CHAPTER 3 CONCEPT OF ELECTRONIC...
Transcript of CHAPTER 3 CONCEPT OF ELECTRONIC...
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CHAPTER 3
CONCEPT OF ELECTRONIC VOTING
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A voting machine is the combination of electromechanical,
mechanical or electronic equipment which includes its software, firmware and
the required documentation to program control and support equipment used to
count and cast votes, defined ballots, to display or report election result and to
produce and maintain audit trail information. This machine is able to provide
the voter hasty feedback such as over voting or under voting results in a
spoiled ballot. This machine has different levels of security, usability,
accuracy and efficiency. The first voting machine made was mechanical. Now
the most commonly used machine is electronic.
3.1.1 Need for Electronic Voting System
The main reason that people want to extend an electronic voting
system is its mobility. People always prefer to cast their votes if they can cast
votes from their computers at homes, offices, and schools. Besides, each
election day the government spends much money on bussing people to get
back their home to vote. If people can cast their votes from anywhere, not
only the voter participation might increase, but also the government may save
money.
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3.1.2 Benefits of Electronic Voting System
The greatest potential benefit is the increase in speed of the ballot
tabulation process. As the votes are stored digitally and the counting process is
automatic, the waiting time for the results is reduced significantly. The increase
in accuracy of the results is another advantage, but it depends on the kind of
system used and the design and conditions of the hardware and software, as well
as human behaviour (Fisher 2001). The accuracy of the results is threatened by
security risks that in some cases are more devastating than the security risks
involved in the traditional paper based voting systems.
The important issue that has to be highlighted is the cost associated
with electronic voting. The initial investment that the government has to make
to procure hardware and software is very high. It brings economies of scale as
the increase of the size of the electoral roll does not increase the cost linearly
(Riera and Brown 2003). It also brings savings in future elections as the
hardware and software are reusable because the votes can be stored, counted
and erased in computer memory.
Accessibility is another added value for electronic voting systems, as
it allows alternative ways to access the ballots. It decreases rate of
abstention, because the remote voting method allows widespread
technologies to be used, such as cell phones (for SMS voting) or the Internet.
The voters no need to move physically to a voting centre to cast their votes.
It provides geographic independence, better accessibility to the disabled
people and so increasing electoral participation (Riera and Brown 2003).
In electronic voting, the ballots are designed through computer
systems and hence it provides multiple language options on the ballot. If the
system is user-friendly, then it will also offer more information about each
candidate to help the voters in their selection. Electronic voting systems can
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eliminate common errors as under voting (voting for less than the allowed
number of candidates) or over voting (voting for more than the allowed
number of candidates). In case of an error, the system will display an error
message to the voter and ask him or her to repeat the vote.
These are the most important advantages of the electronic
voting systems; the disadvantages involve many security issues (Bederson,
2003) that need to be analysed in detail. Therefore this chapter presents a
review of the security risks involved in the electronic voting systems.
3.1.3 Risks in Electronic Voting System
Unauthorized intervention of third parties in the voting process.
Given the current state of information technology, there is no
guarantee, that a programme would not be manipulated to
allow the storage and printing of a form or document different
from the one appearing on the screen (Economist 2002).
More difficult to detect and identify the source of errors and
technical malfunctions than with conventional procedures.
Possibility that fully digitized system would fail to produce
results and lack physical back-up records, making a public
recount difficult or impossible.
3.2 DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELECTRONIC VOTING
Voting machines are useful utensils built to progress the election
process. They are mixture of mechanical, electromechanical, electronic and
software components working together in order to define ballots, cast and
count votes, report ultimately errors, report final results and guarantee the
safety, the privacy and the security of each polling. Historic voting machines
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are made by mechanical components and they print the results on final paper.
Voting machines are used to define, cast and count ballots for this reason it is
important to verify the security level that every voting machine has reached; a
compromised voting machine may compromise the whole election process
periling to the democracy. There are different types of electronic voting
systems which are being used globally at present. Due to the advent of
internet, voting process has been made easier to the voters.
In recent years, electronic voting systems have mostly eliminated
the traditional hand-counted paper ballots in most states and countries. These
new systems can be divided into three categories : (i) Paper based voting
system or conventional voting system, (ii) Direct Recording Electronic voting
(DRE) and (iii) Remote voting system.
3.2.1 Paper-Based Voting System
Is the traditional voting process used in the past in many countries.
