1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

This thesis seeks to examine fatwā in the post-New Order (Orde Baru)

Indonesia issued by three major fatwā-making agencies (dār al-iftāʼ) in the

country namely Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia (MUI), Lajnah Baḥth al-Masāil

Nahdlatul Ulama’ (LBM-NU), and Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah. It

elucidates the key features of these agencies and the distinctive methods they

utilize in crafting their fatwā. Major factors conditioning the genesis of fatwā

selected are also examined, although it should also be made clear from the

outset that this thesis does not aim at in-depth socio-historical analysis

conditioning the making of fatwā. Another central issue analysed is how

competing modes of thought condition as well as reflect the production of

fatwā within the respective agencies. Furthermore, how fatwā serves as a site

for competing mode of thought of dominant agencies within the Muslim

community of Indonesia will be explored. The overriding interest is in

understanding the implications of fatwā on Indonesia’s plural society and the

extent to which it facilitates adaptation to the demands of rapid social change

confronting the community. While there have been a vast number of fatwā

pronounced by these organisations within the period selected, this thesis will

focus on fatwā that have strong implications on the lives of Muslims within

Indonesian society as they attempt to adapt and adjust to the demands of

change and challenges of the plural society in which they live. Fatwā on

2

sectarianism and inter-religious relations, major aspects of rituals and

religious practices as well as those dealing with issues of modernity will be

examined.

In Indonesia, fatwā-making agencies are generally integral to Islamic

groups or movements. For example, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’

(NU) are equipped with fatwā-making bodies called Majelis Tarjih and

Lajnah Baḥth al-Masāil respectively. Other organizations such as Persatuan

Islam (Persis) also founded the Dewan Hisbah which is responsible for the

production of fatwā within the organization.1 In some organisations such as

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) where no specific fatwā-making institution

exists, the organisation nonetheless frequently functions as fatwā-making

body for its members.

The three organisations selected for this thesis are highly influential in

society. Of these, the most prominent is perhaps Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia

(MUI) which is active in producing fatwā relating to various issues for

contemporary Muslim society in Indonesia as a whole. MUI is a state-

affiliated religious body that represents both the state and the majority of

Muslim groups in Indonesia. As MUI is an organization representing almost

all Muslim groups in the country, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’

constitute part of this umbrella organisation. MUI provides a forum for

discussion for Muslim scholars and leaders and is seen as the most competent

1 For study on Persatuan Islam and the Dewan Hisbah, please refer to Howard M. Federspiel,

Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia (Singapore: Equinox

Publishing, 2009); Syamsul Falah, Pandangan Keagamaan Persatuan Islam: Studi atas

Fatwa-Fatwa Dewan Hisbah Tahun 1983-1997: Laporan Penelitian (Bandung: Pusat

Penelitian: IAIN Sunan Gunung Djati, 1998); and Uyun Kamiluddin, Menyorot Ijtihad

Persis: Fungsi dan Peranannya dalam Pembinaan Hukum Islam di Indonesia (Bandung:

Tafakur, 2006).

3

council in giving guidance and rules on religious problems and questions

(iftā’).2 In general, MUI proclaims itself as a successor of the Prophet

(warathatu al-anbiyāʼ) which functions to fulfil his legacy. Hence, it assumes

the roles as fatwā-giver (mufti), guide and servant for the umma (riʽāya wa

khādim al-umma), movement for reform and improvement (al-iṣlāḥ wa

tajdīd) devoted to amr bi al-maʽrūf wa nahy ʽan al-munkar (inviting to do

good and forbidding evil).3 In its specific function as fatwā agency, MUI

established a special agency responsible for dealing with fatwā called Komisi

Fatwa (Fatwā Commission).

Historically, MUI is founded in May 1975 as the representative-body

for Muslims nationwide. As the creation of MUI was strongly supported by

former President Suharto, many believe that MUI is a politically created

religious institution aimed by the regime at gaining legitimacy from the

ulamā in justifying strategic and potentially controversial policies it

introduced.4 Suharto’s support for its founding was formulated in terms of

concern for the unity of Indonesian Muslims in meeting and resolving

challenges they face with the support and participation of the ulamā’.5

Through this political will, MUI was finally established with branches

spreading across all Indonesian provinces and regencies which have

expanded to more than thirty. As a country with a majority Muslim

2 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa MUI Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga,

2011), 13. 3 See MUI’s website, www.mui.or.id

4 The current chairman of NU, Said Agil Siradj, is among those who believe in this

conviction. See Iip D Yahya, Ajengan Cipasung: Biografi K.H. Moh Ilyas Ruhiat

(Yogyakarta: LKIS Pelangi Aksara, 2006), 197. 5 Atho’ Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama : a study of Islamic legal

thought in Indonesia, 1975-1988, Ph.D Thesis, University of California, Los Angeless, 1990,

92

4

population, matters relating to Islam occupy a central place in politics.

Although the administration of religious affairs in Indonesia has been

formally assigned to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kementrian Agama),

at the practical level, this ministry does not deal with specific issues

confronting Muslims. Since such a role is assumed by MUI, it can be said

that MUI represents the state and its fatwā stands as the formal legal position

of the state on issues relating to Islam.

The other organization which this study focuses on is Muhammadiyah.

This group has been widely associated with a puritan-reformist strand of

Islam, and for such a reason it is also often associated with Wahhabism and

Salafism. However, this description might fail to describe the whole range of

Muhammadiyah movement. In some extent, especially in terms of faith, the

association of Muhammadiyah with Wahhabism is not really misleading.

Similarly, the terms Salafism might also be applied to Muhammadiyah, when

it refers to group which adhere to the principle of returning to the Qur’ān and

Sunna.6 It has also been rendered as the representative of reformist Islamic

movement in Indonesia. Some scholars studied on this movement have also

pointed to its current conservative inclinations. Founded in 1912,

Muhammadiyah was set up as an Islamic movement aimed at ‘purifying’

Islam as practiced by Javanese society in the beginning of 20th

century,

featured by syncretic amalgamation of Javanese traditions with Islamic

teachings.

6 More detail and comprehensive discussion on the multiplicity of Muhammadiyah’s

orientations will be presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis.

5

Although currently labelled as puritan, studies reveal that in its initial

phase, Muhammadiyah was often described as accommodative towards local

tradition. Its rigidity in dealing with local cultures and traditions only

occurred about a decade after its foundation. This paradigmatic shift is

believed to have been conditioned by the establishment of Majelis Tarjih.

Consequently, in addition to being a think tank of this organization, Majelis

Tarjih is also frequently identified as the agent of puritanism within this

group. This ambiguous nature of Majelis Tarjih is relevant to understanding

its mode(s) of thought and how it is reflected in fatwā issued. Majelis Tarjih

is founded in 1927 with the basic function of issuing fatwā or legal

determination for certain problems. Nevertheless, it should also be

emphasized here that Majelis Tarjih does not deal only with religious

problems in a narrow sense. Rather, it also claims to deal with all

contemporary problems by referring back to the principles of the Qurʼān and

Sunna,7 and urges for ijtihād in resolving contemporary issues confronting

Muslim societies.

The other movement, Nahdlatul Ulama’, has been long known as the

representative of traditionalist Muslim groups in Indonesia. It is for this

reason that it is selected for this study. Interestingly, its characterisation as

traditionalist is currently questioned in view of competing mode of thought

that have merged within the movement. The extent to which this

development within NU impacts upon fatwā will be examined. Within NU,

the Baḥth al-Masāil has played a very significant role in constructing

7 See official website of Majelis Tarjih, http://tarjih.muhammadiyah.or.id/content-3-sdet-

sejarah.html accessed on 3 April 2012.

6

religious strand of NU since its foundation in 1926. Literature on the history

of this body indicates that in its initial phase, Baḥth al-Masāil was essentially

a kind of discussion that took place in pesantren as part of a mechanism in

solving problems within society. As a kind of activity, its inception is

concurrent with the founding of NU.8 Subsequently, it was formalized as an

autonomous structure within NU called Lembaga Baḥth al-Masāil or Lajnah

Baḥth al-Masāil.9

Historically, NU is founded partly in response to the ascendance of the

new political power in Saudi Arabia which marked a shift from the Shafi’ite

oriented to a Wahhabi-inclined political leadership. This shift of power was

seen as a potential threat to traditionalistic Islam and its practices as

Wahhabism served as ideological basis for the new regime which harboured

hostility to traditions maintained by traditionalist groups. At about the same

time, the call for religious reforms in Indonesia had begun to take place

spearheaded by several groups. It has inevitably created anxiety among

traditional Muslim leaders which culminated in the foundation of NU. NU’s

formal institutionalization rendered it both as jamīʽa (community) adhering to

traditional practice of Islam as well as jamʽiyya (organization), meaning those

who formally joined NU as its members. For both, NU developed specific

understanding of religion conditioned by as well as reflecting its predominant

mode of thought.

8 See Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di

Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), 34. 9 Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bahtsul Masa’il 1926-1999 (Yogyakarta:

LKIS), 69.

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Apart from their significance in the life of Indonesian society, these

three fatwā-making agencies also reflect the interplay of competing mode of

thought in the formation of their legal thought as reflected in the fatwā-

making processes as well as substance of fatwā issued. The selection also

provides a view of their impact on fatwā-making.

