Chapter 2: FACTS, LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE BUDGET
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Transcript of Chapter 2: FACTS, LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE BUDGET
© Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration
Chapter 2: FACTS, LAW, INSTITUTIONS
AND THE BUDGET
© Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration
Facts: population2001
Population GDP/(1 000 inhabitants) inhabitants
PPS (2)
1 3 4Population (million) GDP/Pop (euros, PPS)
Malta 0.4 Turkey €5,210 0.0Luxembourg 0.4 Romania €5,860 0.0Cyprus 0.8 Bulgaria €6,510 0.0Estonia 1.4 Latvia €7,720 0.0Slovenia 2.0 Lithuania €8,730 0.0Latvia 2.4 Poland €9,210 0.0Lithuania 3.7 Estonia €9,800 0.0Ireland 3.8 Slovak Rep. €11,060 0.0Finland 5.2 Hungary €11,840 0.0Denmark 5.3 Malta €11,920 0.0Slovak Rep. 5.4 Czech Rep. €13,280 0.0Austria 8.1 Greece €15,780 0.0Bulgaria 8.1 Slovenia €15,970 0.0Sweden 8.9 Portugal €16,920 0.0Hungary 10.2 Cyprus €17,800 0.0Portugal 10.3 Spain €19,100 0.0Beligium 10.3 Sweden €23,130 0.0Czech Rep. 10.3 United Kingdom €23,160 0.0Greece 10.6 France €23,620 0.0Netherlands 16.0 Germany €24,140 0.0Romania 22.4 Italy €24,270 0.0Poland 38.6 Finland €24,280 0.0Spain 40.1 Beligium €24,690 0.0
• EU 25• 6 big nations
– > 35 million (Germany, the UK, France, Italy and Spain and Poland)
• Netherlands (16 million) • 8 “small” nations (size of a big
city, like Greater Paris), – 8 to 11 million: (Greece, Belgium,
Portugal, Sweden and Austria, Czech Republic and Hungary).
• 11 “tiny” nations (less than moderate sized metro area like Berlin with its suburbs)– Together make up less than 5% of
EU25 population. – (Slovak Republic, Denmark,
Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta).
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Facts: income per capita
• 11 high income – over €20,000 – – Denmark, Ireland, Austria,
Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Germany, France, UK, and Sweden.
• 9 medium income category – from €10,000 to €20,000– Spain, Greece and Portugal, Cyprus,
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Malta and the Slovak Republic.
• 6 low income nations, less than €10,000– Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,
Bulgaria, Romania, and • NB: Turkey’s income is half that of
the richest-of-the-poor, Estonia. • Luxembourg is in the super-high
income category by itself. – per capita income is almost twice that
of France. – About 40% of Luxembourgers work
so average worker earns over €100,000 a year!
€5,210€5,860€6,510€7,720€8,730€9,210€9,800€11,060€11,840€11,920
€13,280€15,780€15,970€16,920€17,800€19,100
€23,130€23,160€23,620€24,140€24,270€24,280€24,690€26,020€26,320€27,470€27,530
€45,750
€0 €10,000 €20,000 €30,000 €40,000 €50,000
TurkeyRomaniaBulgaria
LatviaLithuania
PolandEstonia
Slovak Rep.Hungary
MaltaCzech Rep.
GreeceSloveniaPortugalCyprus
SpainSweden
United KingdomFrance
GermanyItaly
FinlandBeligium
NetherlandsAustriaIreland
DenmarkLuxembourg
GDP/Pop(euros, PPS)
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Facts: Size of economies • Economic size distribution is VERY
uneven• 6 nations (Germany, the UK, France, Italy,
Spain and the Netherlands) account for more than 80% of EU25’s economy.
• Other nations are small, tiny or miniscule, • ‘Small’ is an economy that accounts for
between 1% and 3% of the EU25’s output– Sweden, Belgium, Austria, Denmark,
Poland, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Ireland.
• ‘tiny’ is one that accounts for less than 1% of the total,
– Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Cyprus.
• miniscule as one that accounts for less than one-tenth of one percent.
– Latvia, Estonia and Malta.
GDP, current prices, 2000
I
F
UK
Cyp
Lith
Sl
SR
Hu
CzPol
Lat
ABNL S DK Fin
D
E
MalEst
L
Gr P Ire
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Lessons from Economic Facts
• The vast inequality of economic size and income level pose enormous problems for European Union governance.– Would be like trying to treat city of Paris and city of
Macon as equals in some sense (these cities have the same ratio of population as Germany and Malta)
• This inequality in population, economic size and income levels will not disappear; the 2004 enlargement made the inequalities even greater on all three dimensions.
