CHAPTER-III

NUCLEAR ESTABLISHMENTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Nuclear Establishments in Ka-zakhstan

At the hei.gb.t of the cold war era, the dominant thought was

that the two nuclear superpowers were invulnerable to pressure from

witbin and without as they were powered by nuclear warheads. All

this, however, changed with the radical redrawing of the political

map of the Central Asia followed by the implosions of the Soviet

. Union. New countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine

emerged as the nuclear states. Its strategic nuclear forces were

located in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan while tactical

nuclear weapons were scattered 1n about _ten republ1cs.1

Approximately 3,000 strategic and 6,500 tactical nuclear

weapons were located outside the Russian Federation. By M837 1992,

!!ill tactical weapons were transferred to Russia but strategic weapons

remained in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Kazakhstan's

nuclear stockpile consist.s of 1,410 warheads, 370 of them on heavy

bombers and 1,040 on 104 SS 185, the USSR;s largest ICMBs.2

2

S. Greenhouse, "US to double aid to Ukraine and Kazakhstan as · reward for Nuclear Accord", International Herald Times, 6 May : 1994.

Ibid.

76

The Semiplatinsk test site was established in 1949 and after

many nuclear explosions, was closed on 29 August 1992, in response

to a mass movement against nuclear testing led by a famous poet of

Kazakhstan. Unlike, Belarus and Ukraine, Kazakhstan is not a party

to the Partial Teat Ban Treaty (PTBT of 1963).

Kazakhstan has a sophisticated nuclear establishment with a

milltary potential. It has several nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The

republic has a nuclear power plant as well as a beryllium production ·

facility. Its liquid metal fast breeder reactor, BN -350 at Aktau

(formerly Shevab.enko) began commercial operation in 1973 and has

a license to operate until the year 2000. There is a phase of arraor

radar at Sari-Shagan and the famous Baikonur Cosmodrame.3

Kazakhstan was reported to be producing 50 percent of the

Soviet Union's uranium. There are plans to build a second fast

breeder reactor (350 MW). All these facilities, being part of the

nuclear weapon complex, have functioned without any international

inspection. Planning a maJor development of ita nuclear

infrastructure, Kazakhstan has recently established two- new

organizations.

3 President N ararbaev was immediately rewarded by US President Bill Clinton's decision to double $85 million of safe and secure nuclear disarmament aid pledged by Washington to that date, Strategic Digest, Nuclear Briefings, Maor 1994,

77

The Kazakh State Atomic Power & Engineering Industry

Corporation is given the responsibility for uranium production,

project management and facility construction and the Kazakh Atomic

Energy Agency w1ll manage the development of export controls and

safety regulations. All this would require financial, technological and

human resources.

In reality, it is Lisbon Protocol, 23M~ 1998, rather than the

START I Force Treaty that has ushered 1n denuclear1sat1on J>rDCess 1n

Central Asia and erstwhile Soviet states. The US Senate was

particularly concerned with denuclearisatlOI). and viewed any attempt

on the opposite as tantamount to breach of treaty: To tbis effect

Russia has made the implementation of the START I dependent on the

republics rat:ifying the treaty.4 Belarus and Kazakhstan have- ratified

ST.ART-1; but none of them has acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear

weapon state.

Ukraine and Kazakhstan have been most reluctant to part with

their nuclear weapons. They have made claims which amount to

'proliferation by inheritance'. President Nursultan Nzarbaorev has

pointed out that his country is sandWiched between two nuclear

weapon powers, Russia and China, both of them have made territorial

claims against it. He has, therefore, sought security guarantees from

4 Ibid.

78

the US. In February 1992, he linked denuclearization of his country

With the elimination of American, Russian and Chinese nuclear

arms.6

On another occasion he even maintained that because nuclear

test explosions continued to be conducted at the Semiplatinsk test site

when the NPT was being defeated Kazakhstan was entitled to be a

member of the exclusive "nuclear club". Under American pressure

Kazakhstan became a sign.atory to the Lisbon Protocol thereby

committing itself to a non-nuclear weapon .status.

The posture, however, is coupled with insiStence that instead of

transferring nuclear weapons to Russia they should be dismantled on

its own territory under international supervision. 6 Kazakhstan, like

Ukraine, objects to· the predilection of the western powers to regard

Russia as the sole inheritor of the Soviet nuclear stockpile.7

Because of its 'nuclear neighbourhood', there iS considerable

reluctance to allow Russia to have a monopoly of these weapons.

Oumirserik Kasenov and Kariat Abusetov of the Centre for Strategic

Studies in Alma Ata maintain that their country cannot exclude the

6

6

7

End of CIS Command heralds new Russian Defense Polley, RFE/Research Report, Vol.2, No.27, July 1993.

Strategic Digest, Nuclear Proliferation in Central Asia, Maor 1995.

R.S. Norris, 'The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago', Arms Control Today, Vol.22, No.1, Jan. 1992.

79

possibility of the emergence of a resurgent and expansionist Russia,

Kasenov says that Kazakhstan will not become a 'nuclear-free zone'

soon for two reasons.

The START-1 force limits do not include the destruction of all

nuclear weapons located in Kazakhstan; and secondly, any

negotiations on the remaining strategic nuclear weapons must

include Kazakhsstan as a full member of the negotiating process to

eliminate these weapons.

The ground realities are that both Ukraine and Kazakhstan

have come to realise the value of their nuclear capability, therefore,

are intent to dr:i.ve a ·hard bargain wbile affecting the process of

denuclearisation. The traditional Russophobia the historical fact has

also compounded this problem. In addition, six mill1on Russian.B

livtng in Kazakhstan also figure as a factor to be considered.

Central Asian Security and Kazakhstan's Nuclear Stockpiles

The problems raised by Kazakhstan's acquisition of nuclear

weapons dominated Western and Asian strategic reactions to the

Central Asian republics immediately after their independence.

