Chapter 2 Summary - Princeton

Chapter 2

Summary

PageThe FOFA Concept and the FOFA Debate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Is FOFA Appropriate to the Threat? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22How Do Our NATO Allies View FOFA?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24How Might the Soviets Respond to FOFA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Implementing FOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27What and Where to Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Obtaining the Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Assembling the Pieces: “Packages’’o f Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Remaining Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) . . . . . . . 40Replacement for the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS). . . . . . . . . 42Munitions Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42Remotely Piloted Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Arms Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

TablesTable No. Page2-l. Illustrative Packages of Systems To Support Specific Operational

2-22-32-42-52-6

Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Status and Costs of Selected FOFA-Related Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Packages Based on MLRS and Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Packages Based on ATACMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Packages Based on F-16 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Packages Based on F-15E Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

FiguresFigure No. Page2-1. Warsaw Pact Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182-2. NATO’s ’’Layer Cake’’ Defense.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202-3. FOFA Reduces Advancing Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

. .

Chapter 2

Summary

THE FOFA CONCEPT AND THE FOFA DEBATE

On several occasions, NATO’s Supreme Al-lied Commander Europe (SACEUR), GeneralBernard W. Rogers, has warned that were theWarsaw Pact to attack NATO, it would onlybe a few days before he would have to askNATO political leaders for permission to usenuclear weapons. Neither of the two impliedchoices—surrender or nuclear war-is a pleas-ant one. Some analysts believe that the Sovietsmight overrun NATO so quickly that NATOwould not have time to decide to use its thea-ter nuclear weapons. Only strategic nuclearweapons would be left.

With the strong backing of the United States,General Rogers has been pushing for a thirdalternative, to improve NATO’s conventionaldefenses so that the credibility of NATO’s de-

terrent is maintained. FOFA is a major ele-ment of this conventional force improvement.

Many observers have suggested that majorchanges are needed in NATO’s conventionalforce structure, posture, and organization, aswell as in its strategy for employing thoseforces and in its procurement procedures. Butseveral major political and bureaucratic fac-tors combine with geography to limit NATO’slikely options. First, economic and politicalrealities make it doubtful that the number ofNATO army divisions and air force wings willbe increased substantially. Early in its history,NATO decided to rely on both conventionaland nuclear weapons because it could not af-ford a completely conventional defense. Sec-ond, NATO is a defensive alliance, and will not

Photo credi( NATO

NATO members signing the Paris Agreement in 1954.

15

16 . New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

adopt publicly a strategy that calls for send-ing its ground forces deep into Warsaw Pactterritory, even though that might give it a bet-ter chance of victory and of keeping conflictoff NATO soil. Tactical counterattacks, how-ever, would not be precluded, and opinions dif-fer on how deep those might be. Third, NATOcannot plan to fall back deep into Germanyin the face of an attack, trading space for time.Losing large parts of Germany would be cata-strophic for the Alliance, and planning to doso would be unacceptable to German publicopinion. These factors force NATO into adefensive posture close to West Germany’sborder with East Germany and Czechoslova-kia, which, combined with a “share the bur-den” political policy that gives each membernation in the Central Region a section of theborder to defend, sharply restricts freedom formajor force movements along the front tocounter Warsaw Pact force movements.

Within these constraints, NATO has decidedboth to improve the conventional forces it hasin place, and to adopt the FOFA concept. Theseinitiatives cannot overcome NATO’s fundamen-tal problems, but are designed to make betteruse of what Alliance members have procuredand are procuring.

In simple terms, FOFA means using longerrange weapons—airplanes, enhanced artillery,rocket launchers, and guided missiles-to at-tack enemy ground forces that have not yetcome close enough to NATO’s defending groundforces to engage them in direct combat. Thepurpose of attacking follow-on forces is to im-pede the ability of the Warsaw Pact commandersto bring their ground forces into the battle whenthey want to and at full strength. While it hasapplication to operations in all parts of Eur-ope, the primary focus of attention is on theCentral Region.

Three major factors came together to pro-duce the FOFA concept and make it a majorpart of NATO’s defensive strategy. First is arecognition that successfully attacking thefollow-on forces could have a profound effecton the ability of the Warsaw Pact to executeits offensive strategy. Second is a new empha-

sis on directly attacking the ground forcesthemselves, in addition to facilities such as airbases that would support them: NATO has al-ways had plans for interdiction missions intoenemy territory. Third-and perhaps most rele-vant to the issues before Congress-is the rec-ognition that achieving a significant capabil-ity to attack follow-on forces depends stronglyon exploiting new technologies. In theory,FOFA provides an opportunity to exploit tech-nology to offset a fundamental East-Westasymmetry.

The Warsaw Pact not only enjoys significantnumerical superiority over NATO in the Cen-tral Region, it also has the advantage of con-ducting a strategically mobile offense whileNATO’s ground forces have much less free-dom to maneuver in response. The WarsawPact, following Soviet doctrine and leadership,organizes its divisions into armies, which areorganized into army groups (called fronts bythe Soviets), all under the command of a thea-ter commander.’ NATO expects that theseforces would be used not uniformly across theentire border, but to conduct rapid, deep,powerful thrusts into selected sectors ofNATO’s defensive line. These would be aimedat getting into NATO’s rear area, disruptingNATO’s ability to command and control itsforces, capturing or destroying NATO’s thea-ter nuclear forces, and cutting off NATO’s in-dividual army corps from each other and fromtheir support. These thrusts are likely to bedirected at NATO’s weakest corps sectors. Thestrongest—especially the U.S. corps—are likelyto see only holding actions, designed to pre-vent them from redeploying to aid in defend-ing against the main attacks. Of course, NATOcannot know in advance how the offensivewould be conducted; surprise is a basic tenetof Soviet doctrine. This offensive would be pre-ceded and accompanied by massive air and mis-

‘Organizationally, Warsaw Pact armies are roughly equiva-lent to NATO corps, Pact fronts are roughly equivalent to NATOArmy Groups, and the commander of the theater of militaryoperations (TVD) is roughly equivalent to NATO’s Central Re-gion commander. However, at each level there are major differ-ences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, for example in man-power and firepower.

Ch. 2—Summary . 17

sile attacks against NATO’s air bases andother fixed facilities, and by small attacks byspecial forces deep within NATO territory.

NATO expects that a Warsaw Pact offen-sive would be conducted with succeeding waves,or echelons, of ground forces. Once thoughtto be rigidly structured, this offensive is nowbelieved likely to display a good deal of flexi-bility at several levels of organization. Thefronts conducting the initial attacks would bedivided into first echelon armies that wouldbegin the attack, as well as operational ma-neuver groups (OMGS)2 that would exploit itand second echelon armies that would continueit. The division among these elements is notrigidly set. It could vary among fronts and bealtered as the front goes into battle. Each armywould be divided into first echelon divisionsto spearhead the attack, second echelon divi-sions, and mobile groups. And within each di-vision there could be first and second echelonregiments. After the first fronts have donetheir jobs, the theater commander would havesecond fronts available to follow them. ByNATO’s definition, all those forces moving upbehind the forces that are directly engagingNATO’s defenders are follow-on forces.

NATO lacks a similar layered structure, al-though there is some ability for reinforcement.Defending NATO divisions would defend againstone attack, only to be faced with another at-tack by fresh forces, and then another, and soon. So, for example, a single U.S. (or German,or Belgian) division might defend against two(or one, or three, or more) first echelon divi-sions of the first echelon army, and—depletedfrom that battle—be attacked by a fresh sec-ond echelon division of that same army, andthen by a force from the first echelon of thesecond echelon army, etc. If the Soviet planwent forward unimpeded, there would be notime for the U.S. force to recover between as-saults on it: each attack would find it weakerthan the preceding one did. Alternatively, whileoccupied by an attack by the first wave, itmight be bypassed by follow-on forces seek-ing to reach deeper objectives.

Because of evolving flexibility in the way theSoviets would use their forces, NATO cannotexpect a “set piece” of equal waves attackingeach division, or a uniform attack across theRegion. It can rely on two fundamental aspectsof a Pact offensive: that all the forces will notattack at once; and that the Pact has muchgreater freedom to maneuver their forces toattack heavily on selected parts of the frontthan NATO has to maneuver in response.FOFA seeks to oppose both of these: imped-ing the movement forward of follow-on forces,reducing the forces that NATO’s defendershave to face and helping improve NATO’s abil-ity to recover from one battle before facinganother; and moving firepower rapidly acrossthe front to compensate for difficulties in mov-ing ground forces across the front.

Some believe that simply directing firepoweragainst forces moving up, or against main So-viet efforts, will not be effective: there are somany targets that not enough would be killedto make a difference. In this view, it will benecessary to find that small part of the forcethat is the focus of the attack and destroy it,thus causing the entire effort to fail. Doing thisrequires an ability to monitor and accuratelyassess Warsaw Pact force movements.

FOFA was a matter of some controversywhen first proposed, and some still argue thatit is not sound policy. Some Europeans, per-haps confusing FOFA with the U.S. Army’sAirLand Battle concept, have seen it as offen-sive and inconsistent with NATO’s defensiveposture. Others argue that it is more efficientto wait until targets are close before attack-ing them, that attacking deep diverts resourcesfrom the close battle while providing little pay-off. Still others believe that the follow-on forceswill not be very important to the Soviet offen-sive, that most of the combat capability willbe in the initial attack. Finally, there are sev-eral groups who argue that while the idea maybe sound in principle, it will be very costly andextremely difficult—if not impossible—to im-plement.

The FOFA concept is still under develop-ment, and is seen somewhat differently by the‘Also called Mobile Groups.

