CHAPTER-7

ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS

For the geo-strategic point of view Tajikistan lies at the crossroads of diverse political

and cultural system most important being Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, China and the

Central Asian republics, Kyrgyzstan particularly Uzbekistan. As such this chapter makes a

critical study of the role and interests of international actors in the post-Soviet Tajikistan, i.e.,

since 1991. International interests in Tajikistan can be categorized into two phases, i.e., first

the period of civil war (1992-1997) and the post 9/11. The civil war of Tajikistan was

ostensibly because of ethno-regional factors and the active role of international actors to

establish their influence in Tajikistan either to use it as a gateway for Central Asia and also to

spread religious ideology. Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were the key player

in the key players in this role. Other powers such as Russia and Uzbekistan sought to

maintain their influence in the region, prevent Islamic extremism from establishing itself rule

in the region, prevent drug trafficking and for minimizing the influence of USA and Turkey

influence in the region. The post-civil war period saw active economic involvement of China

in Tajikistan. The events of 9/11 led United States and western countries to take active

interest in the region to check the spread of Islamic extremism and to fight against terrorists

outfits in Afghanistan. Besides the western nations also want to check the growing Chinese

influence in the region.

RUSSIA

The process of de-Russification started in late 1980s with the passing of language and

culture law in some Central Asian republics, including Tajikistan, whereby their native

language was made an official language. It led to mass migration of Russians. Many

Russians stayed back as they had been living in these distant lands for generations. The

Russian and Russian speaking diaspora in Commonwealth of Independent States made

Russia to come out with its 'Near Abroad' policy.

In 1990-1991 Russia's President, Boris Yeltsin, together with the democratic forces

in Russia, provided moral support to the Tajik opposition of democratic and Islamist forces

in their criticism of the Tajik communist government. And when the Tajik conflict erupted,

Moscow reacted with its lack of interest and Russia was unclear about its stand towards the

events in Tajikistan. At the same time it did not otTer any support to the Tajik coalition

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government of Democrats and Islamists, created in May 1992, and Russia remained passive

when that government was attacked and asked for help (Katz 1995). Initially, the Islamist-

Democratic coalition government and the majority of members of the presidium supported

the demand of the local authorities, to invite CIS "blue helmets" into the zone of conflict.

However, the demand failed to receive approval from the top Muslim clergy, who considered

the presence of "foreign military contingent" in the conflict zone as interference in

Tajikistan's internal affairs (SWB, SU/1428, 1992).

Referring to the incident ofVakhshanzamin, where many Tajiks place, Davlat Usmon

stated that "When this incident took place in Kurgan- Tyube, and the insurgents forced their

way into the town, the current leadership of the republic, led by Akbarsho Iskandarov,

contacted the Russian leadership a number of times and infonned them of the current

situation ... that night we did not sleep and we went to the garrison of the Russian forces and

requested that General Vorobyev ought to meet us tonight. When we met General Vorobyev

we put a number of issues to him including, first and foremost, the urgent removal of the

regiments in both Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab to another neutral place. General Vorobyev said

that the garrisons themselves were not strong enough to cope with the removal of these

forces from this region. It was necessary that a number of servicemen should be invited from

Russia to reinforce these garrisons so as to enable them to remove those forces from there .....

As a result General Vorobyev with the agreement of Akbarsho Iskandarov sent a telegram {to

Russia} inviting a few hundred Russian persons [servicemen]. This is the background to the

arrival.. .. of a few hundred Russian servicemen. Our main aim was for these Russian forces

to urgently destroy or retake the tanks which they had given to the insurgent forces" (SWB,

SUI I 504, 1992).

However, the Russian Foreign Ministry wanted to maintain its unchanged position

vis-a-vis Dushanbe and conveyed its desire to cooperate with any govenunent. It was only

when the civil unrest finally developed into civil war that Russian 201 st Motorized Rifle

Division was officially asked to remain neutral. According to international political

observers, Russia's geostrategic involvement in Tajikistan was guided by its concern of

United States and Turkey's expansion in Central Asia. Russia was also fearful of the radical

Taliban of Afghanistan. According to Warikoo, "Russia- the successor to the Soviet Union

has been bearing the burnt of the security and defence of 2000 kilometers long Tajik-Afgan

244

border. The Central Asian states have also signed bilateral defence agreements with Russia

which is seen by these states as the guarantor of regional peace" (Warikoo 1995: 33). It is

important to note that at no point Tajikistan doubted the role of Russia in post-Soviet Central

Asian. Soviet breakup not only led to a fragile socio-economic situation in all the erstwhile

Soviet republics but it was also a transition period for Russia. Tajikistan was the only country

in Central Asia where the government did not demand the with(lIawal of Russian troops. In

fact, in July 1992, Russia agreed to reinforce its sub-division at Tajik-Afghan and Tajik-

Chinese borders. According to political observers the posturing of Moscow and the three

Central Asian states neighboring Tajikistan, just one day after the dismissal of Tajik

President Rakhmon Nabiev by the members of the Presidium of the country's Supreme

Soviet and Cabinet, was indicative of Russia's backing for Nabiev.

'Newsweek' reported that the leader of Afghanistan'S Hizb-i Islami Golboddin

Hekmatyar and his commander Abdullatif were involved in arming Tajik opposition and that

they were not only fighting the Afghan mujahideen who were ruling Kabul, but also fighting

the government of Tajikistan in Dushanbe. Khudoberdi Khaliknazarov, Tajikistan's minister

of foreign relations responded to the "Newsweek" article in an interview with 'Nezavisimaya

Gazeta' stated that, "When our delegation was in Kabul, representatives of the country's

defence minister, Ahmed Shah Masood, confirmed our supposition that many of the several

hundred residents of our republic currently staying illegally in Afghanistan are ordinary

smugglers and have nothing to do with the Islamic Rebirth Party." He further said that

Masood confirmed his readiness to close the border. The difficulty lay in the fact that the

most tense Paynj which was under the control of Hekmatyar. Masood assured that once the

Paynj region came in the control of the Afghan government, they would stop the supply of

arms to Muslim brethrens fighting against the communists in Tajikistan (ITAR-TASS 1992).

Russia signed an agreement with Tajikistan in November 1992, whereby the duties of

the Russian troops in Tajikistan were determined. At the same time the agreement provided

that the duties of Russian special-pwpose troops related to guarding key installations in the

republic, including power stations and airports, were withdrawn from Tajikistan in

November 1992, to the 201 st Motor-Rifle Division. According to the agreement the Russian

troops were not to take part in any combat operations but would help in maintaining order by

forcing curfew, protecting economic installations, setting up border checkpoints, helping to

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get through and assisting in operations to disarm bandit formations. In the same month the

Russian Border Troops detachment appealed to the Russian government for "legal or social

security" or else their units withdrawn. This was done because Russian troops would

inevitably get involved into the Tajik internal conflict as the Afghan troops and officials were

openly interfering in Tajik internal affairs with the assistance of local authorities in the

border area and with the connivance of the Tajik government. For this reason Russian Border

Troops found themselves under fire from both the sides. All this led to lack of motivation,

low morale and many losses. The officers warned that if their demands were not met, then

they might resort to a suspension of normal border guard duties. There were even reports of

Russian officers wanting to escape from Tajikistan. A report even stated that they were told

that they were being sent to help out with the annual potato harvest in Central Russia, and

had no idea that they were being sent to Tajikistan. They said that they had all served in

Armenia and did not want to fight against any ethnic or religious group any more (Tajik

Radio 1992).

