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CHAPTER 4
MODELING SCENARIOS AND COMPUTATION OF
RESULTS
4.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter deals with calculation of modeling scenarios with
respect to all the thirty-five industries studied by the researcher and the
computational results of the scenarios are tabulated. However, for the purpose
of easy understanding, thermal radiation and shock wave pressure for five
selected industries among the 35 sample industries, located in different
regions in the State, with different capacities are discussed in detail. The data
for the remaining industries were also calculated for scenarios in the same
way and the computational results of all the 35 industries are given in Table
4.4. The damage Contour details are incorporated in the layouts. Damage
contours including thermal radiation distances with various intensities, graph
showing thermal radiation versus damage distances and damage due to
explosion with various shock wave pressure levels are incorporated in the
exact location map. This has been done to identify the areas of domestic
population, houses, industrial properties, roads, public utilities, possibilities of
domino effects and other environmental aspects, which may likely be affected
in and around the location of the industry.
Data collected during physical inspection of the industries and
computational results of consequence scenario of all the elements are fed into
the questionnaire. The consolidated results of positive and negative impacts,
thus arrived at, are shown in percentages in tabular form.
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4.2 PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE STUDY
The study details of the different modeling strategies and statistical
interpretations of LPG release scenarios with consequences based on the
information arrived from the questionnaire are administered to different
industries. The action plan for carrying out the study comprised of the
following steps:
Step 1: Preparation of Questionnaire and collection of data.
Step 2: Selection of software for analysis of the data collected.
Step 3: Method of calculation of Consequence modeling scenarios
for fire and explosion.
Step 4: Detailed discussion of scenarios calculated for five sample
industries and its results.
Step 5: Computational results of scenario of all thirty-five industries.
4.2.1 Preparation of Questionnaire and Collection of Data
A research questionnaire was prepared for carrying out the research
study. Research questionnaire contains details of statutory requirements such
as safety, health and environmental aspects. The researcher adopted two
strategies while carrying out the study. The first strategy involved physical
visit to the plant facility of all the sample industries. The second strategy
involved scrutiny of records in all the industries to acquire the first hand
information about the compliance of statutory provision by each and every
company with regard to onsite and offsite emergency requirements, besides
other information. Copy of the questionnaire is given in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Research Questionnaire (For Academic Purpose only)
INDUSTRY DETAILS SL DESCRIPTION DETAILS 1 Name of the Company and Address Serial No. 2 Contact Person and Details 3 Name of Manufacturing Process 4 Description on use of LPG in the industry
QUESTIONNAIRE S.NO. DETAILS YES NO I. LPG BULLETS
1. Whether the factory has valid PESO License? 2. Whether all the safety equipments are functional? 3. Whether Fire Hydrant System is available? 4. Whether the vessel is maintained well? 5. Whether support columns are intact? 6. Whether the vessel and other fittings are intact? 7. Whether the level gauges are functioning? 8. Whether the dyke wall is intact? 9. Whether the dyke is adequate?
10. Whether Earthing and bonding provided and periodically checked?
II. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 1. Whether MSDS of LPG is displayed? 2. Whether unloading procedures are displayed in English
and Tamil?
3. Whether adequate supervision is provided during unloading?
4. Whether effective access control is provided? 5. Whether Static Charge discharging facility is provided 6. Whether sparking tools are allowed inside the LPG area? 7. Whether wooden wheel stoppers are provided? 8. Whether hazardous area classification system has been
implemented?
9. Whether FLP Electrical fittings are available? 10. Whether Hazard Communication Warning is exhibited?
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III. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 1. Whether Onsite Emergency Plan has been prepared? 2. Whether the Emergency Plan covers all the details of
LPG Hazard?
3. Whether the Chief Inspector of Factories has approved the Onsite Emergency Plan?
4. Whether onsite Mock Drills are conducted once in six months?
5. Whether the recommendations of the mock drill are implemented?
6. Whether windsocks are installed? 7. Whether sensor /detectors are functional? 8. Whether the hydrant lines are always maintained with
water under adequate pressure?
9. Whether the LPG detectors are available? 10. Whether Emergency Siren System is available? 11. Whether Mutual Aid facilities are available?
IV. RISK ANALYSIS AND CONSEQUENCE MODELING 1. Whether any Risk Analysis Study has been conducted? 2. Whether DNV PHAST Software has been used in Risk
Analysis and Consequence Modeling?
3. Whether this Risk Analysis Report is approved? 4. Whether the Damage Zone has been identified? 5. Whether the Damage Zone has been superimposed on the
site plan?
6. Whether the Thermal Radiation Concept has been taken into account?
7. Whether Over-pressure Concept has been taken into account?
8. Whether confinement is not available during LPG Release?
9. Whether any Public Road is running near the LPG Storage?
10. Whether the vehicles are fitted with Spark Arrestors including internal vehicle?
V. ENVIRONMENT IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1. Whether the Factory is covered within the purview of
EIA System?
2. Whether Consent Deals with the LPG Storage available?
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3. Whether the Ambient Air Monitoring is in conformance with the requirement?
4. Whether there is any LPG Emergency effect on the atmospheric air?
5. Whether any water facility within the damage zone is likely to be affected?
6. Whether there is any Historical Monument near the damage zone?
7. Will there be any effect on Flora and Fauna? 8. Will there be any effect on Cattle Field? 9. Will there be impact effect on cultivation and
agriculture?
10. Will there be any effect on Forest zone? 11. Will there be any effect on endangered species?
VI. IMPACT RESULT AND DAMAGE CONTOUR 1. Whether the Damage Zone goes outside the compound? 2. Whether there is any possibility of Offsite Emergency? 3. Whether any Public houses are located within the
Damage Zone?
4. Whether any Schools are located within the Damage Zone?
5. Whether any open and naked flames are available within the Damage Zone?
6. Whether any hospitals are located within the Damage Zone?
7. Whether any Public Utilities are available within the Damage Zone?
8. Whether any Offsite Consequences are going to have Domino Cascading Effect?
9. Whether any Adjacent factory workers are affected? 10. Whether any Public Roads are falling within the Damage
Zone?
