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CHAPTER 2

THE THEORY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The study of capital structure attempts to explain how listed firms utilise the mix of various

forms of securities in order to finance investment. Modigliani and Miller (1958: 201)

demonstrated that capital structure is irrelevant under certain restrictive assumptions. Ever

since then, many researchers have approached the study of corporate capital structure

under less restrictive assumptions. This has led to the confirmation of an existence of the

optimal choice of capital structure. Unfortunately, there has been little consensus among

researchers on what the optimal capital structure is. However, it is important to synthesise

the literature on capital structure and where possible, to relate the literature to known

empirical evidence.

2.1.1 Goal of this chapter

The goal of this chapter is to discuss the various theories that help to explain the

determination of capital structure. The capital structure puzzle is unravelled and a clear

picture is presented in terms of why capital structure matters. The patterns of corporate

capital structures around the world are also discussed.

2.1.2 Layout of this chapter

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides a detailed justification on why

capital structure matters. Section 2.3 discusses the principal theories of capital structure,

namely, trade-off, agency, signalling, pecking order and contracting cost theories. Section

2.4 discusses the factors affecting the capital structure of firms throughout the world.

Section 2.5 documents the differences in corporate capital structures between firms in the

developed and developing countries. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter.

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2.2 DOES CAPITAL STRUCTURE MATTER?

The concept of capital structure received much attention after Modigliani and Miller

(1958: 261) demonstrated in their paper that the choice between debt and equity does not

have any material effects on the value of the firm. This proposition indeed holds assuming

perfect capital markets. A perfect market is one in which there are no frictions such as

transaction and bankruptcy costs. However, in the real world, one may ask whether all

capital markets are perfect. When market imperfections such as transaction and

bankruptcy costs are considered, capital structure may well be relevant. As pointed out by

Strabulaev (2007: 1787), small adjustment costs may cause large variations in capital

structure.

Modigliani and Miller (1963: 433) subsequently corrected their capital structure irrelevance

proposition for taxes. Because interest on debt is a tax-deductible expense, the firm

effectively reduces its tax bill as it employs more debt. As the debt to equity ratio

increases, the market value of the firm increases by the present value of the interest tax

shield. This implies that the cost of capital will not rise, even if the use of leverage

increases to excessive levels. Solomon (1963: 276) argues that, in an extreme leverage

position, the cost of capital must rise. This is because excessive levels of debt will induce

markets to react by demanding higher rates of return. Therefore, to minimise the weighted

average cost of capital, firms will avoid a pure debt position and seek an optimal mix of

debt and equity. Moreover, Kim (1978: 45) observes that during the period between 1963

and 1970, non-financial firms in the United States were financed by only one-third of debt.

This finding provides circumstantial evidence that, in the presence of taxes, firms will avoid

a pure debt position.

Baxter (1967: 395) provides two main reasons for the low debt ratios observed in levered

corporations. Firstly, the interest rate on debt is positively related to the debt to equity

ratio. This implies that as the firm borrows more, creditors will demand a higher rate of

return on the borrowed funds. Secondly, higher debt levels could lead to the probability of

default on interest payments, thereby leading to bankruptcy. For these reasons, firms will

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seek a level of financing that maximises the tax savings induced by higher debt levels and,

at the same time, minimising the possibility of bankruptcy costs.

Several studies have, however, confirmed the existence of an optimal debt-equity mix.

This is based solely on the existence of market imperfections such as transaction and

potential bankruptcy costs. For instance, Baumol and Malkiel (1967: 554) demonstrate by

use of indifference curves that the introduction of transaction costs to the value irrelevance

equation produces a disequilibrium, in which the shareholder seeks an optimal point in the

mix of debt and equity.

A few years later, Stiglitz (1972: 458) considered the implications of bankruptcy on the

value of the firm, and argues that under certain assumptions, there is an optimal capital

structure. This argument is based on the basis that in the absence of bankruptcy, nominal

rates on debt are independent of the debt to equity ratio. However, when there is a

possibility of bankruptcy, the nominal rates on debt increase, thus rendering bonds to be

more risky. Therefore, the market value of the firm will depend on the possibility of

bankruptcy, even if transaction costs were ignored.

Kraus and Litzenberger (1973: 911) introduce corporate taxes and bankruptcy penalties

into a state preference model of optimal financial structure, and they confirm the existence

of an optimal capital structure. Pursuant to this, Turnbull (1979: 939) shows that the

optimal capital structure of a value maximising firm will occur before the firm‟s debt

capacity. This is the maximum amount of credit that can be extended by lenders.

Furthermore, Brennan and Schwartz (1978: 103) argue that the possibility of bankruptcy

costs increases the uncertainty of future tax savings, and they demonstrate that this

uncertainty is sufficient to induce an optimal capital structure, even if bankruptcy costs are

isolated from their model.

According to Miller (1988: 102), the capital structure irrelevance proposition was not

intended to suggest that “... the debt-equity ratio was indeterminate ...” Given this

backdrop, Myers (2001: 86) advises that the Modigliani and Miller (1958: 201) propositions

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should be viewed as a benchmark, and not the ideal end result. The propositions are

simply showing that financing does not matter, except for specific transaction costs.

In conclusion, the literature on the capital structure debate has progressed from the

irrelevance propositions of Modigliani and Miller (1958: 201) to the counter arguments

based on more realistic assumptions. The introduction of taxes and bankruptcy costs

suggest the existence of an optimal capital structure, which financial theorists have failed

to determine due to lack of precise capital structure models. The major competing theories

of capital structure are discussed in the next section.

2.3 THEORETICAL DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTRE

This section reviews the principal theories of capital structure. These are the trade-off,

agency, contracting cost and information costs theories. The information costs theories

comprise the signalling and the pecking order theory.

2.3.1 The trade-off theory

The trade-off theory of capital structure postulates that managers attempt to balance the

benefits of interest tax shields against the present value of the possible costs of financial

distress (Myers 2001: 88). This theory originated from the study of Kraus and Litzenberger

(1973: 911), who formally introduced the interest tax shields associated with debt and the

costs of financial distress into a state preference model. According to Chakraborty

(2010: 296), the trade-off theory postulates that some form of optimal capital structure

should exist pursuant to the balance between the present value of interest tax shields and

the cost of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy costs can be classified under direct and indirect costs.

As shown in Baxter (1967: 395), direct costs of bankruptcy include, inter alia, the

administrative and legal expenses incurred by a firm that goes bankrupt. On the other

hand, the indirect costs relate to the reduction in the market value of the firm due to the

firm‟s inability to service its debt obligations. According to Barclay and Smith (1999: 10)

the indirect costs of bankruptcy can constitute a substantial portion of the market value of

the firm. Having said this, the dilemma in capital structure theory has been to determine to

what extent debt can be employed in order to offset tax implications to the extent that the

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risk of excessive debt is avoided. Figure 2.1 illustrates the trade-off that exists between

the present value of the tax subsidy associated with an increase in leverage and the

present value of bankruptcy costs. This provides a scenario whereby firms will seek for the

optimal capital structure. This is the level at which the tax benefits are maximised while

minimising the risk of bankruptcy, which arises from the use of excessive debt.

Figure 2.1: The trade-off theory of capital structure

Source: Brealey, Myers and Allen (2007, 504)

There are four main predictions of the trade-off theory. Firstly, the trade-off theory predicts

that firms will have a target debt ratio and that these ratios will differ from firm to firm. This

prediction is confirmed by Graham and Harvey (2001: 187) who report that the majority of

the surveyed Chief Financial Officers agreed that they follow a target debt ratio.

