CHAPTER I·

MONGOL- JAPANESE RELATIONS 1911-1939: MONGOLIA IN JAPANESE IMPERIAL STRATEGY

MONGOL- JAPANESE RELATIONS 1911-1939: MONGOLIA IN JAPANESE IMPERIAL STRATEGY

Before 1911 Mongolia was a part of Manchu-Chinese empire. Due to

historical circumstances, Mongolia could not have had any political relations with

other countries including Japan. In 1911 Mongolia witnessed a revolution which

enabled the then Mongolian government, governed by Bogdy Khan, for pursuing

independent foreign policy. 1

This government tried to establish political ties and diplomatic relations with

countries like Russia, China, United States of America and Japan. 2 So relations

between Mongolia and Japan, started in the beginning of twentieth century. Political

relations have also made a debut. But Russia, by and large influenced Mongolia's

independence and provided, guided protective shield for Mongol's independence and

political autonomy conditionally. By ths factor relations could not make any progress.

China out rightly rejected Mongolian independence. America and the other western

countries hesitated to establish diplomatic relations with Mongolia. Japan was interested

1. Idshinnokov, S. Sain Noyen Khan ~Narrmansuren' , "Unen", 9th March,1990, Ulaan Baatar.

2. Davaasu Zen, B. Daa Lama, ~Tserenchimiol', "Unen", 3rd March,1990, Ulaan Baatar.

1

m Mongolia, but Japan had concluded a secrete agreement with Russia on the

Mongolian question. Russia fought with Japan in 1904-1905, where the former was

humbled down by the latter. Subsequently in 1907 Japan concluded a secrete agreement

with Russia. The agreement signed in 1907 was broadly aimed to control and counter

each others influence in Far-East and Central Asia.

By this agreement Russia established its protective policy over Outer Mongolia. In

the northern part of Manchuria Japan had been given powers of control and, Russia

allowed Japanese protection over Inner Mongolia, Northern China and south Manchuria

including Korean peninsula. From this time Japan became interested in Mongolian

territory and, its claim over continental Asia was clear. 3 Japan could not establish its

control all over China, Mongolia and the East because, inspite of its defeat, Russia was

still a strong power to reckon with. Russia had also received active support from United

States of America, the west and other countries against the growing influence of Japan.

Russia, after its agreement in 1907 with Japan, tried to become strong and influential

in Manchuria and North China.

Japan on the other hand increased its influence in Inner Mongolia and China. After

the independence in 1911, Russia controlled Mongolian foreign policy. They obstructed

Mongolian diplomatic relations with other countries including Japan. But both Japan

and Mongolia were interested in each other. In 1912 Bogdy Khan the then ruler of

Mongolia sent a letter to Japanese emperor. 4 In that letter Bogdy khan informed

3. M. Onuki, The Study of Monogolian History in Japan and our present time (In Mongolian), Osaka, Japan, Tokyoki Byunko, 1984, p.8.

4. Dilav Hutagtiin Uepil "Unen", Ullaabaator.

2

9 December, 1990,

Japanese monarch about independence of Mongolia. It is clear that before 1911

revolution, Mongolia was not an independent state according to Japanese sources. He

expressed his strong desire for establishing relations with Japan. He accepted that

Mongolia was a small kingdom and sought Japanese help in protecting Mongol

sovereignty and independence. Mongolia sent Da lama Tserenchimid. He was also

minister for interior affairs in Bogdy khan's government. The Lama was interested in

seeking Japanese protection over Mongolia. But a quick, succession of events occurred

against Mongolia. Russian councillor in Kharbin (the then Manchurian Capital city)

stopped Dalarna Tserenchimid by not granting visa to Japan. The Mongolian

government tried hard but could not succeed.

In 1912, Kozima, a Japanese business man visited Mongolia. He contacted

Bogdy Khan and informed him that he had personal support with Japanese king and,

influence over Japanese government. He also said he was interested in Outer Mongolian

government for constructing railway track from China to Outer Mongolian capital

through Inner Mongolia. Kozima's revelations made Mongolian authorities think that

he might be a special secret envoy of Japanese government. 5 Further Kozima proposed

for projects exploiting big gold reserves in Mongolia. By viewing all his proposed

projects, Bogdy Khan handed over him a personal letter and asked him to deliver to

the Japanese king. In that letter he expressed his willigness to establish and improve

economic, political and diplomatic relations between two countries. He also expected

Japanese protection over nascent Mongolian independence.

5. B. Rindin, Mind Tiuudiin Dursama, Ulaan Baatar, 1993, pp.l2-15.

3

Unfortunately, the Russian councillor diplomat in Outer Mongolian capital

came to know it and, informed it to the Russian authorities. After receiving this secrete

information, the Russian government protested against Japanese secrete diplomatic

mission in Mongolia Russia also rejected Japanese intervention in Mongolia.

According to 1907 Japanese-Russian agreement Japan could nod conclude any

secrete pacts of contact with Mongolia without Russian knowledge. The Japanese king

sent a letter to Russian Czar clarifying that, he did not send Kozima and his visit was

a his personal one. He also reiterated that his government remained bounded to the

agreement. As a policy matter Japanese king sent Bogdy Khan's letter back to

Mongolia as Russia demanded.

All this indicates how a business man. approached Bogdy Khan and Japanese

king for their better relations. It also reflects upon Mongolia and Japan governments

attitudes to improve their relations. One can say that Japan was interested in Mongolia

for its military strategic view point, whereas Mongolia sought economic and political

support from Japan. By Russian Czar's intervention, Japan ceased to be a party with

Mongolia. Japan by this time established its military presence in far East and Central

Asia and Inner Mongolia. Japan stationed hundreds of thousands of military forces in

Inner Mongolia and also sent young military scientists to survey strategic loCations in

Central Asia. It imported raw material like wool, meat, etc. from Central Asia. In 1915

Mongolian independence came to an end due to a secret agreement between China and

Russia. 6 Mongolia ceased to he an independent state and her relations with Japan were

6. Dash, D. Hicheengu, Mergen Said, "Ardyn erk", 9 May 1990, Ulaan Baatar.

4

no more. However, some of the Japanese business men, doctors travelled to Mongolia

as it happened previously.

