Chapter 17 Income Distribution and Welfare Programs Jonathan Gruber Public Finance and Public Policy...
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Transcript of Chapter 17 Income Distribution and Welfare Programs Jonathan Gruber Public Finance and Public Policy...
Chapter 17Income Distribution
and Welfare Programs
Jonathan GruberPublic Finance and Public Policy
Aaron S. Yelowitz - Copyright 2005 © Worth Publishers
The moral hazard costs of welfare policyMoral hazard effects of a means-tested
transfer system Actual welfare benefits are related to
program parameters through the following equation:
Where B stands for actual benefits received, G is a benefit guarantee level, Τ is the benefit reduction rate, w is the hourly wage rate, and h is hours worked.
B G earn ings G wh
The moral hazard costs of welfare policyMoral hazard effects of a means-tested
transfer system Setting actual benefits equal to zero
results in the “break-even formula” – the income level where welfare eligibility ends:
Thus, with a guarantee of $300 and tax rate of 75%, earnings of $400 reduces the welfare benefit to zero and removes the person from welfare.
B earn ingsG
0
The moral hazard costs of welfare policyMoral hazard effects of a means-tested
transfer system In principle, setting G equal to the
poverty line (with, say, =1.00) would eliminate poverty.
The Current Population Survey suggests that such a policy would cost $98 billion, a concept known as the poverty gap.
Yet such an exercise does not account for the moral hazard effects of such a policy.
The moral hazard costs of welfare policyMoral hazard effects of a means-tested
transfer system Figure 3Figure 3 considers the individual’s
choice of leisure and consumption with such a grant and tax rate.
There are dramatic work disincentives, especially for those mechanically eligible for welfare who earn less than the grant, G.
2,000 Hours of leisureper year
$ of consumptionper year
25,000
G = 9,000
A
B
C
Z
D
X
Y
5,000
20,000
1,6001,200400
10,000
slope = -wage = -12.50
1,280
Figure 3This is the budget constraint before welfare is introduced.
Individuals make different choices based on preferences.
Welfare is introduced with a $9,000 guarantee and a
BRR of 100%.
Some will be “mechanically” eligible and reduce hours of work.
Others are initially ineligible, but reduce their work effort, too.
The moral hazard costs of welfare policyMoral hazard effects of a means-tested
transfer system Thus, eliminating poverty is potentially
much more expensive – perhaps three times as much: Those who are mechanically eligible for
welfare stop working completely, costing the government more money.
Some who are initially ineligible change their behavior by cutting back on work and getting onto welfare. By doing so, they give up some consumption, but get much more leisure.
The moral hazard costs of welfare policy
Lowering the benefit reduction rate A natural solution to the moral hazard
problem here (the reduction in labor supply) is to lower the benefit reduction rate.
This is illustrated in Figure 4Figure 4.
2,000 Hours of leisureper year
$ of consumptionper year
25,000
G = 9,000
A
B2
C
Z1
D
X1
Y1
slope = -net wage = -6.25
560
Y2
X2
B1
slope = -wage = -12.50
18,000 Z2
1,280
Figure 4
Lowering the BRR changes the
budget constraint.
Hours of work fall for person X.
Hours also fall for person Y.
And person Z becomes eligible.
The moral hazard costs of welfare policy
Lowering the benefit reduction rate Although such a policy ameliorates the
work disincentives relative to higher tax rates for some people, it potentially exacerbates the work disincentives for others.
This is because the breakeven level to qualify for welfare goes up when the tax rate is lowered.
The net impact depends on the relative sizes and preferences of the different consumers.
The moral hazard costs of welfare policy
The “iron triangle” of redistributive programs The iron triangle means that there is no
way to change either the benefit reduction rate or benefit guarantee to simultaneously encourage work, redistribute more income, and lower costs. If the tax rate is lowered, work could be
discouraged for some and costs could go up.
If the guarantee is lowered, work increases and costs fall, but redistribution falls.
REDUCING THE MORAL HAZARD OF WELFARE
Are there other policy instruments that can overcome these moral hazard problems? Moving to categorical welfare payments Using ordeal mechanisms Increasing outside options
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Moving to categorical welfare payments Moral hazard occurs because the
benefits are not well targeted – the government cannot observe an individual’s earnings capacity.
If the government could observe true earnings ability, it could simply give payments to those with low earnings ability.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Moving to categorical welfare payments Instead, the government observes
earnings outcomes. Outcomes are related to ability, but not perfectly. A person may be poor either because: He or she is high ability but lazy He or she is low ability and working hard
By targeting benefits to actual earnings, the government creates incentives for high ability people to be lazy.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Moving to categorical welfare payments There are some characteristics that are
easy to verify, hard to change, and related to low earnings. For example, being blind limits a
person’s job opportunities and individuals are unlikely to change their behavior to qualify.
