served as the director for policy planning in the State Department under President George H.W. Bush and 'Special Middle East Coordinator' under President Bill Clinton. The envoy and chief negotiator under both republican and Democratic presidents, Ross was integral in shaping US involvement in West Asia peace process and in dealing directly with the negotiations during his tenure. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2006), [Online: web] Accessed 20 June 2006, URL: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org.

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to a [mal 'status accord' when Israel still refused to carry out obligations under

existing interim agreements. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, showed a positive

outcome, even though his coalition government was crumbling around him.

President Clinton releid on the recommendations of Secretary Albright and

went to the summit with confident he could achieve a historic agreement which would

crown his political career. Under his auspices, Barak and Chairman Yasser Arafat met

at Camp David from 11-24 July 2000, an attempt to reach a permanent agreement.

As part of the persistent effort to bridge the substantial gaps that existed between

them, Clinton announced the objectives ofthe Camp David peace summit were:

I) To reach an agreement on the core issues that had fuelled half-century

of conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

2) Peace that could fulfil the Israeli people's quest for security.

3) Genuine reconciliation with Palestinians and genuine acceptance in the

region.

4) Peace that could fulfill the Palestinian people's legitimate aspirations to

determine their destiny on their own land.

5) And to build a better future for the Palestinians.9

Israeli Positions:

The well-kwon Israeli and Palestinian positions on the key issues reflected a wide

range of differences. On the issue of Jerusalem, Ehud Barak maintained, "A

Jerusalem broader than it ever has been in Israel's history, with a solid Jewish

majority for generations to come; a capital united under their sovereignty and

recognised by the entire world."lo

1) Annexation to Jerusalem the cities within the West Bank beyond the

1967 border, like Ma'ale Adumirn, Givat Ze'ev and Gush Etzion.

2) Palestinian sovereignty over certain villages or small cities annexed to

Jerusalem after 1967.

3) No relinquishment of the parts of Jerusalem taken in 1967 War.

9 President Bill Clinton (2001), Remarks Announcing the Camp David West Asia Peace Summit and an Exchange with Reporters, 5 July 2000. Public papers of the Presidents of the United States. William J. Clinton, Book l/- June 27 to October J J. 2000, Published by Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington: 200 l.pp. 1380-84.

10 Prime Minister Ehud Barak (2000), Remarks to the General Assembly of the United Jewish Communities 13 November 2000, Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs, {Online: web] Accessed 9 August 2007, URL: http://www.mfa.gov.iIIMF AlGovernment/Speeches+by+ Israeli+leadersl2000/.

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4) Ehud Barak's positions on the other issues were:

a) No right of return for the Paiestinian refugees into Israel

proper.

b) 80 percent of Israeli settlers within settlement blocs under

Israeli sovereignty.

c) No militarisation of the West Bank and Gaza.

d) Pennanent recognised borders for the State oflsrael.

e) Security arrangements that would provide adequate safeguards

for Israel against external threats. I I

Palestinian Positions:

The Palestinians resented the Israeli positions when Abu Mazenl2 in his speech at the

meeting of the PLO's Palestinian Central Council stated:

The positions we adopted are, in our point of view, the minimum that we can accept. They are positions that are based on United Nations Resolutions 242, 338 and 194. They are based on agreements signed between the Israelis and us, they are based on Israeli documents concerning the 1948 'nakba' I 3 and the forced expulsion of Palestinians from their homes, and they are based on UN Security Council resolutions dealing with Jerusalem and Jewish settlements.

The Palestinians demanded the following concessions: 14

I) Full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories- including East

Jerusalem.

2) Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 242, related

resolutions and other longstanding principles ofintemationallaw.

3) Full Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem occupied in 1967.

II _ (2000), Press Conference following the Conclusion of the Camp David Summit, Washington, 25 July 2000, My Israel Source, [Online: web] Accessed 4 March 2006, URL: http://www.myisraelsource.com/contentlbarakcampdavidpress.

12 M.ahmoud .A.bbas also cal!ed as Abu Mazin was elected President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) on 9 January 2005, and took office on 15 January 2005. Abbas is a leading politician in Fatah. He served as the first Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority from March to October 2003 when he resigned citing lack of support from Israel and the United States as well as "internal incitement" against his government Before being named Prime Minister, Abbas led the PLO's Negotiations Affairs Department He has served as Chainnan of the PLO Executive Committee since II November 2004, after Vasser Arafat's death. Abbas is frequently portrayed by Israel and the West as the face of Palestinian moderation.

13 Nakba- The Palestinian exodus referred to by most Palestinians and Arabs as the Nakba (Arabic: meaning the "disaster", "catastrophe", or "cataclysm," refers to the creation of the Palestinian Arabs refugee problem during the last six months of the British Mandate of Palestine, the founding of the State of Israel, the First Arab-Israeli War and also during the period of the consolidation of the State ofIsrael

14 Mahmoud Abbas (2000), Speech at the meeting of the PLO's Palestinian Central Council, 9 September 2000, UNISPAL-United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, [Online: web] Accessed 22 September 2006, URL: http://domino.un.orglUNISPAL.nsfl.

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4) Recognition of the right of the Palestinian refugees to return home in

accordance with UN Resolution 194.

During 11 to 24 June 2000, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators, led by Clinton, went

into round-the-clock talks, with Clinton shuttling between Arafat and Barak offering

bridging proposals, in hopes of reaching an agreement. With no further progress, the

White House declared late on 19 July that the summit had concluded without reaching

an accord.

4.1.1 Clinton Camp David Parameters

Clinton proposed a number of possible compromises, specifically on the question of

Jerusalem. In his autobiography he wrote:

I told him (Arafat) that I thought he could get 91 percent of the West Bank, plus at least a symbolic swap of land near Gaza and the West Bank; a capital in East Jerusalem; sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City and the outer neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem; planning, zoning, and custodianship but not sovereignty over the Temple Mount, which was known as Haram aI-Sharif to the Arabs. Arafat balked at not having sovereignty over all of East Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount. He turned the offer down; I called Arab leaders for support. Most wouldn't say much, for fear of undercutting Arafat. ls

On the night of 24 July 2000, Clinton asked each side to send him one negotiator.

Israel chose Shlomo Ben Ami, 16 and the Palestinians sent Saeb Erakat.17 Clinton

presented the duo with some positive proposals on Jerusalem:

1) Palestinian "sovereign custodianship" over the Haram aI-Sharif, while Israel

would retain "residual sovereignty."

15 Clinton, Bill (2004), My Life, Hutchinson: London, p. 915. 16 Professor Shlomo Ben-Ami was Israel's top negotiator during the July 2000 Camp David summit.

Ben-Ami became the Minister of Internal Security, responsible for the Israel Police in Ehud Barak Government in July 1999. In August 2000, when David Levy resigned as Foreign Minister during talks with Palestinian leaders in the United States, Barak designated Ben-Ami to be the acting Foreign Minister and he was officially appointed to the role in November 2000. Ben-Ami remained Foreign Minister and Security Minister until March 2001, when, having won elections, Ariel Sharon took over from Barak. Ren-Ami ref'.lsed to senre in the Sharon government and resigned from the Knesset in August 2002. For further reference see Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2002), [Online: web] Accessed 22 September 2006, URL: http://www.mfa.gov.iIIMFAIMFAArchiveI2000_200912002/8.

17 Saeb Erekat has been at the center of negotiations with Israel for over a decade and participated in numerous peace conferences. He was deputy head of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the 1992-1993 follow-up talks in Washington. In 1994, Erekat was appointed the Chairman of the Palestinian negotiation delegation and in 1995, he served as Chief Negotiator for the Palestinians during the Oslo period, including the Camp David meetings in 2000 and the negotiations at Taba in 2001. He also acted as Yasser Arafat's 's English interpreter. When Mahmoud Abbas was nominated to serve as Prime Minister of the Palestinian Legislative Council in early 2003, Erekat was slated to be Minister of Negotiations in the new cabinet. See, Palestinian National Authority, (2003), "Politics in Palestine: The PA Ministerial Cabinet List, Emergency Cabinet, October 2003 - November 2003", Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, [Online: web] Accessed 24 September 2006, URL: http://www.jrncc.org/politics/pna/newemerggov03.htm.