18 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack

Figure 2-1 .—Warsaw Pact Offensive

Czechoslovakia

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Munich \Austria

SuuHut AaapIea worn Jonn b r-rlnes, bowel r-rorr( uperallons In turope—~lannlng ror knclrclemenl, a paper presented at a conference sponsored Ithe Alumn( Association of the Norwegian National Defense College Study Committee, Apr 25-26, 1985

Ch. 2—Summary ● 1 9

NATO’s Integrated Military CommandNATO members

France

Spain

Iceland

Denmark

Greece

Italy

Norway

Portugal

Turkey

Belgium

Canada

Germany

Luxembourg

Netherlands

United Kingdom

United States

I NATO’s IntegratedMilitary

Command II 1v +

Allied Allied AlliedCommand Command Command

Atlantic Europe ChannelA

II

I IACE

Allied

MobileForces

SouthernForce Europe

principal players: SHAPE (Supreme Head-quarters Allied Powers Europe, the headquar-ters for NATO’s Allied Command Europe); theU.S. Army; the U.S. Air Force; and the defenseforces of our Allies. SHAPE’s perspective isall of Europe including the entire Central Re-gion, and it defines FOFA as delaying, disrupt-ing, and destroying follow-on forces from justbeyond the troops in contact to as far in theenemy rear as NATO systems can reach.SHAPE considers FOFA from the point ofview of: 1) the corps commander, who wantsto control the forces about to move in againsthis troops; 2) the Army Group commander,who wants to delay the second operationalechelon (second echelon armies) until his corpshave dealt with the first and his reserves are

in place; and 3) the Central Region commander,who would like to make the second strategicechelon (second fronts) irrelevant to the war.

The U.S. Army sees FOFA as the “deep bat-tle” part of its operations, as a means for“metering” the flow of enemy forces; its con-centration is almost entirely on those sectorsin which U.S. Army forces would be defend-ing. As the Army sees it, striking deep not onlyreduces the threat to the defending groundforces, but also improves the effectiveness ofthe ground forces in handling the threat. Be-cause their primary concern is the progress ofthe close battle, focused at the individual corpsand subordinate division commanders’ levels,the Army’s approach puts great emphasis on


Figure 2-2.— NATO’S “Layer Cake” Defense

North Sea

4

EastGermany

7A

A /

l--

SOURCE. Off Ice of Technology Assessment, 1987

Ch. 2—Summary ● 21—

Figure 2-3.— FOFA Reduces Advancing Forces

SOURCE SHAPE

FOFA Provides Cross Corps Support

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

I

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment 1987


identifying and attacking those units-individ-ual battalions, regiments, and possibly entiredivisions-that pose the most pressing threatto its ground forces in the immediate future.

The U.S. Air Force, which sees FOFA as fall-ing under its existing interdiction mission,views it primarily from the Army Group/ATAF(Allied Tactical Air Force) level, the commandlevel above corps. While individual regimentsand even battalions might be targeted at therequest of corps commanders, the Air Forceis more likely to think in terms of attacks onwhole divisions or their component regiments,possibly before they become an immediatethreat to a corps sector. Attacking these largertargets while they are farther out makes it eas-ier to preplan takeoff times and attack routes—necessary to keep attrition down-and permitsgiving greater latitude to pilots to choose amongspecific target vehicles within the larger array.The Air Force is also interested in the conceptof striking very deep to cause long delays inthe arrival of the second fronts.

Is FOFA Appropriate to the Threat?

We can never know exactly what the Sovietswould do if they went to war against NATO.Analysts working from similar sources havedisagreed over whether the Soviets wouldlaunch a conventional offensive, and whetherfollow-on forces would play a significant rolein that offensive. There is currently general(but not unanimous) agreement that theSoviets are at least preserving the option fora conventional offensive, and most observersargue that they would want to begin with aconventional offensive and keep it conven-tional as long as possible. Most observers alsoagree that while the Soviets are developing con-siderable operational flexibility in their use ofground forces and have considerable latitudeto beef up the first echelons at the expense ofthe second echelons, there will be significantfollow-on forces at all levels.

There is currently a great deal of uncertainty—and a great deal of controversy—concerninga number of factors of importance to FOFA.

In particular:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

how much flexibility Soviet ground forcescommanders have at various levels oforganization to change the direction of at-tack, to compensate for unanticipated sit-uations, and to allocate their forces amongfirst echelon, second echelon, and mobilegroups;how sensitive the Soviet offensive planwould be to delays and to destruction ofsome of its forces;how robust and resistant to disruption theWarsaw Pact command and control sys-tem is;how important the follow-on forces are toSoviet strategy; andhow much they could move their forcesforward prior to hostilities.

Mobilization is an important factor in a warin the Central Region. It is thought unlikelythat the Soviets would attack without anymobilization: not enough of their forces wouldbe ready and in place. However, some analystsbelieve that by increasing the numbers, qual-ity, and readiness of their forces in EasternEurope, and by reforming their commandstructure, the Soviets may be developing a ca-pability to do just that. NATO military plan-ners are acutely aware that NATO would needseveral days of mobilization before it could ef-fectively resist a massive attack, in additionto whatever time would be needed to recognizea Pact mobilization and decide to respond.Hence, NATO planners are very concernedabout a Pact attack preceded by a short or con-cealed mobilization.

A NATO ability to attack follow-on forceswould pose a dilemma for the Soviets: shortmobilizations mean more Soviet forces wouldhave to move forward during hostilities whenNATO could shoot at them, and less opportu-nity to ‘front load’ the offensive; long mobili-zations would risk giving NATO sufficientwarning to also mobilize. This is part of theappeal of the concept (discussed below) of usingB-52 bombers carrying cruise missiles to putthe rail lines in Eastern Europe at risk. Sec-ond echelon fronts—and possibly elements of


Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Elements of Soviet army forces.

24 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack—. — —

the first fronts—would have to come forwardacross Eastern Europe by rail to reach the bat-tle. After leaving the rails, they would be trans-ported on roads in Poland, Czechoslovakia, andEast Germany, and finally move under theirown power to join the battle.

It is widely believed that Warsaw Pact andNATO forces would be intermingled to consid-erable depth. There would be Pact penetrationsinto NATO territory and NATO penetrationsinto Pact territory—much like interlockingfingers. Some analysts believe that it there-fore would be extremely difficult to pick outand attack the follow-on forces.

How Do Our NATO Allies View FOFA?

Our European Allies generally have beenslower to accept FOFA than the United Stateshas. Up through early 1986 there appeared tobe little enthusiasm: conservative defense-minded governments were cautiously in favor;opposition Socialist parties were generally op-posed. Underlying some European reactionshave been long-standing transatlantic tensionson the degree to which NATO should rely onconventional forces, sharing of defense costs,and trade in defense equipment. This was height-ened by a perception, especially among the Ger-mans, that FOFA would draw resources fromthe close battle—their primary concern—andyield little in return. The situation was aggra-vated because FOFA came in the midst of sev-eral other (primarily United States, or at leastviewed as such) initiatives that seemed to ar-rive at a faster pace than the Europeans couldrespond, and because of calls for still greaterspending increases to implement FOFA.

There is mounting evidence that the Alliesare moving toward greater understanding andacceptance of the FOFA concept, and are be-coming more enthusiastic for developing andprocuring systems that could support FOFA.

To the Germans, whose thinking stronglyinfluences other Central Region nations, FOFAis of lower priority than fighting the close bat-tle or air defense, a sentiment echoed by someother nations. However, they have apparently

dropped their efforts to get NATO to assignpriorities among the key mission concepts. Itis difficult for the Germans to accept anythingthat might appear to reemphasize forward de-fense, which is a cornerstone of German pub-lic acceptance of NATO. And German mem-bership is itself a basis of the Alliance.

The British, Germans, Dutch, and Belgians—as well as the French, who are not part ofAllied Command Europe–have accepted thevalue of attacks out to the range of the Multi-ple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), and areplanning to procure MLRS as well as enhancedartillery and targeting systems. However, forsome this procurement is at least ten years inthe future.

The Germans and British accept, in princi-ple, the value of striking deeper with army sys-tems, but have not yet decided whether it canbe made practical and cost-effective. The Dutchand Belgians think that their defense estab-lishments are too small to support the neces-sary complex packages of systems. All the airforces are interested in upgrading their inter-diction capabilities, but here again the smallerforces are limited in the variety of systems theycan support. Within the Conference of NATOArmament Directors, a FOFA baseline listingthe basic capabilities needed for FOFA andspecifying a near term interest in ranges outto 150 kilometers has been approved. Work isnow underway to produce an agreed list of can-didate systems to meet these basic needs.

Availability of funding will limit what all thenations can do (the United States included).This is particularly a problem for the British,whose defense budget is expected to declinein real terms (with significant declines in spend-ing for conventional defense in order to fundTrident), and for the Belgians, who are morelikely to apply whatever money is available pri-marily to improving their ability to fight theclose battle.

The focus of attention appears to have shiftedfrom the conceptual to the more concrete arenaof arms production and cooperation. It seemsclear that the Europeans are unlikely to be en-thusiastic about FOFA if FOFA means buying


Photo credlf NATO

Ministerial meeting of North Atlantic Council.

predominantly American technology. There isalso evidence that they are becoming interestedin producing and selling systems that could sup-port FOFA. On the other hand, while it may bedifficult to separate real concerns from rheto-ric, it may be unwise to dismiss all previous Euro-pean concerns as a rhetorical smokescreen foreconomic considerations. U.S. efforts to developgreater Alliance cohesion and cooperation onthe development of FOFA systems have cen-tered on the Department of Defense (DoD) De-fense Science Board FOFA II Task Force, andthe 1985 Nunn Amendment initiative. Bothhave apparently achieved some initial successin arousing European governmental and indus-trial interest, but it is too early to tell whetherthere will be significant concrete results.

Nonetheless, some major elements are dis-cernible. The Europeans are most interestedin those approaches to implementing FOFA

that are most in consonance with what theyhave already been planning. In this they arenot alone-the U.S. approach to FOFA alsoincludes only systems that were underway be-fore the term “FOFA” was invented. However,the U.S. approach is focused at longer rangesthan the European, and one source of frictionappears to be the reluctance of our Allies tojump to an approach centered on our products.