Secondly, the trade-off theory predicts that firms with relatively safe tangible assets will be

less exposed to the costs of financial distress, and will therefore, be expected to borrow

more. Conversely, firms with risky intangible assets will be more exposed to the costs of

financial distress, and will be expected to borrow less. This prediction is confirmed by

Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1453) for firms in seven developed countries, Frank and Goyal

(2009: 26) for non-financial firms in the United States and Qiu and La (2010: 283) for non-

financial firms on the Australian Stock Exchange.

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Thirdly, the trade-off theory predicts that higher marginal tax rates will be associated with

higher levels of leverage. This is because of the tax deductibility of interest. Using tests

based on incremental decisions, MacKie-Mason (1990: 1471) documents that firms faced

with higher marginal tax rates are more likely to have higher debt ratios, and firms with low

marginal tax rates will issue more equity compared to debt. Using data for more than

10 000 firms, Graham (1996: 41) finds a statistically significant positive association

between debt ratios and marginal tax rates. Contrary to the prediction of the trade-off

theory, Negash (2002: 25) reports a negative association between tax rate variables and

debt for 64 firms listed on the JSE‟s industrial sector. This result is expected because for

South Africa, the incentive to take advantage of the tax shields could have been mitigated

by the declining tax rates over the period of assessment. Figure 2.2 shows that statutory

and effective tax rates have been on a general declining trend for the past 20 years.

Fama and French (1998: 819) utilise cross-sectional regressions to determine the effect of

taxation on firm value. They find no evidence that interest tax shields contribute to the

market value of the firm. If this is the case, there may be no incentive for firms to add more

debt to take advantage of the tax shields. On balance, the documented evidence suggests

that taxes seem to play a moderate role in explaining the capital structure of firms.

Figure 2.2: Statutory and effective corporate tax rates in South Africa

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

1989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007

Historical tax rates for South Africa

Effective tax rate Statutory tax rate

Source: Author’s calculation using study data set

Finally, the trade-off theory predicts that firms with more taxable income and relatively few

non-debt tax shields such as investment tax credits and depreciation will have more

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incentives to borrow (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980: 4). Therefore, in order to take advantage

of the interest tax shields, firms with fewer non-debt tax shields should be expected to

borrow more. Conversely, firms with more non-debt tax shields should have less debt in

their capital structure.

Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984: 873) find contrasting evidence to this prediction. They

report a positive relationship between non-debt tax shields and firm debt to value ratios.

This outcome is confirmed by Chakraborty (2010: 310) for firms in India. This positive

association could also mean that firms with high non-debt tax shields such as depreciation

have tangible assets in place. This enables them to support more debt. On the contrary,

Titman and Wessels (1988: 13) report an insignificant negative association between non-

debt tax shields and leverage. Likewise, Ozkan (2001: 187) employs a dynamic capital

structure model for firms in the United Kingdom and reports a significant negative

relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage.

In sum, there is substantial evidence for the first three main predictions of the trade-off

theory. The fourth prediction is moderately supported. Most studies show that firms with

more non-debt tax shields have more debt in their capital structure.

2.3.2 The agency theory

The agency theory is based on the notion that managers will not always act in the best

interest of the shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 305) further elaborate on this

concept by identifying two main conflicts between parties to a company, firstly, between

the managers and shareholders, and secondly, between the shareholders and the

creditors. In the first instance, managers are tempted to pursue the profits of the firms they

manage to their own personal gain at the expense of the shareholders. In the latter

instance, debt provides shareholders with the incentive to invest sub-optimally. Harris and

Raviv (1991: 301) argue that if an investment yields returns higher than the face value

of the debt, the benefits accrue to the shareholders. Conversely, if the investment fails, the

shareholders enjoy limited liability by exercising their right to walk away. This leaves the

debt holders with a firm whose market value is less than the face value of the outstanding

debt.

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Another potential agency cost of debt is pointed out by Myers (1977: 149). He notes that

when firms are on the verge of bankruptcy, there is no incentive for shareholders to invest

more equity capital, even if positive NPV projects are available. This is because the value

derived from the projects will accrue mainly to the debt holders. The implication is that

high debt levels may result in the rejection of value increasing projects.

Stulz (1990: 4) argues that debt payments may affect shareholders both positively and

negatively. On the positive note, debt payments force managers to pay out interest

thereby reducing the potential overinvestment problem. On the negative side, excessive

debt may lead to high interest repayments, which may lead to the rejection of profitable

projects, thus leading to the underinvestment problem. Capital structure is therefore

determined by a trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt.

Considerable work has been done to test the validity of the agency cost hypothesis. For

example, Kim and Sorensen (1986: 139) detect the presence of agency costs in

Compustat listed firms in the form of a strong relationship between insider ownership and

leverage. Vilasuso and Minkler (2001: 65) employ a dynamic model of capital structure on

a set of 28 publicly held firms, and demonstrate that agency costs are associated with

shifts in leverage. Harvey, Lins and Roper (2004: 3) investigate whether debt can control

the effects of agency costs for a set of emerging market firms, and they observe that the

benefits of debt are concentrated among firms with high expected agency costs.

Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006: 1069) develop a profit efficient indicator as a

measure of firm performance, and they confirm the predictions of the agency theory that

higher leverage is positively related to profit efficiency. However, Brounen, DeJong and

Koedijk (2006: 1409) survey managers in European countries and they find no evidence to

suggest that agency costs influence capital structure decisions. Overall, evidence

suggests that there is some support for the agency theory.

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2.3.3 Information costs theories

Information costs are based on the information disparities between corporate managers

and investors. This information disconnect is also known as asymmetric information. This

has led to the development of the signalling and pecking order theories.

The signalling theory

The signalling theory emanates from information asymmetries between firm management

and shareholders. If managers believe that their firms are undervalued, they will issue

debt first and then issue equity as a last resort. Conversely, if management believes that

their firm is overvalued, they will issue equity first. The signalling theory was first coined by

Ross (1977: 23) who posits that if managers have inside information, their choice of

capital structure will signal information to the market. Leverage may well be influenced by

the theoretical premise that increases in debt are a positive sign that managers are

confident about future earnings. Debt contracts are a commitment by managers to make

future interest payments. Failure to repay debt could lead to bankruptcy. This signals

confidence to the market that the firm will have sufficient cash flows to service debt.

The shareholders of a firm are the residual claimants to the firm‟s cash flows. This is

because promised interest payments are an obligation and have priority over dividends.

As a consequence, share prices are more sensitive to financial structure announcements

than bond prices. If managers are optimistic about their firm‟s future prospects, the firm‟s

share price will appear more undervalued than bond prices.

Smith (1986: 12) empirically tests the signalling theory, and finds an average reduction of

three percent in the share price of firms that announced new equity offerings. By contrast,

there was a negligible decline in the share prices following debt issue announcements. In

addition, increases in debt were associated with an increase in share price returns of

about 14 percent for debt for equity substitutions.

Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995: 4) classify the firms whose earnings increased the

following year as undervalued firms, and those firms whose earnings decreased the

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following year as overvalued firms. They find a very small statistically significant positive

association between leverage and unexpected earnings.