123

Map 4.1

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Source: Dennis Ross (2004), The Missing Peace, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. No maps were ever drawn up by the United States or Israel to reflect the proposals made at Camp David or the White House in 2000 during negotiations between President Clinton, Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The map is from chief negotiator Dennis Ross.

124

Map 4.2 Approximate Clinton Plan as Future Palestinian State

The map is a rough approximation of what the Clinton Plan envisioned as a future Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip showing the overland highway expected to connect the two.

Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.orgljsource/History/clintonmap.html .

125

2) Arafat would recogmse Israeli sovereignty over all the other areas of

expanded East and West Jerusalem, and the settlement blocs of greater and

metropolitan Jerusalem.

3) Palestinian functional jurisdiction in the inner neighbourhoods: Musrara,

Wadi al-juz, Shaykh Jarrah, Ras al-Amud, al-Tur, Suwwana, and Salah al­

Oin.

4) Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian Quarters of the Old

City. IS

5) Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish and Armenian Quarters.

6) Palestinian sovereignty over Jerusalem's "outer" neighbourhoods; if the

"inner" neighbourhoods had Palestinian sovereignty, then a special regime

would apply in the Old City; the details of which the party would agree

among themselves.

However, the unequivocal Palestinian rejection of the American proposals disturbed

Clinton's calculations, which Arafat insisted were Israeli ideas. Within a week of the

convening of Camp David, Clinton came to realise that the assessments presented by

his aides had nothing to do with'the reality of the Is:aeli-Palestinian conflict .

... in a last-ditch effort I offered to try to sell Barak on full sovereignty for East Jerusalem's outer neighbourhoods, limited sovereignty over the inner ones, and "custodial" sovereignty over the Haram. Again Arafat said no. I shut down the talks; it was frustrating and profoundly sad. There was little difference between the two sides on how the affairs of Jerusalem would actually be handled; it was all about who got to claim sovereignty.19

The failed Camp David peace summit in July of 2000 had been a matter of

contention. Although numerous factors contributed to the failure of the Camp David

Summit; two radically different narratives dominated the failure of Palestinians and

Israelis.

18 The Old City is a 0.9 square kilometre (0.35 square mile) area within the modem city of Jerusalem. Until the 1860's this area constituted the entire city of Jerusalem. The Old City is home to several sites of key religious importance: the Temple Mount and its Western Wall for Jews, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre for Christians, and the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque for Muslims. Traditionally, the Old City has been divided into four quarters, although the current designations were introduced only in the twentieth century. Today, the Old City is roughly divided into the Muslim Quarter, the Christian Quarter, the Jewish Quarter and the Armenian Quarter.

19 Clinton (2004), n. 15, p. 915.

126

4.1.1.1. Israeli Perception oftbe Camp David

1) For most Israelis, Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians the best possible deal

and made generous concessions, including on Jerusalem, but Arafat simply

rejected the deal without even bothering to reciprocate.

2) Arafat wanted not only the West Bank and Gaza but all ofIsraeeo

3) Israelis came a long way but regrettably the vision of peace suffered a heavy

blow because of inflexibility on the Palestinian side to strike a deal. 21

4) To Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israel dropped its refusal to divide Jerusalem and

accepted "full Palestinian sovereignty" on the Temple Mount and asked the

Palestinians only to recognise the site was also sacred to Jews. Both Barak and

Clinton were prepared to do what was necessary to reach agreement but

unfortunately Arafat was not.

5) There was a problem with a mythological Palestinian leadership that

presupposed it already made its concessIOns. Arafat was a problem for

achieving permanent agreement.22

6) The failure of Camp David was largely attributed to the fact that Arafat did

not even negotiate.

7) Arafat rejected Israeli· and American ideas on borders, Jerusalem, and land

transfers "one of those was a Palestinian state comprised of four cantons" but

Arafat did not raise a single idea himself.23

Dennis Ross view was that, Arafat was afraid to make the historic decisions about an

end to the conflict because the critical clause in the agreement specified that the

agreement meant the end of the conflict.24 Barak alleged Arafat did not negotiate in

good faith; "he did not negotiate at all he just kept saying 'no' to every offer, never

making any counterproposals of his own." Arafat sought Israel's demise while he cord

20 Telhami, Shibley (2002), The Stakes: America and the Middle East, London: Westview Press, pp. 114-118.

21 Barak (2000), n. 10. 22 Ben-Ami wrote detailed day-by-day account of what went on at Camp David. For detail see Ben­

Ami's Camp David Diaries (2000), [Online: web] Accessed 27 September 2006, URL: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourcelPeacelbenamidiary.html.

23 Saul Singer (2006), "Camp David, Real or Invented," [Online: web] Accessed 27 September 2006, URL: http://www.meforum.org/artic\e/169.

24 Dennis Ross (2004), The Missing Peace, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, pp. 713-730.

127

Map 4.3 Old City of Jerusalem

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Israel (2008), [Online: web] Accessed 7 July 2008, URL: http://www.mfa.gov.illMFAIFacts+About+lsraellIsrael+in+Maps/OId+City+of+Je rusalem.htm.

128

along with succession oflsraeli and Western leaders and hoodwink officials such as

former US National Security Council expert Robert Malley.25

4.1.1.2. Palestinian Perception Although Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, acknowledged that Barak was eager for a

deal and wanted it achieved during Clinton's term in office, they clarified what

actually transpired at Camp David in a reply to Barak's contentions and stated that at

Camp David Arafat's negotiators accepted the notion of Israeli annexation of West

Bank territory to accommodate settlements, though they insisted on a one-for-one

swap of land "of equal size and value." The Palestinians argued that the annexed

territory should neither affect the contiguity of their own land nor lead to the

incorporation of Palestinians into Israel.

The Palestinians perceived that Israelis essentially wanted to dictate their

own solution. The timetable for reaching agreements had been based on immediate

concerns ignoring the necessary background work on substantial issues. The

Palestinians explicated that Israelis came not to negotiate but to make a '"take it or

leave it" offer, presenting few concessions and not enough territory to make a viable

Palestinian state. 26

The PLO Negotiations Affairs Department highlighted their justification on

'why the Palestinians rejected the Camp David peace proposal.'

1) Clinton parameters deviated from international law to the detriment of the

Palestinians, while legitimising Israel's illegal settlement activity and human

rights violations.

2) The parameters fell short of the requirements for a permanent peace.

3) Dividing Palestinian Jerusalem into a number of unconnected islands separated

each other from the rest of Palestine.

4) Forcing Palestinians to surrender the right ofretum of Palestinian refugees.

25 Interview with Ehud Barak by Benny Morris, on 9 August 2001, New York Review of Books (2002), 49 (10), [Online: web] Accessed 27 September 2007, URL: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15501.

26 Robert Malley was Special Assistant for Arab-Israeli Affairs to President Bill Clinton from 1998 to 2001, and was a member of the US peace team and participated in the Camp David summit. Hussein Agha, Senior Associate Member of St Antony's College at Oxford University had been involved in Palestinian affairs for more than thirty years. For further readings see Hussein Agha and Robert Maley (2002), "In Response to Camp David and After: An Exchange, (A Reply to Ehud Barak, 13 June 2002)." The New York Review of Books (49 (11) [Online: web] Accessed 27 September 2006, URL: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15540. Also see Robert Malley and Hussein Agha (2001), "Camp David: Tragedy of Errors." New York Review of Books, 48 (13) [Online web] Accessed 27 September 2006, URL: http://www.nybooks.com/articlesJI4380.