In 1921 Mongolia had its second revolution. It was also called as people's

revolution. The communist government under Lenin in Russia was the first communist

government in the world and Mongolia was the second communist government. Before

this people's revolution there were drastic changes in both the countries. Russia

witnessed October Revolution in 1917 and became Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR). In China also nationalists attained power under Sun Yat Sen. With the

revolution in Russia, Mongolia, become a close ally of Russia and became a permanent

foe to China. After 1921 Revolution in Mongolia communist leaders became

apprehensive of Chinese clandestine designs over Mongolia. Mongolia also showed

indifference to Japan. Mongol communist leaders toured both Japan and China. It was

due to their fear, that, the Japanese occupation over Mongolia and Chinese expansionist

policies. Adding fuel to the worsened relations, Japan stationed its military forces in

South Mongolia, Manchuria and North China from 1928 onwards. The situation

changed rapidly.

Significantly Japan did not occupy these areas but merely kept them its control.

Northern areas were already under its control. Japanese military exercise and its troops

presence in these areas raised alarm about its imperialist expansionist designs. By that

time in Japan military took control over polity and economy. Military dominance over

all the spheres was visible. In 1926 Japanese military leaders, who served in North

5

China and Korea organised a study committee in Inner and Outer Mongolia. 7 They

organised a conference once in a year on Mongolian problems. By 1928, this

organization spread its activities and policies in the military and strategic areas. The

Japanese stationed several military troops for this purpose in Inner Mongolia and

Manchuria. This organization worked strictly under military supervision. Although

started as an academic one it worked for military intelligence purposes only. This

organization collected information for military tasks and published dictionary of

Mongol-Japanese langu~ge in Japan.

Japanese started stationing qualified army called Kwantuan. In 1920, General

Tanaka became the Prime Minister of Japan. In China, they published a memorandum

named after Tanaka. It said "If Japan wants to establish its influence in the world ...

Japan should conquer China, then only it could establish its power over Manchuria and

Inner MC!ngolia "8

It cautions if Japan wants to realise its task,Japanese forces must occupy Outer

Mongolia. Then Japan would have real opportunity over Russia, Far East and the Asian

continent. This Tanaka Memorandum was said to be traced by Chinese intelligent

service some time before. The communist International Published General Tanaka's

memoranda time and again to create an awareness about Japanese imperial design to the

people which Japanese government neither agreed nor refuted. An other paper revealed

7. S. Lodisu's Publications on Japanese and Mongolian Relations before the II World War. "Unen", June-August, 1994, Ulaan Baatar.

8. See, A Niyoma, 'Japanese Claim for Mongolia before the II World War', "Ardyn erb", June-July, 1994, Ulaan Baatar.

6

that Chinese intelligent agency traced the original Tanaka memorandum in Japanese

Queen's Library.

Chinese government also claimed that Japan had grand imperial designs over

China, Far-East and Central Asia. By the end of 1920s Russian and Mongolian leaders

believed in these documents. The communist leaders in Moscow used these memoranda

episode, effectively. They, time and again exploited the newly independent Mongol

situation by showing Japanese designs over Mongolia. The Mongol communist leaders,

who blindly followed their ideologues in Moscow danced to this tune. Moreover

Mongol leaders who achieved independence through peoples revolt, wanted to protect

their independence at any cost. They were also afraid of Japanese presence in Inner

Mongolia. But till today we do not have the original documents of Gen. Tanaka

memorandum. Japan occupied Manchuria and established Manchu state, a puppet

government in Japanese hands. It also mobilized one million soldiers in Manchu-Inner

Mongolian region till 1938.

However, with the onset of World War II, all this changed. The War Office

announced several casualties when nine Japanese soldiers, making a topographical

survey near Changlingtzu, on the eastern Machoukuo-Soviet border, were fired on by

Soviet troops. The fighting continued with the arival of Japanese reinforcements.

Ambassador Ohta is instructed to protest against the Changlingtzu clash and

Premier-Foreign Minister Hirota makes an oral protect to Ambassador Yurenev when

the latter presents a protest from Moscow. On March 27, 1936 Moscow circulated Uian

Bator messages, saying further border clashes are anticipated because of a

concentration of Japanese-Manchoukuo troops near Lake Buir. On March 30 the

Kwangtung Army announced that two Outer Mongolian airplanes bombed and machine-

7

gunned a Japanese-Manchoukuo patrol party twenty kilometers north of Taulan, killing

one soldier and wounding four Manchoukuo and the Kwantung Army. 9

On March 31. Manchoukuo received from Outer Mongolia a protest alleging

that the border clash of March 29 was caused by Japanese-Manchoukuo attacks inside

Outer Mongolia, fifty kilometres from the frontier, and urged a conference to discuss

the situation as soon as possible.

On April 3. A Soviet bomber flew over Manchoukuo north-west of Heiho, and a

scouting plane appeard over Suifenho. [Heiho is on the northern, Suifenho on the

eastern border of Manchoukuo.]

April 8. The K wangtung Army headquarters, announced more details of the

clash of March 31 on the Manchoukuo-Outer Mongolian border and revealed that four

Japanese soldiers were killed. Three Mongolian planes were forced down and two

armored cars captured. On April 9. A Japanese officer and two soldiers are killed in a

clash with the Soviets near Suifenho. Two points that are worth noting in this chronicle

of border skirmishes are. First, each side invariably accuses the other of being the

aggressor. Inasmuch as neither the Japanese nor the Soviet Army tolerates foreign

observers in its exposed frontier sectors It is difficult to assess with certainty the precise

course of events and the degree of responsibility in each of these numerous frontier

brushes.