At the same time many people in Tajikistan feared that these young servicemen who

had no special training were unable to withstand the pressures of war given that there were

many illegally held weapons in Tajikistan. In addition, "the task of guarding the border in

GBAO fell mainly to the Russian border forces, augmented in certain areas by Tajik border

forces.92 The Russian border forces were deployed along the Pyanj River and at the entrances

of the valleys formed by its tributaries" (S/1995/799: 3). In this area the friction was

comparatively higher between the Russian border forces and the so-called Self Defence

Forces (SDF), which were part of the opposition IRPT. On a number of occasions, the

Russian border forces fired across the border into Afghanistan for the stated purpose of

preventing illegal border crossings by persons betieved to be either opposition fighters or

drug smugglers. At the same time, Russian border forces accused the Tajik opposition

fighters for attacking from Afghan territory.

The democratic-Islamist opposition was always critical of Moscow for being

Dushanbe's "strategic ally". Even the CIS forces took the side of the regional group of

92 By 2002, of the 1,200 km Tajik-Afghan border, the KOGG is responsible for only one 73Km. section. Tajikistan has also taken over duties carried out by the Russian FPS along its 430 Km border with China the principal training centre in Tajikistan for border guards is the FPS Red Banner Training Centre, founded in 1930. Although an estimated 65% of its students are now Tajik, they also prefer to serve in the Russian FPS Border Troops rather in the Tajik Border Forces KOGG (Starostin 2002).

246

Kulyab. In one of the interview relayed on TV and Radio, Davlat Usmon, Deputy of the

IRPT, said that "CIS troops were supplying arms to the government forces." In the same

interview he said that " .. .it was in the interests of the CIS troops' safety to leave Kurgan-

Tube" (Mayank Radio 1992). More importantly, at a meeting of the leaders of the CIS states

on May 15, 1992, in Tashkent, Uzbek President Islam Karimov abandoned his former

opposition to the formation of a CIS defense force in return for an agreement that called for

the intervention of CIS combat troops in the Tajik civil war, thus authorizing Uzbek military

intervention along with Russian forces. IRPT preferred neutral Kazakh and Kyrgyz

peacekeeping troops instead of Russia and Uzbek peacekeeping forces to Tajikistan. At the

same time Tajikistan wanted these countries to bear the cost of the troops as it was in acute

economic crisis.

Despite the Russian support to the government at the center, it did not hesitate to give

refuge to the members of the opposition. In 1993 when the criminal proceedings were passed

against opposition leaders for their role in the civil war, some of the opposition leaders found

refuge in Moscow. Russia also played an important role in encouraging the parties to come

on the negotiation table and it served as a key sponsor and observer of the inter-Tajik

negotiations. Russia was the place chosen for the first and the final two negotiations between

the government and the opposition leader Nuri that led to the signing of the General

Agreement for peace in Moscow, on 27 June 1997. In practice Russia's "first priority was to

continue support for the Rakhmonov regime. As part of that policy, the Tajik regime had to

be made legitimate in the eyes of the international community. The inter-Tajik talks,

therefore, were afforded only second priority. Presidential and parliamentary elections and

the referendum on a new Tajik constitution became the cornerstone of Russian policy ..... On

the one hand, Rakhmonov was totally dependent on Moscow for his continued rule of the

country. On the other hand, Moscow to a certain degree became dependent on Rakhmonov

and a hostage to Dushanbe's policy" (Jonson 1998: 9- 10).

In December 1994, Sayeed Abdullo Nuri, leader of IRPT, appealed to the UN

Secretary General's personal envoy, Ramiro Piriz-Ballon, for increased monitoring of the

alleged cease-fire violation by Russian Border Troops based on the Tajik-Afghan border who

was involved in "punitive actions" against the opposition groups which had already ceased

armed action. A senior commander of the Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan, Col. Gen.

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Aleksander Tymko responded by saying that there was "impressive concentration" of the

Islamic opposition forces on the Afghan side of the border with order to "conduct acts of

terrorism against Russian officers". He added that, "powerful border forces are formed" in

Vanch and yazgulem areas to resist militant attack" (SWB, SU/2290, 1995). There were also

reports that Taliban forces had penetrated some 20 kms into Badakshon Province, and had

reached the bank of the Amu Darya River, which forms part of the border with Tajikistan.

(ICG 2000: 2).

It was under Russia's pressure that Rahmon agreed to negotiate with the Tajik

opposition and he signed an agreement for the creation of Commission for National

Reconciliation followed by the peace agreement in June 1997 in Moscow. Thus there was a

change in Russia's policy towards Tajikistan as initially Russia thought that the Tajik civil

war could be won by military means. Later Russia realized that it was only through

negotiation that the peace could be achieved in the region.

The development of bitter relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan due to

Uzbekistan's dominating policy was resented in Tajikistan, i.e., both by the government and

the opposition. It was due to Uzbekistan's desire to assert itself as the regional leader that

made Uzbekistan ally with international players like the United States in mid 1990s.

However, the Andijon incidents of May 2005 led Uzbekistan revert to its earlier pro-Russian

foreign policy, which was reciprocated by Russia's tilt towards Uzbekistan to balance

Kazakhstan's rising economic clout and strong regional position.

The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan made Tajikistan wary. Tajik President during his

visit to Moscow in April 2001 expressed his concern at an imminent offensive by the Taliban

against Northern Alliance forces near Afghanistan's border with Tajikistan (preston 2001:

294).

The IRPT did not officially advocate the policy of jihad against the Russian Border

Guards though its fighters had been involved in ethnic killing of Russians. This could be

possibly because IRPT was aware of the fact that the Islamic revolution did not appeal to the

Tajiks. According to official of Tajikistan's KNB (successor to the KGB), "Men are even

afraid to grow beards" lest they be taken for Islamic functionaries and punished (Reuters, 21

December 1992). Tajiks realized that only Russia could ensure their security and keep them

safe from the dominant pan-Turkism in Central Asia. In the post-Soviet period Russian

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interest in Tajikistan can also be attributed to the fact that it wanted to check the immigration

of Afghan mujahideen in Chechnya. It was reported that Chechens were getting trained in

Ferghana valley. It is somewhat clear that Russia had no intention to be actively involved in

the civil war of Tajikistan and the Russian soldiers were acting independently in the initial

years of the war. It was only after 1993 that the Russia took stand and supported Rahmon

government. Russia's concern in Tajikistan deVeloped due to Chechen and drugs trafficking.

But soon Russia realized that the war in Tajikistan was burdensome to Russian economy and

that there was high resentment amongst the Russian soldiers. President Yeltsin in one of the

statements during the CIS summit of January 1996 mentioned his concern towards the

Russian soldiers and he was resolving the Tajik crisis. It was immediately after the

appointment of Yevgenii Primakov, Russia's Foreign Minister, that the active efforts to the

establishment of peace were intensified. It was also because of the weakening of the position

of Rahmon in Tajikistan, Russia's only ally in Tajikistan, due to the dissent within the

Rahmon militia leaders particularly from Khudoberdiev and IOOd and the subsequent

strengthening of political opposition.

Russia was against the Tajik Islamists for practical, ideological and strategic reasons.

Victory for Islamic forces would have resulted in a large-scale exodus of the remaining

300,000 Russians to Russia where there was an acute shortage of housing and jobs, thus

inflaming opinion in parliament and on the streets (Hiro 1994: 214).

The withdrawal of Russian border forces in Tajikistan from 2006, much against

Tajikistan's desire, only added to the flourishing drug trade but also led to significant shift in

Russia and Tajikistan relations. Most of the working population in Tajikistan has migrated to

Russian Federation for jobs and labour. The recent law on immigrants passed by the Russian

government is resented by Tajik government as it puts restrictions on Tajik workers in

Russia. The Tajik immigrant population is one of the major contributors to Tajikistan

economy. The remittances sent by these immigrants' forms a huge portion of Tajikistan's

Gross Domestic Production.