Name &Designation:
Sign with Date:
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After the completion of the questionnaire, the out come of the
results were discussed with the management and their signatures obtained to
confirm their acceptance.
4.2.2 Selection of Modeling Software
Around 80 software models are utilized globally for conducting
Risk Analysis studies. On detailed analysis and field experience, the DNV
Phast model was found to be the suitable software for carrying out
quantitative risk assessment studies.55 Since Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has approved this software, various Regulatory bodies and
research organizations are also using this software for conducting Risk
Analysis and Consequence Modeling for various chemicals including LPG. In
view of the above and taking into consideration the various technical inputs
and ground conditions for effective analysis with less errors and deviations,
this software was procured from DNV for the purpose of this research study.
The software was utilized to analyse the following;
- Discharge and dispersion models.
- Flammable models resulting in radiation effects for jet fires, pool fires and fire balls.
- Flame shape can be displayed in a radiation contour map.
- Explosion models to calculate overpressure and impulse effects.
- Models for toxic hazards of a release including indoor toxic dose calculations.
- Continuous validation of modeling capabilities against experimental data.
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- Use of geographical information system (GIS) for display of consequence results on maps and plot plans.
- 3 D modeling results for fire balls etc.
DNV software is licensed for the researcher and screen shot of the
opening page of the model is given in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 Snapshot showing Analytical Aspects of DNV Software Model
Screen shot showing separate folder of each company in the
software and the selection of chemical i.e. LPG is given in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 DNV Screen Shot showing Selection of Chemical LPG
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4.2.2.1 Set of Rules and Assumptions for Consequence Analysis
Consequence analysis is part of a Quantitative Risk Analysis. Here, as part of the risk modeling, the researcher adopted the following set of rules and assumptions inline with statutory obligations, prior to the execution of the risk calculations. Changes to the assumptions in this document may have an impact on the calculated risk levels. The QRA is intended to assess the total individual, societal risk to personnel and impact on environment, which includes the risk from fire and explosion events.
1. Catastrophic Rupture of LPG Bullet.
2. Release inventory is 80 % of total volume stored.
3. BLEVE is considered for calculation. Because this will give maximum impact than pipeline leak, rupture etc.
4. Release time of LPG is taken into consideration of 600 Seconds (10 Minutes) for all events.
Table 4.2 summarises the possible ignition sources applicable to the
accidental events.
Table 4.2 Possible Ignition Sources
Sl. Onsite Ignition sources
A Electrical lines within or outside the boundary
B Possible occurrence of Static electricity in storage and operation area.
C Canteen area
D Plant area
E Truck movement
F LPG yard
G Cigarette smoking and use of match box inside the premises.
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Table 4.2 (Continued)
Sl. Offsite Ignition sources
A Electrical Wires
B Domestic/Commercial Cooking activity
C Crackers
D Grass Fire
E Industrial fire outside
F Commercial Vehicle movement (Car /Trucks)
5. Wind Speed and Pasquill stability classes are taken for calculation, i.e. 5D (neutral) and 5 m/s wind speed.
6. Operating Temperature is 35oC. Bullet pressure is variable for each bullet based on the process requirements, which is given by the management concerned.
4.2.3 Method of Calculation of Consequence modeling scenarios
The purpose of conducting environmental risk assessment is to
complete the research tool questionnaire pertaining to Emergency
preparedness, Risk analysis, Environmental Impact Assessment, onsite and
offsite Impacts and damage contour. In consequence analysis, mainly the
worst - case scenarios of BLEVE, fireball, jet fire and vapour cloud
explosions are considered for calculations.
Consequence descriptions may be qualitative or quantitative
estimates of the effects of an accident in terms of factors such as health
impacts, economic loss and environmental damage. Consequence analysis
quantifies the extent of damages on onsite as well as offsite. Release
modeling is called discharge or source modeling mainly used to identify
possible worst-case scenarios such as thermal radiation effects due to fireball,
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jet fire, pool fire and shock wave pressure due to confined or unconfined
vapour cloud explosion.
Thermal radiation results are obtained in terms of heat flux in three
variables as per DNV, 37.5 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2 and 4.0 kW/m2. The results
would quantify exact damage areas in and around the LPG using automobile
industries, which includes domestic population in the vicinity, schools,
colleges, public roads and agricultural lands including flora and fauna.
The flow chart for consequence modeling scenarios is given below:
Figure 4.3 Flow Chart Scenarios
The various terms indicated in the flowchart scenario are explained
as follows:
Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) is a naturally occurring by-product of
natural gas extraction. It is a combination of propane and butane molecules,
along with trace amounts of other compounds. At a normal temperature, LPG
is a gas. Under pressurized condition, it transforms into a liquid.
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The LPG releases can be gases or two-phase substances. Gaseous
releases may result in fireball or jet fire depending on the availability of the
conditions and the effects of such combustion is thermal radiation having its
own damage distances that may either result in onsite or offsite consequences.
Thermal radiation is the emission of electromagnetic waves from
all matter that has a temperature greater than absolute zero. The heat flux
depends on the release volume of LPG. This may occur due to catastrophic
failure of LPG bullet, pipeline rupture, safety valve rupture resulting in
thermal radiation such as BLEVE, Jet fire, Pool fire etc.
The word BLEVE is an acronym for ‘‘Boiling Liquid Expanding
Vapour Explosion’’. A BLEVE is the consequence of the rupture of a
pressure vessel containing a liquefied gas. In other words, it can be explained
that a BLEVE is an explosion resulting from the failure of a vessel containing
a liquid at a temperature above its boiling point at normal atmospheric
pressure when released vapour cloud reaches ignition source, it results in the
formation of a fireball.
A flash fire is a sudden, intense fire caused by ignition of a mixture
of air and a dispersed flammable substance.
A jet fire is an intense, highly directional fire resulting from
ignition of a vapour or two phase release with significant momentum.
Radiation level depends on release quantity and wind direction.
A pool fire is from an ignited liquid pool of flammable liquid.63
A Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) is an explosion occurring
outdoors and producing a damaging overpressure. They occur by a sequence
of steps, which are:
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1) sudden release of a large quantity of flammable vapour, which occurs when a vessel containing a superheated and pressurized liquid ruptures,
2) dispersion of the vapour throughout the plant site while mixing with air, and
3) ignition of the resulting vapour cloud.