129

5) Denied Palestinian control over their borders, airspace, water resources, its

seacoast, and maintain military locations on Palestinian soil. 27

According to the Palestinians, a comprehensive settlement to the conflict is

embodied in United Nations resolutions 242 and 338, which were accepted by both

sides at the Madrid summit in 1991 and later in the Oslo accords of 1993. The

purpose of the negotiations was to implement these UN resolutions (which call for an

Israeli withdrawal from land occupied by force by Israel in 1967) and reach

agreement on final status issues.28 The Palestinians, on the other hand, sought to

establish a viable, sovereign state on their own territory, secure the right of Palestinian

refugees to return to the homes they were forced to flee in 1948.

4.1.2. Critical Appraisal of the Camp David Talks

Clinton declared the Camp David summit over concluding that Israel and the

Palestinian Authority could not resolve their differences on Jerusalem and needed

time for internal debate and reflection in a less pressured environment before

making further progress. He stated that the parties could not reach an agreement at

that particular time taking into account the historical religious. political, and

emotional dimensions of the conflict. Despite US desires to continue to keep th

details of the talks in hope of building on the progress achieved, Israel stated that

in the absence of an agreement, all negotiation positions it had offered at Camp

David were "null and void." 29 The results of Camp David could be seen as a

possible starting point for subsequent talks. But the parties had agreed in advance

that nothing would be fmal until everything was agreed, especially concerning

Jerusalem, and so it was technically accurate to say that no agreement had been

reached on anything at all. 3o America's offer of a fmancial aid package for the

Palestinians upon the signing of an agreement failed to convince and conciliate

the Palestinians.

27 Negotiations Affairs Department (200 I), "Official Palestinian Response to the Clinton Parameters and letter to the international community," I January 2001, [Online: web] Accessed 27 September 2006, URL: http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=nego nego clinton nclintonp.

28 Ibid. - - -

29 Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Trilateral Statement on the Conclusion of the Camp David Talks, Camp David, Mary-Land, 25 July, in Clinton (2001), n.9, pp. 1453-58.

30 William B. Quandt (2005), Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967 - Third edition. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 371.

l30

Map 4.4 Pn~j~t'9'Jl (y[ !h~ WIt')d B.m.k .ina} Stalm Map pt~)oIe.ruof:cl

f;>y h1~d. C$lmp D.w~d, '/.)l(V Z{JOO

... ... ....

,. ..... 1"1_ Ac:Nlemk: 8oe'et)I fcJr .... Stud,. of ..... rnat"ktMlI Aft ..... (PAU'A,

Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (2008), Online: web] Accessed 6 June 2008, URL: http://www .passia.orglpalestine JactslMAPS/wbgs _ campdavid.html.lsrae I never released a map of its proposal at Camp David. This is the Palestinians' interpretation of the Israeli offer.

131

Clinton blamed Arafat for the summit's failure, stating that Barak showed

more flexibility and seriousness of purpose than his Palestinian counterpart. Clinton's

role at Camp David was unmistakable and both negotiating parties seemed to have

had a degree of confidence in him. However, he avoided taking stands on many of the

most controversial issues, urging them to reach a consensus decision themselves. He

often listened with great attention and understanding to the Palestinian viewpoint and

on many occasions argued against the views of his advisers. Nonetheless, Clinton had

his own calculation and limitation which was a structural constraint emanating from

the permanent American policy of supporting Israel. A leading American specialist,

William Quandt, has commented that Clinton was right to try, but should have done

so a year earlier, rather than waiting until the tail end of his presidency.3l Whereas

Roger Hardy a West Asian analyst, opined Bill Clinton won points for trying. It is

legitimate to ask whether he was right to force the pace, given the intractable nature

of the issues the parties were grappling with.32

One sided negotiation position: The Palestinians alleged the United States

and Israel worked closely with each other on their respective proposals prior to

presenting them to the Palestinians. 33 The Palestinian negotiators appealed openly to

the US to leave aside its bias toward Israel in order to be an honest broker.

Palestinians requested the US to put forward compromise proposals of its own rather

than reflected-over Israeli ideas.34 Robert Malley acknowledged in March 2001 that

there was a clear bias towards the Israeli negotiating position. The US position

substantially departed from UN resolutions 242 and 338, which the Palestinians had

been promised would be the basis ofthe negotiations. 35

) 1 Quandt (2001), n. 6, pp. 32-33. 32 Roger Hardy (2000), "Camp David: What went Wrong?" BBe News, Wednesday, 26 July 2000,

[Online: web] Accessed 24 June 2003, URL: http://news.bbc.co.ukJllhi/world/middle eastl852726.stm.

lJ Stephen Zunes (2003), Tinderbox: u.s. Fo-;:eign Policy and the Roots of Terrorism, London: Zed Books Ltd., p. 119.

34 Q uandt (200 I), n. 6, p. 34. 35 Robert Malley (2000), "Lecture at the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, Washington DC, 27

July, Quoted in Stephen Zunes (2003), n. 33, pp. 122.

132

Contention over Jerusalem: The issue of Jerusalem36 was the biggest issue of

contention, and it partly accounted for the collapse of the talks. The issue was

particularly complex for both symbolic and substantive reasons. Israel annexed East

Jerusalem immediately after the 1967 War, and made settlements all around the

eastern part of the city with the affIrmed purpose of cutting it off from the rest of the

West Bank. Clinton hoped that the two sides would achieve a framework agreement

on all 'permanent status' issues including Jerusalem.

Clinton conveyed to Arafat that Palestinians could have custodial (providing

protective supervision or safeguarding) rights over Haram al Sharif37 and would be

able to fly Palestinian flags on the mosques but that they would remain under Israeli

sovereignty. Clinton understood that the issue of Jerusalem is sacred in Israel and that

no Israeli government could compromise on Jerusalem remaining the united capital

of Israel. But the Palestinians could not agree to Israeli sovereignty over East

Jerusalem in exchange for Palestinian statehood in the rest of the West Bank and

Gaza. An overwhelming majority of the Palestinians rejected a Palestinian state

without Jerusalem at the same time significant majorities in Israel rejected the idea

that a Palestinian state would be sovereign over the Old City. This was also one of

Barak's red lines.38

Clinton blamed Arafat for not presenting anything new regarding Jerusalem,

while he believed Israel had taken steps forward. Ben-Ami in his Camp David journal

wrote:

The interesting fact is that Clinton told them ... 'if you reject my proposal, at least offer your own', since at that point in time Arafat realised that the entire Camp David deal, even if minor

36 The Greater Jerusalem includes Israeli West Jerusalem (9<)010 Jewish), the Old City, Mount of Olives, East Jerusalem (the Palestinian residential and commercial centre), Arab villages declared to be part of Jerusalem by Israel in 1967 and Jewish neighbourhoods constructed since 1967, either on land expropriated from Arab villages or in areas requisitioned as 'government land'. Although the area of the greater Jerusalem district is 627 sq km, the Old City of Jerusalem covers just 0.9 sq km. Administration: Until the Arab-Israeli War, Jerusalem had been divided into the new city of West Jerusalem- captured by Jewish forces in 1948, and the old city, East Jerusalem, which was part of Jordan. Israel's victory in 1967, however, reunited the city under Israeli control. Israel applied its law to East Jerusalem on 28 June 1967, and extended municipal boundaries by 45 km (28 miles). Europa (2003), The Middle East and North Africa, London: Europa, 50th edn., p. 604.

37 Haram ai-Sharif also called the Noble Sanctuary or The Temple Mount is a religious site in the Old City of Jerusalem. See, in Chapter Three, n. 10.

