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CHAPTER 2

History of Afghanistan

Intertwined in the historical expression of Afghanistan is the ethnic mosaic of

the nation that validates the understanding of the society and also the work from literary

perspective. To study the evolution of ethnicity, its nuances, both pragmatic and forced

in Afghanistan, it becomes essential to typify the historical events that are spooled in the

knowledge of the nation. The story of Afghanistan is in many ways a tragic one as it

features a few of the goriest events that can occur to mankind. Its war-torn, most

ravaged and most beleaguered status is a witness to the invasions, internal ethnic

upheaval and a variety of conflicts that has left the nation in such a devastated state.

Afghanistan was once a cradle of civilizations and now its people are being projected as

backward and tribal. Its people have been subjected to not just physical trauma that

occurred due to internal upheaval and external pressures but also to the labyrinth of

ideologies pertaining to Islam--a constant and conflicting feature. For the people,

nothing has changed in the last one thousand years; the leadership had only one

objective--to rule and manifest power. First of all, when we study who the Afghans are,

we get to see a multitude of traditions and cultures that have merged into this nation and

this substantiates our study on the ethnicity of Afghanistan.

This nation has been aptly described as one on the crossroads of Asia and this

makes it evident to understand how the future of this country will have an effect on the

entire Asian continent. And modern Afghanistan is said to be an accidental

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geographical unit carved out of the heart of Central Asia by the sword of its

conquerors. Afghanistan has historically been the link between Central Asia, the

Middle East and the Indian sub-continent--a nation made up of many different

nationalities, the result of innumerable invasions and migrations. In earlier centuries,

its geopolitical position let to alternate enrichment and devastation, as armies marched

in through on their way to other lands. Its commercial crossroads became vulnerable

for its inhabitants, despite the opening of the sea lanes in the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. Within its current borders there are at least a dozen major ethnic groups –

Pashtuns, Baluch, Chahar Aimak, Turkmen, Hazara, Tajik, Uzbek, Nuristani, Arab,

Kirghiz, Pashai and Persian. Historically and technically, the Pashtun ethnic group has

been the most dominant. Therefore the term Afghan is synonymous with the Pashtuns

and is generally viewed by other people in the country and across the globe to refer to

the powerful, heroic and the dominant group. The royal families of the country have

been Pashtuns, and today represent about 50% of the total population. Tajiks come in

second with 25%, and the rest make up considerably smaller percentages. Although

there are tiny Hindu, Sikh and Jewish communities, the vast majority of the people are

Muslims, and in fact many ethnic groups consider Islam to be one of the defining

aspects of their ethnic identity. However, as the work progresses further, it becomes

mandatory to study the origin and evolution of the different ethnic groups in

Afghanistan. History reveals that Islam was brought to Afghanistan during the eighth

and ninth century by the Arabs; and prior to that, the nation was ruled by various

Persians, Greeks, Sassasians and Central Asian empires. Following a subsequent break

down in Arab rule, semi-independent states began to form and later these local

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dynasties and states however were overwhelmed and crushed during the Mongolian

invasions of the 1200s that were to remain and rule the country until the 1500s, despite

much resistance and internal strife.

After the collapse of the Mongol rule, Afghanistan was caught between the vice

of two great powers. During this time it was the Mughals of northern India and the

Safavids of Iran that fought over the mountains and valleys of Afghanistan to lay siege

in the nation. Armies marched devastating the land and murdering the people

conquering city after city, and destroying whatever had been left by the invading army.

Afghanistan was subject to anarchy and it was not until 1747 that Afghanistan was able

to free itself when Nadir Shah an empire builder from Iran, died and left a vacuum in

central Asia. It was Ahmed Shah Durrani, a former Afghan bodyguard who was able to

fill the vacuum. Ahmad was a Pashtun, and his Pashtunwali- the honour code of the

ethnic group, allowed the Pashtuns to rule Afghanistan in one form or another for the

next 200 years. Ahmad Shah displayed himself as an ardent follower of the tenets of

the Pashtun ethnicity, and was able to unify the different Afghan tribes and went on to

conquer considerable parts of what are today eastern Iran, Pakistan, northern India and

Uzbekistan. Although, his successors proved unable to hold his vast empire together

and within 50 years, much of it had been seized by rival regional powers. Within the

country there were numerous bloody civil wars; each ethnic group tried to substantiate

its stance in the nation. Several wars for the throne took place, and for many Afghans,

it meant little that their lives were being uprooted and destroyed by ethnic kin as

opposed to foreign invaders. Diverse ideologies of each ethnic group led to the

mayhem leaving the life of common man in a devastated state. These ethnic and

51

internal conflicts paved way for the two imperialist powers- the British Empire and

Czarist Russia to intervene in the 1800s thereby aggravating the internal conflicts

dramatically.

The British with a view to expand and consolidate their colonial holdings on the

Indian sub-continent were looking at the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan as a

natural barrier to prevent invasion by rival imperialists. The Russians were expanding

south and east swallowing up several formerly independent sultanates and emirates in

Central Asia. The two great powers essentially engaged in a race for Afghanistan and

their trials for seizures of land and the intention to overthrow the indigenous nations

and interference into the affairs of the remaining independent states in the region

became known as ‘the Great Game.’ The arrival of European imperialism simply

accelerated and made living more difficult; the wars, poverty and material destruction

had already wrecked not just the region but also their interest in life.

In 1900 Abdur Rehman Khan, the ‘Iron Amir’, ruled Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901

described his country’s vulnerable position: “How can a small power like Afghanistan

which is like a goat between two lions or a grain of wheat between two strong

millstones of the grinding mill, stand in the way of the two stones without being

ground to dust?” (2) It was to keep Afghanistan away from the imperial lions and to

attain an internal toughness and integrity so that it would deter any foreign intrusion in

the Afghan soil he struggled. But the two powers Russia and Britain came to

understand the advantages each would bag, each perceiving the intention of the other.

Afghanistan in short became a buffer state and the nation’s limitations viz-a-viz its

economic backwardness, subservient military divided ethnic tribes acted as deterrents

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to have common national goals and national independence. Not just this, but the

subsequent rulers of the nation acted as coadjutors for the imperial lions to take

position in the country with a view to build modern military and improve its economy

with the aid of foreign investors.

On two separate occasions, British armies from India out rightly invaded

Afghanistan in attempts to install puppet governments amenable to British economic

interests, and to oppose the economic interests of Czarish Russia. The first came to be

known as the First Anglo-Afghan War that took place in 1838. Outraged by the

presence of a single Russian diplomat in Kabul, the British demanded a deal that

Afghanistan avoids any contact with Russia or Iran, and that it hand over vast tracts of

Pashtun inhabited land to British India. Dost Mohammad the Afghan ruler agreed to

these humiliating demands, but the British did not stop invading the country. The

British however seized most of the major cities in Afghanistan with little resistance,

but their tyranny soon resulted in a popular uprising by the people which resulted in the

massacre of the entire British army of 15,000. Still the British outrage over the

uninvited arrival of a Russian diplomatic envoy in Kabul, in 1878, resulted in the

Second Anglo-Afghan War. Subsequently the British withdrew but not before they set

up a puppet ruler and forced the country to hand over control of its foreign affairs to

Britain. It was demanded that Afghanistan would remain a British protectorate until

1919. Following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the wave of popular rebellions

that rippled through Asia subsequently, Amanullah the then king of Afghanistan,

declared his country’s independence by signing a treaty of aid and friendship with

Lenin, and declaring war on Britain. After a period of border skirmishes, and the

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bombing of Kabul by the Royal Air Force, Afghanistan’s Independence was conceded

by the British. Notwithstanding its defeat, Britain conspired with the conservative

religious and land owning elements of the country that were unhappy with

Amanullah’s attempts to secularize and reform the country. This makes it evident that

more than the foreign outbreaks it is the internal differences between the ethnic groups

that created the differences time and again. The outbreak of an uprising and civil war

forced Amanullah to abdicate in 1929. Different warlords contested for power until a

new king, Muhammad Nadir Shah took power and was assassinated four years later.