Government of Tajikistan is the main employer in the country. The Russian military

was the second largest employer until its withdrawal from Tajikistan in 2006. The Russian

federation has offered to absolve the debt on Tajikistan in exchange of permanent grant of

land for the Russian military base and ownership of the Okno Space Observation Station at

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Nurek as well as substantial share in hydropower projects. Initially, Tajikistan demanded $50

million from Russia in respect of leasing rights for the above mentioned facilities. However,

President Rahmon later accepted Russia's demands.93 Some observers believed that Putin

coerced Rahmon into changing his mind by threatening to forcibly return thousands of Tajik

labor immigrants working in Russia. The return of these people might create social and

economic problems as there were insufficient jobs in Tajikistan. Such measures could be

politically destabilizing for Rahmon as many Tajiks depend on remittances sent from friends

and relatives working in Russia. At the same time, Tajikistan's growing disenchantment with

US policy in Central Asia also led to the change in Rahmon's policy. Moreover, Tajik

government was reportedly disappointed over the level of Washington's direct assistance to

Dushanbe. It was also apprehensive of the US-led stabilization efforts in neighbouring

Afghanistan. As these efforts were posing a serious security threat for the entire region

(Arman 2004). Russia is involved in the construction of Sangtuda-1. Russian aluminum

company RusAI is investing in the construction of Rogun hydroelectric power station over

seven years and Oleg Deripaska, is to modernize the huge Tajik aluminum factory in

Turzunzade and Rogun power station. According to international observers, the recent

Russian Federation's tilt towards Uzbekistan is believed to be guided by Russian strategic

interest to balance Kazakhstan's rising power in the region. According to a treaty signed

between Russia and Tajikistan, Russia got the property rights to Okno space monitoring

station for 242 million USD and the lease rights over Nurek for 49 years for a symbolic sum

of 30 US cents a year.

Common Tajiks attitude towards Russia is that of gratitude towards Russian they

would not like to part with Russia. Majority of Tajiks do not view Russians as colonial or

93 In January 2004 Asia Plus article made some bold comments about the Russian interests in Tajikistan and its step motherly treatment towards the country. The author argued that the country's debt to Russia was not a real debt but a result of Tajikistan being loyal and remaining in the rouble zone when Russia itself carried out its monetary reform in the early 1990s. when Russia made a loan of9 million roubles available to Tajikistan it had imposed an interest rate of 7 percent per year, while no other country at that time charged such a high rate of interest. Now the interest payment on that loan had increased Tajikistan'S total debt to Russia to about 300 miJIion USD. Why is not Russia remitting the Tajik debt, when it is generously remitting the multi-billion debts of other countries? He pointed out that Russia used all the infrastructure ofTajik facilities, which he estimated to be worth more than 2 million USD for the past 12 years, at no cost, and demanded that Russia pay rent to Tajikistan for the military base and for the use of the Okno space surveillance station at the rate of 250-300 million usn per year. He concluded that Tajikistan had to realize that to a small country economic issues must have first priority, and it must therefore make demands on the larger power for which strategic military-political aspects are more important. (RFEIRL 2004)

250

exploiter. This is because of Tajikistan's economic, political and military dependence on

Russia and Russia's contribution to the development oftheir country.

The Soviet time is still considered as a golden period by the Tajiks. In spite of being

at the commanding position during the civil war the Russians never tried to take advantage of

the feeble political, economy and social situation in Tajikistan. Although during the civil war

there were some hostile actions against the Russian and Russian speaking population, they

were momentary. In fact in 1992 when Ralunon came to power, many IRPT members took

refuge in Russia. For IRPT, the only important thing was that they wanted to be recognized

by the Russians as the main opposition political force in Tajikistan.

AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is the immediate neighbor of Tajikistan with which it shares the longest

border. With its substantial Tajik population residing in the northern part of Afghanistan it

has had close ethno-cultural ties with Tajikistan. Through its history, unstable Afghanistan

has acted as a springboard for civil and political instability in Tajikistan. During the

Basmachi revolution (1924-1928) Afghanistan was used as a base for carrying out the attacks

in parts of southern Tajikistan, particularly in Gorno Badakshon. Later in 1970s and 1980s,

Afghanistan provided moral and material support to the Tajik rebels in their efforts to

destabilize the situation in Soviet Tajikistan following the Soviet armed intervention in

Afghanistan. During Soviet forces suffered heavy men and material losses at in the hands of

seven principal rebel organizations formed of the Seven Party Mujahideen Alliance94•

Subsequently, Afghan incursion in the southern border of Soviet Tajikistan became more

active as its military intervention in Afghanistan was seen as a "direct Communist attack on

Islam...... Apart from the scrumptious trans-border movement and movements and

smuggling of arms and ammunition, Afghan mujahideen leaders openly abetted rise of

militancy among the Muslims of Tajikistan. For instance, Burhannudin Rabbani and Aluned

Shah Masood, both being Tajiks and belonging to Jamat-i-Islami .. _ reacted strongly to the

Dushanbe disturbances of February 1990 (anti-Armenian riots). They characterized these

94 In 1979, as part of the Cold War strategy, United States government, under President Jimmy Carter and National Security Advisor Zbignie Brzezinski, began to clandestinely fund Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence agency (lSI) to train anti-government mujahideen to fight Marxist regime in Afghanistan. The Seven Party Mujahideen Alliances was formed in 1985. Milt Bearden, he served as the CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989, wrote in his personal chronicles mentioned that United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and the UK were "major players" in the effort to aid the Afghan mujahideen. (Bearden 2007)

251

disturbances as 'freedom movement' or 'internal revolts' against the 'Soviet subjugation'"

(Warikoo 1994: 2 - 4).

Soon after the Soviet withdrawal vftroops from Afghanistan in 1989 and the takeover

of Afghanistan by Afghan, mujahideen illegal trafficking of anns into Tajikistan started. In

one of his interview with Narzullo Dustov, Vice-President of Tajikistan, stated that the

Democratic Party of Tajikistan had stated that they would not hesitate to use arms in case of

any physical attack on the opposition (SWB, SU/1345, 1992).

And the internal conflict between Afghan Mujahideen and Northern Alliance led by

Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood spilled over into Tajikistan. In May 1992, the opposition

alliances, of Islamists and democrats, fonned the government in Dushanbe. Afghanistan was

part of the civil war because it considered that the course that Rahmon followed is in

continuation of fonner Soviet regime.

After the fall of Tajikistan's coalition government in November 1991, Islamic Rebirth

Party of Tajikistan took refuge in Afghanistan due to president Rahmon pursued offensive

policies towards the opposition fighter. The opposition forces started operating from

Afghanistan, where it was working under the name of "Islamic Movement of Tajikistan".

Since Mghanistan shares a long and close border with Tajikistan, it gave the Islamic

opposition an opportunity to maneuver Tajik crisis. Moreover, the partnership between the

opposition and the Afghan mujahideen helped in easy cross-border narcotic trade, which

remains the main financial resources for the Islamists.

During the civil war in Tajikistan, the Islamist launched several attacks on the

government forces and Russian Border Forces from their basis in Afghanistan. In

Afghanistan the Islamists had three bases used for different purposes. "The first, near Mazar-

e-Sharif, a town controlled by General Dostum, was mainly for civilians. The Saqi refugee

camp was under the supervision of the United Nations Office of High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) and was not used for military purposes. The second base in Taloquan,

the area controlled by Masood, was both the political headquarters of the [IRPT] and the

point at which armed groups waylaid before entering Tajikistan. The third base was in the

area of Kunduz-outside of Masood's control and after 1996, in the hands of pro-Tali ban

groups-where foreign Arab militants both brought humanitarian aid for civilian refugees

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outside of UNHCR control and administered a program of ideological, religious and

probably military training" (Roy 2000: 23-24).

