Chapter 9- Executive department.docx

8/14/2019 Chapter 9- Executive department.docx

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CHAPTER 9: Executive Department

A. The President- qualifications; term; compensation;disabilities; rules on vacancy and succession

Joseph Estrada vs Macapagal & Desierto

De Jure vs De Facto President

Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of

Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his

popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4,

2000. Singson, a longtime friend of the Estrada, went on air and accused

the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from

jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January

19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m.,

the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General

Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had

defected. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the

Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged

the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of

power, the Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases

previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in

motion.

ISSUE:Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD:

The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It

was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing

his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent

as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2)

he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the

sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He

did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he

was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears;

(3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve

them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to

serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any

future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our

country. Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the

office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his

supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of

reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation

and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the

presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of

farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove

that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a

President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern

temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decisionthat respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch

of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.


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3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence intheir behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more

fully.

4. Petitioners argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption

that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole

prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislativeinterference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the

executive department of government whose principal power and

responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary

component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See

R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica

Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and

there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to

distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners complaint about the prejudicial publicity

that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the

records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that

attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and

impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal

effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are

basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

Philippine Constitution Association vs Enriquez

Political Law Veto Power Part of the Legislative Process

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto

authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994.

This case also involves the power of Congress as far as the pork barrel fund

is concerned. Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the

countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only

allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds

would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In

another case, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the

GAA of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto.

Instead, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of

prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No.

113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the

veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the

Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works

and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in

the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH,

and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.

HELD:

In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within

its power. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and

granted the others.

Veto on special provisions

The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the

ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt

reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is

already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly

addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the

P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the

president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount


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allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the

vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that

such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing

Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.

Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs

The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the President

vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the

creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed.

The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the

same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al claimed this as

unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to

the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and redundancy.

Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road

maintenance

The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a

breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to

abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special

Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the

subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance,

and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended

70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows

the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an

expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which

they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The

veto herein is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military

equipment

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and

prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of

contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original

intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment

deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any

provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or

requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a

separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds

According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits

should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the

purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.

Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the

officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC

retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the

payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message

that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the

CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No.

1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons

provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would

only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc


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In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional

injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional

which states that no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall

receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically

authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said

offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-

established principle on compensation standardization. Taada et al claim

that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence

and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and

the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions

questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by

the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional

mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given

pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders

that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with

law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

Government of the Philippine Islands vs Milton Springer

50 Phil 259 Law on Public Officers Power to Appoint is Essentially

Executive

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was

created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822)

provides that: The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a

committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate,

and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No.

37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House

Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be

solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government

(President at that time was considered the head of state but does not

manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the

Senate President and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate

President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the

objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four

others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warrantoproceeding

in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the

validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker

can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.

HELD:

No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of

separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature

creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the

persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially

executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It

was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it,

through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members

of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court

however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the


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legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be

found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within

the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does not

weaken the executive branch.

SEE: MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS

E. Executive Immunity- sec 1; sec 17, Art XVII

Soliven vs Makasiar

Constitutional Law PresidentsImmunity From Suit Must Be Invoked by

the President

Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with

others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-

affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a

complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He

grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.

However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself tobe placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be

consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president,

the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself

thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person

other than the president.

HELD:

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of

immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and

functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the

Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of

the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue

of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any

other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et al, in

a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the

presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding

against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the

President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may

shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts

jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is

solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed

and imposed by any other person.


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F. Power of appointment- sec 16, ART XVII- classifications;

who can be appointed; steps; limitations; discretion;

SEE: SPRINGER VS GOVT

Ulpiano Sarmiento III et al vs Salvador Mison & Carague

Political Law Appointments

This is the 1stmajor case under the 1987 Constitution. Mison was

appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as

the Secretary of the Department of Budget. Their appointment was done

without the concurrence of the CoA. Ulpiano, being members of the bar,

taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment

of the two sans confirmation by the CoA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid.

HELD:

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987

Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall

appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel

or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him

in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not

otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law

vest in the President alone.