An explosion occurring within a vessel or confined area is called
confined vapour cloud explosion. These are most common and usually result
in injury to the inhabitants and extensive damage to the buildings.
An unconfined explosion occurs in the atmosphere. This type of
explosion is usually the result of a flammable gas spill and leakage due to
rupture and holes. The gas is dispersed and mixed with air until it comes in
contact with an ignition source. These explosions are very destructive, since
large quantities of gas and large areas are often involved.
A shock wave pressure or overpressure is the pressure caused by
a shock wave, over and above normal atmospheric pressure. The shock wave
may be caused by sonic boom or by explosion and the resulting overpressure.
A major emergency can be defined as an accident/incident that has
potential to cause serious injuries or loss of life. It may cause extensive
damage to property, serious disruption both in production and working of
factory and may adversely affect the environment. The factors which cause
major emergency are (i) Plant failure (ii) Human error (iii) Vehicle crash
(iv) Sabotage (v) Earthquake (vi) Natural Calamities and (vii) Fire.
‘Onsite Emergency’ is an accident/incident, which takes place in a
factory, and its effects are confined to the factory premises, involving only the
persons working in the factory and the property inside the factory.
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‘Offsite Emergency’ is an accident/incident, which takes place in a
factory and its effects are uncontrollable and spreads even outside the factory
premises, affecting the general public and property in the nearby vicinity
outside the factory.
For the purpose of Research study, two major scenarios were
considered for calculations. They are:
1. Fire due to thermal radiation and
2. Shock wave due to explosion.
4.2.3.1 Fire due to thermal radiation
In order to carry out calculation of consequence modeling, the input
parameters used for obtaining thermal radiation results due to Catastrophic
Rupture/Pipe Line Rupture are as follows:
- LPG bullet type
- LPG release capacity
- Bullet Storage Pressure
- Temperature
- Wind speed
- Stability class
- Atmospheric condition
- Humidity
- Elevation
- Release phase
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- Rupture area such as Safety relief valve, Unloading tanker and lines
- Pipe line Diameter, Length
- Pipe line pressure
The study report contains, three levels of thermal radiation damage
results, which are reflected in terms of heat flux in kW/M2. The three levels
are:
37.5 kW/m2 - Sufficient to cause major damage and 100 %
fatality
12.5 kW/m2 - Minimum energy required for melting plastic
and1% fatality
4.0 kW/m2 - Cause pain for prolonged exposure.
The following results containing thermal radiation damage
distances are accounted and incorporated in layouts for each sample
companies.
1. Snapshot showing Radiation effect - Fire Ball.
2. Snapshot showing Intensity versus radiation distances Fireball.
3. Snapshot showing Thermal radiation results incorporated in the layout.
Thermal radiation distances are dependant on mass and storage
pressure. As the mass increases, there will be repeated explosion / fire since
the availability of certain quantity of combustive LPG within the
flammable/explosive range will be restricted and hence the damage zone will
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be less even though the quantity is more and the relationship between quantity
/mass and damage distance is neither linear nor proportional.
Further, storage pressure is directly proportional to thermal radiation
distance. For e.g., In the case of 95 MT, storage pressure is 16 Bar and the
radiation distance are 193 M. However for 1350 MT the storage pressure is
very less, 4 Bar only and hence the damage distance is also less and restricted
to 303 M.
The source of heat generation is at the centre of LPG bullet. Due to
the subsequent explosion at the same place and since the storage pressure is
very less proportionately the damage distance is also very less.
4.2.3.2 Vapour Cloud Explosion
Shock wave pressure occurs due to confined or unconfined Vapour
Cloud Explosions. An explosion occurring outdoors beginning with the
unplanned release of a large quantity of flammable gas or vapourising liquid
which ignites following the formation of a cloud or plume of pre-mixed fuel
and air. The speed of flame travelling through the cloud may approach
detonation velocity with a massive pressure rise63.
The following three levels of shock wave pressure are only
calculated for research study purpose and the same are as under:
0.20 bar - Heavy damage
0.13 bar - Moderate damage
0.02 bar - Significant or minor damage.
The following results containing thermal radiation damage
distances are accounted and incorporated in layouts for each sample
companies.
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1. Snapshot of shock wave pressures (Catastrophic Rupture).
2. Snapshot of shockwave pressure versus distances.
3. Snapshot of shock wave pressure results incorporated in the layout.
The result clearly reveals exact damage areas in and around the
LPG using automobile industries, by which impact on domestic population in
the vicinity, schools, colleges, public roads and agricultural lands including
flora and fauna are quantified.
4.3 DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SCENARIOS CALCULATED
FOR FIVE INDUSTRIES
For the purpose of detailed discussion of scenarios, the researcher
selected five samples among 35 industries having LPG storage in the
premises, one each from five different locations in the State of Tamilnadu.
The scenarios calculated for five industries are discussed in Table 4.3 given
below:
Table 4.3 Selected Five Industries Detail
SL Industry List Sl.
No.
LPG Bullet Capacity
Pressure Details
Quantity Discharged
(80%)
Location of the Plant
1 1 95 MT 16.00 Bar 76 MT Sriperumpudur
2 7 20 MT 14.50 Bar 16 MT Kancheepuram
3 15 5 MT 6.00 Bar 4 MT Mahindra World City
4 23 30 MT 14.50 Bar 24 MT Tiruvallur
5 30 10 MT 5.00 Bar 5.0 MT Hosur
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The name of the chemical, mass inventory in kg. storage conditions
such as pressure and temperature are fed into the software through the drop
boxes. The LPG chemical and its storage and inventory information are fed
for all the selected LPG storages and accordingly, modeling was done.
The toxic and explosion parameters, fire ball, jet fire, pool fire are
arrived for different scenarios, materials, discharge parameters for short pipe,
dispersion and bund, building and terrain conditions.
Scenario type includes line rupture, leak and catastrophic failure of
LPG storage and piping system. Piping dimension, which includes internal
diameter of the pipe and pipe length are fed to the software for each sample of
the study. For hole leak, the orifice diameter, which is a primary factor that
decides release velocity and length is fed to the software for such modeling.