Kazakhstan had 104-SS-18 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

(ICBMs) with a total of 1,400 warheads as its soil. Each ICBM could

travel up to 11,200 kilometers and carried them independently

targeted warheads, each of which was equivalent to half a million

80

tons of TNT. The two main missile bases were in the north, in areas

dominated by Russian settlers. Overnight, Kazakhstan had become

· the fourth-largest nuclear power m the world. It was an awesome

responsibility for President Nursultan Nazarbayev and immensely

disturbing for a world that barely knew him or his policies.8

After the failed August 1991 coup, US Secretary of State J~s

Baker rushed to Alma Ata, where Nazarbaorev told him that so long as

Russian ~aintained its nuclear capability, Kazalthstan would retam.

its nuclear weapons~ 'I am absolutely against having any single

republic control all nuclear weapons by itself, 1rrespecttve of how

large that republic might. 9 I saor that 1n the Soviet Union, defense

should be unitary and all nuclear weapons should be under the

control of the central government', Nazarbaorev told Baker .10 In

December as the Soviet Union was on the verge of breakup,

Nazarbayev told Baker 1n another meet1ng that the joint control of aJ1

nuclear weapons should be shmoed by the nuelear inheritors of the

SOViet state. Russia, Ukraiiie, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

8

9

10

!TAR-TABS, Six CIS States join Forces to Enforce Export Control, 9 Feb. 1993.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Central Eurasia, FBIS-Sov, 10 Feb. 1993.

Peter Rudolf, 'Non-Proliferation and International Export Control', Aussenpolitik, Summer 1993.

81

At the meeting in Alma Ata on 21 December at which the

formation of the CIS was formally announced, all four nuclear states

agreed to keep the Soviet strategic arsenal under collective central

command, to accept US expertise in mOVing nuclear weapons from

outlying republics to Russia by 1994 and in carrying out plans for the

destruction of nuclear weapoJ+S. The only part of this agpeement that

was ever fulfilled was that by July 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons

had been moved to Ruasia. The US Congress sanctioned payment of

$400 million to the four nuclear states for the destructiOn of their

surplus nuclear weapons. '

.AI3 expected Ukraine and Kazakhstan_ linked d.enuclea.rjsati.on

With financial aid and at times appeared to show belligerent stands,

givtng room for a lot of_ speculations. It would be pertinent to recall ·

Nazabeyev's statement. On 28 January 1992,11 he declared that he

would not transfer bis weapons to Russia. 'It is not our fault that we

have become a nuclear power', he told the French Foreign Minifi.ter

Ronald Dumas.12 Rumours abounded in the western press that

Kazakhstan had sold 44 SS-18 to Iran and that it was about to

provide Teheran With uranium. None of these reports was ever

11

12

Ibid.

K.M. Cambell, et. al., "Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union", CSIA Studies in International Security, No.1.

82

proved but they kept western intel.l.i.gence agencies on their toes for

much of the year.

President Nazarbayev travelled to Washington in Maor 1992,

where he met President George Bush and signed a protocol in which

Kazakhstan agreed to sign the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

(START!) which would eventually allow the eUminatiOn of one-third

of Soviet and US nuclear weapons. Ukraine and Belarus had also'

signed such a protocol with the USA, so that all three states had

guaranteed with they would either destroy their missiles or move

them to Russia within seven years. All three states also pledged to

Sign the. Nuclear Non-Prnliferation Treaty (NPT) m the shortest

possible time. Russia was offi.cial.1y designated as the successor

nuclear state to the former Soviet Union.

Nazarbayev once again hardened stand, pointing to nuclear

status to China, Pakistan and India and called for unified, rather

particular denuclearisation programme. 13

In June 1992, the US and Russia agreed to START!, which

would eliminate all land-based multiple warhead missiles, leading to

an eventual ceiling of each side fielding 3,000 to 3,500 warheads by

the year 2000. The first missiles to be eliminated would be the SS-

18s, the very missiles on Kazakh soil. Ukraine, with 1,650 nuclear

13 Ibid.

83

warheads on the soil, refused to fall in and began a lengthy process of

threats, blackmail and ultimatums to Washington and Moscow in a

bid to obtain security guarantees from the USA and more than $175

million earmarked by Washington for the elimination of the missiles.

In January 1993, after three days of talks in Washington, Ukra.inia.n

leaders agreed to accept US security guarantees after Russia had

agreed to compensate Ukraine for giving up its nuclear weapons.

Kazakhstan is the only Asian country, other than China, India

and Pakistan to have declared nuclear weapons on its territory. It

has a total of 1,340 strategic nuclear weapons and was said to have

had 650 tactical nuclear weapons till these were Withdrawn into

Russia in mid-1992. Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon Procotol on 22

Maor 1992 and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclea:r weapon state. It

has also declared a 'no first use' policy. There was considerable

speculation as to what will happen to these weapons once the overall

responsibility of the SOViet Union ceases. Initially President

Nazarbaorev had stated that it would help its nuclear weapons for

another 15 years. 14 But the Kazakh parliament has now decided to

withdraw all strategic nuclear weapons from operation by 1995. Till

then these will be under 'four power' control with control of 'nuclear

button' with the Russian President and the Kazakh President only to

14 John Muller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World", International Security, Falll998.

84

be kept informed. The actual elimination Will not be achieved soon.

In accordance With STARI, in the course of the next 7 years, i.e. by

2000 Kazakhstan Will be cutting its nuclear armaments in the same

proportion applicable to the Soviet . Union. At the same time

Kazakhstan and Russia, bound by their defense treaty, will decide for

themselves where to station these nuclear weapons in future.

The other question is on the safety and matntenance of the

nuclear weapons With Kazakhstan. There were considerable doubts

about this, but apparently an agreement has been reached with

Russia for ensuri.ng their safety. The disposal of the nuclear sites a;re

posing some problems, wliicll will be resolved within the Kazakhstan

Defense Ministry. The SenupaJ.atinBk nuclear testing site has been

converted into a national nuclear research centre, meant for non­

m111tary research and develop;ment.

