Chapter II

Ethnic Versus Civic Nationalism

The French Canadian community was originally a colonial offshoot of France which

gradually became a distinct community after Canada was established as an uneasy

accommodation of the "Two Founding Nations" of French and English descendants.

The French Canadians evolved into a nation and its leaders made pluralistic to

autonomist claims when they perceived the community's·survival to·be threatened by

the British administration. As Canada became a Dominion within the British Empire

and then an independent country within the Commonwealth, most French Canadian

political leaders adopted a conservative, clerical and agrarian-based type of

nationalism aiming at the perpetuation of their community's distinctiveness within an

increasingly pluralistic Canadian society (Gingras 1998:1 ).

In the previous chapter, I have highlighted on ·the theoretical aspects on

nationalism. Here, a more general and specific considerations of the theory will will

be applied to understand the Quebecois nationalism since Confederation and

throughout Canada's often-turbulent social history. It then becomes imperative to

know that successive imperial governors and federal prime ministers have faced the

challenge of pacifying various and disparate regional groups with a view to eiisllrin:g

cohesion and perpetuating the integrity of the dominion. Indeed, if there is one

constantly pre-eminent theme throughout the political, social and economic evolution

of Canada, it is that of the leaders attempting to maintain at least a semblanceofinter­

regional cohesion in the face of a myriad of internal and. external pressures

(Blackburn 2007: 2). Behind the facade of the constitutionally enshrined principles

of 'Peace, Order and Good Government,' Canadian domestic and foreign policies

have consistently taken a back seat to the practical exigencies of national unity.

Indeed, the threat of Quebec's separation from the rest of Canada is a clear

and ever-present danger to the country's federal political union (Piromalli 2001: 79).

Starting from a strong linguistic-based ethnic identity, the impulse of Quebecois

35

nationalism was sustained and accelerated by the rapid social change that

accompanied the last half of the twentieth century (Balthazar 1995: 44). This

inclination has, however, evolved and manifested into different scenarios by which

the nationalism had recourses to the entrenchment of active political parties at both

the national and provincial levels dedicated primarily to Quebec's secession, and

Quebec's isolation and exclusion from the Canadian constitution. Indeed, the

extremity of the failed referendums to fulfill their aspirations points to the anxious

attempts of the Quebecer nationalists to further their cause.

This chapter focuses on the ethnic dimension of the Quebecer nationalism,

seen more clearly before the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, and the changing nature

and course of the nationalism into a territorial civic form, which is more open and

inclusive of all the people within the province of Quebec. The latter characteristic and

attitude towards non-French communities is premised on the hope of achieving

collectively the desired goals and aspirations of the 10,000 French descendants. The

changed aspect is because Quebec has left a bad taste by the fact that the nationalist

movement is based on ethnicity. This realisation emerged because nationalism of the

ethnic type sometimes paradoxically takes the form of intolerance, directed against

other groups or communities who do not belong to them, which can be explained by

the inability to understand and entertain a different national consciousness. 16

Before specifically examining Quebec nationalism, it is fitting to examine

briefly the concepts of nation and nationalism. Evidently, it is only after one has

acquired a clear view of what nationalism is in general, that one can grasp the

particularities of Quebec nationalism. Further, these general considerations will be a

theoretical base to outline th~ different forms of Quebec nationalism. It will be shown

that the different courses of nationalism throughout Quebec history, since the

Confederation, can clearly be identified to assess the ethnic and civic dimension in

16 See for instance, Greenfeld, Liah (1992), Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. In that book, Greenfeld argues that there are many different sorts of nationalist movements, but she normatively accepts only one point of view. She endorses what she calls the civic/nationalist model of nationalism expounded in Great Britain and in the USA.

36

the course of the period. Indeed, the general considerations will serve to lay the

foundations for the specific understanding regarding Quebec that will follow.

General Considerations on the Concept of Nation and Nationalism:

A nation is a community of individuals cemented together by a sense of solidarity and

wishing to perpetuate its existence in the future. Normally, it does this through some

form of political action although it is possible to "imagine" a nation. 17 There are four

core debates which permeate the study of nations and nationalism. First among these

is the question of how to define the terms "nation" and "nationalism". Second,

scholars argue about when nations first appeared. Academics have suggested a variety

of time frames, including (but not limited to) the following:

• Nationalists argue that nations are timeless phenomena. When man climbed

out of the primordial stage, he immediately set about creating nations;

• The next major school of thought is that of the perennialists who argue that

nations have been around for a very long time, though they take different

shapes at different points in history;

17 According to Benedict Anderson, a nation is an "imagined political community". In an anthropological spirit, then, he proposes the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds- of each lives the image of their -communion. The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation in the way that it was possible, in certain epochs, for, say, Christians to dream of a wholly Christian planet. It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism- of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith's ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state. Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings. These deaths bring us abruptly face to face with the central problem posed by nationalism: what makes the shrunken imaginings of recent history (scarcely more than two centuries) generate such colossal sacrifices? I believe that the beginnings of an answer lie in the cultural roots of nationalism. See Anderson, Benedict (1991), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition 2003, London and New York: Verso, Pp. 5-7.

37

• While post-modernists and Marxists also play in the larger debates

surrounding this topic, the modernisation school is perhaps the most prevalent

scholarly argument at the moment. These scholars see nations as entirely

modern and constructed.

The tl:tird major debate centres on how nations and nationalism developed. If

nations are naturally occurring, then there is little reason to explain the birth of

nations. On the other hand, if one sees nations as constructed, then it is important to

be able to explain why and how nations developed. Finally, many of the original

classic texts on nationalism have focused on European nationalism at the expense of

non-western experiences. This has sparked a debate about whether nationalism

developed on its own or whether it merely spread to non-western countries from

Europe.

Nonetheless, ever since the Greek philosophers of the Ancient World, the

human need to belong to something larger than ourselves has been well recognised.

Contributing to the sense of solidarity are a number of factors. Some of these factors

are described as "objective", meaning that they are easily recognisable and

unchallengeable, and "subjective" factors that are more difficult to measure and

assess, yet are important in the creation of the sense of solidarity.

Objective factors contributing . to the forging of nations are a common

territory, common language and culture, ethnicity or race, customs and traditions, as

well as religion. Sharing some or all of these elements in common binds these

individuals together, helps define them as identifiably separate from others, and

forges links of solidarity between them. The subjective factors are the shared sense of

history, of their origin, of the struggle faced in the past, the clear consciousness of

constituting a separate entity, a shared appreciation of what they would consider as

their common interest, and their desire to continue to live together in the future.

Of all of these factors, history is the most important as the characteristics,

objective or subjective, have been forged by the passage of time, and nations

38

frequently demonstrate their existence through history. In this respect, it is interesting

to note that the motto of Quebec, which appears on its Coat of Arms, is "Je me

souviens" (I remember). In any case, the objective and subjective factors are such that

it is ordinarily easier for the members of a nation to understand and co-operate with

each other than it would be to do so with other nations.18

Related to the word nation is the ideology of nationalism. According to John

Breuilly (1985: 3), the term "nationalism" is used to refer to political movements

seeking or . exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist

ar~ne~ts. 19 Nationalism cannot exist without the underlying belief in the existence

of a nation. While nationalism does not necessarily arise in all nations it, nevertheless,

cannot exist without the context of the existence of a nation. Thus, to recognise the

existence of nationalism is to admit of the presence of a nation or of a process that is

creating one. This may appear self-evident yet a peculiarity of the Canadian situation

is that Quebec nationalism has been and is well recognised throughout the land by

people who will deny, at the same time, the existence of a Quebec nation or of a

multi-national state in Canada.