In particular, the Europeans are interestedin shorter ranges—out to roughly 30 kilometers—where enhanced artillery and MLRS (whichseveral are now buying) could be applied, andin air interdiction. The Europeans appear mostinterested in FOFA enhancements to systemsin which they have already made large nationalinvestments, such as the Tornado aircraft, andcontinuing parallel development of sensor sys-tems–e.g., Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV),the United Kingdom’s Airborne Stand-Off Ra-


dar (ASTOR), and the French Observatoire Ra-dar Coherent Heliporte d’Investigation DesElements Ennemis (ORCHIDEE)–that mayduplicate U.S. efforts. U.S./European cooper-ative efforts may thus focus largely on ensur-ing some degree of interoperability among com-peting systems. The Germans are developingattack drones for use against armor and airdefenses, and advanced anti-armor weaponsto be carried on combat aircraft. There appearsto be little European enthusiasm for longerrange attack missiles, like ATACMS. Indeed,political problems—centering on public percep-tions of such missiles as being “offensive,” onarms control considerations, and on notionsthat they are destabilizing because the Sovietsmight think they carry nuclear warheads andrespond with nuclear weapons—surround thedeployment of such missiles in Europe, andmight cause problems as the United Statesseeks to deploy them.

There is a growing recognition within Europe—including France-that cooperative programsare the key to obtaining costly modern capa-bilities. But the Europeans have several con-cerns about cooperative programs. There is lit-tle sentiment for buying goods produced in theUnited States, and a growing reluctance sim-ply to co-produce U.S. developments, becausethat stunts the growth of European technol-ogy. They prefer co-development programsthat draw on and nurture the technologicalstrengths of all parties. Many see in U.S. pol-icy several impediments to cooperative pro-grams: “buy American” sentiments; an in-ability to commit to a several year project;“black” programs that they cannot have ac-cess to; restrictions on transferring technol-ogy to our allies; and restrictions on sales ofresulting products to third parties.

Based on past experience with cooperativearms production, the process of developing andprocuring the many systems required for FOFAis likely to be quite time-consuming. There areseveral fora—formal and informal groupingsof European states, bilateral and multilateralarrangements including the United States,industry-to-industry cooperative programs,and attempts to sell existing systems or their

co-production— through which such deals canbe arranged. All will have to be harmonized,and the final products gotten through theirrespective national governments.

Both the British Labour Party and the Ger-man Social Democratic Party appear to be deep-ly opposed to FOFA (and to a number of otherbasic NATO ideas). Labour stands a reason-able chance of coming to power. If this hap-pens, NATO will face a very different situa-tion, because both Britain and Germany arenot only major players, but have a strong in-fluence on how the smaller countries react.Even out of power, both these parties are im-portant political forces in Europe.

How Might the Soviets Respondto FOFA?

The Soviets are likely to regard FOFA bothas worrisome and as presenting an opportu-nity to stimulate and exploit a controversywithin NATO. Their reactions to it have taken,and most likely will continue to take, twoforms: political exploitation of a new contro-versy within NATO; and adjustment of theiroperations to take account of it.

Their propaganda has played on many of theconcerns voiced in Europe, in particular: thatFOFA is an offensive doctrine that threatensthe East; that FOFA would be destabilizingbecause missiles carrying conventional war-heads could not be distinguished upon launchfrom nuclear missiles; and that it would lowerthe nuclear threshold through the use of con-ventional weapons of high destructive poten-tial. The Soviets have taken the position thatFOFA is yet another manifestation of aggres-sive U.S. behavior and intentions, and has con-trasted that to the peace-loving image theypaint of themselves. They have drawn a pictureof the United States developing an aggressivestance with new weapons having the destruc-tive potential of “weapons of mass destruc-tion” (i.e., nuclear weapons). They will try touse it to drive a wedge between the UnitedStates and Europe, and to stir up the Euro-pean left.


Although these concerns may not be takenvery seriously among defense professionals inEurope, they do have some support within themajor opposition parties in Germany and Brit-ain. Furthermore, these and similar argumentscan be exploited by the Soviets to influencepublic opinion, and perhaps elections, in thedemocratic European states. The threat toNATO is both political and military. The Sovietswould probably prefer to split NATO and sep-arate the United States from Europe by polit-ical means if they could do so, rather than riskwar.

On the military level, they are concernedboth about the concept itself, and about theindividual systems being designed to supportit. In the first instance, they have added FOFAinto their ongoing reevaluations of their strat-egy and operational art. Their reaction mayultimately take the form of deemphasizing thesecond echelon at all levels (and otherwise

‘‘front-loading’ their offensive), or increasingthe combat capability of their leading units,or both. However, geography and a desire tolimit the vulnerability of massed forces to anuclear strike will reduce their opportunitiesfor front-loading. They can also be expectedto take active and passive countermeasuresagainst the weapons and other systems usedby NATO to find and attack their follow-onforces. Each of these steps can be taken onlyat some cost.

The Soviets appear to have deep concernsabout the rapid reaction capability of NATO’snew strike systems. In the abstract, such sys-tems could counter their plans faster than theycould modify their plans in response, and stealthe initiative from them. They will probablytake measures to speed their planning cyclesor protect them from FOFA weapons. Theyare also developing similar systems and thetheory of their use on the modern battlefield.

IMPLEMENTING FOFA

Initially, a great number of different FOFAconcepts were under discussion. But over thepast few years, several important study effortshave helped to narrow the range of possibil-ities by taking into account both operationalconsiderations and technological realities. At-tacks could be conducted either by ground-launched missiles or interdiction aircraftagainst a variety of targets at many differentranges from the FLOT. The targets could becombat units, selected high-value elements ofthe combat units (e.g., command posts or sur-face-to-surface missile launchers), or the sup-plies for those units. Moreover, attacks couldbe launched to create chokepoints—for exam-ple, by dropping a bridge or sowing a mine fieldalong a route of advance-just as a unit wouldbe about to move through. Attacking the com-bat units might delay, disrupt, or destroy them;attacking their command posts could disrupttheir ability to contribute to the offensive, andcreating chokepoints would delay their advance,

What and Where to AttackOf the three general types of targets-groups

of vehicles, individual high-value units that,while mobile, tend to spend most of their timemoving, and fixed chokepoint targets-thefixed targets are the easiest to target, requir-ing at most some indication that the time isright to hit them, in addition to informationthat can be gathered in peacetime. The high-value targets are inherently difficult becausetheir presence can be obscured. When NATOdeploys rapidly responding reconnaissance andtargeting systems that can find moving vehi-cles (as well as the weapons to engage them)these targets will probably become easier tolocate and destroy than the high-value targets.Until then, there is likely to be more interest,as a practical matter, in the high-value targets.

Quantitative analyses have tended to favorattack of moving combat units either in tran-sit from division assembly areas (roughly 50

28 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Fe/low-On Forces Attack— —

to 150 kilometers from the FLOT) to final as-sembly areas (out to perhaps 50 kilometersfrom the FLOT), or in their move out of finalassembly areas to join the battle. Althoughopportunities to attack stopped units shouldnot be ignored if they present themselves, at-tacking moving units provides a better basisfor planning; stopped units are more likely tohave taken measures to hide from both detec-tion and attack.3 The concept is to attack bat-talions or entire regiments, destroying so muchof their combat capability that they can nolonger be usefully committed to the assault asscheduled.

In attacking these units, emphasis could beput on killing tanks, the other armored vehi-cles, or the soft-skinned vehicles such as trucks.Destroying tanks is particularly difficult; theirheavy armor is designed to protect againstmost munitions. Fewer than half the armoredcombat vehicles, however, are tanks. The others—armored fighting vehicles, armored person-nel carriers, surface-to-air missile launchers,and surface-to-surface missile launchers, aswell as armored engineering equipment neededby the combat vehicles-are easier to put outof action and are also important to the com-bined arms offensive. Fewer than one-third ofthe vehicles in a Soviet division are armored,but the closer the division gets to the battle,the more of its soft-skinned vehicles it leavesbehind.

The supplies for these forces would be almostas hard to find as the forces themselves, buteasier to kill. However, analyses differ on thevalue of attacking supplies. Although suppliesare vital, the Soviets may have much morethan they absolutely need. Some conclude thatforces going into battle carry enough on boardto do without resupply for a while. On the otherhand, some analysts conclude that these arepotentially valuable targets, especially supplyunits that are part of combat units (i.e., “or-ganic supply”). In order to continue an attackor move forward and exploit it, a combat unitwould need at least minimal critical supplies.

3The U.S. ASARS-II system now in Europe can detect stoppedvehicles.

Close to the battle, combat vehicles would out-number supply trucks, making each supplytruck a more valuable target.

High-value targets such as command posts,missile launchers, and resupply points areworth attacking when they can be located. Nomeans of routinely locating and engaging themhas as yet been identified, but the fact thatthey tend to stay put for many hours increasesthe likelihood that clues from a number ofsources can be pieced together successfully.If found, they could be killed with today’sweapons; they are much fewer in number thanthe combat vehicles. The Army believes thatattacking these targets could seriously disruptthe offensive. In the near term—until systemsfor locating moving units and weapons for at-tacking masses of armored vehicles becomeavailable-attacks would probably be limited


Phc)fc~ credlf U S Deparimenf of Defense

Less well-protected Soviet vehicles outnumber the tanks.

to such high-value targets and to creatingchokepoints to cause delay.

Causing delays can be very useful if the de-lays are sufficiently long; however, studies in-dicate that most attacks would be incapableof causing significantly long delays. In manycases, there may be enough “slop” in theSoviets’ schedule to compensate. Two prom-ising exceptions are: deep strikes against therail lines in Eastern Europe, where delays meas-ured in weeks may be possible; and strikes veryclose to the FLOT, where delays of just a fewhours may be very significant. Some analystsbelieve that it is very important to delay thesecond operational echelon to allow NATO’sreserves to get into place, and to delay the sec-ond strategic echelon until NATO has success-fully dealt with the first.

In general, the closer to the FLOT the at-tacks take place, the more systems can reach

the targets, the more effective the attacks arelikely to be, and the more direct their effecton the close battle. However, waiting for theenemy to get very close risks not being ableto fire enough rounds in the time he is exposedto attack. Furthermore, this is not necessarilyan argument in favor of short-range systems,because longer range systems have greaterflexibility to redirect fire across the front.

