Chapter - III Historical Background of the Right to...
Transcript of Chapter - III Historical Background of the Right to...
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Chapter - III
Historical Background of the Right to Freedom in
India
The concept of freedom as a human requirement in terms of
individual’s ability to express and criticize, to peacefully assemble and
discuss matters concerning society, to move about for occupational and
tourist purposes and all forms of freedom that make human beings
happy in a civilized society is basically an age old concept in the
political tradition of India.
The concept can be traced in the famous Indian epics- the
Ramayana and the Mahabharata wherein we find that even the lowest
section of the society was permitted criticism of the King and the state
and the King was expected to work in the interest of the society, for the
welfare of the society. Though it is equally true that at that time there
was no properly written and codified system of rights of the individuals
and the basis for the acceptance of rights was morality and natural law.
Manu, who is considered the progenitor of human race, was
necessarily in favour of the concept of the Divine Rights of the Kings,
yet his King was expected to rule in a manner that provided the best
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social environment in which individuals received humane treatment by
the political rulers. Though Manu does not give the people the right to
oppose the King but the very concept of welfare state has the seeds of
recognition that essential requirements of the public should be met in a
way that the conditions of revolution does not come into existence.
This is possible when the ruling authority does not practice
discrimination and people are free in their personal matters. Kautilya,
a scholar on political and economic administration of the state has also
stood for welfare state and considered the state a contract between the
people and the king, thereby ensuring essential freedoms in the life of
the individuals within the state.
The situation changed when India came under the colonial rule.
The struggle for Freedom of the country was then supplemented with
the struggle for securing essential freedoms of the individual.
The Indian desire for civil rights had its roots in the 19th
century.
It was implicit in the formation of the Indian National congress in
1885. Actually Indians wanted the same rights and privileges as their
British masters were enjoying in India and as the Britons were
enjoying in their country. Though it was not easy but the Indians
wanted to put an end to the discrimination inherent in the colonial
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regime. A number of Acts were passed by the British rule to pacify the
Indians but none put an end to discrimination and as a consequence the
Indians decided to uproot and throw the discriminatory foreign regime
in its entirety.
Perhaps the first explicit demand for fundamental rights
appeared in the Swaraj Bill of 1895 which was inspired by Lokmanya
Tilak described by Mrs. Annie Besant as the Home Rule Bill. It
visualized a constitution guaranteeing to every citizen rights so basic as
“freedom of expression, inviolability of one’s house, right to property
and equality before the law.” Article 16 of this bill laid down a
number of rights including those of free speech, imprisonment only by
competent authority and of free state education.1 A series of Congress
resolutions adopted between 1917 and 1919 repeated the demand for
civil rights and equality of status with Englishmen. The resolutions
called for equal terms and conditions in bearing arms;2 for ‘a wider
application of the system of trial by jury’, and the right of the Indians
‘to claim that not less than half of the jurors should be their own
countrymen’.3 A further resolution stated ‘the emphatic opinion’ that
Parliament should pass a statute guaranteeing ‘the Civil Rights of His
Majesty’s Indian subjects’, which would embody provisions
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establishing equality before law, a free press, free speech etc. The
statute should moreover lay down that political power belonged to the
Indian people in the same manner as to any other people or nation in
the British Empire. 4
The demand for equality of rights and for self-government
exemplifies not only the well known desire for negative freedom, but
also that aspect of positive freedom so perceptively described by Sir
Isaiah Berlin as ‘the desire for the “positive” freedom of collective
self-direction’. ‘The “positive sense of liberty comes to light’, wrote
Berlin, ‘if we try to answer the question not, “What I am free to do or
be?”, but “By whom am I ruled?” or “Who is to say what I am, and
what I am not, to be or do?”5 The demand for this particular aspect of
positive liberty and the demand for negative freedom were to come to
their logical fulfillment with the attainment of independence and of its
corollary, adult suffrage, and with the inclusion of fundamental rights
in the Constitution.
In 1919, the Rowlatt Act gave extensive powers to the British
government and police, and allowed indefinite arrest and detention of
individuals, warrant-less searches and seizures, restrictions on public
gatherings, and intensive censorship of media and publications. The
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public opposition to this act eventually led to mass campaigns of non-
violent civil disobedience throughout the country demanding
guaranteed civil freedoms, and limitations on government power.