There are evidently many forms of nationalism. In its mildest manifestation, it

is a sentiment that is shared by the members of a nation that wish to perpetuate its

existence, to ensure the survival of the group. Taken in this form, virtually all French

18 For Eric Hobsbawm, neither objective nor subjective definitions of a nation are satisfaCtory and goes on to argue that both are misleading. He holds that, in any case, an agnostic view is the best initial posture of what constitutes a nation. See Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1990), Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

19 To Breuilly, a nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions: (i) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character; (ii) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values; and (iii) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty. In Breuilly, John (1985), Nationalism and the State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, P.3. For Smith, political assertion and actualisation of objective and subjective consciousness or will becomes nationalism. In Smith, Anthony D. (2001), Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, reprinted 2003, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 127. Marxist writers point out that nationalism is an ideology usually assumed and integrated within a specific class that seeks to advance its own selfish interest through the use of nationalism and the seeming promotion of group status. While some good may be achieved for the group, what nationalists seek, in the Marxist view, is to advance their class interest. Indeed, Marxists have a tendency to be internationalists in perspective and to view nationalism negatively.

39

Canadians, in the past or today, may be considered as nationalists as all have wished

for the survival of French Canada. Nonetheless, nationalists invariably display a

sentiment· of reverence and loyalty to the nation; they usually attach a great deal of

importance to the characteristics that define the nation and help distinguish it from

other nations. In doing so, they will frequently insist on defending and on the

maintenance of these characteristics strongly against attacks. Their vision is to view

all situations through the prism of the effect that events or ideas will have on their

nation. Instinctively, they will think of the classification or organisation· of human

beings. as fundamentally. based, on nations. Other forms of organisation or definition

of human beings are deemed not to be so important (class, gender, generation, etc.);

indeed, nationalists will often fight such other definitions of groups that exist as

engendering division within the nation.

Nationalists tend to view individuals primarily as they relate to and affect the

group. In the hierarchy of values, individualism is downplayed, even considered

dangerous under certain circumstances. To the nationalists, collective takes

precedence over individual desires. Frequently, nationalists believe that the

achievement of their primary socio-economic goals may be more easily or fully

realised within the context of the nation than otherwise. It is in this context that

nationalists consider the interest of their group takes precedence over that of other

groups, especially when such interests are in competition or contradiction to that of

their nation.

(i) Specific Considerations of Quebec Nationalism

With the above understanding, it would normally be possible to proceed to describe

and define the nature of Quebec nationalism over the debates on the ethnic and civic

dimension. The specific case of Quebec is one that concern the issue of nation. For

the French Canadians, the term 'nation' to simply mean "people" or society and, thus,

they have the dualistic conception of a political system of Quebec and the rest of the

country. This conception of Quebec as a separate nation is based on the history of the

provmce.

40

In essence, nationalism divides people into two groups: those who are part of

the group- ''we", and who are not part of the group- ''they". As such, nationalism

inevitably creates a dichotomy between ''we" and ''they". Who is part of the ''we" is

usually clear for most nations. However, such is not the case in Quebec. Therefore,

when the definition of the ''we" changes, however subtly, it is because the nature of

the nation, and thus the Quebec nationalism also changes as will be seen in the

following explanation.

Importantly, one should not confuse the nationalists of Quebec with Quebec

itself. While there have been times when the nationalists of Quebec have been as one

with nearly all of the people of Quebec, such as during the period immediately

preceding theRebellion of 1837, or at the time of Riel, or during the two wars on the

subject of conscription, there have been many other times when they were not

followed by the bulk of the population. Therefore, it should never be presumed that

the people of Quebec agreed with all of the ideas of the nationalists. On the contrary,

their feelings or actions were frequently at odds with those expressed by the

nationalists. In fact, it should be presumed that the more often an idea or a theme was

promoted by the nationalists, the more this reflected not only the importance that this

idea had in the mental universe of the nationalists, but, as well, the inability of the

nationalists in convincing the people of the validity of their views. Aside from the

considerable resistance to nationalist ideas among the bulk of the population, there

exist ofa significant population of Anglophones, Allophones and Natives in Quebec

who have remained largely impervious to nationalist ideas.

Based on the above c9nsiderations, the study shall now attempt at the ethnic

form of nationalism and the shift towards a more civic nationalism in contemporary

times. It is interesting to observe how the nationalism changed its conception of who

constitute the Quebec nation. We shall now look at the ethnic nationalism of the

period from 1840-1960 and examine the emergence of civic discourse i.e. from 1960

to the present.

41

(ii) The Phase of Ethnic Nationalism

Customarily, this phase of nationalism is also known as ultramontane nationalism, or

in French, "clerico-nationalisme". With the ignominious defeat of the Patriote

movement,20 the discredit that inevitably fell on the class that had sponsored the more

progressive ideas and nationalism, the rapid departure into exile of many of the

leaders of the nationalist movement, such as Louis-Joseph Papineau, served to rapidly

alter the situation and to shift the power base within Quebec into the hands of the

Roman Catholic clergy.

In 1840, the Union Act was passed. The merit of the Union Act was to bring

responsible government in Canada and to establish the principle of the co-operation

of both French and English-speaking communities in government (Corbett 1967: 18).

This precipitated a major re-alignment within Quebec and created at least in part to

bring about the assimilation, indeed, the destruction of the Canadiens (Belanger

2000). The power of the Church was reflected in a variety of ways. First, it attracted

an increasing number and proportion of the brightest minds of the province within its

. ranks to the extent that, eventually, about half of all of the university graduates in

French-speaking Quebec became priests?1 In any case, those that did not join the

priesthood studied in the many classical colleges of the province erected and

controlled by the Church.

20 Under the Patriotes, the first phase to achieve independence began. The leader of the rebellion, Louis-Joseph Papineau proclaimed that "one nation should never govern another" (Corbett 1967: 17). The movement also traced directly to the parliamentary disagreements, on ideological lines, in Lower Canada between 1791 and 1837. It emerged over the question of who should control the finances, as the Britishers were in favour of mercantile capitalism while the French Canadian wants sufficient autonomy to control and improve their economic situation. This led to an armed uprising and a Patriote declaration proclaiming Lower Canada an independent republic in 1838 (Gingras & Nevitte 1994: 4). However, the British government was adamant and consistently backed the governor's opposition to Patriote, led by Louis Joseph Papineau, which galvanised the latter's orientations into a nationalist stance (Jain 1992: 279). In view of the Britain's consistent support to the governor, Church's condemnation of the revolution, Papineau's weak military leadership, the failure to marshal peasant support and ineffective military organisation, the Patriote resistance subsided (Young & Dickinson 1988: 148). The defeat of the Patriotes had significant consequences for the leadership of French Canada and the development of Quebec nationalism over the next century. 21 The number of religious communities in Quebec increased dramatically in Quebec immediately after the Union Act: between 1837 and 1853, 17 new religious communities were founded in Quebec or arrived from France to Quebec. Among these were the Jesuits, the Christian Brothers and the Clercs de St. Viateur.

42

Aside from the classical colleges, the clergy controlled all the other schools of

the French-speaking part of the province from the primary level all the way to the

universities. Beyond the schools, the health, social and charitable institutions of the

Catholic part of the province were also in their hands. No major initiative, whether

educational, social, cultural, and even economical or political, was possible, and

potentially successful, without the clergy being involved or providing its blessing.

Convincingly, clericalism reigned supreme over Quebec and reached extraordinary

levels by 1896.22 Thus, the class that carried the nationalist message in Quebec, after

1840, was the clerico-nationalist class and propound~<Lan ~ltramOilt(.ll}e fofil1of

nationalism.