He was succeeded by Muhammad Zahir Shah, who was to be Afghanistan’s last king,

and who would rule for the next 40 years. Zahir Shah’s rule was highly autocratic; the

word of the king was the word of law. Official bodies i.e. the advisory councils and

assemblies were sometimes called to advise the king; they had no power, and in no

way represented the people of Afghanistan. These bodies consisted of the country’s

tribal elders – a nice sounding term, but in reality referred to the brutal land owners and

patriarchs. It is said that this time of Afghanistan’s history was one where attempts

were made to modernize the country – all this really meant was newer rifles for the

army, the purchase a few airplanes, the creation of a tiny airline to shuttle the ruling

elite around, and some telegraph wires to allow the king to collect this taxes more

promptly. Under his rule political parties were outlawed, and unhappy students were

shot and killed when they protested.

In 1973, the king was overthrown by a prominent member of his own family

Daoud, and a Republic was declared. Daoud, decided to title himself president instead

of king and he did bring about some changes as the most draconian realities of

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monarchy were rolled back. Dissatisfaction amongst people started as little was done to

satisfy them. Daoud seized power with an underground party namely the PDPA--

People’s Democratic Party, a pro-Moscow communist party. Once he had consolidated

power he felt no longer needed these controversial allies, and ordered a crackdown

upon the party. The PDPA seized power from Daoud in 1978 in a military coup. After

seizing power they began a series of limited reforms, trying to unite the diverse ethnic

groups, declaring a secular state, and that women deserved equal treatment in the

society. They sought to curtail the practice of purchasing brides, and tried to implement

a land reform program. They quickly met with fierce opposition from many sections of

the deeply religious population though and soon several rural areas rose in open armed

rebellion against the new government. Immediately following the PDPA coup, the

soviets took an active interest in the so-called socialist revolution unfolding in its

backyard. Utterly dismayed by the clumsiness of the radical faction of the PDPA, the

Soviet Union invaded in 1979 and handed power over a man named Karmal, who was

the leader of the more moderate faction of the PDPA. Though, perhaps this was not the

Soviets original intention, they found themselves forced to commit more and more

troops and material to prop up the unpopular PDPA government. Several Islamic

fundamentalist groups sprang up and began waging guerilla warfare. Many of them

operated from camps set up by the CIA and Pakistani Intelligence within Pakistan,

from which they could strike into Afghanistan, and then beat a hasty retreat over a

guarded border. The United States government initially paid little attention to the

PDPA coup in Afghanistan; its attention was instead focused on to the west, where a

popular revolution has overthrown their most valuable Middle East ally, the brutal and

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autocratic Shah of Iran. However, at that point the United States took an active interest

in the Islamic fundamentalists waging war on the PDPA and the Soviets. Mujahadeen--

the name of the Islamic guerillas was provided with military training by the CIA. After

offensive after offensive, gradually the Soviet military became discouraged. They were

actually able to occupy and hold all of the major cities, just at the British imperialists

had been able to, the century before, but they were unable to subjugate the countryside.

Soviet causalities began to mount dramatically; even their control of the air was

becoming an expensive affair.

Mujahideen’s call for ‘Jihad’, or the holy war against the the secular Soviets

won favours from thousands of Arabs across. In 1989 the Soviets withdrew, and the

CIA soon lost interest in its mercenary forces now that they had accomplished their

mission of bleeding the Soviets white. The Mujahideen factions began fighting as

much with themselves as with the PDPA forces, resulting in increased suffering and

bloodshed. It wasn’t until 1992 that Mujahideen fighters were able to topple the

remnants of the PDPA government, ending the Stalinists attempts to bring revolution to

the people of Afghanistan. Different Mujahideen warlords occupied different cities and

regions of the country. The collapse of the PDPA government did not mark the end of

Afghanistan’s civil war. The Mujahideen warlords continued to bring death and

destruction upon the country and sought to enlarge their new fiefdoms at the expense

of their neighboring rivals. Pakistani Intelligence aided in the creation of a new Islamic

fundamentalist movement-- the Taliban which was born in the Islamic schools that had

sprung up inside the Afghan refugee camps inside Pakistan. Its leadership and the bulk

of its initial ranks were made up of young religious Pashtun students, motivated by the

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zeal of religion and the belief that they were ordained to bring stability and the ways of

Allah back to their war torn land.

They railed against corruption and greed of the contending Mujahideen factions

inside Afghanistan, and initiated a military push to conquer the country. They were

initially well received by certain sections of the weary population. In 1996, they

captured the capital city of Kabul, and had forced most of the remaining warlords into a

small pocket in the far north of the country. Once in power, the Taliban sought to

create a theocratic state based on their interpretations of the Koran making it adapt to

their needs. Already severely suppressed by the various Mujahideen warlords, the

plight of Afghanistan’s women was made even worse under the new regime. The veil

became the law of the land, and women were forbidden from attending school or

holding employment outside of the home. Television was banned and an effort was

made to purge the country of any signs or remnants of secular or Western influence.

The country became politically and diplomatically isolated.

The work tends to focus on the mayhem and anarchy that haunted Afghanistan

in the face of ethnic conflicts for thousands of years. Invasions and foreign rule is a

common feature in the history books, but what needs to be understood is how a

particular society reacts to such intrusions and when societal living and communal

harmony is lagging, anarchy becomes the order of the nation. It’s hard to say how

much longer the Taliban will continue to fight, or when the U.S. will end its war.

Afghanistan’s future like its past seems to be very dark indeed.

Ethnic Groups Prevailing in the Nation

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The Pashtun Community: The word Afghan is originally a synonym for Pashtun, and

is symbolic of the physical might and fervor of the people of Afghanistan. Because of

this etymology, the Pashtuns are often referred to as ‘ethnic Afghans.’ Just as Turkey,

Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and other countries have been named for their

historical majority ethnic group, so was Afghanistan by the predominance of the

Pashtuns. Throughout the Pashtun history, the warrior has been the most revered

member of society. It is said that the term 'Pakhto' or 'Pashto' is merely the not name of

the language, but the name of an honour code and religion. These people are highly

conventional and hold strong belief in the main tenets of 'Pakhto' or formally known as

Pashtunwali-

1. Hospitality and asylum to all guests seeking help and justice being very firm

and rigid

2. Eye for an eye or Tooth for a Tooth,

3. Thirdly defense of 'Zan, Zar and Zameen' i.e women/family, treasury and

property.