According to tbe report by Lt-Col Romaz Yakauskas, deputy chief of the Russian

Border Troops stationed Tajikistan, during a combat action in Afghan province of Konduz,

General Rashid Dostum, of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's Uzbek militia, seized a

large group of Tajiks (citizens of the republic of Tajikistan) who were undergoing combat

training in the camps of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar's Islamic Party of Afghanistan (lPA). Another

field commander (a lieutenant colonel who refused to give his name) discovered on the

territory in Konduz province (earlier controlled by IPA) three camps housing militants in

which 120 Uzbeks citizens from the Republic of Tajikistan were detained (SWB, SU/1496,

1992).

The deputy commander of Central Asian Border District said that there was enough

evidence to prove that there were units of Afghan anned opposition building up

redeployment across a border river (SWB, SU/0693, 1990). Kardriddin Aslonov, chainnan of

Kurgan-Tyube was arrested by the Kulyab faction who infonned the representatives of

Kazakh, Uzbek and Russian presidents and Vice President of Kyrgyzstan, that "during the

arrest they found documents that proved that he had maintained contact with the Gulboddin

Hekmatyar's Islamic Party in Afghanistan. Among the documents found were plans for the

elimination of the leaders and supporter of the Kulyabis." (SWB, SU/1535, 1992).

There were many such incident where Tajikistan's special services intercepted and

got hold of coded messages from opposition in Afghanistan authorizing terrorist acts against

the Tajik leaders. Anns and ammunition were hidden pilled up in the mountainous area on

the Tajik-Afghan border, and the mujahideen were hiding in the inaccessible mountain area

of Qarategin in GBAO. The Defence Minister, Aleksander Shishlyannikov noted that there

were many anti-government guerrilla groups that were operating in the inaccessible parts of

Pamir, particularly in Tavildara and Darwaz area (SWB, SU/2014, 1994).

On a number of occasions the local population assisted the Russian border guards in

arresting rebels. This was particularly true of the Murghob region. The Russian radio

reported that several of these mujahideen were military instructors from Pakistan and Saudi

Arabia and were periodically shelling Russian Border Troops subunits (Slavyanka Radio

1992). In a report by Russian Border Troops commander it was stated that "'official Kabul'

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was no longer making any secret of its support to the Tajik opposition. 'Some 3,000 gunmen

are currently being trained by instructors from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other states in

special camps in Afghanistan's Samangan and Takhar provinces'" (SWB, SU/2092, 1994).

Sangak Safarov claimed that "around 70 'foreign mercenaries' were captured by the

government forces during the Tajik conflict that included Afghan mujahideen, people from

Caucasus, and a number of African students" (SWB, SU/1608, 1993). These foreign

mercenaries were not only involved in killing and hostage taking of Russian Border troops

but also provided transport and air cover to the militants. It was reported on 8 December

1992 that three Afghan Air Force helicopters crossed the border and landed in the village of

Ayvadz, in Tajikistan, where they left a 50 to 60-strong armed battalion to support the

Islamist fighters against the Russian and the pro-government forces (SWB, SU/1562, 1992).

Whereas initially Ahmed Shah Masood supported the Islamist fighters in Tajikistan,

he also worked to improve his own position, so that he could negotiate more effectively with

the Russians and the Tajik government, with whose support he hoped to overthrow

Hekmatyar (Djalili & Grare 1995:122). Later on he sought support of Tajik government and

Russia to fight the Taliban. It was also reported that Masood had sought refuge in Tajikistan

and that he had based his aircraft in Kulyab. According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta the existence

of Masood's aircraft in the area was also confirmed by a US diplomat in Tajikistan. The

newspaper informed that "the Kulyab public is openly voicing fears that the Taliban could

start bombing the city, since the servicemen of their enemy are deployed there"

(Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1997).

It is widely believed that after Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, IRPT ceased its

base there. IRPT adopted a neutral stand towards Taliban as their people were still in the

conflict zone in Afghanistan. Nuri openly stated that "We cannot support or oppose any of

the political forces in Afghanistan because our refugees are spread across this country"

(SWB. SUl2742, 1996). Although. Nuri had connections with the extremist organization like

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, there are no substantial reports about IRPTs direct

association with the Taliban. According to International Crisis Group report "Some Central

A"ian governments, along with Russia, India, China and the US have linked the violence in

Afghanistan or the Taliban with the IMU operations, claiming or implying that a common

thread in these incidents is Islamic fundamentalism under the arms, on the march and

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threatening Central Asia" (ICG 2000: 1). At the same time there were reports about Davlot

Usmon, one of the senior members of IRPT having had talks with Taliban leaders where they

discussed matters concerning cooperative action in the struggle against the present

government of Tajikistan. It was also reported that during the meeting DVLOT had delivered

a congratulatory message to them from Tajik opposition leader Nuri. The report also claimed

that Turajonzcx\a also met the representatives of the Taliban movement where he showed

displeasure with the ousted Afghan President Rabbani' s appeal to renounce armed

confrontation with the Tajik authorities and to look for political ways to settle the intre-Tajik

conflict. Thus the Tajik opposition leaders found themselves confronted with two choices:

either to remain loyal to their fellow ethnic Tajik Rabbani, on the grounds that the Tajik

opposition's military headquarters is based in the northeastern part of Afghanistan controlled

by Rabbani or to join the Taliban (SWB, SU/2738, 1996).

The Islamic identity of Tajiks unites them internationally with the Muslim

brotherhood but nationally they remain divided on ethno-regional differences. Whereas the

Islamic opposition sided with the Taliban movement to continue their fight against the Tajik

government but at the same time they were concerned over the exclusion of Tajik or Uzbek

ethnic communities from the Taliban movement. Besides, the radical approach of the Tajik

opposition leaders appealed the comparatively secular and moderate Tajik society that was

still not ready for Islamic revolution it did not find favor with the (Roy 2000).

The political instability in Afghanistan has remained a cause of concern in Tajikistan.

At one point some Afghan mujahideen aimed at establishing a greater Afghanistan that

included parts of Tajikistan. On there part, Tajiks of Tajikistan believed that they were

reaping the fruits of the Soviet reckless adventure in Afghanistan. Their close interaction

with the Afghan mujahideen also resulted in a resurgence of extreme Islam amongst the

Tajiks, thus facilitating the restoration of extremist Islamic political ideology in the region.

The porous Tajik-Afghan border, which was vulnerable to infiltration from Afghanistan

required international efforts to maintain order including development of civil and political

society, peace, security and stability in Afghanistan.

However, after the demise of Tajikistan and during the Karzai regime, landlocked

Tajikistan looks forward to develop trade and transit access through Afghanistan. Three

bridges have been built on Tajik-Afghan border.

255

IRAN

Iran was the first country to extend its diplomatic recognition to Tajikistan. Initially,

it established cultural relations with Tajikistan. During the civil war, the relations were

further expanded as Iran tried to use its good offices to defuse antagonism between the

government and opposition. Though, officially not an ally of the opposition, Iran provided

base to the Islamists in Tehran from where Turanjonzoda, the United Tajik Opposition

(UTO) member, was able to mobilize international support. Iran worked with Russia towards

the establishment of peace between the warring sides. It was mainly because Iran and Russia

were keen to keep in Central Asia free of United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia influence.

Turkey adopted an active policy in Central Asia duly supported by the Western countries.

Iran has better sanding in Tajikistan due to its analogous Persian language and cultural

identity.

Tajiks have a strong Persian identity that overrides their religious differences with

Iran. Tajiks seek guidance from Iran for the restoration of their language and Persian identity.

It was due to the loss of Bukhara and Samarkand to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan's deteriorating

relations with Uzbekistan that Tajiks turned to Iran for cultural direction. Iran is not only

facilitating the development of Persian language and culture but it was also supporting the

Islamist opposition during the civil war in 1990s. Iran often condemned the act of Rahrnon

pro-government forces against the Islamist and nationalist groups. At the same time, Iran

maintained its diplomatic relations with the Tajik government. According to Roy, "After the

defeat of the opposition, Iran was eager to appear more as a broker than as a supporter of the

IRPT. Tehran's message to the Russians was: bring your guys to the table, and I will bring

OUTS •••• In January 1996, Ali Akbar Vilayti, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs clearly

told the Tajik delegation in Tehran, headed by Qazi Turajonzade, that it would have to find

an agreement with Dushanbe and that it would no longer be supported." (Roy 2000: 20).