Obtaining the Capability

The Systems: What’s in the Inventory,What’s Being Bought, What’s UnderDevelopment

Supporters of the FOFA concept believe thatsome or all of these approaches can be madeto work, if all the necessary pieces can be pro-cured. They differ as to which would be themost useful and the most feasible.


Implementing any of these approaches willrequire a package of systems, the major com-ponents of which are:

1. reconnaissance, surveillance, and targetacquisition (RSTA);

2. data analysis and handling (data fusion);3. attack platform;4. munitions; and5. systems to protect the airborne RSTA as-

sets and to help the attack aircraft pene-trate to their targets.

All of these will have to work and be availablein sufficient quantity if the concept is to beviable.

This is illustrated in table 2-1, which sug-gests packages of systems to support specificoperational concepts. None of these conceptscould be fully implemented today, because sys-tems are not yet deployed. Furthermore, a greatmany more systems than are shown here—both existing and developmental-might bebrought to bear. Table 2-2 shows what the U.S.Army and Air Force are currently buying anddeveloping. NATO favors an evolutionary ap-proach to FOFA, i.e., implementing a limitedcapability while more effective systems mature.

Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and TargetAcquisition (RSTA) Systems

Currently the Services have in Europe anumber of different systems that can detectand locate fixed targets and targets that moveinfrequently. Most of these systems are basedon aircraft, and locate their targets by imageryor by detecting electronic emissions. They lackan ability to look over broad areas for longperiods of time to find moving units and rap-idly (i.e., within seconds) report that informa-tion to users. The Joint Surveillance TargetAttack Radar System (Joint STARS), currentlyin full-scale development, is designed to dothat. Although strongly supported by DoD,it has been a controversial program in Congress.

Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) could alsoserve this function, but over a generally muchsmaller area. Whereas one Joint STARS mightsupport several corps at once, one of the Army’sAquila RPVs might typically support a brigade’s

MLRS batteries. Aquila could see targetsmasked from Joint STARS by terrain and veg-etation and could identify individual vehicles.It has also been a controversial program. Sev-eral other RPVs are under development bothhere and in Europe. The Europeans generallyfavor RPV systems, have many in the field,and are developing upgrades and new systems,particularly the CL289. The British are devel-oping abroad area surveillance system—calledASTOR–and the French are developing a heli-borne MTI system called ORCHIDEE.

The Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)has also been controversial and the programwas recently scaled back by DoD and Con-gress. PLSS would have been used to locateradars of air defenses threatening NATO in-terdiction aircraft and RSTA platforms suchas Joint STARS.

Data Analysis and Handling

NATO’s ability to attack moving targets isalso limited by data-handling systems that con-sume long periods of time getting informationfrom RSTA systems to analysts and to attacksystems. This problem has been compoundedbecause modern collection systems can collectlarge amounts of data. The Joint Tactical Fu-sion program, as well as other efforts, are work-ing on using modern computers to streamlinethis process. Systems like Joint STARS willbe able to send data both to assessment centersto plan attacks, and directly to attack systemssuch as MLRS batteries.

Attack Platforms

Currently NATO has a variety of tacticalaircraft-including U.S. F-16s, F-4s, and F-111s, British and German Tornados, and sev-eral other types—conventional artillery, andthe Lance missile to strike into Warsaw Pactterritory. All of these are limited in their abil-ity to attack follow-on forces. Of the aircraft,only the Tornados and F-1 11s can operate atnight and in bad weather,4 and they will haveother interdiction tasks as well.

‘The others can fly at night, but because they lack systemsto support effective navigation and weapons employment in thedark, they would not be particularly effective.


Table 2-1 .—illustrative Packages of Systems To Support Specific Operational Concepts(as yet, not all the pieces exist)

—Reconnaissance, surveillance,

and target acquisition Attack— ——Reconnaissance, surveillance, ‘– Target acquisition,

Operational concept situation assessment attack control Platform Weapon1, MLRS and artillery attack GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, AQUILA and 8 - i n c h SAD ARM

of regimental columns: 5 to Joint STARS, and ASAS AFATDS Artillery30 km deep and MLRS MLRS/TGW

2. Aircraft attack of division GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, Joint STARS F-16 MSOW carrying -

columns: 30 to 80 km deep Joint STARS, and ENSCE Skeet or TGSM orCEB

3. Ballistic MissiIe attack of GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, Joint STARS and MLRSdivision columns: 30 to 80 Joint STARS, and ASAS

ATACMS carryingAFATDS launcher DPICM or TGSM

km deep or Skeet4. Attack with aircraft:create GUARDRAIL, TRS, ASARS, ASARS and GACC F-15E AGM-130, MSOW

chokepoints and then Joint STARS, and ENSCE F-16 carrying variousattack the halted vehicles: munitions lnclud-80 to 150 km deep ing mines—

5. Air-launched cruise missile Various national systems - (on the weapon) B-52 Cruise missileattack of rail network; 350 with variousto 800 km deep munitions— — —

NOTES1

2

3

DeflnltlonsAFATDS—Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System provides target data to artillery and M LRS batter!esAGM1 30—an alrlaunched mlsslleASARS—Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System provides Images of fixed objectsASAS—a developmental Army center for collecting, analyzlng, and dlssemlnatlng surveillance dataATACMS—Army Tactical Mlssde System a balllstlc m{ss!le to be launched from MLRS launchersAQUILA—a remotely piloted vehicleCEB– Combined Effects Bomblet Slmllar to DPICM, designed to be dispensed by the Combined Effects Munltlon (CEM)DPICM—Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munltlon unguided submun!tlon for use against Ilght armor and soft targetsEN SC E–the Alr Force version of ASASGACC–Ground Attack Control Center a developmental center for controlling alr attacks aga!nst ground targetsGUARDRAIL–a tact{cal surveillance systemJoint STARS—Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System mov!ng target Indicator and attack controlMLRS—Multlple Launch Rocket SystemMLRS/TGW–Terminally Gu!ded Weapon a smart anti armor submunltlon for MLRSMSOW—Modular Standoff Weapon a weapons dispenserSADARM –Search and Destroy Armor a smart anti.armor submun!t!on for artillerySkeet —a smart anti-armor submunltlonTGSM —Terminally Guided Submu,jltlon a smart anti.armor submunltlonTRS—Tactical Reconnaissance System carries various sensor suitesReconnaissance surveillance, and sltuatlon assessment would be performed by a number of systems–particularly those shown here —feed!ng into the assessment center Although all need not find the target for the attack to take place, the more there are the greater the chances are that the target WIII befound, recognized and Identlfled wfth suff!clent accuracy to attack (tNot all the submunttlons displayed (n the table are necessarily being developed for deployment on the weapons shown, however, there IS no fundamentalreason why they could not be engineered onto those weapons

The Air Force is currently buying theLANTIRN system for the F-16, which will en-able it to operate effectively at night. Theyhave also begun to procure the F-15E whichis designed for interdiction and carries theLANTIRN and a terrain-following radar. TheF-15E has much greater range than the F-16.

The Army is procuring the Multiple LaunchRocket System (MLRS), which has about twicethe range of 155mm artillery. The ATACMSballistic missile,5 which is designed to reach

‘Also called “Army TACMS” or just “TACMS.” The Armysplit this development off from the Joint TACM S, or .JTACM Sprogram.

well over 100 kilometers into enemy territorywith high accuracy, has entered full-scale de-velopment. It will be launched from the MLRSlauncher. The Germans are developing attackdrones for killing armor and air defenses.

Munitions

Munitions are another major limitation onNATO’s ability to attack follow-on forces. Cur-rent generation weapons are effective primar-ily against single, soft targets; the Air Forcehas weapons (e.g., the GBU-15) that can beused to destroy bridges. The Air Force’s Maver-ick missile can be used to kill tanks (and other

32 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack—

Table 2-2.—Status and Costs of Selected FOFA-Related Programs

Statusa

System (3/1/87)PlatformsF-15A/B/C/D/E . proc/FSD

F-15E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . proc/FSDF-16A/B/C/D procA-7 upgrade FSDATF : : : : : : DEM/VAL

protoPods:LANTIRN . . . . ..proc

Munitions and direct-attack w e a p o n s ’CEM ,,, ,,, ... ... ..procSFW ... ... ... ..FSDGATOR . . . . . . . .. ... ... ...procH V M . . . . . . . a d v d e v

missiles .f i r e c o n t r o l s y s

H T M .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ... ..FSDDAACM ..pre-FSDStandoff weaponsGBU-15 .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ... .proc endsAGB .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ...propHARM . . . . .. .,, .,, ,,. ,,, ...procLCS . . . . . . . . ., ... ... ..adv devAGM-65D/G . . ... ...procAGM-130. . . . . . , ,, .,, ... ... ..FSDMSOW .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .RFP/PD

rel 3/87AMRAAM .FSD/procRSTA Systems:JSTARS E-8A.. .. . . . . . . . . . . .FSDP L S S e .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ....OUE

AMS e . . . . . . . . . . .SNS e . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ,,,..case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TRS f ., ..., ., .procTR-1s, ,, . . . . . . . . . . . . .SS f. . . . . . . . . . . . . .PGS f . . . . . . . . . . . . .BGS f . ,.