Votes are registered on paper, punch-cards or mark-sense cards, and the results
are generated on paper. It is also known as Manual Vote Collection (McGaley
and Gibson 2003). In some cases the voter uses an electronic device to register
the vote but the votes are not stored or saved in any kind of register or
database (Tuesta 2004). The different kinds of voting system in this category
are Paper Ballot, Lever Voting Machines, Punched Card Voting, Mark-sense
ballots and some other alternative processes such as vote by mail. A brief
explanation of this voting system is given below.
Paper Ballot system is the traditional voting method, first introduced in
Australia in 1858 (Jones, 2001), by the British Colony of South Australia as a
way to introduce a secret vote while protecting voters from manipulation or
intimidation. This way of voting was called the “Australian Ballot” and was
adopted in Britain under the 1872 ballot act. (Reynolds and Steenbergen,
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2006). The paper ballot has been improved through the years and is still used
today. Candidates’ names are printed on paper ballots and the voters mark
boxes next to the name of their candidate using a writing tool. The paper
ballots are collected in ballot boxes and are counted manually by election
officials (Fisher, 2001). In voting process, counting of casted votes is laborious
and subject to human error (IPI, 2001).
Lever Voting Machines: were first used in New York, United States, in 1892.
They consist in rectangular array of levers that may be arranged with
candidates from right-to-left and parties from top-to-bottom, or vice versa.
Voters pull down the desired lever to make their choice; when the voter exits the
private room the levers return to their original positions and a connected wheel
turns one-tenth of a full rotation to count the vote. At the end of the voting
process the counters indicate the number of votes that were cast on each lever
(Saltman, 1988). There is no paper ballot involved because the lever machines
count the votes as they are cast, simply accumulating votes; therefore there is
no possibility to recount (Jones, 2001). The Internet Policy Institute (IPI) states
in its Report of the National Workshop on Internet Voting (2001), that this
voting method prevents voting for more than one candidate and that some
versions produce an audit trail. This method is still used in some countries but
lever machines are no longer manufactured (IPI, 2001).
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Punched Card Voting: was first used for voting purposes in 1964 in
United States. Even though punched cards were developed for data processing
in 1890’s, only in the middle of 1960s they were used as a voting tool. This
voting method is based on pre-scored cards, which require voters to record
their vote by punching holes in the card in a specific location depending on
their choice. The cards are counted at a central counting center using a
punched card reader attached to a computer system (Jones, 2001). Some
systems use hole punch type devices while others provide the voter with pins to
punch out the holes. These methods of punching the cards have been subject
to incomplete punches resulting in errors reading the cards (IPI, 2001). The
system has the benefit that the punched cards can be manually recounted and
audited (Fisher 2001), as is the case for paper ballots. It implies an
advantage over the lever voting machines, because the votes are stored, for the
first time, in a computer or memory storage.
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Mark-sense ballots: are based on optical mark sensing technology first used
in 1955 by the University of Iowa (United States) for educational tests. It
consists of a physical paper ballot where the voter marks the selected choice
by filling in an oval, a circle or a box with a writing tool. The ballots are read in
a machine which uses light as a sensor. Ballots can be counted in a central-
count setting with only one high speed counter serving an entire county or
with mark-sense readers attached directly to each ballot box (Jones 2001). The
first generation of mark-sense readers allowed only a standardized ink or pencil
lead and it was difficult to prevent voters from using their own pens or pencils,
which invalidated the vote. Newer versions are based on scanners that can read
marks made from almost anything. The problem is that if the ballot paper has a
defect or a smudge darker than the paper it can be taken as a vote, which results
in an over vote (Jones 2001). An advantage of this kind of voting method is that
it allows manual recounting of the votes, and the votes are stored in a computer
memory as in the case of punched cards.
3.2.2 Direct Recording Electronic Voting System (DRE)
The Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting system is based on
electronic machines that use microprocessor technology to record the vote
electronically and process it by software. It is the first voting method that uses
computers at the front-end of the electoral process, such as a specialized
voting machine or a voter-choice entry station in a voting booth, with touch
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screens, push buttons or a keyboard. The voting machines are connected to a
stand-alone Personal Computer (PC) to store the votes in a digital format and to
tally the votes electronically. It has the advantage that more than one voter can
simultaneously record his or her vote with the entry device and all of the votes
are summarized in a single computer (Saltman, 1988). In this voting system
there is no need to have a paper ballot involved in the process: once the voter
has entered and confirmed his or her vote it is stored in the computer’s memory
and any recount or audit trail should be done electronically, unless a proof of
the vote is printed, which the voter can place in a ballot. This alternative will be
analyzed later in this study. The DRE was conceived originally with no printed
proof of the vote.