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Export shares Import shares
By region Western Europe 67% Western Europe 66% North America 10% Asia 12% Asia 8% North America 8% CEECs and CIS 6% CEECs and CIS 6% Africa 3% Africa 3% Middle East 3% Latin America 2% Latin America 2% Middle East 2%
Top 7 partners European Union (15) 62% European Union (15) 61% United States 9% United States 7% Switzerland 3% China 3% Japan 2% Japan 3% Poland 1% Switzerland 2% China 1% Russian Federation 1% Russian Federation 1% Poland 1%
Facts: EU15’s global trade pattern
• The EU trades mainly with Europe, especially with itself; – about two-thirds of EU exports and imports are to or from other Western European nations – The EU’s exports to North America amount to only 10% of its exports, – Asia’s share is only 8%.
• About 80% of EU exports consist of industrial goods (‘intraindustry’ trade).
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Facts: EU15’s global trade pattern
• EU25 members are all comparatively open economies when it comes to trade in goods. – openness ratio for the EU15 ranges from 17% for Greece up to 75% for the Belgium-Luxembourg – figures for the 10 newcomers are higher than Greece’s.
• figures for Japan and the US are 10% and 8% respectively
• EU15 market is very important for all EU25. – share of exports going to the EU15 ranges between 50% to 80%.
2001 Openness ratio Exports to EU15 as % total exports Openness ratio
Exports to EU15 as % total exports
Greece 17% 49% Malta 44% 48% Italy 22% 51% Slovenia 25% 57% Finland 30% 53% Turkey 62% 58% Sweden 33% 53% Latvia 69% 59% Germany 29% 53% Bulgaria 56% 59% United Kingdom 21% 54% Slovak
Republic 45% 62%
Ireland 61% 57% Lithuania 38% 66% France 22% 58% Cyprus 62% 67% Austria 36% 59% Romania 26% 68% Denmark 29% 59% Czech
Republic 36% 68%
Spain 23% 69% Poland 51% 69% BLEU 75% 75% Hungary 67% 70% Netherlands 55% 76% Estonia 25% 70% Portugal 29% 80%
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Law: “Sources” of EU Law• The EU Court created by the Treaty of Rome
– Court then established the Community’s legal system.
– two landmark cases in 1963 and 1964.
• EC law was established on the basis of:– The EU institutions ensuring that actions by the EC take
account of all members’ interests, i.e. the Community’s interest;
– The transfer of national power to the Community.• Source: Borchardt (1999 p.24)
• Draft Constitutional Treaty may replace this as the source of EU law
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Law: Key principles of EC Law• 1. Autonomy
– system is independent of members’ legal orders.
• 2. Direct Applicability– has the force of law in member states so that Community
law can be fully and uniformly applicable throughout the EU.
• 3. Primacy of Community law– Community law has the final say; e.g. highest French court
can be overruled on a matters pertaining to intra-EC imports. • Necessary so Community law cannot be altered by national,
regional or local laws in any member state. – Source: Borchardt (1999)
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Law: Structure
• The EU’s 3-Pillar Structure– What is the difference
between the European Community and the European Union?
– 3 Pillar Structure• 1st: Economics• 2nd: Security & Foreign• 3rd: Justice
– EC law only applies to 1st pillar.
– EU is ‘roof’ over the three pillars
European Union
ECThe European Community
(Supranational decision making)
Justice and Home Affairs
(no supranational decision making)
JHACommon Foreign
and Security Policy
(no supranational decision making)
CFSP
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Law: uniqueness
• Many regional organisations cooperate on economics, security matters and justice matters, what is really unique about the EU is the depth of cooperation on economics matters (so-called 1st pillar issues).
• Deep cooperation on these mainly economic issues provides good foundation for closer cooperation on other issues (so-called 2nd and 3rd pillar issues).
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Law: Types of EU legislation
• primary legislation– Treaties
• Secondary legislation – collection of decisions made by EU institutions
• 5 types of secondary law– 1. regulation
• applies to all member states, companies, authorities and citizens. Regulations apply as they are written, i.e., they are not transposed into other laws or provisions. They apply immediately upon coming into force.
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Law: Types of EU legislation – 2. directive
• may apply to any number of member states, but they only set out the result to be achieved.
• member states what needs to be done to comply with the conditions set out in the directive (e.g. new legislation, or change in regulatory practice).