Nucleartsa.tion of Tibetan Plateau

Ch1na entered the nuclear age at a breakneck speed faster than

any other nuclear power. It took only 32 months during the early

1960s, a decade of chaos, fa.tlure and famine in China. This

extraordinary achievement required the summ.on:ing of enormous

intellectual and material resources at a time when intellectuals were

being purged and materials scarce. It also required concentrating

these people and supplies iil an elite, secluded setting. The location

85

was a closely guarded state secret and the security was absolutely top-

notch. The place was the Tibetan plateau, in Haibei Tibetan

Autonomous prefecture, 100 k.llometer west of X1ning.16

The selection of the Tibetan plateau for China's primary nuclear

weapons research and development base was the first in a series of

decisions that put China's nuclear .illfrastructure including test sites,

nuclear processing facilities and nuclear weapons production and

assembly in regions populated by non-Chinese peoples. There 1s now

little doubt that China's nuclear programme has had an inordinate

impact on Tibetans,. Uygurs and Mongolians. From land

appropriation to nuclear fallout, to toxic and radioactive pollution in

rivers, lakes and pastures, the story ·about the ugly side-effects of

China's nuclear programme is just beginning to emerge.16

China's nuclear programme is only a fraction Of the size of

those in the United States and the ex -Soviet Union in terms of its

nuclear arsenal, number of test explosions and the volume of nuclear

waste generated. But in the areas of nuclear proliferation, lack of

worker safety and irresponsible waste disposal, China's reco:r;d is as

poor or even worse than those of other nuclear powers. The

implications of this situation, from what we know of the effects in

16

16

John Ackerly, Nuclear Installations on the Tibetan Plateau, 1993, p.3-5.

Ibid.

86

other conntries, for the Tibetans, the Uygurs and the Mongolians is

trulyfr1eghten1.ng. 17

Before explaining the effects of the Chinese nuclear

establishments in Tibet, it is important to bring full details of the

Chinese nuclear setup and its policies. Only the minute descriptions

will tell the true story of the Chinese nuclear hazards for the Tibetan

people.

Nuclear weapons which can destroy all life forms and turn our

beautiful green planet into a barren dust-bowl are the antithesis of·

Buddhist philosopby. They can kill indiscriminately and continue

killing over thousands of years. So it is especial1y disturbing .for '

Tibetans to report that their motherland, dedicated to the peaceful

development of the human spirit, under China's occupation has

become the storehouse of Chinese nuclear weapons, and a place for

radioactive waste dumping. On top of this, China, for financial gain

has reportedly been encouraging foreign countries to ship their toxic

waste to Tibet.

The second part · of this chapter will try to focus on the

following major questions:

(a) . Document the development of nuclear weapons on the Tibetan

plateau.

17 Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 13 Aprill995.

87

(b) Bring to light China's destructive military activities on the

Tibetan plateau and their impact on the global environment.

(c) Create global consciousness about the effects of the

nuclearisation of the Tibetan plateau.

Historical Development

In 1949 People's Liberation .Army (PLA) soldiers entered

Eastern Tibet. In the Spring of 1950, Chi:i:la's "18th .A.rr:DY' entered

Tibet through Dartsedo in the east, and through Am.do in the north-

east. The "14th Division" entered through Dechen 1n south-east 'l'l"bet.

After occupying Kham and Amdo, the advance party of 'the "18th

.Army'' entered Lhasa on 9 September 1951, followed by the unit's

main force on 26 October 1951.18 This was only the beginning of the

vast Chinese military buildup in Tibet which continues to this <hey".

The first known nuclear weapon was brought onto the Tibetan

plateau in 1971 and installed in the Tsaidam basin in northern

Am.do. China currently has approximately 300-400 nuclear

warheads, 19 of which at least several dozen are believed to be on the

Tibetan plateau in Qinghai Province.

18

19

Brahma Chellany, "Regional Proliferation: Issues and Challenges" in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Prospects for Arms Control, Stephen Cohen, ed., Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, pp.323-25.

Ibid.

88

Establishment of the Ninth Academy

The Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design

Academy, known as the "Ninth Academy" or "Factory 211",20 was

built by the Ninth Bureau of Chinese Nuclear Production

Establishment in the early 1960s to produce China's early nuclear

bomb designs. It is China's top secret nuclear city located 1n Haibei

Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, 100 k:m west of S1li.ng.

-The construction of the Ninth Academy was approved by the

late Chinese leader, Den.g Xiaop:lng, who was then the general

secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party.

The Ninth Academy is situated at 36.57N, 101.55E with an elevation

of 10,000 feet above sea level, 10 miles east of Lake Kokonar, and lies

in a watershed which drains into the Tsang Chu R1ver.21 This

becomes the Yellow River. In the late 1970s, the Ninth Academy

further established a Chemical Industry Institute to conduct

experiments on reprocessing highly enriched uranium :fields.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Ninth Academy operated

under emergency conditions, to build China's nuclear weapon

capacity. An unknown quantity of radioactive waste in the form of

20

21

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford University Press, 1988.

Ibid.

89

liquid slurry, as well as solid and gaseous waste was dumped by the

academy. The disposal of waste was haphazard and their record

keeping dismal. Initially radioactive waste was dumped in shallow

and unlined landfills.22

All of the functions of the Ninth Academy are still not exactly

known. But it is clear that the Ninth Academy was responsible for

designing all of China's nuclear bombs through the mid-1970s. For

this purpose the facility designed and carried out non-nuclear

explosions. It also served as a research centre for detonation

development, radiochemi.stry and many other nuclear weapons

related activities. Although the primary function of the Ninth

Academy was on research and design, it also assembled components

of nuclear weapons.

The huge nuclear facility is one of China's most secret and is

rarely mentioned in Chinese or western publications. Activities in

large nuclear facilities in Xingiang and Gansu are now relatively wen

known, but little has ever been written about the "Ninth Academy" .23

Parts of the facility are located underground to deter detection and

possible destruction in the event of an attack.

22

23

Tibetan Review, March 1981, p.13.

There are a few books which discuss nuclear facilities in Gansu and Xinliang, William Ryan and Sam Summerlin, China Cloud, Little Brown & Co., 1967, Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy.

90

One of the only references to the plant which publicly appeared

in English prior to the late 1980s was in the book In Exile from. the

Land of Snows which said that a gaseous diffusion plant, a warhead

assembly plant and research labs had been moved to an undisclosed

area in Tibet in 1968. The other reference, which went largely

unnoticed far decades, was a 1966 Central Intelligence Agency report

that referred to the facility as the "Kokonor Nuclear Weapons Center"

but gave no further infoflll.ation.24

There are reportedly other nuclear-related facilities near the

Ninth A~ademy. The town of Hwmgyuan has related factli~es which

are all connected_ by underground tunnels. At least one Torpedo

factory was located nearby, on the shores of Lake Kokonor, and has

been converted to a guest house.28 Known as "Factory 151", it iS

likely to have been associated with the nuclem." specialities developed

by Ninth Academy scientists. Other milita:ry installations have been

located on the south shore of Lake Kokonor, where abandoned

building and a pier for launching era;tts are now assembling. On the

north side at Gangca, there is a military airport and more facilities.