Secondly, the most serious fighting has taken place at the extreme eastern and

western ends of the long border. This is by no means accidental. The greater part of the

9. William Henry Chamberlin Duck worth, Japan and China, (London), p.59, 1935.

8

frontier is plainly marked by the course of three large rivers, the Argun, the Amur, and

the Ussuri. Although there is dispute as to the proper ownership of some islands in the

Amur River, (especially of one strategically important island which lies in the delta

formed were the Ussuri empties into the Amur near Khabarovsk). Possession of this

island, now occupied by the Russians, would bring the Japanese within shell range of

Khabarovsk, the headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Army.

What the skirmish incidents demonstrate is the Japanese expansiOn over

Mongolia's territory and the Soviet determination to protect it partly in their interest

and partly for Mongolia. Between Lake Khanka and the point where Siberia,

Manchoukuo, and Korea come together the frontier runs through thickly wooded

country. Many of the frontier demarcation posts have rotted away or disappeared. The

combination of an indefinite frontier with mutual illwill has naturally led to many

clashes between border guards and patrols in this part of the frontier. Still more serious

conflicts have taken place along the remote western frontier of Manchoukuo, in the

neighbourhood of Lake Buir. Here an important political question is involved, the

ultimate mastery of the vast, sparsely populated, arid tablelands, who move from place

to place with the flocks and herds that furnish them with almost all they need for their

primitive, self-contained existence. The Mongols to-day, who are estimated to number

about five millions, are divided between four sovereignties. Approximately two million

live in the western provinces of Manchoukuo. About a million and a half are in China,

mostly in the three provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ningsia. Three-quarters of a

million make up the population of Outer Mongolia, which bears to the Soviet Union

much the same relation the Manchoukuo bears to Japan. The majority of the remainder

are to be found in the Buryat Mongol Republic, one of the many national republics

9

included in the Soviet Federation. Buryat Mongolia adjoins Outer Mongolia on the

north-east. 10

Mongolia is a pivotal problem in Japanese and Russian strategy. It lies in the

pathway which seem marked out for Japanese and Russian expansion. It is probably

inevitable that the more ambitious spirits both on the Japanese and on the Soviet side of

the dimly demarcated boundaries should try to exploit in their own ways the Mongols

as a nucleus for propaganda and, perhaps eventual advance into the Mongolian

territory.

A number of officers of the Kwantung Army, notably Lieutenant-Colonel

Terada, have become specialists in the Mongolian question, learning the language,

becoming familiar with the religion and customs of the Mongols. There can be little

doubt that some of these officers cherish dreams of a Pan-Mongolian state, protected by

·· Japan, purged of all Bolshevik influence, based on the ancestral customs and the

Lamaism which has long been the dominant religion in Mongolia. Outer Mongolia

would be an integral part of such a state, and it is quite conceivable that the Japanese

military authorities would be willing to consent to the detachment from Manchoukuo of

the Mongolian provinces lying west of the Hsingan Mountains, provided, of course,

that Japanese influence on the new state was assured and unchallenged.

The Soviet Union, however, regarded Outer Mongolia, where a state under

Soviet influence was set up with the aid of the Red Army in 1921, as a valuable outpost

in the Far East which it does not propose to abandon. This was made very clear in a

statement which Stalin made to an American newspaper, published in March, 1936, to

10. Ibid.

10

the effect that the Soviet Union would be obliged to take positive action in the event of

any attack on Outer Mongolia. So long as it preserved its Soviet orientation, Outer

Mongolia expend Japan's sphere of influence in China. This strategy called for Japan to

be militarily prepared to gain a foot hold in southern Manchuria that appeared neither

to threaten imperial China nor to alarm the foreign powers, yet gave Japan the

capability to strengthen its security in a world it perceived as dominated by predatory

foreign powers. 11 The SMR would operate railways and related enterprises, but it

would · also manage a wide range of cultural and administrative activities of a

nonthreatening nature. Under the guise of the SMR, then Japan quietly and gradually

expanded its influence in southern Manchuria, while developing economic

interdependency with the region.

At the time of its inception, the SMR had quickly become integrated with

Japan's major colonial enterprises. Some nineteen investors in the SMR who were

associated with major Japanese banks and companies also bled held shares in the eight

big colonial enterprises of the day. Financial institutions like the Yokohama Specie

bank became heavily involved in SMR business affairs. 12 Companies like Mitsui

Bussan conducted considerable business with the SMR. As Darien harbor prospered

11. Bard Escusses this concept in Tsurumi Tusuke 1 camp. 1

Goto Shimpei den (Biography of God Simpei) vol.2 1

(Tokyo: Taiheiyo Kyokai Shuppanbu 1 1943) 1 p.10 1 also see the inter of this same concept in ito Takeo 1

Mantetsu ni ikite 1 pp.16-17.

12. Hikotarol ed. 1 Mantetsu: Nihon teikokushugi to Chugoku (SMR: Japanese imperialism and China) (Tokyo: Ochanomisu Chobo 1 1965) 1 pp.46-47 1 57.

11

through the teens and twenties, 13 numerous Japanese companies increased their

business dealings with the SMR, some even locating in South Manchuria.

South Manchuria's total trade from 1911 to 1930 grew at an annual rate of 7.8

per cent. Japan's share of that trade averaged around one-third for the period. By 1930,

around 64 percent of South Manchuria's exports went to Japan, and 62 percent of all

imports came from Japan trader with South Manchuria rapidly grew after 1907 (fig.

1.1). As Japanese investment increasingly flowed into southern Manchuria, imports

from that region into Japan steadily increased, especially cereals and other raw

materials. Japan increased its exports ofchemicals, metals and products, and machinery

to southern Manchuria as well after 1910.