Fatwā relating to religious beliefs and practices posed by challenges in

the advancement of scientific knowledge is a case in point. It can be

illustrated by the fatwā on the determination of the beginning of Islamic

calendar (hijriya), especially with reference to the holy Ramadan and Idul

Fitri. For decades Idul Fitri has not been celebrated concurrently by different

groups of Muslims, Islamic organizations and government. It should be borne

in mind that in the Indonesian context, managing religious matters is part of

the government’s responsibility.10

Not surprisingly, Eid celebration is always

preceded by an official meeting held by the Ministry of Religious Affairs that

involves representatives from all Islamic organizations in Indonesia including

MUI. The meeting popularly known as Sidang Isbat is designed to determine

the exact date of Eid. Once an agreement is achieved, it will be followed by

an official announcement by the Minister of Religious Affairs.

It is usually the case that the government’s decision differs from some

Islamic organizations in Indonesia. This dispute is due to different methods

adopted by Islamic organizations and the government in determining the new

10

According to classical Islamic jurisprudence, a product of ijtihad is not binding. However,

in order to prevent any dispute, state or government’s intervention is often required. Ibrahim

Hosein, a respected Indonesian scholar argued that government should only be allowed to

intervene in social matters and not in matters of worship. See Ibrahim Hosen, Fiqih

Perbandingan Masalah Nikah (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 2003), 13-15.

8

date of the Islamic calendar that is based on the lunar system.11

The most

notable disputants are Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’.12

As widely

known, the former adopts the method of calculation (ḥisāb)13

based on

astronomical and mathematical principles, while the later believes in the

ru’ya method which involves direct vision of the crescent (hilāl). NU rejects

ḥisāb based on a conviction that this method was never practiced during the

Prophet Mohammad’s lifetime.14

The 2011 Eid was not an exception. But

unlike previous years, the controversy in that year was much more intense.

Muhammadiyah, which celebrated Eid on August 30, 2011, a day earlier than

government’s decision, was blamed as the source of tension and confusion

among Indonesian Muslims since it firmly insisted on the results of its own

ijtihād. The controversy intensified as the Sidang Isbat was broadcasted live

by a number of Indonesian national television stations. Comments were

obtained from Thomas Jamaluddin, a scientist interviewed in the programme

who maintained that Muhammadiyah’s method is outdated.

11

For an example of how the dispute is examined by Indonesian scientists, please refer to

Farid Ruskanda, Seratus Masalah Hisab dan Rukyat (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996). See

also, Farid Ismail, Selayang Pandang Hisab Rukyat (Jakarta: Direktorat Pembinaan Peradilan

Agama, Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, 2004); Syamsul Anwar, Hari Raya dan

Problematika Hisab-Rukyat (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2008); Heri Ruslan,

“Penetapan Awal Bulan, Seperti Apa Aturannya?”, Dialog Jumat Republika, 5 November

2010; and Farid Ruskanda (et. al), Rukyat dengan Teknologi: Upaya Mencari Kesamaan

Pandangan tentang Penentuan Awal Ramadhan dan Syawal (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press,

1994). 12

Other smaller Islamic organizations such as Persatuan Islam have their own method of

determining the new Islamic calendar determination. However, in general they follow the

government’s decision in determining the day of Eid celebration. Although generally

Nahdlatul Ulama’ members follow government’s decision, some NU-affiliated pesantrens

celebrate Eid and performed Eid prayer on the same day with Muhammadiyah’s decisions.

This is based on my personal observation. 13

Etimologically, hisab (Arabic) means calculation. It is a derivative form of h-s-b means “to

calculate. For explanation on hisab, see Susiknan Azhari, Ensiklopedi Hisab Rukyat,

(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2005). 14

Detailed explanation on Nahdlatul Ulama’s position regarding ru’ya can be found in A.

Aziz Masyhuri, Masalah Keagamaan: Hasil Muktamar dan Munas Ulama Nahdlatul Ulama

Kesatu/1926 s/d Ketigapuluh/2000 (Depok: Qultum Media, 2004), 52-53.

9

Muhammadiyah’s insistence in adopting the method it employed was also

blamed as the factor for the irreconcilable dispute.15

The scientist further

asserted that by using a more advanced technology the dispute can actually

be avoided. In other words, according to him, it is the reluctance of

Muhammadiyah to adopt a more modern technology that had worsened the

situation. As a result, unlike other Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Saudi

Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, Indonesia had two versions of the

Eid in that year: Muhammadiyah’s Eid coincided with the majority of

Muslim countries while NU and the government’s version was a day later.16

While the Eid celebration ran peacefully despite differences and

controversies on the grass-root level, the dispute resumed at another level.

Having been accused of employing outdated method, Syamsul Anwar of

Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tarjih maintained in defence that the method

employed by NU which the government endorsed is much more outdated.17

Moreover, some commentators even confidently argued that if the moon’s

appearance is considered, Muhammadiyah’s version of Eid day is much

closer to the truth.18

However, none of government officials and others who

endorsed the opposite position responded to Muhammadiyah.

15

http://tempointeraktif.com/hg/kesra/2011/08/28/brk,20110828-353968,id.html; see also

http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/1769952/perbedaan-idul-fitri-karena-penyimpangan-

astronomi; http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/news-392-detail-penjelasan-majelis-tarjih-

dan-tajdid-pp-muhammadiyah-soal-penetapan-idul-fitri-besok.html. Accessed on September

10, 2011. 16

Based on Decree of Minister of Religious Affair of the Republic of Indonesia, Number 148

Year 2011. The copy of the document can be accessed through:

http://kemenag.go.id/file/dokumen/keputusanmenagno148tahun2011tentangpenetapan1syaw

al1432h.pdf. Accessed on September 10, 2011. 17

http://www.dakwatuna.com/2011/09/14341/otoritas-dan-kaidah-matematis-refleksi-atas-

perayaan-idul-fitri-1432-h-tanggapan-atas-kritik-thomas-djamaluddin/. Accessed on

September 10, 2011. 18

http://lemlit.uhamka.ac.id/index.php?pilih=news&mod=yes&aksi=lihat&id=53&judul=pur

nama-dan-awal-bulan-qomariyah.html. Access was done on September 10, 2011.

10

This description is a factual example of how modes of thought

influence fatwā. It has long been acknowledged that the ḥisāb method is

regarded as modern since it is based on astronomical and mathematical

calculations while ru’ya only accepts direct vision of the crescent, although

the vision also involves the use of advanced technology. The debate,

therefore, has wider implications on the issue of compatibility of Islamic law

and modern science. The method adopted also mirrors and conditions

divergent modes of thought of groups concerned.

In the study of fatwā issued by these selected fatwā-agencies, this thesis

confines itself to the period of post-New Order Indonesia for several reasons.

The foremost is the collapse of New Order reign in 1998. This collapse has

ushered considerable changes in political and religious life in Indonesia. Two

most significant and particularly relevant of these are political openness or

political liberalization and freedom of religious expression. Suharto’s Orde

Baru was featured by authoritarianism and strict political surveillance. When

the regime collapsed, political openness was clearly manifested in the

mushrooming of political parties. In the first election in the post-Suharto

Indonesia (1999), forty eight parties participated with a significant number of

them being Islamic political parties. Although the number of participating

political parties fluctuated from one election to another, they nonetheless

indicate the climate of political liberalization in the country. Moreover,

political liberalization is also featured in the emergence of democracy in

Indonesian political life. Relatively transparent elections and freedom of

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speech are among a few consequences that have accompanied the new

climate of political change.

Post-Suharto Indonesia also manifests in the emergence of more open

space for diverse religious expressions, especially from Muslim groups,

including more formalistic and bold expressions of demands for Islamic law

and legal principles in government and administration.19

Accordingly,

Islamic organizations in Indonesia found spacious room to freely elaborate

and express their positions, principles and attitudes regarding significant

issues affecting Indonesian society. Martin van Bruinessen, for instance,

noted that the face of Islam in post-Suharto Indonesian society diametrically

differ from the previous era.20

The space has also witnessed a “conservative

turn” evident in religious violence and inter-religious conflicts as well as the

emergence of transnational Islamic movements attempting to influence

mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU.21

This changing condition has also impacted on religious discourse and

practice of Islamic law in Indonesia. Inevitably, Islamic law has been

witnessing a considerable shift from earlier decades. During the era of

political authoritarianism and oppression under Suharto’s New Order (Orde

Baru) in which political restriction was an integrated feature of the regime,

19

For more discussion on Islamic law dynamic within the context of contemporary

Indonesian setting, please refer to Jan Michiel Otto (ed), Sharia Incorporated: A

Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present

(Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), especially Chapter 10. Comparative perspective on

the subject can also be found in Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (eds), Shari’a and

Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003). 20

Martin van Bruinessen, “Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam

and the

“Conservative Turn” of the Early Twenty-First Century”, in Martin van Bruinessen (ed),

Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn”

(Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), 1-3. 21

Ibid.

12

open expressions of Islam in public space was perceived as a threat to the

stability of the state. Moreover, in the early days of Suharto’s ascension to

power, relationship between Islam and the state was characterized by hatred

and suspicion. When massive student demonstration in 1998 forced Suharto

to step down from presidency and many restrictions were lifted, a new phase

of Indonesian politics was revealed. It was accompanied by unprecedented

challenge to Muslims who continue to seek religious guidance and rulings

from religious elite in resolving uncertainties and complexities of life

encompassing many domains. While this has been ongoing long before the

fall of Suharto, the changing context created less restriction on the expression

of religious opinions including the domain of law and legal thought. This

signifies the basis for selection of post-New Order Indonesia as point of

departure for this study.