24

26

Ibid.

Li Jue, JPRS, p.2. Prior to the opening of the Ninth Academy, nuclear weapon design was conducted at the Beijing Nuclear Weapons Research Institute. After the Ninth Academy was: opened the top scientists and the principal work were relocated from Beijing to the Tibetan plateau.

91

Construction began under what were described as extremely

difficult conditions. Due to the isolation of the site, the altitude,. a

sh9rt annul frost-free period, and many other obstacles, the in1tial

force of construction workers waa inadequate. Authorities reinforced

the construction brigade with workers from thirteen departments,

which probably included prison labourers. The facility was partiaJly

opened in 1963 and fully operational by 1967, at the height of the

cultural revolut1on.26

In 1964, the Ninth Academy conducted the first 1:1 modeLblast

experiment at a site near the facility; It is unknown how many test

explosions have been conducted there, and how much radioactive1

material was involved. All documented nuclear tests have been

conducted at Lop Nor, in Xingia;ng Prov1nce.27 China's top nuclear

scientists continued to gather at the Ninth Academy to refine, update

and develop all of China's nuclear weapons technology through the

late 1960s and early 1970s.

During the 1960s China faced mounting hostilities with its

neighbours. Taiwan was becoming increasingly bel.l.igerent and the

US was considering deploying nuclear missiles on Taiwan - a move

26 Ibid.

27 John Avedon, In Exile from the Lands of Snows, New York: Vintage Books, 1986. ·

92

that led to a Chinese "Cuban Missile Crisis" .28 The Soviet Union and

China broke off relations inl960, and in 1962 the border was with

India completed the hostile encirclement of China in a new nuclear

age. China's tactical response was to create the "Third Front". From

1965 to the early 1970s China conducted massive and Secret

Industrial Investments centered in Sichuan which they thought

safest from invasion and bombing. The Third Front also involved

duplicating or relocating many strategic factories, research

establishments and military installations to protect them from

nuclear or oonventio:p.al attack. 29

Facilities_located m the_north of China were vulnerable due not

only to their proximity to the enemy Soviet state, but also because the

Soviets had helped design and build m.tmy of Cb:ina's nuclear and

military facilities. Thus, the SOViets knew the exact locations,

functions and capabilities of China's military. By 1969, relations

between the Soviet Un1on and China had deteriorated to the extent

that the Moscow was preparing plans for nuclear strikes aga1.nst

China's nuclear facilities. It was decided that the Ninth Academy was

one of the facilities to be moved. 30

28

29

30

Ibid.

John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bombs, Stansford University Press, 1988, p.53.

L. Hong,_ "Nuclear Weapon Breakthrough", China Daily, 9 Sept. 1984.

93

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Ninth Academy operated

under emergency conditions to bufid China's nuclear weapon

capability. An unknown quantity of radioactive waste in the form of

liquid slurry, as well as solid and gaseous waste was dumped by the

academy. The disposal of waste was haphazard and their record

keeping dismal. Initially radioactive waste was dumped in shallow

and unlined landfalls.31

A direct raUwaor line connects the academy with Lake Kokonor,

the largest lake on the Tibetan plateau. Nuclear waste_ experts believe

that radioactive waste was also dumped into, the lake. A reliable

report from a Chinese man whose father was a nuclear scientist in

Lanzhou, states that in 1974 there was an accident involving nuclear

pollution of the Lake (ICT, 1993). The Ninth Academy is loc~ted on

marshy land, allowing polluted water and radioactive particles to

easily seep into the groundwater which flows into Lake Kokonor.

According to the official China News Agency, Xinhua, dated 20

July 1995,32 the Ninth Academy was decommissioned in1987, and

the base was moved to sites in Sichuan prOVince in Eastern Tibet.

However, Tibetans living near the Ninth Academy informed the

Tibetan Government in Exile in 1996 that Chinese security personnel

31

32

Tibetan Review, Jan,-Feb. 1976,"p.26.

M.G. Chitkara, Toxic Tibet under Nuclear China, APH Publishing Coporation,New Delhi, 1996, p.l63.

94

secretly guarded the Ninth Academy round the clock, putting in.to

question the Chinese claim that this nuclear production centre has

been closed.

Anti-Frigate Missile Centre at Drotsa.ng

A new m.1Bsile production centre is located at Drotsa.ng, 63

kilometer in east of S11.1ng. The secret code number of this c-entre is

430. It was originally setup in 1986 and was massively expanded in ./

1995.33 It is a surrogate of the Ninth Academy and has been

producing anti-frigate miBsiles which are being tested in Lake

Kokonor.

Land-Based Nuclear Warheads

When Major General Zhang Shaosong, the Political

Commissioner of the PLA in Tibet, was asked pointblank whether

there were nuclear weapons in Tibet by the BEG's Mack Braine in

1988, he replied, "whether there are nuclear weapons in Tibet or not,

it is up to the authorities to decide." And he smiled.34

Nuclear Missile Launch Sites at Tsaida.m. in Am.do

The Ninth Academy was ready to produce nuclear weapons by

1991.

33

34

Tashi Chutter, Confidential Study on Deployment of Chinese : Occupational Forces in Tibet, 1998.

Va;nya Kewley, Tibet: Behind the Ice Curtain, London, 1990.

95

The first batch of nuclear weapons manufactured at the Ninth

Academy was reportedly brought to Tsaidam Basin stationed at Small

Tsaidam and Large Tsaidam.36

According to various reports, a launch site for Dong Fen.g Four

(DF-4) missiles which are equivalent to Russia's CSS-2 was built in

Tsaidam. These missiles, located at Large Tsaidam and Small Tsaid.am

are reported to have a range of over 4,000 kin, placing the whole

Indian subcontinent within stri.ki.ng d1stance.36

The DF-4 is China's first intercontinental bailistic missile.

During the 1970s the range was extended from 4,000 km to 7,000

km allowing the moclified version now deployed on the Tibetan

plateau to reach Moscow and the rest of the former Soviet Union.37

The Small Tsaidam site 1n northern Tibet, is presumably

organized 1n a similar Wf3¥ to the large Tsaidam deployment and

launch site. The missiles were moved to these sites 1n the Tibetan

plateau in- 1971. According to diplomatic sources of International

Campaign for Tibet (ICT) 1n Wasb..i.n.gton DC, nuclear missiles are

36

36

37

DIIR, Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts, Department of Information & International Relations, CentraJ. Tibetan Administration, India, 1996.