DRE machines were first introduced in 1970s as a computerized
version of the mechanical lever machine (Saltman 1988), and are currently used
in many countries. DRE systems may be classified into two main groups
depending on where the casting of the votes takes place. They are: (i) Poll-site
Electronic Ballot Voting and (ii) Electronic Kiosk Voting.
Poll-site Electronic Ballot Voting: refers to the casting of ballots at public
sites. The entire process is controlled by election officials, from the
authentication of the voter to the storage and transmission or physical movement
of the summarized votes to the central center. It involves ICT systems controlled
by election officials. The voting choices are displayed on a computer screen or
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on a ballot posted on the machine; voters make their choice by touching the
screen, using a keyboard or pushing a button (Connolly, 2004). The votes
are stored in databases to be tallied at the end of the voting period. These
systems can be connected through virtual private networks (VPN) to the
central processing center for tabulation of all the results; alternatively,
they can be stored digitally at the place where the vote takes place and then
sent to the central tabulation center via telephone lines or manually in
removable data storage devices (Saltman 1988).
In the case of Electronic Kiosk Voting, the terminals are
located in convenient places like shopping centers, post offices, libraries,
hospitals, embassies or schools. The whole voting platform remains under the
control of supervisors, and the environment can be modified in order to
monitor the terminals. Supervisors may include election officials, observers,
volunteers and cameras, which address security and privacy to prevent
coercion and guarantee the secrecy of the vote (IPI, 2001). The main
characteristic of this kind of voting system is that results are not accumulated
or counted at the polling place, like in Electronic Ballot Voting, instead sent via
VPN to the central tabulation center. The votes can also be stored digitally
on removable data storage devices to be physically transported to the
central center where they are summarized.
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3.2.3 Remote Voting System
Remote Voting System is one step behind DRE voting in the
sense that the votes are transmitted via the public Internet using web servers as
shown in Fig.3.1. In this model the electronic registration, recording and
counting of votes are done from different locations at private or public sites
such as home, schools, office, libraries, post offices and malls shopping
centers. The results are not accumulated or counted in the polling places but at
the tabulation center. It is an ideal voting system because it allows users to
use a more generic technology to cast their votes, such as interactive digital
TV, telephone, Short Message Service (SMS) or the Internet (Connolly 2004;
Ghassan 2007; Henry 2003).
The implementation of Remote Voting Systems was conceived in
United States to enable military personnel or US citizens outside the country
to vote from embassies, hospitals, offices or homes, given that people can
virtually vote from anywhere at any time. The problems with this kind of voting
system are the risks associated with the security and integrity of the data.
This type of voting system is also called as Electronic Distance
Voting (EDV) and has been used in many countries. Some of the modalities
for EDV are: (i) Internet Voting, (ii) Short Message Service (SMS) Voting,
(iii) Telephone Voting and (iv) Digital Television Voting.
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Figure 3.1 Remote Voting System
Internet Voting refers to the use of the internet to register the vote,
in any private place such as at home, at the office, at school, or any other
place where the voter or a third party controls the voting client (IPI, 2003,
cited by Connolly, 2004). This is an ideal form of voting which gives voters
maximum flexibility for casting their vote. Internet voting has received
intense scrutiny because of the risks associated with the security and integrity
of the data transmitted versus the flexibility of voting (Indrajit Ray, 2002).
Short Message Service (SMS) Voting is a method that has
been used in some countries and allows the voter to register the vote by
sending a short text message to the polling station. It is an application that
reaches more voters due to the fact that more people have mobile phones than
Internet, so for governments it is also a way to overcome the “digital divide”.
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It allows greater parts of the population to vote without the fear of having to use
a computer, which may be a factor for voters who have never used them before
(Connolly, 2004).
Telephone Voting is not widely used, in spite of the advantages it
offers. It is used mostly for disabled people and consists of an interaction with
the electronic voting system through a phone call. The voter calls a number and
has to authenticate with a secret code to gain access to the voting system. If he
or she is a registered voter, he or she is given access to the system and follows
the instructions to cast the vote. The first time this voting system was officially
used in the State of Novia Scotia in Canada, where about 7000 members
participated in the election of liberal party leaders by telephone (Slaton 2000;
Connolly 2004).
Digital Television Voting is also an electronic voting system,
where the link consists of digital television, allowing users to interact with the
system through their television sets. The data is transmitted using telephone
technology. It has not been widely used in official elections, but has been
employed for TV shows (Connolly 2004; Economist 2004).