The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups of officers are the present bone of

contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the

consent (confirmation) of the CoA? By following the accepted rule in

constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of

subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those

appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the

consent (confirmation) of the CoA.

Because of the conflicting extremes provided in the 2 previous

Constitutions, the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting

it, struck a middle ground by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the

CoA for the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the President, without

such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the 2nd

and 3rd groups as well as those in the 4th group, i.e., officers of lower rank.

As to the 4th group of officers whom the President can appoint, it

was pointed out by the intervener CoA that the 3r sentence in Sec. 16,

Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in

rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,

agencies, commissions, or boards. since a law is needed to vest the

appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, this implies


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that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be

appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the CoA; and, if this is

so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should

be appointed by the President, subject also to confirmation by the CoA.

Ulpiano et al argued that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, merely

declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest

their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the

various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the government.

No reason however is submitted for the use of the word alone in said

third sentence

The SC ruled that both arguments are not correct. After a careful

study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the

use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of

Sec. 16, Article 7 is, more than anything else, a slip or lapse in draftsmanship.

In the 1987 Constitution the clear and expressed intent of its

framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the

CoA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first

sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. Consequently, there was no reason to use in

the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 the word alone after the word

President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of

lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads

of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the

President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the

President, without need of confirmation by the CoA, in the second sentence

of the same Sec. 16, Article 7.

Therefore, the 3rd sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 could have stated

merely that, in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law

vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of

various departments of the government. In short, the word alone in the

third sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal

import from the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of

the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7. And, this redundancy cannot

prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987

Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the

first sentence of Sec. 16, Article 7, are not subject to confirmation by the

CoA. Misons and Caragues appointments are affirmed affirmed.

G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989

TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.), LOURDES V.

MASTURA, TRINIDAD A. GOMEZ, ADUL DE LEON, JOSEFINA AZARCON-

DELA CRUZ, TRINIDAD M. DOMINGO, MARIA MAYET T. LEDANO, LOLIT

ANTONIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, AND OFFICES

(C.A.), COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

This is a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with

injunction seeking to compel respondent Commission on Appointments to

allow petitioner TeresitaQuintos-Deles to perform and discharge her duties

as a member of the House of Representatives representing the Women's

Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting petitioner's

appointment to the confirmation process.

On April 6, 1988 (on recess), petitioner and three others were appointed

Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16,paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Executive


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Secretary CatalinoMacaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter,the appointment of the

said sectoral representatives to Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr.

Qunitos-Deles together with 3 other sectoral representatives were

scheduled to take their oaths but were not able to take their oaths and

discharge their duties due to opposition of some congressmen-members of

the Commission on Appointments who insisted that sectoral representatives

must first be confirmed by the Commission before they could take their

oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives.Speaker Mitra suspended their oath-taking.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of

sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by

the Commission on Appointments

RULING:

Yes. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in

paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the

President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it

is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives

are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the

President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16,

Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission

on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).

Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the appointment

of sectoral representatives is vested upon the President until otherwise

provided by law, as follows:

SEC. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a

list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoralrepresentation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.

Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others, the

officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments, as follows:

SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive

departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or

officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or navalcaptain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in

this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the

Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for

by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.

The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers

lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of

departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall

have the power to make appointments during the recess of the

Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointmentsshall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on

Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Calderon vs Carale

Political Law Appointment Cannot Be Expanded by Law

In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or theLabor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding

Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be

appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA.

Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector

which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned

Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the

NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation.

Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by

the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted

that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the

executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may,

by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other

officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the

first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.


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ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the

CoA of appointments extended by the President to government officers

additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art.

7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA.

HELD:

It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987

Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall

appoint. These four (4) groups are:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel

or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him

in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not

otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law

vest in the President alone.

The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required

exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public

ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or

naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the

President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various

Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom

the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments is required.

Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers

whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on

Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phraseand other officers required by law at the end of the first sentence, or the

phrase, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments at the end

of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted

to provide for such additions.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the

Constitution

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for

presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,

Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly

vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral

representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional

commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other

government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by

law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the

Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as

observed inMison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to

provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner

for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose

appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
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Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Ermita

Political Law Ad Interim Appointments

While Congress was in session, GMA appointed Arthur Yap et al as

secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in acting

capacities only. Pimentel together w/ 7 other senators filed a complaint

against the appointment of Yap et al. During pendency, Congress adjourned

and GMA re-issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously

appointed in acting capacity. Pimentel argues that GMA should not have

appointed Yap et al as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the

Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as

Acting Secretary. Pimentel further asserts that while Congress is in session,

there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacantposition of an office needing confirmation by the CoA, without first having

obtained its consent; GMA cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity

to department secretaries while Congress is in session because the law does

not give the President such power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD:

Ermita, in behalf of the other respondents, argued that GMA is

allowed under Sec. 16, Art 7 of the Constitution to make such

appointments. Pursuant to the Constitution, the President shall have the

power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether

voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until

disapproval by the CoA or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Ermita also pointed out EO 292 which allows such an appointment with the

exception that such temporary designation shall not exceed one year. Sec

17, Chap 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that *t+he President may

temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any

other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the

executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting

capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the

President deems that person competent. Also, Congress, through a law,

cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the

undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether

temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and

confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,

cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

What Bernas Says

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an

acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-

interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress,

whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a

vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the

Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting

appointments are not submitted to the Commission on

Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling

important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the

need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

** The SC finds no abuse in what GMA did. The absence of abuse is readily

apparent from GMAs issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents

immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.


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H. Power of Removal

Ruben Villaluz vs Calixto Zaldivar

Political Law Control Power Removal Power Appointees

Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles

Office in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Roces alleged that Villaluz was an

ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed

the removal of Villaluz. The Exec Sec suspended Villaluz and ordered a

committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was

recommended that she be removed. The president then issued an AO

removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no

jurisdiction to remove him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to

be removed considering that he is an appointee of the president.

HELD:

The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and

remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-

competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of RA 2260; being apresidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or

unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be

investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of

the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in

the power to appoint . There is some point in the argument that the power

of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend

or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department

if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service

for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is

inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or

employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent

power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our

Constitution which says that `the Congress may by law vest the appointment

of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of

department.


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I. Commander- in Chief powers- military powers;suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus see sec 14. ART III; sec 18, ART VII;

declaration of martial law

Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al

Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the Montenegro

Doctrine

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a

conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the

PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by

Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no

warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest hence

the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and

companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only

the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of

habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.

HELD:

In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Casewas

reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & theMontenegro Case was

again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the

privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president.

The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political

question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry

with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to

suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right

to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those

arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they

would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby

jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the

invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE:This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution

which expressly constitutionalized theLansang Doctrine. Note as well that

under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail

shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is

suspended.

Horacio Morales Jr vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al

Habeas Corpus The Right to Bail

In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving

a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were charged in CFI Rizal for

rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were

arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were

violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the

right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. Respondents

countered that the group of Morales were already under surveillance for

some time before they were arrested and that the warrantless arrest done

is valid and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was

already suspended.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.

HELD:

Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But

because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended with

respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter

be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,

conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and

offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof,

or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, the natural consequence is

that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is

also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the

suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was

arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no right to bail even after the

charges are filed in court. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or

proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in

furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on

the life of the State. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his

life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the

writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending

investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts

that endanger the States very existence. For this measure of self-defense to

be effective, the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect

to these offenses. However, there is a difference between preventive and

punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of

such charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable

reason, the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee

regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in this case however is that the

2nddivision of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what

they ruled in theGarcia-Padilla Case.

Aquino vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile

Martial Law Habeas Corpus Power of the President to Order Arrests

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of

Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number of individuals including

Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino

and some others filed for habeas corpus against J uan Ponce Enrile. Enriles

answer contained a common and special affirmative defense that the arrest

is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the

declaration of Martial Law.