Indians, who were seeking independence and their own government,
were particularly influenced by the independence of Ireland and the
development of the Irish constitution. Also, the directive principles of
state policy in Irish constitution were looked upon by the people of
India as an inspiration for the independent India's government to
comprehensively tackle complex social and economic challenges
across a vast, diverse nation and population.
All the efforts of the Congressmen during this period were
summed in the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms which were very
inadequate for the nationalists and the public especially at a time when
the freedom movement was in full swing.
By the mid-twenties, congress and Indian leaders generally had
achieved a new forcefulness and a consciousness of their Indianness
and of the needs of the people, thanks largely to the experience of
World War I, to the disappointment of Montague-Chelmsford reforms,
to Woodrow Wilson’s support for self-determination, and to Gandhi’s
arrival on the scene. These influences were reflected in the tone and
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form of demands for civil rights. These no longer aimed at establishing
the rights of Indians vis-à-vis Englishmen, a goal that was to be
achieved through the Independence movement; the purpose now was to
assure liberty among Indians. The experience of colonial status would,
however, continue to be reflected in the demand for rights, for, as great
American judge has said, ‘such constitutional limitations arise from
grievances, real or fancied, which their makers have suffered, and …..
they withstand the winds of logic by the depth and toughness of their
roots in the past.’6
The next major development was the drafting of the seven
fundamental rights provisions of Mrs. Annie Besant’s Commonwealth
of India Bill of 1925. It enumerated fundamental rights which were
almost identical in scope and nature with those adopted by the Irish
Free State in its Constitution of 1921. These laid down that individual
liberty, freedom of conscience, free expression of opinion, free
assembly and equality before the law were to be ensured. There was to
be ‘no disqualification or disability on the ground only of sex’.7
According to two other provisions, all persons in the Commonwealth
of India were to have the right to free elementary education (a right
that was to become enforceable as soon as arrangements for
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educational facilities could be made), and of all persons were to have
equal right to the ‘use of roads, courts of justice, and all other places of
business or resort dedicated to the public.8 Thus were presaged several
provisions of the Fundamental Rights and one of the Directive
Principles.
Within two years of the printing of the Besant Bill came the
announcement that the Simon Commission would undertake a study of
possible constitutional reforms in India. In response the Forty-third
Annual Session of the Congress at Madras in 1927 resolved that the
Working Committee be empowered to set up a committee ‘to draft a
Swaraj Constitution for India on the basis of a declaration of rights’.9
That a declaration of rights had assumed such importance was not
surprising: India was a land of communities, of minorities, racial,
religious, linguistic, social, and caste. For India to become a state,
these minorities had to agree to be governed both at the centre and the
provinces by fellow Indians-- members, of perhaps another minority—
and not by a mediatory third power, the British. On both psychological
and political grounds, therefore, the demand for written rights—since
rights would prove tangible safeguards against oppression—proved
overwhelming. “The community, so to say, is a federal process”10
,
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Laski wrote. And Indians believed that in their ‘federation of
minorities’ a declaration of rights was necessary as it had been for
Americans when they established their first federal constitution.
The committee called for by the Madras Congress resolution
came into being in May 1928. Motilal Nehru, father of Jawaharlal, was
its chairman, and its membership represented the views of Muslims,
Hindu orthodoxy, non –Brahmins, Labour and Liberals. The
committee’s report, known as the Nehru Report, contained an
explanation of its draft constitution that speaks for itself.