Pashtuns are fiercely independent and there is a lot of internal competition. The

Pashtun people are extremely protective of their womenfolk, at home they are

undeniably in-charge of all the family affairs. All Pashtun men are extremely close to

their mothers and are encouraged to espouse the virtues of a chivalrous warrior by their

mothers. To uphold the sanctity of Pashtunwali becomes their primary objective and

the tenets of Pashtunwali are transmitted from generation to generation in the form of a

number of verbal stories or anecdotes that every child becomes acquainted with,

through the elders in the family. Mothers are generally very tough on their male

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children when it comes to being well-mannered. It is seen that women have the

responsibility of guarding and protecting the status of men and the family, within the

Pasthun community. For this reason, women are guarded closely and protected. A

man enquiring about the wife of another man is considered heretic and it would have

serious consequences. The Pashtuns are a private people and the men also make efforts

to safeguard themselves, their extended families, their communities; sustaining their

honour and social status becomes pivotal. Although it is an Islamic duty to observe

burqa, Pashtun women do so because it forms a part of their cultural tradition and not

primarily for Islamic purposes. It is said that ‘Pashtunwali’ has been in existence since

before the advent of Islam and is still practiced today. The Pashtuns are predominantly

a tribal people, although an increasing number of them now dwell in cities and urban

settlements. Many still identify themselves with various clans. Most decisions in tribal

life are made by a 'Jirga' or 'Senate' of elected elders and wise men.

Origin of the Pashtun Community: A number of ancient groups with eponyms to

‘Pukhtun’ have been referred to as possible ancestors of modern Pashtuns. The

Rigveda seems to (1700–1100 BC) mention a tribe called Paktha and their connection

with today's Pashtun people inhabiting eastern Afghanistan. The Greek historian

Herodotus mentioned a people called ‘Pactyans’ living in the same area (Achaemenid's

empire) as the 1st millennium BCE. However, these were often referred to as ethnic

Afghans in the middle ages until the advent of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century.

The earliest mention of the name Afghan (Abgân) is by Shapur I of the Sassanid

Empire during the 3rd century which is later recorded in the 6th century in the form of

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‘Avagana’ by the Indian astronomer Varāha Mihira in his Brihat-Samhita. It was used

to refer to a common legendary ancestor known as ‘Afghana’, propagated to be

grandson of King Saul of Israel. George Moore published his famous work The Lost

Tribes in 1861 where he referred to the origin of the Pashtun tribes. He gave numerous

facts to prove that these tribes are traceable to India. He gave details of the character of

the wandering Israelites, and said:

And we find that the very natural character of Israel reappear in all its life and

reality in countries where people call themselves Bani Israel and universally

claim to be the descendants of the Lost Tribes. The nomenclature of their tribes

and districts, both in ancient Geography, and at the present day, confirms this

universal natural tradition. Lastly, we have the route of the Israelites from

Media to Afghanistan and India marked by a series of intermediate stations

bearing the names of several of the tribes and clearly indicating the stages of

their long and arduous journey. (Moore, 3)

The Exiled and the Redeemed by Itzhak Ben-Zvi, second President of Israel, writes that

Hebrew migrations into Afghanistan began, ‘with a sprinkling of exiles from Samaria

who had been transplanted there by Shalmaneser, King of Assyria (719 BC). He writes:

The Afghan tribes, among whom the Jews have lived for generations, are

Moslems who retain to this day their amazing tradition about their descent from

the Ten Tribes. It is an ancient tradition, and one not without some historical

plausibility... if the Afghan tribes persistently adhere to the tradition that they

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were once Hebrews and in course of time embraced Islam, and there is not an

alternative tradition also existent among them, they are certainly Jewish. (Ben,

Itzhak. 5)

Shalva Weil, anthropologist and senior researcher at the Hebrew University of

Jerusalem said "Of all the groups, there is more convincing evidence about the Pathans

than anybody else, but the Pathans are the ones who would reject Israel most

ferociously. That is the sweet irony" (6).

From the anthropologists’ perspective, they lend credence to the oral traditions

of the Pashtun tribes themselves. Another book that corresponds with Pashtun

historical records-- Taaqati-Nasiri, states that in the 7th century BC a people called the

Bani Israel settled in the Ghor region of Afghanistan and from there began migrating

southeast. These references to Bani Israel agree with the commonly held view by

Pashtuns that when the twelve tribes of Israel who were dispersed, the tribe of Joseph,

among other Hebrew tribes, settled in the Afghanistan region. This oral tradition is

widespread among the Pashtun tribes. There have been many legends over the

centuries of descent from the Ten Lost Tribes after groups converted to Christianity

and Islam. However their modern past stretches back to the Hotaki dynasty and the

Durrani Empire.

The Tajiks: ‘Tājik’ is a word of Turko-Mongol origin and literally means Non-Turk.

Tajik in Central Asia is used to refer to people that still speak an Iranian language,

including both Tajiki-speaking Tajiks, and the Pamiri peoples, also known as the

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Mountain Tajiks. The origin of the name Tajik has been disputable in twentieth-century

political disputes about whether Turkic or Iranian peoples were the original inhabitants

of Central Asia. The Tajiks form the next major ethnic group in Afghanistan and trace

their ancestry to the Eastern Iranian speaking Bactrians, Sogdians, and Parthians. But

the Tajiks adoption of the now dominant Persian language--a Western Iranian language

is believed to be due to the dominance of the Persian empire in the region during the

Achaemenid and Sassanid dynasties. However, the Persian language, particularly the

Tajiki, contain numerous words from Sogdian, Parthian and other Iranian languages of

ancient Central Asia. Following the Arab conquest of Persia, many Persians after

conversion to Islam, entered Central Asia as military forces and settled in the

conquered lands. As a result of these regular Persian migrations (Zoroastrian and

Muslim) over the course of more than 200 years, it is seen that the Tajiks have also

ethnic Persian ancestry in addition to their East-Iranian ancestry. The rich cultural

dissemination through Persian literature also helped to establish the new language,

besides having an intermittent military dominance. According to a leading historian of

Iranian and Central Asian history, Richard Nelson Frye, the Persian migration to

Central Asia may be considered the beginning of the modern Tajik nation. In his later

works, Frye expands on the complexity of the historical origins of the Tajiks. Moreover

in a 1996 publication Frye explains that "the peoples of Central Asia, whether Iranian

or Turkic speaking, have one culture, one religion, one set of social values and

traditions with only language separating them"(48). They predominate four of the

largest cities in Afghanistan--Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Ghazni. In Afghanistan,

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the Tajiks do not organize themselves by tribes and refer to themselves by the region

they are from, such as Badakhshi, Baghlani, Herati, Kohistani etc.

Hazara: The Hazara are a people set apart from fellow Afghans by religion, mixed

ethnicity and an independent nature. Persecution has shaped and defined the Hazara

especially by the Pashtun community, particularly over the last 200 years. They face

discrimination as they are the Shi'ite Muslims, a minority among Afghanistan's

dominant Sunni Muslims and also for their ethnic bias. Their traditional homeland lies

in central Afghanistan amid rugged mountains, where living is not smooth, nearly

inaccessible region of craggy peaks and rushing rivers called the Hazarajat. Hazara

origins are much debated as their name is from a Persian word meaning ‘thousand’.

However current theory suggest that they have obvious Asian features, and are

descents from Mongol soldiers left behind by Genghis Khan in the 13th century, with

considerable Turkish admixture. Their unwritten dialect--- ‘Hazaragi’ is a blend of

regional languages - Arabic, Urdu, Mongol, Turkish and Dari/Farsi, which is now

Afghanistan's primary language. Although they are the third major ethnic group in

Afghanistan they constitute only close to 10% of the population now; they are the

discriminated group and subjected to inhuman treatment by the dominant groups.

History reveals that prior to the 19th century, Hazaras were 67% of the total

population, the largest Afghan ethnic group. As part of ‘ethnic cleansing’ more than

half were massacred in 1893 when their autonomy was lost as a result of political

action. Later fundamentalist governments, including the Taliban—Pashtun dominated,

attempted to dismiss them historically, politically and culturally by labeling them a

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mere religious entity and continued to attack them until they were driven from power.