The implication of the signalling theory is that corporate managers will attempt to time

equity issues based on the market‟s assessment of their shares. For example, Baker and

Wurgler (2002: 1) report a strong relationship between firm financing decisions and

historical market values of equity. In essence, the capital structure of a firm is the

cumulative result of corporate managers‟ past attempts to time the market. However,

Brounen et al. (2006: 1435) do not find any evidence to suggest that European managers

signal their private information to influence capital structure. The evidence provided thus

far suggests that, on average, the signalling theory holds.

The pecking order theory

The pecking order theory takes the signalling theory one step further by suggesting that

the information costs are substantial enough to warrant managers to issue the security

with the least information costs (Barclay & Smith, 1999: 13). This theory was originated by

Myers and Majluf (1984: 188) who demonstrate that a share issue is generally perceived

negatively by the investors. This is because managers tend to issue shares when they are

overpriced. Stated in simple terms, the pecking order theory suggests that in order to

avoid the information effects of new share issues, a firm is more likely to issue debt than

equity. This prediction is conditional on the managers‟ belief that their firm‟s securities are

underpriced.

The pecking order theory implies that managers will follow the path of least resistance,

and that they will work down a pecking order by opting to issue the cheapest form of

financing. In this case, firms will opt for retained earnings as it has no adverse selection

problems. When retained earnings are exhausted, the firm can then issue debt. When it

does not make any more sense to issue more debt, equity can be issued as a financing

source of last resort.

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The pecking order theory suggests that firms with few investment opportunities and high

free cash flows will have low debt ratios. Conversely, high growth firms with low free cash

flows will have high debt ratios. A number of studies have confirmed the existence of the

pecking order theory. Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1454) utilise a data set from seven

industrialised countries, and they find some evidence for the pecking order theory in the

form of a negative association between leverage and profitability. Using a sample of 157

firms in the United States, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999: 219) find support for the

predictions of the pecking order theory. Although this is an influential result, a sample of

157 firms is relatively small compared to all the listed firms in the United States.

According to Frank and Goyal (2003: 218), this raises questions as to whether the theory

is broadly applicable. Using funds flow data for a broader cross-section of American firms,

they discover that net equity issues track the financing deficit more closely than net debt

issues. This finding offers contrasting evidence to the predictions of the theory. Helwege

and Liang (1996: 429) provide a direct test of the pecking order theory by examining the

capital structures of 500 small firms that went public in 1983. They find that the use of

external financing does not follow the pecking order.

On the contrary, Flannery and Rangan (2006: 478) adopt a partial adjustment model of

firm leverage for firms listed on the Compustat (CRSP) database, and they confirm the

existence of a pecking order. Leary and Roberts (2010: 351) utilise simulation techniques

to test the accuracy of the pecking order theory. They perform their analysis by allowing

firm debt capacity to vary with alternate variables associated with the trade-off theory.

They find that the predictive power of the pecking order theory increases significantly with

the variation. This finding suggests that the pecking order and the trade-off theories play

an important role in explaining financing decisions.

Seifert and Gonenc (2010: 11) regress net debt issues on a financial deficit variable for

firms in 23 emerging market economies. They conclude that pecking order financing is

prevalent only in those emerging markets where there are issues of asymmetric

information and significant agency costs. This finding lends support to the theory that

financing decisions are a function of the prevailing market conditions firms are operating

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in. Additionally, Bessler and Drobetz (2011: 123) examine the effects of asymmetric

information on firm financing decisions, and they conclude that information asymmetry is

the primary driver of dynamic pecking order behaviour. Specifically, the probability of

issuing equity is documented to be more pronounced with reduced information

asymmetries.

From the facts discussed, it appears that the evidence on the pecking order theory is

mixed, mainly because of the methodology used and that financing decisions are subject

to a number of factors that may influence capital structure differently.

2.3.4 Contracting cost theories

The contracting cost theories hinge on the underinvestment problem suggested by Myers

(1977: 147). The underinvestment problem can be illustrated as follows; highly levered

firms are more likely to pass up investment opportunities because of the risk of default.

This problem is further exacerbated by the higher costs of equity associated with firms

with the prospect of default. This may cause financially distressed firms to forgo both

capital and investment opportunities. The prediction of the contracting cost hypothesis is

that firms whose value consists mainly of the present value of intangible investment

opportunities will choose lower debt ratios. This conservative approach to debt issuing is

followed in order to minimise the adverse effects of the underinvestment problem.

Conversely, large mature firms with fewer investment opportunities will choose high debt

ratios because of the lower possibility of financial distress costs. This prediction is contrary

to the pecking order theory which posits that high growth firms with relatively fewer cash

flows will have higher debt ratios.

Several studies have tested the contracting cost hypothesis by using the volatility of

earnings, growth in assets, growth in sales and the market to book ratio as a proxy for

growth opportunities. For example, Bradley et al. (1984: 873) use the standard deviation of

earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation divided by average book assets as a

proxy for growth opportunities. They confirm a statistically significant negative relationship

between leverage and volatility. This relationship is observed for both non regulated firms

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and all firms in the sample. Barclay and Smith (1996: 210) use the market to book equity

ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities, and they confirm a negative and statistically

significant relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. Mutenheri and Green

(2003: 166) use the percentage change in total assets as a proxy for growth for a sample

of Zimbabwean listed firms, and they report a significant and positive relationship for the

post reform period.

Abor and Biekpe (2005: 44) use growth in sales as a proxy for growth opportunities for

firms in Ghana, and they report a positive and significant relationship between firm growth

prospects and leverage. This positive association implies that growth firms require

additional funds to finance investment opportunities. Adam and Goyal (2008: 41)

demonstrate that the market to book assets ratio “... has the highest information content

with respect to investment opportunities ...” Hence, Frank and Goyal (2009: 15) use this

proxy to evaluate its relationship with leverage. They report a negative and statistically

significant relationship between the market to book assets ratio and three of the four

measures of leverage2. Ovtchinnikov (2010: 249) utilises difference-in-differences tests to

estimate the dynamics of capital structure of firms in deregulated industries, and finds that

firm growth opportunities are associated with lower debt ratios.

The preceding evidence suggests that when the market to book ratio (market to book

assets and market to book equity) is used as a proxy for investment opportunities, a

negative relationship is usually documented. However, when the growth in sales and

assets is used, a positive association is normally detected. The intuition is simple; growth

in a firm‟s asset base provides financiers some form of collateral for loan advancement.

On the other hand, the market to book ratio may constitute a high proportion of intangible

investment opportunities. Consequently, such firms will choose lower debt.

2 Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1422), Ozkan (2001: 180) and Ngugi (2008: 620) use market to book assets

ratio and find a similar relationship.

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2.3.5 The difficulties in testing the theories of capital structure

Despite the evidence provided regarding the theories of capital structure, Barclay and

Smith (1999: 9) argue that there is no model that convincingly tests the many competing

theories of capital structure because of three reasons. Firstly, with the current tests, it is

difficult to reject one theory in favour of the other. In other words, the theories are not

mutually exclusive. In fact, with respect to the pecking order and trade-off theories, Fama

and French (2005: 581) conclude that each of these two theories has an element of truth

in explaining financing decisions. Secondly, it is not easy to measure many variables that

affect the optimal capital structure, for example, it is not easy to determine managers‟

proprietary information, especially when you are testing the signalling theory. Finally,

rather than being reducible to a precise mathematical formula, theories of optimal capital

structure culminate in a qualitative prediction, hence less reliable than the asset pricing

models.