The first concern of the Indians, the report declared, was ‘to
secure the Fundamental Rights that have been denied to them’. In
writing a constitution, the report continued,
‘It is obvious that our first care should be to have our
Fundamental Rights guaranteed in a manner which shall not permit
their withdrawal under any circumstances…Another reason why great
importance attaches to a Declaration of Rights is the unfortunate
existence of communal differences in the country. Certain safeguards
are necessary to create and establish a sense of security among those
who look upon each other with distrust and suspicion. We could not
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better secure the full enjoyment of religious and communal rights to all
communities than by including them among the basic principles of the
Constitution’.11
The Fundamental Rights of the Nehru Report12
, were
reminiscent of those of the American and post-war European
constitutions, and were in several cases taken word for word from the
rights listed in the Commonwealth of India Bill. Several clauses had,
however, a more particularly Indian origin—such as, ‘no breach of
contract of service or abetment thereof shall be made a criminal
offence’, which related directly to forced labour. The rights of the
Nehru Report were a close precursor of the Fundamental Rights of the
Constitution; ten of the nineteen sub-clauses re-appear, materially
unchanged, and three of the Nehru Rights are included in the Directive
Principles. The first sub-clause of the Rights (that all power and
authority of the government derived from the people) was the raison
d’etre of the Constituent Assembly as expressed in the Objectives
Resolution. The content, although not the form, of other provisions is
also to be found in the Constitution; e.g., the sub-clause on language
became Part XVII on Language.
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In the Nehru Report the desire to afford protection to minorities
was especially prominent. For example, the right to freedom of
conscience and to free profession and practice of religion was included
explicitly to prevent ‘one community domineering over another’13
.
There was also special provision made for the elementary education of
the members of minorities. Such rights as these were called Minority
Rights in the early days of the Assembly, and they appear in the
Constitution as Rights relating to Religion, Cultural and Educational
Rights, and also in Part XVII on Language.
Thus the 1928 Nehru Commission composing of representatives
of Indian political parties proposed constitutional reforms for India that
apart from calling for dominion status for India and elections under
universal suffrage, would guarantee rights deemed as fundamental,
representation for religious and ethnic minorities, and limit the powers
of the government.
In 1931 a new dimension was added to the demand for
constitutional rights. Heretofore almost exclusively devoted to the
State’s negative obligations, the demand now equally emphasized the
State’s positive obligations to provide its people with the economic and
social conditions in which their negative rights would have actual
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meaning. The Congress Session held at Karachi in March 1931,
adopted the Resolution on Fundamental Rights and Economic and
Social Change, which was both a declaration of rights and a
humanitarian socialist manifesto. The Karachi Resolution, as it came to
be called, meant that the social revolution would have a vital share in
shaping India’s future constitution, and the provisions did in fact
become the spiritual, and in some cases the direct, antecedents of the
Directive Principles.
The Karachi Resolution stated that ‘in order to end the
exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include the real
economic freedom of the starving millions’14
. The state was to
safeguard ‘the interests of industrial workers’, ensuring that ‘suitable
legislation’ should secure them a living wage, healthy conditions,
limited hours of labour, and protection from ‘the economic
consequences of old age, sickness, and unemployment’.15
Women and
children were also to be protected in various ways and accorded special
benefits. The state was to ‘own or control key industries and services,
mineral resources, railways, waterways, shipping and other means of
public transport’.16
Another item called for the reform of the system of
land tenure, revenue and rent.
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Several clauses reflected the Gandhian side of the Congress: for
example, the demand for greatly reduced military expenditure, the
ceiling of five hundred rupees per month for civil servants’ salaries, no
salt duty, prohibition, and the demand for protection against foreign
cloth. The provisions concerning the salt tax, prohibition, and
protection for domestic textiles had the ring of a tactical programme
for the Independence Movement—these subjects, had, indeed, been at
the centre of the Civil Disobedience campaign of the previous year—
and of them only prohibition reached the Constitution.
The negative rights of the Karachi Resolution were derived, in
some cases textually, from those of the Nehru Report. Four new
provisions, however, were included: the State should confer no titles;
franchise should be on the basis of adult suffrage; there should be no
capital punishment; and, citizens should have the right to freedom of
movement throughout India.
Jawaharlal Nehru has been given the credit for drafting the
Karachi Resolution, although the ‘Gandhian’ provisions do not sound
particularly like him and the list of negative rights could have been
prepared by anyone.17
The humanitarian cast of the provisions
concerning the welfare of the workers and of the people generally, the
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placing of the primary responsibility for social reform on the State, and
the emphasis on the legislative approach, however, do reflect Nehru’s
ideas and read as if he had written them. Yet there can be little doubt
that these sentiments were generally accepted, for Patel, as Congress
President, was presiding at Karachi during their adoption, and they
have been characterized as the Congress’s approach to the social
revolution from that day.