This concludes the overview of different voting methods
practiced in different countries; some authors have other classifications but
essentially they describe the similar voting systems. Irrespective of the
different modalities of voting, in the electronic voting process the voter has to
interact with some kind of electronic device to record his or her vote in a digital
form before it is transmitted by ICT system to a repository, where the
counting process takes place.
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Paper BasedVoting
Paper BallotVoting System
Lever VotingMachine
Punched CardVoting System
Mark SenseBallot System
Electronic VotingSystem
DirectRecording
System
Remote VotingSystem
Poll-SiteElectronic
Voting System
Electronic KioskVoting System
InternetVoting
SMSVoting
TelephoneVotingSystem
DigitalTelevision
Voting
Figure 3.2 Different types of Electronic Voting Systems
3.3 VOTING IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES
3.3.1 Argentina
Argentina started an electronic voting system in 2003. This system
is based on machines already used in Brazil. The electronic voting machines
(EVMs) resemble ATMs. At the time of voting each citizen shows identity
documentation at the voting place, and the registrar enters the voter’s identity
number at a keyboard with a display. If it appears “OK” on the display, the
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person is approved to vote and goes behind a partition where the EVM is
located (Kohno 2004).
The screen of the EVM shows the first office that the voter will vote
for all the political parties that presented candidates, each paired with a
number. The voter chooses his or her favourite by punching a key with the
number of the chosen party. The next screen shows the name and photo of the
chosen candidate. To confirm the selection, the voter punches a green key. If
the voter wants to change the selection, he or she punches a red key. Once the
selection has been made, the voter pushes a white key and then the green key
to confirm. The system also permits voters to cast “blank” votes, which in
Argentina are counted in order to calculate the percentage of votes obtained
by each party. After completing a vote for a particular office, another screen
appears with the following office to choose and continues until the ballot is
completed. At this point the EVM disables, preventing a second vote (Ansper
2002).
3.3.2 Australia
In Australia, the usage of EVM started in 1998. The Australian
Capital Territory (ACT) is one of eight states and territories in Australia.
Members of the ACT Legislative Assembly are elected using a proportional
representation electoral system known as the Hare-Clark system. Hare-Clark
is a variant of the single transferable vote method used in Ireland. Electors
vote by showing preferences for individual candidates. To be elected, a
candidate needs to receive a quota of votes. Each elector has a single vote,
which can be transferred from candidate to candidate according to the
preferences shown until all the vacancies are filled. In the ACT, the Hare-
Clark system is used to elect 17 members from 3 multi-member electorates.
The electorates of Brindabella and Ginninderra each elect 5 members, and the
electorate of Molonglo elects 7 members.
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A close election in 1998 in the ACT found numerous problems in
the state's hand-counting system, when two candidates were separated by only
three or four votes. After recounting, officials discovered that out of 80,000
ballots, they had made about 100 mistakes. Later, the ACT Electoral
Commission adopted a new system known as “eVACS” (Electronic Voting
and Counting System). The system was created (by a company called
Software Improvements) to run on Linux, which is widely used, freely
available open-source operating system (Australian Electoral Commission, 23
August 2007).
The eVACS-based voting terminal consists of a PC and offers
ballots in 12 languages, including Serbian and Farsi. The system includes
English audio for vision-impaired and illiterate voters. The voter swipes a bar
code over a reader that resets the machine for a new vote and calls up a ballot.
The eVACS- based voting system also encountered few problems,
such as difficult to use barcode readers and minor delays in displaying results
on and after election night, however, it was well received by voters.
3.3.3 Brazil
In Brazil, the largest nation in South America, currently, all votes
are cast by electronic voting machines. The Brazilian Supreme Electoral
Court authorized the use of Electronic voting technology in the 1996
Brazilian municipal elections. In 2000, the Brazilian government had
converted to fully electronic voting and deployed over 400,000 kiosk-style
machines in elections that year. Voters in Brazil use an electronic voting
device that, for each office, displays the choices and prompts the voter for his
or her vote. The voting machines feature an integrated screen and keyboard.
To vote for a candidate, voters only need to press on the keyboard the number
designated for a particular candidate. The candidate’s picture then appears on
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the screen. Voters can confirm, reject, choose another candidate or start the
selection process again. The Brazilian electronic voting technology is unusual
in that the voting machine itself tallies the votes once voting finishes,
producing both digital and printed reports of the number of votes given to
each candidate. (Sarah Everett 2008).