HELD:

The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or

rebellion, or imminent danger against the state, when public safety requires

it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus orplace the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at

bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country has not yet disappeared,

therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest

is then a valid exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.
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Benigno Aquino Jr. vs Military Commission No. 2, Chief of Staff, Chief

Justice et al

Martial Law Open Court Theory Military Courts

In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was

arrested and was placed under custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. Hefiled for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the

SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of

martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military

court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other

companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms,

ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the

Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court.

Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are

still operational.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military

court.

HELD:

The SC upheld the power of the president to create military

tribunals or military courts which are authorized to try not only military

personnel but also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and

functioning. The SC basically rejected the open court theory observed in

the USA.

Olaguer vs Military Commission

Habeas Corpus

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military

personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his

group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of

explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President

and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce

Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate

Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roo and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine

buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro

Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and

proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980,the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition

and habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

HELD:

The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic

because by the time the case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions

were already released from military confinement. When the release of the

persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed

is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and

academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from

their confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become


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moot and academic. But the military court created to try the case of

Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.

ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has

the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.

HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the

military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases

involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try

and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over

civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts

are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body

relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the

military tribunal concerned.

GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]

Facts:

The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial

target zoning" that were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were

unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be

search and that there is no search warrant orwarrant of arrest served. Most

of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates

or identification cards. The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by

banging on the walls andwindows of their houses. The residents were at the

point of high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to

strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The

residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their

belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their money and

valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported

incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were

detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions

and tactical informations. The respondents said that such accusations were

all lies. Respondents contends that theConstitution grants to government

the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance

of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to flush out

subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the

said drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and

carefully planned months ahead for the actual operation and that local and

foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such event.

Issue:Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation

of human rights.

Held:

It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it

is the procedure used or the methods which "offend even hardened

sensibilities" .Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have

been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest

before any houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were

arrested. There is no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by

the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights of the squatters

and low income familiesare fully protected. However, the remedy should

not be brought by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and not

one violator is properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit,

there is no erring soldier or policeman whom the court can order
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prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed,

the court temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to

the senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.

IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII

of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP

Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and

utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing

criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the

Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for

a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have

improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the

Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the Presidents factualdetermination of the necessity of

calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review

(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint

visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy

over the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress

lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a

discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of

the Constitution, Congress may revoke suchproclamation of martial law or

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may

review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such

equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents

action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out

power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and

power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the

framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3

powers and provided for their revocation and review without

anyqualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said

powershighlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and

broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as

the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law,

both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil

rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by

Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary

power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is

incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is
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totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such

heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there

exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the

Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of

Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not

constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.The calling of the

Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law

enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility

patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does notunmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the

operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not

with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as

members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to

speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols

does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.

Lacson vs. Perez

Power of the president to declare a state of rebellion

In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to

warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion.

FACTS:

On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an angry

and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs,

stones and other deadly weapons assaulting and attempting to break into

Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of

rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order

No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine

National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region.

Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the

rebellion were thereafter effected.

Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a state

of rebellion, which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the

following four related petitions were filed before the Court. Prior to

resolution, the state of rebellion was lifted in Metro Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is

constitutional

RULING:

As to warrantless arrests

As to petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion

is being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary

of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific

persons in connection with the rebellion. xxx


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With this declaration, petitioners apprehensions as to warrantless arrests

should be laid to rest.

In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only

resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided

under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so

warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on

the declaration of a state of rebellion.

Was there violation of doctrine of separation of powers?

Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the Peoples Movement against

Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a state of

rebellion is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an

encroachment on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional

prerogative to determine or interpret what took place on May 1, 2001,

and that the declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to

the general rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.

We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the Constitution

expressly provides that *t+he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of

all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he

may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,

invasion or rebellion thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.

Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):

xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easilyquantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered

for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not

always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of testual standards

that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at

such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain

pertinent information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove

unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be

difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the

evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call

out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast

intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified

as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of

the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in

emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass

destruction of property. xxx

The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the

factual basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer

feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.