Even in the post-civil war period, Iran has been balancing its relations with the government

and the opposition. The change in the IRPT leadership and the socio-political order where

slightest radicalism is met with severity has also effected the relations between IRPT and Iran

as the latter does not want to offend the Tajik government. At the same time the Shiite Iran

has been wary of Saudi funding and religious support to the Sunni majority in Tajikistan.

256

"Although, the post-Khomeini leadership in Iran adopted a moderate position in its

foreign policy orientation and tried to expand Iran's relations with the international

community, they continued to export their brand of Islamic revolution in Tajikistan through

Afghan Shiite clientele organizations. Iranian support to the resistance movement in

Tajikistan included distributing literature and providing arms and ammunition" (Emadi 1994:

572). According to Oliver Roy the deciskm to export the Islamic revolution to Central Asia

was upheld for two reasons: "lack of Shiite leverage- particularly of any cleric network-in the

area; and the fact that more radical Iranian institutions, like the Revolutionary Guards or

some clerical networks, did not challenge the policy of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in Central Asia, as they had the Middle East and Afghanistan" (Roy 2000: 11). At the

same time Turajonzode was clear that they did not want to replicate the Islamic state of Iran

in Tajikistan.

According to Mannanov, "Three years ago Rahmon criticized Iran for its confined

role in Tajikistan politics. Lately, Iran has got involved in economic cooperation. It has

committed itself to building Anzop tunnel that connects northern Tajikistan to Iran"

(Mannanov: 2007). Iran has been successful in getting Russo-Iranian collaboration on

Sangtuda-I while US was to invest 100 million US dollars and Kazakhstan 30 million US

dollars. (Tajik Radio Programme 2004). Since the Sangtuda-I95 was originally a Russian

project so Iran was given a smaller project on Sangtuda-II. An official tripartite agreement

was signed with Tajikistan in 2005 (Marat 2006). During Iranian President Kahtami's visit in

2004, Iran offered to invest in Sangtuda-II, a 220 MW hydroelectricity project which is

intended for export of electricity to Khorasan province of Iran via Afghanistan. Iran will hold

the rights to exploit the profits for 10 years. Iran is also involved in the gas project in

Khojhsartiz. With the establishment of the "Silk Route railway" in May 1996, it has opened

window of opportunities of trade for Tajikistan. Iran also had invested in building the

highway between Kulyab and Kalai-Kumbh. Iran aimed to become the main transit route for

landlocked Tajikistan. In addition, Mostazafin and Janbazan Foun~ation of Iran have

undertaken several projects in Tajikistan, including poultry production.

95 Russia agreed to invest 250 million dollars. Of which 50 million dollars were deducted from Tajikistan'S debt and the remainder of its debt were to be paid by giving Russia a share in the power plant.

257

PAKISTAN

Pakistan's policy toward post-Soviet Central Asia has been to secure strategic depth

vis-a.-vis India. Even before the disintegration of Soviet Union, Pakistani Special Services

had devised strategies and programs to strengthen the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism, to

destabilize the socio-political situation in the USSR's Central Asian Republics and to create

conditions for their secession from the Soviet Union. Under the rule of General Zia ul-Haq

(Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky refers to his rule as "military-Islamist"), "Pakistan aimed to

create a zone 'of strategic depth' north of the country's borders- a zone that would consist of

areas of Afghanistan and Kashmir under Islamabad's control, but in the larger perspective all

of Muslim Central Asia. The existence of such plans was very likely known in the capitals of

the Central Asian republics. The alarm in official circles probably gave rise to glee in the

opposition groups, which had experienced a feeling of pride over the Muslim victory in the

war against the Soviet superpower. These attitudes were reinforced by reports that some of

the Soviet soldiers taken prisoner by the mujahideen converted to Islam and refused to return

home" (Belokrenitsky 2005: 158). The base camps of groups entering Soviet territory were

located north of Peshawar- in Chitral district, along the border with Afghanistan.

According to Anatoliya Belousov, Tajik KGB Deputy Chairman "The armed Afghan

opposition was being manipulated and schools had been set up in Afghan settlements near

the border to give 'military and religious training to young Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens so

that they can subsequently be used to carry out hostilities against the USSR'" (SWB,

SU/1141, 1991 & SWB, SUIl140). In fact, "From 1984 to 1987, Afghan mujahideen

(fighters for the faith) trained by the Pakistanis- conducted a series of successful acts of

sabotage in the contiguous river areas in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. One of their main goals

was to disseminate copies of Koran and other literature in native tongues among the local

population and, with the latter's assistance, to send these into Central Asia. Such literature

provoked hostile attitude towards the Soviet regime, and also served to heighten the feelings

of Muslim solidarity. The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States assisted in

preparing and delivering the Islamic literature to Pakistan. In 1984 alone, Afghan groups-

trained by Pakistani intelligence- sent five thousand copies of the Koran across the border.

The backbone of these groups came from people living in the northern Afghanistan, above all

258

Uzbeks, among whom there stood out the field commander VaH Beg, a man of peasant

origin" (Yousouf & Adkin 2005.: 157).

Kommunist Tadjikistana of "May 13, 1988 disclosed that Islamic revolutionary

literature was being distributed in thousands, which was later confirmed by Afghan

mujahideen sources. There was wide circulation of audio cassettes, video films etc. to spread

radical Islam in Tajikistan. Works of Maududi- the founder of Jamat-i-Is!ami, Said Kutab,

Muhammed Kutab and Kamal Din Afghani, the noted Muslim revolutionary were translated

into Russian and printed at Peshawar and then smuggled across Afghanistan into Tajikistan

for wide circulation. Wahabism gained roots in the rural areas of Tajikistan especially along

the Tajik-Afghan border. The Wahabi literature that was smuggled via Afghanistan, lays

emphasis on religious absolutism and is opposed to Sufism and holy shrines which represent

the traditional and tolerant trend in Islam. Tajikistan's Wahabi leader Abdullo Saidov

advocated the creation of Islamic state" (Warikoo 1994: 4). According to General

A.A.Liakhovskii, a participant in the Afghan war, "Pakistan's policy had a definite impact on

Central Asia during the Soviet era after the conclusion of the Geneva agreements in April

1988 and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and also later {right up to the

civil war in Tajikistanf (Liakhovskii 2005: 157).

To get into the social and political milieu of Tajikistan, Pakistan provided guest

houses for pilgrims en route to Mecca. Pakistan played an important role in the dissemination

oflslamic literature-for example, the translated writings of Abdul 'I A'ia Mawdudi and Hasan

al-Banna-found its way through the lama'at printing press and networks in Lahore and

Peshawar. "The Islamic literature was brought to Central Asia by the many delegations of

individuals who used to travel by PIA, the Pakistani airlines, has for some time a biweekly

Islamabad-Peshawar-Tashkent flight until the Uzbek authorities imposed a severe crackdown

on visa in 1992. Under these conditions, the IRPT was unable to become the main

interlocutor and channel of foreign Islamic militant movements, except with the Pakistani

lama'at" (Roy 2000: 11-12).