38 Shibley (2002), n. 20, p. 113. Nakba- The Palestinian exodus referred to by most Palestinians and Arabs as the Nakba (Arabic: meaning the "disaster", "catastrophe", or "cataclysm," refers to the creation of the Palestinian Arabs refugee problem during the last six months of the British Mandate of Palestine, the founding of the State of Israel, the First Arab-Israeli War and also during the period of the consolidation of the State ofIsrael

133

adjustments were made, is not congruent with Palestinian mythology, and thus he did not think it was worth while ... J9

Arafat stood ftnn and said he would neither sign away nor relinquish Jerusalem and

the holy places, Israelis had moved neither forward nor been generous. In response to

Palestinian demands to establish their capital in East Jerusalem, the Israelis agreed to

allow them to set up their new government only in Abu Dis (a West Bank village not

far from the city's outskirts that could be annexed into greater Jerusalem), thereby

allowing the Palestinian Authority to also claim Jerusalem as their capital. In return,

the Palestinians would be required to recognise Israel's annexation of virtually the

entire remainder of the city.40 Barak was not prepared to recognise full Palestinian

sovereignty over any part of the 'Old City.' The obvious deadlock in the negotiations

led to the declaration of the summit as a failure on 25 July 2000.

The Palestinian position was that all of East Jerusalem would return to

Palestinian sovereignty. The Jewish quarter, Jewish settlements and Western Wall that

were under Arab control until the 1967 War, would be placed under Israeli authority,

not Israeli sovereignty.41 Jerusalem would be an open city and the municipal services

would be administered on the basis of mutual cooperation between the two parties.

From Arafat's point of view, these were significant concessions.42

4.l.2.1 Failure of the Camp David Summit

The following section will endeavour to outline certain factors that contributed to the

failure of the Camp David summit.

1) Incompatible offers: The Camp David summit reflected that the peace envisioned

by the Palestinians was not the peace Israel was prepared to offer.

2) Lack of Palestinian counterproposal: According to Shlomo Ben-Ami, Camp David

collapsed over the fact that Paiestinians refused to make a counterproposaL ''r'-Io one

demanded that they give a positive response to that particular proposal of Clinton."

J9Ben-Ami's Camp David Diaries (2000), [Online: web] Accessed on 14 October 2007 URL: h up:1 Iwww.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourcelPeace/benamidiary.html.

40 Reinhart Tanya (2002), IsraeVPalestine: How to End the War of 1948, New Delhi: LeftWord Books, p.35.

41 Mahmud Abbas (2001), "Report on the Camp David Summit, Gaza, 9 September 2000" (Excerpts), reprinted in Journal of Palestine Studies, 30 (2): p. 169.

42 Telhami, Shibley (2001), "Camp David II: Assumptions and Consequences," Current History, 100 (642): pp.l0-14.

134

What was being asked of the Palestinians was they put forward, at least once, their

own counterproposal.43

3) Contrast frame of reference: For the Palestinians, the frame of reference was­

Israel's borders before the June 1967 War, with modifications to accommodate each

other's needs. For the Israelis, it was how much more to concede beyond the status

quo. In the Palestinian mindset, what Israel keeps out of the West Bank is what the

Palestinians "give" to Israel. For the Israelis, what the Palestinians get beyond what

they now control is "given" by Israel.

According to Joel Beini, Barak loudly announced that Israel would not

return to its pre-l 967 war borders. He sought to annex settlement blocs containing

about 80 percent of the 180,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank (excluding

Jerusalem) to Israe1.44 However, the Palestinians believed they had already

conceded 78 percent of historic Palestine in accepting Israel as a state and were

claiming only the West Bank and Gaza, which Israel had occupied in 1967. 45

4) Lack of diplomacy: Arafat and Barak failed to develop a good working

relationship, with the two negotiating mostly through Clinton. Clinton felt that the

parties were not ready for peace agreement in such a state of affairs.

5) It reached no agreement: The whole summit was run under the rule of "Nothing is

agreed until everything is agreed. ,,46 In other words, 'nothing was final until

everything was agreed,' no agreement had been reached on anything.47 Besides, the

fact that there were no written formal proposals put forth during the negotiations,

Israel didn't put forth direct proposals to the Palestinians. Rather, the United States

ended up conveying suggestions on behalf oflsrael to the Palestinians.

6) Preparedness: President Clinton insisted to jump to final status negotiations

without prior confidence-building measures, which led the Palestinians to question

43Shlomo Ben-Ami (2001), "An Interview" Ha'aretz on 13 September 2001, [Online: web] Accessed 26 September 2006, URL: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.orgljsourcelPeace/benami2.html.

44 Joel Beinin (2000), "Camp David II," Middle East Report on Line, 26 July 2000, [Online: web] Accessed 27 September 2006, URL: http://www.merip.orglmero/mero072600.html.

45 Shibley(2002), n. 20, p. 110. 46 Barak (2000), n. 10, p. 154. 47 Quandt (2005), n. 30, p. 371.

135

the sincerity of both Israel and the United States.48 Arafat pleaded that they needed

more time, but Clinton pushed Arafat to come and try anyway, promising not to

blame him if the summit failed. On the contrary, Clinton put enonnous pressure on

Arafat to accept the Israeli proposals and blamed Arafat for the collapse of the talks

when the Palestinian leader rejected Barak's peace proposals.

On the other hand, Robert Malley stated Camp David was not rushed.

Although it was inadequately prepared lacking proper fall-back options, without a

doubt it was not premature.49 The Camp David summit failed largely because neither

side was ready for a final agreement. A series of miscalculations by both the Israeli

and the Palestinians and by President Clinton doomed the Camp David summit.

Meanwhile the time was running out both for Barak, whose Knesset would reconvene

in late October, and for Clinton, whose time in office was growing shorter.5o

7) Domestic political unrest: Domestic political concerns of the US and Israel

overrode the goal of a lasting peace. According to Akram Hanieh, in his work The

Camp David Papers, Washington exercised its role according to the needs,

requirement, and concerns of the Israeli government. Members of the Palestinian

delegation were so constantly irritated with Barak's coalition problems that they

questioned whether the summit was to salvage the peace process or to rescue Barak's

government.51

Moreover Barak and Arafat faced considerable uncertainties as they

confronted their respective constituencies. Barak had to decide whether to limp

forward with a minority government, cobble together a new coalition, or call fresh

elections. Arafat, although for the moment enjoyed a hero's welcome had to come up

with a new strategy. Camp David has changed the political landscape, but had also

plunged the region 1.."1to a ne"'i and uncertain phase,

8) Whose to be blamed: Both Barak and Clinton have, in differing degrees, blamed

Y asser Arafat for the Camp David breakdown. In their eyes, the Palestinian leader

proved impossibly stubborn and inflexible. But in one important respect Barak

48 Shibley (2002), n. 20, p. 110. 49 Robert Malley (2008), "Fictions about the Failure at Camp David," New York Times, Saturday, 24

May 2008. 50 Quandt (2001) n. 6, p. 34. 51 Hanieh Akram (2001), "Camp David Papers," Journal of Palestine Studies, 30 (20): p. 79.

136

seemed to have misjudged Arafat's position, believing that he would bargain away

sovereignty in Jerusalem in return for most of the West Bank. For any Palestinian

leader, such a trade-off was never on the cards. Jerusalem was as much of a red line

for Arafat as it was for Barak.52

According to Robert Malley, Camp David offered close to 99 percent of

Palestinian dreams, but they said no and chose to hold out for more. Worst, they did

not present any concession of their own, adopting a no-compromise attitude that

unmasked their unwillingness to live peacefully with a Jewish state by their side.

Ehud Barak had uncommon political courage but the measure ofIsrael's concessions ought not to be how far it has moved from its own starting point; it must be how far it has moved toward a fair solution. The Palestinians did not meet their historic responsibilities at the summit either. I suspect they will long regret their failure to respond to President Clinton at Camp David. 53

Mahmoud Abbas affirmed in a special interview with Palestinian TV interview that:

"No human being could withstand the pressure that President Arafat came under

during seventeen days at Camp David. There was pressure from the strongest nation

in the world, America, and pressure from all sides to accept certain proposals and

ideas. But in spite of the pressure, we, the humble side, said no when we saw that that

pressure will lead to concessions on some issues. ,,54

4.1.2.2. Camp David Prospect and Limitation

1) In Camp David both sides engaged fully in the real issues, presenting for the

fIrst time their true positions. It provided an opportunity for the Palestinians to

present their version and positions directly to the American president whereby

the US understood the limits of the Palestinian positions.