The second major change in the period after 1840 is the shifting nature of the

nation. Prior to 1840, the nation had been "Ia nation canadienne".23 With the passage

of time, the original British settlers increasingly aware of their growing separateness

from the people of the mother country eventually developed a view of themselves as

"Canadians". If the English-speaking population became "Canadians", then the

French speaking population could not remain "Canadiens". Previously, to have been

22 The Church of Quebec, between 1840 and 1960, was an ultramontane Church. In the same way as the European conservative and reactionary forces of the early 19th century, it looked beyond the

· mmmtains to the Papacy for inspiration and leadership in their fight against the rising tide of new ideas mounting from the French Revolution. It derived from it the same anti-modernist, undemocratic, intolerant ai:td unenlightened views as were defined in the Syllabus of Errors by Pope Pious IX. Beginning in the 1840's, there was an intensification of contacts between the Catholic Church of Quebec and the great ultramontane centres of Europe, in France and in Rome. Between 1840 and 1876, over 150 priests of Quebec crossed the Atlantic, bound for Europe to visit or study. The ultramontane nature of the Church of Quebec has been the subject of dozens-.of studies and is a well-recognised factor today. The chief proponents of ultramontanism were Mgrs Bourget and Lafleche as well as Jules" Paul Tardive!, a journalist who published a newspaper entitled aptly La Verite (The truth). When Bishop Bourget constructed a new cathedral in Montreal, he had it constructed on the model of St.

· Peters in Rome; to an ultramontane bishop, the Roman model was the ideal, and only model. The same two bishops were active in recruiting soldiers (zouaves) to defend the temporal power of the pope against the attacks of liberal revolutionaries who wanted to unite Italy. That the bishop was able to raise several hundred French Canadian zouaves in a province notorious for opposing foreign wars speaks volumes of the strength of ultramontanism in Quebec in the nineteenth century.

23 While focused on the French inhabitants, its expression had been broad enough to have received the support of many of the Irish immigrants into the province, as both groups were linked by religion and distrust of Britain and British officials. Together, they had forged political alliances. However, as the number of impoverished Irish immigrants increased after 1840, fuelled by the Irish potato famine, the increasing competition for scarce jobs between the Irish and the French served to somewhat drive a wedge between them.

43

"Canadien" was to have affirmed the existence of a separate nation. As the nation

wished to continue its separate course of existence, a new self definition was needed:

the nation of the French Canadians was born. The expression did not merely say that

there existed Canadians that spoke French. It affirmed clearly the existence of a

separate people, of a nation. Thus, the ''we" shifted from "Canadien" to "French

Canadian. "24

At the outset, the French Canadian nation was centred in the St-Lawrence

Valley, along the. ancestral farmlands that dotted the landscape of the province. The

increase in population beyond the capabilities of the farm areas to absorb, the

deepening of agricultural crisis of the nineteenth century, and the slow pace of

industrialisation to absorb all the excess population led to large-scale emigration from

Quebec to other parts of the continent. 25 The scattering of the nation to different parts

of the continent not only made impossible the creation of a nation-state, except as a

state of the mind, but raised the question of its survival. Survival became a constant

theme during this period and the nationalist discourse changed after 1840 to focus on

the ideology of Ia survivance.26

24 The very change of the description of the nation is a powerful signal of the desire of the nation to distmguish itself, to. affirm its separate identity, to ward off its integration and assimilation to the rest of the continentor the country. By the same process, the "we" of the nation ceased to be as inclusive as it had been previously; the only members of the nation were those that shared its characteristics: they had -to be Catholic; they had to be French speaking, and they had to be of "Canadien" descent. Anybody else was part of"les autres" (the others). Thus, in this period, the nation acquired an "ethnic" flavour that it had not ha:d clearly previously.

~5 The emigration of between 800,000 to 1,000,000 French Canadians, fully 40% of the population of ·Quebec, from 1830 to 1930 was one of the most traumatic events to have fallen upon the nation. In practice, what it did was to remove precise borders around the nation. Clearly, one could not create a nation-state any more, except in imagination around the scattered settlements of French Canadians in New England, the American midwest, in Ontario or Northern New· Brunswick, as well as in Quebec.

-26 The survival of the community against the assimilation plans of the Union Act; the survival of the French minorities in the rest of Canada or in the "little Canadas" of the United States; the survival of a small nation, "un petit people" in the words of Abbe Groulx, against the incredible pressure of the North American environment. The theme of Ia survivance cannot be divorced from the realisation of the minority and endangered position of the nation. French Canadians were not only a nation. They were a minority nation, one that reason would suggest should have died, but also one that miraculously had survived. In the universe of the ultramontane nationalists, such a survival could only be achieved because God was on the side of such a people.

44

The first mam ideological components of this phase concern

the characteristics of the nation. After 1840, much discussion is focused on the three

pillars of survival. The first of these pillars was Catholicism. The nation was a

Catholic nation, with a Catholic mission, on a Protestant continent. Next came the

French language, important as a cultural heritage inherited from the ancestors, a

symbol of the link of the nation and deemed that "la langue est la gardienne de la foi"

(language is the guardian of the faith). The third pillar was the institutions that served

to distinguish the nation and separate it from the rest. These were the legal (French

civil law), familial (large family, traditional role of the mother) or institutional

elements (seigneurial system, classical colleges, co-operative movement) that

characterised the nation and had to be preserved if the nation was to last. The three

pillars of survival, of which Catholicism was evidently the most important, provided

an endless source of patriotic sermons and-speeches throughout the period.

Another major component is the embattled nature of the nation. The

nationalists of this period saw the nation as under constant attacks or threats, inuch

quite real but some imagined. Although Confederation was established in 1867,27 the

threat receded but was never to be quite forgotten. As French,, Canadians were

increasingly scattered throughout the continent, including in various parts of Canada,

they faced the real threat of assimilation. Since the general threat of assimilation was

very real, given the natural deniographical and geographical factors at play on the

North American continent, there increased the intolerant attitude of "les autres" (the

others) as they disregarded and abolished French-Catholic minority school rights in

one· area after another i:q the post-Confederation period.28 Thus, the nationalists were

so successful in spreading the idea of an embattled nation, of a nation under siege,

and of portraying "les autres" as a threat.

27 A major selling point of 1867 constitutional arrangement was that, for the first time in Canadian history, it transferred a degree of political sovereignty to Quebec's French majority which could be used to safeguard the French Canadian distinctiveness in a loose and decentralised political system. See Gagnon, Alain-G (1993), Quebec.' State and Society, Toronto: Nelson, p. 26. 28 New Brunswick outlawed separate schools in 1871. In 1890, Manitoba took similar action against separate schools and dropped French as an official language in the province. Again in 1916 Manitoba abolished bilingual schools. Likewise, the 1913 Ontario school crisis regulating the limited use of French questioned French Canadians minority rights outside Quebec.

45

(iii) A Double Compact

It was clear that the embattled version of the compact theory was no longer an

adequate protection for French-Canadians interests, since the provinces could evoke it

to fend off criticism of their treatment of French-Canadian minorities or federal

intervention to force for remedy. And it was no defence against untoward actions of

the federal government in its own jurisdictions, whether it be the hanging of Riel or

the commitment of Canadians to military adventures.

This aspect was especially contributed by one of the greatest nationalists of

the time, Henri Bourassa, grandson of Louis-Joseph Papineau. In 1902 Bourassa

reformulate the theory and presented the notion of a 'double compact'. Reaching back

to the United Canadas, he seized upon its dualism, arguing that it constituted a moral

premise of Confederation:

The imperial statute which the current government has given us is only the force of a double

contract. One was concluded between the French and the English of the old province of

Canada, while the aim of the other was to bring together the scattered colonies of British

North America. We are thus party to two contracts- one national and one political. We must

keep a careful eye on the integrity of these treaties (cited in McRoberts 1997a: 20).