After the fall of the Tajik opposition in November 1992, and the establishment of

IRPT's base in Afghanistan and Iran, the leaders of IRPT traveled extensively to Pakistan

and in 1995 Himmatzade attended a gathering of radical Islamist organizations of

Afghanistan in Pakistan. Pakistan being a base for the training of Islamic fundamentalist and

259

holy fighters also provided training to IRPT fighters. Pakistan supplied trained Islamic

fighters from Middle East and Africa to fight in Tajikistan during the civil war. In an

interview with Interfax in Moscow, Tajik president Rahmon stated that "Pakistani transport

planes were making daily flights to northern Afghanistan to deliver food and arms to refugee

camps in the area where Tajik militants were said to be undergoing training by Afghan

mojahideen" (SWB, SU/1620, 1993). The Pakistani motive behind backing IRPT was to find

a gateway to Central Asia for economic, strategic and religious purposes. In his letter written

to president of UN Security Council, Yuliy Vorontsov, circulated on August 31, 1994 by

Tajik Foreign Ministry, Rahmon expressed his "serious alarm" at the large-scale involvement

of "mercenaries from Algeria, Afghanistan, Sudan and certain other states" in hostilities on

Tajik territory (SWB, SU/2090, 1994).

In an interview Major General Mukhredin Ashurov, commander of 201st Motor-Rifle

Division in Tajikistan mentioned that "The guerrillas are now training across the border. This

is mainly in three or four areas. The combat groups that were here have not all been

eliminated. They have dispersed into small groups, into cells. They have their own command,

leadership, radio communications and even Stingrays, American surface-to-air missiles, for

hitting targets in the air (SWB, SU1l676, 1993). The strong Saudi financial backing and the

US support made Pakistan a strong religious contender in the region. Sunni Islamic ties are

also important to keep Pakistan's role in Tajikistan vital in the long run.

It is also worth noting that the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan have

provided safe heavens to Central Asian Islamic extremists who are likely to become Islamic

extremists under prolonged interaction with the extremist forces during their exile.

"Although, the Pakistani did not allow him [Turajonzoda] to use the Pakistani territory as a

military base, they, along with Afghan fundamentalist groups, continue to support the Tadjik

resistance movement" (Emadi 1994: 573). According to K.Warikoo, "Pakistanis even

established their camps and distributed food to the Islamic rebels during their demonstrations

at the Freedom Square in Tajikistan" (Warikoo 2007). The Tajik opposition rebels were

rewrtedly provided both military and religious training, along with Mujahideens. "According

to .... ~ KGB of Tajikistan, the leaders of the opposition formations and special services

instruct their emissaries to use smuggling channels, family ties and the common ethnic and

260

religious background of the inhabitants of the Soviet and Afghan border area in order to

create an anti- Soviet feeling and develop an anned struggle" (SWB, SU/1141, 1991).

Pakistan provided trained fighters to Islamic opposition who took part in the Tajik civil

war. Pakistan also provided venue to conduct peace negotiations between the government

and the opposition as it was one of the observers in the peace talks. Pakistan's adventurous

policy in Tajikistan was guided by its desire to get access to the energy resources in Central

Asia, spreading religious extremism, and linking the Karakoram trade routes that connected

China to Pakistan and its southern sea port Gwadar thus providing access to the land locked

Central Asian countries for trade. Pakistan along with US wanted to push Russia out of the

region. After the establishment of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, in the meeting held

between the Rahmon and Pakistani Foreign Minister Gowhar Ayub Khan in June 1997 the

latter proposed a joint forum of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, China and

Pakistan which would act as the guarantor of peace settlement in which US and Russia would

act as observer countries. In addition, Ayub Khan mentioned that the Taliban movement was

a reality in Afghanistan and that greater contact with Taliban will lead to greater

development in the region. He also added that there was total peace and calm on the Taliban

controlled border provinces of Afghanistan on Iran and Turkmenistan side and that the

situation was unstable along the Tajik and Uzbek border where the Northern Alliance was

still active (SWB, SU/2953, 1997).

In mid 1990s, after Pakistan's active involvement in the Tajik crisis, IRPT's equation

with Afghan Mujahideen's was affected by the potential threat from Pakistan backed Taliban

in Afghanistan. It was during this time that the members of IRPT often traveled to Pakistan

where their members received training in Pakistani madarssas or terrorist camps. Pakistan

was in favor of an escalation of Islamic fight in Central Asia whereas Masood needed the

support of Russia to find safe heaven and to fight the Taliban.

On their part the general Tajik population has not overcome the adverse social,

economic and political impact of civil war and has to realize the negative role played by

Pakistan in the Tajik civil war. Moreover, the deteriorating Pakistani image in international

politics due to it being the breeding ground of madarssas and terrorists made Tajiks wary

about their relations with Pakistan.

261

However, in recent years, Tajikistan has developed substantial economic relations

with Pakistan. It has signed an agreement with Pakistan on transit shipment. With the

opening of the Karakoram pass it can provide an easy access to the sea for landlocked

Tajikistan. Pakistan is also exporting edible goods to Tajikistan and providing financial

assistance for the development of electricity power plant.

SAUDI ARABIA

Soon after the disintegration of Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia invested in building

mosques and distributing the Holy quran to the Muslim brothers in Tajikistan, instead of

investing in building up of the Tajik economy. Saudi Arabia is presently not involved in any

big economic projects in Tajikistan. Islamic missionaries from Saudi Arabia often visit

Tajikistan. The presence of Salafis has caused concern in the social and political environment

of Tajikistan.

UZBEKISTAN

Tajikistan shares its borders and same religion with their Uzbek neighbor. The only

difference is that Uzbeks trace their ethnic ancestry to Turks and Tajiks to Persians.

Uzbekistan has always acted as a big brother to Tajikistan's polity and society. During the

Soviet period, Khojandis formed the power structure and sought guidance from the Uzbek

leadership. The weakening of power of Khojandis at the centre made Uzbekistan insecure. It

also undermined Islam Karimov's ambition to create an Uzbek-dominated Turkistan.

Moreover, Karimov was alarmed by the rising Tajik nationalism not only within Tajikistan

but also in Uzbekistan. Since the opposition consisted of the Islamists and the Rastokhez,

their main ideology being revival of Islamic faith and Persian culture, it was cause of concern

for Uzbekistan. Karimov feared that "events in Tajikistan would not only consolidate the

rapidly growing Islamic consciousness in Uzbekistan but also lead to its politicization. The

increasing clout of militant Wahab; radicals including the formation of armed bands in

Ferghana valley and influx of Uzbekffajik refugees and even Afghan nationals into

Uzbekistan further strengthened these fears .... Presence of sizeable number of ethnic Tajiks

who constitute about a quarter of Uzbekistan's population, is yet another factor for the Uzbek

concerns over disorder in Tajikistan" (Warikoo 1994: 8-9). Uzbekistan was also critical of

Tajik government providing safe heaven to the members of Islamic Movement of

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Uzbekistan, an extremist group which aimed at the overthrow of Karimov's government and

establish an Islamic state.

In a message, President Karimov stated that there were external forces which would

like to sow and cultivate the seeds of ethnic discord, political and civil confrontation in the

region. He drew the attention of the members of the international community to the

inadmissibility of interference in the internal affairs of Tajikistan (IT AR-TASS 1992).

Uzbekistan was directly involved in the Tajik crises. Several units of Popular Front,

who had been trained in Uzbekistan, entered Dushanbe on December 10, 1992, with tanks

that were supplied by the Uzbek government. They are reported to have defeated the Tajik

opposition with the aid of the Uzbek air force (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 1992). The new

Dushanbe government openly stated that the sorties were flown in connection with an official

request from the Tajik leaders. According to a report in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, when the pro-

government forces took control of Dushanbe on December 10, 1992, there were people who

had arrived in motor vehicles from Surkhandar plates of Uzbekistan. In another incidence

Nezavisimaya Gazeta correspondent noted how in the hotel of the Uzbek community of

Uzun a Kulyab militant interrogated two "suspicious" Tajik juveniles who had come to

Uzbekistan from Gharm. Ibod, the leader of Turunzade-Regar militarized detachment, went

to many business meetings with the local district authorities and the Uzbek "border guards".