The software also accommodates release location i.e. height of release from
the ground level which again will impact the liquid column above the point of
release from the ground level.
4.3.1 Modeling Results of Thermal Radiation of Industry No.1
(95MT Bullet - BLEVE)
The results of thermal radiation of 95 MT bullet leads to 37.5
kW/m2 (100% Fatal Zone) and extends to 193 m, 12.5 kW/m2 extends to
459 m and 4 kW/m2 extends to 846 m. Snapshot showing radiation effect of
Industry No.1 are given in Figure 4.4.
In figure 4.5, the snapshot showing thermal radiation versus
distances for fireball are calculated and shown. At a required distance, the
radiation effects are calculated and accordingly, the location of machinery and
workstation can be decided.
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Figure 4.4 Snapshot showing Radiation Effect of Industry No.1- Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.5 Snapshot Graph showing Radiation versus Distance for Industry No.1 - Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
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Figure 4.6 shows the snapshot of thermal radiation results
incorporated in the layout for Industry No.1 and its damage effect, which
extends to onsite as well as offsite to a radius of 846 m. The damage zone
covers three factories, National Highway NH-4 and adjacent road (100 Ft),
temple and office structure. In case of any other chemicals stored and handled
by the any other factories located within the damage zone, this may further
lead to domino effect.
The result calls for the urgent need of preparation of onsite and
offsite plan by the management concerned and obtaining approvals from the
statutory authority.
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Figure 4.6 Snapshot showing Thermal Radiation Result Incorporated in the Layout of Industry No.1
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4.3.2 Modeling Results of Vapour Cloud Explosion of Industry No.1
(95MT Bullet - VCE)
The results of shock wave pressure of 95 MT bullet leads to 0.20
kg/cm2 extends to 383 m, 0.13 kg/cm2 extends to 428 m and 0.02 kg/cm2
extends to 1734 m. Figure 4.7 shows snapshot of shock wave pressure for
Industry No.1.
Figure 4.7 Snapshot showing Shock Wave Pressure Results for Industry No.1 (5D Stability Class)
The shock wave pressure versus distances are calculated and given
in Figure 4.8.
At a required distance, overpressure effects can be calculated and
accordingly, the location of machinery and workstation can be decided.
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Figure 4.8 Snapshot Graph showing Worst Case Late Explosive Overpressure versus Distance for Industry No.1 (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.9 shows the shock wave pressure results for Industry No.1
incorporated in the layout and its damage effect, which extends onsite and
offsite to the radius of 1745 m. The damage zone covers five factories, pond,
trees, shops, National Highway NH-4 and adjacent road (100 Ft), temple and
office structure.
The result calls for the urgent need of preparation of an onsite and
offsite plan by the management concerned and obtaining approvals from the
statutory authority.
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Figure 4.9 Snapshot showing Shock Wave Pressure Results Incorporated in the Layout for Industry No.1 (5D Stability Class)
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4.3.3 Modeling Results of Thermal Radiation of Industry No.7(20MT
Bullet - BLEVE)
The results of thermal radiation effect of Industry No.7 of 20 MT
bullet leads to 37.5 kW/m2 (100% Fatal Zone) and extends to 56 m,
12.5 kW/m2 extends to 220 m and 4 kW/m2 extends to 427 m. Figure 4.10
shows the thermal radiation results for Industry No.7.
Figure 4.10 Snapshot showing Thermal Radiation Effect for Industry No.7- Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
The thermal radiation versus distances for Industry No.7 are
calculated and given in Figure 4.11.
At a required distance, the radiation effects can be calculated and
accordingly, the location of machinery and workstation can be decided.
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Figure 4.11 Snapshot Graph showing Radiation versus Distance for Industry No.7 - Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.12 shows the results of thermal radiation for Industry No.7
incorporated in the layout and its damage effect, which extends onsite as well
as offsite to a radius of 427 m. The damage zone covers agricultural lands,
cattle field and proposed construction of supplier park industries. In case of
any other chemicals stored and handled by the factories located within the
damage zone, this may lead to domino effect.
The result calls for urgent need of preparation of onsite and offsite
plan by the management concerned and obtaining approvals from the
statutory authority.
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Figure 4.12 Snapshot showing Thermal Radiation Result Incorporated in the layout for Industry No.7
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4.3.4 Modeling Results of Vapour Cloud Explosion of Industry No.7
(20MT Bullet - VCE)
The results of shock wave pressure of 20 MT bullet leads to 0.20
kg/cm2, which extends to 196 m, 0.13 kg/cm2 extends to 242 m and 0.02
kg/cm2 extends to 999 m. Figure 4.13 shows the snapshot of shock wave
pressure results for Industry No.7.
Figure 4.13 Snapshot showing Shock Wave Pressure Results for Industry No.7 (5D Stability Class)
The shock wave pressures versus distances are calculated for
Industry No.7 are given in Figure 4.14.
At a required distance, overpressure effects can be calculated and
accordingly, the location of machinery and workstation are decided.
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Figure 4.14 Snapshot Graph showing Worst Case Late Explosive Overpressure versus Distance for Industry No.7 (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.15 shows the shock wave pressure result in respect of
Industry No.7 and damage effect, which extends to onsite and offsite for a
radius of 999 m. The damage zone covers agricultural lands, cattle field and
proposed construction of supplier park industries.
The result calls for the urgent need of preparation of onsite and
offsite plan by the management concerned and obtaining approvals from the
statutory authority.
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Figure 4.15 Snapshot of Shock Wave Pressure Result Incorporated in the Layout of Industry No.7 (5D Stability Class)
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4.3.5 Modeling Results of Thermal Radiation of Industry No.15
(5MT Bullet – BLEVE)
The results of thermal radiation of 5 MT bullet leads to 37.5 kg/cm2
(100% Fatal Zone) and extends to 129 m, for 12.5 kg/cm2 extends to 459 m
and 4 kg/cm2 extends to 256 m. Figure 4.16 shows the snapshot of radiation
effect for Industry No.15.
Figure 4.16 Snapshot showing Radiation Effect for Industry No.15 - Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
The thermal radiation versus distances for Industry No.15 are
calculated and given in Figure 4.17. At a required distance, the radiation
effects can be calculated and accordingly, the location of machinery and
workstation can be decided.