F-O TRSg .adv devESM . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ..pre-FSDGACC .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ...pre-FSDCommunications and data fusion systems’JTFP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ...FSDH A V E Q U I C K . , ,,, ,, .. . .. FSD/proc

(I/II/llA)Electronic warfare systems:E F - 1 1 1 A U / Gh .. .. ... ... ... ..FSDF-4G WW’ . . . . . . .. ... ... ... ..FSD

c o m p u t e r sr e c e i v e r g r o u p s

Compass Call .. .. ... ... ... ..FSD

Air Force ProgramsThrough FY 1987 Expected total-. —

Fundsb

appropriated

$ 35B

$ 23B$ 35M$550M

$ 1.86

$ 1.2B$ 85M$560M$ 34M

—TBD

$ 1B$ 33M RDT&E

$ 1.96$110M

o

$ 1.8B

$625M$675M

$ 1.5B

$ 27M$ 34M$ 3 .5M

$ 80M$160M

$ 90M$240M

$325MNOTES

Unitsprocured’

92550

440N/A

o

150 nav10 tgt

48,0000

10,200

0000

—TBD

4,500TBD

10,00040

0

180

2

3 +61

—2714

11000

022,000

0

1500

16

Acquisition d

Costb

$ 46B

$ 48B$190M

TBD

$ 4B

$ 2.2B$ 2.3B$560M$ 1.8B

$88M RDT&E$340M

—TBD

$ 2.1B$ 67M RDT&E

$ 6B$ 2 .1BTBD

$ 8B

$ 3B$675M

$ 1.9B

$ 1.6B$230M$ 40M

TBD$500M

$265M$565M

$520

Unitsprocured c

1,270390

2,740N/A750

700 nav700 tg t

96,00014,00010,200

100,000200

TBD2,850

—TBD7,300TBD

60,0005,600TBD

17,000

10

3+61

2714

12

TBD34

N/A

TBD43,000

38

150124

16

aadv advanced, DEM demonstration, dep deployment, dev development, FSD full.scale development, OUE operational utlllty evaluation PD Program Direcllveproc procurement, prod production, prop proposed, proto prototype, RFP request for proposals, VAL valldaflon

bApproxlmate (n current (’then.year’] dollarscApproxlmate number planneddlncludlng ’05t Of research, development, testing, evaluation, and procurement but not OPeratlOn and maintenance

‘PLSS Precls!on Locatton Str{ke System, AMS Airborne Mtsslon Subsystem, SNS Suite Nawgatlon Subsystem, CPS Central Processing Subsystem 3 + lndlcatesthree allup AMSS plus apart!al AMS requ!rrng refurbishment

fTRS Tactical Reconnaissance System, SS sensor suite, PGS prototype ground station BGS bunkered ground station9FOTRS Fooowon Tactical Reconnaissance Syslem (ATARS)

‘LUG upgradeIWW Wild Weasel

SOURCE US Alr Force (SAF/LLL January 1987

Table 2.2.—Status and Costs of

System

P/at formsMLRS

Iaunchersrockets

ATACMSReconnaissance,RPV/TADARS

G C SAV1

IEW UAVrr’GCSAV’

JSTARS GSMT R A C

Sta tus A

Selected FOFA-Related

Army ProgramsThrough FY 1987

F u n d s b

(3/1/87) a p p r o p r i a t e d

proc $ 3.1B

FSD $350MSurveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Systems

FSD $820M

dev $ 28M

F S D $240M

adv dev $ 2 5 MImproved GUARDRAIL/

C o m m o n S e n s o r proc

&fun/f IonsDPICM

155 m m proc8-inch proc155 mm B Br’ FSD

M L R S / T G W adv dev

S A D A R M adv devM L R S r o u n d s1 5 5 m m r o u n d s8-inch rounds

Communication SystemsSINCGARS proc

al rg r o u n d

A D D S procN C S ”EPLRS [’J T I D S

FIC)T F$

$300M

$ 2.0B$620M$ 56M$ 72M

$190M

$480M

$280M

Unitsprocured’

3921951000

—

5k

12

212

3

28

4.4M640.000

35,000—

15012,000

4670

10


Programs—Continued

Expected total

Acquisition d UnitsCostb procured’

$ 4.9B681

440,000$ 1.2B TBD

$ 2.2B53

376$110M

646

$730M 95TED 1

$ 1.0B 65

$ 4.3B 9.4M$640M 650,000

$ 2.2B 1.0MTBD TBD(Incl $310M RDT&E)

$ 3.4B 50,000$910M 70,000TBD 6,000

$ 4.9B14,000

280,000$ 2.4B

14022,000

580

‘~afi, ac~, anc,e(~ DEM cfemc n strat! m de~ dCrIl CIf men f dev dt?~elopmenf FSD f u l l scale d e v e l o p rneflt O U E ope-at!onal u tIIIty evaluatmn P D P-oqfdm D!rec tIVP fJr OL

;,, ,,O ,,rernen~ ~,r,,,j ~r ,du, ~1,,~1 ~,,c,L) ~r.,r,,,~ed ~,~!r, ~rr,l~t ~pe RFP request ff,r p r o p o s a l s V A L valldal!(?n[ A [,: .,, $ ,r~ ate - !J rr~rl 1 I t h+= n , oar I dcJl I d-s

[ APFrrJS rrdl~Cl, q l,kr~,nq r,st ,f rps,-ar, h r!c, , el r ; mpnt tec,l I n r; P, aludi!r,r) and pro{ L rement bu ! n nt operat(on and rmalntenan~ eJGCS G.mJ nc Conl.rJl Stdt J“

~ In, r,,n @ef P v IL FIs Rfim!e G , JL nd To<m I ndls ,rl I !

IAV A I c Veh IC Iem LJat ~ Is ‘r,. I n It d I E// L AV ’01 lb w or Ohle, I I ~e I E W U AV Druqram Is u rider de ielo~lment‘) BB Base Bl~eO sh~li‘J P4CS Net c , nt, c,l S!dt I,, n~ E pLRs E n h ~nr Prj P’jsII I,, n 1 c,( at r n Report I n q S, stem

See Glossdr, frr t her Ierrns

S O U R C E U S Army (OSA/LL) January 1987

armored vehicles) one at a time, G but a capa-bility to attack groups of vehicles with a sin-gle shot and to defeat masses of armor is gen-erally lacking. Currently, the Air Force isbuying the Combined Effects Munition (CEM),which dispenses about 200 bomblets (CEBs)

61, A NT I RN will support shooting two Mavericks per pass,but the pilot must find a target for each Maverick he launchesand line it up with the crosshairs on his cockpit display whileflying his airplane. Many observers believe that multiple passesper launch are more likely than multiple launches per pass.

from a tactical munitions dispenser droppedfrom an airplane. The CEB is effective againsttrucks and most armored combat vehicles ex-cept tanks. The Army is buying a similar mu-nition, called Dual Purpose Combined EffectsMunition (DPICM) for the MLRS. Although theDPICM could conceivably go in the ATACMS,current plans call for initial ATACMS to carrythe anti-personnel-anti-material (APAM) mu-nition which has essentially no capability againstarmor. The German Tornado carries the MW-


1 dispenser that drops the KB-44 anti-armorsubmunition as well as several other submu-nitions.

These munitions, although capable of hittingseveral targets per weapon launch (or an areatarget, or one whose location is impreciselyknown), are all unguided, and hence most willfall on empty ground. Moreover, they have lit-tle effectiveness against tanks. The next gen-eration of munitions, currently in development,will have both greater effectiveness againsttanks and seekers to guide them to their tar-gets. These include sensor-fuzed weapons, suchas the Army’s SADARM and the Air Force’sSkeet, that fire a self-forging slug at a target,and the Army’s Terminally Guided Submuni-tion (TGSM, also called terminally guidedweapon, or TGW) that guides directly to a tar-get and detonates a shaped charge warhead.Technical issues still surround these programs,but these munitions are needed if attackingtank columns is to become a reality. The Ger-mans are developing a new, improved, anti-armor submunition and a smart launcher forit to be carried by an airplane.

Whether or not scatterable mines can pro-vide an effective means of creating chokepoints(or exploiting natural chokepoints, or augment-ing the effects of dropping bridges) is a mat-ter of some controversy. Advocates believe ascatterable mine system could provide greatpayoff for a small investment. Both Serviceshave inventories of anti-vehicular and anti-per-sonnel mines, and programs to develop smartmines that can sense targets at a distance andfire munitions (e.g., Skeets) at them. But mineprograms tend to have low priority in bothservices.

In defense procurements, munitions havetended to get low priority. The munitions are justas important to FOFA as any of the other sys-tem components. If the concept is to work, theproper munitions will have to be bought andbought in sufficient quantities to do the job.

Assembling the Pieces:“Packages” of Systems

The five general packages of systems listedbelow are now under serious consideration. Allare evolutionary in the sense that it is envi-sioned that capabilities will expand as new de-velopments come online. With the possible ex-ception of the last, all can be implemented withlimited capability before all the pieces of thepackage are available:

1. package based on MLRS and artillery,2. package based on the ATACMS ballistic

missile,3. package based on F-16,4. package based on F-15E, and5. package based on B-52s carrying cruise

missiles for deep strike.

MLRS and Artillery

The Army is currently procuring the Multi-ple-Launch Rocket System.7 This, combinedwith existing artillery, will provide some ca-pability to engage follow-on forces during theirmovement from final assembly areas to thebattle (see table 2-3). The DPICM8 submuni-tions being procured for these rockets will havesome capability against light armored vehiclesas well as against high-value targets like com-mand posts, but very little against tanks. Anti-armor capability will improve with the deploy-ment of the MLRS/TGW submunition9 and theSADARM for the artillery, both of which couldbe in production in the early 1990s. The Armyplans to procure 350 MLRS launchers.

Important improvements in the ability toattack moving targets would be obtained fromeither Joint STARS or an RPV system thatcould target directly for an MLRS battery.

‘Several of our Allies also have plans to acquire MLRS.‘Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition.9MLRS/ Terminally Guided Warhead, a smart anti-armor sub-

munition.

Ch. 2—Summary ● 3 5—

Table 2-3.—Packages Based on MLRS and Artillery

Targets

Stopped. . .

Fixed.,

high value chokepoints.-

Moving unitsTrucks A C V Tanks

Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . MLRS (P) MLRS (P) MLRS (P) MLRS (P) MLRS (P)

RSTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . current current Joint STARS (F) orRPV (F, D, N)

Munition . . . . . . ... D P I C M ( P ) mines (variousstages)

KEY I In InventoryP - In productionF = In full scale engineering developmentN - Not yet In formal development

AC RON ‘fMSMLRS—multlple launch rocket systemDPICM—dual purpose Improved conventional munltlonJoint STARS —Jofnt Surveillance Target Attack Radar SystemRPV–remotely piloted vehicleTGW—terminally guided weaponACV—armored combat veh!cle

This concept has the advantage of being con-sistent with the preferences of our Allies, sev-eral of whom have plans to buy MLRS. And—ifdeployed across the Central Region-wouldprovide a consistent capability across the re-gion. The range of the MLRS limits its use insupporting other corps, and therefore the abil-it y to concentrate firepower across the region.