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K. Diplomatic power sec 21 ART XVII- treaty making;

executive agreements; deportation of undesirable aliens

Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, GR L-10280

Facts:

- May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilo Galang charged petitionersbefore the Deportation Board, having purchased US dollars in thesum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central

Bank of the Philippines, which was then secretly remitted to Hong

Kong

- Petitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua andBasilio King attempted to bribe officers of the PHL and US

governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the Intelligence Division of

the Central Bank, Capt. A.P. Charak of the OSI, US Air Force) to

evade prosecution for the unauthorized purchase.

- A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the DeportationBoard. They filed a surety bond of P10,000.00 and cash bond forP10,000.00, thereby provisionally setting them at liberty

- Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss in theDeportation Board for the reason that the same does not constitute

legal ground for deportation of aliens, and that the Board has no

jurisdiction to entertain such charges. Motion was denied by the

Board on Feb. 9, 1953

- Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/orprohibition to the Court, but made returnable to the Court of First

Instance of Manila. After securing and filing a bond for P5,000.00

each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower court,

restraining the DB from hearing deportation charges against

petitioners pending termination of the habeas corpus and/or

prohibition proceedings.

- The DB then filed its answer to the original petition, saying as anauthorized agent of the President, it has jurisdiction over the

charges filed, and the authority to order their arrest. The Court

upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the

Deportation Board of his power to conduct the investigations. It also

sustained the power of the DB to issue warrant of arrest and fix

bonds for the aliens temporary release pending investigation,

pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Adminsistrative Code.

- Hence this appeal.Issues:

1. WON the President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently,2. WON the delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate,

carries with it the power to order the arrest of the alien complained

of

Held:

1. Yes. As stated in Sec 69 od Act 2711 of the Revised AdministrativeCode

-x-

SEC. 69Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a

foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported,

expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own

country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior

investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent,

of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such casethe person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges

against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the

preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard

by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and

to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."

-x-

While it does not expressly confer on the President the authority to

deport these aliens, the fact that such a procedure was provided for

before the President is a clear indication of such power. SC statedpetitioners committed the act ofprofiteering which is a ground for

deportation. The President may then order their deportation if after

investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged.

2. No. President Quirinos EO 398 authorizes the DB to issue thewarrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him

under detention during the investigationunless he files a bond for

his provisional release. The exercise of the power to order the

arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretionby the

one issuing the same. Such conditions are dependent/personal to

the one upon whom the authority devolves. It is an implied grant of


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power that would serve as curtailment on the fundamental right of

security to life and liberty, which equally applies to both citizens and

foreigners in this country. The guarantees of human rights, then,

must not rest on such a shaky foundation.

EO 398, as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest and to fixbond and prescribe the conditions for his temporary release, is

therefore declared as illegal.

Order of arrest of DB upon petitioners is declared null and void.

M. Executive legislation; Veto power

Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig

Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the

constitutionality of Corys veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill

(Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990

Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the

Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s

and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when

she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision;

(2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she

cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the

item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or

restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of

separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,

Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and,

therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose

restrictions on the exercise of that power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power

accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President thepower to veto `provisions of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD:

SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations

bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation,

and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be

treated as item, which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of

his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even

assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to

veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions

in the budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions that

should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power.


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Bengzon vs Drilon

Political Law Veto Power of the President

On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the

Supreme Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed

by the President because a resolution by the Court providing for

appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill

provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the

Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the

Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the

General Appropriations bill is constitutional.

HELD:

The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension

that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has

no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court

neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes

promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.

The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove

any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to

veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

SEE: PHILCONSA vs ENRIQUEZ

O. Residual power

SEE: MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS

P. Immunity from suit

SEE: SOLIVEN vs MAKASIAR


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CHAPTER 10: The Judicial Department

Admission to the Bar:

IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful

Candidates of 1946 to 1953;

ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Resoluti, 1954 on March 18

Facts:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar

Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court

then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an

average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed

petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other

motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also

invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are

also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades

without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to

individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for

reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic

Act No. 972.

Issue:Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar,

those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and

inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,

suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the

practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a

judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system

from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment

or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is

concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of

the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the

practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by

Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities

may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

Chapter 9- Executive department.docx

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Transcript of Chapter 9- Executive department.docx