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford Press, 1988.

Ibid ..

96

stationed in Small Tsaidam and are onJy moved to large Tsaidam in ·

times of emergency.

Another nuclear missile launch site is located at Terlin.gkha,

217 km southeast of Tsaidam. It houses DF-4 and Intercontinental

Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Terlingbha is the missile regiment

headquarter for Am.do which consists of four -associated launch

sites.38

A New Missile Division in Amdo

A new nuclear missile division has alSo been established on the

Tibetan plateau on the border between Qinghai and Sichuan

prov1nces, in the Tibetan province of Amdo. Four CSS-4 missiles are

deployed here, which have a range of 8,000 m1les39 capable of striking

the United States, Europe and anywhere in Asia. Amdo province of

Tibet has in total four nuclear missile launch sites, two at Tsa.idam,

one at Terlingbha and one at the border between Amdo and Sichuan

prov1nce.

Missile bases at Risur in N a.gchuka

In 1979s numerous reports surfaced regarding the stockpiling

of nuclear weapons. These reports also confirmed that missile base

38 JohnAckerly, ICT, 1998.

39 The Tribune, 5 July 1997, 'China's Nuclear Power in Tibet'.

97

construction work had started about 10 miles north of-Nagchuka in

the 'Tibet Autonomous Region' in 1970 and that there was a

considerable buildup of Chinese military personnel in the area. 40

On 14 October 1987, an article in the Australian newspaper

The Australian reported the presence of nuclear missile at Nagchuka.

Subsequently, the Austrian Nuclear Disarmament party, in a press

release dated 28 October 1987, expressed their grave concern and

stated that 20 Intermediate Range Ballistic M1Bs1les (IRBM)41 and 70

medium range ones (MRBM) were stationed in Nagchuka.

Mr. Tasbi Chutter's newly published book (1998) Confidential

Study on Deployment of Chinese Occupational Forces in Tibet

confirms that there are nuclear missiles permanently stationed at

Nagchuka. The missiles are housed 1n underground complexes under

.Risur mountain, 25 km southeast of Nagchuka. The Risur site has

reportedly been developed by the Chinese government for two nuclear

reasons; to provide an alternative to the Lop Nor nuclear test site in

Eastern Turkistan (Xinl1a.ng), and to store as well as test China's

upgraded air defense missi.l,es and nuclear weapons. Nag Cb.uka is

reported to have the largest airforce unit stationed at any scheduled

40

41

Ibid.

Ibid.

98

site.42

Like . the Risur site, another missile base is located at Tagb.o

mountain in the remote valley of Pelok which lies to the East of

Nyima Dzon.g under Nagchuka administrative division of 'Tibet

Autonomous Region'. Missiles of either nuclear or non-nuclear are

reportedly stored in the underground rocky tunnels of Ta.gb.o

mountain. Tl:).e entire region is described as a desolate desert, where

only military vehicles are allowed to enteT. ~

Underground Missile Storage Site in Lhasa

Dhoti Phu is located at 3.5 km to the northwest of Drapchi

Prison and one km to the west of Sera Monastery. It came into.

existence between the late 1960s and 1970s. It was observed that

occasionally 20 to 25 trucks, loaded with long shaped objects

wrapped in canvas cloth were seen entering the storage site. The

movement of such vehicles takes place only at night. The

sophisticated underground storage complex of. Dhoti Phu reportedly

contains missiles known as di dui tron.g (ground-to-air) and di dui di

(surface-to--surface). 44 In Lhasa during Chinese Army Daur ( 1

42

43

44

Tashi, Chutter, Confidential Study on Deployment of Chinese Occupational Forces in Tibet, 1998.

Ibid.

Tibetan Review, Jan. 1981.

99

August), a number of missiles of these types were displayed to the

public on missile vehicles.

Missiles in Kon.gpo

A large underground missile storage centre is located at Payi

Town in Kongpo N;Yingb.i, 'TAR'. Its secret code number is 809. It is,

controlled by the Chengdu Military Logistic Division. Supplies are

brought in by the 17th, 18th and 20th Transport Reg:tmentEI from

Chengdu and some supplies are also brought in from Lhasa. A few

low ceiling barracks were noticed near the foothill of ~ mountaln 1n

Paon where there is an' entrance leading to an underground storage

complex. Long convoys of military trucks belonging to the transport

reg:tments have been .observed entering the storage facility when fresh

supplies arrive at the facility, storage complex drives replace the

regular drivers inside the complex. 46

It is reported_ that ground-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles

are stored at this site. During mock military exercises a large

number of such missiles are taken out of this complex. At one time,

about 80 missiles were observed. They were mounted on 20 trucks,

each truck carryin.g four missiles. Each missile measured about one

and half times the length of the trucks. During these exercises,

46 Ibid.

100

missiles were launched vertically and horizontally to hit pre-arranged

, targets.46

Airbases with Nuclear Weapons

There are three types of aircraft in China currently available for

nuclear bombing missions: the Hong-6 bomber, the Hong-5 bomber,

and the Qian-5 attack jet. The Hong-6 has a combat radius of over

3,000 km and can reach areas in the former Soviet Union and India.

The Hong-5 has a combat radius of 1,200 km.. 47

:During the 1960s and 1970s the three maJn military airbases

in Tibet were the Lhasa A:irfi.eld, Chabcha .Airfteld, and Golmud

Airfi.ed. During the 1960s Chabdra and Golmud airfields were used

as refuell:lng stations for Chinese on their way to Tibet and the Indian

border.

The Gongkar a1rfl.eld, located 97 km. southwest of Lhasa has

been· the main military air:field and the main supply centre for the

Chinese forces in the border area. At Shigatse military airport, four

or five IL-28 bombers were deployed with some jetfighter aircraft.

Military transport aircraft such as the AN -32 and the Russian made

IL-18 were noticed in frequent operations at the airport. Every

46

47

Richard Fieldhouse, 'Chinese Nuclear Weapons: A Current and Historical Overview", Natural Resource Defence Council, USA, March 1991.

Ibid.

101

autumn, these bombers carried out bombing exercises at a place

known at Logma Then.g, west of the airport at a distance of 50 km.