ATACMS Ballistic Missile

Adding the ATACMS missile would give aU.S. corps the ability to attack divisions mov-ing from division assembly areas to final as-sembly areas, helping to alleviate some of theshort reaction problems in the previous ap-proach. It would also provide some capabilityto support neighboring corps and to concen-trate fire on massing forces. DoD’s efforts tointerest the Allies in ATACMS have thus farbeen unsuccessful,10 but solely United Statesdeployments could be of some value acrossnearly the entire Central Region.11

.—. . .—.‘This may be changing. I%nentations to the NATO Army

Armaments Group Panel on Surface-to-Surface Artillery in No-vember 1986 generated interest on the part of Germany, Italy,and the Netherhnd~., but had not yet resulted in changes inofficial positions.

11 ATACMS deployed in U.S. V corps could reach as far northas the British I corps sector. ATACMS deployed with U.S. IIIcorps, if I I I corps is deployed into NORTHAG, can extend thatcoverage to the border of the Central Region. However, 11 I corpswould be in reserve and would not likely be deployed at the be-ginning of the war.

DPICM (P) DPICM (P) TGW (D)

The initial ATACMS will be procured withAPAM submunitions which are not effectiveagainst armored vehicles. Without a systemlike Joint STARS, it would be limited to at-tacking soft high-value targets that don’t movevery often, such as command posts, missilelaunchers, communications links, and logisticslinks-when they could be adequately located.Joint STARS would support the attack of mov-ing supply trucks, and-with the addition ofanti-armor submunitions like TGW12—movingarmored columns. These targets also might belocated with RPVs or some combination ofother systems. Attacking moving columnswould also require systems to analyze and dis-seminate data quickly. Attacking small groupsof moving vehicles or a specific group of vehi-cles within a larger column at 100 kilometersbeyond the FLOT would require a cue that thetarget had arrived at the intended aimpointjust prior to missile launch. However, if theobject is to attack any vehicles within a largecolumn, less timely information would suffice.

Some observers consider the ATACMS tobe too closely linked to the RSTA system andlacking in flexibility. They claim that break-ing the link of rapid target observation, loca-tion transmission, and launch would render thesystem nearly useless against mobile targets.

Izor I RTGSM, or SADARM, or DPICM, etc.

36 ● New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack— —

Photo credit LTV Aerospace & Defense Co

ATACMS missile, launched from MLRS launcher.

Others believe that these concerns are over-blown, and that even without Joint STARS andadvanced anti-armor submunitions, ATACMSwould be very important.

Although the ATACMS missile makes goodmilitary sense, there may be political problemsassociated with deploying it. Some Europeanshave voiced concerns that ballistic missileslaunched into Warsaw Pact territory will bemisinterpreted, leading to a nuclear response;others fear that it will strengthen the U.S.corps so much that the offensive will be chan-neled against weaker sectors. We do not knowhow serious or enduring these concerns are.The Soviets can be expected to play on at leastthe first of these. On the other hand, if theATACMS works and is deployed, the Euro-peans may want it in their forces.

As arms control proposals get shuffled in thewake of Reykjavik, some may cause problemsfor the ATACMS; at one time the German Gov-ernment was reported to have asked the UnitedStates to seek to include limits on ballistic mis-siles with ranges exceeding 100 kilometers inthe intermediate range arms control negotia-tions with the Soviets. If the United Statesis to preserve the option to deploy ATACMS,negotiators will have to see to it that ATACMSis excluded from negotiated limits, either bylimiting only missiles with longer ranges, orby some means of differentiating nuclear fromconventional ballistic missiles. This would be-come difficult if ATACMS were to be madecapable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Compared to the next two concepts, whichrely on tactical airpower, the MLRS and


Table 2-4.— Packages Based on ATACMS

Stopped Fixed Moving units

high value chokepoints Trucks ACV Tanks

Platform . ‘,-. . ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F) ATACMS (F)— .

RSTA ., . . . . . . . . . . current current Joint STARS (F) orRPV (N, D, F)

Munition . . . . . . ,APAM (1) mines APAM (1) [TGW (D)] [TGW (D)]DPICM (P) [DPICM (P)]

[IRTGSM (D)] [IRTGSM (D)]KEY I In Inventory

P In productionF In full scale engineering developmentN Not yet in formal developmentI I The next generation submunltlon for the ATACMS has not yet been selected TGW or IRTGSM could fit, as could [he DPICM currently In oroduct[on

ACRONYMSATACMS– Army Tactical Mlsslle SystemDPICM—dual purpose Improved conventional munltlonIRTGSM—infrared (guided) terminally guided submunltlonJo!nt STARS—Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar SystemRPV—remo[.ely piloted vehicleTGW—terminally guided weaponACV– armored combat veh!cle

ATACMS concepts share some advantagesand disadvantages. They are more dependenton the RSTA systems—airplanes have pilotswho can compensate to some extent for late,inaccurate, false, or missing information; andalthough the ATACMS can be fired laterallyinto other corps sectors, the launchers cannoteasily be moved large distances in response tomovements in Warsaw Pact forces. Tacticalairpower, by contrast, can be shifted rapidlyacross most of the Central Region.

Conducting air interdiction is much morecomplicated than launching a missile. Attack-ing aircraft would have to deal with enemy airdefenses, requiring defense suppression, escortaircraft, and preparation of attack corridors.Although the Air Force practices attacks onfixed targets and moving targets that appearapproximately where and when anticipated,planning large interdiction efforts againstmoving targets that may appear on short no-tice is difficult. Although it generally takesmany hours to plan an attack, once plannedit can be redirected on shorter notice, althoughnot as quickly as a missile launcher can bereprogrammed. NATO can expect the Pact tomake a strong effort to close NATO’s air bases:effective airbase attacks would be likely to lead

to a reduction in sorties available for FOFA.In addition, there are likely to be many com-peting demands for interdiction aircraft. Inconversations in Europe, OTA found generalagreement among Army and Air Force officersthat few aircraft would be available for FOFAduring the first few days, because the more im-mediate concerns of protecting NATO’s airspaceand ensuring NATO’s ability to fly over the bat-tle area should take precedence in the first fewdays. However, this is not set in stone, and ifSACEUR and CINCENT decide that empha-sis should be on interdiction the first day, itwill be.

Because of the specific disadvantages of eachapproach—air interdiction and missile attack—a combination of the two would appear tobe more effective than either alone.

F-16 Aircraft

This concept would provide coverage simi-lar to that of the ATACMS, but with greaterlatitude to be moved to different sectors of thefront. It would make use of an existing asset,the F-16, which is already in the force and inproduction. Furthermore, attacking into Pactterritory with interdiction aircraft is acceptedby U.S. Allies, who themselves have capableinterdiction aircraft including F-16s and the


Tornado. The German Tornado, which carriesunguided anti-armor submunitions in its MW-1dispenser, may beat present NATO’s best as-set against masses of armor.

If used against combat units, this conceptwould almost certainly require a broad areaRSTA system like Joint STARS, especially ifit is to be responsive to Pact force movementsacross the Central Region. Until such a sys-tem becomes available, it might be possible tofocus a complicated combination of other sys-tems to obtain the necessary information.However, unlike the preceding concepts, thisone would have greater capability to compen-sate for shortcomings in the RSTA system.

Other developments will be needed to com-plete this concept. The CEM is similar to theArmy DPICM–it is effective against lightlyarmored vehicles, soft vehicles, and personnel,but has little effectiveness against moderntanks. If tanks are also to be attacked, it wouldhave to be replaced, or supplemented, by aSkeet or some other terminally guided anti-armor submunition. The LANTIRN, as wellas short stand-off missiles like AGM-130 orGBU-15 configured to carry a submunition dis-penser or an inertially guided dispenser, wouldbe valuable for increasing aircraft surviva-bility.

F-15E Aircraft

Under current plans, the F-15Es will startto appear in Europe in the late 1980s. Thesetwo-seat airplanes, configured primarily forground attack but retaining their fighter ca-pabilities, will have much greater range andpayload than the F-16s, as well as night andall-weather capability supported by LANTIRNand terrain-following radar. They will, how-ever, cost considerably more than F-16s. TheF-15Es will supplement United States AirForce in Europe’s (USAFE’s) deeper attack ca-pabilities that currently reside exclusively withthe F-111s.13 F-15Es and F-111s could attacktargets well into Western Poland. The F-15Es

“This might also be augmented by B-52s, and possiblyFB-111s.

Photo credff U S Department of Defense

F-1 11s, current mainstay of NATO’s deep attackcapability.

and some tasked F-111s14 could be operatedwith or in place of the F-16s as described above,and could be used to extend FOFA capabilityto create chokepoints on the Oder and NeisseRivers (the GDR-Polish border) and attackunits in transit on road and rail in WesternPoland.

If they operate beyond the range of theF-16s, the F-15Es will also be generally beyondthe range of Joint STARS and similar tacti-cal surveillance systems. This will not limittheir ability to operate against fixed targetslike airfields and bridges, but it will affect theirability to attack moving targets, and to createchokepoints at the optimum time. Further-more, the deeper these aircraft operate, themore difficult it becomes to protect them. Thegreater range of the F-15E could also be ex-ploited to operate out of bases that are fartherfrom the battle (perhaps in Britain), and there-fore less likely to be attacked than bases usedby the F-16s. The greater range would also pro-vide improved flexibility to operate through-out the Central Region in response to an evolv-ing Pact offensive.

Deep Strike Using B-52sCarrying Cruise Missiles

The Air Force is considering the use of B-52bombers carrying long-range cruise missilesto interdict the rail network across EasternEurope. One variant of the cruise missile could

14The F-1 11s, limited in number, already have several impor-tant missions including interdiction and air base attack, andstanding nuclear alert.

Ch. 2—Summary 39— — — .

Table 2-5.– Packages Based on F-16 Aircraft—

Targets—.