The Japanese government clearly understood the economic importance of

Manchuria of Japan's economy and national security at the time the SMR strengthened

its hold in that region. And it responded quickly to any external threat that might

undermine the SMR's activities. When E.H. Harman offered Japan a bid to lease and

operate the SMR after the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan declined.t4 15 In 1909, the U.S.

secretary of state, Philander C. Knox, proposed that an international consortium of

lenders grant China a loan to enable it to purchase the Chinese Eastern Railway and the

13. Masahika, comp., Minami Manshu tetsudo kabushiki kaisha dai sanji junen shi (The year history of the South Manchuria Railway Company) (Tokyo: Ryukan Shout 1976) See appendix volume (maps and tables) and charts B-10 through B-15 for depicting the rapid growth of traffic through Dairen.

14. nij ikkanenkan ni okeru minami Manshu taigai boeki no susei", pp.187-189.

15. Ghang Kia-Ngau, China's Struggle for Railroad Development (Baltimore: John ay Company, 1943), p.31.

12

SMR, but Tokyo and Moscow rejected that proposaJ.16 The former claimed that the

Portsmouth Treaty justified the SMR, and Moscow claimed its right to free trade in

Manchuria, and Mongolia already existed.t7 Then in 1910 China obtained a forty-

million-dollar loan to build a railway line between Hulutao Port and the Peking-Mukden

line and a longer line from Chinchow to Tsitsihar and onward to Aigum. Again, Japan

protested that if such lines were to be built, then the SMR should be allowed to extend

to Aigun as well. 18 It clearly shows, how Japan wanted to establish its superiority over

western China and Mongolia.

During World War I, Japan continued to expand its sphere of influence in South

Manchuria. In 1915, Tokyo successfully compelled the Republic of China to extend

Japan's lease of the Liaotung and the SMR railway to ninety-nine years. Tokyo also

obtained an agreement for Japanese financing and control of the New Kirin-Ch'ang-

ch' un railway line, and promise that the Japan would be consulted if China intended to

use foreign capital to construct railways in Manchuria and Mongolia. 19

On August 7, 1925, Chinese students at the SMR's medical college walked our

of their classes carrying banners and demanding that the Mongolia is a potentially

useful corridor, through which Soviet cavalry and motorized units could strike into the

16. Chao Wei, "Foreign Railroad Interests in Manchuria: An Irritant in Chinese-Japanese Relations", St. John's University, 1980, pp.156-157.

17. C. Walter Young, Japan's Special Position in Manchuria (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1931), pp.140, 159.

18. Chang Kia-Ngau, China's Struggle, pp.56-57.

19. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919, pp.185-186.

13

western part of Manchoukuo, threatening the communications of the Japanese forces

stationed in the northern part of the country. The loss of Outer Mongolia would lay

bare a thousand miles of Siberian frontier. A Japanese air base in Ulan Bator, the

capital of Outer Mongolia, would be a menace to the large new iron, steel, and

machine-building which have been constructed at Novosibirsk and at Kuznetsk, in

Central Siberia. These plants would certainly be turned for military purposes in the

event of war.

Japanese agents have been active among the Mongols of China. An incursion of

Mongols from Manchoukuo, obviously sponsored by Japanese military authorities, led

to the establishment of a pro-Japanese regime in Chahar in the winter of 1935-1936. An

attempt to repeat the process in suiyuan in the later part of 1936 failed because the

Chinese offered unexpectedly strong resistance and the Japanese did not bring their own

troops into action.

Outer Mongolia, which is, from a political and military standpoint, virtually a

part of the Soviet Union, has thus far proved too hard a nut for the K wan tung Army to

crack. Two prolonged conferences which were held at the Manchoukuo border town of

manchouli in 1935 failed to bring about any agreement between Manchoukuo and Outer

Mongolia on such questions' as exchange of diplomatic representatives and frontier

delimitation.

The conference broke down because the Mongols refused to admit a

Manchuokuo mission to their capital, Ulan Bator. Trouble was freely predicted m

Hsinking as a result of the breakdown of the conference; and trouble, eventually

cropped up during the first months of 1936. It was, in the form of vigorous skirmishes

at various points along.the frozen boundary. Since Stalin has made it plain that serious

14

aggression against Outer Mongolia will mean war with the Soviet Union there have

been fewer bellicose statements from the headquarters of the K wan tung Army. As will

be shown in more detail later, war with Russia does not figure in Japan's immediate

military calculations.

Two economic problems which have created friction between the Soviet Union

and Japan at times are the regulation of Japanese fishing rights in Siberian waters and

the operation of the oil concession which Japanese companies held in the Russian

northern half of the island of Sakhalin.

At the time of Allied intervention in Russia, Japan occupied Northern Sakhalin,

Vladivostok and a considerable section of Eastern Siberia. Partly because of American

diplomatic pressure, partly because the interventionist enterprise was expensive and

unpopular in Japan itself. As the army was not entrenched in power as it has been since

1931, Japan gradually withdrew from Siberia, abandoning Vladivostok late in 1922.

Northern Sakhalin was restored to Soviet sovereignty later, in 1925, as part of the

general agreement for restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the two

countries. Japanese firms were granted long term concession for exploiting part of the

oil and coal deposits of this territory. The disputes which usually occur when foreign

business organizations endeavour to operate on Soviet territory have not been absent in ~

the Sakhalin oil concession. But in the summer of 1936 an agreement extending the

prospecting rights ofthe Japanese firm until 1941 and clearing up various points of

disagreement was signed in Moscow. The Japanese hope that they may realize half a . million tons of oil from the concession by 1941. This would be considerably iri excess

of the entire meager output of oil in the Japanese Empire, although it would only cover

about one-eighth of Japan's present oil requirements.

15

In the middle of 1930s, Japan occupied North China and Inner Mongolia. But

Manchu state was not included in Japanese North China and Inner Mongolia. It existed

because of a nominal ruler where the officialdom was dominated by Japanese. Over a

period of time Manchu national culture) became a part of it. They ruled China from

16th century to the beginning of 20th century. retaining their own script and language.