2.3.6 Summary of the origins and evidence of the main theories of capital

Structure

Table 2.1 shows a summary of the origins and evidence of the main formal theories of

capital structure. The next section elaborates on the factors affecting the capital structure

of firms in the developed and developing economies.

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Table 2.1: Summary of the origins and evidence of the main theories of capital

Theory Origin of theory Evidence for Evidence against

Trade-off theory Kraus and

Litzenberger

(1973: 121)

MacKie-Mason

(1990: 1471),

Graham (1996: 41)

and Graham and

Harvey (2001: 187)

Qiu & La (2010: 283)

Fama and French

(1998: 819), Wald

(1999: 161)

Contracting Cost

theories

Myers (1977:

147)

Bradley, Jarrell and

Kim (1984: 857),

Barclay and Smith

(1995:14), Frank

and Goyal (2009:

15)

Abor and Biekpe

(2005: 44) and

Mutenheri and

Green (2003: 166)

Signalling theory Ross(1977: 23) Myers and Majluf

(1984), Smith (1986:

12), Brennan and

Kraus (1987), and

Baker and Wurgler

(2002: 1)

Barclay and Smith

(1996: 17), Barclay

and Smith (2005,

15) and Brounen

et al. (2006)

Pecking order theory Myers and

Majluf (1984:

188)

Kester (1986: 5),

Titman and Wessels

(1988: 1) & Rajan

and Zingales (1995:

1421), De Miguel

and Pindado (2001:

91), Flannery and

Rangan (2006: 478)

Leary & Roberts

(2010: 351)

Helwege and

Liang (1996: 429)

and Frank and

Goyal (2003: 218)

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Agency cost theory Jensen and

Meckling (1976:

305) and Myers

(1977: 149)

Kim and Sorensen

(1986: 131)

Vilasuso and Minkler

(2001: 65), Harvey

et al, (2004: 3) and

Berger and

Bonaccorsi di Patti

(2006: 1069)

Brounen, DeJong

and Koedijk

(2006: 1409)

2.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON FACTORS AFFECTING CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Corporate finance literature advocates for a number of factors that can be attributed to the

cross-sectional variation in firm capital structure. This section provides an analysis of prior

empirical literature on the most prominent factors that have been correlated to leverage.

2.4.1 Institutional, legal and financial factors

La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998: 1114) elaborate on access to

external financing as being influenced by the legal and financial environment.

Consequently, weak financial systems pose a significant hurdle to growth, as firms

operating in this environment obtain less external financing. Demirguc-Kunt and

Maksimovic (1998: 2107) attribute the variations in capital structure to differences in the

development of stock markets and banks, as well as differences in the underlying legal

framework. Fan, Titman and Twite (2008: 2) examine a cross-section of firms in a

heterogeneous sample of firms in 39 countries, and they conclude that institutional

differences are an important determining factor of capital structure choices compared to

other factors like industry affiliation. For example, they document that firms tend to use

less debt in countries where dividends are preferentially taxed.

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2.4.2 Size

Size can be considered as an explanatory predictor for variations in firm leverage. Larger

firms are more likely to take on more debt than smaller firms. Eriotis, Vasiliou and

Ventoura-Neokosmidi (2007: 325) argue, firstly, that larger firms can negotiate for loans on

more favourable terms. This enables them to take on more debt at lower interest rates.

Secondly, because larger firms are less risky than smaller firms, banks are willing to loan

them more funds. This lowers their probability of default. Hence, a positive association is

likely to be observed between size and leverage. On the contrary, Drobetz and

Wanzenreid (2006: 948) argue that large firms have sufficient analyst coverage and are

subject to lower costs of information asymmetries. Hence, they should access equity

markets with relative ease. Moreover, the fixed costs associated with equity issues should

be smaller for large firms. On that account, size should be inversely correlated to leverage.

The empirical evidence regarding size as a possible determinant of firm leverage is mixed.

Marsh (1982: 121) examines the debt-equity choice for firms in the United Kingdom and

reports a positive relationship between the size of the firm and leverage. This direct

relationship is later confirmed by Bennet and Donnelly (1993: 52). Booth, Aivazian,

Demirguc-kunt, and Maksomovic (2001: 112) use the natural logarithm of sales to

measure the importance of size in a sample of emerging market economies, and they find

size to be positively correlated with leverage for most of the countries in their sample. On

the other hand, Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004: 399) use the natural logarithm

of total assets, and they find a strong and statistically significant positive relationship

between size and the debt to capital ratio for firms in the Asia-pacific region.

Huang and Song (2006: 28) use the natural logarithm of sales as a proxy for size for

Chinese firms and they report strong and significant positive correlations between size and

total leverage. Eriotis et al. (2007: 328) also use the natural logarithm of sales and they

confirm a statistically significant positive correlation between size and leverage for Greek

firms. Alternatively, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009: 10) use the logarithm of total assets as a

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proxy for size. They confirm a statistically significant positive relationship between

leverage and size for firms in South Africa and Zimbabwe3.

Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1456) examine a cross-section of firms in seven industrialised

economies and find that size is negatively related to leverage for firms in Germany and

France. The plausible explanation for this inverse association is based on information

asymmetries. According to the pecking order hypothesis, the information asymmetry

between large firms and the capital markets should be low, thus enabling larger firms to

issue informational sensitive securities such as equity with ease. This tends to lower the

debt levels relative to equity.

Chen (2004: 1347) uses the natural logarithm of total assets and documents a negative

association between size and the long term debt ratio for Chinese firms. The author

argues that the negative association may be due to larger firms‟ reputation that enables

them to access the equity markets with relative ease, and the fact that the Chinese public

bond market is virtually nonexistent. Delcoure (2007: 411) documents a similar inverse

relation between size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, and long term

leverage for firms in European transition economies. Nunkoo and Boateng (2010: 987)

use the GMM technique to estimate capital structure determinants for 835 Canadian firms.

They also document a negative correlation between size, measured by the natural

logarithm of total sales, and the long term debt ratio.

To summarise, the picture that is emerging is that irrespective of the proxy being used,

size tends to be strongly and positively correlated with leverage. However, in some

studies, long term leverage is found to be inversely related to the size variable. This is due

to the low information asymmetries associated with large firms.

3 The exception was for Nigeria where there was a significant negative relationship between leverage and

size. The coefficients for Kenya were negative but insignificant with the exception of the long term debt ratio

- 43 -

2.4.3 Profitability

Myers and Majluf (1984: 188) predict that a negative relationship should exist between

firm profitability and leverage. They contend that firms that are more profitable will prefer

to use retained earnings, and thus will have lower debt ratios. However, the trade-off

theory posits that, in order to take advantage of the interest tax shields associated with

higher leverage, more profitable firms will have higher debt ratios. Similarly, the free cash

flow theory hypothesises that profitable firms should issue more debt. This is a measure to

bond the future cash flows and to discipline managers by paying out cash to bondholders

instead of wasting the funds on negative NPV projects. The pecking order theory

hypothesises that profitability is inversely related to leverage. In contrast, the trade-off and

the free cash flow theories suggest that profitability is directly related to leverage.

A number of researchers have tested the effect of profitability on firm leverage. Kester

(1986: 13) compares capital and ownership structure of manufacturing firms in the United

States and Japan. The author finds that there is a negative relationship between

profitability and leverage, measured in terms of the total debt to book and market value of

equity. Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1453) and Wald (1999: 174) draw similar conclusions

for the United States, United Kingdom and Japan.