– 3. decision • is a legislative act that applies to a specific member state,
company or citizen.
– 4. & 5. Recommendations and opinions • These are not legally binding, but can influence behaviour
of, for example, the European Commission, national regulators, etc.
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Institutions: The “Big-5”
• There are dozens of EU institutions, but only 5 are really important– European Council – Council of Ministers – Commission– Parliament– EU Court
• Others matter in specific areas or at particular moments
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Institutions: European Council• Consists of the leader (prime minister or
president) of each EU member plus the President of the European Commission.
• By far the most influential institution – Its members are the leaders of their respective nations.
• Two main tasks:– Provides broad guidelines for EU policy. Like decision
to open membership talks with Turkey.– Thrashes out detailed final compromises on sensitive
issues, e.g.• reforms of the major EU policies; the EU’s multiyear budget
plan; Treaty changes; final terms of enlargements, etc.
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Institutions: European Council
• Meets at least twice a year (June and December)– meets more frequently when the EU faces major
political problems. – highest profile meetings at the end of each six-month
term of the EU Presidency. – These meetings are important political and media
events • determine all of the EU’s major moves.
– Most important decisions of each Presidency are contained in a document, known as the “Conclusions of the Presidency”, or just the “Conclusions.”
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Institutions: European Council• Strangely, European Council has no formal role in EU
law-making– Its political decisions must be translated into action via Treaty
changes or secondary legislation.
• Confusingly, the European Council and the Council of the EU are often both called the Council
• The 2003 draft Constitution proposes to make the European Council a form part of the EU institutional structure, – Previously its was not formally part of EU institutional structure
despite its de facto importance.
– This de facto vs. de jure flexibility may come to be important in dealing with enlargement problems with, but especially without the Constitutional Treaty.
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Institutions: Council of Ministers• Usually called by old name Council of Ministers
• formal name is now “Council of the EU”
• Consists representatives at ministerial level from each Member State, empowered to commit his/her Government– Typically minister for relevant area
• e.g, Finance ministers on budget issues,
– Confusingly, Council uses different names according to the issue discussed.
• Famous ones include EcoFin (for financial and budget issues), the Agriculture Council (for CAP issues), General Affairs Council (foreign policy issues).
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Institutions: Council of Ministers
• Is EU’s main decision-making body • Almost every EU legislation must be approved by it
• Main task to adopt new EU laws, e.g.– measures necessary to implement the Treaties– also measures concerning the EU budget and
international agreements involving the EU.
• Increasing it is the political ‘court’ that makes judgments– e.g. Council decides whether a member has violated the
famous 3% deficit rule, or whether a member is ready to adopt the euro.
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Institutions: Council of Ministers
• Council also decides on:– 2nd and 3rd pillar issue, i.e. Common Foreign and
Security Policies (2nd), police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (3rd).
• Two main decision-making rules. – On the most important issues, unanimity
• e.g. Treaty changes, enlargement, multi-year budget plan, Council decisions are by.
– On most issues (about 80% of all Council decisions), majority voting
• qualified majority voting (QMV).
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Institutions: QMV
• QMV is complex and is changing
• Three sets of rules:– 1. Procedure that applied late 2004
• Basic form unchanged since 1958 Treaty of Rome
– 2. Procedure post-2004 (from Nice Treaty) unless Constitutional Treaty supersedes them.
• Political agreement in Nice Treaty; implemented by Accession Treaty for 2004 enlargement
– 3. Procedure from Constitutional Treaty• Draft endorsed by European Council at June 2003 meeting
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Institutions: QMV• Procedure that applies until late 2004: ‘old
fashioned QMV’– Each member’s minister casts a certain number of votes – more populous members have more votes,
• many fewer than population-proportionality suggests
• e.g. France (60 million citizens) has 10 votes; Denmark (5 million citizens) has 3
– Total number of votes in the EU15 is 87. – The threshold for a winning majority is 62 votes
• This is called a “qualified majority,”.
• i.e. the majority rule is that about 71% of all votes are required to adopt a proposal.
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Institutions: QMV
• The implications of this system are complex.– Since bigger members have more votes, 71% of the
votes does not mean 71% of members. • Three large members voting ‘no’ could block adoption
even if the other 12 voted ‘yes’.
– Since small nations get far more votes than strict population-proportionality would suggest, 71% of the votes does not mean 71% of the EU population.
• 71% threshold can theoretically be reached, for example, by a coalition of just 8 members representing 58% of the EU population.