This new version was to become deeply rooted in Quebec and to shape

fundamentally the crisis in which Canada now finds itself. Thus;.beyond a 'political'

contract, to which all the provinces were party, there was a 'national' contract, which

was the exclusive product of the United Canadas. According to Ramsay Cook,

apparently the national contract guaranteed French.:.English duality whereas the

political contract protected French Canadians from· the imposition of imperial military

obligations by their English-Canadian compatriots (Cook 1967: 57).

Of course, Bourassa did not claim that the term~ of the compact could be

directly derived from the British North America Act, the formal text of

Confederation. Rather he pointed to the 'spirit of the constitution'. For Bourassa it

would be foolish to rely exclusively on a detailed exegesis of the Act's provisions

without considering the origins of British constitutionalism and 'the particular

46

circumstances that preceded and surrounded the signing of the federal pact'. As

Ramsay Cook argues, 'Bourassa's cultural compact was, in the last analysis, a moral

compact' (ibid: 62).

Two additional points about Bourassa's vision of dualism must be stressed.

First, if the notion of a cultural compact was developed largely in response to the use

that some governments had made of their provincial autonomy at the expense of their

French-Canadian minorities, it was not to diminish, let alone replace, the long­

standing notion of a compact among all the provinces .. After all, Quebec still

remained the heart of French Canada, and Quebec's provincial autonomy was the

indispensable first defence of French Canada's interests. In Bourassa's words,

Quebec was 'the particular inheritance of French Canada'. Thus, the two ideas

remained together in an uneasy co-existence. The contract was a double contract.

According to McRoberts (1997a: 22), the compact theory had become deeply

rooted among English-Canadian politics, but only as a compactamong provinces. In

Quebec, however, the notion of a double compact, in which an inter -provincial

compact was coupled with a national compact between the two founding peoples,

became firmly entrenched. For their part, the francophones of Quebec continued to view Canada in terms of their own nationality as French Canadians or Canadiens.

Imperialism, war, and their natural extension: conscription, during the World

War I added to the menace ofthe nation. To Bourassa, war and imperialism had to be

opposed because they were not in conformity with Catholic doctrines of universality

and peace. While his anti-imperialism and war views found theological justification

in Catholic doctrine, for the most part they remained rooted in his nationalism. To

Bourassa, Canada was an Anglo-French nation. At the time, the term "nationalis('

implied more power for the government of Quebec in cultural matters and more

independence of Canada from the British connection (Van Loon and Whittington

1987: 77).

47

Despite the fact that Canada and Quebec entered the phase of industrialisation

and helped Quebec to pull out of the agricultural crisis, improved the standard of

living of the population and, eventually, slowed down considerably the emigration of

French Canadians to the United States, nationalists of this period were strong

believers in agriculturalism.29 Their ~alysis of the impact of industrialisation was

usually negative for it led to urbanisation. By uprooting them from where God meant

them to be, i.e., in the agricultural sector, industrialisation and urbanisation put the

life and the soul of the nation in danger. Indeed, French Canadians were encouraged

to remain an agrarian society and avoid urban commercial enterprises. · I

With industrialisation, the federal government of Canada became increasingly

more active in taking measures to protect citizens i.e. unemployment insurance, old

age pensions, family allowances, etc. Along with other factors, it contributed Canada

toward centralisation. In centralisation, the nationalists found another issue to tackle.

When Confederation was established, a division of powers was effected between the

federal and the provincial governments. In general, at the insistence of Quebec to a

large extent, the powers with the greatest incidence on culture, language and society

were given to the provinces. So,· the nationalists mounted campaign upon campaign

against centralisation, and stood squarely behind provincial autonomy. They sought to

protect the control over the educational, health and social services that the Roman

Catholic clergy exercised in Quebec. Indeed, provincial autonomy was necessary so

that the pillars of survival would remain unaltered and unchallenged.

Communism and feminism also imperilled . the nation, as it endangers the

Catholic values and ethos. In fact, immigration was· one of the most·· sensitive

elements of the nationalist thinking of the period. The desire in the federal

government was to present immigration to the people of Quebec in such a manner

29 Agriculturalism or ruralism was not peculiar to Quebec at the time. But, here, it acquired a dominance, a magnitude, that was rarely matched elsewhere. As well, its ideological setting was quite different from that found elsewhere. Michel Brunet defined agriculturalism as an unbounded love of agriculture and a belief that God had meant French Canadians to be farmers. Farming was the natural economy of the people and when you farmed you inevitably communed with the forces of nature and with God. The rural areas were steeped in tradition and were the backbone of the fight for survival of the nation. By contrast, the cities were the work of"les autres".

48

that it would appear that immigration made a positive contribution to the preservation

of their nationality. On the contrary, the federal government also conducted its

immigration policy oblivious to the goals of the people of Quebec. Every time that an

immigrant landed in Canada, the proportion of French Canadians in the country

decreased accordingly. Thus, in analysing the attitude of Quebec, or of the

nationalists, to immigration, the minority situation of the nation should be kept in

mind. In general, the people of Quebec showed a good deal of tolerance and·

acceptance of those who came and settled among them, while the nationalists did not,

especially to the Jews.30

Aside from the defence of the three pillars of survival, and the fight against all

the elements that threatened. the nation, three other characteristics of ultramontane

nationalism were their focus on history, anti-Statism and political objectives. A very

strong component of ultramontane nationalism, one that had been absent from the

earlier nationalism, was reliance on history. In this context, Canon Lionel. Groulx

initiated the teaching of Canadian history at the University of Montreal in 1915,

making history a strong entrance in the ultramontane nationalist discourse. Indeed,

:Groulx became the first professional historian in Quebec and, between 1915 and

1945, was the chief proponent of ultramontane natiot;talism in Quebec. Central to his

interpretation of the history of French Canadians was the role of Catholicism and of

the clergy as the guardian of the values of the people and of the preservation of tradition.3i

To Groulx, French Canadians were not only a nation with a holy mission, they

were the descendants of a people that once discovered, evangelised, conquered,

civilised and controlled much of the North American continent. Groulx made it his

30 Anti-Semitism was alive and well among the ultramontane nationalists of the period of 1890 to 1945. To them, the Jew was covered with all of the imaginable sins. He was the source of communism, and strangely enough, of the worse excesses of capitalism as well. The contradiction never bothered the nationalists; it only served to blacken Jews further. They were blamed for all of the ills that afflicted the urban society. 31 On the role of history, and the connection of the historians of Quebec to the society that produced them, see Rudin, Ronald (1997), Making History in Twentieth-century Quebec, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

49

task to tell the people about their history. It had a moralistic tone and a nationalist

goal. He was largely responsible for the mythology that filled French Canadian youth

with nostalgic pride in the exploits of the French regime in Canada. He stressed the

antagonisms between the two conflicting language groups subsequent to 1760, and

the seeds of separatist discontent are readily discernible in much of his work. Though

Groulx cannot be charged with the wave of separatism which welled up in the 1930s,

it is clear that its leaders found in his emotion-laden rhetoric sanction for many of

their prejudices, including a dose of racism which for some ofthem was an excuse for

anti-Semitism (Corbett 1967: 30).

Another component of ultramontane nationalism was its anti-Statism. The

ultramontane Church preached distrust of the state. Even when the province of

Quebec was created in 1867, a French and Catholic state in practice, the Church

continued to preach distrust of the state and ascribed to it dangers that simply did not

exist. Only by the 1930s did a new emergent form of nationalism in Quebec start to

challenge the anti-statist views of the ultramontane nationalists. In general, the

ultramontane nationalists were not involved in politics. They have little faith in

political solutions. Both the separatist and the federalist ultramontane nationalists

basically wanted to achieve the same thing: the security of the nation, its survival.