Booth et al. (2001: 112) find a negative correlation between leverage and profitability for a

sample of firms in emerging markets. This relationship is however, stronger than the Rajan

and Zingales (1996: 1453) observation. Mutenheri and Green (2003: 166) find no

significant relationship between leverage and profitability for firms in Zimbabwe. In fact,

the observed coefficients for the fixed and random effects models are positive. Bauer

(2004: 16) uses restricted OLS models to test the effect of profitability on leverage for

Czech firms, and finds a negative and significant association between profitability and the

debt ratio. Delcoure (2007: 411) uncovers statistically strong and negative correlations

between profitability, measured as the return on total assets, and all measures of

leverage. Chang, Lee and Lee (2009: 209) utilise the structural equation model to test the

determinants of capital structure for firms in the Compusat industrial files. They confirm a

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significant negative association between profitability (measured by the ratio of operating

income to total assets) and all measures of leverage.

Strebulaev (2007: 1747) utilises dynamic trade-off models with adjustment costs and also

shows that profitability is inversely related to book and market measures of leverage.

Likewise, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009: 9) find a negative and significant relationship for firms

in South Africa and Ghana. The relationship for firms in Zimbabwe is only negative and

significant for the short term debt ratio. The only exception is Nigeria where the

coefficients are positive and significant for the total and long term debt ratio. This positive

association confirms the trade-off and free cash flow theories of capital structure.

The evidence presented in the preceding discussion suggests that most firms in both

developed and developing countries follow a pecking order in their financing decisions.

These findings confirm the predictions of Myers and Majluf (1984: 188).

2.4.4 Asset tangibility

The general consensus among researchers is that asset tangibility is directly related to

leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 305) point out the possibility of risk shifting

strategies whereby managers may shift to riskier investments at the expense of the

bondholders. These agency costs of debt can be mitigated if the collateral value of assets

is high. Hence, asset tangibility is likely to be positively associated with leverage.

Furthermore, in the event of bankruptcy, a higher proportion of tangible assets could

enhance the salvage value of the firm‟s assets. The lenders of finance are thus willing to

advance loans to firms with a high proportion of tangible assets.

Haris and Raviv (1991: 341) observe that non-debt tax shields and firm assets are usually

regarded as proxies for asset tangibility. Bradley et al. (1984: 873) use non-debt tax

shields as a proxy for asset tangibility, and they find a statistically significant positive

relationship between firm leverage and non-debt tax shields. Alternatively, Friend and

Lang (1988: 277) use the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets and

they report a strong positive relationship between leverage and asset tangibility for both

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closely held and public corporations. On the other hand, Titman and Wessels (1988: 16)

incorporate the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets and they

confirm a positive association between collateral value and leverage.

Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1453) use both the book and market values of leverage and

they report a positive and significant relationship between leverage and asset tangibility for

firms in most of their sampled countries4. Booth et al. (2001: 112) observe a similar

relationship for a sample of emerging market economies. In contrast, Mutenheri and

Green (2003: 166) examine the determinants of capital structure for firms in Zimbabwe.

They observe a strong negative association between asset tangibility and leverage for the

pre reform period (1986-1990). However, a strong positive association is detected for the

post reform period (1995-1999).5 The negative association observed for the pre reform

period could be associated with the lack of proper contract enforcement systems

associated with underdeveloped capital markets. Therefore, asset tangibility may not be

used actively as a criterion for advancing loans.

Abor and Biekpe (2005: 43) report a negative and significant relationship between asset

tangibility and leverage for Ghanaian firms. They attribute this observation to the higher

operating risk associated with a higher proportion of fixed assets. Huang and Song

(2006: 30) perform robustness analyses by examining, inter alia, first difference

regressions for Chinese firms and a strong positive correlation is observed between asset

tangibility and leverage. Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009: 15) use fixed and random effects

models and confirm a statistically significant positive relationship for firms in Nigeria and

South Africa6 suggesting that financiers in these countries require collateral to issue long

term debt. Contrary to the predictions of the theory, Sheikh and Wang (2011: 127)

document a strong negative correlation between book leverage and asset tangibility for

listed manufacturing firms in Pakistan. The authors note that the negative association

4 There are two exceptions to this observation; when book values are used, the relationship is positive but

insignificant for Italy, and when market values are used, a positive and insignificant association is observed for France 5 This strong relationship is found using the fixed and random effects models. The pooled least squares

approach yields no statistically significant results. 6 The only exception for South Africa is the short term debt ratio, which is significantly negatively related to

asset tangibility

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could be due to the tendency for managers to “... empire build ...” at the expense of

collateralised assets.

Overall, the empirical evidence discussed so far provides strong support for the positive

association between asset tangibility and leverage predicted by capital structure theorists.

A negative association is observed only in exceptional circumstances. This is because of

the influence of the institutional environment on the providers of loan capital.

2.4.5 Age

Age plays a significant role on firms‟ ability to acquire debt. Older firms are deemed to be

more stable and thus more reputable due to their ability to survive over a longer period of

time. Therefore, the prediction is that older firms will have more long term debt in their

capital structures. Johnson (1997: 60) reports a significant positive association between

age and publicly held debt for a set of firms drawn from the Compustat database. This

suggests that the reputational capital held by older firms is sufficient to ensure that the risk

of default on public debt is minimised.

Ojah and Manrique (2005: 463) document a positive but insignificant effect of this variable

on corporate debt structures of Spanish firms. Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009: 15) find

conflicting evidence for firms in five African countries. Particularly, age is strongly

negatively correlated to leverage in Zimbabwe. A positive correlation is observed for

Kenyan and Nigerian firms. The coefficients for South Africa are significantly positive only

for long term debt and significantly negative for short term debt.

2.4.6 Growth prospects

Capital structure theories suggest that growth opportunities are correlated to firm financing

behaviour. The general consensus among researchers is that growth opportunities are

negatively related to leverage, principally because future growth prospects are intangible

and hence cannot be easily collateralised (Barclay and Smith, 2005: 10). However, the

effect of growth is dependent on the measure used to capture growth. Gupta (1969: 520)

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uses the annual compounded growth rate in sales and finds that growth firms tend to have

higher leverage than non-growth firms. This is partly due to their ability to access external

finance in a relatively unconstrained manner.

Titman and Wessels (1988: 4) use the percentage change in total assets and they arrive

at a similar conclusion for the ratio of long term debt to the book value of equity. This

evidence is consistent with the prediction that growth firms add value to the firm and

hence increase the firm‟s debt capacity. Delcoure (2007: 414) pools data for firms in

western European transition economies and fails to find a statistically significant

association between firm growth prospects and leverage.

A contrary view is pointed out by Myers (1977: 150) who argues that firms with growth

potential will tend to have lower leverage. This is because firms with intangible growth

prospects will generally avoid debt to mitigate the potential loss underinvestment problem

associated with financial distress. Eriotis et al. (2007: 324) concur with this viewpoint by

positing that growth causes variations in the value of the firm. Larger variations are

therefore interpreted as high risk. This presents a significant hurdle for growth firms to

raise capital with more favourable terms. Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1453) use the market

to book ratio of total assets to proxy growth opportunities and they find evidence

supporting Myers‟ (1977: 150) prediction. Barclay and Smith (1999: 13) and Ngugi

(2008: 620) reach the same conclusion for a sample of 6700 firms covered by Compustat

and Kenyan firms respectively. On the contrary, Al Najjar (2011: 12) finds a positive

relationship between leverage and growth opportunities (measured by the market to book

ratio) for Jordanian firms. This finding is contrary to the predictions of Myers (1977: 150)

suggesting that growth firms in Jordan prefer to finance investments with debt.