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Institutions: QMV• Even though QMV is the basis of most Council
decisions, the Council rarely votes – They usual decide things by “consensus”.
• Shadow voting– Despite this, QMV and voting weights are important– If nations know they would be outvoted, were a vote were
to recorded, they usually join the consensus to be collegial.
– Nations go through a mental process of “shadow voting” before deciding to join the consensus.
• figure out what the outcome would be, if a vote were held. • Majority rule and votes matter to mental calculation
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QMV: Nice/Accession Treaty Reforms• Reforms change QMV in 2 main ways
• (changes scheduled to take effect in November 2004)
• 1. Makes QMV more complex; 2 new criteria in addition to votes– Proposition passes the Council when coalition of yes-
voters meets 3 criteria: • Votes
– 72% of the Council votes (232 votes of the 321 Council votes in the EU25).
• Number of members, – 50% of the member states
• Population. – 62% of the EU population
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QMV: Nice/Accession Treaty Reforms
• 2. votes reallocated to favour big nations
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Ger
man
y
Uni
tedK
ingd
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Fra
nce
Ital
y
Spa
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Pol
and
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ands
Gre
ece
Cze
chR
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Bel
gium
Hun
gary
Por
tuga
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Sw
eden
Aus
tria
Slo
vaki
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Den
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Fin
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Irel
and
Lith
uani
a
Lat
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Slo
veni
a
Est
onia
Cyp
rus
Lux
embo
urg
Mal
ta
Council votes (old rules)
Council votes (Nice rules)
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190%190%190%190%
238%238%
160%140%140%140%140%140%
150%150%
133%133%133%133%133%
33%33%33%
100%100%
50%
GermanyUnitedKingdo
FranceItaly
SpainPoland
NetherlandsGreece
CzechRepublicBelgiumHungaryPortugalSwedenAustria
SlovakiaDenmark
FinlandIreland
LithuaniaLatvia
SloveniaEstoniaCyprus
LuxembourgMalta
QMV: Nice/Accession Treaty Reforms
• To see this another way, look at % increase by member– Members ranked
by population
• Poland, Spain are relative biggest winners
• Tiny members biggest relative losers
EU25 average =135%
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QMV: draft Constitutional Treaty• Voting rules in the Nice and Accession Treaties
widely viewed as failing to meet the goal of maintaining the Council’s ability to act.
• European Convention (2002-2003) proposed a radical reform– Embodied in 2003 draft Constitutional Treaty (CT)
• Endorsed by European Council at June summit
• Under CT rules, qualified majority needs yes votes from: – Member states with at least 60% EU population– At least half members
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QMV: draft Constitutional Treaty• Draft CT says the new rules take effect in 2009
– Nice rules could be in place for several years.
• Voting rules among the most controversial changes in the draft CT & the IGC changed them.
• Final CT (still must be ratified) rules:– 55% of members– 65% of population (i.e. members that together account for at least
65% of EU population)– Last-minute compromise added at least 15 members must vote
‘yes’, but this is irrelevant; 15 members of 25 is 60% and thus greater than 55%, but by the time these rules take effect, the EU should have 27 members and 55% of 27 is 15 (Bulgaria and Romania are penciled in for membership in 2007). Thus the 15 member rule will be redundant by the time it takes effect.
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QMV: Constitutional Treaty• Power implications
– Big nations gain a lot• Except Spain and Portugal who lose a lot
– Intermediate sized nations lose– Tiny nations gain slightly
• Source: Baldwin and Widgren (2003) “Decision Making and the Constitutional Treaty: Will the IGC discard Giscard?” www.cepr.org
Increase in power from CT compared to Nice Treaty (negative number means power decreases)
-2%
-1%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
D GB
F I E PL
Ro
NL
Gr
CR
B H P S Bu
A SR
DK
SF
Ire
Li
La
Slo
Es
Cy
L M
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Institutions: the Commission• Stopped revision here
• European Commission is at the heart of the EU’s institutional structure
• driving force behind deeper and wider European integration.
• Has three main roles:– propose legislation to the Council and Parliament,– to administer and implement EU policies– to provide surveillance and enforcement of EU law
• “guardian of the Treaties”
– ALSO, represents EU at some international negotiations
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Commissioners, Commission’s composition• Before the 2004 enlargement:
– one Commissioner from each member • extra Commissioner from the big-5 (Germany, UK, France, Italy
and Spain in the EU15). • This includes the President (Romano Prodi up to 2005), two
Vice-Presidents and 17 other Commissioners.