Under the impact of the depression, a new Q1Jebec provincial party, I 'Union

Nationale, led by Maurice Duplessis, was elected in 1936 on a programme of

provincial rights and opposition to the federal government and to English-owned

business. Unable or unwilling to legislate the reforms he had promised, Maurice

Duplessis, the new Premier, tried to placate those interests which opposed reform but

approved of nationalism. With one exception, in 1939,32 this appeal led him to victory

in every election until his death in 1959.

Under his leadership, conflict between the Quebec and federal governments

often took the form of provincial protests against alleged federal encroachments on

32 The more socially progressive of Duplessis' nationalist colleagues quit the Union Nationale, and revived a former nationalist party, the Action Liberale Nationale. The split of the nationalist forces led to the electoral victory of the Quebec Liberals in 1939.

50

provincial jurisdiction, especially federal anti-depression measures. Duplessis

understood Quebec politics to be an art of pleasing voters, the bishops, and the

Anglophone bourgeoisie, not necessarily in that order, while making "Ottawa" the

scapegoat for all real or imagined evils. He played the game superbly.33 However, by

1950s, the hold of traditional elites on Quebec began to loosen. The Asbestos strike34

of 1949 in Quebec set popular opinion against Maurice Duplessis's Union Nationale.

The death of Duplessis and defeat of his Union Nationale in 1960 by Jean Lesage's

Liberals can be cited as the beginning of Quiet Revolution which radically changed

... the reactionary, priest-ridden, rural, poor and tradition-bound society and politics of

Quebec.

Towards Civic Nationalism

While the ultramontane nationalists were very active for over a century, they were not

very successful in the political dimension of Quebec nationalism. There was a

considerable gulf between their message and the views or actions of the average

French Canadian. In part, this may have been because they envisaged too much

individuals only in relation to the group; this tendency may be normal among

nationalists, but it seemed to have been taken to an exaggerated level among the

ultramontane nationalists.

Civic nationalism as Latouche (2001: 193) describes is ''that form of

collective identity and action that stresses those elements of individuality based

principally although not exclusively on a territorially bounded public sphere rather

33 A useful account of the Duplessis regime is Quinn, Herbert F. (1979), The Union Nationale, 2"d Edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 34 Technically, it was an illegal strike because when the negotiations broke down the workers set up picket lines instead of following provincial procedures and waiting for arbitration. The companies involved appealed to the provincial government, and Duplessis responded by denouncing the strike and sending in his provincial police to break up the picket lines and arrest the strike leaders. The workers, nonetheless, held firm and stayed out for four months until a new contract was signed. In the history of Quebec's industrial relations, the Asbestos Strike was no more violent and no more significant than many other strikes, but it has since been given a huge symbolic importance and has come to be seen as a turning point in the history of the province. It was noteworthy that one of the unions was a Catholic union and that this union was among the most militant in its defiance of its employer and of the provincial government. Even more unusual was the fact that leading clergymen, including Archbishop Charbonneau of Montreal supported the strikers.

51

than on the exclusive combination of certain ethno-cultural markers and historical

experiences". Similarly, Christopher Dandeker (1998: 26) stresses that the distinction

between an ethnic group and a 'nation' is that of territory. A nation is an ethnic group

that identifies with a specific territorial space. Nations possess territory rather than

merely retain an association with it. These definitions conform to the notion of

Quebecois nationalism.

The discourse on CIVIC nationalism presents the nation as a plural and

heterogeneous political community and as a civic project to be accomplished within

given, geographic or territorial boundaries. This means, concretely, that everyone and

anyone who lives within the Quebec territory is considered a citizen,35 hence a

Quebecois/6 an appellation which is no longer reserved to identify only the French

Canadians of old. Quebec's civic nationalism encourages pluralism beyond the

historical, culturally determined confmes that used to define Ia nation quebecoise,

celebrates diversity, promotes the integrity of minority cultures, and posits at the

same time the Quebec state as the rallying point with which all can and should

identify. 37

35 Quebec cannot formally deliver citizenship status. Legally, only the Canadian state can. However, the Quebec government's insistence on dealing with its various constituencies as citizens says much about the will to sovereignty that pervades its actions and self-perception. In June 2000, the minister responsible for civic relations and immigration launched a public document for discussion in a general public consultation. This document simply titled La citoyennete quebecoise suggests the legal, institutional and symbolic parameters that should ideally comprise a new Quebec citizenship. It presented and understood by the government as the first step toward the establishment of a formal, Quebec-based citizenship. 36 Literally, "Quebecois" means a resident of Quebec but the psychological meaning of the label is unclear. In the civic nationalist sense it means the collective identity of a group of people born or living in a specified territory with a shared history, a shared voluntary allegiance to a sovereign government whose powers are defined and delimited by laws enacted and enforced through institutions such as Parliament or Congress, and a common loyalty to powerful symbols and myths of nationality (McPherson 1998: 14-15).

37 In spite of its 1977 language legislation and subsequent amendments, which make French the only official language of public transactions in Quebec, force immigrants to attend French schools, and make corporations have commercial signs and publicly in French only, the nationalist Parti Quebecois has been committed to protecting the rights of Anglophones to an English-language education, to providing service in English in health-care system and various state agencies, and allowing the use of English, as well as French, in the National Assembly. In addition, the Quebec state, following the Parti Quebecois initiative in the mid-1980s, officially recognises Quebec's Aboriginal communities as nations, with a full panoply of rights including autonomy within Quebec society, the protection of their languages, cultures and traditions, the right to hold and control land, and the right to participate fully in economic development on their own terms. Finally, the Quebec state has since 1975 a Charter of

52

In the present form of Quebec nationalism, the political self-determination,

and eventually, the full independence of the Quebec state from Canada are matters for

all Quebecers to decide and not simply the francophone majority. Implicit in this view

of things is the idea that Quebecers, regardless of their origin or background, have to

work together to develop a common civic culture based on universal values to which

everyone can readily subscribe (democracy, open civic participation, equality

between men and women, freedom of speech, socio-economic solidarity), with the

French language as the central vector of its reproduction and transmission.

The relatively new expression, as opposed to the traditional ethnic form of

Quebec nationalism, vindicates the will of most liberal proponents of nationalism to

make it a morally, intellectually and politically sustainable project. Indeed, the

emphasis of current Quebec nationalism on pluralism meets the liberal perquisite of

unimpeded individualism, its insistence on democratic citizenship satisfies the liberal

faith in universal values, and its aspiration for a common civic culture fulfills the

fundamentally integrative bent of the liberal state (Salee 2002: 167).

While it.can be said that for an extended imprint of ethnicity and justified

what some would see as quasi-tribal attitudes, it is also true that nationalist

exhortations led to a large movement of self-affrrmation, democratic emancipation

and social change in the 1960s and 1970s. Qut?bec nationalism went from a--- __ _

conservative defence of French-Canadian social, cultural, and moral values against

the British ruler, to confident, self-possessing, at times aggressive, claims of self­

determination and political independence for the socio-economic promotion of

French-speaking Quebecois.

Quebec's leading nationalists and sovereignist governments today has, since

the Quiet Revolution, progressively rejected, at least in public documents, the

traditional, ethnic and cultural connotations, which until about the early 1980s,

essentiaily informed Quebec nationalism. Accordingly, today Quebec nationalists

Rights and Freedoms which guarantees the protection of all fundamental rights for everyone living in the Quebec territory.

53

claim to understand Ia nation quebecoise no longer as the sum total of an historically

determined, common cultural experience shared mainly by French-speaking

Quebecers, but as the gathering through citizenship, of reasonable and equal social

and political beings around rational, democratic institutions upon which they all have

agreed, regardless of their differences and diverging interests (ibid: 166).