2) Camp David made it clear that the Israeli establishment was not ready for real

peace. Israel's hard-line demands regarding the Hararn at-Sharif were

explosively dangerous, opening the way for a religious conflict in t.lIe region.55

3) The Palestinians agreed to Israeli security arrangements on the principle that

some Jewish settlements in the West Bank would be incorporated into a

52 Hardy (2000), Camp David: What went wrong? BBC News, Wednesday, 26 July, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/llhifworldJmiddle eastl852726.stm

53 Malley (2008), n. 49. -54 Mahmoud Abbas- Abu Mazen (2003), "No Peace Agreement without Jerusalem, interview with

Palestine TV on 29 July 2003, spoke about the pressures President Vasser Arafat and the Palestinian delegation came under during the Camp David Summit [Online: web] Accessed 27 September 2006, URL: http://www.nad­plo.orglinner.php?view=nego ..J>ermanentjerusalem ..J>ress ..J>jeruslem2p.

55 Barak (2000), n. II.

137

sovereign Israel; and to Israeli control over parts of East Jerusalem, including

the Western Wall, the Jewish Quarters, and Jewish neighbourhoods that were

built in areas occupied in 1967.56

4) The two sides have broken certain taboos on the Palestinian refugees' right of

return, and above all, on the highly charged and deeply symbolic issue of

Jerusalem. Israel began seriously considering compromises on the issue of

Jerusalem and was prepared to agree to withdraw from over 90 percent of the

Occupied Territories.57

5) The US realised that the Palestinians were not ready to accept just about any

deal under pressure. 58

6) Mahmoud Abbas said;

I consider the Camp David Summit a success in that it brought about an understanding of the all the final status issues among the three sides. The Summ it gave the Palestinian delegation a chance to explain the issues and their far-reaching effects in detail to the Israeli delegation and the American team. For the first time, all the issues were out on the table, nothing remained hidden.59

Despite the failure of the summit, Camp David certainly transformed the character of

the peace process. It created a favourable environment where each side for the ftrst

time got a glimpse of the other's bottom line. Although they were unable to resolve

crucial differences and the gaps remained wide, the negotiations were unprecedented

in both scope and detail which constituted a concrete basis for future negotiations.

4.2. Peace Effort through the AI-Aqsa Intifada

After the close of Camp David, Clinton appeared in an interview on Israeli television.

In the course of his interview, Clinton reiterated the US guarantees of increased

military aid, enhancing the strategic relationship and his consideration of moving the

US embassy to Jerusalem. Clinton's comments on Israeli television and his

accusation of the Palestinians as solely responsible for the failure of the Camp David

embarrassed the Palestinians and created a tough sense of bittemess.6o Cheryl A.

Rubenberg, observed that, the tinderbox built through empty years of negotiations

56 Abu Mazen (2000), Speech at the meeting of the PLO's Palestinian Central Council, 9 September 2000 [Online: web] Accessed 26 September 2006, URL: http://domino.un.orgiUNISPAL.nsf/.

57 Roger Hardy (2000), n. 52. 58 Clinton (2004), n. 15, p. 915. 59 Abbas (2003), n. 54. 60 President Bill Clinton (2001), Remarks to Israeli Television on the moving of the US Embassy to

Jerusalem and the Camp David Summit, Washington, 28 July 2000", see Clinton (2001), n.9, pp.1497-1502.

138

and broken conunitments was ignited by Ariel Sharon's demonstration of Israel's

sovereignty over the Hararn aI-Sharif on 28 September 2000.61

Since Arafat learned the plan of Ariel Sharon's deliberate provocative visit to

the Haram aI-Sharif, or the Noble Sanctuary (and which Jews call the Temple Mount),

he pleaded with Barak to block Sharon's plans. The purpose of the visit, according to

Sharon, was to emphasise Israeli sovereignty over the place. Hundreds of members of

the Israeli security forces accompanied Sharon, which further aggravated tensions,

leading to clashes between Palestinian civilians and Israeli security forces, both in al­

Haram AI-Sharif and the rest of East Jerusalem.

Even though these events took place in East Jerusalem (which is Israeli

occupied Palestinian territory), Barak insisted it was an internal Israeli matter. Israeli

forces brutally suppressed the demonstrators by using heavy weapons, killing over

two-dozen Palestinians. The US government made no public objection, leading

members of the Congress in both parties to insist that these spontaneous

demonstrations were actually pre-planned by Arafat and other Palestinian leaders to

destroy the peace process.62

4.2.1. Sharm AI-Shaykh Summit, October 2000

At the beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada, Clinton and his team worked relentlessly

urging the parties to end the violence. A period of intense international diplomatic

activity ensued. In an attempt to bring about an end to the violent confrontations, a

summit meeting was arranged with the help of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Clinton called a summit at Sharm al- Shaykh in Egypt where he personally sought to

bring a deal to end the vio lence between the two parties.

The summit duly proceeded on 16 October 2000, concluding the following

day. Arafat, Barak; Clinton Kofi Annan, King Abdullah II of Jordan, President Husni

Mubarak of Egypt and a representative of the European Union attended it. However,

the focus of the summit was on re-establishing a truce rather than advancing the

search for a comprehensive agreement.63 On 17 October, both sides agreed to a

ceasefrre. Israel agreed to work towards an end to the conflict, while Arafat agreed to

crack down on incendiary elements and to re-imprison militants who were freed at the

61 Cheryl A Rubenberg (2003), The Palestinians: In Search of a Just Peace, London Lynne Rienner,: p. 304.

62 Zunes (2003), n. 33, p. 126. 63 Europa (2004) The Middle East and North Africa, London: Europa, 50th edn., p. 561.

139

beginning of the al-Aqsa intifada. The leaders agreed on three basic objectives and

steps to realise them

1) Both sides agreed to take immediate and, concrete measures to end the

ongoing confrontation while ensuring an end to the violence and

incitement, maintaining calm and preventing recurrence of recent events.

The United States would facilitate security cooperation between the

parties as needed.

2) The United States would develop a fact-fmding committee to look into the

causes of the al-Aqsa intifada with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as

in consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General. A fmal report

would be submitted under the auspices of the US president for publication.

3) The leaders agreed the United States would consult with the parties within

the following weeks in regards to the resumption of efforts to reach a

permanent status agreement based on the UN Security Council

Resolutions 242 and 338 and subsequent understandings.64

The sides had agreed that a committee charged with investigating the causes of

the violence would be appointed by President Clinton in consultation with Israel,

the PA and the UN. It would be led by an American but would include

international members. The agreement was taken with much scepticism by many

Palestinians, who saw it as a bid to suppress their uprising against the Israeli

occupation and to enable Israel to impose its political terms. Consequently, the

truce agreements brokered by Clinton at Sharm al-Shaykh failed to hold the

vio lence and it continued unabated.

Shlomo Ben Ami alleged Palestinian gunmen continued provoking Israel's

security forces throughout the territories and in Jerusalem. Such activities were

contrary to aU agreements signed with the Palestinian Authority. The outbreak of

violence in the territories violated the recent Sharm al Sheikh understandings, and

it was carried out by the Tanzim in full cooperation with the Palestinian

64 The cease-fire agreement reached at Sharm al-Shaykh was oral and vague, which included an order for Israel and the Palestinian Authority to implement the steps. The main points were extracted from the statement by president Clinton made at a joint press conference with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak following the summit. See "President Bill Clinton (2002) Main Points of Agreement Reached at the Sharm Al-Shaykh Summit, 17 October 2000." Public papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J Clinton, Book l/I- Oct 12, 2000 to January 20. 2001, Pub. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington: pp. 2209-2211.