During the political and religious turmoil, between 1978-2001 war years, numerous

Hazara fled with other Afghans to Pakistan or Iran. While many returning refugees

settled in Kabul to work as laborers, market vendors or in service positions while a

majority returned to their mountain homelands. They comprise half-dozen tribes and

identify themselves by village location rather than by family ties. They lead a semi-

nomadic life, simple and harsh in the arid region where water is scarce and cultivation

a formidable task.

It is sad to note that health issues are serious as they are deprived of basic

necessities; moreover their condition is aggravated due to geographical isolation,

unsanitary conditions and little access to medical care. Hazara women are honored in

legend and folk tales. Many pre-Taliban Hazara women were highly educated and

entered teaching or medical professions; they also served in political roles. And it is

important to note that unlike the other Afghan women; they fought beside their Hazara

men in battles. Their contribution in the country tag Hazaras as brave, hardworking,

trustworthy, friendly and committed. The Hazara are Muslims, otherwise known as

‘Twelvers’, who hold a particular reverence for the son-in-law of the prophet

Mohammed. A number of Hazara who have strong ties with the Tajik people are

Ismaili Shi'ites--also known as ‘Seveners’. Strong feelings prevail between the two

sects, each one often denying they have any ethnic affinity with the other at all.

Uzbeks: The Uzbeks are generally indicated to have formed from waves of ancient

migrations holding the Turkic-Mongoloid ancestry reflected by lighter skin and flat

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facial features. Uzbeks identify themselves as Sunni Muslims, although this is largely a

cultural identity now than a religious one. As Afghanistan’s fourth largest ethnic group

and nearly one-tenth of her total population, Uzbeks reside primarily in mountainous

northern regions. They live simply in small villages, often with Tajik neighbors but are

averse to the Pashtuns who moved into their homelands in large numbers to render

them a minority by the 1960s in territory they once controlled. Afghan culture has been

undeniably impacted by the Uzbeks, particularly in music, carpet making and sport.

Buzkashi, a violent game played by teams on horseback with a headless goat carcass

and now synonymous with Afghanistan as its national sport, was introduced by

Uzbeks. They are considered to be creative people and are patrons of poetry, music and

playing unique instruments, such as the Uzbek 2-stringed fretted flute. Their ethnic

culture is preserved through folk dances and traditional handicrafts like metal working,

wood carving, leather craft and wall or textile painting. Many urban Uzbeks are

businessmen, others are skilled craftsmen. Women are noted for weaving exquisite

rugs, an area of significant contribution to Afghanistan’s textile heritage. Their lives

are however affected due to their ethnic distinctiveness but however less affected than

some other groups. Medical care is not readily available and economic opportunity is

spare. The name Uzbek is said to mean ‘independent’ or ‘self-ruling’, from ‘uz’,

meaning self and ‘bek, meaning master. The name seems fitting since the Uzbek in

northern Afghanistan have remained a cohesive group, where distance from the capital

city Kabul, has allowed them some autonomy. Political interests are represented by a

single party, even when the 2001 Allied invasion increased political opportunities for

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them. Uzbeks continue to champion a central government with representation for all

Afghan ethnic groups, but granting broad control over local issues to the provinces.

Baluchs: The Baluchis are one of Asia’s cross-border minorities who have a strong

awareness of their minority status. Several rebellions have been waged in the nation to

claim their stance and maintain their autonomy. The Baluch claim their history to be

more than a millennia old, a consensus by eminent scholars was also reached where it

was believed that the Baluch had some nexus with Aleppo in Syria and their movement

towards the southern coast of the Caspian Sea after which they migrated and settled in

today’s Iranian Baluchistan, Pakistani Baluchistan and Afghanistan. Hence they are

divided across the countries of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan and across the three

nations there has been a strong struggle for self-determination with the view to the

formation of an independent Baluchistan, but the demands have gradually faded

through sustained political repression at the hands of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.

The demand articulation for autonomy by the Baluchs in Afghanistan was not

considered as its territorial concentration was lower. They practice Sunni Islam and

live in the sparse and arid lands of the south-west and south in Hilmand and Faryab

Provinces. Their language is Baluchi, although some speak Brahui. The Baluch

People's Liberation Front (PLF) was the strongest organized Baluch group in search of

independence in the 1970s. Most of PLF guerrillas were based in training camps in

southern Afghanistan and were reportedly given sanctuary by Daoud's regime. The

Baluchis are one of the named ‘national' ethnic minorities in the new Afghan

constitution and accordingly have all the rights bestowed to Afghan citizens. However,

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a lack of information on the situation of Baluchis in post Taliban Afghanistan makes it

difficult to ascertain the future of the group within Afghanistan and in the process of

re-building the state care needs to be taken to not exclude them.

Mujahideen: Amongst the ethnic groups that impacted the religious and socio-

political conditions in Afghanistan, the world cannot be oblivion to Mujahideen whose

complexity has evoked appreciable response from people across nations. The group

consists of people who took up arms against the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party)

and the Soviet forces, who regarded themselves as engaged in a ‘jihad’ or the holy war.

The Jihad movement legitimized the large-scale exodus of a significant proportion of

population to neighboring Islamic countries as Afghanistan had been transgressed by a

secular force and therefore ceased to be Islamic. People from Afghanistan migrated to

Pakistan, Baluchistan, Punjab and Iran and were given aid by the host countries to fight

against the Soviet forces. According to Peter Marsden in The Taliban:

The definition of Mujahideen thus encompasses all those who moved to

Pakistan and Iran, and engaged in fighting within Afghanistan on the basis of

incursionary movements from these two countries, together with the many

people who opted to remain in Afghanistan throughout the war, often fleeing to

the sanctuary of the mountains with their families and organizing raids from

there. Some of these were affiliated to organized groups. Others acted

spontaneously as part of their village or tribal communities. (Marsden, 27)

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The leaders of the Islamist parties who settled in Pakistan saw an opportunity to claim

leadership over the resistance movement, and declaration of ‘Jihad’ (the Holy war)

proved to be a blessing. Pakistan’s interest to support the movement was geared

towards settling border issues with Afghanistan over Pushtunistan and also to practice

political control and destabilize the existing Daoud’s regime in Afghanistan. Another

motive of Pakistan was to create strategic strength against India through the formation

of Islamic bloc stretching from Pakistan to Central Asia. USA provided aid covertly in

1979 in its attempt to destabilize the Soviet forces and then pronounced its aid on a

massive scale from 1986 onwards using Pakistan as a conduit. This gave the Islamist

movement a fillip where there could gather arms and other resources to the Mujahideen

fighting within Afghanistan. Several groups emanated justifying their holy war but the

government took a stand and recognized only seven parties or ethnic groups and stated

that the smaller groups would affiliate to any of the seven main groups.

Four of these ethnic groups were Islamist and tried to create a political

movement which had an ambit in the reinterpretation of the essential elements of

Islam. They set out to achieve a radical restructuring of society in accordance with

reinterpretation of Islamic principles with a view to incorporate the economic, judicial,

social and political system within the Islamic sphere. These religiously driven ethnic

groups gained importance and popularity across nations, more so with the Arab world

that provided them with monetary and moral support. The so called groups legitimized

under the Islamist movements were 1. Jamiat-i-Islami 2. Hisb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) 3.

