Chapter 3 - A Basic Form of Good, Knowledge - PRNT

7/27/2019 Chapter 3 - A Basic Form of Good, Knowledge - PRNT

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A Basic form of Good: Knowledge

Basic values are good reasons for action and a description of human conduct. They are

self-evident. Knowledge or speculative knowledge is what we are examining in this

chapter. This means knowledge as sought for its own sake and not knowledge as sought

only instrumentally.

Another way of describing the basic value of knowledge is truth. Any proposition

whatever the subject matter may be inquired into either:

i. Instrumentally

ii. Out of curiosity (the desire to know or find out the truth and to avoid

ignorance and error)

Finnis says that by knowledge he means that the pursuit of a subject matter out of

curiosity to find out the truth about it simply out of an interest for the truth.

From Inclination to Grasp of Value

Curiosity is the name given to our desire or inclination when, just for the sake of

knowing, we want to find out something. On reflection it becomes clear that knowledge

is a good thing to have and ignorance and muddle are to be avoided therefore we pursue

knowledge because we consider it a good thing to have. The well-informed and clear-

headed persons are well-off.

The misunderstandings to be avoided are:

1. To think of knowledge as a value is not to think that every true proposition is

equally worth knowinge.g. it is more worth while knowing whether the

contents of this summary are true, than knowing how many milligrams of ink

were used to print it.

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2. To think of knowledge as a basic form of is not to think knowledge, for example,

of the truth about these contents, would be equally valuable for all.

3. Nor is it thought that knowledge has any priority of value.

4. Just as knowledge is good does not mean that the knowledge should be pursued

by everyone at all times and in all circumstances, it does not mean that knowledge

is the only general form of good, or the supreme form of good.

5. Knowledge, although thought of as a value, must not be thought of as a moral

value.

6. Knowledge is an intrinsic good. It is considered to be desirable for its own sake

and mot merely as something sought after under some such description.

7. Reference to the value of knowledge makes intelligible any particular instance of

human activity and commitment involved in such pursuit.

Practical Principle and Participation in Value

A practical principle is any expression through which we may understand more clearly a

value and provides the starting point for reasoning about what to do. An example of a

practical principle is Knowledge is a good thing to have and ignorance should be

avoided.

A basic principle serves to orient ones practical reasoning and can be instantiated in

indefinably many, more specific, practical principles. It suggests new horizons for human

activity. One may participate in the basic goods through particular projects or

commitments.

The Self-Evidence of the Good of Knowledge

The good of knowledge is self-evident (obvious.) It cannot be demonstrated but it needs

no demonstration. The value of knowledge is not something innate and the value of truth

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becomes obvious only to persons who have experienced the urge to question, who have

grasped the connection between question and answer, who understand that knowledge is

constituted by the correct answers to particular questions, and who is aware of the

possibility of further questions and of other questioners who could enjoy the advantage of

attaining correct answers.

A new born child has not passed through such experiences. A value cannot be deduced

simply from the possibility of wanting to know the truth about something. No value can

be deduced from a fact or set of facts. However, saying for example that knowledge must

be a real value because intelligent men have regarded it as value, is not making an

inference because the premis of the apparent deduction rests on its conclusion.

Besides, the universality of a desire does not mean that it is objectively good for all. The

fact that knowledge, or any other basic good may be pursued by all, does not mean that

ALL desire to pursue it! Not all men might desire that particular value and pursue

throughout their lives. Conversely, it does not mean that because all men do not pursue

the value, then that value is to be rejected

Principles of theoretical rationality are not demonstrable, for they are presupposed or

deployed in anything that we would count as a demonstration. They do not need

demonstration as they are obvious. To defy such principles is only being unreasonable.

The basic values are self-evident in the same way as these principles of logic are. Such

self- evident principles are not validated by feeling, but rather they are themselves the

criteria whereby we discriminate between feelings and discount some of our feelings no

matter how intense they might be.

Object of desire and Objectivity

When we reach a point where it is not possible for any interferences to be made, we are

then faced with the self-evident.

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The skeptics say that mans desire and decision to pursue the object are consequential to

his judgment that:

A. The object is good and;

B. He will really be better-off for getting or doing or effecting it.

The belief that our practical judgments of value are no more than expressions of our

feelings and desires. However, we should not be deflected by this. It is obvious that a

man who is well informed is better off than a man who is muddled or ignorant. The state

of the first is better than that of the second in all cases. One must admit that knowledge is

better than ignorance in all cases, even though I may not desire to know truth. The

affirmation of a practical principle has nothing to do with any expression of desire of

mine. It is a rational judgment about a general form of human well-being, about the

fulfillment of a human potentiality

In conclusion it is quite unreasonable for the skeptic to point out that the basic value may

not be desired by all as Finnis is saying nothing about the principle being universally

affirmed. He is only saying that that if one takes into account the relevant human

possibilities one can understand that the realization of those possibilities is good and

desirable for all; and that ones understanding needs no further justification.

Skepticism about this Basic Value is Indefensible

Finnis adopts a defensive strategy since he does not intend to show the objectivity or self-

evidence of the basic value of knowledge but only to illustrate the inconsistency of the

counter-arguments by the skeptics. He restricts himself to the value of knowledge, but is

aware that, by defending this one basic value, he may also be contributing towards the

collapse of the skeptical doubts about all the other values.

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The self evidence of the basic value of knowledge therefore applies to the other values

too. Most arguments against the self evidence of knowledge can be proved wrong due to

their contradicting notions. (it can be proved that nothing can be proved.) Other

arguments do not hold due to their false assertions (one states I do not exist.)

The skeptical assertion that knowledge is not a good is operationally self refuting. For

one to make such an assertion, intending it as a serious contribution to rational/objective

discussion, is implicitly committed to the proposition that he believes in his assertions

worth making, and worth making qua true. He thus is committed to the proposition that

he believes that the truth is a good worth pursuing or knowing. Thus he is implicitly

committed to formally contradictory beliefs.

The skeptic view is therefore a self-refuting one and should be abandoned, also in

relation to other values.

A judgment or belief is objective if it is correct. Thus as a conclusion, we have proved

that as assertion (that knowledge is good, that knowledge is self-evident and should be

pursued), has its right to be called objective in so much as its opposing propositions are

contradictions due to their inevitably falsity by the acting of asserting it.

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Chapter 3 - A Basic Form of Good, Knowledge - PRNT

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