Today, Quebec nationalism is still imbued with this forward-looking attitude,

and has enlarged its original conception of national identity to include all who live

and reside in the Quebec territory as equal and full partners in nation-building. This

sense of the Quebec nation has pervaded public documents and policies for over a

decade now, and no nationalist leader or intellectual would entertain, at least

officially, any other view of the nation. The type of nationalist discourse that

currently holds sway in Quebec is premised on inclusiveness and openness to

diversity.

By the 1960s and to the 1970s, French-speaking Quebecers gained remarkable

confidence in their abilities to exercise control over their personal and collective

destinies. They were able to succeed in imposing their culture and language as the

primary conduits of social and economic life, making the ·English progressively

ceased to figure as the oppressive other against whom their own identity was defined

and made sense. Unlike the pre-modern and early modem Quebec nationalists,

targeting the English and Anglo dominance as the source. of French Canadian woes

appeared increasingly ineffective and futile by the 1980s. This results as the socio­

economic power started shifting clearly in favour of French-speaking Quebecers, and

elements of Anglophone culture began to be considered more as potential tools to

penetrate international markets and further Quebec's economic development than as

instruments of oppression of a hostile neighbour. This transformation came about by

the 1960s as the state began to emphasis the pre-eminence of development. The

modernisation and industrilisation of the province boosted economy of Quebec. This

led to the gradual disappearance of the English as symbolic foe and contributed to a

relative de-ethnicisation of Quebecois claims and national identity (ibid: 168).

54

The influx and increased visibility of immigrants in many sectors of Quebec's

social and economic life have also influenced the transformation of the nationalist

discourse, if only for sheer political reasons. In the wake of their defeat in the first

referendum on independence in 1980, nationalist leaders became aware that if

immigrants were not made somehow to feel that they are an integral part of Quebec

society, they would never support the sovereignist project. This in itself was a

powerful incentive to modify the traditional, nationalist discourse and make it more

inclusive. Nationalist leaders began to clearly understand after 1980 that immigrants

and minorities could not be counted outofanY democratic atte111pt attl1llling Quebec

into an independent country. Having known the difficulty in leaving aside the non­

French speakers in matter of political importance, the state's immigration policies and '

general approach toward ethno-cultural minorities since then have by and large

reflected a new and greater sensitivity to the social reality of immigration as well as a

more ready willingness to address and satisfy the poli_tical demands of diversity.

In order to integrate immigrants coming to Quebec, the language policy of the

late 1970s opened the way in this regard, for it allowed for a much more considerable

degree of interaction between immigrants and the rest of the population than had been

the case uritil the point. This was possible with the coming to power of Parti

Quebecois in 1976. Since then, they were able to promote French language as the

central vector for integrating immigrants to the Quebecois society. By . requiring

immigrant children to attend French schools, language legislation progressively

socialised immigrants and several minority groups into the francophone mainstream,

bringing larger segments of these constituencies to take a more active and more direct

part in the social, cultural, and economic life in Quebec society. French-speaking

Quebecers have become, with time, less likely to look upon immigrants and

minorities as a threat to the -integrity and permanence of Quebec's majority culture.

Many among them have developed as a result an increasingly positive attitu~e toward

immigration and ethno-cultural diversity and are less prone to differentiate between

"us and them", at least in public settings and situations.

55

The integrative approach over the past decades shows that Quebecers in

general are progressively inclined toward immigration and ethno-cultural minorities.

Intercultural and interracial contacts are on the increase and even encouraged,

particularly within the Montreal area where the bulk of the immigrant population

lives. The open attitude of the Quebecers is a stark contrast with the more reserved

and negative attitudes that generally prevailed. In fact, Quebecers tend to be on the

whole more accepting of immigration and will more readily recognise it as having a

positive effect on society than any other Canadians.38 The changing view and

perception of the current nationalism tmvar<ls iiT1Il1igrantsis als() as aresult()ft11e .

decline in birth-rate among the Quebecers.

The fact that there is a significant evolution in public mentality toward

immigration, which has translated into greater social acceptance of immigrants and a

narrowing of the symbolic gap between majority and minority, portrays that the

nationalism has become more liberal and open to other communities. However, this

does not imply that ethnicity has become irrelevant in public discourse, .or that civic

integration is a total success. Importantly, it should be kept in mind that the changing

acceptance of immigrants does not mean the socio-economic exclusion on the basis of

ethno~cultural differences has been eradicated. Significantly, this evolution has led to

a conception of the Quebec nation as encompassing - in principle at least - far more

than the French-speaking majority. The political programme of Parti Quebecois today

acknowledges that the Quebec people is made up of every individual who resides

within Quebec territory; up until that time its notion of the Quebec people included

primarily Quebecers of French origin to whom were added all those who had joined

them and shared in their culture.

The expressed will of Quebec's economic elite to face up to the challenges

and imperatives of economic globalisation can also be cited as another factor

accounting for Quebec nationalism's emphasis on citizenship. The nationalist state

38 For an elaborate details on the acceptance of immigrants by the Quebecers, see also Palmer, D (2000), Canadian Attitudes and Perceptions Regarding Immigration: Relations with Regional Per Capita and Other Contextual Factors, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services.

56

policies of the 1960s and 1970s largely contributed to the social and political ascent

of a new class of francophone capitalists who, since the early 1980s, have come to

prevail in the economic and political affairs of the province. This new economic elite

has been particularly anxious to tackle new markets and expand its international

economic horizon, as will be seen in detail in Chapter 5. Its eagerness in this regard

heightened its sensitivity to global pressures, made it more open to the world, and led

it to realise as a result the limitations a narrowly defined conception of the Quebec

nation could impose not only on the province's ability to grow, but also on its own

prospects: too strong a focus on ethnicity or Particularism could him Quebec ....

nationalism into a liability.

Hence, the current insistence of Quebec's nationalist discourse on citizenship

largely reflects the concern of Quebec's economic elite to defuse the "dangers" of the

post-modernist and post-colonialist claims that have come to pervade Quebec's

political landscape. These claims presumably contribute to the fragmentation of the

unity of the political community, bring about political instability, and compromise the

quality of the socio-political environment needed for the market to thrive. Like the

economic elite of most contemporary western societies, Quebec's capitalists are more

comfortable with the integrative bent and universalist pretenses of liberal-democratic

citizenship.

There is a genuine imiovation in the nationalism of the Quebecois on the

notion of collectivity with regard to the accommodative policies towards the non­

francophone Quebecers through the implementation of the liberal-democratic

citizenship. This gradual transformation into civic form of nationalism has propelled

themselves to a better understanding of the realities of the contemporary times. This

move would let the cultural differences engulfed into the political recognition and

aspirations in a more concretised way, thereby, enabling themselves to move ahead

without having to confront with the Rest of Canada in an ethnic French way.

57

(i) The Debate on the Civic Nationalism of Quebec

Having seen the discourse on the civic nature of the contemporary nationalism of

Quebec, we shall now discuss as to as to the dispute whether Quebec's new

nationalism is really civic, whether it can ever be, or whether ethnicity is bolind to

remain a significant dimension of their nationalistic expression. Be that as it may, the

civic nationalist discourse is real. It implies a qualitative shift in the way the

nationalist intellectual and political elites are conceiving Quebec, and in what they are

asking the population to understand Quebec to be. Gone are the primitive, emotional .

appeals to bond as a linguistically and culturally distinct people. This may appear to

many as a good thing and a sign of democratic progress. But gone also is the spark, in

the present context, that has motivated successive generations of Quebecers to

mobilise in support of what they saw as a "struggle" of national liberation against

·Anglo-Canadian "oppressor"; the same spark, in fact, that ignited several federal­

provincial confrontations and constitutional conflicts between Quebec and Ottawa, as

will be seen in detail from Chapter 3.