Hisb-e-Islami (Khalis) 4. Ittihad-i-Islami. Each group had its own mode of operating

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and redirecting the Islamic learning of people inviting young radicals to make the

movement more heard and felt. These groups have however demonstrated strong

opposition to the Shi’a minority and the dominant group i.e the Pushtuns took the lead

in professing these radical movements. The other three parties recognized were 1. The

Afghan National Liberation Front 2. Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-islami 3. Mahaz-i-Milli-i-

islami. These groups were referred to as traditionalist, by virtue of its absence of

ideology and power base in the nation.

These parties from the time they were established as channels for military aid, it

became difficult for the government to determine to what extent the various groups

inside Afghanistan were affiliating themselves to one ethnic group or another because

of the resources on offer and the conviction they had. However, geographically it was

possible to identify an ethnic group’s predominance in a particular area, but the fact

remains that within a given village or family more than one group might be represented

adding complexity to the existing conditions. The seven parties which established

themselves into the Seven party Alliance in May 1985 were all adherents of Sunni

Islam. In addition to the existing parties, two Shi’a parties with the encouragement of

the Iranian government to strengthen and bargain the power of Shi’as in the internal

struggle within Afghanistan were formed. It is very ostensible that the ethnic groups’

motive to form a predominant group was to claim a stand, gain sympathy and practice

power in the nation. The war between the Soviet forces and the Mujahideen went

through several phases and from1987 the Soviet Union showed commitment to the

UN-sponsored peace negotiations that had been going on throughout the war involving

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nations like Pakistan, the USA and the Afghan government barring the Mujahideen

parties. The Afghan Interim Government was however formed with the alliance of the

Seven Party group days before the Soviet withdrawal. The government’s capacity to

stay in power was in large part due to the backing by the Soviet Union; this enabled to

defend the urban population with reasonable level of income. The rural population was

also taken care of, and the nation however witnessed subsequent growing

fragmentation within the ranks of Mujahideen. The unity which the Mujahidin

displayed during the Soviet occupation soon took a toll on the common man and led to

the subsequent departure of Soviet troops. As it is said in the Taliban, Localized

fighting erupted between members of one Mujahidin group and another, pitting village

against village, neighbor against neighbor and brother against brother. (35-36) The

Mujahideen parties actively discouraged refugees from returning from camps until an

Islamist government was established and that it would be in their interest to strengthen

their power base in the country. The fighting for power by the religious leaders of

Mujahideen also led to corrupt practices disrupting the beliefs of the common man.

The Taliban: It is believed that the Taliban began as a small spontaneous group in

Kandahar in the early 1994, consisting of religious students who felt outrage at the

devastating attempts of the religious leaders of the Mujahideen. This group evolved as

a colossal force soon with much backing from Pakistan, the USA and Saudi Arabia.

There is much debate as to whether the movement is a Pashtun one with an intention to

reassert the Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan that existed before the war and was

challenged by the Tajik leadership. The Taliban professed Sunni Islam and was not

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receptive of the Shia’s or the Ismailis. The movement’s dictum is heavily based on the

commitment of its soldiers and strong resistance from liberal, urban and western

values. Initially, the focus was to eradicate corruption and to create a society that

accorded with Islam; their role in strengthening of the administrative structure was

however secondary. They set certain rules or rather code of dress and conduct for men

and women and issued decrees. They substantiated that men wear turbans, have beards,

short hair and wear shalwar kameez; women were forced to wear the burqa, a garment

that covers the entire body including the face. It was also imposed that men pray five

times a day and it was the responsibility of women to involve themselves in house-hold

responsibilities and raise their progeny, hence they were prohibited from working

outside. The education for girls would have to wait until an appropriate Islamic

curriculum was designed by religious scholars. Ban on music, entertainment of any

kind, games, television and tapes was also enforced. Soon the Taliban attained great

prominence having captured almost half of Afghanistan. There was a virtual stalemate

between the forces of the Taliban and those of the government, especially in relation to

the Taliban’s attempt to capture Kabul. Not only this, the Taliban also enforced decrees

using the military because culturally and linguistically the Persian-speaking Heratis

were different from Pushtun and rural Taliban. There was strong resistance from places

like Kabul and Herat where female access to education had been provided as a right.

And later, with the intrusion of the Humanitarian agencies it was possible to secure

authority for women to work in health sectors in places like Kandahar and Herat,

although, they did not make any modifications on ban on girl child education.

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The Taliban’s gruesome dictate led many of the elite professionals and those working

in the government agencies to leave the country. There was obvious slowdown in job

opportunities in the various sectors and people started searching to relocate themselves

in the neighboring countries. The country was also wrought with continuous fights of

the Taliban with the other religious ethnic groups for the sake of establishing power.

Young people were reported to be making their way to Pakistan, Iran or beyond to

escape forced recruitments within Afghanistan by the Taliban. They were also accused

by opposition forces of relying heavily on Pakistani volunteers and from other parts of

the world. Their approach to enforce law and order through adaptation of Islam was

much punitive although they gained popularity in the initial years of their coming to

power.

It is discerned that the Western world has been judgmental in its images of the Islamic

world as ‘Islamic Fundamentalists’. In talking about the Taliban there is a tendency to

make hackneyed statements to emphasize these stereotypes. As Peter Marsden says:

The Western vision of Islam is firmly anchored in the crusades, with images of

holy warriors, fired with the passion of mart yrs, storming the battlements of

some crusade castle. Within the Western psyche there appears to be an almost

paranoid fear of Islam as something wild, mindless and potentially

overwhelming. (Marsden, 57)

Ethnic conflicts that occurred due to clashes in civilizations have been shifted to

clashes occuring due to changes in religious ideologies. It cannot be denied that this

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ethnic group embarked on a journey of holy warriors with an onward march willing to

martyr themselves for the cause. However, their extreme oppressive ways towards

women by enforcing stringent and inhumanistic decrees proved detrimental for their

attempts to coerce all regions of Afghanistan under their terrain. Still, it emerged as a

spectacular movement in response to the dissatisfaction with the status quo of existing

society. A set of principles were identified to guide followers and proclaim their modus

operandi also to the world. Within such a movement, there were adaptations of Islam

and ways of putting the belief system to an imperfect world remained in a state of flux.

While Reformation in Europe was a result of growing corruption and opulence of the

Catholic Church, the puritanical Protestant movement rose as a response to the

unprincipled behavior. When the Soviet-backed government fell in April 1992, there

were great hopes that a broad-based Islamic government would be established and

hence peace be restored after 14 years of struggle and conflict. Hence, the aim of the

Taliban was purification of Afghanistan. This was confirmed by Taliban Liason Office

in Kandahar, which quoted Mullah Omar that his main goal was to rid Afghanistan of

‘corrupt, Western-oriented time-servers’ (61). The major fear of the religious leaders in

the Islamic world has been that societies to which they belonged would soon lose their

religious beliefs and the waves of secularism would overtake them. And ever since the

West started to play havoc on the world stage, both the religious and intellectuals felt

that religion would be in a dubious state and therefore they looked for ways and means

to modify Islam to adapt to new circumstances to justify the revival of religion:

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Some have advocated that Islam should seek to incorporate what was seen to be

best from western society while retaining those aspects of Islam that were felt

to be superior to what the West had to offer. Others have felt that Islam should

be modernized and adapted to the new circumstances in which it found itself, in

order to strengthen it vis-à-vis the West. Yet others have rejected any kind of

accommodation with Western values and have sought to return to the key

elements of Islam, at the same time removing all vestiges of Western influence.