3.3.4 Belgium
In Belgium, Electronic voting was approved by law in 1994, and
widely used in 1999 and 2000 general and municipal elections. In the general
elections of May 18, 2003, 3.2 million Belgian citizens were able to vote
electronically. Belgium adopted similar approach as Ireland’s in that it does
not modify the voting process, but rather replaces the ballot paper with a
machine at the polling station, and then uses an electronic counting system to
tally the results. In 2003, an audit report released by the Federal Public
Service of the Interior approved the systems after a simulation based on
around 1 million votes (Danny De Cock and Bart Preneel).
Some difficulties were recorded during the 2003 voting (May 18) in
the Belgian communes where electronic polling booths were in use for the
general elections, which renewed both federal assemblies of the country.
Delays occurred in voting operations in some localities, causing some polling
stations to have to remain open well after the official closure time of 3 p.m.
Voters therefore had to wait for a long time to cast their votes in some areas.
Most did wait, due to Belgium's compulsory voting system and fines for
failing to do so, but it was reported that an estimated 10% of voters abstained
from the ballot in certain areas.
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3.3.5 Costa Rica
The EVM system was tried out in elections for mayors, district
councilors, municipal district councils and aldermen on December 1, 2002.
Electors who choose to vote electronically are given a blank receipt signed on
the back by the members of the panel presiding over the polling station. The
electors’ choice at each election is indicated on this receipt either by the
electors themselves or with the aid of an assistant using a printer provided for
that purpose. The chairperson of the Receiving Board activates the system so
that each elector can vote. Electors are then presented with a monitor screen
showing a ballot paper with the list of parties. Electors vote for the number of
the party of their choice, they are then shown the ballot paper for district
councilors, and must follow the same procedure. When each elector has
finished voting, he or she must take the receipt and fold it so that the
signatures of the members of the panel are visible, then drop it into the
relevant ballot box. Once the paper is in the box, the elector's ID card is
returned and he/she must leave the polling station (Thomos Buchsbaum,
2004).
3.3.6 Italy
In Italian electronic scrutiny system involved in the large scale
election in 2004. According to the Italian Government, the main advantages
of an electronic scrutiny system would be easier and faster operations, more
accurate vote counting, faster and secure transmission of results and an
increase in overall election efficiency.
The Italian government has not yet released detailed technical
specifications of the planned electronic vote counting system (Sarah Everett,
2008).
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A national ad-hoc Commission will assess the pilot, with particular
reference to the efficiency of the system, and address any problems it may
encounter. The Commission will then make any necessary recommendations
in order to prepare the system for wider testing in future elections (Kim
Alexander 2001).
3.3.7 Panama
In Panama, the first experiment with electronic voting in 15th
November 1992. The system consisted of a mechanical element in which
electors used bulb type switches to vote, and then pull a lever to record their
vote via perforations in a paper. The experiment involved six voting machines
in the metropolitan area of Panama City and San Miguelito, in the districts of
Bella Vista, Parque Lefevre, Juan Díaz, San Francisco, Bethania and Belisario
Porras. In 1999 elections, an electronic voting system was tested at several
points in the Republic of Panama, though in the end it was not used due to a
lack of consensus between political parties as to its use (Thomos Buchsbaum
2004).
3.3.8 Spain
Spain has experimented with various forms of electronic voting. In
the March 14, 2004 general elections, numerous small-scale, non-legally
binding electronic voting trials were successfully conducted. These included
diverse technologies in addition to strictly Irish-style electronic voting
systems, such as Internet and SMS remote voting.
On November 16, 2003, three e-voting pilot tests were successfully
conducted during the elections to the Parliament of Catalonia. This included
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remote voting via the Internet for eligible voters living abroad, and touch
screen voting coupled with an electronic counting system (developed by
Demotek) (Thomos Buchsbaum 2004).
3.3.9 United Kingdom
United Kingdom started EVM in May 2002, tested various
technological improvements to voting or vote counting, such as touch-screen
voting machines while others tested techniques for voting remotely. Some
jurisdictions allowed voters to cast their ballots using electronic methods,
such as interactive voice response (IVR) technology, PC-based systems and
handheld mobile devices via short message service (SMS). Some of these
jurisdictions allowed voters to cast ballots from PCs or kiosks in public places
such as shopping centres. In the Electoral Commission’s report to reviewing
the e-voting trials, it found that the hardware and software pilots, although it
did express concerns about potential security and privacy violations (Kim
Alexander, Jefferson and Kohno).