Committing themselves to socialism in 1936, the Congress
leaders took examples from the constitution of the erstwhile USSR,
which inspired the fundamental duties of citizens as a means of
collective patriotic responsibility for national interests and challenges.
In all the three sessions of the Indian Round Table Conference
held in London, the subject of Fundamental Rights was discussed at
length and memoranda was also submitted by the individuals and
groups for a provision of such chapter. But the Joint Parliamentary
Committee, in 1934 refused to accede to this demand and no mention
of Fundamental Rights was made in the Government of India Act,
1935. After this Act was partially brought into execution, the Second
World War began and the Congress started the Quit India Movement
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against the Britishers as a consequence of which the major Congress
leaders were imprisoned.
Under the educational system of British Raj, students were
exposed to ideas of democracy, human rights and European political
history. The Indian student community in England was further inspired
by the workings of parliamentary democracy and British political
parties.
Finally the Sapru Committee’s Report recommended that the
declaration of Fundamental Rights was absolutely necessary for
Indians and also for prescribing a standard of conduct for the
legislatures, government and courts. It was a major document on rights
in the pre-Assembly era. The Committee was a non-party organization
of intellectuals constituted under the Chairmanship of Sir Tej Bahadur
Sapru. It submitted its report in 1945.
The report suggested a constitutional scheme for India, and
although the portions of the report dealing with fundamental rights
contained overtones of the social revolution, it addressed itself mainly
to the problem of placating minority fears, which were again
overshadowing the political scene. With independence likely in the not
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too distant future, the minorities had to face the responsibility of living
together and of creating a state.
The fundamental rights of the new constitution, said the Sapru
Report, will be a ‘standing warning’ to all
‘That what the Constitution demands and expects is perfect
equality between one section of the community and another in the
matter of political and civic rights, equality of liberty and security in
the enjoyment of the freedom of religion, worship, and the pursuit of
the ordinary application of life’.18
Not only must the rights protect minorities, the report went on to
say, but they must prescribe ‘a standard of conduct for the legislatures,
government and the courts’.
The most striking feature about the treatment of rights by this
committee was that it also described that Fundamental Rights were to
be of two types one justiciable and other non-justiciable. The
distinction was not made, as it would be in the Constitution, in the
context of positive and negative rights, but in connection with minority
rights. Skilful lawyers, said the report, should find it possible to divide
the assurances and guarantees given to the minorities ‘in such a way
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that the breaches of some may form the subject of judicial
pronouncement, and the breaches of others may be remedied without
resort to courts of law’19
. A few months more than a year later the
Constituent Assembly began framing the Fundamental Rights and the
Directive Principles of State policy.
The Cabinet Mission had laid down in its 16th
May Plan that the
Constituent Assembly should have an Advisory Committee whose duty
would be to report the Assembly on
‘the list of Fundamental Rights, the clauses for the protection of
minorities and a scheme for the administration of the tribal and
excluded areas and to advise whether these Rights should be
incorporated in the Provincial, Group or Union Constitution’20
As per the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission, the
Working Committee of the Congress drew up a resolution establishing
the Advisory Committee at its meeting of 8 December, 1946.
Thus the task of developing a constitution for the nation was
undertaken by the Constituent Assembly of India, comprising of
elected representatives under the presidency of Rajendra Prasad. While
members of Congress composed of a large majority, Congress leaders
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appointed persons from diverse political backgrounds to
responsibilities of developing the constitution and national laws.
Notably, Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar became the chairperson of the
drafting committee, while Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel became chairpersons of committees and sub-committees
responsible for different subjects. A notable development during that
period having significant effect on the Indian constitution took place
on 10 December 1948 when the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and called upon
all member states to adopt these rights in their respective constitutions.
With the formation of the Constituent Assembly for framing the
Constitution of India this advisory Committee consisting of 54
members with Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel as its Chairman was elected
to go about in the task. It was not until 24 January 1947 that the
Assembly voted to create the Advisory Committee. It was originally to
have been elected by the Assembly, but instead the Congress
leadership arranged that the members be chosen in off-the-floor
conferences held between Assembly leaders and the chief members of
each minority group.