Stopped Fixed Moving units

high value chokepoints Trucks ACV Tanks

Platform . . . . . . . . . . . F-16/LANTIRN—.

F-16/LANTIRN F- 16/LA NT IRN F-16/ LANTIRN ‘-F-16/LANTlRN--

RSTA . . . . ... ... current current J o i n t S T A R S ( F )Advanced RPVS (?)

Weapon/Munition. ., . . Bombs, mines, bombs TMD/CEM (P)cluster bombs, cluster bombsTMD/CEM (P)

Other . . . . . . . . . ., . . systems for defense avoidance and suppressionKEY I In Inventory

. —

P - In produc t i on

F In full scale engineerlng developmentN Not yet In formal development

ACRONYMSLANTIRN –Low altitude navigation and targeting Infrared system for nightTMD—tactical munltlons dispenserCEM–combined effects mun{t{on (a TMD carrylnq Combined Effects Bombletst

TMD/CEM (P)Rockeye (1)Maverick (I, P)

and for protection

Skeet—an IR guided submunltlon that fires a sel~forglng slug Also called SFW, or sensor fuzed weaponRockeye —a cluster bomb containing ant! armor submunltlonsMaverick—an anti.tank guided m{sslleACV—armored combat vehicle

Table 2-6.—Packages Based on F-15E Aircraft

Stoppedhigh value

Platform . . . . . . . . ., F-15E (P)F-ill (1)

RSTA . . . . . . . ... current

Weapon/Munition, . . . Bombs,cluster bombs,TMD/CEM (P)

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . systems for— .K E Y I I n Inventory

P In p roduc t i on

F - In full scale engineering developmentN Not yet In formal development

ACRONYMSGBU 15–a highly accurate guided gllde bombAGM.130—a powered verston of the GBU15TMD—a tactical munitions dispenser

—Targets

TM D/Skeet (D)

Maverick (I, P)

of RSTA assets

Fixed Moving units———chokepoints Trucks - ACV Tanks

F-15E (P) - F-15E (P) F-15E (P) F-15E (P)F-1 11 (I) F-1 11 (l)(?) F-1 11 (l)(?) F-1 11 (I)(?)a

—current Joint STARS (F)

GBU-15 (1) TMD/CEM (P) TMD/CEM (P) TM D/Skeet (D)AGM-130 (F) cluster bombs Rockeye (1)mines Maverick (I, P) Maverick (I, P)

defense avoidance and suppression and for protection of RSTA assets

CEM —combined effects munltlon (a TMD carrying Combined Effects Bomblets)Skeet—an IR gu!ded submunltlon that f!res a self-forging slug Also called SFW or sensor fuzed weaponRockeye —a cluster bomb contalmng ant[.armor submunltlonsMaver!ck —an anti.tank guided missileACV—armored combat vehicle

aF 11 1s are typ!cally tasked for deep mlsslons against targets Ilke alrflelds and bridges

be configured to drop bridges, while another bers, and the airplanes could be released fromwould sow smart mines along the rail lines. their strategic nuclear roles through introduc-These aircraft would be flown from the United tion of B-Is into the force.States to their launch points, launch their mis-siles against fixed targets, and return to bases The primary goal most likely would be to de-in the United States. It has been estimated lay the arrival of forces rather than to causethat by the mid-1990s suitable cruise missiles attrition. In theory, this would prevent the sec-could be developed and built in sufficient num- ond fronts from arriving in time to exploit the


successes of the first fronts, and allow NATOtime to reverse the situation.

Proponents of this concept contend that hav-ing the capability to hold the rail lines at riskin time of war could force the Soviets to a longmobilization, bringing their forces through therail lines in peacetime and therefore providingNATO with long, unambiguous warning. A“long warning” scenario is generally morefavorable to NATO than a “short warning”scenario, because NATO is expected to mobi-lize more slowly than the Warsaw Pact. How-ever, the added warning would be of value toNATO only if NATO accepts it and reacts ac-cordingly.

This concept would make use of existing as-sets, the B-52s. There would be no aircraftprocurement costs, but operations and main-tenance would be incurred to keep the forceactive for this (and other conventional) roles.Eventually, those B-52s would have to bereplaced by more modern aircraft or exten-sively overhauled. Suitable tanker aircraft sup-port would have to be made available. Becauseof the long range of the bombers and of the

weapons they would carry, exposure to enemyair defenses could be kept to a minimum. Com-pared to the other four concepts, the require-ments for timely surveillance are much less.

The proposed cruise missile could be devel-oped from an existing type—e.g., the BoeingALCM or the Tomahawk. Engineering studieshave shown that this ought to be a straight-forward task; it has yet to be demonstrated,however. Alternatively, a new missile could bedeveloped.

Problems related to arms control may alsohave to be solved. Under the SALT II agree-ment, the B-52 was defined and counted as astrategic nuclear delivery vehicle. Whateverarms control agreements ultimately areproduced in the wake of Reykjavik will haveto come up with a definition of a strategic bom-ber. If this option is to be pursued, either someway will have to be found to keep convention-ally armed B-52s from being counted as stra-tegic nuclear weapons, or the United Stateswill have to give up some nuclear capabilityto get conventional capability.

REMAINING ISSUESThere are a number of FOFA-related pro-

grams that Congress will decide on. Some—such as the F-15E and the ATACMS missile—do not appear very controversial, although thatmight change. The controversial issues are:Joint STARS, Aquila RPV, a successor toPLSS, and advanced munitions programs. Inaddition, Congress will have to deal with co-operative development and production withour Allies.

Joint Surveillance Target AttackRadar System (Joint STARS)

Although Army, Air Force, and SHAPE fa-vor the Joint STARS, it has been the subjectof much controversy, particularly in Congress.In each of the past 3 years, the House opposedthe system while the Senate supported it. Con-

ference action has supported funding for thesystem. The Joint STARS, now in full-scaleengineering development, is built around amoving target indicator (MTI) radar carriedon an E-8A (modified Boeing 707) aircraft. Itwould provide both surveillance informationto assessment centers, and targeting informa-tion to command centers and directly to mis-sile launchers or attack aircraft. From a pa-trol orbit behind the FLOT, it would providebroad area coverage over extended periods oftime.

Opponents argue that the Joint STARS willbe vulnerable to Warsaw Pact surface-to-airmissiles (SAMs) and interceptor aircraft, andwill either be shot down or have to retreat sofar from the FLOT as to be not worth its cost.They favor stopping the program until a muchmore survivable version can be produced. Pro-


ponents acknowledge its vulnerability, but ar-gue that a variety of protective measures couldgreatly enhance its survivability, and that evenwhen taking protective measures it would becapable of providing a great deal of capability.

The capability that Joint STARS (or a sys-tem like it) would provide is very importantto most FOFA concepts. FOFA could be donewithout it, but with much greater difficultyand probably much less effectiveness. The sys-tem would be very useful for identifying thefocus and major movements of a Pact attack,and, before the shooting starts, for monitor-ing Pact troop movements and providing ef-fective warning of an attack. The Air Forcebelieves that an 13-8A-based system is neces-sary for deployments to areas other than Eur-ope. Proponents argue that it would be usefulto get a system into the field as soon as possi-ble, so that crews can learn how to operate itand find out what it can really provide.

Prior to hostilities, the Joint STARS couldoperate very close to the FLOT and observePact movements deep inside East Germanyand Czechoslovakia. In wartime, the Air Forcewould defend the Joint STARS (and the air-space it and other surveillance aircraft oper-ate in), suppress enemy air defenses, and ad-just the patrol pattern of the E-8A to reduceits vulnerability. At selected times it couldsurge forward, that is, patrol closer to theFLOT with dedicated defenses in order to lookinto selected deeper areas. As the war pro-gresses and Pact defenses are suppressed, itshould become possible to increase the amountof time spent patrolling closer to the FLOT.

If operated as the Air Force now intends,the E-8A Joint STARS should be capable ofproviding frequent broad area coverage to adepth of 50 to 100 kilometers beyond the FLOT.There will be a great many targets within thisband, and more weapons can attack here thandeeper. Attacking combat units in this bandcan be more efficient because many of the non-combat vehicles will be left behind as the unitsprepare to go into battle. Furthermore, fre-quent coverage is likely to be of greater im-portance within this band than deeper: the tar-

gets are expected to traverse this band rapidlyand be less constrained to major roads. Surgeoperations would allow some coverage ofdeeper areas. This pattern of operations wouldgenerally require the Joint STARS to operatefarther from the FLOT than the nominal set-back usually discussed for it. The coveragewould similarly be reduced from what a nomi-nal orbit would provide,

Some opponents of the E-8A Joint STARShave suggested that consistently deeper cov-erage could be obtained by basing Joint STARSon an inherently more survivable platform thatcould operate closer to the FLOT without be-ing detected. OTA has not been given accessto information on such programs, and the readershould be aware that there is potentially rele-vant information that OTA does not have. Ingeneral, such a system would have its own limi-tations. For it to be stealthy, it will have tocarry an equally stealthy radar, known as ‘LPI”(or low probability of intercept) radar, and aradar antenna that—when illuminated by athreat radar-is as difficult to detect as theairplane. LPI may be achieved in part by man-aging power, that is by reducing the amountof energy a radar transmits in a given time,which reduces the amount of information theradar can obtain. Therefore a stealthy JointSTARS would also not be able to gather asmuch data as the E-8A Joint STARS in itsnominal orbit.

Because the reduction in coverage would takethe form of “looking” less rather than mov-ing back from the FLOT, coverage of both deepand shallow targets would be reduced.

We at OTA do not have enough informationto compare the coverage of a E-8A Joint STARStaking evasive, protective action and a stealthyalternative, but we believe that such a compar-ison would be important. We believe that if Con-gress does not have enough information to makea decision on Joint STARS, it ought to mandatea study comparing the cost, survivability, cov-erage, and operational utility of Joint STARSand proposed alternatives operated in a realis-tic manner, but ought not to stop the develop-ment program in order to do so.