The preceding evidence shows that most studies that use the growth rate of assets as a

proxy for firm growth opportunities tend to exhibit strong positive correlations. On the other

hand, most studies that use some form of a market to book value of assets ratio reveal

negative associations between growth and leverage. This is because growth in the asset

base of a company provides an incentive for creditors to advance loans to growth firms.

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Conversely, the market to book ratio reveals intangible growth opportunities which may

not easily be collateralised.

2.4.7 Corporate taxes

The introduction of taxes to the Modigliani and Miller (1958: 261) irrelevance model

suggests that corporate taxes are a vital element in the determination of firm leverage.

Modigliani and Miller (1963: 433) demonstrate that the tax savings associated with

interest tax shields induce firms to take on more debt. Therefore, a positive association

between tax and leverage should be observed. The bone of contention, however, has

been to determine a reliable proxy for the tax rate. Most studies use the ratio of taxes paid

to total taxable income and the empirical evidence has, at most, been conflicting.

Homaifar, Zietz and Benkato (1994: 1) utilise a general autoregressive distributed lag

model to test Modigliani and Miller‟s (1963: 433) tax relevance predictions for both the

short run and the long run. They document a long run positive relationship between

leverage and corporate tax. However, no significant relationship is observed in the short

run. Graham (2001: 41) uses a sophisticated simulation technique in an attempt to derive

a more accurate measure of the effective tax rate and concludes that taxes affect leverage

in a positive manner.

Negash (2002: 26) argues that, where there is a change in the tax regime, the use of

simulation to estimate the effective tax rate may not be appropriate. In his study of firms

operating in a tax regime where firms are not progressively taxed, he finds that taxes are

negatively associated with leverage. This finding is confirmed by Abor and Biekpe

(2005: 44) for Ghana. However, Ngugi (2008: 620) and Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009: 13) find

insignificant correlations for Kenya and South Africa respectively. Likewise, Frank and

Goyal (2009: 15) confirm strong negative correlations for the book value measures of

leverage. However, strong positive associations are observed for the market value

leverage ratios.

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In summary, it appears that attempts to determine the effect of tax on leverage have

yielded inconclusive results. While Modigliani and Miller‟s (1963: 433) prediction is

confirmed by some studies, the negative association depicted in other studies cannot be

ignored. It is therefore necessary to review the corporate tax debate in the context of non-

debt tax shields.

2.4.8 Non-debt tax shields

The presence of non-debt tax shields such as depreciation, operating losses carried

forward and investment tax credits in a firm‟s financial statements reduces the firm‟s tax

bill, thereby lowering the effective tax rate. Recall that figure 2.2 shows that the effective

tax rates in South Africa have been lower than the statutory rates. This observation can

partly be explained by the use of non-debt tax shields in the South African corporate

sector.

DeAngelo and Masulis (1980: 3) have illustrated that the tax advantages of debt are lower

for those firms with opportunities to avoid tax through other related non-debt tax shelters

such as depreciation, investment tax credits and tax loss carry forwards. It follows that

firms with higher non-debt tax shields are less likely to issue more debt. Therefore, an

inverse relationship is expected between non-debt tax shields and leverage.

Again, the empirical evidence regarding non-debt tax shields has yielded mixed results.

For example, Bennet and Donnelly (1993: 54), Saa-Requejo (1996: 55),

Wiwattanakantang (1999: 394), De Miguel and Pindado (2001: 77), Ozkan (2001: 187)

and Ngugi (2008: 620) confirm the prediction of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980: 3) that non-

debt tax shields are a substitute for debt. However, Bradley et al. (1984: 873), Barclay et

al. (1996: 210) and Boyle and Eckhold (1997: 434)7 provide evidence suggesting that

non-debt tax shields have a positive impact on firm leverage. Chang et al. (2009: 209)

7 Boyle and Eckhold (1997: 434) report a positive correlation for the long term debt ratio for the pre liberalisation period and insignificant positive correlation for the post liberalisation period. The short term debt ratio is positively correlated to leverage for the pre liberalisation period and negatively correlated to leverage for the post liberalisation period.

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confirm a positive association between leverage and non-debt tax shields for Compustat-

listed non-financial corporations.

This contradiction is not surprising because of two main reasons provided by Barclay and

Smith (2005: 15). Firstly, firms with higher non-debt tax shields have higher proportions of

tangible assets in their balance sheet. This provides an increased potential to accumulate

more debt. Therefore, non-debt tax shields may not only be a proxy for low taxes, but

rather a proxy for low contracting costs associated with debt. Secondly, firms with tax loss

carry forwards are often in financial distress. Consequently, the market value of equity for

such firms is eroded thereby increasing the debt ratio. It is therefore not clear whether tax

loss carry forwards are a reliable proxy for non-debt tax shields.

2.4.9 Dividend policies

Miller and Modigliani (1961: 411) have argued that dividend policy does not affect the

value of the firm or the cost of equity. If this is true, then dividend policy is irrelevant.

Pursuant to this proposition, several financial theorists have argued otherwise, that

dividend policy is relevant. Lintner (1962: 243) and Gordon (1963: 264) have argued that

investors value the next dollar of dividends more than future capital gains. In effect, the

perceived riskiness of a dividend paying firm should be lower than that of a non dividend

payer. Consequently, the required return of a dividend paying firm reduces with an

increase in dividends. This proposition has been termed the “bird-in-hand theory”.

On the other hand, the introduction of market imperfections such as taxes into this debate

could sway the argument to the other side. Boyle and Eckhold (1997: 431) reason that if

capital gains are taxed lower than dividend income, then an increase in dividends will

reduce the after tax return of shareholders who may in turn require a higher pre tax

expected rate of return. Consequently, the increased cost of equity may induce firms to

issue more debt relative to equity. In this case, dividend payout may be positively

correlated with leverage.

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If dividend policy is relevant, then the subsequent change in the market value of equity

should affect capital structure. If the bird-in-hand theory holds, an increase in dividends

should be inversely related to the debt ratio. The dividend relevancy argument is

consistent with Jensen‟s (1986: 323) free cash flow hypothesis that increases in dividend

and debt interest payments reduce the firm‟s free cash flows. Consequently, firms with

higher dividend payments are forced to seek external financing from the capital markets. If

more debt is issued, then dividend payout may be directly related to the debt ratio. If more

equity is issued, then dividend payout may be inversely related to the debt ratio.

Empirical evidence on the relevancy of dividend policy has provided conclusive evidence

on the dividend signalling theory, which suggests that dividend increases are associated

with managements‟ confidence of future stability of cash flows. Specifically, Bhattacharya

(1979: 259) and John and Williams (1985: 1053) predict a positive correlation between

dividends and future cash flows. This prediction should translate to a positive association

between dividends and shareholder wealth.