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The draft lists were prepared by B.N. Rau, K.T. Shah, K.M.
Munshi and a number of distinguished experts. It submitted its interim
report to the Constituent Assembly on the 29th
of April, 1947. Except
for certain controversial provisions the drafting of the rights was
completed by mid- December, 1948. These rights in the finalized form
now constitute Part III of the Indian Constitution. The Fundamental
Rights were included in the First Draft Constitution (February 1948),
the Second Draft Constitution (17 October 1948) and final Third Draft
Constitution (26 November 1949) prepared by the Drafting Committee.
In the first session of the Constituent assembly held in December
1946 all the members had accepted that a complete Chapter on
Fundamental Rights was required. The Assembly had to face the
difficulty in choosing the categories of rights as to which were of them
were to be fundamental and how to make them sacrosanct. If they
acceded to the liberal democratic view then naturally the rights to ‘life,
liberty and property’ were to be given utmost importance. At the same
time an India that had been financially looted, culturally destroyed and
educationally backward, needed much more to attain the prevalent
global standards, This demanded the inclusion of rights such as right to
education; right to work, right to better livelihood, etc. But the
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Constitution framers, distinguished experts as they were, well
understood the fact that in the contemporary economic and social
conditions of India the grant of all rights as fundamental was likely to
create clashes in the society. The experience of both liberal and
socialist democracies was available to them. They also understood that
along with the social welfare concept of the state, the nature and scope
of fundamental rights had also widened. At that time United Nations
came up with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the 10th
of
December, 1948. India being a member of the United Nations was also
among the signatories. The Constitution framers now had the clarity of
the idea that the age of American Bill of Rights which believed in
‘human perfectibility and state’s malignancy’ was over21
. Thus the
difference between justiciable and non-justiciable rights was made by
B.N. Rau. The preliminary reaction of the Assembly to this proposal
was unfavourable but finally it accepted this idea.22
The sub-committee
discussed fundamental rights with different perspectives. One
perspective was that more and more rights should be incorporated in
the list of Fundamental Rights. These rights were to be enforced
through courts so that the citizens could easily avail them in practical
form.23
The second group was of the opinion that Fundamental Rights
should be limited only to certain fundamental aspects.24
In fact there
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was a third group also which was absent in the committee but was of
the opinion that under the scheme of Fundamental Rights in India there
should be no requirement of the existence of police and jails. There
should be no restriction on press and the police was not to carry stick
and gun to control the exercise of Fundamental Rights. Indians should
be free to do whatever they liked.25
The Constitution framers while considering the provisions on
Fundamental Rights had consulted the working Constitutions of a
number of countries.. Thus the development of constitutionally
guaranteed fundamental human rights in India was inspired by
historical examples such as England's Bill of Rights (1689), the United
States Bill of Rights (approved on 17 September 1787, final ratification
on 15 December 1791) and France's Declaration of the Rights of Man
(created during the revolution of 1789, and ratified on 26 August
1789).
Shri Somnath Lahiri wanted that all such rights that people of
India are desirous of should be incorporated in the Chapter on
Fundamental Rights because the wilful foreign rule had deprived the
Indians of all essential freedoms for a long time. The Britishers
imprisoned and tortured them in an arbitrary manner and put them
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behind bars without proper legal trial. Thus the perspective of
Fundamental Rights for Indians should not be based on the outlook of
police rather that of a nation clamouring and struggling for freedoms
and independence.26
Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar considered two major purposes of
Fundamental Rights, one that all the citizens could put forward their
claim to them and secondly those responsible for making of laws must
necessarily respect and abide by the philosophy underlying them.
The advisory committee had recommended that two lists of
Fundamental Rights be prepared, one that could be executed through
law courts and the second list was to incorporate those social principles
which though non-justiciable, yet were to be considered fundamental
in the political system of the country. The rights fundamental for the
realization of the goals enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution
were thus embraced in the Constitution under two different headings-
one called Fundamental Rights constituting Chapter III and the other
‘Directive Principles of State Policy’ constituting Chapter IV of the
Constitution. The main point of distinction being, that the former are
enforceable by the courts and the latter being non-enforceable. This
distinction was so made because the founding fathers had deep
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understanding of the difficulties that would arise in ensuring them to
the people of India straightaway.