During the rest of the year the all>craft practice flight manoeuvring

exercises. 48

A classified Pentagon report quoted by the Washington Times

states that missile launch complexes in Ji.all.Shui, near the China-Viet

border and at Daton.g in Am.do are equipped with CSS-2 and CSS-5

launchers that can bit targets which cover "most of India" other

targets include Russian, Japan and Taiwan, quoting a. classified study

prepared by the National Air Intelligence Centre (NAIC). 49

China has been party to the violation of the 1963 treaty many a

times having exploded underground nuclear device on 17 August

1995 followed by two more explosions on 8 June 1996 and 29 Jwy

1996, ta.k;ng the whole taJly to forty-five.6° China's 45th nuclear

explosion of 29 July 1996 came just a few hours before delegates sat

down to negotiate the final stage of the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty" (CTBT) at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in

Geneva.

48

49

60

Tashi Chutter, Confidential Study on Deployment of Chinese Occupational Forces in Tibet, 1998.

Ibid.

United News of India (UNI), 28 Sept. 1997, 'China Tests more Nuclear Bombs'.

102

CNN World News on 7 Aprill998, announced that France and

the United Kingdom ratified the CTBT to prevent international

nuclear proliferation for a nuclear free world. China is one of the five

nuclear states in the world, along with the US and Russia who are yet

to ratify the CTBT. China signed the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty

in 1998.61

With trade matters and real politi.k. com.1n.g to the forefront of

the world diplomacy. China's nuclear tests are no longer vociferously

contested for it will entail huge trade losses to the advanced

countries. These nations are just ma.king occasional murmur

showing shift from the 1960s when the Tibetan cause was

voc?-ferously felt.

Radioactive Waste on the Tibetan Plateau

Radioactive wastes are chemical wastes which contain their

own unique blend of hundreds of distinctly unstable atomic

structures called radioisotopes. Each radioisotope has its own life

span and potency for giving off alpha, beta and gamma r837B. These

rays can cause cancer and other diseases in human beings and

animals; most frightening of all, radiation emitted by radioactive

wastes can cause genetic mutation resulting in birth defects in babies

etc. Scientists have not discovered any foolproof wa;y to permanently

61 Tibetan Review, 25 Jan. 1996, 'China's Nuclear Power'.

103

contain radioactive wastes. One spoonful of plutonium powder is

enough to destroy the population of a large city.

The Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on H11rnan

Rights, 1993, articulated that, 'Illicit dumping of toxic and dangerous

substances potentially constitutes a serious threat to human rights,

life and the health of everyone. "62

'

The Basel Convention,63 signed in 1992 by various countries to

which China is a signatory, and the subsequent Basel Ban, adopted as

an amendment to the convention in September 1995, prohibit trade

in hazardous wastes from industrialized to non-industrialized

countries. AT the fourth conference of parties held in Kuching,

Malavrsia between 23-27 February 1998, China half-heartedly

supported no changes to the Basel Ban to stop certain developing

countries from benefiting from trade in recyclable hazardous waste.

Although this is a step in the right direction, China's own record of

waste disposal on the Tl'betan plateau 1B dismal, to savr the least. 54.

On 18 February 1984, the Washington Post reported that China

had tentatively agreed to stare up to 4,000 tons of radioactive waste

62

63

64

The Tribune, 5 July 1998, 'Nuclear Hazards and China's Contributions'.

Ibid.

Tibetan Review, 'How Tibet is turning to be a nuclear waste bowl'. This news aJ.so explains the effects of nuclear wastes on the people of Tibet.

104

from European nuclear reactors in the remote Gobi Desert in

exchange for US $6 billion. Since then this was to take place over the

next 16 years. 5 5

In the fall of 1988, news began circulating among Tibetans as

to the potential use of Tibet as a nuclear dumping ground for Western

Europe. According to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, spiritu~ and

temporal leader of the Tibetan people, a signed document offers

evidence that the Chinese government is planning to dump foreign

nuclear waste in Tibet. 66

In 1991, Greenpeace reported that the city officials in-

Baltimore, Maryland, USA, had sec'ured a tentative agreement with

China to ship 20,000 tons of the city's toxic sewage waste to Tibet in

exchange for payment of US $1.44 million. The brokers for the

shipment were California Enterprises, and Hatnan Sunlight Group, a

Chinese government agency. The latter said that such shipments did

not require government approval according to China's import rules

and guaranteed that the sludge would not be shipped back to the

USA. Greenpeace noted that the import document describeP- the

BB

66

Michael Werskopf, 'China Reportedly agrees to store Western Nuclear Wastes', The Washington Post, 18 Feb. 1984, p.21.

Ibid.

105

shipment as "heni", which means "river silt"67 in Chinese.

Greenpeace protested, "Urban sewage iB not river silt". In the United

States, sludge from urban sewage treatment plants are ~hronicaJly

laced with toxic pollutants.

His Holiness tlie Dalai Lama, while participati.n.g in a "Meet the

Press" programme organized by the Karnatak.a Union of Working

Journalists in Bangalore in India said having authentic information

that China had set up a nuclear weapon factory in 'IJ.bet. He said that

China had stationed a half-a-million strong military force in. Tibet,

which indicated that the situation in the occupied territory was

potentially explosive. 68

China responded to international allegations levelling them as

baseless. But at the same time it conformed the exiStence of 80 sq.

meter dump for radioactive pollutants in Habey in Tibetan

autonomous prefecture near the source of lake Loparov. Another

aspect of the report was the consistent clean chit given to the Ninth

Academy pressing its excellent track record, but it conveniently heed

the facts of nuclear dangers like the· effec;t of radiation on the

villagers, livestock, natural pollution, pollution of rivers and trans-

national impact of nucleariBation. Thus, it becomes all the more

67

68

John Ackerly, A Poisonous Atmosphere: Nuclear Installations on the Tibetan Plateau, China Human Rights Forum, Spring 1993, pp.4-8.

The Statesman, 21 January 1992.

106

necessary to examine the cases of tbis genre while focussing on each

of the mentioned areas. We shall therefore examine all these aspects

with concrete examples and lists them under the respective headings

as follows below. 69

The report did not give details as to how the nuclear waste

initially contained or how it is being managed. It did s937 however in

the words of Mr. You Delrang, spokesman for the China National

Nuclear Corporation, that spent a large amount of money ft>om 1989

to 1993 to "strictly supervise the environmental conditions of the

retired nuclear weapon base" .60

A 1993· report "Nuclear Tibet", published by the International

Campaign for Tibet, documented reports by a local Jibetan -d.octor,

Tasbi Dolma, of abnormally b.1gh rate of diseases in the nearby towns

of Reshui and Ga.nzihe. The doctor also treated cbildren of nomads

who grazed their animals adjacent to the nuclear base called "Ninth

Academy" or "Factory 211", seven of whom died of cancer witb1n five

years.