B. Mode of Thought

One of the major issues examined in this thesis is the function of mode

of thought in conditioning fatwā. In its relation to religion, mode of thought is

reflected in groups’ perspective of religion including what aspects of religion

are deemed significant and what are marginalised or overlooked. It is also

manifested in how religious teachings are conceived and applied. While

mode of thought of groups may shift over time and may not be monolithic at

any point in time, it is nonetheless possible to discern dominant modes of

thought as manifested in ideas, views, opinions, and judgment held by the

groups as they respond to their milieu as opposed to those that are marginal.

13

Three major mode of thought are relevant to this study, namely

traditionalism, revivalism and reformism. The meanings attributed to these

terms must be clarified at the outset to avoid confusion as they have been

used by various scholars in diverse ways. Against the backdrop of Indonesian

Islam’s complex diversity, these typologies of mode of thought in

understanding religious experience might be viewed as an oversimplification.

However, such categorizations are ideal types which do not ignore the

dynamic interaction within and between a particular social group’s religious

outlook while facilitating analyses of interplay and contestation among

variety of modes of thought. As ideal types, these constructions are also

meant to capture the main tendencies of mode of thought in the context of

Indonesian Muslim society without over-generalising. In general, Nahdlatul

Ulama’ is widely associated with traditionalistic Islam as opposed to

Muhammadiyah which is predominantly classified as a reformist Islamic

movement. MUI, on the other hand, being the amalgamation of all

Indonesian Muslim groups and supported by the state, is often highlighted for

its traditionalistic and conservative bent in Indonesian Islam. The meaning of

these modes of thought as defined in this thesis and their usage in analysing

fatwā will elucidate the extent to which such dominant perceptions of their

mode of thought hold sway, although this in itself is not the major aim of the

thesis.

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Traditionalism

According to Robert Towler, traditionalism is “a style of religiousness

which clings on the old ways.”22

Its main tendency is maintaining tradition it

has received unquestioningly from generations of the past. Similarly, Karl

Mannheim formulated traditionalism as “a tendency to cling to vegetative

patterns, to old ways of life.” Given its dogmatism in according the ways of

the past at the core of its religious belief, traditionalism can be seen as a

potential as well as a manifest “reaction against deliberate reforming

tendencies and is characterised by fear of innovation”.23

Similarly,

traditionalism in William Graham’s understanding refers to “an emphasis

upon the historical authority of, and the continuity with or recovery of, norms

and institutions basic to a particular cumulative tradition.”24

All these

concepts of traditionalism indicate an attitude of reluctance in dealing with

contemporary situation which shares the attitude of conservatism. However,

Karl Mannheim viewed traditionalism and conservatism as two distinct

concepts. For him, traditionalism is not “necessarily bound up with political

or other sorts of conservatism”.25

It is also obvious that traditionalism is closely related to tradition

although the two can be clearly distinguished. Edward Shils describes

tradition as “anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past to

22

Robert Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion

(London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1984), 83. 23

Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought” in Kurt H Wolff, From Karl Mannheim

(London: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 281. 24

See William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation”, The

Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), 496. 25

Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought” in Kurt H Wolff, From Karl Mannheim

(London: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 281.

15

the present”.26

This formulation underlines the continuity or linkage with the

past as an important element of tradition. Similarly, Bauman asserts another

possible understanding of tradition as “the element of historical continuity or

social inheritance in culture, or the social process by which such continuity is

achieved.”

More fundamentally, tradition can also be interpreted as “the collective

social inheritance of particular people, culture, society, group or collectivity

and as such stands as the referent of its collective identity.”27

Similar in a way

is a definition of the term offered by Harry B Acton who defines tradition as

“belief or practice transmitted from one generation to another and accepted as

authoritative, or deferred to, without argument.”28

In its derivative form,

William A Graham refers “traditional” to “those societal norms and

institutions that a culture perceives as congruent with or continuing older

precedents and values…” while Phillips and Schochet argue that in most

cases tradition is identified with “enduring social practices” and “tacitness is

often regarded as its signature”.29

Shaharuddin Maaruf’s formulation of

tradition is also instructive. He maintains that it is the “cultural or value

system which have been influential in moulding or shaping the world-view of

a given people for a significant period in their cultural history. The cultural or

26

Edward Shils, Tradition (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), 12. 27

R. Bauman, “Anthropology of Tradition”, in Neil J Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds),

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (New York: Elsevier, 2001),

15819. 28

See William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation”, The Journal

of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), 496. 29

Mark Salber Phillips and Gordon Schocet, “Preface” in Mark Salber Phillips and Gordon

Schocet (eds), Questions of Traditions (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), ix.

16

value system represents the stable core, which provides the basis for the

society’s responses to contemporary and future challenges.”30

It cannot be denied that above-mentioned understanding portrays

tradition in neutral and positive rather than negative ways. The basic

understanding of tradition connotes neutral and even positive meanings but

an analogous meaning cannot be applied to traditionalism, since

traditionalism is often understood in a pejorative sense. 31

Jeroslav Pelikan,

for instance, makes a very sharp distinction between the two. For him,

tradition is “the living faith of the dead,” while traditionalism is “the dead

faith of the living”.32

However, as tradition is intrinsically related to the past,33

it is also

sometimes pejoratively perceived. For example, it is sometimes used in

comparison with Enlightenment and Renaissance movements that promote

discontinuation with the past, since the past is perceived as a symbol of

30

Saharuddin Maaruf, One God, Many Paths: Essay on the Social Relevance of Religion in

Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Aliran Publication, 1980), 242-243. 31

In an Islamic context, both positive and negative connotations of traditionalism could also

be found. Scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and his disciple Malaysian philosopher

Osman Bakar, for example, are often categorized as the defenders of “traditional Islam” that

engaged in promoting positive meanings of tradition. For Nasr, tradition is “…the principal

milestone for spiritual authenticity and an infinite source of grace”. Tradition in Nasr’s

thought is understood as spirituality and perennial philosophy of Islam that should be

renewed and revived in facing the challenge of modernity. Furthermore, Nasr writes: “…at

once al-din in the vastest sense of the word, which embraces all aspects of religion and its

ramifications, al-sunnah, or that which, based upon sacred models, has become tradition as

this word is usually understood, and silsilah, or the chain which relate each period, episode

or stage of life and thought in the traditional world to the Origin, as one sees so clearly in

Sufism. Tradition, therefore, is like a tree, the root of which are sunk through revelation in

the Divine Nature and from which the trunk and branches have grown over the ages.” See

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London and New York: KPI

Limited), 13. 32

Jersolav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition: The 1983 Jefferson Lecture in the

Humanities (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), 65. 33

Edward Shils, Tradition (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), 12.

17

backwardness and primitiveness.34

Tradition is also at times perceived

negatively due to confusion in mistaking it with traditionalism35

as the

traditionalists have also irresponsibly hijacked traditions for their interests.

Robert Towler describes traditionalism in terms of several salient

features such as: a) firmly holding on to the past and shutting the gate of

critical inquiry; b) cherishing the certainty of the stable and secure order

lodged in the past; c) resistant to any kind of innovation; d) affirms and

reinforces the established order; d) hostile to any change and alert in pressing

innovative endeavours back into the established mould; e) strong tendency to

avoid or dismiss all questions by directing all questions to an exclusive

custodial authority.36

In the context of Islam in Indonesia, apart from the above traits,

traditionalism is also used to refer to the practice of religion that blends with

adat, “local practice” or “the way of the ancestors”.37

Concomitantly, the late

Abdurrahman Wahid, the former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, described

traditionalist Muslims as follows:

…[they] are widely supposed to be rather backward in orientation

and ossified in their understanding of Islamic society and thought.

It is held that their persistence in upholding orthodox Islamic

law… leads them to reject modernity and a rational approach of

life. Similarly, in matters of theology, their determined adherence

to the scholasticism of al-Asy’ari and al-Maturidi is said to have

resulted in a fatalistic understanding of submission to God’s will

and disregard for the exercise of free-will and independent

34

William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation”, The Journal of

Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993). 35

Jeroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition: The 1983 Jefferson Lecture in the

Humanities (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984). 36

Robert Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion

(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 82. 37

Martin van Bruinessen, “Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist

Discourse within NU”, in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional

Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 165.

18

thinking. Traditionalists are furthermore accused of being too

other-worldly in their practice of ritual Islamic mysticism

(tasawuf)… Thus the commonly held view of traditionalists is that

they are wholly passive community unable to cope with the

dynamic challenges of modernisation, the sort of community that

scholars regarded as belonging to a dying tradition.38

In the Indonesian context, Islamic religious traditionalism is manifested

in the reverence for tradition or adat and its incorporation into religious

teachings and practice. Moreover, it is also associated with adherence to

mystical orientation of Islam and its influence on the attitude towards worldly

life. Despite the influence of modernism, traditionalism as a religious

orientation in Islam continues to be a major type of religious orientation

among Muslims. In general, Muslim traditionalists are characterised by

certain common traits:

Firstly, they adhere dogmatically to selective interpretations of the

Qurʼān and Sunna without engaging with competing views.39

As Binyamin

Abrahamov noted, traditionalism is built on several foundations of which

strict adherence to selective teachings of the Qurʼān and Sunna of the

Prophet is a major one. Consequently, any kinds of interpretations not in

accord with its selected meaning are disregarded although traditionalists do

not object to the diversity in the understanding of Islamic teachings. In

understanding the Qurʼān, the use of reason is very limited. Hence,

38

Abdurrahman Wahid, “Foreword”, in in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul

Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute,

1996), xv. 39

Karim Douglas Crow, Roots of Radical Sunni Traditionalism Fear of Reason and the

Hashwiyah (Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008), 19; George

Makdisi, “Remarks on Traditionalism in Islamic Religious History”, in Carl Leiden (ed), The

Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (Austin: The

Humanities Research Center the University of Texas, 1966); and Binyamin Abrahamov,

Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,

1998).