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Figure 4.17 Snapshot Graph showing Radiation versus Distance for Industry No.15.Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.18 shows the snapshot of thermal radiation result for
Industry No.15 incorporated in the layout and the damage effect, which
extends onsite as well as offsite to a radius of 256 m. The damage zone covers
the nearest village and agricultural lands including cattle field.
In case of any other chemicals stored and handled by the factories
located within the damage zone, this may lead to domino effect. The result
calls for the urgent need of preparation of onsite and offsite plan by the
management concerned and obtaining approvals from the statutory authority.
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Figure 4.18 Snapshot showing Thermal Radiation Result Incorporated in the Layout of Industry No.15.
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4.3.6 Modeling Results of Vapour cloud Explosion of Industry No.15
(5MT Bullet - VCE)
The results of shock wave pressure of 5 MT bullet leads to 0.20
kg/cm2 extends to 123 m, 0.13 kg/cm2 extends to 150 m and 0.02 kg/cm2
extends to 611 m. Figure 4.19 shows the snapshot of shock wave pressure
results for Industry No.15.
Figure 4.19 Snapshot showing Shock Wave Pressure Results for Industry No.15 (5D Stability Class)
The shock wave pressure versus distances are calculated and given
in Figure 4.20.
At a required distance, overpressure effects can be calculated and
accordingly, the location of machinery and workstation can be decided.
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Figure 4.20 Snapshot Graph showing Worst Case Late Explosive Overpressure versus Distance for Industry No.15 (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.21 shows the shock wave pressure result for Industry
No.15 incorporated in the layout and the damage effect, which extends onsite
and offsite to the radius of 611 m. The damage zone covers the nearest
automobile factory having LPG installation, village, houses and agricultural
lands including cattle field.
The result calls for the urgent need of preparation of onsite and
offsite plan by the management concerned and obtaining approvals from the
statutory authority.
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Figure 4.21 Snapshot showing Shock Wave Pressure Results Incorporated in the Layout for Industry No.15 (5D Stability Class)
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4.3.7 Modeling Results of Thermal Radiation of Industry No.23
(30MT Bullet – BLEVE)
The results of thermal radiation of 30 MT bullet leads to 37.5
kW/m2 (100% Fatal Zone) and extends to 87 m, 12.5 kW/m2 extends to 269 m
and 4 kW/m2 extends to 512 m. Figure 4.22 shows the thermal radiation effect
for Industry No.23.
Figure 4.22 Snapshot showing Thermal Radiation Effect for Industry No.23- Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
The thermal radiation versus distances for Industry No.23 are
calculated and given in Figure 4.23. At a required distance, radiation effects
can be calculated and accordingly, the location of machinery and workstation
are decided.
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Figure 4.23 Snapshot Graph showing Radiation versus Distance for Industry No.23- Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.24 shows the thermal radiation result of Industry No.23
incorporated in the layout and its damage effect, which extends onsite as well
as offsite to a radius of 512 m. The damage zone covers one factory having
LPG bullets, storm water canal in longitudinal direction of length covering
approximately one kilometer with small area of cattle fields. In case of any
other chemicals stored and handled by the factories located within the damage
zone, this may lead to domino effect.
The result calls for the urgent need of preparation of onsite and
offsite plan by the management concerned and obtaining approvals from the
statutory authority.
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Figure 4.24 Snapshot showing Thermal Radiation Result Incorporated in the Layout for Industry No.23.
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4.3.8 Modeling Results of Vapour Cloud Explosion of Industry No.23
(30MT Bullet – VCE)
The results of shock wave pressure of 30 MT bullet leads to 0.20
kg/cm2 extends to 224 m, 0.13 kg/cm2 extends to 275 m and 0.02 kg/cm2
extends to 1149 m. Figure 4.25 shows the snapshot for shock wave pressure
result of Industry No.23.
Figure 4.25 Snapshot showing Shock Wave Pressure Results for Industry No.23 (5D Stability Class)
The shock wave pressure versus distance was calculated and given
in Figure 4.26.
At a required distance, the overpressure effects can be calculated
and accordingly, the location of machinery and workstation can be decided.
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Figure 4.26 Snapshot Graph showing Worst Case Late Explosive Overpressure versus Distance for Industry No.23 (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.27 shows the shock wave pressure result of Industry No.23
and the damage effect, which extends onsite and offsite to a radius of 1149 m.
The damage zone covers three factories, between this two factories having
LPG bullets, warehouse, school and storm water canal, state highway and
adjacent road (40 ft) and symmetry.
The result calls for the urgent need of preparation of onsite and
offsite plan by the management concerned and obtaining approvals from the
statutory authority.
107
Figure 4.27 Snapshot of Shock Wave Pressure Results Incorporated in the Layout for Industry No.23 (5D Stability Class)
108
4.3.9 Modeling Results of Thermal Radiation of Industry No. 30
(10MT Bullet – BLEVE)
The results of thermal radiation of 10 MT bullet leads to 37.5
kW/m2 (100% Fatal Zone) and extends to 22 m, 12.5 kW/m2 extends to 155 m
and 4 kW/m2 extends to 307 m. Figure 4.28 shows the snapshot of thermal
radiation effect for Industry No.30.
Figure 4.28 Snapshot showing Thermal Radiation Effect of Industry No 30- Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
The thermal radiation versus distances was calculated and given in
Figure 4.29. At a required distance, the radiation effects can be calculated and
accordingly, the location of machinery and workstation can be decided.
109
Figure 4.29 Snapshot Graph showing Radiation versus Distance for Industry No.30- Fire Ball (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.30 shows the thermal radiation result of Industry No.30
incorporated in the layout and its damage effect, which extends onsite as well
as offsite to a radius of 307 m. The damage zone covers five small shops,
state highway, eight numbers of houses and agricultural lands with cattle
fields. In case of any other chemicals stored and handled by the factories
located within the damage zone, this may lead to domino effect.
The result calls for the urgent need of preparation of onsite and
offsite plan by the management concerned and obtaining approvals from the
statutory authority.