Woolridge (1983: 1618) examines unexpected dividend announcements for a sample of

New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed firms and reports a statistically significant

relationship between unexpected dividend changes and shareholder wealth. Dhillon and

Johnson (1994: 282) report a positive association between large dividend increases and

share prices and a simultaneous inverse relationship between bond prices and dividend

changes. This finding is consistent with both the dividend signalling and the wealth

redistribution hypotheses. If this is the case, the wealth redistribution observation builds a

stronger case for the argument that dividend increases are negatively associated with

leverage.

Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002: 387) have examined both the short and long

term wealth effects of dividend changing firms and they find a significant increase in share

prices for dividend increasing firms for both the short and long run. They attribute this

positive wealth effect to a reduction in the systematic risk of dividend paying firms. This

observation is consistent with Lintner (1962: 243) and Gordon‟s (1963: 264) “bird-in-hand”

theory.

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From a South African perspective, inspection of figure 2.3 suggests two schools of

thought. Firstly, large dividend payments reduce firms‟ free cash flows thereby reducing

funds available for investment projects. This forces corporate managers to seek additional

finance from the capital markets. This conjecture is consistent with Jensen‟s (1986: 323)

free cash flow hypothesis discussed earlier. Secondly, many listed firms use dividends as

a credible signal that their future earnings prospects are sound. This gives them the

incentive to seek further borrowing from the capital markets. An inspection of figure 2.3

shows that there was an increase in the dividend payouts in the year 1998. This spike in

dividend payouts is followed by a general rise in the debt ratios in the following two years.

Likewise, for the 1991 to 1997 period, it can be noted that declining dividend payouts are

associated with lower debt ratios. From this viewpoint, dividend payout in South Africa

may be positively associated with leverage.

The literature documented in the preceding discussion suggests a strong support for the

dividend signalling hypothesis which is consistent with the “bird-in-hand” theory. This

empirical evidence suggests that, dividend policy does matter. If this is the case, dividend

changes may be negatively correlated with leverage. However, the South African

perspective suggests that dividend payout may be positively associated with leverage.

Figure 2.3: A comparison of dividend payouts and market value total debt ratios

Source: Author’s calculations from study data set

0

0.1

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1989

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Dividend Payout

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TD/TA(M)

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2.4.10 Similarities in capital structure determinants

Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1422) observe that the variables (asset tangibility, log of sales,

profitability and market to book ratios) used to determine the choice of capital structure in

the United States are similarly correlated in the other seven developed nations. For

example, leverage increases with size in all countries, with the exception of Germany. The

plausible reason for this finding is that larger firms have a lower possibility of financial

distress. Booth et al. (2001: 117) perform a cross country analysis of capital structure

determinants among developing countries, and they confirm that, despite the institutional

differences, financing choices in developing countries are also affected by the same

variables as in the developed countries.

To summarise, the evidence documented suggests that firm specific characteristics such

as size, age, profitability, asset tangibility, growth prospects, taxes, non-debt tax shields

and dividend policy have an impact on firm financing. Firm profitability tends to be

negatively related to leverage. However, with regard to size, the evidence is mixed with

some studies reporting a positive relationship between size and firm leverage, while others

suggest that a negative relationship exists. Asset tangibility appears to be positively

correlated to leverage and growth coefficients tend to be negative when the market to

book ratio is used as a proxy for growth prospects.

The empirical evidence regarding taxes and non-debt tax shields is mixed, partly due to

methodological differences and the nature of the tax regime within which firms operate.

Dividend payout ratio is theoretically predicted to be negatively correlated to leverage due

to the positive association between dividend payout and the market value of equity. The

other pattern that is emerging is that variables used to determine the choice of capital

structure are similar among developing countries and between developing and developed

countries.

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2.5 CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURES AROUND THE WORLD

This section distinguishes between the practice of corporate capital structures in

developed and developing economies. Atkin and Glen (1992: 377) succinctly point out that

there is no reason to suggest that firms in developed countries have different objectives

from firms in the developing countries. However, because capital markets in the

developing countries are less developed than the capital markets in the developed

nations, there is reason enough to believe that capital structure behaviour may differ. The

idea is to document notable differences in firm financing and to see whether patterns in

financing exist across countries.

2.5.1 Corporate capital structures in the developed economies

Numerous studies have documented the manner in which capital is structured in firms

selected from different industrialised economies. For example, Marsh (1982: 121)

empirically tests the choice between debt and equity for firms in the United Kingdom and

finds some evidence that firms “appear” to have target levels of debt in mind. Borio

(1990: 10) reviews capital structures of firms in industrialised countries and finds that, by

international standards, leverage ratios in the United States are low, when the 1980s are

taken into account. However, a closer inspection of the trend in financing reveals that,

during this period, leverage ratios were rising at a “... fast rate...” Rajan and Zingales

(1995: 1433) review the 1987-1991 period based on both book and market values, and

they conclude that firms in Germany and the United Kingdom are relatively under levered

compared to the United States.

In terms of internally generated funds, the first and perhaps most important observation

made by a number of researchers is that firms in industrialised economies principally rely

on retention of earnings as a dominant source of finance. For example, Mayer

(1988: 1172) examines flow of funds data for non-financial firms in the United Kingdom for

the period 1970 to 1985. He finds that retentions accounted for a large proportion of

investment in the United Kingdom. Atkin and Glen (1992: 377) observe an increase in the

use of retained earnings for firms in the United States in the post World War II era. They

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argue that equity has never been the popular choice of finance among firms in the United

States. This is mostly due to a high proportion of bond issues as opposed to equity during

the post World War II era.

Corbett and Jenkinson (1996: 71) study corporate capital structures in Japan, Germany,

United Kingdom and the United States. They confirm that the main source of finance for all

countries in their sample was internal funds. Lemmon, Zender and Jaime (2010: 1161)

review CRSP and Compustat listed firms for a period ranging from 1971 to 2001, and they

confirm that firms in their sample principally rely on internally generated funds. These

observations suggest that corporate managers consider information costs of issuing

external finance when financing corporate investments.

Borio (1990: 4) observes that countries are either “high leverage” such as Japan,

Germany and France, or “low leverage” such as Canada, the United Kingdom and the

United States. However, there are some qualifications in respect to these observations.

The results of the various studies on corporate capital structures are dependent on the

measures of leverage. Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1430) argues that if leverage is

measured as a ratio of debt to total assets at book values, then Canadian firms are the

most highly geared at 36 percent, and the lowest being German firms at 20 percent. If

market values are considered, then Italian firms have the highest gearing at 28 percent,

and firms in the United Kingdom and Germany have the lowest gearing at 16 percent.

These findings lead Corbett and Jenkinson (1996: 71) to conclude that, if market values

are used for leverage, both British and American firms are more highly geared than

German firms. De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008: 1957) perform a more extensive

analysis of long term leverage of firms from 42 countries. They confirm the observation by

Rajan and Zingales (1995: 1430) that German firms are the lowest geared among firms in

industrialised economies (See figure 2.4).

Financial systems in different countries can either be classified as bank or market based

financial systems. Bertero (1994: 69) states that the French system was until the mid

1980s classified as a bank based system. This is because of the over reliance on bank

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overdrafts by French firms as compared to their Japanese and German counterparts.

However, French firms, have recently increased their reliance on retained earnings, as is

the case in Japan, and reduced their reliance on short term debt with a further increased

reliance on equity and bonds. This is a result of capital market efficiency brought about by

reforms in the French capital market.