The civic nationalism of Quebecers offers a legalistic project embedded in a

formal, purportedly neutral sense of liberal~democratic ·citizenship. Paradoxically,

though it seeks to broaden the nation, to make it as politically compelling and

inclusive a category as possible, civic natio11alism as·· formulated by its Quebec

proponents insists rather on the jurisdictional and territorial essence of the Quebec

nation. As Salee (2002: 170) observed, the contemporary nationalism of Quebecois

implicitly asks them to choose not so much between two very distinct visions of

nation (Quebec and Canada) or two very distinct social projects - one, Quebec's,

which would be significantly better than the other - but between two logics, two

conceptions of socio-economic management, and two underlying concerns for social

cohesion that are basically identical, and differ only in terms of who is formulating

them.

Quebec civic nationalists endorse in fact the same fundamental values and

guiding principles of political community and social cohesion that inform the current,

58

prevailing VISIOn of the Canadian state on issues of national unity; that is,

unadulterated reason and "common sense," the fusion of social and ethno-cultural

singularities into one unified conception of the community, and the dominance of

liberal-democratic norms of socio-political transactions.39 This is not to suggest that

Quebec and Ottawa are so similar that the days of administrative and constitutional

wrangling are over. But if the whole Quebec nationalist project boils down simply to

asserting jurisdictional boundaries and administrative prerogatives, and if the

respective, internal logics driving the Quebec state and the Canadian state become

increasingly blurred and indistinguishable, the Quebec public.may well wonder, what,.

then, is the point of nationalism, and, by extension, of pursuing sovereignty.

Critics and political opponents of Quebec nationalists routinely dispute this

view of things and insist that no matter how urbane and politically advanced Quebec

nationalism appears in theory, it is in fact parochial, inward-looking and xenophobic.

They argue that despite its high-minded, inclusive references to all-encompassing

citizenship, it remains ultimately geared toward and conceived for "old stock"

francophone Quebecers. The new brand of Quebecois nationalism is but the brain­

child of a state-engineered, public relations strategy designed to hide its true nature

and cajole public opinion.

Critics and foes notwithstanding, while it is riot improb(!.blethat public image

considerations play a role, the emergence of civic nationalism in Quebec's political

discourse is a more complex phenomenon and is best understood as the result of the

combined action of several factors related. to the. general process of socio-economic

transformations experienced by Quebec society following the Quiet Revolution.

39 There is, of course, a political difference between Quebec and Canada that cannot be downplayed. Quebec's will to full citizenship and insistence on social cohesion must be appreciated in the context of its perennial attempt at establishing itself as a self-contained and self-determined political community. Canada's approach on the other hand is mainly motivated by a fundamental concern to preserve and strengthen historical, political and symbolic boundaries that serve as defining markers of the country's statehood and sense of nation. Still, there is little difference in terms of the inner logic of civic and political homogenisation at play in both cases.

59

On the face of it, civic nationalism may seem like a more "advanced," more

civilised form of communal expression, but to the extent that it waters down

Quebec's pre-political collective identity - that very same identity in defence and

promotion of which much of Quebec's political mobilisations of the past decades

against Ottawa were championed - it also dulls the sense of outrage and injury

necessary to galvanise political energies in support of Quebec sovereignty. As

independantiste political philosopher Serge Cantin noted:

The new credo of an open, plural, multi or transcultural Quebec nation undermines the very

project it purports to advocate by gradually stripping it of its raison d'etre. Indeed it implies

that we should disappear on account of altruism, that we should renounce, in the same name

of democracy, the very principle of democracy, that is, the right of peoples to self­

determination and self-government (cited in Salee (2002: 170).

Although Cantin's lament is obviously rooted in a fundamentally ethnic,

almost nostalgic understanding of the Quebec nation, nevertheless; it cogently

underscores the paradox of civic nationalism in Quebec. In the present form of

Quebecois nationalism, Quebec sovereignists are faced with an interesting challenge.

By making Quebec into a civic nation, they have modernised Quebec nationalism, but

they also seem to have diluted its ability to persuade Quebecers to engage in a · vigourous tug-of-war with Canadian federalism.

As against the view of the civic character of the· contemperary natiomilism,

French-speaking Quebecois stress, individually and collectively, that they are unlike

other ethnic groups in Canada and regard themselves as distinct people with their own

bonding territorial identification and historic institutions. Accordingly, the

Francophone ethnic identity has developed into a full-fledged riatiorialism based upon

the preservation of francophone culture within the Quebec homeland (Schmitt 1997:

4). The French Canadian nationalist urge, born of an ethnic identity rooted finnly in a

separate language, religion and ideology, with immutable roots in the North

American territory of La Nouvelle France, gained particular momentum in the last

half of the twentieth century (Smiley 1978: 201 ). Its enduring qualities underline the

power and persistence of the ethnic-based origins of the Quebec sovereignist

movement, based as they are in a unifying and distinct identity (Kaufmann 1996 141;

60

Latouche 2001)40 reinforced by nation-defining conformity to the specific territory of

French North America that is Quebec (Dandekar 1998: 26). Effectively, the

movement underscores the power and passiOn of the French-Canadian ethnic

nationalist spirit and demonstrates the notion that,

... even in the most civic of states (like Canada), where political and legal equality are the rule

rather than the exception, where there is a high degree of interaction, mutual sympathy, and

even common identity, and where there is equal access to government and government

largesse some will want to separate (Holsti 2000: 165).

Thus are planted the seeds of ethno-political conflict reflective· ofQuebec;s

struggle within Canada where nationalist fervour, perceived inalienable rights and

struggles over access to the organs of state power (Gurr 1994: 354) provide intense

fuel for emerging conflicts, where compromise can b~ difficult if not impossible and

nationalistic passions can be inflamed beyond the point of self-restraint among many

partisans (Schmitt 1997: 4-6). When national identity is tied to territory and

autonomy, as it is in Quebec, national movements are fundamentally associated with

enhanced risks of conflict and violence (Dandekar 1998: 26). The propensity of

conflict effectively rises in societies where there is a large degree of ethnic

intermingling, as in Quebec, and separatists align their aspirations with direct control

over specific tracts of land.

Within the context of ethno-national mobilisation, like the Quebecois

sovereignist movement, the friction caused by the close interaction of distinct ethnic

groups hardens and reinforces opposing collective identities. The more radical

elements within each group tend to impose sanctions on those who do not contribute

to their own cause while opposing groups, themselves, assign adversarial labels to

those outside their own collective (Kaufmann 1996: 143). Under such conditions,

contemporary historical analysis and surveys demonstrate that, even in democratic

40 While Kaufmann and Gellner both underline the importance of homogenous cultural factors (i.e., ideology, religion and race), in facilitating the establishment of cultural identities, Gellner stresses the importance of acquiring economic education and skills and political power as avenues by which nationalism is exercised and expressed. Latouche, in tum, posits that the unique challenges of globalisation (i.e., embedding, incorporation, enclosure and consciousness) provide the same effect, thus explaining the "persistence and re-orientation of Quebec nationalism."

61

societies, albeit less developed than Canada, direct attacks on civilians, intense

guerrilla warfare, ethnic cleansing and genocide can result (Brown 2001: 7). Indeed,

because of the multiple vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities offered by ethnic

intermingling of populations, as in some areas of Quebec, they cause intense security

dilemmas (Kaufmann 1996: 139).

Although the French-Canadian identity traces its roots back to the experiences

of the earliest voyageurs. and habitants who literally carved a unique existence out of

the harsh hinterland of the St. Lawrence River valley, it was the rapid economic.

growth and resulting socio-eeonomic pressure for social change following World War

Two that precipitated the Quebec nationalist impulse of today. Historically, the

French Canadian identity had been stoked by a long record of perceived mistreatment

based on a strong sense of systemic exploitation, resentment at English Canada's

"internal colonialism" (Meadwell 1993: 206) and a grave concern that the

fundamental Canadian notion of duality -between the founding French and English

races was failing and being displaced (Gagne and Langlois 2000: 31). Ultimately,

this dynamic also fuelled broader symbolic concerns over collective identity,

distinctiveness and.recognition while planting the seeds of enduring cultural cleavage

between francophone Quebec and the rest of English Canada on issues of foreign,

defence and social policies (Rioux 2005: 17-20).