110
Figure 4.30 Snapshot showing Thermal Radiation Result Incorporated in the Layout for Industry No.30
111
4.3.10 Modeling Results of Vapour Cloud Explosion of Industry No.
30 (10MT Bullet – VCE)
The results of shock wave pressure of 10 MT bullet leads to 0.20
kg/cm2 extends to 146 m, 0.13 kg/cm2 extends to 179 m and 0.02 kg/cm2
extends to 755 m. Figure 4.31 shows the snapshot of shock wave pressure
results for Industry No.30.
Figure 4.31 Snapshot showing Shock Wave Pressure Results for Industry No.30 (5D Stability Class)
The shock wave pressure versus distance was calculated and given
in Figure 4.32. At a required distance, the overpressure effects can be
calculated and accordingly, the location of machinery and workstation can be
decided.
112
Figure 4.32 Snapshot Graph showing Worst Case Late Explosive Overpressure versus Distance for Industry No.30 (5D Stability Class)
Figure 4.33 shows the snapshot of shock wave pressure results
incorporated in the layout for Industry No.30 and its damage effect, which
extends onsite and offsite to the radius of 755 m. The damage zone covers a
village with domestic population and their houses, state highway and village
road (30 Ft), agricultural land with cattle fields.
The result calls for the urgent need of preparation of onsite and
offsite plan by the management concerned and obtaining approvals from the
statutory authority.
113
Figure 4.33 Snapshot of Shock Wave Pressure Results Incorporated in the Layout for Industry No.30 (5D Stability Class)
114
4.4 COMPUTATION OF MODELING SCENARIO RESULTS
OF ALL THIRTY-FIVE INDUSTRIES.
Consequence Modeling scenarios such as thermal radiation and
vapour cloud explosion results of all thirty-five industries were consolidated
and the results are discussed as given below in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4Modeling Scenario Results of all thirty-five Industries
SL
Cap
acity
of B
ulle
ts
in M
T
Dis
char
ge Q
ty in
(8
0%) M
T
Pres
sure
in B
ar
Thermal Radiation Vapour cloud
explosion
37.5 12.5 4.0 0.20 0.13 0.02
kW/m2 Bar
Radius in Meter
1 95.0 76.0 16.0 193 459 846 383 428 1734
2 4.7 3.76 6.0 21 130 257 119 146 603
3 9.35 7.48 6.0 36 167 327 151 185 775
4 5.0 4.0 6.0 9 129 256 123 150 611
5 9.35 7.48 7.0 43 172 335 150 184 777
6 4.7 3.76 6.0 21 130 257 119 146 603
7 20.0 16.0 14.5 56 220 427 196 242 999
8 4.6 3.68 6.0 21 129 255 118 144 601
9 100 80.0 16.0 196 467 860 390 435 1765
10 9.35 7.48 5.00 25 162 319 152 186 772
11 30.0 24.0 14.5 87 269 512 224 275 1149
12 7.49 5.99 6.0 31 154 303 140 174 730
13 9.1 7.28 6.0 35 166 324 150 183 771
14 15.0 12.0 8.0 63 210 402 177 219 921
15 5.0 4.0 6.0 9 129 256 123 150 611
115
Table 4.4 (Continued) SL
Cap
acity
of B
ulle
ts
in M
T
Dis
char
ge Q
ty in
(8
0%) M
T
Pres
sure
in B
ar
Thermal Radiation Vapour cloud
explosion
37.5 12.5 4.0 0.20 0.13 0.02
kW/m2 Bar
Radius in Meter
16 50.0 40 14.5 144 359 668 306 343 1399
17 33.0 26.4 14.5 123 310 578 262 298 1224
18 9.36 7.48 7.0 43 172 335 150 184 777
19 10.0 8.0 6.0 37 171 335 155 190 785
20 17.0 13.6 18.5 103 256 477 209 237 973
21 25.0 20.0 14.5 110 281 525 238 271 1104
22 7.5 6.0 6.0 31 154 303 140 174 730
23 30.0 24.0 14.5 87 269 512 224 275 1149
24 15.0 12.0 7.0 56 204 395 176 219 921
25 4.6 3.68 5.0 7 125 249 119 146 598
26 4.7 3.76 6.0 21 130 257 119 146 603
27 10.0 8.0 6.0 37 171 335 155 190 785
28 9.35 7.48 5.5 31 165 323 151 185 774
29 25.0 20.0 18.5 120 294 545 241 271 1104
30 10.0 8.0 5.0 22 155 307 146 179 755
31 5.0 4.0 6.0 9 129 256 123 150 611
32 10.0 8.0 2.5 NR 146 298 160 196 801
33 9.35 7.48 7.0 43 172 335 150 184 777
34 9.4 7.52 14.5 73 198 374 169 194 792
35 1350 1080 4.0 303 911 1715 845 1019 4162
116
4.4.1 Analysis of Onsite and Offsite Results for 35 industries
The results reveal the damage distances from the source. Based on
the damage distance levels, onsite emergency and offsite emergency were
identified. If the damage distance is restricted within the premises and within
the boundary, it is called as onsite damage only. If the damage distance goes
beyond the boundary, it is called as offsite damage.
During the field visit, it was observed that in most of the industries
fire hydrant system, LPG vessel maintenance, adequacy and intactness of the
dyke, LPG sensor/detector, access control, static discharge facilities,
provision of wheel stoppers, emergency siren system and mutual aid
arrangement system were missing.
During the verification of records pertaining to safety management
system, emergency preparedness, consequence modeling and impact study
details carried out in the company, it was found that components of safety
management system such as safe operating procedures, implementation of
hazardous area classification system and other communicational warning
procedures were not given due importance by the companies. Most of the
industries did not have the mandatory document of Onsite Emergency Plan
(OSEP), offsite emergency plan and risk assessment report. The probability of
onsite and offsite emergency plan to protect the surrounding facilities, general
public and environmental aspects were not properly addressed and ensured.
In view of the above lacuna, the researcher prepared a detailed
onsite emergency plan and risk assessment report for the industries
concerned. As committed by the researcher, the results were shared with each
industry and a report was prepared on the possible consequences in case of
accidental release of LPG stored. Accordingly, the report of OSEP was
prepared as per Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals
117
Rules 1989 (MSIHC Rules 1989) and submitted to all the 35 industries by the
researcher with suitable suggestions/recommendations for implementation.