Shallow Ian?- burial techniques, considered obsolete in the west,

were deemed "sufficiently safe" for implementation in China. On the

69

60

Xinhua, 19 July 1995. Its explanation is contradictory. It claims that there has not been a single case of nuclear contamination to any Tibetan.

Tibetan Review, 18 August 1994.

107

proposed site for High Level waste, Chinese officials said that China

had a very wide distribution area it would be easy to find a site.81

Since Tibet is sparsely populated by 'minority nationalities' and is far

removed from Beijing to the Chinese wa;y of thinking, it is a perfect

site to dump nuclear wastes.

According to a Reuter report dated 10 November 1993, China

was building its radioactive waste disposal centre in the aid western

province of Gansu and had planned three more in Bouthern, south-

western and eastern China under its ambitious schemes to boast

nuclear power to make up for a protected annual shortage of some

150 million tons of coal by 2000 and 1.2 billion tons by 2050.

Taiwan's nuclear experts went to Peking to attend a symposium

billed as an "ice-breaker for atom splitter". China offered a dump site

for Taiwan's stockpile of radioactive waste.82 According to AFP on 28

May 1997 Taiwan snubbed the offer by China to take their 60,000

barrels of nuclear waste.

Local Impacts

Dumping of nuclear wastes on the Tibetan plateau will directly

affect the lives of people and the health of the environment in both

61

62

United News of India (UNI), 25 Sept. 1993, 'Nuclear Dumping Sites in Tibet'.

Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 March 1993.

108

the short-term and over millions of years.

For example, the half life of uranium is 4,500 million years.

Therefore, harmful radiation emitted is a health hazard for millions

of years to come and will lead to a number of deadly diseases

includi.ng cancer and leukaemia. Radioactivity also affects the DNA

in livin.g calls causing genetic d18orders and deformities that can be

passed from generation to generation in human, animals and plants.

People, Animals and Plants contaminated

Mr. Gonpo Thondup, who escaped from Tibet to Dharamsala in

India in March 1987, visited two nuclear weapons production

departments code numbered 405 in Kyangtsa and 792 in Thewo,

Amdo region of Tibet. His statement was presented by Mr. Tsewang

Norbu at the World Uranium Hearing in Salzburg, Germany, on 14

September 199~.63

(

It reads, "The effects of experiments and waste from 792 and

405 have been devastating. Before 1960, in this region of Am.do,

harvests were plentiful and domestic animals healthy. Now the crop-

field has shrunk, and people and animals are dying mysteriously, and

in increasing numbers. Since 1987 there has been a sharp rise in the

number of deaths of domestic animals and fish are all but vanished.

63 Detail explanation by Mr. Gonpo was published in Tibetan Review, 18 May 1992.

109

In the years of 1984 and 1990, 50 people died in the region, all

frommysterious causes. Twelve women gave birth in the Summer of

1990 and every child was dead before or died during birth. One

Tibetan woman, Tsering Dolma (aged 30), has given birth seven times

and not a single child has survived."

Mr. Gonpo added, "The people living near dpeartments 405 and

792 have experienced strange diseases. They have never seen before

many local people's skin turned yellowish and their eye-sight has

been affected seriously. Local populace reported strange memory

losses ~d many babies are born deformed. The people of the area are

desperate, and can only turn to religion and local doctors, who have

no knowledge of the uranium mines or of the nuclear plants nearby."

There is consistent evident that China's nefarious nuclear

programme has caused the regular loss of human lives. According to

the Tibet Information Network (TIN), London 1n a News Update of 11

September 1992, at least 35 Tibetans living near uranium mines died

within a few hours after developing a high fever and distinctive

diarrhoea 1n Ngaba Prefecture in Sichuan Province. 5 4

In 1984 villagers from ReshuLand Ganzihe villages, located

close to the Ninth Academy in Am.do, reported strange diseases to the

64 These reports were documented by ICT in 1990s. Reports a.re based on the interviews of the people have run awa;y from Tibet.

110

Tibetan doctor, Tashi Dolma and her medical team. However, the

China authorities would not allow the medical team to follow up these

reports. Dr. Tashi worked at Chabcha hospital 1n Hainam Tibetan

Autonomous Prefecture directly south of the nuclear ·city known as

Ninth Academy, where they treated the children of nomads whose

cattle grazed near the Academy.66 These children developed cancer

which caused their white blood cell count to rise uncontrollably.

Seven of these children died . during the years that Dr. Tashi was

working at the hospital. An American doctor conducting research at

the hospital reported that these symptoms were similar to concerns

caused by radiation after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atom bombings

in 1945. In addition there have been numerous reports of

unexpected deaths and illness amongst this nomad population.

In September 1992, the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) ·

fact-finding team found that meant from the area had been banned

from stores by the Chinese authorities. However, poor Tibetan often

ate the contaminated meat either out of ignorance or economic

constraint. 66

66 Ibid.

66 FEER, 15 August 1995.

111

Uranium Mining

Uranium mines are located in several regions of Tibet,

including Damshung, north of Lhasa, Tsaidam began north of Golm.o,

Yamdrok Tso and Thewo in southernAmdo, 254 km from Tsoe under

Khaulho. The uranium deposits at Thewo in Gannan Tibetan

Autonomous prefecture are known to be the largest in Tibet. 67 At the

uranium mines at Thewo poisonous waste waster is allegedly

collected and stored in a stone structure 40 meters high before being

released into the local river, which the people use for drinking.

Tibetan refugees escaping to India report the following results from

the mining.

(a) More than-50 Tibetan residents ofThewo died between 1987-91

from mysterious illness.

(b) Domestic animals die mysteriously and the cause of illness i~

unidentif1able.

(c) Trees and ·grasses wither.

(d) The Jampakok river is polluted; the water is black and it

67

68

stinks. It merges with Dukchu Kurpo.68

M.G. Chitkara, Toxic Tibet under Nuclear China, APH Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, p.l63.

Ibid.