This type of targeting – categorical welfare payments – can overcome the iron triangle.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Moving to categorical welfare payments What characteristics make a good
targeting mechanism? Characteristics that are unchangeable. Characteristics that target those with
low earnings capacity. In reality, welfare programs target
characteristics like blindness, age, disability, and single motherhood.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Moving to categorical welfare payments The last of these – single motherhood – seems
on the surface to meet these two criteria. The second criterion, low earnings capacity, is
clear: poverty rates for single parent families exceed 33%.
The first criterion – whether single motherhood is unchangeable – is more debatable, however.
Although theoretically women might become single mothers to qualify, in practice this does not seem to be very common.
Figure 5Figure 5 shows the time-series correlations.
Figure 5
Single motherhood has increased over time.
While benefits have fallen.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Moving to categorical welfare payments Although single motherhood and
welfare generosity rose together during the 1960s, welfare benefits fell thereafter while single motherhood continued to rise.
This appears true for within-state comparisons over time.
The consensus from existing research is that this effect is, at most, very small.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Moving to categorical welfare payments Despite the view of the existing academic
studies, the possible negative effects of welfare on formation of stable families remains a major source of opposition.
This opposition affected the targeting in the TANF program – which, in theory, removed the distinction between single parent families and other types. The potential moral hazard from such a
policy must be weighed against the costs of expanding eligibility to a larger set of richer families.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Using “ordeal mechanisms” An alternative approach is to try get
individuals to reveal themselves as less able through ordeal mechanisms.
Ordeal mechanisms are features of welfare programs that make them unattractive, leading to self-selection of only the most needy recipients.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Using “ordeal mechanisms” Consider two types of individuals –
hard-working but low-ability individuals, and lazy but high-ability individuals.
Although some characteristics, like education, are correlated with ability but only imperfectly.
If the system was set up such that high-ability, lazy individuals find the system unattractive, they self-select out of welfare.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Using “ordeal mechanisms” Work or training requirements of TANF are
an example of such a mechanism – they impose a cost on lazy individuals who are just using welfare as a means of increasing their leisure.
The provision of in-kind benefits rather than cash is another example. If the government gives away cash, then individuals who are not needy will pretend to be needy to qualify. If the government offers, instead, a somewhat run-down public housing project, those with high ability may not be interested in taking up the benefit.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Using “ordeal mechanisms” The efficiency problem is that non-needy
individuals might masquerade as needy in order to qualify for benefits.
If the government provides a benefit that is not attractive to the non-needy, they won’t pursue this masquerade and targeting will be more efficient.
The paradox of ordeal mechanisms is therefore that apparently making the less able worse off actually makes them better off, because the government can make a fixed budget go further.
An example ofAn example ofordeal mechanismsordeal mechanisms
Ordeal mechanisms suggest a rationale for “stigmatizing” welfare programs. For example: Food stamps that are redeemed in
public at a supermarket. Waiting in lines at public welfare
offices.
Applicati
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An example ofAn example ofordeal mechanismsordeal mechanisms
Consider the following “soup kitchen” example. Imagine that there are two types, low (l) and high (h) ability, and they enjoy soup (S) but dislike waiting in line for it (W).
The low ability person’s utility function is:U S WL 240
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An example ofAn example ofordeal mechanismsordeal mechanisms
The high ability person’s utility function is:
Thus the high ability person gets less utility from each serving of soup, and more disutility from waiting in line.
U S WH 120 2
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An example ofAn example ofordeal mechanismsordeal mechanisms
Further, imagine that the SWF is utilitarian, and that the government has 2 bowls of soup to allocate.
If the waiting time was W=0, both would want the soup, and if it were divided evenly, societal welfare would be:U UL H 240 120 360
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onon
An example ofAn example ofordeal mechanismsordeal mechanisms
If the waiting time was such that W=61, then the high ability person would not wait in line for 1 bowl of soup, but the low ability person would.
Thus, both bowls of soup go to the low ability person, and societal welfare equals: U UL H 240 240 61 0 419
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An example ofAn example ofordeal mechanismsordeal mechanisms
Overall, social welfare has risen because those masquerading stop trying to collect the soup.
Making the low-ability person wait in line raise both his utility and social welfare.
This occurs because the gains from efficient targeting outweigh the costs of the ordeal mechanism in this case.
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Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Increasing outside options The third approach to reducing moral
hazard is to increase the outside options available so that it is no longer as attractive to be on welfare.