Following World War II, high economic expectations exacerbated growing

social frustration on the part of the growing class of well-educated, professionally

confident and socially aware Quebec francophone baby boomers. This phenomenon

resulted in improvements in standards of living being positively correlated with rising

resentment towards Ottawa and growing confidence in secession to the point of it

being a "driving force" in the nationalist impulse (Dion 1996: 278). Quebec Premier

Jean Lesage's socially progressive initiatives in the early 1960s to modernise Quebec

society through governmental, educational and social welfare reforms had been in

response to, but not enough to satisfy, Ia Revolution Tranquil/e. Wider popular

political, economic and social expectations could not be satisfied by the legacy

contemporary political order (Astroff 2000: 4). This socioeconomic modernisation

62

fostered an acrimonious atmosphere of competition with Ottawa as the government of

Quebec created its own welfare, cultural and economic programmes and struggled to

regain what it had either previously lost or never acquired from the Dominion

(Balthazar 1995: 43).

This growing political and social disaffection manifested itself most

prominently through the politicisation of the separatist movement embodied by the

birth of the separatist Parti Quebecois (PQ) in 1968. With its election to the National

Assembly in 1970, followed by its watershed ascension to the premiership of Quebec

in 1976, Canada commenced its still unfinished and profoundly destabilising journey

down the road of provincial challenges to the federal union (Smiley 1978: 224).

Consequently, the question of national unity has controlled the Canadian national

political agenda for a generation and the Quebec separatist impulse stands out as

being one of the most powerful nationalist movements in the West today (Meadwell

1993: 203). Indeed, Quebec separatism was the most fundamental issue of political

conflict in Canada in the twentieth century (Ross and Gurr 1989: 421).

Despite the fact that the Quebecois nationalism has evolved into a civic form,

some features attached to the ethnic form of the traditional French nationalism do

exist. The fear of linguistic isolation, in particular, and the fear of English

assimilation led to the feeling of collective francophone solidarity in Quebec (Dion

1996: 277) and has provoked state-sponsored retrenchment in the form of provincial

legislative efforts to reinforce the French linguistic regime in the province (Smiley

1978: 216; Schmitt 1997: 5). Accordinglr, the state apparatus of the Quebec

provincial government has come to be seen as the legitimate gtiarantor of Ia nation

Quebecois.

Concurrently, the Quiet Revolution precipitated a strengthening and

renaissance in the notion of French-Canadian nationalism towards a model that

reflected the emergence of a socially progressive etat moderne Quebecois. Though

deeply rooted in the historical homogeneity of le Canada fram;ais, the ethnic concept

of nationalism began to encompass the notion of 'civic nationalism' and identification

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with a pluralistic concept of a Quebec nation (Coulombe 1993: 189). In effect, the

civic-nationalist notion that sprung from the Quiet Revolution of being, foremost,

Quebecois41 served to amplify and legitimise the emotional fervour and attachment of

les Canadien-jran9ais in defence of their common language, institutions and distinct

identity (McPherson 1998: 14-15; Balthazar 1995: 44). Indeed, both the authors stress \

the enduring and adaptive qualities of the civic nationalist model and its fundamental

relevance to the Quebec separatist movement.

As a result of the bad press and negative image with nationalistic and

ethnicity-driven upheavals in many parts of the world, Quebecois nationalism tries to

uphold the virtues of nationalism, stressing its liberal nature and insisting on its

emancipatory potential by pointing out its openness to diversity. Conversely,

Francois-Pierre Gingras and Neil Nevitte (1984) argument that the changes associated

since the Quiet Revolution, which redirected the course of contemporary mainstream

nationalism, are not as complete as many have supposed and that traditional and

modem forms of nationalism continue to co-exist even today still holds true. Again,

discrimination with regard to Bill101 (which obliges children of immigrants to attend

French schools) creates doubts over the civic character of their nationalism. Thus,

social tensions have not resulted into violence but discrimination continues to be

experienced by racial minorities.

Conclusion

The nationalism of Quebecois, as seen from the preceding perspectives, shows how

the movement has evolved its course with the passage of time. In the present context,

by making Quebec into a civic nation, they have modernised Quebec nationalism. On

the contrary, they also seem to have diluted its ability to persuade Quebecers to

engage itself-to the ancient stand of a French nation in the Western-Hemisphere in an

ethnic French way. In this way, they have diluted the dreams and aspirations of the

original French settlers. However, it may not be impossible that, in the long run, the

41 By at least the early 1990's, contemporary polls showed that Quebec francophones identified themselves as Quebecois by a margin of 62% before any other label. See Meadwell, H (1993), "The Politics ofNationalism in Quebec", World Politics, Vol. 45, No.2 (January), p. 218.

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new, civic sense of nation will bring about a revitalised sense of collective self

capable of enjoining Quebecers to resist Canada. At this particular juncture though it

is not clear that this is a likely outcome: neither ethno-cultural minorities nor "old

stock" Quebecers seem ready to endorse the new conception of the Quebec nation

fully, the former because they simply do not trust the state's encompassing recasting

of the Quebec political community, and the latter, because it propounds an image of

the Quebec nation which requires that their existence be somehow downplayed (Salee

2002).

The outlook of what is in store is still largely unfathomable. Nevertheless, it

seems safe to surmise that the further Quebec's overall political identity will develop

from its original, pre-political incarnation, the more unlikely the province will be to

articulate its relationship with the rest of Canada in terms of the historical, ethno­

cultural duality of the country. Civic nationalism, provided that it is indeed genuinely

a feature of Quebec political culture as the official discourse would have us believe,

might essentially be making this duality and the dynamics of confrontation that

usually ensued, irrelevant.

On the positive side, civic nationalism is clearly conceived as superior to ethic

nationalism. Specifically in the context of Quebecois nationalism, the civic form of

nationalism has gradually overridden ethnic nationalism, the later being somewhat

marginalised. But as seen from above, there are features and tendencies that ethnic

nationalists seek to revive, politicise and extend rights that are so prominent a concern

for those adhering to the civic vision of the nation. Based purely on the issue of

territoriality, it still constitutes an ethnic nation.

Nowadays, in view of the increasingly heterogeneous nature of Quebec

society due to the continual flux of immigrants, defining what it means to be

Quebecois has become even more complex. The old parameters laid down by the

roman de terre (religion, tradition, the land and the family) certainly no longer hold

tight, nor does the image of "Quebecness" that emerged from the rebellious sixties.

Following the failure of the last sovereignty referendum in 1995, Jacques Parizeau

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controversially blamed on the ethnic vote, French Canadians have been forced to face

the fact that they are no longer the only significant cultural group living in Quebec.

As the debates on the political future of Quebec has persisted and become

embittered, especially since the 1995 referendum, opponents of sovereignty or even

special constitutional status for Quebec have been increasingly quick to accuse

Quebec nationalism of being "ethnic". In the face of these accusations, Quebec

nationalists generally have adopted a defensive position and argued that their

nationalism is purely "civic" or ''territorial". However, for past half a century, Quebec

has been dominated neither by ethnic nationalism nor by a purely civic nationalism.

Indeed, it will be seen in the next chapter as to how Quebec tries to evolve

itself by their assertions of their special place in the federation. Through their distinct

culture and status as compared to the other provinces in Canada, they assert and at

times assume the role of leadership needed to counter the centralising tendencies of

the federal government.

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