After the foundation of Japanese Manchu state Japanese military leader tried to

establish political relations with Outer Mongolia. By that time Japanese intelligence

agency activised their activities near Outer Mongolian border. And a series of Mongol

Japanese border clashes were recorded. From 1930s the former Soviet Union concluded

secret pacts with Mongolia and pledged for its sovereignty and independence. As a

result of those secret agreements, Mongolian guards wandered enough to clash with

giants like China and Japan soldiers on its borders. These border clashes happened in

1936, 1937, 1938. Former Soviet Union sent military assistance to Mongolia in 1932

itself. Though the military forces were of small contingents, the USSR warned its

adversaries with dire consequences, if Mongolia was invaded in any form.

The former Soviet leaders also used these circumstances for their advantage.

All the times they pressurised ,Mongolia for its over all dependence on Soviet Union. \

As a consequence, Mongolia was bored and concluded a series of agreements. Leaders

of Mongols criticised communists and hesitated to support foreign troops presence in . "Independent" Mongolia. They also tried to establish friendly relations with Manchu

state. Mongolian- Manchu dialogue started in 1935 and it continued till 1936. But these

negotiations were done strictly under the supervision of former Soviet Union and Japan.

These two countries were Naturally at the mercy of the then super power Japan and

16

USSR. After it Japan stranded its troops to East Mongolian borders. The former Soviet

Union started to build railway routes from East to West Mongolia border. At the same

time Mongolia also started constructing rail-roads from Kharabin to the east border of

independent Mongolia.

At last, in the East Mongolian border khalhiin Golo, a military crisis started

between Mongolia and Japan. The then Manchu state demanded one area from

Mongolia but the independent Mongolia rejected Manchu-Japanese claim over it. As a

result in August 1939, the Khal Kenu gol war erupted it. This particular event was

recorded as war in Mongol - Russian history books. But in Japanese history it was

named as the case of "Nomun Khan" ,20 it means. Japan did not recognise it to be a

war, but it was under Japanese perception a military crisis came up between the former

Soviet Union and Japan. In this war Japan experimented its armaments and newly

equipped modern weapons against Mongols and Russian soldiers. It was also interesting

to note that the Kholhin war took place just a month prior to the second world war.

Japanese troops, which were stationed in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, reconverted

for more than a military purpose.21

In 1939 itself,Japan used bio-logical weapons against Mongol-Russian military

forces successfully. These weapons were tested in Eastern Mongolia. 22 Japan in a

short time became a big threat to the former Soviet Union. The old Czarist army which

20. See. B. Battbayar (Babar) Banana's Republic, Ulaan Baatar, 1995, pp.356-392.

21. Tayama Waguzy, "Mooko, Martgho, Skiberga", 1964, (In Japanese), p.250.

22. The History of Mongolia, vol. III, Ulaanbaator, 1968, pp.170-192.

17

was hiding in Manhuria, after its defeat m 1917 Revolution, assisted Japan against

Soviet Union. The Czarist army was named as Simonovs army. Somonov was the

Russian Czarist General during 1917 Revolution.

The former USSR was also showed considerable interest in the war because it

wanted to destroy Japan in the Far East. For the purpose Russia sent big military forces

through independent Mongolia. Now it is clear that before second world war Japan

interested in Inner, Outer Mongolia along with North China. Japan might have been

thought of using united occupied Mongolia against the former Soviet Union. The

former Soviet Union also leased Mongolia as a smooth road to send its troops through

because, North China was a hilly region. That was why Russia sent its troops through

East Mongolia.

By citing these historical evidences one can say that Japan, was interested in

Mongolia. But the episode pertaining of General Tanakas memorandums (it is not sofar

clear) which was sent to Japanese king is not sofar proved and obscurity continues.

From this it can be said that Japanese interest in Mongolia is very clear.

Mongol-Japanese Cultural Relations During the Cold War

After 1939 war, Japanese-Mongol relations had ·undergone unexpected changes

and were never restored to normalcy until democratic process as were initiated in

Mongolia in 1990s. From 1939 onwards, the communist leaders, guided polity,

economy society and people's psyche in a systematic way, which suits them best. In

Mongolia, people were taught that Japan was their enemy. The former Soviet Union,

added fuel by inserting in education, Japanese, a foreign enemy, which sought to grabe.

By 1939, Japan founded Manch state and tried to form a Mongolia. The united

18

Mongolia included Inner and Outer Mongolia. Burriad TuVa, Khuh Nuur, and Oirat

Mongolia. Japan would be a big power, if it united all these Mongol areas under one

banner. Japan probably thought of using united Mongolia against Russia and China. A

united Mongolia possibly would be a force to reckon with and Japan was possibly

interested in this objective.

In Inner Mongolia there was a liberation movement against China. It took place

before and during second world war. It was spearheaded by the grand grand-son of

Changhis Khan, ... Dem Chig Donrov ..... After the Chinese revolution in 194823, he

went to Mongolia as a refugee. But the pro-communist leadership in Mongolia sent

back Denehig Dontor to China on the former Soviet Union advise. "Along with his

family, he was executed in Beizing in 1948". Demchig donrov got active assistance

from Japan during his liberation movement in Inner Mongolia against China. He fought

for a united Mongolia.

It is clear that whatever may be the reasons, Japan aspired for a united

Mongolia. Unfortunately, the communist government in Mongolia at the instigation of

the former Soviet Union, developed a psychlogical terror over its people, regarding

Japan. It continued till 1990.

In the second world war Mongolia supported the former Soviet Union and Japan

could not concentrate more on Central Asia, as it was engaged seriously in other parts

with American forces. The former Soviet Union, fought with Japan in Far-East and

Central Asia The USSR, after the second world war negotiated with other three big

23. Demchigdonzov. Urigdaj oihood barigdgan min (How they arrested in the MPR). Ug. 1991. No. 1,2,3. Ulaanbaator.

19

powers, namely Great Britain, France and America, for Mongolian independence. The

former Soviet Union also suggested for a plebescite in Mongolia. The big powers

agreed and an over whelming majority voted for Mongolian independence. For this

president Roosevelt of United States of America, used his good officers in pacifying

Koumingtong government in China.