19

traditionalist can only accept certain types of interpretations of the Qurʼān

and do not evaluate competing views on ground of principles. As Seyyed

Hossein Nasr explicates, traditional Islam accepts “…the Noble Quran as the

Word of God in both content and form: as the earthly embodiment of God’s

Eternal Words, uncreated and without temporal origin. It also accepts the

traditional commentaries upon the Quran, ranging from the linguistic and

historical to the sapiental and metaphysical.”40

This strict adherence to

selective readings of the Qurʼān and Sunna is termed as isnad41

paradigm of

traditional Islam. This paradigm is based on derivation of authority primarily

or even solely from linkage to a sacred tradition through a chain of personal

transmission linking intervening authorities to an original source. 42

For

traditionalists, the meaning of the Qurʼān is self-fulfilling prophecy in nature,

and for this reason it does not need any complicated interpretation. In

technical terms, traditionalists believe that the Qurʼān is both qath’iy al-

wurūd (transmitted in very fixed and unquestionable method) and qath’iy al-

dalāla, which means that the meaning of the Qurʼān is also fixed and

undisputable.43

Secondly, Islamic traditionalism stands on the perception that pious

forebears of Islam are unchallenged. Azhar Ibrahim calls this tendency as

40

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London and New York:

KPI Limited), 14. 41

Isnad is a technical term in the study of hadith that basically means chain. This term refers

to the chain of scholars or ulama’ in transmitting hadith. 42

William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation”, The Journal of

Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), 502. 43

Manbaul Ngadhimah, “Potret Keberagamaan Islam di Indonesia (Studi Pemetaan

Pemikiran dan Gerakan Islam)”, Innovatio, Vol. VII, 14, (2008), 272.

20

“romanticism of the medieval past”.44

Conditioned by this attitude, Islamic

traditionalism has a tendency to give overriding importance to religious

knowledge of the past which it deems as perfect and complete. Moreover,

traditionalists believe that ideas, knowledge and values propagated by

forebears are at the same time relevant and constitute truth which cannot be

ignored. The same attitude is also applied to the formulation and product of

thinking of ulamā’of the past deemed as complete, final and absolute. As a

result, any attempts to contextually understand Islam or interpret its teachings

contextually is forbidden on the basis that such interpretations were never

practiced by pious forebearers (salaf al-salīh). Hence, traditionalists are also

often trapped in a symbolic type of Islam. For example, in certain circles of

traditionalist Muslims, emphasis is given to genealogical origin in the belief

that only descendants of the Prophet are authorised to teach Islam. In

Indonesian history, the debate over privilege accorded of sayyids and habaib

(the descendants of the Prophet) instanced by Jami’at Khair and al-Irsyad is

illustrative. While the latter give importance to Muslims based on quality of

their devotion to God (taqwa), genealogy signifies a significant factor in the

mode of thinking of the former.45

Thirdly, Islamic traditionalism is ambivalent to reason and generally

perceives it as limited. Amidst the significance of rationality in the

contemporary context of modernity traditionalism is becoming much more

assertive in limiting the role of reason in interpreting religious text. Its

44

Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Islamic Discourse in the Malay-Indonesian World: Critical

Perspective (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2014), 18. 45

See Deliar Noer, “Introduction” in Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-

Ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), xv.

21

attitude towards reason is based on the conviction of intrinsic limitations of

reason which prevents it from determining truth.46

Azhar Ibrahim argues that

this trait of traditionalism resembles medieval mysticism which sees reason

as the enemy of human beings in achieving spirituality.47

He also maintains

that the reluctance and also suspicion of traditionalists in employing reason is

influenced by Sufi theosophical speculation which “draws sharp distinction

between reason and revelation, in which the former is seen as absolutely

fallible.”48

As the result of this limited employment of reason, traditionalists

are characterised by “uncritical and dogmatic reliance on religious

traditions”.49

The fourth characteristic of traditionalism featured in Muslims mode of

thought is the fear of innovation.50

It should be made clear that innovation in

this context refers to innovation in thought and social practices and not in

terms of religious rituals. This distinction is important, since traditionalist,

despite their fear of innovation, often create rituals that are deemed as bid’a

(heresy) by revivalist and reformist.51

This fear of innovation is further

strengthened by the tendency of glorifying the past and of perceiving the past

as the only ideal that Muslims must refer to. Consequently, this mode of

thought defines their reluctant attitude toward social change. As Hisham

46

Wan Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Uthman Ali, Islam dan Modernisma (Kuala

Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 1977), 17-18 47

Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Discourse, 5. 48

Ibid, 6. 49

Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, “Changing Roles, Unchanging Perceptions and Institutions:

Traditionalism and Its Impact on Women and Globalization in Muslim Societies in Asia,”

The Muslim World, 97 (July 2007), 481. 50

Benyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh:

Edinburgh University Press, 1998), chapter 2, 1-11. 51

In the section on reformism, I will discuss types of orthodoxies that among other things

pertaining ritual innovation.

22

Sharabi argues, traditionalists are usually bound with historicism as they see

the past as the locus and not the future. Therefore, as Azhar asserts,

traditionalists’ views “are generally the opposite of the ideas of the reformists

who advocate progressive change in society.”52

Fifthly, traditionalists are usually closely linked to traditional Islamic

institutions and use those institutions as medium in the spread of their ideas

transmitted from the past. They tend to dominate religious institutions such as

mosques, religious learning centres, madrasa and pesantrens. In Indonesia,

traditionalists also often dominated state-affiliated Islamic institution. Fatwā

institution in Indonesia represented by Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia is an

example of state-affiliated religious institution dominated by traditional-

minded religious scholars. This mode of thinking impact on religious thought

including fatwā.

The dominance of traditionalism bears implications on the attitude

towards social change. They are reluctant to accept social change since from

their point of view surrendering to present needs implies compromising

Islamic belief. Although they resist change, traditionalists often gradually

accommodate and adjust to changing conditions. However, they do this on

the ground of exigency rather than principles. They continue to uphold

selected religious formulations they deem “authentic” as they pragmatically

adapt to the demands of their milieu.

52

Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Discourse, 5.

23

Revivalism

Revivalism refers to a type of mode of thought which is politically

assertive and reflects a more conscious intellectual and political formulation

compared to religious traditionalism. Some revivalists are engaged in

political activism and use politics as a means to achieve their ideals. They

include, but not limited to, personalities such as Abul A’la al-Mawdudi,53

Hasan al-Banna,54

Sayyid Qutb55

and Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani who are

identified with the agenda of institutionalising an Islamic order or Islamising

society through political means. The founding of Islamist political parties and

organizations with such a mode of thought has intensified their immense

influence in the global spread of Islamic revivalism in the contemporary

Muslim world, including Southeast Asia.56

Basically, Islamic revivalism is

another response of Muslims to the challenges of modernity which is featured

by its strong hostility towards the West. The seeds of religious revivalism

have taken place more than a century ago in the context of colonialism in the

19th

century. It is from this point that puritanical stance of revivalist mode of

53

On Mawdudi’s thought and role in the making of Islamic revivalism, see Seyed Vali Reza

Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press);

Seyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawlana Mawdudi’s Biography” The Muslim World Journal, 85, 1-

2 (1995), 49–62. 54

For further account on Hasan al-Banna see Gudrun Krämer, Hasan al-Banna (London:

Oneworld Publications, 2009). 55

On Sayyid Qutb’s political thought see Sayyid Qutb and William E Shepard, Sayyid Qutb

and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam (Leiden

and New York: E.J. Brill, 1996); Muhammad Hafiz Diyab, Sayyid Qutb: al-Khitāb wa al-

Iduyulujiyya (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, 1989); Sayed Khatab, The Power of

Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb (London and New

York: Routledge, 2006); Adnan A Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and

the Foundation of Radical Islamism (Westport: Praeger Publisher, 2005); John Calvert,

Sayyid Qutb and the Origin of Radicalism Islamism (New York: Columbia University Press,

2010); Ibrahim M Abu Rabi’, “Discourse, Power and Ideology in Modern Islamic Revivalist

Thought: Sayyid Qutb” The Muslim World Journal, 81, 3-4 (1991), 283–298. 56

Ira M Lapidus, “Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the

Historical Paradigms”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 40, 4

(1997), 444-460.

24

thought emerged. In the attempt to alleviate the socio-economic plight of the

Muslims ravaged by the impact of colonial policies, these groups maintained

the conviction that religion can facilitate the progress of the community.

However, their revivalist orientation conditioned their view that the way

forward was to return to the pristine past of Islam which was constructed

based on their image of Muslim history and Islamic culture. In this mode of

thinking, Islam as practiced by Muslims has been corrupted by the influence

of local and popular cultures. This syncretic type of Islam to their mind had

contributed to the stagnation of Muslims and had to be “reformed” in order

for Muslims to progress.57

In the contemporary period, this mode of thought is rooted in internal

and external factors impacting on newly independent Muslim states and

societies in meeting the demands and challenges of social change. Since the

1970s in Indonesia, revivalist ideas had begun circulating among student

circles and some groups. However, restrictions that the New Order regime

imposed upon dissenting voices had suppressed their demands. In the

subsequent period, the fall of Suharto’s regime has facilitated the space for

their manifestations in the religious landscape of Islamic thought in

contemporary Indonesia. While this mode of thought dominates radical

movements and political groups such as Hizbut Tahrir and Front Pembela

Islam, its salient traits are not confined to such groups.