In his three years spent at the border, 'Nezavisimaya Gazeta' correspondent spotted Ibod

Baimitov in Uzbekistan twice. It was rumored that the appearance among the Regar

militarized groups of tanks and armored equipment was connected with Ibod's visit to

Uzbekistan. There were no instances of tanks having been driven from the 20 I st Russian

Motor rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan but there was Uzbek armored equipment close to

Regar (SWB, SU/IS71, 1992).

Earlier Uzbekistan came out in open to support of the Peoples Front (PF) forces in

1992, which facilitated the seizure of Dushanbe. In fact, "During 1992 when the Islamic

opposition groups were in control in Tajikistan, Karimov launched suppression of the Uzbek

opposition groups like Birlik and the Islamic radicals in Ferghanan" (Warikoo 1994: 9). The

Uzbek help came in the form of armored vehicles and aviations. They even trained the Uzbek

units of Popular Front forces.

263

According to K.Warikoo, "At other level, Karimov kept channels of his friendly

communication open with General Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek and the powerful military leader

in Afghanistan with his stronghold in Mazar-e-Sharif. Dostum visited Tashkent several times

during 1992 and held discussions with the Uzbek authorities. In November 1992, Dostum's

troops captured a key Amu Darya river crossing to Tajikistan at Sher Khan Bandar which

was earlier used by Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami as a staging point for cross-border forays.

Subsequently a network of border posts along the river supported by boats patrol was set up

under the new Afghan Uzbek commander in-charge of border security, Maj.Gen.Abdul

Hamid Aka. This led to sealing of an important channel of supply 'of arms and support to

Tajikistan's Islamic opposition. Besides, Dostum was in close touch with General Nadiri, a

leader of the Ismailis and some other important personalities in northern Afghanistan in order

to influence the course of events there. That Dostum's family was staying in Tashkent on

long term basis is also evidence of cooperation between Dostum and Uzbek authorities.

There were reports that General Dostam and Uzbek President, Karimov have been toying

with the idea of creating a 'secular buffer zone' in northern Afghanistan to cover the southern

borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan which would act as a wedge against the spread of

radical Islam from the direction of Iran from the west and from the side of Pashtuns under

Hekmatyar from the south. However, it becomes clear that there was a basic understanding

between Dostam and the Uzbek leadership on the need to keep at bay the radical Islamist

fighters" (Warikoo 1994: 10).

Expressing concerns at the developments in Tajikistan, Karimov requested the UN to

send a commission to study the situation in the republic. This was the first time the UN

involvement in the Tajik civil war was initiated. Following the request, for the first time UN

sent observers in Tajikistan in January 1993. With the change of its relations with Russia and

pro-US policy, Uzbekistan's relations with the government of Tajikistan altered.96

Uzbekistan started criticizing Dushanbe's offensive policies towards the opposition and the

Russia's military engagement in Tajikistan. Though Uzbekistan was an official observer in

the inter-Tajik negotiations, it initially did not agree to sign, as a guarantor of the 1997

General Agreement on peace. Moreover, Uzbekistan closed its borders to check inflow of

96 Later Uzbekistan officially joined pro-US organization of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUUAM) in 1999

264

Tajik refugees and unilaterally installed landmines on border. Uzbekistan had put mines on

its borders with Tajikistan in 1992 to prevent opposition refugees from fleeing to Uzbekistan

and again in 2000 Uzbekistan took a unilateral activn to lay antipersonnel landmines along

the Tajik-Uzbek and Uzbek-Kyrgyz borders.

Being a landlocked country, Tajikistan depends on its neighbors for trade and

economic growth. Much of its trade depends upon its relations with Uzbekistan and

Afghanistan other than Russia and China. Following the success of the referendum on

October 1999, the anti-government rebels entered Tajikistan from Uzbekistan, straining the

relations between the two countries. In 2002 Tajikistan declared 'open door policy' and in

2003 President Rahmon used the term 'national interest' to define his foreign policy.

Other then this, the Tajik-Uzbek bilateral relations have been deteriorating because of

the following reasons. Tajiks are still resentful about the loss of its cultural capitals Bukhara

and Samarkand to Uzbekistan and alleged acts of discriminations committed against Tajiks in

Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan has accused Tajikistan for being lenient with the Islamic Movement

ofUzbekistan97 (lMU) as Uzbeks charged Tajiks for providing safe heavens to the members

of lMU, and forceful removal of Tajiks from Surkhandarya in Uzbekistan to Tajikistan.

Chronic shortage of resources makes Tajikistan depend on its neighbours. Tajikistan depends

on Uzbekistan for gas and electricity. The International Monitory Fund report mentions that

the rise in inflation is due to the decision by Uzbekistan to double gas export prices (lMF

2007: 3). Tajiks feel that Uzbekistan has exploited the situation to its advantage. They

consider that Uzbekistan wants to maintain its superiority over Tajikistan and thus would do

efforts to deny Tajiks to build itself as an independent nation. Uzbekistan is also reported to

have pressurized the Russian government to abandon the construction of hydropower project

in Tajikistan that would have not only solved the Tajik energy requirement but also freed

Tajikistan of its dependence on Uzbekistan.

KAZAKHSTAN

In Kazakhstan there were debates in the Parliament on several clashes between Kazak

soldiers and the local population of Badakshan. Interestingly, the Kazakh local newspaper

Karavan (Karavan, 12 August 1994) and P{lnorama (August 1994, No.35) reported about

97 IMU is an extremist organization with an objective of removing President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan and establishing an Islamic state of Uzbekistan and then establishing Islamic states in other Central Asian countries.

265

the appeals by Zheltoksan Human Rights Committee and number of political parties and

movements of Atyrau Region to the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet, requesting that Kazakhstan

military unit be withdrawn from Tajikistan and also that "volunteers be allowed to take part

in hostilities on the side of the Tajik opposition" (SWB, SUI2077, 1994). At the same time

the Kazaldl Foreign Minister Tokayev said that the President should listen to opposition

(SWB, SU12524, 1996). In fact, several leaders of the non-governmental organizations, who

were slowly becoming more and more popular among the Kazakh public, published their

protest in number of Alma-Ata newspapers. They explained their disagreement saying fact

that there is a law in Kazakhstan which bans the participation of Kazakh troops in the

settlement of inter-ethnic conflicts (SWB, SU1l552, 1992).

KYRGYZSTAN

In 1990, Tajikistan demanded the surrender of 24,000 hectares of Batken land to the

people of Isfaran Rayon from the Kyrgyz government. This region has always been a

contentious issue between the two countries. There were also tensions between the people

living on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border over the sharing of water resources. Kyrgyz government

was concerned about the Islamists, drug smuggling and the possibility of spill over of the

Tajik civil war in Kyrgyzstan. In 1996, Kyrgyzstan reinforced its southern borders to prevent

the possible infiltration of Afghan militants across Tajikistan into the republic. The

reinforcement was also done to prevent the drugs and arms smugglers from entering into

Kyrgyzstan along with the refugees.

Kyrgyzstan initially agreed to send its peacekeeping troops to Tajikistan on two

conditions, "first, if all conflicting parties cease fire, and second, if they withdraw to their

earlier positions" (Interfax 1992). The government of Kyrgyzstan had initially sent its troops

under the CIS 'blue helmets' armed forces to resolve Tajik crises. Soon Kyrgyzstan

parlianlent decided against it as the deputies were guided by the principle of non-interference

by Kyrgyzstan on other states' affairs and judged the events taking place in the neighboring

country as its own internal matter. In addition to this the Kyrgyz government was not able to

manage any confirmation from the warring sides about the safety of the peacekeeping

soldiers. Moreover, the women of Kyrgyzstan were against sending their sons to the place

that might become a second Afghanistan (Kyrgyz Tag October 1992). The main problem of

deploying peacekeeping forces according to Anatoli Ivlen, commander's aid of the 201 st

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Russian [Motor-Rifle] Division stationed in Tajikistan, was that "Unfortunately, so far the

status of peace-keeping troops has not been defined yet" (SWB, SU/1558, 1992). Another

important concern .... :as the doubt about the agreement and commitment by the warring sides

to provide corridor to the Kyrgyz forces in providing a buffer zone between the warring

sides. It was also because Kyrgyzstan could not sustain its forces there due to financial

constraints and popular demand within Kyrgyzstan to withdraw its forces from Tajikistan.