140

Authority. Ben-Ami appealed the UN Secretary-General to condemn Palestinian

violence and exert its influence on the Palestinian Authority.65

4.3. Clinton Proposals 2000

During the last weeks of his term, President Clinton intensified efforts to promote a

framework agreement for permanent status between the Israelis and Palestinians

following the collapse of the Camp David summit in July and the beginning of the al­

Aqsa intifada In his speech on West Asia peace in New York on 7 January 2001,

Clinton stated that:

Given the impasse and the tragic deterioration on the ground, a couple of weeks ago both sides asked me present my ideas. So I put forward parameters that I wanted to be a guide toward a comprehensive agreement; parameters based on eight years of listening carefully to both sides and hearing them describe with increasing clarity their respective grievances and needs.66

Clinton and Albright convened a White House meeting with Saeb Erakat and Ben­

Ami in a final effort to re-engage the belligerent parties. He offered his proposals to

Israeli and Palestinian negotiators on 23 December 2000. He affirmed these proposals

would not be binding on his successor upon the completion of his presidential tenure

in January 2001. The parameters were not introduced as the basis of a final deal.

Instead, Clinton hoped that these guidelines would steer the course of negotiations in

the subsequent weeks.

The plan included wide range of contentious issues such as territory,

security, Jerusalem, refugees and proposals in regards to the end of the conflict,

which according to him would be a settlement based on sovereign homelands,

security, peace, and dignity for both Israelis and Palestinians.67 Some important

points of his proposals are outlined as follows:

Territory 1) A Palestinian state on 94-96% of the West Bank territ.ury. 2) The land annexed by Israel would be compensated by a land swap of 1-3% in

addition to territorial arrangements such as a permanent safe passage.

3) Two sides would also consider a swap of leased land.

65 Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs (2000), Annex to the letter dated 20 October 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General 20 October 2000, [Online: web] Accessed 27 September 2006, URL: http://domino.un.orglunispa\.ns£'.

66 Bill Clinton's Remarks on West Asia Peace at an Israel Policy Forum Dinner in New York City, 7 January 2001, see Clinton (2002) n. 64: pp. 2838-2846.

67 Ibid.

141

4) The Parties would develop a map consi~lent with the following criteria:

• 80% of Jewish settlers under Israeli sovereignty.

• Contiguity.

Clinton asserted there could be no genuine resolution to the conflict without a

sovereign, viable, Palestinian state that accommodated Israel's security concerns and

demographic realities. He suggested Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza as well the

vast majority of the West Bank and the incorporation of settlement blocs into Israel.

The State of Palestine would be a viable geographically contiguous entity consistent

with the logic of two separate homelands.68

Security

1) International forces to be deployed as Israel withdraws.

2) Small Israeli presence may remain in 36 locations under the authority of the

international forces.

3) Israel to maintain three early warning stations in the West Bank, subject to

renewal after ten years.

4) Israel to have right to deploy its forces in Palestinian territories during "a

national state of emergency."

5) Palestinian sovereignty over its airspace. 'The sides should work out special

arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.

6) A demilitarised State of Palestine.

On the security issue Clinton observed that there would be no peace agreement, unless

the Israeli people have lasting security guarantees. However, these need not come at

the expense of Palestinian sovereignty or interfere with Palestinian territorial

integrity. He proposed international presence in Palestine to provide border security

along the Jordan valley and to monitor implementation of the final agreement.69

Jerusalem

1) Arab areas to be considered as Palestinian and Jewish areas as Israeli.

2) In East Jerusalem, the Palestinians would have sovereignty over all Arab

neighbourhoods while Israel would extend its sovereignty over the 11

Jewish settlements built within Jerusalem's annexed and enlarged city

boundaries since 1967.

68 President Clinton (2000) Proposals for a Final Settlement, Washington, 23 December 2000, Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, [Online: web] Accessed 27 September 2006, URL: http://www.jmcc.org/documentsiciintonprop.htm.

69 Clinton (2002), n. 64, and n. 66

142

3) The Old City of Jerusalem would be divided ethnically, with the

Palestinians having sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian areas and

Israel gaining sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter, the Western Wall and

the access road through the Armenian Quarter.

4) Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram aI-Sharif, and Israeli sovereignty

over the Western Wall, with shared functional sovereignty underneath the

Haram al-ShariflTemple Mount and joint approval of excavations

required.

The Jerusalem issue had been perhaps the most emotional and sensitive of all for

Clinton. He understood that it was a historic, cultural, and political centre for both

Israelis and Palestinians, and a unique city sacred to all three monotheistic religions­

Judaism, Christianity and Islam. His parameters had been established from four

logistic propositions.

a) First, Jerusalem should be a divided city, with assured freedom of worship for

all. It should encompass the internationally recognised capitals of two states,

Israel and Palestine.

b) Second, what is Arab should be Palestinian.

c) Third, what is Jewish should be Israeli.

d) Fourth, the principle of mutual respect for religious beliefs and holy shrines of

Jews, Muslim, and Christians should be considered in a long lasting peace

agreement.

Refugees

1) Israel to acknowledge moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinians

by the 1948 War.

2) Palestinian refugees could return to the State of Palestine; Israel alone would

decide how many refugees would be allowed into Israel.

3) An international compensation regime to be established.

Clinton proposed two alternatives: (a) "both sides recognise the right of return to

historic Palestine" or (b) "to their homeland." Clinton suggested five possible homes

for the Palestinian refugees, which according to him was consistent with the two -

state solution:

1. The State of Palestine;

11. The areas ofIsrael transferred to Palestinian sovereignty;

111. Rehabilitation in host countries;

143

IV. Resettlement in third countries;

v. And admission to Israel.

Clinton stated that the solution would have to be consistent with the two-state

approach - the state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and the

state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. All Palestinian refugees who

wished to return to the historic Palestine should have right to do so, and those who

wanted to find new homes, whether in their current locations or in third countries,

should be able do to so, consistent with those countries' sovereign decisions including

Israel.

However, Clinton viewed the Israeli side could not accept any reference to the

right of return that would imply a right of emigrate to Israel in defiance of Israeli

policies of admission that would threaten the Jewish character of the state. According

to him the unlimited right of return to present Israel and at the same time, to give up

Gaza and West Bank and have settlement blocs as compact as possible would threaten

the very foundations of the State of Israel and would undermine the whole logic of

peace.70

End qf conflict

1) The UN Security Council would officially state that UN Resolution 242 and

338 have been implemented.

2) Israel would release all Palestinian prisoners.

Clinton reaffIrmed that the end of the conflict must manifest itself with concrete acts

that demonstrate a new attitude and a new approach by Palestinians and Israelis

towards each other.

4.3.1. Critical Appraisal

CHIlton and l~Jbright briefed the leaders of Egypt, France, Jordan, Russia, Saudi

Arabia, and Turkey on the proposals to press Arafat to accept them Both Barak and

Arafat eventually accepted the proposals with reservations as the bases for further

talks. Israel noted forty concerns, while the P A sent a letter to Clinton listing twenty­

five points that needed clarification.

However, Clinton responded that the US saw no point in further discussion

with the P A until it clearly accepted the parameters. Meanwhile, Barak strongly stated

70 Ibid.

144

that he would never sign an agreement that ceded sovereignty over the Haram al­

Sharif/Temple Mount to the Palestinian Authority or that accepted the right of return

in any shape, form or period, and thus raising questions on whether Israel would

seriously consider the Clinton proposals if talks resumed.

4.3.1.1. Palestinian Perception of Clinton Proposals

The Palestinians stated that they could not accept a proposal that secures neither the

establishment of a viable Palestinian state nor the right of Palestinian refugees to

return to their homes. It failed to satisfy the conditions required for a permanent

peace. The United States proposals would:

1. Divide a Palestinian state into three separate cantons connected and divided by

Jewish-only and Arab-only roads and would jeopardise the viability of the

Palestinian state.

2. Divide Palestinian Jerusalem into a number of unconnected islands separate

from each other and from the rest of the Palestine.