A central motive in this mode of thinking is the notion that the

advancement of Western modernism has induced secularism of state and

57

Fauzan Saleh, Fauzan Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th

Century Indonesia: A Critical Survey (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 2-3.

25

society which revivalists associate pejoratively with relativity of human

values, objectification of the world or nature and the overthrow of religion. 58

Therefore, revivalist discourse is strongly bent on “reviving and returning to

the fundamental teachings and precepts of the Islamic faith.”59

However, in

this mode of thought, what is deemed fundamental in religious teachings is

exclusively defined by the group at the expense of others.

This exclusive trait in revivalist mode of thought is manifested in its

credo that Islam is not a mere religion but al-dīn, a comprehensive religion, a

total way of life and the only path to salvation and that the “Islamic system”

is the most legitimate and authentic. While generally Muslim do not object to

these formulations, the meaning that revivalists accord to these, however, are

markedly different and which they alone have the prerogative of defining to

the exclusion of all others. The claim of absoluteness in its formulation of

Islam is also manifested in its strong tendency to regard other Muslims who

adhere to other interpretations and practice of Islam as un-Islamic or even

worse, outside the fold of Islam. 60

In this mode of thought, Islam and state are not separable. This doctrine

is best described in terms of Islam as dīn wa dawla, or that Islam embodies

not only religious matters but also defines how a state is run. The separation

of dīn (religion) and dawla (state) is inconceivable as religion is perceived as

both a polity and a method of government. Their denouncement of the

58

Shaharudin Maaruf , 2001, p 3 59

Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State (Singapore:

University of Singapore Press, NUS, 1993), 1. 60

Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jama’at-I Islami: The Origins, Thoery and

Practice of Islamic Revivalism”, in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala

Lumpur and Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005), 105-106.

26

present social order and insistence on what they define as the Islamic

alternative reflect elements of utopian mode of thinking. 61

Revivalists do not see the relevance of classical Islamic tradition as a

legacy that should be preserved or revaluated so that it can contribute to the

development of the community. At the same time they adopt the popular

credo of “returning to the Qurʼān and Sunna”. In fact, this relegates the entire

vista of classical learning to the margins with the exception of few scholars

like Ibn Taymiyya and al-Mawardi. 62

Unlike the traditionalists who cherish

and adhere strictly to the opinions of savants of the classical period,

revivalists reject this as taqlīd and attempt to reconstruct the past based on

ijtihād which they consider pristine and authentic. However, their lack

adequate grounding in both religious sciences and modern knowledge impairs

their capacity for genuine reform.

Revivalism is not anti-modernity. Zainah Anwar, for instance,

maintains that in contrast to stereotypes that “most Islamic revivalists are not

educated, anti-modern, and society misfits, they are in fact well-educated,

upwardly mobile and motivated individuals.”63

It is hence unsurprising that

while harbouring strong hostility to the West and the existing order it deems

secular, western concepts including those of state and government are heavily

61

Hussin Mutalib, “Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States”, Asian Survey, 30, 9 (1990), 877-

891. 62

R. Hrair Dekmejian,“Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences”, in

Shireen T Hunter (ed), The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Bloomington

and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 4. 63

Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students (Petaling

Jaya: Pelanduk Publication, 1987), 2.

27

utilised in conceiving what they imagine as an Islamic state, system or

order.64

In their fixation of returning to the pristine Islam of the past, the

revivalist mode of thought tends to reject local religious traditions and

practices which have syncretised with Islam. These include religious rituals

and ceremonies long observed by Muslim such as kenduri or slametan,

maulud, ratib, barzanji and many others which they pronounce as bid’a

(innovation). Their preoccupation with creating a Muslim identity that is

untainted by un-Islamic elements is strongly manifested in their version of

aurat, insistence on what they regard as halal, gender interaction, attitude

towards cultural forms and expression and many other domains of life. The

halal movement and awareness is not only confined to food, but has also

extended to other dimensions such as banking, insurance and economic

practices, in general. Furthermore, in the Indonesian case, as in Malaysia,

Islamic revivalism is manifested in the form of sexual segregation in

attending schools or religious classes, lectures or other public functions.

Recently, some bylaws are imposed to restrict women activities. The

Indonesian National Commission for Women identifies that there have been

at least 154 bylaws that discriminate women. Among these is the obligation

to wear the veil for all women in Bangkalan, Madura. The same obligation is

also imposed on civil servants in Bulukumba, Sulawesi. According to

Indonesian National Commission for Women, there are at least 15 regions in

Indonesia that have applied rules or bylaws that potentially or even have been

64

Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jama’at-I Islami: The Origins, Thoery and

Practice of Islamic Revivalism”, in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala

Lumpur and Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005), 106.

28

proven to be discriminative against women. These regions include Nanggroe

Aceh Darussalam, Banten, Gorontalo, Central Java, East Java, Lampung,

South Borneo, and North Sumatra.65

The assertiveness of Islamic revivalism in public life is also evident in

the strong demand for a stricter Islamic observance almost in all aspects of

life. Such idea as Islamic or sharī’a economy as mentioned earlier can be

attributed to this mode of thought. As Timur Kuran analyses, the idea and

practice of Islamic economy cannot be separated from revivalist tendency of

Mawlana Abul A’la al-Mawdudi.66

However, their project of Islamizing all

realms of life is more rhetorical than substantive. The movement for

Islamization suffers important internal debates and conflicts. For instance,

while some uphold the belief that Islamization of society has to precede

Islamization of the state, 67

others opine otherwise. The demand for

Islamization of society, through the application and the formalization of

sharī’a is a case in point68

as it is maintained that without such participation,

sharī’a formalization is difficult to achieve.

Revivalist mode of thought is also manifested in the puritanical stance

in understanding religious teachings. They condemn all practices and ideas

65

http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2010/01/29/063222253/Komnas-Perempuan-Desak-154-

Perda-Diskriminatif-Dibatalkan, accessed on 31 December 2011. 66

Among the strong supporters of this view is Timur Kuran. He sees that there is a strong

linkage between Islamic economics with Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism. See Timur

Kuran, Islam and Mammons: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism (Princeton University

Press, Princeton, 2004); also Timur Kuran, “The Economic Impact of Islamic

Fundamentalism”, in Marty, M.E., Appleby, R.S. (Eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State:

Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993),

302–341. 67

Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jama’at-I Islami: The Origins, Thoery and

Practice of Islamic Revivalism”, in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala

Lumpur and Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005), 106-107. 68

For discussion on the stages of shari’a formalization according to Partai Keadilan

Sejahtera’s method, see Nandang Burhanuddin, Penegakan Syariah Islam Menurut Partai

Keadilan Sejahtera (Jakarta: Pustaka al-Jannah, 2004), 107-118.

29

deemed as un-Islamic or anathema to the Islamic tawhīd. This can be seen in

their attitude towards democracy. The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s insistence

on the revitalization of caliphate is not only motivated by utopian aspiration

about the reviving Islamic golden age through the re-establishment of

caliphate, but also accompanied by condemnation of democracy as un-

Islamic. It can be argued that like traditionalism, revivalism depicts an

ambivalent attitude towards innovation. However, the fields of innovation

that traditionalist and revivalist fear are distinctive. While the ambivalence of

traditionalists has more to do with contemporary social change that

aggressively penetrates society which is perceived as threatening tradition,

the latter’s concern is with innovation in the realms of ibāda (bid’a).

Furthermore, while traditionalists are innovative in creating rituals regarded

as ibāda, as represented in practices such as Barzanji, revivalists condemn

such innovations as un-Islamic.

Reformism

Reformism as used in this thesis refers to a type of mode of thought

which seeks to revitalize religion amidst contemporary challenges and

contextualize religious teachings and values with the aim of improving the

well-being of man and society. Elements of this mode of thought are reflected

in the views of Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian Muslim reformer who

maintains that reform aims

“…to direct the faith of Muslims in such a way as to make Muslims

better and to improve their social condition. It seeks to put an end to

errors and misunderstanding of religious texts so well that once the

30

beliefs are fortified, actions will be more in conformity with

morality.”69

Reformist mode of thought is featured by some of the following

indicators: a) a strong intellectual basis; b) a focus on substance over form; c)

strong social philosophy informed critically by social sciences; d) grounded

in contextual local needs and challenges; e) clear and consistent in the

commitment to pedagogical strategies and planning; f) contain multiple and

diverse approaches and strategies in meeting its objectives.70

Reformist mode of thought is not a denial of or opposition to tradition.

Its main objective lies in creatively synthesising religious teachings and value

with the demands of the modern world. In the domain of religion, reformist

mode of thought does not devalue ideas of pious savants of the past nor the

eradication of their achievements and contributions. It simply means that

ideas including legal thought of the scholars must be revaluated where

necessary, even if they arose from influential ulamā’ of that time. Hence, in

reformist mode of thinking, contributions of the past scholars that are of

value are to be revived, modified and developed even if they have been

marginalized by the weight of conservatism. Although it is not anti-tradition,

reformist mode of thought is anti-dogma. This means it rejects emotive

overreliance on ideas and practices of the past that have outlived their

purpose.

69

Ibid, 81. 70

Azhar Ibrahim, “The Idea of Religious Reform: Perspective of Singapore Malay-Muslim

Experiences”, in Syed Farid Alatas (ed), Muslim Reform in Southeast Asia: Perspective from

Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore (Singapore: Majelis Ugama Islam Singapura, 2009), 84-

87.

31

Another salient trait of reformist outlook is the distinction it makes

between universal and eternal values prescribed by the religion from

teachings which are historically determined. Hence, reformist thought

denounces uncritical adherence to religious traditions and dogma of the past.