This document could be used by the industries concerned for obtaining
approvals by the statutory authority like Director Industrial Safety and Health,
Government of Tamilnadu and Tamilnadu Pollution Control Board.
The offsite emergency plan preparation would be taken care by the
district administration for all the hazardous installation in other factories
located in the district level. Hence, the management concerned should take
efforts towards the preparation of offsite emergency plan with the help of the
district administration.
All the managements shall cover the Public liability insurance to
the equal value of affected victims in terms of human population and
environmental facility in the vicinity, in case of emergency.
4.5 CONSOLIDATION OF QUESTIONAIRE RESULTS
The primary data for all the 35 industries were personally collected.
Secondary data were prepared based on the collected primary data and both
the data was fed into the questionnaire in order to calculate the actual impacts
on environment. The completed data with respect to risk, consequences
modeling of various scenarios, emergency preparedness, environment impact
assessment and damage zones were systematically analyzed and the results
were tabulated.
4.5.1 Completion of Research Questionnaire
The results were organized based on the total number of companies
satisfying partially or fully with the statutory requirements and the same are
tabulated as shown in Table 4.5. Green colour coding indicates a positive
118
impact on environment and the red coding shows a negative impact to the
environment in percentages.
Table 4.5 Consolidated Questionnaire Results
Description
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
List of Factories 1 2 3 4 LPG Bullet Statutory 80 20 80 20 70 30 60 40 Safety Management System 80 20 60 40 30 70 10 90 Emergency Preparedness 90 10 90 10 70 30 70 30 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 70 30 80 20 50 50 60 40
Environment Impact Assessment 80 20 80 20 70 30 70 30
Impact Results and Damage Contour 20 80 90 10 40 60 40 60
List of Factories 5 6 7 8 LPG Bullet Statutory 50 50 80 20 100 0 50 50 Safety Management System 60 40 60 40 60 40 40 60 Emergency Preparedness 70 30 90 10 30 70 30 70 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 80 20 90 10 10 90 20 80
Environment Impact Assessment 60 40 80 20 60 40 50 50
Impact Results and Damage Contour 50 50 40 60 30 70 20 80
List of Factories 9 10 11 12 LPG Bullet Statutory 90 10 80 20 100 0 70 30 Safety Management System 70 30 50 50 100 0 70 30 Emergency Preparedness 90 10 70 30 90 10 80 20 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 70 30 60 40 90 10 80 20
119
Table 4.5 (Continued)
Description
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Environment Impact Assessment 50 50 60 40 30 70 70 30
Impact Results and Damage Contour 50 50 10 90 100 0 80 20
List of Factories 13 14 15 16 LPG Bullet Statutory 90 10 100 0 70 30 70 30 Safety Management System 70 30 80 20 80 20 70 30 Emergency Preparedness 90 10 90 10 80 20 60 40 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 70 30 70 30 80 20 90 10
Environment Impact Assessment 60 40 80 20 40 60 60 40
Impact Results and Damage Contour 20 80 40 60 60 40 40 60
List of Factories 17 18 19 20 LPG Bullet Statutory 70 30 80 20 50 50 80 20 Safety Management System 70 30 50 50 60 40 70 30 Emergency Preparedness 60 40 90 10 60 40 80 20 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 80 20 70 30 60 40 80 20
Environment Impact Assessment 80 20 80 20 80 20 70 30
Impact Results and Damage Contour 60 40 20 80 20 80 30 70
List of Factories 21 22 23 24 LPG Bullet Statutory 90 10 80 20 70 30 80 20 Safety Management System 80 20 70 30 60 40 80 20 Emergency Preparedness 90 10 90 10 80 20 70 30 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 80 20 80 20 80 20 60 40
120
Table 4.5 (Continued)
Description
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Posi
tive
Impa
ct
Neg
ativ
e Im
pact
Environment Impact Assessment 50 50 50 50 80 20 50 50
Impact Results and Damage Contour 50 50 50 50 60 40 60 40
List of Factories 25 26 27 28 LPG Bullet Statutory 50 50 60 40 50 50 70 30 Safety Management System 60 40 50 50 10 90 40 60 Emergency Preparedness 60 40 80 20 20 80 60 40 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 70 30 60 40 40 60 50 50
Environment Impact Assessment 60 40 60 40 80 20 70 30
Impact Results and Damage Contour 50 50 30 70 80 20 20 80
List of Factories 29 30 31 32 LPG Bullet Statutory 60 40 70 30 80 20 80 20 Safety Management System 70 30 60 40 70 30 70 30 Emergency Preparedness 70 30 80 20 80 20 70 30 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 70 30 80 20 80 20 70 30
Environment Impact Assessment 70 30 50 50 80 20 70 30
Impact Results and Damage Contour 30 70 40 60 30 70 90 10
List of Factories 33 34 35
LPG Bullet Statutory 100 0 80 20 80 20 Safety Management System 90 10 80 20 70 30 Emergency Preparedness 90 10 70 30 90 10 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 80 20 80 20 60 40
Environment Impact Assessment 90 10 70 30 70 30
Impact Results and Damage Contour 100 0 70 30 20 80
121
The above results were further compiled element wise to arrive at
the average positive and negative impact results of all thirty-five factories as
shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 Compiled Impact Results of all Sample Industries
Impact of Factories Total Positive
Impact Total Negative
Impact
LPG Bullet Statutory 75% 25%
Safety Management System 63% 37%
Emergency Preparedness 74% 26%
Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling 69% 31%
Environment Impact Assessment 66% 34%
Impact Results and Damage Contour 49% 51%
The performance of each establishment in terms of compliance was
recorded. Both these organized data were taken for the analysis along with the
parameters such as location of LPG installations, safety management system
in the site, effective emergency preparedness as per statutory requirement,
risk analysis and consequence modeling, environment impact assessment and
damage contour onsite as well as offsite in case of emergency.
4.5.2 Preparation of Histogram
The histogram is a graphical representation of the distribution of
the data as shown in Figures 4.34. This histogram represents the number of
industries complying the set criteria mentioned in the questionnaire. The ‘yes’
status means the positive impacts of compliance of relevant statutes by the
industry and no status represent negative impact i.e. Non-compliance to the
statutory.