(Smith, 59)

These movements, diverse as they are, yield intended as well as unintended

consequences which reflect social transformation and change. The enormity of

changes has been staggering, though uneven, affecting the social, economic,

demographic sphere. Political norms get violated and politics of survival becomes an a

priori in the movement.

Ethnic Political Movements and the Plural Society Approach Theory: The growing

fragmentation of multi-ethnic societies all over the globe and that it being

accommodated under the umbrella of modernization led to the assimilation of theories

in the 1970s that offered ideas regarding the different ways in which ethnic groups

could be politically incorporated and assimilated in a multi-ethnic state so as to create a

stable and democratic polity. British economist J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith

proposed the plural society approach theory where they expounded that multi-ethnic

states cannot remain stable and democratic. As the inter-group relations remain

confined to competition, these states fail to develop a sense of common political

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identity and loyalty that could keep astray the cultural and ethnic differences between

them. Furnivall proposes that the only way the plural societies could be held together is

through force, and colonialism truly justifies it. M. G. Smith expanded the plural

society approach and suggests ways in which the different ethnic groups could be

incorporated into multi-ethnic states, although, he expresses his doubt about the

stability and durability of such states. First, he proposes that members of different

ethnic groups could be ‘uniformly’ incorporated as equal citizens with equal civil and

political rights irrespective of their ethnic affiliation; an approach that might lead to the

creation of political nation-state. Smith proposes a second approach where different

ethnic groups could be ‘equivalently’ incorporated with equal or complementary public

rights and status thereby creating a consociational democratic polity. Although, the

model has its shortcomings, the components of consociation are unequal in numbers,

territory, and economic potential. Lastly, his proposal of incorporating the ethnic

groups ‘differentially’ in which the dominant ethnic group exercises power and

maintains its superior position by excluding other groups from power. The theory

however raised doubt on the stance that differential incorporation would lead to

dominant-subordinate relations among ethnic groups.

Arend Lijphart in his seminal works Democracy in Plural Societies: A

Comparitive Exploration and Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus

Government in Twenty-One Countries, provided a consociational mosaic where a

stable and multi-ethnic state is possible. His framework was built on the stance of

creating a consociational polity with elite cooperation in the formation of a coalition

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government where representation for the minority in the upper chamber of the

parliament is made, proportional representation of different ethnic groups in multiple

political parties, non-territorial federalism and decentralization of power, a high degree

of autonomy for each ethnic state and the creation of a written constitution with

elaborate and difficult procedures for amendments. The above model stated by Lijphart

has produced relatively stable multi-ethnic democratic states in places such as

Switzerland and Holland and to a lesser degree in India and Canada and the ethnic

conflict and outbreak is very obvious in Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. In

‘Conflict regulation in Divided Societies’ Eric Nordinger sounded skeptical about the

lucrative impact of cross-cutting ties between ethnic groups or geographical isolation

of ethnic groups with the cooperation of the elite. He argues that an individual’s

cultural identity is more predominant than cross-cultural ties. Moreover, geographical

isolation of ethnic groups, instead of promoting elite and group cooperation may lead

to more differences thereby increasing sentiments for autonomy or separation.

Donaatesld Rothchild, an African political specialist and an exponent of the

hegemonic exchange approach found that most African governments could impose a

limited amount of hegemony on ethnic groups within their borders as they lacked the

required coercive capability and political legitimacy. The governments of these states

had to engage in a process of ‘exchange’ with the other ethnic groups with a view to

protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation. This resulted in a system

where the national governments of many African states were holding a hegemonic

coalition of representatives belonging to various ethnic groups. In such a system,

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tradeoffs and bargaining are possible and ethnic violence can be ended by changes in

policies of allocation of power. The role of the state in such a set-up is therefore of a

mediator and facilitator for a viable democracy and stability. However, associational

living and cohesion can still be at stake by the emergence of new counter-elites who

cannot be incorporated into the system or at times by the emergence of new group

demands which cannot be accommodated. Therefore, it can be said that the models of

consociational democracy and the hegemonic-exchange do not ensure political stability

in multi-ethnic states.

Moreover, ethnic groups are likely to engage in political movements when their

expectations are not met by the state i.e. they receive less than they feel they deserve.

This deprivation in which they find themselves that is inequitable and unfair leads to

mass political movement and revolt. Such a relative deprivation helps to explain the

political mobilization of not only economically under-privileged but also of

economically prosperous groups such as the Muslims in India or the Tamils in Sri

Lanka. This resource competition perspective paves way for intense elite interaction

and competition behind politicization of ethnicity. States such as Afghanistan, India,

Ukraine, South Africa, Nigeria have manipulative, power-seeking regional leaders who

exploit their power and take advantage of the communal spirit for their own selfish

ends. As Urmila Phadnis says:

Ethnic politics and nationalist politics are different from each other in one

important aspect; while the objective of nationalist politics is national self-

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determination; ethnic politics is primarily concerned with protecting the rights

of group members within existing state structure (Phadnis, 63).

In Minorities at Risk, Ted Gurr has provided a detailed account of the various types of

ethnic political movements active in the world. According to him, a politically salient

communal group is one which either collectively suffers or benefits from systematic

discrimination of other groups in a state and works towards political mobilization and

action to either defend or promote its self-defined interests. He has subdivided

politicized communal groups into two other groups i.e. national and minority peoples.

Nationalist peoples refer to regionally concentrated groups that have lost their

autonomy to expansionist states but preserve their cultural and linguistic

distinctiveness and want to protect or establish some degree of politically separate

existence. The Indian example proves best in this context where several ethnic groups

within states want autonomy and the struggle with the larger political system continues.

Minority people on the other hand have a better defined socioeconomic status within a

larger society based on their origin, immigration, economic roles and religion. Their

premise is particularly to protect or improve their status demanding or proclaiming

greater access or control of the state. We can say that Afghanistan and its people have

struggled between ethnic and nationalist politics where each had its own obscure

agenda and thereby making it detrimental to reach consensus or profess common

motives for democracy and stability to prevail.

Ethnic conflict according to Gurr can also be distinguished between inter-

groups differentials and outright discrimination. Traits such as cultural, political and

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economic differentials reflect the inter-group differentials. Cultural differentials

include nationality or ethnicity, language, religion, customs, origin, rural or urban

residence. Political differentials are talked in terms of communal groups varying in

access to positions of power, access to civil service, recruitment to military and police

service, political association rights, voting rights and legal rights. Economic

inequalities reflect differentials in income, land and other property, positions in high

office, professions and business. His study further reveals that economic and political

differentials have been deliberately created and reinforced by social practice and public

policy; more by the elites who find it easier to give the disadvantaged groups political

rights and some access to power than to reduce the economic inequalities. History has

shown that contemporary ethnic political movements display a general lack of

congruence between a group’s political and economic status in society and its demand

for separation. Moreover, cultural differences had a greater impact on economic

differentials and discrimination compared to political disadvantages. It is however

logical to understand that if the disadvantaged groups have been victims of deliberate

discrimination and if the groups have mobilized in self-defense but failed to obtain

their legitimate stance in the society, secessionist claims would certainly be made.