This mode of thought contradicts traditionalism in approach and

conceptualisation of heritage of the past or local traditions (adat). While

traditionalist clings onto traditions without question, reformists advocate the

need for its revaluation on basis of principles.71

In reformist orientation, the

basic, humanistic and eternal aspects of the teachings and values of Islam

must be harnessed and concretized to deal with problems that have emerged

within the specific historical and socio-cultural contexts of a given

community. Hence, its emphasis is on critical appraisal of ideas that were

themselves inevitably conditioned by their own contextual conditions.

Also, reformist orientation is inclusive. While it is grounded in

humanitarian and religious traditions based on the teachings of Islam, it does

not ignore the intellectual contributions of others that are of value. Reformist

mode of thinking, therefore, entails the assimilation of contributions of

mankind that are consistent with religious philosophy. It acknowledges that

no society has the monopoly of knowledge and that ideas that contribute to

the betterment of man cannot be denied. This essential aspect of reform is

supported by ample historical evidence as far back as the inception of Islam

71

The syncretic nature of Islam in Indonesia is linked to preIslamic element of Hinduism and

Buddhism. Although the exact date of the coming of Islam to Nusantara is still debated by

historians it cannot be denied that Hinduism and Buddhism preceded Islam in forming the

system of values of Indonesian societies. In view of this Islamic missionaries chose to

accommodate local practices with lslamic doctrine. It is believed that from this point, Islamic

syncretism started to emerge. See Merle C Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of

Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries (Norwalk: East Bridge,

2006).

32

itself in the seventh century. Historical records reveal how Muslims have

borrowed, assimilated, refined and modified law and ideas originating from

other nations and societies for its own people where these were found to be

useful and compatible for their purpose.

Yet, another important attribute of reformist orientation is the

importance it gives to thought and practices that lead to outcomes better than

what exist in terms of its impact on human life. In this mode of thought, it is

meaningless for any group simply to assert that their initiatives are reformist

unless it can be demonstrated that these have brought about improvements to

human lives and condition. This important criterion means that mere use of

the term reform with reference to a particular set ideas of a group without an

evaluation of its relevance and impact on human lives merely breeds

confusion.

The reformist mode of thinking rejects the slogan of returning to the

Qur’ān and hadīth as unconstructive as it fails to discern what aspects of

these sources one should return to and how these are to be construed in the

context of the contemporary world. As has been briefly indicated earlier, the

dark age of Muslim intellectualism was among other factors due to

widespread belief that religious interpretations has been completely

formulated by earlier generation of ulamāʼ, and as such, no further ijtihād is

needed for Muslims today. Reformists severely criticise this doctrine and

strongly urge for the use of reason in the application of religious teachings

and values to the current context. In reformist thought, ijtihād is not limited

33

to certain course of period in Islamic history.72

Unavoidably, this stance

which effectively rejects taqlīd preserved by the traditionalist wing has had

adverse consequences on the influence of this mode of thought 73

Historically, the pejorative labelling of Kaum Muda in Malaya in the early

20th

century as those who subscribe to erroneous theology and deviant

practices is a case in point.

Ijtihād, as advocated by reformists, is the “exertion of mental energy in

the search for legal opinion to the extent that the faculties of the jurist

become incapable of further effort.”74

The vitality of ijtihād advocated by

reformist underscores the importance of reason in understanding religious

doctrine. This emphasis on reason as a tool in understanding and appreciating

religious values is a marked feature that distinguishes reformist mode of

thinking from competing orientations.75

By employing rationalistic approach to religion, reformists view the

urgent need to see religious teachings in its historical context, and the need

for religious thought of the present to address the current challenges. As a

result, the legitimacy of ijtihād in formulating current laws and practices is

unchallenged. Socially, reformist group generally emerged from within the

progressive strand of the religious circles. In most cases they also receive

72

Wael B Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”, International Journal of Middle East

Studies, 16, 1 (1984), 3-41; J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1964), 70-71. 73

On taqlid and stagnation of Muslim thought, see Syaykh Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Issues in

Contemporary Islamic Thought (Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005),

70-80; and Indira Falk Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the

Evolutuion of Modern Sunni Islam (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010). 74

Wael B Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”, International Journal of Middle East

Studies, 16, 1 (1984), 3-41. 75

Benyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh:

Edinburgh University Press, 1998), vii.

34

training in classical Islam as do traditionalists. But their openness and

exposure to exogenous ideas stimulate their drive to introduce reform from

within. A rational approach to Islam to them is the answer to enable Muslim

to confront the present challenge of development. This can be seen from how

Muhammad Abduh, among earliest reformist Muslim, carried out his

religious reforms.76

In Southeast Asian context, reform sparked by Abduh

and al-Afghani in Egypt and Middle East in general also found its fertile soil

through local reformists who were inspired by reform in the Arab world. In

Malaya, the ideas of Muslim reformers such as al-Hadi illustrate the point.

His contributions to diagnosing the causes of socio-economic backwardness

and remedies prescribed reveal a strong grounding in progressive religious

traditions and their relevance to alleviating the plight of the Malays in the

context of imperialism. Some aspects of his reform ideas can be found in the

journal al-Imam which he and his circle of ulamā’ spearheaded. The ideas

they expounded on the problems and impediments to modernisaton including

religious life, the nature of elite, economic stagnation, modern education and

the role of women among others reveal serious attempts at reviewing the

relevance of religious values in facilitating adaptation to the modern world.

Another key feature of reformist orientation is their approach to

understanding texts. Interpretation of texts is instrumental in the thought of

reformist since it is determinant in defining reformist attitude towards a

number of issues. Fazlur Rahman,77

Mohammad Sahrour, Nasr Hamid Abu

76

Indira Falk Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolutuion of

Modern Sunni Islam (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), 165-196. 77

Fazlur Rahman’s method of Qur’anic text interpretation is popularly known as “double

movements” which firstly consists of viewing the message of Qurʼān and the Hadith as a

35

Zayd, Mohammed Arkoun, Hassan Hanafi, Amina Wadud and Asma Barlas,

for example, are among those who approach Qur’anic text that enable them to

relate the Qur’anic formulation to current situation and context.78

In general,

these thinkers propose hermeneutical approach in understanding Qur’anic

text that will enable Muslims to comprehend Qurʼān beyond its textual

meanings. They believe that if Muslims are trapped in textual meanings of

the text without any attempt at reproducing new meanings that correspond to

the contemporary situation, Islam will lose its relevance. Reformist mode of

thought also advocates the use of concepts and theories of modern knowledge

in understanding religious texts and traditions. As M.K. Nawaz argues, “the

application of sociological methodology to the Qur’ān and Sunna simply

means that legal norms embodied in those sources should be interpreted in

their social context.”79

unity and should be understood by paying particular attention to the social context of their

inception. Next, understanding the interpretation of Qurʼān by several scholars that always

incorporated those interpretations to the context of their time, by doing this the eternal

principles of the Qurʼān can be extracted and finally those principles could be applied for

contemporary setting of Muslim societies. See Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of Qur’an

(Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994); Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an

Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Jon Armajani, Dynamic

Islam: Liberal Muslim Perspective in a Transnational Age (Lanham, University of America

Press, 2004), 80-82; Riffat Hassan, “Islamic Modernist and Reformist Discourse in South

Asia,” in Shireen T Hunter (ed), Refomist Voice of Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity

(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 170-172. 78

Approaches and methods of those intellectual in Qur’anic interpretation can be found in

their works such as: Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of Qur’an (Minneapolis, MN:

Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994); Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Tekstualitas al-Qur’an: Kritik terhadap

Ulumul Qur’an (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 200), Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Naqd al-Khitab al-Dini

(Cairo: Sina’i Nasr, 1990), and Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical

Analysis (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006); Mohammad Sahrour, Al-Qur’an

wa al-Kitab: Qira’a al-Mu’ashira (Damascus: al-Ahli li al-Taba’a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tauzi’,

1990), and Dirasat Islamiyyat al-Mu’ashira fi al-Dawla wa al-Mujtama’ (Damascus: al-Ahli

li al-Taba’a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tauzi’, 1990); Asma Barlas, Believing Women in Islam:

Unreading Patriarchal Interpretation of the Qur’an (Austin: University of Texas Press,

2002); Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Women (Kuala Lumpur: Fajar Bakti, 1992). 79

M.K. Nawaz, “Some Aspects of Modernization of Islamic Law”, in Carl Leiden (ed), The

Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (Austin: The

Humanities Research Center the University of Texas, 1966), 71.

36

Lastly, it should also be mentioned that reformist attempts to renew

religious understanding is not always a success-story. As the main reformist

agenda is to eliminate traditional and conservative tendencies within Muslim

societies, it is inevitable that their efforts have aroused backlash from their

opponents. In many instances, reformists are confronted by the challenge of

the strong grip religious traditionalism in contemporary society. Their critical

insights tend, therefore, to be relegated to the margins of society.

C. Significance of the Study

Studies on fatwā in Indonesia can be broadly categorized into three

groups, namely those focusing on methodological aspects of fatwā-making,

studies on economic issues and those which examine socio-political issues.

Falling under the first category is the pioneering work by M Atho’ Mudzhar

published more than two decades ago. Mudzhar’s study focuses on MUI’s

fatwā during the period of 1975-1988. He describes his study as an

“endeavour to identify the nature of the MUI’s fatwā in terms of their

methodological formulations, their socio-political surroundings, and societal

reaction to fatwā”.80

Another research within this category is the one done by

M.B. Hooker which analyses fatwā81

spanning from 1920s to 1990s issued

by four main fatwā-making institutions in Indonesia: Majelis Ulama’

Indonesia (MUI), Persatuan Islam (Persis), Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul

Ulama’. Hooker relates the problems of fatwā to the challenge of modernity.