In 1945, following this agreement the former Soviet Union, declared war

against Japan, Mongolia followed suit, after a day and declared war against Japan. The

significance of this war was, independent Mongolia fought for liberation of Khoh-

Khot, the Inner Mongolian capital, and several important towns in Inner Mongolia and

Manchuria. The independent Mongolian government and army announced " we are

going for liberation war for our brothers and sisters in Inner Mongolia". 24 Outer

Mongolian communist leaders believed in proppanda and not for action. They never

tried hard for a united Mongolia for example Mongolian communist leaders like

Chetybdson never, took, some thing real, that would be useful for a united Mongolian

task. In practice, he obstructed any suggestion for united Mongolia. The people of

Inner Mongolia submitted several hundreds of petitions for Unification with Outer

Mongolia.

Several provincial authorities and their leaders expressed their desire to unite

with Outer Mongolia. But the then communist supremo in Mongolia had kept all these

things under darkness. And the public was never allowed to know this information. One

or two, who knew it, had no courage to discuss it in public due to the fear of

24. Sodvyn Bayasgolan. "Marshal Choibalsan". ·Gazaryn Medee" 1995, Ulaanbaator.

?n

Zasgiin

Mongolian secrete police. It can be concluded that the communist leaders, who have the

opportunity for a possible unification did nothing and a greater vision for united

Mongolia remained a dream so far.

After the war against Japan in far East, a delegation from independent Mongolia

went to Japan and attended "Tokyo process" over negotiating war indemnity terms.

Mongolia as a nation received war compensation. The indemnity, mainly consisted of

weapons and prisoners of war (POW). Japan refused to recognise Mongolian authority

and did not deliver any financial assistance.

The former Soviet Union sent 12,318 Japanese prisoners of war to Mongolia for

reconstruction work. 25 These prisoner of war worked for five years in Mongolia, a

total of 1,640 soldiers died, during their stay in Mongolia, the remained returned to the

former USSR. These POWs built several massive constructions in Mongolian capital

Ulaan Bataar. The Mongolian State Theatre, the Mongolian State University, Main

Campus, Mongolian Foreign Affairs Building, all these were constructed with great

skills. Contrary to the state policy, common people of Mongolia maintained cordial

relations with Japanese war prisoners. But the Mongolian government criticised and

restricted Japanese activities and put severe restrictions on prisoners of war. After

second world war to till 1960s, independent Mongolia had no direct contacts with

Japan.

Japan till late 1950s was under American control and it could not exerctse

independent foreign policy, at the same time. Similar situation prevailed in Mongolia,

whose foreign policy was strictly monitored by the former Soviet Union. That is why

25. The History of MPR, Ulaann Baatar, 1966. ~ ( ~\ THESIS " ~-

327.520517 ~<\ 7}f-6o61 . ~•j

M931 Mo 21 ·~-~ Ill II II 111111111 /IIIII Ill

TH6061

Mongolia could not pursue independent foreign policy. Due to this for more than one

and half decades ranging from 1945 to 1960, relations between Japan and Mongolia

ceased to exist. From the beginning of 1960s international relations and circumstances

of Mongolia, started changing gradually. The political liberalization in the former

USSR under krucheu helped the process. Kruschev pursued more liberal policy and

criticised Stalin rule and role. These events, directly reflected on Japanese-Mongol

relations, and strongly influenced Mongols social and political life. 26

A democratic intellectual movement started in Mongolia. They criticised

Mongolian foreign policy and demanded liberalization of foreign policy, especially in

cultural spheres. Under this liberal political atmosphere first international studies

conference took place in 1962. In that conference delegates from the west (Mongols

settled in westrn countries) suggested for establishing cultural relations between

Mongols and the west including Japan. Several scholars from Japan attended the

conference. After this conference Mongolian State UQiversity opened venues for

language teachers, and provided facilities for young scholars from Japan. At the

Japanese request Mongolian State University, sent two Mongol language teachers to

Japan. It continued from 1960 onwards. Mongolian cultural organization also actively

participated in exchange progrmmes.

Mongolian cultural troops performed shows in Japan Mongolia also sent sports

teams for training in Japan. Monglia, screened Japanese films with Russian translation.

These cultural interactions continuced till the beginning of 1990. All the time, the

26. D. Dashpurev, The Historycal Studies of Modernization of Mongolian Traditional Society, Ulaanbaatar, 1995, (In Russian) p.l41.

22

secret police of Mongolia kept an eye on these activities. And it also monitored and

controlled common people's enthusiasm on Japapese Mongoal relations. The

dotoodyam gathered secret information about the common people, who attended the

cultural programmes. Through these· crucial, ways the Japanese-Mongol relations

slowly but steadily started improving.

Japanese Attempts for pan-Mongolism

With the active co-operation of Japan m 1919 the Mongols living in Outer

Mongolea and Manchuria organised an important politicl meeting In this conference

they formed a united pan-Mongolian government in Manchuria. Organisors of this

conference invited representative from all Mongol regions. They invited

representatives from Outer Mongolia. In 1919 itself the Outer Mongolian government

was abolished by the Chinese. The pan--Mongol government in Manchuria was named

as 'Bogdy Khan' Government. But Bogdy Khan himself did not attend this conference.

Japanese military agents and Russian Czarist Khiti Army' leaders also attended the pan­

Mongol conference. 27 This conference was held in the city of Danger raillway station

which was located near the borders of Russia-China in Manchuria. It was attended by

Biryat Mongols and Inner Mongolia etc. This kind of attemppts for founding pan­

Mongol government by Japan was severely criticised by Russia and China. Japan tried

many a time to achieve this objective in vain. It is said that Bogdy Khan and his

followers did not come out openly in support of pan-Mongol movement due to fear of

losing Russian support to Outer Mongolian and its independence.

27. The History of MPR, UlaanBaatar, 1966.

23

It is clear that from 1921 people's Revollution in Mongolia to till 1990

communists in · Mongolia who have been safe-guarding Russian interests attempted

openly, some times and indirectly all the time to sabotage pan-Mongolian movements.