3.3.10 India
In India first election using electronic voting is scheduled to hold
from April 20 to May 10, 2004. India is the world’s largest democracy with a
population of more than 1 billion; India has an electorate of more than 668
million and covers 543 parliamentary constituencies, and will require more
than one million electronic voting machines (EVMs). The legal approval in
1989 to allow the use of EVMs, they have been used in many state elections
but never used an entire general election. Electronic Voting Machines
prepared by Electronics Corp of India and Bharat Electronics. The EVM
comprises two units, one for control by the polling staff and the other for the
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use of voters. The balloting unit requires voters to press the button next to the
candidate's name and symbol and the control unit records the vote. A light
next to the button glows, and a short beep sound follows indicating the vote
has been cast. The polling officer then presses a switch to clear the machine
for the next voter. The EVM comes in a reusable carry pack, and can operate
on a battery power source in remote areas. According to Election Commission
officials, each EVM can record five votes minute or nearly 3,000 votes in a
polling day (Lorrie Faith Cranor 2001).
3.4 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRONIC VOTING
High security is essential to elections. Democracy relies on broad
confidence in the integrity of elections. There has been a lot of attention to an
electronic voting by cryptographers. Many scientific researches are carried
out in order to achieve security, privacy and correctness in electronic voting
systems by improving cryptographic protocols of e-voting systems. Currently,
the cryptographic scheme is not the main problem. The main interest is the
practical security in e-voting systems. What properties are to be justified in
order to claim that the system is secure for implementing? (Bouras 2003;
Karro 1999; Lin 2003; Daimi 2005; Moffett 2003). One of the main interests
is seemingly contradicting security properties. On the one hand, voting must
be private and the votes must be anonymous. On the other hand, voters must
be identified in order to guarantee that only the eligible voters are permitted to
vote. Hence, e- voting should be uniform, confidential, secure and verifiable.
The following “core properties”, as described by Cranor et al (1996)
outline the main desired characteristics of an ideal Electronic-voting scheme
as shown in Figure 3.3.
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Privacy
Efficiency
Anonymity
Uncoercibility
Authentication
Democracy
Accuracy
VOTINGSYSTEM
Verifiability
Accuracy
A system is accurate if:
(1) It is not possible for a vote to be altered (integrity).
(2) It is not possible for a valid vote to be eliminated from the
final count.
(3) It is not possible for an invalid vote to be counted
(soundness).
In the most accurate systems the final results must be perfect, either
because no inaccuracies can be introduced or because all inaccuracies
introduced can be detected and corrected.
Partially accurate systems are systems that can detect but not necessarily
correct inaccuracies.
Fig.3.3 Security Requirements for Electronic Voting System
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Fairness No one can learn the voting outcome before the tally.
Democracy
A system is democratic if:
(1) It permits only eligible voters to vote (eligibility).
(2) It ensures that each eligible voter can vote only once and each
vote is equally weighted (uniqueness).
Privacy
A system maintains privacy if:
(1) Neither election authorities nor anyone else can link any ballot
to the voter who cast it.
(2) No voter can prove that he or she voted in a particular way.
The second privacy factor is important for the prevention of vote
buying and extortion. Voters can only sell their votes if they are able to prove
to the buyer that they actually voted according to the buyer’s wishes.
Likewise, those who use extortion to force voters to vote in a particular way
cannot succeed unless they can demand that voters prove that they voted as
requested.
Verifiability
A system is verifiable if all voters can independently verify that
their votes have been counted correctly without sacrificing privacy. In
addition each voter must be able to verify the final results of the tally (tally is
the term used for the final sum of the votes).
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Convenience
A system is convenient if it allows voters to cast their votes quickly,
and with minimal equipment or special skills. This quality is important to
fulfill the promise of enhanced turnout e.g. in governmental elections.
Uncoercibility
(a) A voter is not able to prove to anyone else how he voted
(b) Only the voter is able to decide his intended vote.
Anonymity
There should be no way to derive a link between the voter’s identity
and the marked ballot.
Efficiency
The whole election should be held in a timely manner, such that all
computation is done in a reasonable amount of time that would be acceptable
to a standard voter, and voters are not required to wait for other voters in
order to complete their voting exercise.
3.5 SUMMARY
This chapter discussed about the concepts of electronic voting
system in detail. Benefits and risks associated with electronic voting system
are presented. It also illustrated the different types of security requirements
for electronic voting system.