80

Atho’ Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama : a study of Islamic legal

thought in Indonesia, 1975-1988, Ph.D Thesis, University of California, Los Angeless, 1990,

8. 81

M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa (Crows

Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2003).

37

Among his findings are that fatwā issued by those institutions reveal

variations and similarities on certain issues. In terms of fatwā institutions

being studied, this study is similar to Hooker’s. However, it differs in terms

of aims and focus. Yet, another research that falls within this category is

Fathurrahman Djamil’s study which critically assessed the method employed

by Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah in its ijtihād.82

Although Djamil’s study

did not focus on fatwā, his study nonetheless provides useful backdrop of this

institution and can be drawn upon in better understanding how fatwā is

deduced by Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tarjih. In 2005, Syamsul Anwar,

current head of Majelis Tarjih of Muhammadiyah, undertook a study on

contemporary fatwā-making process (iftā’) in Muhammadiyah.83

An

important point noted by Anwar is that Majelis Tarjih’s fatwā reflects

reformist inclination of Muhammadiyah. In his words: “Muhammadiyah’s

fatwā formulated by Majelis Tarjih thus promote the reformist ideology of

the movement which aim to purify faith and dynamize social life.” This study

contributes to understanding Majelis Tarjih and its fatwā in the contemporary

period which this thesis draws upon for critical analysis of Muhammadiyah’s

fatwā.

Similar to Djamil’s study is Ahmad Zahro’s research on Bahth al-

Masāil, a fatwā institution within Nahdlatul Ulama’.84

One of the most

important findings that Zahro presented in this study is the wide range of

82

Fathurrahman Djamil, Metode Ijtihad Majlis Tarjih Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Logos,

1995), based on his Ph.D dissertation, State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. 83

Syamsul Anwar, “Fatwa, Purification and Dynamization: A Study of Tarjih in

Muhammadiyah”, Islamic Law and Society, 12, 1 (2005), 28-44. 84

Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Lajnah Bathsul Masail 1926-1999 (Yogyakarta:

LKIS, 2004).

38

NU’s fatwā which not only encompass normative and religious matters, but

non-ritual, social and cultural issues as well. This study also examines the

methods employed by Bahth al-Masāil and its position within Nahdlatul

Ulama’. It contributes to understanding the intellectual tradition within NU

which this thesis revaluates. In 2004, another study on Bahth al-Masāil was

carried out by Ahmad Kemal Reza.85

This study portrays the dynamics of

Bahth al-Masāil in East Java. It fills lacunae in fatwā studies at the local

level.

Several related studies employed a comparative approach. Among these

are Rifyal Ka’bah’s study on Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tarjih and NU’s

Bahth al-Masāil.86

Another recent study with a similar approach was carried

out by Muhammad Shuhufi.87

This study critically examines the methods

adopted by Indonesian fatwā-making bodies, the significance of fatwā

institutions and how the fatwā produced are implemented by general Muslims

in Indonesia. Recently, a study on fatwā that focuses on the role of fatwā in

realizing maṣlaḥa was carried out by Nurul Huda in 2010. The main concern

of this study is how Indonesian fatwā-making institutions specifically Majelis

Ulama’ Indonesia (MUI), Bahth al-Masāil Nahdlatul Ulama’, and Majelis

Tarjih Muhammadiyah adopt maṣlaḥa as their main objective. Using Ibn

Ashur concept of maṣlaḥa this study argues that maṣlaḥa should be the main

85

Ahmad Kemal Reza, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law in Indonesia: The Case of

Nahdlatul Ulama’ bahtsul masail in East Java, Master Thesis, Australian National

University, 2004. 86

Rifyal Ka’bah, Hukum Islam di Indonesia: Perspektif Muhammadiyah dan NU (Jakarta:

Universitas YARSI, 1999). This book is based on his PhD dissertation at the Faculty of Law,

the University of Indonesia. 87

Muhamamd Shuhufi, Metode Ijtihad Lembaga-lembaga Fatwa (Studi Kritis Terhadap

Implementasi Metodologi Fatwa Keagamaan di Indonesia), Ph.D dissertation, Alauddin

State Islamic University, 2011.

39

objective in fatwā-making. The work provides insights into yet another

dimension in this field of study which this thesis draws upon.

The second category of studies on fatwā, especially those of MUI’s

encompass those dealing with insurance, finance and banking. The focus of

these studies mirrors the growing interest among Indonesian researchers in

developments in this domain since the formation of Dewan Syariah Nasional

(National Sharī’a Council) and the popularity of Islamic economic practices.

Amongst these are the works of Andi Cahyono on the application of DSN-

MUI’s fatwā on murābaḥa practice in sharī’a micro financial institutions;88

Alwan Sobari’s research on DSN-MUI’s methodology in issuing fatwā

relating to Islamic banking practices,89

Diah Eka Pratiwi’s study on the

influence of MUI’s fatwā on bank interest and Muslims’ attitude toward

conventional banking90

and Priambodo Trisaksono’s research on the

implementation of DSN-MUI’s fatwā in the practice of banking in

Indonesia.91

Apart from these, the study by Rahayu Hartini which traces the

position of MUI’s fatwā in resolving disputes in religious court can also be

included.92

These studies are useful in revealing ideas on Islam and modern

88

Andi Cahyono, Aplikasi fatwa DSN-MUI tentang Murabahah terhadap praktik pembiayaan

murabahah pada lembaga keuangan mikro syariah di Surakarta periode tahun 2010, 89

Alwan Sobari, Studi Metode Ijtihad Dalam Fatwa-Fatwa Dewan Syari`ah Nasional (DSN)

Tentang Pembiayaan Di Perbankan Syari`ah Tahun 2000-2005. 90

Diah Eka Pratiwi, Pengaruh Munculnya Fatwa MUI tentang Pengharaman Bunga Bank

Terhadap Minat Umat Islam Menabung, Bachelor thesis, Muhammadiyah University of

Surakarta, 2007. 91

Priambodo Trisaksono, Kesalahan penerapan fatwa DSN nomor.45/DSN MUI/II/2005

dalam perbankan Syariah di Indonesia: analisa terhadap penerapan akta wa'ad: studi kasus

pada Bank Syariah X & Y, Master thesis, University of Indonesia, 2009. 92

Rahayu Hartini, Kedudukan Fatwa MUI Mengenai Penyelesaian Sengketa Melalui

Basyarnas Pasca Lahirnya UU No. 3 Tahun 2006 tentang Pengadilan Agama, Research

Report, Muhammadiyah University of Malang, 2007.

40

banking and finance through fatwā. The focus of these studies differs from

this thesis.

The third category of fatwā studies encompass works on fatwā and

socio-political factors. Here, the main thrust is a sociological understanding

of fatwā and its position in the context of Indonesian national legal system.

Included in this category is Moch. Nur Ichwan’s study that traces the

dynamics of MUI after New Order period. The author examines the

transitional period following the fall of New Order regime and its

implications on MUI’s orientation. The study discussed the interplay between

ulamā’ and politics in the contemporary settings. Although it does not deal

with methodological aspects of MUI’s fatwā, it is relevant in contributing to

the backdrop of this study.93

Another work that can be included within this

category is by Kadarusman which attempts to reconcile fatwā and the politics

of religion in post-New Order Indonesia.94

In the midst of constitutional

reforms and the unprecedented significance of fatwā, a number of studies

were also carried out to examine fatwā within the context of the Indonesian

constitution. Most of these researches are concerned with the position of

fatwā within the national legal system. Studies by Oky Candra Aditya95

and E

Hajar Abra96

fall into this category.

93

Moch. Nur Ikhwan, “Ulama, State, and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia After Suharto”,

Islamic Law and Society, 12, 1 (2005): 46-72. 94

Kadarusman, Rekonsiliasi Fatwa dan Politik Keagamaan di Indonesia (Kajian Fatwa-

Fatwa Keagamaan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru), Ph.D dissertation, Sunan

Kalijaga State Islamic University. 95

Oky Candra Aditya, Kedudukan Fatwa Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia (MUI) dalam Sistem

Perundang-undangan di Indonesia, Undegraduate thesis, Muhammadiyah University of

Yogyakarta, 2006. 96

E Hajar Abra, Kedudukan Fatwa MUI dalam Sistem Perundang- Undangan di Indonesia,

undergraduate thesis, Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, 2009.

41

Generally, these studies are useful in contributing to shed insights into

various dimensions of fatwā. As a whole they provide a more comprehensive

understanding of the role and dynamics of this institution. This thesis departs

from many of these studies in its aims and focus. However, it distinguishes

itself in the central problems which it seeks to address. These include in

particular how fatwā is deduced by various institutions and the genesis of

their formation. This study also provides a sociological understanding of how

fatwā is conditioned by group’s dominant mode of thought, ideas and values.

How mode of thought mirrors in as much as they condition fatwā is

examined. The inter-play between competing orientations and their impact on

fatwā is also explored. This thesis also investigates the extent to which fatwā

facilitates Indonesian Muslims to adjust effectively to the plural and changing

contexts in which they live. These central problems as a whole are not

generally duplicated in existing studies. Furthermore, this thesis focuses on

fatwā in the post-New Order period of Indonesia. Although many of the

studies above are useful in shedding insights into various aspects of fatwā,

they do not cover recent developments in which fatwā has assumed a more

complicated constellation in Indonesian politics and legal discourse.

Hooker’s study, for instance, ends with the 1990s which marks the beginning

period of this study.