Although firms in the United States and the United Kingdom are situated in a market

based financial system, Corbett and Jenkinson (1996: 76) report that the proportion of

internal funds utilised by firms in the United States increased by 29.2 percent over a

period of 19 years, from 1970 to 1989, while firms in the United Kingdom and the United

States reduced their reliance on market based financial sources during this period. This

has been attributed to financial innovation on the part of the financial institutions that

operated during the period of study. Most recently, Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal

(2008: 59) examine the dynamics of leverage for firms operating in these two financial

systems and they conclude that leverage is largely influenced by the market conditions

prevailing in the two financial systems.

A more comprehensive study by Lemon, Roberts and Zender (2008: 1605) reveals a

surprisingly stable leverage pattern for a sample of non-financial Compustat listed firms for

the period 1965 to 2003. Firms that are high (low) leverage maintain this pattern over time.

They conclude that the variation in corporate capital structures is mostly driven by

relatively stable factors over time.

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Figure 2.4: Long term debt ratios for firms from select industrialised countries

Source: De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008: 1957)

The evidence presented by the different studies shows that there are notable differences

in leverage ratios for firms across the developed countries, and these differences are

partly due to methodological differences. The pattern that is emerging is that, despite the

differences in financing behaviour, firms in developed countries rely more on retained

earnings than on debt and equity.

2.5.2 Corporate capital structures in the developing economies

Data on corporate finance for firms in developing economies is scarce. However, the

International Finance Corporation (IFC) embarked on a program to compile a database on

balance sheet data for 50 of the largest publicly traded manufacturing firms in 9

developing economies for the period 1980 to 1988. This has made it possible for further

analysis of financing patterns on the part of firms in developing economies. Atkin and Glen

(1992: 371) utilise this database and find notably, that firms in developing economies

operate in capital markets that are less developed and therefore access to finance is

restricted to a few financing options.

There has been a fairly strong consensus among most researchers that firms in

developing economies rely less on retentions and more on external finance. For example,

Singh and Hamid (1992: 1) examine 50 largest manufacturing firms in nine developing

countries by utilising balance sheet data, and they find more reliance on external finance

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than on retentions. Singh (1995: 1) perform a more robust analysis by including a larger

sample, and where possible, a longer time period. The results of the study confirm the

findings of Singh and Hamid (1992: 1). Mutenheri and Green (2003: 159) document a

similar phenomenon for the Zimbabwean corporate sector.

Cobham and Subramaniam (1998: 1035) examine the Singh and Hamid (1992: 1) sample

for India by using net sources of finance data. They conclude that although capital

structure patterns in India are similar to those of the Mediterranean countries there were

considerable differences with the Anglo Saxon countries. This is mainly due to differences

in the choice of methodology. De Jong et al. (2008: 1957) document long term leverage

ratios for non African firms in emerging economies. An analysis of their data shows that

the average non African firms in emerging economies is about 15 percent, which is higher

than the 12 percent documented for firms in industrialised economies (see figure 2.5). This

finding is contrary to the earlier observations made by Glen and Singh (2004: 162) that

firms in emerging markets have lower leverage than their counterparts in the developed

economies. However, these observed differences could be due to the measures of

leverage used in the different studies.

Figure 2.6 shows the debt ratios for firms in five African countries. When total debt ratios

are used, Nigerian firms tend to have the lowest debt. Ghanaian firms tend to have lowest

long term debt ratios, an observation also noted by Abor and Biekpe (2005: 42). The

average long term debt ratio for African firms is 11 percent, which is slightly lower than

that of firms in other non African emerging economies. Another important finding from this

analysis is that firms in Africa rely principally on short term debt, which averages 49

percent. Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009: 17) conclude that firms in African countries exhibit

similar patterns of leverage to their counterparts especially in Brazil, Mexico, Thailand,

South Korea, Jordan and Turkey.

The evidence on corporate capital structures in the developing countries indicates a non

uniform pattern as per the different studies conducted at different times. This has mainly

been attributed to each firm‟s unique circumstance and the data definitions. However,

firms in developing countries rely less on internal financing and more on external

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financing. Furthermore, firms in African countries exhibit similar levels of leverage to firms

in other developing countries.

Figure 2.5: Long term debt ratios for firms from select developing countries

Source: De Jong et al. (2008: 1957)

Figure 2.6: Debt ratios for select African countries

Source: Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009: 7)

2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has focused on the theory and practice of capital structure. The discussion

commenced with the capital structure irrelevance debate. The train of thought in the

capital structure irrelevance propositions has developed to a general consensus among

researchers that there is an optimal capital structure. This is principally because as market

Short Term Debt ratio, Ghana, 49%

Short Term Debt ratio, Kenya, 34%

Short Term Debt ratio, Nigeria, 12%

Short Term Debt ratio, South Africa,

38% Short Term Debt ratio, Zimbabwe,

32%

Short Term Debt ratio, Average, 33%

Long Term Debt ratio , Ghana, 9%

Long Term Debt ratio , Kenya, 15%

Long Term Debt ratio , Nigeria, 13%

Long Term Debt ratio , South Africa, 14% Long Term Debt ratio

, Zimbabwe, 6%

Long Term Debt ratio , Average, 11%

Total Debt ratio, Ghana, 59%

Total Debt ratio, Kenya, 49%

Total Debt ratio, Nigeria, 25%

Total Debt ratio, South Africa, 52%

Total Debt ratio, Zimbabwe, 38%

Total Debt ratio, Average, 45%

Short Term Debt ratio Long Term Debt ratio Total Debt ratio

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imperfections are introduced, managers will attempt to balance the tax benefits of debt

against the present value of the costs of financial distress. The practical significance of

this notion is that although debt presents a tax shield that translates to fairer market

valuations, financial managers are aware of the dangers of excessive debt.

The main theories of capital structure have been discussed. These are the trade-off,

agency, signalling and pecking order theories. Several reasons have been suggested on

why the tests of the competing theories of capital structure fail to yield conclusive results.

Firstly, it is difficult to include proxies for some variables that affect the optimal capital

structure. Secondly, the theories cannot be reduced to a precise mathematical formula,

but rather predict in qualitative terms, thus making them less reliable than asset pricing

models. Lastly, the theories are not mutually exclusive.

A broad literature review on the factors that affect the choice of capital structure has been

presented. The major factors that have been cited by researchers are legal, institutional

and financial factors. Cross country studies also reveal that the choice of capital structure

in developed countries is affected by the same variables.

The effect of firm characteristics on the capital structure of firms has also been

documented. The researchers have found conflicting results on the correlation between

size and leverage. The empirical relationship between profitability and leverage is mostly

negative. Growth is usually negatively correlated to leverage when the market to book

ratio is used and mostly positively related to leverage when growth in assets is used.

Asset tangibility is usually positively correlated to leverage and evidence is mixed

regarding the effect of age on firm leverage.

Finally, the pattern of capital structure for both the developed and developing countries

has been discussed. Each country observed shows a unique pattern because of the

circumstances that the firms in that particular regime are operating in. The main finding by

the researchers is that debt levels in the sampled industrialised countries were relatively

stable, with the exception of the United States. The other finding is that debt levels in bank

based financial systems were higher than those in the market based financial systems.

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From a developing economies perspective, firms rely more on external financing as

compared to their counterparts in the developed world. The corporate capital structures in

the developing countries indicate a non uniform pattern as per the different studies

conducted at different times. This has been attributed to each firm‟s unique circumstance

and the data definitions. The next chapter discusses the theory of financial liberalisation.