• Under Nice Treaty each member in EU25 has one Commissioner
• draft Constitution, only 15 Commissioners– rotating evenly among all members– Would have non-voting Commissioners from other nations
• IGC likely to change this
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Commissioners, Commission’s composition• Commissioners are chosen by their own national
governments• subject to political agreement by other members.
• Commission, the Commission President individually, approved by Parliament.
– Commissioners are not national representatives. • should not accept or seek instruction from their country.
• appointed together, serve for five years• current Commission’s term ends in Jan 2005.
• Each Commissioner in charge of a specific area of EU policy– Directorate-Generals or DGs
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Commissioners, Commission’s composition• Executive powers
– Commission executive in all of the EU’s endeavours,– power most obvious in competition policy and trade
policy
• Manage the EU budget, subject to EU Court of Auditors.
• Decision making– Decides on basis of a simple majority, if vote taken – almost all decisions on consensus basis
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Institutions: European Parliament• two main tasks:
– oversees EU institutions, especially Commission; – it shares legislative powers, including budgetary
power, with the Council and the Commission;
• Organisation– Up till the 2004 enlargement, 626 members (MEPs)– After 732. – Directly elected in special elections organized by
member nation. – number per nation varies with population but rises
less than proportionally.
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Institutions: European Parliament• MEPs supposed represent local constituencies, but generally organised along classic European political
lines, not national lines as in Coucil.– Centre left and centre right two main party groupings
• Together about 2/3rds of seats
– MEPs seat, physical, left-to-right
• Location– Parliament is in Strasbourg, in Luxembourg, and in Brussels– Nationalistic struggles to keep an EU institution local resulted in this.
• Democratic control
• The Parliament and the Council are the primary democratic controls over the EU’s activities. The MEPs are directly elected by EU citizens, so European Parliamentary elections are – in principle – a way for Europeans to have their voices heard on European issues. In practice, however, European Parliamentary elections are often dominated by standard left-versus-right issues rather than by purely EU issues. Indeed, European Parliamentary elections are sometimes influenced by pure national concerns with the voters using the elections as a way of expressing disapproval or approval of the ruling national government’s performance. Moreover in many member states, participation in European Parliamentary elections tends to be fairly modest, and MEP absenteeism is a problem. By contrast, the elections by which national governments are chosen have very high levels of popular participation. The national elections, however, involve many issues, so voters may find it difficult to influence their nation’s stance on EU issues via national elections.
• The 2003 draft Constitutional Treaty proposes few changes for the Parliament, although it does expand its power somewhat by giving the Parliament a voice in almost all legislative activities. As usual, see the OLC website for the latest.
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Institutions: European Parliament• Democratic control
– Parliament and Council are the primary democratic controls over the EU’s activities.
– MEPs directly elected so in principle a way for Europeans to have a voices
– In practice, however, European Parliamentary elections dominated by standard left-versus-right, and purely local issues rather than by EU issues.
• The 2003 draft Constitutional Treaty proposes few changes for the Parliament– does expand its power, giving it equal standing with the
Council on almost legislation.
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Institutions: European Court of Justice • EU laws and decisions open to interpretation that lead to disputes that cannot be settled by
negotiation. – Court settle these disputes, especially disputes between Member States, between the EU and Member States,
between EU institutions, and between individuals and the EU.
• EU Court’s supranational power highly unusual in international organisations.
• Influence
• As a result of this power, the Court has had a major impact on European integration. As mentioned above, a 1964 judgment established EC law as an independent legal system that takes precedence over national laws in EC matters, and a 1963 ruling established the principle that EC law was directly applicable in the courts of the members. Its ruling in the 1970s on non-tariff barriers triggered a sequence of events that eventually led to the Single European Act (see Chapter 4 for details). The Court has also been important in defining the relations between the Member States and the EU, and in the legal protection of individuals (EU citizens can take cases directly to the EU Court without going through their governments).
• Organisation
• The Court of Justice, which is located in Luxembourg, consists of one judge from each member state. They are appointed by common accord of the member states' governments and serve for six years. The Court also has eight “advocates-general” whose job is to help the judges by constructing “reasoned submissions” that suggest what conclusions the judges might take. The Court reaches its decisions by majority voting. The Court of First Instance was set up in the late 1980s to help the Court with its ever growing workload.
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Institutions: European Court of Justice • Influence
– Court has had a major impact on European integration via case-law
• Organisation– located in Luxembourg– one judge from each member – appointed by common for six years– also eight “advocates-general” to help judges– The Court reaches its decisions by majority voting.– Court of First Instance set up 1980s to help with ever
growing workload.