112

A list of 24 Tb.ewo residents who myseriously died was part of

Thewo residents who mysteriously died was part of the information

provided to our desk. Witnesses said that before they died, aJl

experienced a high fever, then shivering cold. After death, their skin

had a blUish hue. Animals also turned blue or black after death and

their organs appeared burnt.69

Vanyakewley, a BBC reported who visited the Chinese missile

base at Nagc~uka in 1988 interviewed several people liVing 1n the

area. In her book Tibet: Behind the Ice Curt~ a Tibetan man caJled

Kelsang said, "Many people have seen and heard movements and

noises. Most people here have seen missiles coming from China and

mapy travellers have seen movements of missiles of different

places. "70

He further said, "As a result of the situation here, a.nirnals are

getting strange diseases and dying. Some people are dying and

children are being born deformed. In many places water 1s

contaminated and undrinkable. The moment you drink it, you get ill

or get diseases that we never had before. People get ill and go to

69

70

Ibid.

Green Tibet Annual Newsletter, 1995-96. China snubs the world with Nuclear Tests, DIIR, Central Tibetan Administration, India. This newsletter explains ill details about the nuclear effects on the lives of Tibetan people.

113

different hospitals. They don't get better and the doctors don't tell us

what it is and then we have to keep quiet about it. "71

The Use of Prisoners at Nuclear Establishments

Though, the human right organisation have regularly spoken of

the existence of labour camps behind the bamboo curtain just like the

SOViet Gulags noboy link them with the ongoing nuclear programme.

While mapping out the nuclear establishments in Tibet it became

increasingly evident that they were all located near large prison

labour camp adding fuel to the argument that the Chinese nuclear

programme used prison labourers. A classic example is the Delingha

Farm near Terlingbka Silos, home to one of three largest labour

camps 1n China with prison population put at one lakh.72 The picture

repeats itself the other missile sites spread over Central Am.do, large

tseaidom, Lanzhou in Ganso province and at other places in Am.do.

This scenario was confirmed by Harrywou, a former Chinese political

prisoner. The international campa:ign for Tibet, USA, took up tbis

issue with reference to the nuclear instalments at Lopnor and

Lanchou.73

71

72

73

Ibid.

Vanya Kewley, Tibet: Behind the Ice Curtain, London: Cra:ftion Books, 1990.

Green Tibet Annual Newsletter, 1995-96. China snubs the world with Nuclear Tests, DIIR.

114

Trans-National Impacts

Most toxic disposals sites on the Tibetan plateau have minimLal

safety standards. The effects of harmful radioactive pollutants

dumped anywhere on the plateau will be felt war beyond its borders,

particularly because it is the source of 10 great river systems of Asia

and commands - massive interdependent ecological zones which

share weather and climatic anomalies.

Atmospheric Pollution

The nuclear waste pollution of the Tibetan plateau, besides

haVing local effects, also has trans-national implications. The b.1gh

altitude winds (jet streams) that blow over the Tibetan plateau may

carry nuclear pollutants from Tibet across the globe to affect other

countries, since no boundary can be built to control air pollution.

The Tibetan plateau is seismologicaJJy an active region. Consequently,

serious accidents at nuclear power and weapons production plants

can endanger the lives of people and the health of the environment.

When the accident occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in

the former Soviet Union in 1986, the radioactive dust from the plant

travelled 950 miles (1,529)74 in all directions resulting in irreparable

damage to people, people and the environment.

74 Sunda.ry Morning Post (SMP), 6 August 1989, 'Mainland Stores Nuclear Waste Amid Claims of Ignorance'.

115

Groundwater and Soil Contamination

Mr. Pan Ziqiang, Director of the Safety Department of the state­

run National Nuclear Industry Corporation, is quoted ass~ that

so far aJ.l of China's nuclear wastes have been put in concrete

basement facilities which are safe for only about 10 years.75 Mr. Luo

Guerhen of the State Environmental Protection Bureau 883'8 that

1,200 people have been injured by radioactivity between 1980 and

1985 and about 20 have died.

Due to weatherin.g, radioactive and other military wastes

· concrete containers buried in the ground will seep out. the

contaminate ground water sources, which are normally used tor

drinking and agricultural purposes. Groundwater makes up a

s1gni.:ficant share of China's water resources.

Reports from Tibet confirm that underground water supplies in

Amdo have been djminishin.g at a rapid rate. Underground acquifers,

which are one of the maJor source of drinking water supplies, once

contaminated are impossible to clean. Therefore, any pollution at all,

especially radioactive contamination of groundwater is of great

concern.76

76 Ibid.

76 M.G. Chitkara, n.

116

River Pollution and Flooding

Radioactive waste .randomly disposed of near water bodies will

pollute rivers, lakes and springs. Since Tibet is the primary source of

water for most of south and south-east Asia, the impact of head water

pollution, especially by nuclear or industrial toxic waste on the social

and economic fabric of millions of people in downstream countries

would be disastrous. Countries including China, Pakistan, India,

Bangladesh, Burma, Thatlan.d, Cambodia, Laos, Bhutan, and Vietnam

will be drastically affected and forced to alter their livelihood. This

will certainly cause terrible suffering to everyone dependent on these

rivers for their livelihood. 77

Massive deforestation of the Tl."betan. plateau largely contributes

to the situation of the downstream rivers and the increas:ingly

destructive flooding that occurs each year. Rivers such as the

Bramhaputra, Yangtse, Yellow river, Salween,. Sutlel, Indus,

Mekongand others may also carry nuclear-Telated _ waste from

uranium mines in Tibet. These rivers finally flow into the Arabian

Sea, Bay of B~ngal and the South China Sea. The global scale of such

an environmental catastrophe is truly frightening.

Between 1985 and 1994, 36,000 hectares of Chinese farmland

annually suffered from top-soil loss, especially along the Yangtse and

77 Tibetan Review, 25 Maor 1991, 'Tibet and its Nei.ghoburs'.

117

Yellow rivers, both of which originate from Tibet. Erosion has caused

river beds to rise several meters higher than the surround.i.ng

farml~;LD.d, thereby increasing the incidence of floods.

In an extensive survey of China's major river basins, carried

out in 1994 only 32 percent of the river water was found to meet the

national standards for drinking water sources. Large. segments of the

Chinese population still haVe to rely on polluted sources for drinking

water, though estimates differ considerably. 78

78 UNDP, 1997, People's Republic of China: Development Co-operation Report, 1995.

118