It was also noted that Kyrgyz peacekeeping battalions in Tajikistan's Pamir region

were targeted by Tajik armed opposition fighters. In a report published in Stova Kyrgyzstan

mentioned that while the Kyrgyz troops were trying to build the relations with the local

inhabitants, Uzbek forces were openly running bombing raids on behalf of the Tajik

government. Russia wanted more Kyrgyz troops deployed, but the danger of China becoming

involved in the Badakshon region made the Kyrgyz government think twice about making

further commitments in Tajikistan (SWB, SU/2225, 1995). In another report the same

newspaper pointed out that Kyrgyzstan had nothing to gain from sending additional troops to

join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping forces on the Tajik-

Afghan border, because this would only help to prop up a Tajik government which had

"considerable territorial claims" on Kyrgyzstan. The newspaper said that the Kyrgyz forces

could play an alternative role such as protecting ethnic Kyrgyz communities living "in a state

of constant calamity" in Tajikistan, and it accused the Kyrgyz government of a very "cavalier

attitude" to the problem (SWB, SU/2283, 1995). During the civil war Kyrgyzs provided

passage to the Aga Khan Humanitarian aid to the Ismailis of Badakshon.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE WESTERN NATIONS

Tajikistan has provided air base to US troops in Dushanbe and Kulyab airport in

support of their crusade against terrorism. In return, the US provides military technical

assistance and training to Tajik armed forces. Tajikistan became member of North Atlantic

Treaty Organization's Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund Policy in September 2000.

Despite Tajikistan being a part of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the

European Union which also implies observance of human rights principles, European Union

and US officials have abstained from officially commenting on human rights violations in

Tajikistan.

267

In spite of US humanitarian and technical assistance to Tajikistan it has not been able

to establish deep bilateral relations. The color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine and th.e

Andijon and Tulip revolution of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan respectively has led to

Tajikistan's uneasiness about the US policy in Central Asia in general and Tajikistan in

particular. The training is also looked with suspicion by international observers of US efforts

to margin~lize Russian presence in the region has been looked at with suspicion by Tajik

government.

CHINA

China's relation started with contentious border issues that were resolved under Shangai

Five.98 Although the agreement was reached on the demarcation of the border Karazak pass

and the river of Markansag in August 1999, the most difficult section in the Pamirs remained

unresolved due to Chinese claim on a considerable part of the Badakshon region (SWB,

SU/3614, 1999). The trading zone was established between the two countries in Murgab

district of GBAO. The borders between the two countries remains open with simplified

border crossing procedures. Though there are checkpoints at the Tajik-China border, the

trade figures between the two countries remains distorted due to high level of corruption

existing on the Tajik side of the border. This can be realized by analyzing the differences in

the statistics given by the Chinese government and the Tajik government.

China's interest in Central Asia arose from its fear of incursion of foreign Islamic

extremism in its western Xinjiang province that can act as a destabilizing force in the region.

China's policy of developing trade routes through this region will affect the nomadic tribes in

Xinjiang and thus China could also extend its political influence over them (Warikoo 1992:

15).

China's project to revive the ancient silk route and connecting Tajikistan with the

Karakoram highway is aimed at seeking an easy access to the Central Asian market. During

the Chinese Premier's visit to Dushanbe in June 2006, various bilateral cooperation

agreements were signed between the two countries. The most important of them was the

reconstruction of the Dushanbe-Chanak highway that forms the part of the old Silk Route

98 Shangahi Five is a regional organization. It initially included five members i.e. Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The purpose of the organization was to resolve the border issues between China, Central Asian states bordering China and Russia. After Uzbekistan became the member of the organization, it was renamed as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCQ).

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running from Kulma (south-east Tajikistan and at Chinese border) to Khorog-Darvaz-

Kulyab-Dushanbe and the Dushanbe-Khujand-Buston-Chanak highway. This highway would

then connect to Uzbekistan. In addition China agreed to finance LEP-500 North-South high-

voltage power line. The proposed study was done during the Soviet times. The plant is likely

to supply electricity from Uzbekistan to Tajikistan and 220 KV power line Lolazor-

Obimazor-Khatlon th::\t would extend to Faizabad area in the Badakshan province of

Afghanistan. The leadership of Tajikistan has recognized that Chinese are their big brothers99

and great neighbors. Tajikistan and China share the same apprehensions on the Islamists

design. It is also likely that China wants to develop its Xinjiang province in order to

marginalize the Uighurs rebels of western Chinese province bordering Tajikistan's eastern

GBAO. China is the biggest investor in Tajikistan. Due to the increasing Chinese

investments in Tajikistan, it has been noted that Tajiks now prefer to send their children to

China for education for better job opportunities.

The Staff Report of International Monitory Fund of March 2007, noted that the total

loans provided by China for the construction of two-high voltage electricity lines and a the

road linking Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, that amounts to $604 million to finance projects in

the infrastructure and energy sector, may put Tajikistan at high risk of future debt problems.

"Although concessional in nature (with grant of 40 percent), the disbursement of these loans ,

will lead to a rapid reaccumulation of debt, very soon after debt relief was provided under the

Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)" (IMF 2007: 4).

The role of the outside powers in the internal affairs made the life of foreign aid

workers unsafe as severed of incidents of killing and hostage taking of relief workers were

reported in Tajikistan. The members of the international organizations were threatened and

attacked for helping the government. In February 1994, a local staff member of Medecins san

Frontieres from Belgium was murdered by unidentified men while in a car bearing the

organization's name and logo. On November 25, 1994, two UNHCR drivers transporting

gasoline from Uzbekistan to the Tajik city of Shahrtuz were stopped at a checkpoint in

Khatlon oblast and were ordered by the senior police officer to give gasoline. When they

refused, they were subjected to verbal abuse, accused of helping the government and were

subsequently beaten. Another international organization operating in Khatlon reported that its

99 Big Brothers for Tajikistan does not mean that they would dictate their terms

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staff was threatened by local Kulyabis for "helping Oharmis" and told that the homes that

were being rebuilt for Oharmis would be burned down again (Human Rights Watch May

1995). The UN members were also taken hostage.

Presently the working of the International NOOs is closely monitored by the

government. The foreigners are asked to produce the written permission of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Education if they have to conduct any interview with them.

The members of the international organizations are not very open to talk about the politics or

society of Tajikistan. In fact, the observers don't like to be quoted as they do not want any

trouble with the government. Most of the international observers suggested that they should

be quoted as "in conversation with a political observer of an International organization". The

entry of international organization is restricted because the organizations deal with the

establishment of civil society, democracy, human rights etc., which comes in conflict with

the governments. The movement of foreigners from one region to the other also requires the

government permission and police registration.

To conclude, at present, China is the biggest investor in Tajikistan. The Tajik

president, on the occasion of annual celebration of Nawroz on 21 March, stressed that

Tajikistan is developing relations with China. Russia remains the biggest investor and

strategic partner of Tajikistan. In addition, Russia plays a vital role in the political and

decision making in Tajikistan. Instability in Afghanistan remains a cause of concern for Tajik

stability due to close proximity and ethnic correspondence. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia can

play an important role in exporting and consolidating Islamic extremism in economically,

socially and politically fragile Tajikistan. In addition, the Role of Russia, Uzbekistan,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, UN and OSCE remains important towards the working of peace

and stability; establishment of democracy and in bring economic prosperity in Tajikistan.

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