3. Force Palestinians to surrender the right of return the Palestinian refugees. It

also failed to provide workable security arrangements between Palestine and

Israel.

Territory: The US recommended that the fmal map would place 80 percent of

Israeli settlers in the annexed settlement blocs but according to the Palestinians that

would nonetheless violate territorial contiguity. As for the "land swap," the proposals

did not identify which areas within Israel were to compensate for the annexed land. 71

Jerusalem: The key element of Palestinian position on Jerusalem is that it

was to be an open city with free access for all, ensuring access to all holy sites for all

those who hold the city sacred and to guarantee free movement through the State of

Palestine. However, according to the Palestinians, the proposals did not refer to this

essential concept.

Palestinian refugees: The United States proposed that both sides recognise

the right to return either to historic Palestine or to their homeland, but added that the

agreement should make clear that there would be no specific right of return to Israel.

71 Palestinian Reservations (2001), Concerning President Bill Clinton 23 December Proposals for an Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, Ramallah and Gaza, I January 200 I ," Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, Documents, [Online: web] Accessed 28 September 2006, URL: http://www.jmcc.org/documents/ciintonpropI.htm.

145

Instead, it proposed five possible final homes for the refugees. The proposal reflected

the adoption of the Israeli position that the implementation of the right of return be

subject entirely to Israel's discretion. However, the UN Resolution 194, calls for the

return of Palestinians refuges to 'their homes," wherever located but not to their

"homeland" or to "historic Palestine."

Security: The Palestinians speculated that Israel doesn't require three years to

withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The provision for Israel to maintain

three early warning stations in the West Bank, and to have right to deploy its forces in

Palestinian territory during "a national state of emergency," if actually implemented

would virtually undermine Palestinian sovereignty.

The proposal defined Palestine as a "non-militarised state," meanwhile,

acknowledging Palestinian sovereignty over its own airspace. The Palestinians found

it problematic with the US proposal for Israeli training and operational needs in

Palestinian airspace, which Israel could easily infringe upon, endangering the

Palestinian civilian population and its environment.

Assessment: The proposals, however, remained silent on certain issues that are

essential for establishment of a lasting and comprehensive peace such as the future

political and economic relationship between the two parties. It neglected matters

relating to ending the conflict and did not address vital issues particularly water,

compensation for damages resulting from over thirty years of occupation,

environment, and other state-to-state issues.72 The Palestinian negotiating team gave

an explanation regarding the Clinton proposals that:

The United States proposals were couched in general terms that in some instances lack clarity and detail. A permanent status agreement, in our view, is not merely a document that declares general political principles. It is, rather, a comprehensive instrument that spells out the details, modalities, and timetables of ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For such an agreement to be effective, it must be backed by clear, effective international implementation guarantees. We believe that a general, vague agreement at this advance stage of the peace process will be counterproductive. This conviction has resuited from our past experiences with vague agreements and from Israel's history of non-compliance with signed agreements. The permanent status agreements must be a truly final agreement rather than an agreement to negotiate.73

4.3.1.2. Israeli position on the Clinton Proposals

Israel affmned that it gave a positive answer in principle to President Clinton

proposals which proved its commitment to peace process. The Israeli government

72 Interview with Sulaiman Khatib, Coordinator 'Combatants for Peace', Jerusalem, on ]9 October 2007 at Boston, MA.

73 See Palestinian Reservations (200 I), n. 71.

146

would continue to act towards achieving this goal while upholding the State ofIsrael's

vital national and security interests. But if the other side remained unwilling, Israel

would be prepared for any possibility, Prime Minister Barak said.74

Shlomo Ben-Ami, in an interview entitled "End of a Journey," published in 5

April 2002 said:

The Clinton parameters were the culmination of laborious effort by an honest broker, a brilliantly devised point of equilibrium between the positions of the parties at the latest stage of the negotiations. But Mr. Clinton, desperately short of time at the end of his presidency, was unable to rally the Arab governments to his enterprise and could not build an effective alliance with the Europeans and the Russians to sustain his peace deal. 75

Clinton invited Arafat to Washington for one-to-one talks. The talks focused on both

what the P A could do to halt the clashes and convincing Arafat to accept his

parameters. Despite Palestinians objections, Yasser Arafat agreed during his meeting

with Clinton on 3 January 2001 to accept the bridging proposals "with reservations."

With these regards Clinton said, "Both Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat

have now accepted these parameters as the basis for further efforts. Both have

expressed some reservations. At their request, I am using my remaining time in office

to narrow the differences between the parties to the greatest degree possible.,,76

The conditional acceptance by both sides somehow opened the way to the US

mediation to refine the understandings. However, Clinton could not do much in

bringing the sides together for a comprehensive final status agreement. He hardly had

three weeks from leaving his office when he met Arafat in January 2001. As such,no

sufficient progress was made in the peacemaking.

4.4. Taba Talks January 2001

Despite these enormous obstacles, the Clinton proposals of December 2000 were

talcen up at Taha talks between Israeli and Palestinian delegations at the Egyptian

resort ofTaba from 22 January to 28 January 2001. The talks were structured around

four committees to discuss different aspects of the peace negotiations - Jerusalem, the

refugees, territory and security aimed at reaching the "fmal status" negotiations to end

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

74 Prime Minister Barak (2000) "Israel has proven its Commitment to Peace," (Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser) Jerusalem, 31 December 2000, [Online: web] Accessed 28 Septem ber 2006, URL: http://www.mfa.gov.iIIMF A/GovernmentiCommun iques.

75 Shlomo Ben-Ami (2008), End of a Journey, "Bush's Mideast Opportunity" New York Times Monday, 26 May 2008.

76 Clinton (2002), n. 64. pp. 2838-2846.

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1) On Jerusalem, Israeli negotiators presented to the Palestinians the idea of

creating a special international regime for the "Holy Basin"- an area

including the Old City and some areas outside the walls including the

Mount of Olives cemetery. The Palestinians rejected the proposal, insisting

on Palestinian sovereignty instead.

2) On territory Israel reduced its demands to SlX percent with territorial

compensation that would offset about three percent while the Palestinians

proposed an Israeli annexation of approximately three percent along with a

territorial compensation of the same amount. The new maps presented by

the two sides were closer than ever before to an agreed-upon borderline.

3) The Palestinians further agreed to Israeli sovereignty over eleven Jewish

settlements in and around greater East Jerusalem that surrounded

historically Arab-populated areas, as well as Western Wall and Jewish

Quarter in the Old City. This was the first time the Palestinians presented a

map that acceded to Israeli annexation of the West Bank territories.

A joint statement at the conclusion of the Taba talks was, "the sides declare that they

never been closer to reaching an agreement" yet, it ultimately failed to achieve its

goals.77 Although the Taba talks were eventually suspended in the midst of

discussions, "Peace seemed very possible at Taba," said Ben-Ami. Palestinian

negotiator Abu Ala78 said, "in Taba, we achieved real tangible steps toward a [mal

agreement." Deborah Sontag observed the negotiations were suspended by Israel

because elections were imminent in February 2001 and the pressure of Israeli public

opinion against the talks could not be resisted.79

The summit took place against the backdrop of the failed Camp David 2000

and the al-Aqsa intifada. The Clinton administration had already left office and the

77 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (200 I), Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement at Taba January, 27 January 200 I, [Online: web] Accessed 28 September 2006, URL: http://www.mfa.gov.iIlMFAIMFAArchive/2000_ 2009/200 1/l/lsraeli­Palestinian%20Joinf'1020Statemenf'1o20-%2027 -Jan-200 I.

78 Ahmed Ali Mohammed Qurei also known as Abu Ala- He is a former prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. As a member of the Fatah Central Committee, Qurei was instrumental in negotiating the Oslo Accords. Later, at Camp David (July II to 25, 2000), he took part in the negotiations with Ehud Barak. After the resignation of Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) on 6 September 2003, Palestinian Authority president Vasser Arafat nominated Qurei to fill the post. He said he would only accept the job if Washington "guarantees Israeli compliance with a US backed peace plan, including a halt to military strikes."