122
Figure 4.34 The Number of Sample Industries with ‘YES’ Status only.
123
In Figure 4.35, the bar chart represents the comparative value of
each element in percentage for all the 35 industries indicating both ‘Yes’ and
‘No’ status.
Figure 4.35 The Number of ‘YES’ Status and ‘NO’ Status of the Selected 35 Industries.
124
The analysis suggests that the study factors differ from each other
and the salient observations are as follows:
1) Impact results of LPG bullet installation and statutory
requirements:
Figure 4.36 shows the average results of 35 industries on LPG
bullet and statutory requirement.
Figure 4.36 LPG Bullet and Statutory Requirement
The average results indicate a 75% positive impact and 25%
negative Impact.
Further, all the thirty-five factories surveyed have valid PESO
(Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organization) license. Also, more than
70% of the industries have functional safety equipments and other facilities
mentioned in the items. Deficiency observed was, that they do not have
adequate and intact dyke wall facility. Referring to Figure 4.35, seventh,
eleventh, fourteenth and thirty-third industries satisfy all the requirements of
LPG bullet storage. But fifth, nineteenth, twenty fifth, twenty seventh
125
companies do not satisfy even half the criteria set by the researcher in line
with statutory requirement and hence these companies need to be more
concerned about the LPG bullets storage conditions.
2) Impact results of safety management system:
Figure 4.37 shows the average results of 35 industries on safety
management system.
Figure 4.37 Safety Management System
The average results indicate a 63% positive impact and 37%
negative Impact.
Investigating the safety management system at automobile
industries, there appeared to have adequate supervision during unloading and
effective access control but there was no adequate display of unloading
procedures in 75% of the companies. One third of the factories do not have
wooden wheel stoppers and hazardous area classification system. Referring to
Figure 4.35. The 11th industry satisfies all the requirements of safety
management system. But third, fourth, eighth, twenty seventh and twenty
126
eighth companies do not satisfy even half the criteria set by the statutory
authority. These companies need to focus more on the safety management
system.
3) Impact results of emergency preparedness:
Figure 4.38 shows the average results of 35 industries on
Emergency Preparedness.
Figure 4.38 Emergency Preparedness
The average results indicate a 74% positive impact and 26%
negative Impact.
As per the emergency preparedness plan requirement, about 94 %
of automobile industries surveyed have emergency plans and the necessary
equipments. One third of the industries lack emergency siren system and
hydrant lines with static water storage. It was observed that 43 % of the
industries do not have wind sacks installation and 72 % of mutual aid
facilities.
127
4) Impact results of risk analysis and consequence Modeling:
Figure 4.39 shows the average results of 35 industries on Risk
Analysis and Consequence Modeling.
Figure 4.39 Risk Analysis and Consequence Modeling
The average results indicate a 69% positive impact and 31%
negative Impact.
As per the Risk and consequence modeling, nearly half the
automobile industries do not have enough space for dispersion of leaked gases
during emergency release of LPG. The space looks very confined. In this
condition, damage level goes up very high in case of emergency. 49% of
industries do not have vehicles with spark arrester. Approximately half the
industries are nearer to the public roads, which may cause severe damage
during accidents. Besides, most of the automobile industries do not take over-
pressure concept into account.
128
5) Impact Results of environment impact assessment:
Figure 4.40 shows the average results of 35 industries on
Environment Impact Assessment.
Figure 4.40 Environmental Impact Assessment
The average results indicate a 66% positive impact and 34%
negative Impact.
Analyzing the environment of surrounding industries, it is observed
that more than half the factories are located at sites surrounded by agricultural
land. The deposition of the air pollutants might reach these lands and cause
damage to the crops.
6) Impact results and damage contour:
Figure 4.41 shows the average results of 35 industries on Impact
results and damage contour.
129
Figure 4.41 Impact Results and Damage Contour
The average results indicate a 49% positive impact and 51%
negative Impact.
Nearly 81% of the factories do not have proper facility inside the
damage zone except second, twelfth, twenty-seventh, thirty-second, thirty-
fourth factories.
4.6 SUMMARY
Of the 80 software models used widely, DNV Phast was selected
for the calculation and analysis of data collected from 35 industries. For easy
understanding of the scenario and results, data with respect to five industries
out of 35 industries, were chosen for detailed calculation and results discussed
in detail with graphs and damage contours in layout map. The data with
respect to35 industries on thermal radiation level, shock wave pressure level,
and damage contour etc., were calculated and the results consolidated as
percentage. Accordingly, histograms and compliance status charts for all the
industries were prepared based on the data results. Further, the main element
130
wise consolidation of data of 35 industries was compiled and results were
obtained.
The compliance to the statutory requirements of the LPG bullets is
only 75%, which clearly indicates that a lot needs to be done in legal
compliance even though the same is only a bare minimum requirement.
The Safety Management System is implemented only for 63%,
which clearly demonstrates that the remaining industries, elements of safety
management system such as safety organization, accident investigation,
hazard identification, standard operating procedure, standard maintenance
procedure, work permit, corrosion monitoring etc. are having deficiencies
which may result in accidents or LPG releases, if these deficiencies are
aligned and allowed to occur in series.
Emergency Preparedness in terms of onsite and offsite emergency
planning is the last layer of protection after the LPG release or accidental
scenarios. Immediate interventions without any time delay in a methodical
manner can minimize the effects and consequences of such releases. This
element is also lagging to the extent of 26%, which necessitates the LPG
handling automobile industries to strengthen the emergency preparedness
system.
Risk Analysis and Consequence modeling studies are neither
carried out nor implemented in31% of the sample LPG handling automobile
industries, thus depriving them the knowledge on understanding of damage
distances, losses and socio-economic consequences.
Environmental Impact Assessment is lagging to the extent of 34%
among the sample industries which demonstrates that the environmental
aspects are not given enough focus and the impact assessment need to be
131
understood and appreciated in proper perspective for having least impact on
the environment.
The impact results and damage contour of 51% effect on the
facilities in and around the plant clearly establishes that half of the LPG
handling industries are prone to major losses in and around the plant, thus
putting the facility, operating personnel and public living in and around the
premises in jeopardy.