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Legislative processes• Main procedure, codecision procedure, gives the Parliament equal standing with the Council after a
proposal is made by Commission– used for about 80% of EU legislation
• the codecision procedure requires – Commission’s proposal to be adopted by the Parliament (deciding by simple majority) and Council (deciding by
qualified majority) before it becomes law. – If the Parliament and/or the Council disagree, proposal only adopted if a Council-Parliament compromise can be
reached.
• The consultation procedure is used for a few issues – e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy’s periodic price fixing agreements – where the member states wished to keep tight control over politically sensitive decisions. Under this procedure, the Parliament must give its opinion before the Council adopts a Commission proposal. Such opinions, when they have any influence, are intended to influence the Council, or the shape of the Commission’s proposal. Another procedure in which the Parliament plays a subsidiary role is the assent procedure. For example, on decisions concerning enlargement, international agreements, sanctioning member nations and the coordination of the Structural Funds, the Parliament can veto, but cannot amend a proposal made by the Commission and adopted by the Council. The final procedure, the cooperation procedure, is a historical hang over from the Parliament’s gradual increase in power. Specifically, before the codecision procedure was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, the cooperation procedure was the one that granted the most power to the Parliament. The best way to think of it is as the codecision procedure where the Parliament’s power to amend the proposal is less explicit. Also, the Council can overrule an EP rejection by voting unanimously.
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Legislative processes• Other procedures
– Consultation procedure • used for few issues, Parliament only gives opinion
– Assent procedure. • e.g. decisions concerning enlargement
• Parliament can veto, but cannot amend proposal
– Cooperation procedure, • historical hang over
• Quite similar to codecision procedure
• Like codecision procedure but Parliament’s power to amend is less explicit.
• Draft Constitutional Treaty to make Codecision apply to almost all decisions
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The budget: Expenditure
Pre-accession Aid3%
External Actions
5%
Other Internal7%
Administration5%
Agriculture46%
Cohesion34%
Note: Cohesion spending refers to spending on disadvantaged regions; this includes the Structural Funds (see Chapter 9) that can be spend on disadvantaged regions in any member, and the Cohesion Fund that can only be spent in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Source: General Budget of the EU for Financial Year 2003, European Commission (2003). http://eurpoa.eu.int/budget/
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Evolution of spending priorities
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Evolution of spending, level
Total Spending, Million euros, 1958-2006
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© Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
UK
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EU average
Finland
France
Spain
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euro per person
Operational Expenditure/Pop
Expenditure/Pop
Evolution of spending, level
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Finland
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NL
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Belgium
Greece
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Million euros
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Administration
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Funding of EU Budget• EU’s budget must balance every year• Financing sources: four main types
– Tariff revenue – ‘Agricultural levies’ (tariffs on agricultural goods)– ‘VAT resource’.
• Like a 1% value added tax (reality is complex).
– GNP based. • tax paid by members based on their GNP.
• Miscellaneous– relatively unimportant since 1977– taxes paid by eurocrats, fines and earlier surpluses– Pre-1970s direct member contributions
© Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration
Evolution of Funding sources
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001S
har
e of
tot
al r
even
ue
GNP
VAT
Miscellaneous
Customs Duties
Agricultural Duties
Source: “The Community Budget: The facts in figures” European Commission, 2000. Downloadable from http://eurpoa.eu.int/budget/
© Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration
Contribution vs GDP, 1999, 2000• % of GDP per
member is approximately 1% regardless of per-capita income
• EU contributions are not ‘progressive’
• e.g. richest nation, (L) pays less of its GDP than the poorest nation (P)
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
Portugal
Greece
Spain
Italy
France
Belgium
UK
Finland
EU
15 Median
Netherlands
Ireland
Germ
any
Austria
Sweden
Denm
ark
Luxem
bourg
€0
€5,000
€10,000
€15,000
€20,000
€25,000
€30,000
€35,000
€40,000
€45,000
€50,000Contribution/GDP, 1999
Contribution/GDP, 2000
GDP per capita, 1999 (right scale)
© Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration
Net Contribution by Member
-€8,000 -€6,000 -€4,000 -€2,000 €0 €2,000 €4,000 €6,000 €8,000
SpainGreece
PortugalBelgium
IrelandLuxembourg
FranceDenmark
EU15 MedianFinland
ItalyAustriaSweden
NetherlandsUK
Germany
Net Financial Contribution, 2000
Net Financial Contribution, 1999