Consider Figure 6Figure 6, which raises wage rates.
2,000 Hours of leisureper year
$ of consumptionper year
25,000
G = 9,000
A
B
C
D
Y1
1,200
10,000
slope = -wage = -12.50
35,000 E
slope = -wage = -17.50
F
Y212,250
1,300 1,486Figure 6
Higher wages rotate the budget
constraint outward.
And reduce the “breakeven” level
for eligibility.
Individuals will adjust their hours. Person Y no longer goes onto welfare.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Increasing outside options There are five different approaches the
government can take to increase outside opportunities for welfare recipients: Training Labor market subsidies Child care Child support Removing welfare lock
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Increasing outside options The traditional approach to increasing
outside opportunities is training welfare recipients. Most recipients have low skills.
Empirical evidence suggests training programs lead to modest declines in welfare receipts and increase earnings. Yet they cannot induce sizable reductions in the welfare rolls.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Increasing outside options Another approach is to directly
subsidize wages. One fairly expensive, broad approach is
the Earned Income Tax Credit. An alternative is targeted wage
subsidies to those on welfare. This runs into the problem that it does not help those who are reluctant to go on welfare, and could also have “entry” effects for those who did not intend to go on welfare.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Increasing outside options A third approach is to subsidize
childcare costs. This raises the net wage in the previous
figures. Regulation of quality of childcare
providers usually goes hand-in-hand with subsidies, however. This could push individuals into unregulated forms of childcare, which may be detrimental to children.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Increasing outside options A fourth approach is fully enforcing child
support obligations of absent fathers. Child support is a court-ordered payment
from an absent parent to support the upbringing of their children.
Only half of court-ordered payments are actually made. As a result, women are unable to leave welfare
because they cannot finance consumption with their earnings alone.
Child support rules have become much more stringent over time.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Increasing outside options The key problem is that many of these
non-paying fathers are poor as well, so there is not much money that can be collected.
In addition, the welfare system essentially taxes these payments at 100%, creating a disincentive for women on welfare to help track down deadbeat dads.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Increasing outside options Finally, cash welfare is often linked
with other programs, most prominently, Medicaid health insurance.
Until the mid-1980s, Medicaid was restricted to those on AFDC cash welfare. Leaving welfare entailed the entire loss of the health insurance.
Figure 7Figure 7 shows what the disincentive looked like.
2,000 Hours of leisureper year
$ of consumptionper year
25,000
slope = -net wage = -6.25
560
9,000
slope = -wage = -12.50 HI = $3,000
Cash = $9,000
slope = -net wage = -6.2518,000
21,000
A
C
B
E
F
D
Figure 7
Medicaid is offered on an “all-or-
nothing” basis.
This creates a “notch” in the
budget constraint.
Reducing the moral hazard of welfare
Increasing outside options The discontinuous loss of Medicaid is
known as the Medicaid “notch” – where the marginal tax rate on earnings is far in excess of 100%.
Uncoupling health insurance from cash welfare could therefore lead to exits from cash welfare.
Empirical evidence is mixed on the actual effects.
WELFARE REFORMChanges due to welfare
reform The 1996 legislation, PRWORA, made
many changes to the welfare system. These include: Block grants to states rather than open
ended entitlements. Greater freedom for states to
experiment with program rules. Time limited benefits. Work requirements. New efforts to limit unwed motherhood.
Welfare reformEffects of the 1996 welfare
reform As illustrated earlier, welfare caseloads
fell dramatically: On a national basis, caseloads fell more
than 50%. Some states experienced reductions of
more than 80%. Empirical evidence suggests one-third
of the decline was from welfare reform, but other factors, like the growing economy, also played an important role.
Welfare reformEffects of the 1996 welfare
reform Welfare reform was a windfall to the
states, because their block grant was based on welfare expenditure in 1994, when caseloads were very high.
Some states used the windfall to subsidize pro-work policies, like subsidized childcare.
Welfare reformEffects of the 1996 welfare
reform A key question about welfare reform is
how it affected the income and well being of single mothers.
Most single mothers have not seen a drop in their consumption – there was a large increase in labor supply at the same time that caseloads were declining.
Some subgroups, mainly low skilled single mothers, have suffered a decline, however.
Welfare reformEffects of the 1996 welfare
reform Was welfare reform a success?
They have reduced the welfare rolls without lowering incomes of single mothers.
Yet, success in the long run also depends on: The distribution of income, not just the
average. The reduction in utility from reduced leisure. Whether the block grants will work well
during recessions. The long run effects on children in these
families.