79 Deborah Sontag (2001), "Quest for Mideast Peace: How and Why It Failed," New York Times, 26 July 2001.

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Bush team was not yet engaged. The US was not invited to the talks though both sides

briefed the State Department. Barak government continued to offcr concessions to the

Palestinians, but neither the Israeli public nor the Knesset supported these positions.

The breakdown was attributed to the political circumstances posed by the Israeli

elections and the changeover of leadership in the United States. They could not

conclude an agreement with Clinton now out of office while Barak standing for

reelection in two weeks.so

Israel had no inclination to negotiate with the Palestinians and the peace process

ended with the election of the Zionist hardliner Ariel Sharon as the new Prime Minister on 6

February 2001. As the violence continued, the Sharon government turned away from the

Barak policy of concessions. This was also the end of the peace process during the Barak

government, and effectively the ends of the entire Oslo peace process that started at Madrid in

1991.

4.4.1. Clinton and the Peacemaking: An Assessment

The subsequent section will present the overall assessment of Bill Clinton's effort in

the peacemaking. Clinton continued his personal involvement in the peace process

until the end of his term, offering his own bridging proposal less than a month before

he left office and issuing open letters urging the Israelis and Palestinians to make

peace. After leaving office, he made public statements praising Barak's peace efforts

and implicitly criticising Arafat. Clinton understood in order to reach a

comprehensive peace certain guidelines s needed be taken into consideration:

1) The only path to a just and durable resolution is through negotiation. There

is no place for violence and no military solution to this conflict.

2) For a lasting peace and regional stability a strong and secure Israel is vital.

Therefore the United States must maintain its commitment to preserving

Israel's qualitative edge in military superiority.

3) Talks must be accompanied by acts. Specially, an end to the culture of

violence and incitement on the Palestinian side. On the other hand, an end

to the humiliating treatment on the streets or at checkpoints by Israelis. 81

80 Palestine Facts (200 I), "What happened at the Taba Conference in January 2001?" [Online: web] Accessed on 5 July 2007, URL: http://www.palestinefacts.org/pC199lto_now _alaqsa _taba.php.

81 Clinton (2002), n. 60.

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In his presidential speech to the Israeli Policy Forum (a US based organisation that

.. ·aims at promoting the peace process), Clinton strongly reiterated that there must be an

end to the culture of violence and the culture of incitement on the Palestinian side. To

him, such a conduct was inconsistent with Oslo's non-violent path to peace.

Meanwhile, he criticised the Israeli settlement enterprise and building of bypass-roads

in the Occupied Territory, which was also inconsistent with the Oslo commitment.

According to Clinton, Camp David was a transformative event, where the two sides

faced the core issues of their dispute for the first time in an official forum. Just as

Oslo forced Israelis and Palestinians to come to terms with each other's existence, the

negotiations during the six months since July 2000 have obligated them to come in

terms with each other's needs. 82

Despite an extraordinary effort, an outgoing President Bill Clinton failed in his

effort to formally establish agreed-upon parameters for the future conduct of final

status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Nevertheless, the

events since the Camp David till January 2001 have moved the relationship between

Israel and the Palestinians irrevocably beyond the diplomatic and territorial

constraints established in the Oslo accords.

Certain factors responsible for the failure of Clinton's effort to achieve his

peacemaking goals can be highlighted as:

82 Ibid.

1) The Clinton team recognised Israel's security requirements as the primary

focus of the negotiations which prevented it from recognising the

Palestinians' security concerns. 83

2) Pressure from the US Congress was a problem for him. The Republicans

controlled both houses, and pro-Israeli resolutions regularly commanded

nearly unanimous support in the Senate and the House of . 84 RepresentatIves.

3) The intense US concern over immediate Israeli domestic political

constraints overrode the goal of a lasting peace.

4) The tough stalemate on the parties to the conflict made further

complication to deliver a peace deal.

83 Christison (1998), n. 3, pp. 53-64, also see Zunes (2003), n. 33, p. 119. 84 Ibid., also see, in Quandt (2001), n. 6, p. 37.

150

5) Though President Clinton listened with great attention and understanding

to the Palestinian viewpoints, he was restrained by America's known

foreign po licy stance of supporting Israel. 85

6) Throughout the peace process, the Clinton administration seemed to

coordinate the agenda of the talks closely with Israel, ignoring Palestinian

concerns.

7) Clinton could not risk controversy by taking positions that might offend

the Israelis. Rather he was inclined to go slow, not to get too far out ahead,

he chose to hesitate than to confront. He failed to take firm stands with

either party.

Edward Said, while commenting on the role of Bill Clinton at the Camp David said:

Clinton whom Palestinians had placed their hopes in, greeted in Ramallah and Gaza like a hero, rushed together the two opponents, locked together in a decades of complicated struggle for his selfish purpose to say he had engineered a historical achievement. Clinton had always been an opportunist, a Zionist and a clumsy politician. The Palestinians were the weakest party; they were badly led and poorly prepared. Clinton assumed that because his and Barak's terms in office were ending, he could produce a peace ceremony based on Palestinian capitulation, a ceremony that would forever enshrine his presidency. But this great plan, failed completely.

He added Ehud Barak was there mainly to extract a promise from the Palestinians that

would end the conflict, and end all Palestinian claims against Israel (including the

right of return for refugees). In support to this argument Said referred to American

sources made public by Robert Malley in support of the Palestinian argument that

Barak's 'generous offer' was neither an offer nor generousity. Althouhg, Malley

critical of Palestinian tactics during the Camp David summit, he made it clear that

Israel wasn't even close to offering what the Palestinian legitimate national

aspirations required.86

85 Akram (200 I), n. 51, p. 92. 86 Edward W. Said (2003), From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map: Essays. Westminster, MD, USA:

Knopf Publishing Group, p 88-89. Edward Wadie Said (1 November 1935 - 25 September 2003) was a Palestinian American literary theorist, cultural critic, political activist, and an outspoken advocate of Palestinian rights. He was University Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, and is a founding figure in postcolonial theory. He was most known in academic circles for "Orientalism," the 1978 book that argued that "every European, in what he could say about the Orient, was a racist, an imperialist, and almost totally ethnocentric." Daily Princetonian Staff Published: Tuesday, 30111 September 2003, see [Online: web] Accessed 28 September 2006, URL: http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2003/09/30/news/8662.shtml.

151

Conclusion

Clinton was trusted by the mainstream Israelis as the one who understood their unique

security dilemmas and their historical trauma. Even in the Palestinian view, he was

the first president to understand them. He had the ability to reach over barriers and to

appeal to both sides of the conflict. However, his inability to take finn stand with

either party was his dilemma. He could not take a firm stand or threaten sanctions

despite the failure of the contending parties to meet deadlines or honour agreements.

Besides, Clinton and his team while tackling the Israeli-Palestinian problem were

dismayed by the rigidity of the conflicting parties.

Clinton with all his peace efforts could bring the conflicting parties to the

threshold of peace, but at the most crucial of moments, the untoward violence that had

erupted in the late September 2000 had unravelled much of what had been achieved in

the previous years. 87 In the final year of the Clinton's administration, the importance

of a just and lasting peace had been overshadowed by the need for yet another interim

agreement that would provide only short-term political gain. Thus, the prospect of a

long-term stability and peace in West Asia was put at risk.88 Although Clinton

declared that he was committed to reaching an agreement between Barak and Arafat

in the waning days of his administration, neither Barak nor Arafat was prepared or

able to end the crisis on mutually acceptable terms. Consequently. Clinton's

credibility as a mediator was not sufficient to bridge the differences. Despite all his

failures, Bill Clinton used his personal authority and his undoubted skills of

persuasion at Camp David. That is unlikely to be repeated.

87 Quandt (2001), n. 6, p. 39. 88 Richard (2001), n. 2, p. 9.

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