The “Fundamental Rights” are fundamental in the sense that
they have been incorporated in the fundamental law of the land i.e. the
Constitution; are justiciable and enforceable by the courts and available
to all citizens. They are binding on public authorities in India, on the
Central government, state government and on local bodies.
Though the rights were divided under two different headings yet
none of them was to be looked down upon by the other, more
especially the ‘Directive Principles’ by the ‘Fundamental Rights’. The
founding fathers themselves stated that the Fundamental Rights were
not to be considered sacrosanct and that the Directive Principles were
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of
the state to apply these principles in the making of laws. But inspite of
the aforesaid statement the controversy of primacy of Fundamental
Rights over Directive Principles continued.
During the earlier or the first phase of judicial decisions the line
of thought was in favour of ‘Fundamental Rights’ and that Part III on
the whole was dealt to be as sacrosanct and Part IV was relegated to
the second priority. During the second phase both were treated at par
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and the Supreme Court agreed to look upon ‘Fundamental Rights’
from the view point of Directive Principles or Part IV.
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REFERENCES
1. Author unknown, The Constitution of India, in Shiva Rao, Select
Documents I, (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public
Administration), 1965-66
2. Evolution’ (Calcutta: The Book Co. Ltd.) 1940, pg.19
3. Resolution of 1917, Chakrabarty and Bhattachaya, ‘Congress in
Evolution’ (Calcutta: The Book Co. Ltd.) 1940, pg.19
4. Resolution of 1917, Chakrabarty and Bhattachaya, ‘Congress in
Evolution’ (Calcutta: The Book Co. Ltd.) 1940, pg.26
5. Issiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press), 1961, pg. 47-48
6. Judge Learned Hand, ‘The Spirit of Liberty’, ed. By Irving
Dillard, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 1954, pg. XVIII
7. Commonwealth of India Bill, Clause 8(g)
8. Commonwealth of India Bill, Clause 8(d) & (e)
9. Chakrabarty, D. and Bhattacharya, C., ‘Congress in Evolution’
(Calcutta: The Book Co. Ltd.) 1940, pg.27
10. Laski, ‘A Grammar of Politics’, (London: George Allen and
Unwin) 1960, pg. 97
85
11. All Parties’ Conference: Report of the Committee to Determine
Principles for the Constitution of India, pg. 89-90
12. All Parties’ Conference: Report of the Committee to Determine
Principles for the Constitution of India, pg.101-103
13. All Parties’ Conference: Report of the Committee to Determine
Principles for the Constitution of India, pg.29
14. Chakrabarty, D. and Bhattacharya, C., ‘Congress in Evolution’
(Calcutta: The Book Co. Ltd.) 1940, pg.28
15. Chakrabarty, D. and Bhattacharya, C., ‘Congress in Evolution’
(Calcutta: The Book Co. Ltd.) 1940, pg.28
16. Chakrabarty, D. and Bhattacharya, C., ‘Congress in Evolution’
(Calcutta: The Book Co. Ltd.) 1940, pg.29
17. Dev, Acharya Narendra, ‘Socialism and the National
Revolution’, (Bombay: Padma Publications), 1946, pg.203; Also
finds mention in: Brecher, Michael, ‘Nehru: A Political
Biography’, (London: Oxford University Press), 1959, pg. 175
18. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Others, ‘Constitutional Proposals of
the Sapru Committee’, The Sapru Report, pg. 260
19. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Others, ‘Constitutional Proposals of
the Sapru Committee’, The Sapru Report, pg. 258
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20. Gwyer, Maurice and Appadorai, A., 'Speeches and Documents
on the Indian Constitution’ (London: Oxford University Press),
1957, pg. 283
21. Pylee, M.V., ‘Constitutional Government in India’, (Bombay:
Asia Publishing House), 1966, pg. 88
22. Shiva Rao, B., ‘The Framing of the Indian Constitution: A
Study’, I edition, (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Public
Administration), 1968, pg 175
23. Opinion of K.T. Shah, K.M. Munshi, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur
and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
24. Opinion of M.R. Masani and Sardar Harman Singh
25. Outlook of the Muslim League
26. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. III, pg. 870