It can be concluded that the pan-Mongolia idea became open, got public support in

1919 and it still remained a dream due to lack of active cooperation from the Mongol

motherland i.e. Outer Mongolia.

From the beginning of 1930 Mongols in Inner Mongolia actively involved and

struggled for independent united Mongolia. This movement struggled for the

lilberation of Outer Monggolia from Russian influence. They denounced the former

Soviet Union's high handed behaviourand ideoligicaal guidance over Outer Mongolia.

They also denounced Communist International as a bogus bankrupt one. At the same

time leaders of this movement condemned Chinese control over Inner Mongolia. The

lelader of this movement was Den Chig Don Rov. He was 30th successor of Czenghis

Khan dynasty and one of the powoerful feudal Lords in Inner Mongolia. He organised

the congress of Mongols in 1933 and in 1934.28 By that time Japanese founded

Manchu State and they supported his movoement for united Mongolia. This movement

ultimately succeded in establishing united Mongolian government in 1937. It announced

Khokh Khot a city in Inner Mongolia as its capital. Dein Chig Don Rov was elected as

the head of the government. He visited Japan in 1941. He was also succeded in

mustering support from Chang Kai Shaik government. Interestingly Outer Mongolian

28. Dilav Hutzgt's deposition to the Mongolian secret Police-Defeediig Mongolian Gazar. "Unen", 9 December, 1990, Ulaanbaatar.

24

Communist leaders rejected Dem Cheg's united Mongol government.

After sec'ond World war American leaders not so actively but supported for a

united MONGOLIAN government. Unfortunately war ravaged Japan coulld not do

any thing for united Mongolia after its defeat in second world war. By 1966 political

conditions in Mongolia were different. Soviet Communist leader Breznev visited

Mongolia in 1966. During his visited the Security Agreement between the former

Soviet Union and Mongolia was extended for thirty years. (The first agreement was

concluded in 1936 for 30 years). This agreement was concluded mostly againstt

Japanese and Chinese agression. By the renewal of the agreenment, the former Soviet

Union became military protoector of Mongolia against China. From 1968 onwards

Soviet-Mongol military forces, were stationed m Sino- Mongolian borders. The

number of solders increased year by year. The number reached its acme during

1970's with one hundred thousand solders plus several thousand officers, advisors and

other Soviet personnel. Thus Mongolia became a strategically important country for

the former USSR. All important oroganizations including the government became

dependent on the Soviet Union. All important places in Mongolia, were occupied by

the former USSR advisers. Hence this policy passed the way for Sovietization of

Mongolia.

In this process by and large, Societised Communist control information that flew

into Mongolia. It strongly influenced Mongol's polity, economy, culture, education and

defence forces. By this time Japane interests also increased in Mongolia. Because the

formmer Soviet Union's military presence in Mongolia, was dangerous not only for

Central Asia, but also for Far-East and Japan. Japanese specialists on Mongolia have

openly claimed and named Mongolia as antina of the Soviet Union. They had arrived

25

this kind of conclusion after reviewing Soviet activities in Mongolia. It is also noted

that Mongol studies in Japan were establilsh well by 1970's.29 Two important Centers

for Mongol studies existed in Japan. One is Tokyo University Foreign Studies. Here

they studied and worked on old Japanese-Mongol relations. These were under taken by

the specialists who studied earlier on it. Japanese, who took these studies were

previously worked for Japanese secrete police and defence intelligence during second

world war. After the war they became scholars and university professors.

Usually they studied Mongolian language historical literature and ancient

history. Some scholars wrote and studied materials, like economy, polity and military

affairs which was gathered by Japanese intelligent agencies during cold war era. We

have no enough sources how Japanese collected these materials. In any case the

scholars continued their studies. The information was provided by the Japanese military

sources.

The second Mongol study Centre existed in Osaka University of Foreign

Studies. Osaka University is the second biggest Mongol study Centre in Japaan after

Tokyo University. This was established in 1950's. These scholars Centre was a new

one. Most of these scholars, study, Mongol literature modern history and language.

The scholars, teachers use to spend one or two years in Mongolian State university.

All these Centres received (Jaapanes Centres) language teachers from Mongolia.

These centres sent their students to Mongolia. But Tokyo University sent their students

first to Inner Mongolia then they used to go United States of America, on their return

29. M. Onuki, The Study of Mongolian History and Present Time, Osaka, 1984, Japan, Tahazuki-Byanko Mongolian), pp.18-20.

26

Our (In

only they were allowed to go to Outer Mongolia. It happened due to Soviet influence

over Mongolia.

After their return, the Inner Mongol students, found opportunities in Japan as

teachers etc. Some of them worked in Ministry of Foreign Affairs etc. The Osaka

Centre usually sent their students directly to independent Mongoglia, because their

students were more younger than Tokyo University students. Most of them find it

difficult to get jobs after their graduation. So they, used to work as teachers. But

inspite of job opportunities, they continued their field of studies on Mongolia. The

Mongol studies Society has more than 300 voluntery members. They met once in a

month and published journals in Japanese and Mongol languages.

So these studies and mutual interests became a common feature for Mongol-

Japanese relations, which helped to improve their relations. On the other hand efforts

were put for Japanese studies in Mongolia. During 1960s and 1970s they had only

limited political and economic relations. 30 In Mongolia, during this particular period,

Japanese activities by the Mongols were totally controlled by the secret police. A .

separate division among the police was alloted for this purpose. The suppression of

information and propoganda, had been a part of it. It was continued unabated till the

normal diplomatic relations were restored between the two countries in 1990. This

policy was a part of Mongolian old communist leaders game plan to divert the people

from real domestic problems. Mongols were put under the impression that, Japan was

a great foreign threat to the independence of Mongolia.