D. Methodology

This study does not deal with determining theological validity or

correctness of fatwā from a religious point of view. Rather, it seeks to analyse

42

fatwā as ideas emanating from diverse and competing groups within

Indonesian society. As a study of group thought, some aspects of the

sociology of knowledge are useful in guiding the approach of this thesis.

Essentially, the sociology of knowledge maintains that ideas, beliefs and

values within society are never coincidental or arbitrary nor do they emerge

in abstract. On the contrary, they are rooted in concrete socio-historical

contexts. In Mannheim’s words, the sociology of knowledge “seeks to

analyse the relationship between knowledge and existence” and “trace the

forms in which this relationship has taken in the intellectual development of

mankind.”97

Contrary to understanding ideas in abstract or as “narratives”

which “simply sets out to show their development”,98

the sociology of

knowledge examines ideas as conditioned by background of social groups

within a given social structure and historical context. As Mannheim

explicates “…there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately

understood as long as their social origins are obscured”99

Understanding the socio-historical basis of ideas requires identifying

specific human agencies responsible for its making, their inter-play and

ramifications within a given society. For Mannheim, man’s ideas do not exist

independently from social groups of which he is a part of. Man “speaks the

language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks”.

Divergences in ideas do not simply represent plurality of divergent

conceptions of the world. On the contrary, they reflect unconscious

97

Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to Sociology of Knowledge

(London: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1949), 237. 98

Kurt H Wolff (ed), From Karl Mannheim, (New Brunswick and London: Transacation

Publishers, 1993), 260. 99

Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 2

43

situational motives in group thinking or the worldview and interests of social

groups. In Mannheim’s words, “it is not men in general who think, or even

isolated individuals who do the thinking, but men in certain groups who have

developed a particular style of thought in an endless series of responses to

certain typical situations characterizing their common position. On the

contrary they act with and against one another in diversely organized groups,

and while doing so they think with and against one another. These persons,

bound together into groups, strive in accordance with the character and

position of the groups to which they belong to change the surrounding world

of nature and society or attempts to maintain it in a given condition.”100

Two dominant styles of thought which Mannheim developed in

unmasking thought are ideology and utopia. The concept of ideology reflects

the idea that dominant groups can in their thinking become so intensively

interest bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain

facts which would undermine their domination. There is implicit in the word

that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures

the real condition of society both to itself and others and thereby stabilise.

The concept of utopian thinking “reflects the opposite discovery of the

political struggle, namely that certain oppressed groups are intellectually so

strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition

that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation that tend to

negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing an existing

condition. They are not at all concerned with what really exists; rather in their

100

Ibid, 3.

44

thinking they already seek to change the situation that exists…” 101

These

aspects of the sociology of knowledge contributes to explain the social basis

and meaning of competing or conflicting religious opinions. It avoids the

inadequacy of seeing religious thought merely as a reflection of certain

theological viewpoints and avoids the pitfall of labelling.

Based on some aspects of this approach, this thesis examines

competing ideas among dominant Muslim groups in Indonesia in formulating

fatwā and Islamic legal thought as not mere reflections of divergent opinions

that emerge in vacuum.102

Rather, fatwā is viewed as conditioned by styles of

thought and religious orientation of the specific agencies that enunciate them.

These styles of thought characterising fatwā functions not only as reflection

of the life situation of the group that expresses them but also reveals their

basic intention which it to promote and defend what exists or radically

transform it. As Mannheim explains:

“…the ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded as

functions of his existence. This means that opinion, statements,

propositions and systems of ideas are not taken at their face value

but are interpreted in the light of the life-situation of the one who

expresses them. It signifies further that the life –situation of the

subject influence his opinions, perceptions and interpretations.”103

The approach used in this study thus examines how modes of thinking

or religious orientations characterised as reformist/ progressive, traditionalist

101

Mannheim, p.36 102

On the role of social circumstance in the forming of knowledge, see Peter L Berger and

Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in Sociology of

Knowledge (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1966). 103

Mannheim , p.50

45

and revivalist manifested in significant fatwā-making agencies impact upon

fatwā-making and their ramifications on society. 104

This research utilises numerous primary and secondary sources

including books, journal articles, academic exercises and other materials

obtained from traditional and new media. Apart from relevant theoretical and

empirical works, both contemporary and historical, primary data on fatwā

issued by respective fatwā-making agencies in Indonesia provide another

major material for this study. In this respect, I visited the office of MUI in

2012 and 2013 to obtain primary information relating to fatwā. In addition,

the MUI official statements covered widely by various Indonesian media and

websites were also utilised.

In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the subject

matter, this study also embarked on empirical investigation in the form of

fieldwork consisting of in-depth interviews with selected respondents were

selected based on their knowledge, expertise and involvement in the

problems of fatwā. Essentially they comprise Muslim thinkers and religious

leaders who belonged to Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. In addition,

prominent personalities and scholars within the Shi’a and Ahmadiyah

community were also interviewed. These interviews were conducted in

several cities in Indonesia, including Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Garut (West Java),

Tasikmalaya (West Java), Bangil (East Java), Tulungagung (East Java) and

Malang (East Java). Through the interviews I was able to access data that are

not easily available elsewhere. The interviews with the leaders within the

104

Kurt H Wolff (ed), From Karl Mannheim, (New Brunswick and London: Transacation

Publishers, 1993), 260.

46

movements selected also provided deeper insights into competing perceptions

of fatwā, their genesis and actual effects of their implications on the

community. My visit to Ahmadiyah community in Tasikmalaya right after

the eruption of violence against the community also provided me with the

opportunity of witnessing first hand, the intensity of the problem closely

related to fatwā against them.

E. Thesis Structure

This thesis is organized into eight chapters including an introductory

and a concluding chapter. This introductory chapter consists of an

explanation of the aims and objective of the study, its significance, a

literature review on existing works that have been done on the subject matter

and definition of key concepts and methodology utilized for the purpose of

this thesis.

In the next chapter, I will discuss fatwā in two ways: normative and

empirical. The first involves tracing fatwā within the context of Islamic legal

theory. This includes a discussion on the nature of fatwā, its development in

the history of Islamic legal system, and how fatwā has been conceived by

Muslim jurists and scholars. It will also include a discussion on how fatwā

differs from and resembles other forms of Islamic legal thought. At the

empirical level, the discussion is oriented towards the position of and

discourse on fatwā within Indonesian legal system and legal history.

Chapter Three discusses MUI’s fatwā in relation to the nature of the

pluralistic society of Indonesia. Indonesia is a multicultural country with

47

wide ranging understanding, interpretations, and orientations of Islam. This

undeniable fact is often overlooked or denied by dominant religious

authority. This chapter examines the problem by focusing on the extent to

which fatwā contributes to nurturing Indonesia’s plural society and creating

tolerance among Muslims. Three fatwā issued by MUI relating to issues of

religious pluralism will be examined in this chapter. They include fatwā on

the prohibition of pluralism, liberalism and secularism.

Chapter Four examines the social impact of the fatwā. It devotes

attention to the response of several social groups in Indonesia to the fatwā

analysed in chapter 3 pronounced by the three major fatwā-making agencies.

The groups which are the subject of the fatwā have been the target of public

anger. Muslim groups such as Ahmadiyah and Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL),

for instance, suffered public violence and attack due to fatwā on the infidelity

of Ahmadiyah and the prohibition of liberalism and secularism. Examining

the response of such groups to the fatwā will provide a balanced

understanding of the discourse and competing mode of thought within

Indonesian Muslim groups.

In Chapter Five, I deal with the fatwā on Ahmadiyah and the deviance

of Shi’a issued by MUI. MUI’s fatwā on the deviance of these two groups,

how they are arrived at, and their impact on the well-being of the targeted

groups will be explored. The chapter also examines responses of Ahmadiyah

and Shi’a groups to the fatwā proclaimed against them by the Central Board

of MUI Jakarta and East Java Province’s MUI respectively. The chapter also

discusses Ahmadiyah’s and Shi’a’s fundamental doctrines which are seen as

48

having deviated from Islamic faith. They include the controversy of Mirza

Ghulam Ahmad’s position and the position of Taḍkira within the tradition of

Ahmadiyah. Shi’ite insider perspective on such issues as the position of

Prophet’s companions, imāma, and the allegedly Shi’ite version of the

Qurʼān will also be discussed.

Chapter Six focuses on the dynamics of fatwā-making in Nahdlatul

Ulama’ (NU) by examining the fatwā issued by Lajnah Bahth al-Masāil, the

fatwā-making body of NU. Widely known as the voice of traditional Islam,

this chapter analyses the factors conditioning the dominant orientation of this

agency and its manifestations in the credo and fundamental dogmas of the

movement. The extent of the influence of its dominant orientation on fatwā

making is then explored. How these impact upon the well-being of Muslims

is also examined. The chapter will also explore competing orientations within

the movement, if any.

Chapter Seven analyses fatwā issued by Majelis Tarjih

Muhammadiyah. It begins by critically analysing dominant features of

Muhammadiyah’s religious orientation as reflected in its basic motifs and

well established doctrine. The chapter will also examine the methods

employed by Majelis Tarjih in determining legal rulings and fatwā. How the

salient features of its religious orientation influence its conceptualisation of

fatwā will also be examined. As with the case with NU, the impact of its

fatwā in facilitating effective response to social change will also be analysed

as would the significance of competing orientations within the movement as

manifested in fatwā.

49

The concluding chapter highlights the main findings of the study. Some

theoretical implications of this research on the field of studies on fatwā will

also be discussed.