One alternative that might be considered isan E-8A Joint STARS complemented—ratherthan replaced—by a more survivable system.The E-8A Joint STARS could provide com-plete coverage to a limited depth, and eachcould provide limited coverage deeper in Pactterritory. The coverage of both would be lim-ited by terrain and foliage, but limitationsmight be less for the more survivable platform.

An important consideration for either a sub-stitute or a complementary platform is whetherthe necessary LPI radar could be built fromthe Joint STARS radar, or would require anentirely new development effort. Without moreinformation, OTA cannot answer this questionin detail. However, the Joint STARS radar hassubstantial capacity for conversion to LPIoperation. It appears to OTA that if the LPIradar were to operate in the same frequencyband as the Joint STARS radar, much of theexisting design could be used.

Replacement for the Precision Locationand Strike System (PISS)

For fiscal year 1987, Congress decided, atthe request of DoD, to deny funding for pro-curement of the Precision Location Strike Sys-tem (PLSS, pronounced “pens”), and to appro-priate $20 million for further development andtesting. Congress and DoD now face the issueof whether a new system is needed to performthe function originally conceived for PLSS.

Until this year, PLSS–a developmental sur-veillance and control system designed to de-tect, identify, and accurately locate modernmobile, electronically agile radars and jammersin near real time—was an important part ofthe program for improving surveillance in Eur-ope. However, the Air Force has not requestedfunding for procurement, and apparently hastaken the position that other systems couldadequately do the job for which PLSS wasdesigned. Moreover, PLSS has encounteredmany problems and delays during its long de-velopment history.

Others still see value in PLSS, particularlyfor targeting modern mobile SAMs, and as amajor contributor to the survivability of Joint

STARS and other surveillance systems. It hasdemonstrated emitter location speed and ac-curacy which are superior to those of existingtheater systems, as well as a high emitterreporting rate. These may be necessary if, asexpected, at the outbreak of a war enemy ra-dars shut down, move, change frequencies, andbegin wartime operations in short on-time, elec-tronically agile modes.

Modern mobile, electronically agile radarsand jammers would accompany and protectfollow-on forces; an ability to attack them soonafter they are detected in a new location wouldbe very valuable to protecting allied aircraftused to detect and attack follow-on forces.PLSS has demonstrated a capability to locateand report more such emitters per hour withgreater accuracy and timeliness than all otherU.S. systems now reporting to Europe com-bined. It would use electronic equipment car-ried aloft by three TR-1 aircraft operating to-gether, each communicating with a centralprocessing ground station. The ground stationwould report emitter locations, and could alsocontrol attacks against emitters.

During development, PLSS has failed todemonstrate emitter location errors as smallas those required by its specifications, and itsreliability has been a problem. However, re-cently its performance has steadily improved.Emitter location accuracy has approached thespecified value, and the reporting rate require-ment has been reduced to what PLSS has al-ready demonstrated. In addition, the systemhas often reported each actual emitter as sev-eral. Some causes of this problem were identi-fied and corrected.

Munitions Programs

There are three major concerns regardingmunitions programs: 1) the effectiveness ofanti-armor submunitions in a realistic combatenvironment; 2) buying enough munitions forFOFA to have an effect; and 3) what to doabout mines.

Munitions programs-and the weapons tocarry them—tend to be a neglected area. Theyare usually not glamorous, and are often can-


didates for scaling back and stretching out inorder to save money. None of the FOFA con-cepts will work if there are not enough muni-tions to kill a large enough number of targetsto have an effect. A multi-billion dollar invest-ment in RSTA, data analysis centers, missiles,and airplanes of various types can be under-cut by not buying enough munitions. OTA can-not say how many of each type are needed (in-deed, that is a job for the Services). However,the Warsaw Pact forces in Eastern Europehave hundreds of thousands of vehicles, includ-ing many tens of thousands of armored com-bat vehicles.

Although current-generation unguided sub-munitions can be effective against most vehi-cles, including most armored combat vehicles,advanced guided anti-armor submunitions nowunder development may be the key to beingable to destroy groups of tanks. Because theyare guided, they may also be much more effec-tive against less heavily armored vehicles. Twotypes are under development: sensor fuzedweapons—e.g., the Air Force Skeet and theArmy SADARM—that sense the presence ofa target within their search areas and fire aself-forging slug at it; and terminally guidedsubmunitions--like the Army’s TGW for MLRS—that search a large area, guide to the target,and detonate a shaped charge warhead onimpact.

These concepts have been demonstrated incontrolled environments, but important ques-tions remain regarding their ability to oper-ate in the presence of countermeasures to bothwarheads and seekers. Both operational andtechnical countermeasures are of concern.There has been concern that enemy forcescould use the cover of both forests and villagesto obscure the signature of the target vehiclesand to deflect incoming warheads so that theylose momentum or do not hit the armor at anangle that permits them to penetrate. Dash-ing between covered locations could reduce theexposure of the targets. Both spreading for-mations out and bunching them tightly upcould affect the number of vehicles a group ofsubmunitions hits. There is also concern thatthe damaged vehicles littering the battlefield

might attract submunitions away from func-tioning vehicles.

Smoke and various types of material cover-ing a vehicle could reduce the ability of a sen-sor to find it. Various schemes have been sug-gested that would cause the munition to guideto a spot off the target rather than one on it,as have devices that would cause a shapedcharge warhead to detonate before reachingits target.

Various advanced types of armor are underdevelopment in the East and in the West. Someare very effective against shaped charge war-heads; others are more effective against kineticenergy weapons like self-forging slugs. Howwell advanced munitions do against advancedtanks will depend in part on how well the war-head characteristics match the armor charac-teristics of the target.

Not all suggested countermeasures are prac-tical and effective. However, it is very impor-tant to test munitions against various typesof targets employing various types of coun-termeasures. Programs like the joint ChickenLittle series of tests can be very valuable inthis regard.

Remotely Piloted Vehicles

The Army is developing a family of un-manned aerial vehicles (UAVs, a term whichincludes both remotely piloted vehicles anddrones) to perform a variety of functions in-cluding surveillance, reconnaissance, targetdesignation, jamming, and attack. The mostmature member of the family, the Aquila RPVof the TADARS (Target Acquisition/Designa-tion Aerial Reconnaissance System) now in full-scale development, has been a matter of con-cern in Congress.

UAVs could usefully complement airbornestand-off radar systems like Mohawk, ASARS-II, and Joint STARS: these could quicklysearch large areas and tell UAVs whereto look;and UAVs could find the targets and discrimi-nate among them. UAVs could also find or fol-low targets hidden from airborne radars byhills or trees. Aquila could locate shallow tar-


Photo credit U S Department of Defense

Simple countermeasures, such as a camouflaged tank, may be able to outwit smart submunitions.

gets with greater precision and designate themwith a laser for either Copperhead artilleryrounds or laser-guided bombs. Several typesof UAVs are now operational or under devel-opment in Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,Italy, the United Kingdom, and Israel.

Since 1978, the estimated time to developTADARS has more than doubled and the esti-mated program cost has quadrupled; the num-ber of RPVs to be produced has been halved.However, the major problems which have be-set the system now appear to have been solved.TADARS will have unique capabilities for ac-curate location and laser designation of shal-low targets. These could be useful for FOFA:TADARS could find and locate targets for ar-tillery, MLRS, and ATACMS, and designatefor laser-guided bombs.

Other RPVs have been proposed as alterna-tives to Aquila, but lack its target location ac-curacy, laser designation capability, and jam-resistance. According to the General Account-ing Office, procuring another RPV and equip-ping it with the laser designator, navigation,and communications systems developed forAquila would cost about $100 million more andtake a year longer than completing TADARS.

Arms Cooperation

When FOFA was first advanced, some Euro-peans tended to see it as a vehicle to sell themAmerican defense systems. The Defense De-partment has been working to dispel this prob-lem by encouraging European-American armscooperation programs as well as the identifi-

Ch. 2—Summary 45— —

Photo credit N A T O

Tornado aircraft, result of European collaboration, carry in the German MW-1 munitions dispenser.

cation of European systems that could sup-port the concept.

The principal foci of activity have been theNATO Conference of National Armaments Di-rectors (CNAD) and the Defense Science BoardFOFA II Task Force. A major stimulus to co-operation has been the money made availableunder the 1985 Nunn Amendment.

The FOFA II Task Force has been workingwith similar advisory groups associated withEuropean governments to identify potentialareas of cooperation that could then be recom-mended to their respective governments forfurther action. The group will report duringthe first half of 1987 on strategies to achievecooperation on several programs.

There are two major activities related to theCNAD. The first is a FOFA ad hoc workinggroup that is preparing a paper outlining thetypes of systems that are necessary to achievea FOFA capability. This activity is importantbecause it helps define what the allied govern-ments (as distinct from NATO itself) agreeconstitutes FOFA. Concurrently, the UnitedStates is negotiating a number of memoranda

of understanding concerning co-developmentof systems, only some of which are FOFArelated.

There has been a meeting of the minds ona number of questions, but thus far the Euro-peans have shown no official interest in eitherATACMS or Joint STARS15 (although thereis interest in interoperability among JointSTARS and the British ASTOR and FrenchORCHIDEE MTI systems). Although someof the arguments against these systems havebeen on fairly fundamental grounds, interestmay develop in the future, particularly afterthe systems are fielded and their real capabil-ities become known.

This process will pose three important issuesfor Congress. First, if Congress supports thisform of cooperation, they will have to providethe requisite funding for cooperative programs.Second, Congress may have to make choicesbetween slowing programs to bring the Euro-peans on board and proceeding only in theUnited States. Finally, the Europeans may

‘5 There reportedly has been interest on the working level.


seek to sell us their equipment, to smooth the interests generally complicate such efforts, andtwo-way street. Congress will then have the U.S. policies are seen as complicating them stillusual choice between buying American or buy- further. Nevertheless, the trends are away froming European. buying U.S. products, and toward greater intra-

The Europeans are enthusiastic about theEuropean cooperation. The Europeans believethat their technology equals that of the United

possibilities for joint programs; however, they States in many areas and may surpass it inare somewhat skeptical about the possibilitiesfor successful cooperative ventures, especially some.

with the United States as a partner. National

Chapter 2 Summary - Princeton

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