30. Observation of Mongol-Japanese Relation, "Ardyn erk", June-July, 1995.

27

For example, in the beginning of 1930s Mongolian secrete police carried its

operations against the common Mongols. Cases were registered against educated

intellectuals in the name of treason and conspiraccy. This oppression continued till

1950s. It is aappropriate to quote one small funny, but interesting case on how secrete

police behaved under communist rule. Dan din Suren, was a famous scholar. Just

before second world war, the Central committee of Mongolian Communist Party,

appointed a secrete committee to suprevise pro-Japanese movement in Mongolia. The

secret committee planned to arrest Dan din Soren at any cost. A person on the secret

committee instruction approached him and asked, 'where is Japan', in a world map.

Dan din pointed it. The person asked whether 'Japan was a great country or not?'

Dan din replied 'May be Japan is a small country area wise, but it is a great power by

its economic and military strenghth'. Then he was arrested immediately under the

charges of treason. He was imprisoned for six years. It was happened for talking

about 'Japan as a developed country'. 31 Like this an artificial anti Japanese fever

continued. During second world war, they stopped all kind of contacts with Japan.

But intellecltuaals and, educated ones secretely continued their studies.

For example, there was a Mongol teacher who was arrested by Mogolian secret

police for studying Japanese in the 1940s. He was branded as a secrete agent of

Japan. He made friendship with one of prisoners of war (POW) from Japan and

improved his Japanese language skills while in the prison. After his imprisonment he

was sent to country side as a herdsman. There also he continued his studies. He wrote

31. From the Personal archives of Prof. Damdinsuren, "Azdaohlal", 1992, Ulaanbaatar.

28

a Mongol-Japanese dictionary, which was published in 1992. He also authored

several books on Japanese hisotry, culture. Some of them were published in 1993 m

Japan, by the Sakura publishing house. He died in 1991. But before his death, he

asked his childern to invite some Japanese. His childern organised one Japanese­

Monggol expedition called 'THREE RIVERS' It included dne professor and the

project was a successful one. The Three River Project Report was published in

Mongolia. 32

This is one of the difficult but interesting lilving legends, that exist in Mongol­

Japaanese relations. During 1960s and 1970s Mongol State University and Mongoglian

Academy of Social Studies, tried to improve Japanese Studies in Mongolia. The

scholar works on Mongol-Japanese Relations were controlled by Marxian ideology.

And they were parochial in their approach. Mongolian Academy of Sciences and

Mongolian international Studies Committee, time and again, organised symposia

seminars, and discussions. At the Mongolian State University many students studied

Japanese Language. Most of the Language students found it difficult to get jobs after

completion of their courses. During this pepriod, they studied, Japanese language,

I iterature etc but not history, economy and polity. During 1960s and 1970s Japaanese

government, in any· case tried to improve its relations with Mongolia. These Japanese

efforts remained unyield any positive result, due to the presence of the former Soviet

Union. It was in 1970s, that it yielded some positive result.

Historical facts show that before the 1960 Mongol - Japanese relations were

only of political importance. There was not even a single reference to economic

32. Japanese Zedn, "Khoh Tolb", 1994, no.S, Ulaanbaatar.

29

relations. The political relations had developed under troubled conditions. Both

countries struggled hard to improve their relations under foreign contries supervision.

Strained conditions prevailed due to foreign countries interference. In any case

Mongolia did not try to establish amicable relations with Japan due to strong influence

of former Soviet Union. In 1960s however Japan showed inclination towards Mongolia

and gradually started showing interest in Mongolia to some extent explicitly. As a result

of it a slow but progressive relations started between the two. Cultural relations showed

a leap forward during 1960s and 1970s. Japan trained specialists adequately on Mongol

studies. But on Mongolian side, they could not respond equally. Even the cultural

events were supervised and controlled by the communist regime strictly, only a few

intellectuals attended these cultural programmes at personal level. Many an unofficial

gathering took place. These congregations were basically organised by academicians

and intellectuals for improving Mongol-Japanese Relations.

This is a peculiar but specific character established between Japan and Mongolia

for more than five decades. Mongolia as an independent country, has developed

relations with India, Korea, former USSR and so on. Mongolia has histotical, ancient

cultural bonds with Japan. Their relations go back to 13th and 14th century A.D.

Regarding Russo-Mongol relations, Mongols are always cordial and sympathelic

towards Russians but Russians are not so much, enthusiastic towards Mongolia.

Russian historians blamed Mongols, that they were expansionists. Russian communist

historians portraied Czenghis Khan as a genecider. Russians were also jealous of

Mongols power during 13th and 14th centuries where Russia was a weak power during

that period.

It is also necessary to mention a few words on Chinese-Mongol relations. They

30

have 2000 years histiory. Some time Mongols established its control over China, other

times China occupied Mongolia. This kind of power game continued for a long time.

But Japanese Mongol relations are quite differnt. It was in 13th century that the

interaction started between Mongolia and Japan. Khubilai, the grand son of Czenghis

Khan, sent a big naval expedition to conqueror Japan. Mongol army on ships reached

Japan. But a powerful typhoon destroyed all Mongol naval forces.

After two years, Khubilai, again, sent another naval expedition to Japan. 33 It

was met with the same fate. That is why the Japanese saying became prominent

"Mongols do not conquer us because God is with us". After a long gap in the beginning

of 20th centuary Japan showed interest in Mongolia. Some nationalist leaders in

Mongolia advocated friendly relations with Japan and also sought for Japanese

protection instead of former Soviet Union.

By these histroical facts, one can say Mongolia is not so Keen in establishing

relations with Japan till 1950. At the same time Magalia's attitude was also not anti

Japanese. Japan still respects Mongolia as a nation. Till today some Japanese think that

they originated from Mongol race, and consider Mongolia as their Mother land. These

Japanese believe that if they have Mongol origin, they expect their children with a blue

mole at their back at the time of their birth. They also believe that the blue mole of the

newly born kids will disappear, after some time if they are from Mongol origin. This

belief still persists in rural Japan.

Finally, the official communist policy till 1989 was anti - Japanese, where

common people maintained normal relations with Japan.

33. The History of MPR, vol.II, Ulaanbaatar, 1962.

31