Ethnic Political Insurgents: Ethnic insurgency has been in the agenda of human

history for several reasons vis-à-vis seek natural and human resource and power

establishment. The ethnic insurgents undertake international diplomatic activity to

invite external support and sympathizers across nations. As Urmila Phadnis observes:

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Once they emerge, ethnic political movements are prone to get entrenched,

thereby engaging the state in a war of attrition. For an ethnic political

movement to be entrenched, it needs to be durable, visible and audible. The

first aim-maintaining physical durability—refers to the desire of the ethnic

nationalists to exist as a group and as a political movement, especially in the

face of oppression and repression by the state. Durability comes from the

movement’s ability to attract external material support (bases, training,

finances, weapons, soldiers, intelligence, etc.). Additionally, to survive state

oppression and achieve success as a political movement, ethnic insurgents need

to be visible (to be seen) and audible (to be heard) internationally in order to

attract external allies and sympathizers. (Phadnis, 55)

This kind of a political activity mobilized by the ethnic insurgents can be at individual,

group and state levels. At the individual level, it begins with lobbying, mostly

influential foreign politicians, intellectuals, religious figures, prominent leaders and at

times media persons to facilitate their motive and act as spokespersons. At the group

level, it may be the neighboring people who would be able to provide with military,

financial, training facilities and also moral support. Ethnic Diasporas could also be

roped in under this category. Apart from these neighboring kin states who profess

similar struggle or ideologies may also be approached. At the state level, the ethnic

insurgents approach the states that support the central government and request them to

withdraw their support. States which have been in support of similar activities in the

current or past situations are also likely to be approached by the ethnic insurgents.

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Superpowers and former colonial powers also could be another category of states that

may be asked for support either for making it take stance in the global agenda or to

resolve the conflict.

Not just this, IGOs (Inter-governmental organizations) and INGOs (International non-

governmental organizations) are approached by the insurgents with a view to seek

support from a wider audience across nations and attain legitimacy to their movement.

These ethnic insurgents at times make their movement visible and audible by resorting

to terrorist methods to make their cause global and attract media. They resort to

violence when outside states impose solutions on them. And when we consider the case

of Afghanistan, violence began with a resistance movement against the colonial rule

and slowly took shape of strategic politicization of the movement, leaving astray its

agenda.

Theories of Primordialism, Constructivism and Instrumentalism

Having discussed the reasons for ethnic conflicts in terms of the political aims

driven by the leaders, the discourse becomes central to the theories of Primordialism,

Instrumentalism and Constructivism. Instrumentalism is based on the notion that ethnic

conflict is driven by the greed and grievance of the political leaders, or the active

manipulation of claiming ethnic identity. And particularly with Afghanistan this theory

perfectly fits into the subsequent ethnic framework of the society that has nurtured

extremist ethnic identities. The Taliban, the Mujahideen squarely justify their motives to

gain political control for political gains. The theory of Constructivism argues that ethnic

conflict is a product of historical processes over a period of time, resulting in divergent

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ethnic identities and hostility between them. The aggressive motives of the ethnic groups

that have formed as a result of hostility towards the ethnic foreign insurgency and its

ideologies accommodate the constructivist theory. It enables to understand that the

groups have been formed to bring about a social change and ascertain their stand in the

society. Both the above theories accommodate the motives of the extremist ethnic groups

and their agenda of promoting their ideology of restoring the tenets of Islam.

Primordialism argues that ethnic conflict stems from ancient hatreds between ethnic

groups—Pashtuns and Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks and so on—the Sunni sect however

being at the dominant side. The differences can be accounted to religious, racial or

regional connections. The notion of Primordialism and its relation to ethnic conflict

largely originates from the writings of Clifford Geertz. He outlines the concept of

Primordialism in his book The Interpretation of Cultures where he states:

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the ‘givens’ – or more

precisely, as a culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed

‘givens’ of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly,

but beyond them the given-ness that stems from being borninto a particular

religious community, speaking a particular language... and following

particular practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on are

seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of

themselves. One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow

believer, ipso facto; as the result not merely of personal affection,

practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great

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part by virtue of someunaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie

itself. (Geertz, Clifford 259-260)

This theory has been disregarded by most theorists for the reason that Primordialism

has included simplifying complex situations, and its suggestions of ethnic conflict

being natural and to be expected. As Fenton in his critique of Primordialism observes

these divisions as natural, culturally and socially moulded, being grounded in place,

language and shared historic experience. Ethnoconsciousness amongst the different

ethnic groups in Afghanistan prior to the ethnic foreign intervention can be said purely

civilizational and cultural.

South Asian States: Ethnicity at a Glance

South Asian States have been in a constant state of flux, and if we were to look

for common denominators, it is to discern the pattern of the political framework,

conflicting objectives of economic growth and the social status. Several hundred ethnic

groups live in an area stretching from Afghanistan in the west to Bangladesh in the

east. Although the state has relative autonomy with regard to the society, it is very

glaring that it embodies and reflects the values of dominant social strata from which

most of its proactive members function. In view of the common interests of the state

elite and the power elite in South Asia, and also their intention to identify one another

to act in concert, plurality and heterogeneity seems to underlie the dynamics of socio-

economic structure. These varied patterns have also led to the politicization of mass

movements; whatever may be the crux of the conflicts. However, an appraisal of the

similarities and dissimilarities of South Asian states’ ethnicity directs the study in the

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light of 1. The historical context for the formation of South Asian States, 2. Socio-

economic objectives, 3. The constitutional framework, 4. Political structure, 5.

Religious objectives, 6. Policies for coping with the ethnic demands.

The political boundaries of these states have been relatively recent;

commonalities in socio-political and economic spheres can be discerned in the region

prior to the western colonialism. The civil societies in the region prior to colonialism

were characterized by a relatively common pattern of tribal and feudal social

formations. It is to note that all the world’s great religions have substantial followings

in South Asia with Hinduism predominant in India and Nepal; Islam in Afghanistan,

Bangladesh and Pakistan; and Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Bhutan. Ethnicity and

language have consistently proved more powerful a factor than religion in the politics

of South Asia over the past six decades. This was very apparently demonstrated when

the overwhelmingly Muslim Bengali-speaking population of East Pakistan revolted in

1971 against a military dictatorship believed to represent the interests of the equally

Muslim Punjabis, the predominant ethnic group in the western half of the country. And

the Muslim majority state of Bangladesh emerged on the subcontinent in 1971, and its

new constitution specified that the Bengali language is a key element of what it is to be

Bangladeshi.

The impact of colonialism in the South Asian States shall be viewed from the light of

its duration, intensity and scope. Although different schools of thought have allowed

their rhetoric to soar discussing the impact of British colonialism, there is a consensus

on the unevenness of its penetration. Apart from this, the unintended consequences

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should also be considered that contrived a great deal in the social, economic and

political structures of not just the colonies they invaded but also a spill-over effect in

the neighbouring states.

Ethnicity in Pakistan: Pakistan has remained overwhelmingly Muslim, but has

ironically remained diverse in its ethnicity. About 98% of languages spoken in Pakistan

are Indo-Iranian, a branch of Indo-European family of languages. The major ethnic

groups of Pakistan in numerical size include Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Saraikis,

Muhajirs, Balochis, Hindkowans, Chitralis and other smaller groups. Pakistan has five

provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and Gilgit-Baltistan.

Language has been an important variable in ethnic group identification in Pakistan.

Each province consists of more than one language and many dialects. Punjabi is the

largest speaking language of Pakistan with 44.15% of total population speaking the

language, the second mostly spoken language is Sindh. Pashto is spoken in Khyber-

Pakhtunkhwa. There are also other languages spoken in this region as different

emperors and rulers stayed here for years. These include, Chitrali, Kohistani, and

Hindko. In Baluchistan province, mostly Baluchi is spoken, however in some parts of

Baluchistan Pashto is also spoken. However, there are other ethnic groups such as the

Marris, Bugtis, Bizenjos and Mengals within the Baluchis and the Yusufzais,

Mohammadans, Khattaks among the Pathans. In a country like Pakistan, where

economical and political instability prevails, ethnic differences augment the disparities

of societal living. History concurs with this notion as economical and military

disparities and language controversy lead to a war in 1971 between East and West

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Pakistan. It resulted in separation of East Pakistan which became Bangladesh. The

military took serious measures at the rapid deterioration of law and order in the nation

occurring due to ethnic differences. The nation came to acquire international acclaim

due to it being a conduit for promoting religious ethnic conflicts across neighbouring

countries.

The Case of Bangladesh: Contrary to Pakistan, Bangladesh is noted for the ethnic

homogeneity of its population. Over 98 percent of the people are Bengalis;

predominantly Bangla-speaking, 86 percent being Bengali Muslim and the rest Bengali

Hindus. People speaking Arabic, Persian, and Turkic languages also have contributed

to the ethnic characteristics of the region. The four largest tribes here are the Chakmas,

Marmas (or Maghs), Tipperas (or Tipras), and Mros (or Moorangs). (internet) The

tribes tend to intermingle and can be distinguished from one another more by

differences in their dialect, dress, and customs than by tribal cohesion. Only the

Chakmas and Marmas display formal tribal organization, although all groups contain

distinct clans. By far the largest tribe, the Chakmas are of mixed origin but reflect more

Bengali influence than any other tribe. Unlike the other tribes, the Chakmas and

Marmas generally live in the highland valleys. Most Chakmas and Marmas are

Buddhists, but some practice Hinduism. The Mros are considered to be the original

inhabitants of the Chittagong hill tracts, while a few have been presumed to be

migrated from India and Burma.

The Case of Maldives: The plethora of migrations stretched over 2000 years from

India, Sri Lanka, Arabia and Africa paved way for the presence of ethnic groups in

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Maldives. Yet, the mass conversion of its population to Islam about eight centuries

ago, its common language called Dhivehi derived from Elu ( an old form of Sinhala

during the medieval period) have given a cultural homogeneity to the people here (75).

However, the contemporary homogeneous mixture of Sinhalese, Dravidian, Arab,

Australasian, and African ethnicity in Maldives results from historical changes in

regional hegemony over marine trade routes. It is said that an early Dravidian-speaking

substratum of population from Kerala in India had settled in the islands leaving its

legacy in the language and place-names. This group was subsequently displaced by

Dhivehi-speakers who arrived from Sri Lanka and whose language became the official

one. Arabs were the last group to arrive beginning in the ninth century. The only

distinct ethnic minority is found in Male among the trading community of Indians, who

settled there in the 1800s. Several hundred in number, they are also a religious

minority, belonging to the Shia branch of Islam.

Bhutan: The geophysical features and the socio-political twists and turns in Bhutan’s

neighbourhood have been the two factors contributing for its multi-ethnic structure.

The society has emerged as a conglomerate of various ethnic groups identifiable

region-wise. The population in the great Himalayan valley in the west, of Tibetan

origin migrated to Bhutan in the ninth century and lately in 1959-60 consequent to the

Mahayana Buddhist influence. They are called the Ngalop group and speak the

Dzonkha language. The Sharchop ( means easterner), the second largest ethnic group,

an Indo-Mongoloid people, thought to have migrated from Assam or possibly Burma

during the past millennium comprise most of the population of eastern Bhutan. The

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Sharchop have been largely assimilated into the Tibetan-Ngalop culture and because of

their proximity to India some speak Assamese or Hindi. The third group consists of

small aboriginal tribal people living in scattered villages throughout Bhutan. Culturally

and linguistically part of the population of West Bengal or Assam embrace the Hindu

system of endogamous groups. They include the Drokpa, Lepcha, and Doya tribes as

well as the descendants of slaves who were brought from similar tribal areas in India.

Together, the Ngalop, Sharchop, and tribal groups were thought to constitute up to 72

percent of the population.

The remaining 28 percent of the population are of Nepalese origin. They were

estimated to constitute a majority in southern Bhutan. These small groups of Nepalese,

emigrated primarily from eastern Nepal under Indian auspices in the late nineteenth

and early twentieth centuries. Mostly Hindus, the Nepalese settled in the southern

foothills and are sometimes referred to as southern Bhutanese.

Nepal: In Nepal, the discourse on ethnicity has been interpreted on the lines of its

conceptual framework, conflicting views on majority and minority status and

interpretation of caste-ethnic relations. Nepal witnessess great ethnic diversity as

studied by many anthropologists. A few of the anthropologists have made the ethnic

groupings reflective of the tribal groups. And in the census and government

publications, ethnic group figures are provided for linguistic, religious groups, race and

descent population. However, the variables mentioned above can be considered as

broad categories for the enumeration of ethnic groups in Nepal. On the basis of race or

descent, the Nepalese people can be categorized into ‘Mongoloid’ or ‘Tibeto-Burman’,

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‘Indo-Aryan’ and ‘Austro-Asiatic’, barring intermingling of racial groups. When

religion is considered, a confluence of Hindu, Buddhist and non-Hindu religious

practices and beliefs among ethnic groups like Newars, Magars, Tamangs and Gurungs

is evident. To study ethnicity under the broad category of language is also problematic

as most of the ethnic groups do not have their own script and literature, a large number

of them being bilingual. Thus language cannot be considered in total isolation from

other objective attributes in group identification. The non-Tarai Hindus are the largest

comprising almost half the population, the Tarai Hindus accounting for one-fourth. The

ethnic groups categorized are Chhettri, Brahman-Hill, Magar, Tharu, Tamang, Newar,

Muslim, Kami, Yadav and other unspecified groups. It is to note that the Tarai Hindus

speak Hindi or its dialects like the Maithili, Bhojpuri and Awadhi. The non-Tarai

Hindus speak Nepali.

India: Divergent variables to be considered in the identification of ethnic groups loom

large in the study of the Indian context. In a vast country like India, the mapping of

ethnic groups and communities has to reckon with two pertinent facts, its long drawn

civilizational thrust underlying unity on the one hand and recognition of diversities on

the other. As regards the former, in the realm of Vedantic philosophy, it is epitomized

by the lofty ideal of the many paths for the realization of ‘self’ being many. The

Brahminical stratum of the society that stands the highest in the hierarchy of the caste

system in India provided a structural framework to maintain and sustain the caste

heterogeneity. The meaning and interpretations of such experiences as put forth to the

society gives an insight of the societal division. Territorialisation of Hinduism

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appeared in the formation of the state systems and proclamation of distinctive cultural

heritage of the core ethnic community seemed another variable. However, if language

has to be considered a factor for ethnic consciousness, the argument seems to be in

dubious shape as there are too many linguistic groups and to regard linguistic states as

minorities would validate the omission by several authors as they are the formal units

of government, and not all members of a particular linguistic group reside there.

Weiner in his joint studies with Katzenstein say that what constitutes an ethnic group in

multi-ethnic societies remains as unclear in India as in other multi-ethnic societies

where ethnicity itself remains in a state of flux. Therefore, considering the various

cultural markers vis-à-vis race, religion, tribe, language we can view ethnic groups as

encompassing many disparities. If the tribes have to be considered, the north-eastern

region has many tribes like the Naga, Mezo or Meiti community. If language is

considered, Tamil, Malyalam, Bengali, Assamese etc fall under the category. If

religious groups are taken for ethnic consciousness then Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and

Parsees can be considered.

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