Public Sector Compensation Scheme 2013 Public Sector Pensions Authority Consultation.
Chapter 12: Public Pensions
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Transcript of Chapter 12: Public Pensions
Chapter 12: Public Pensions
Historically, the elderly had their needs provided for by their families, however in modern society this has changed, and elderly care has fallen on society
Retirement income is broken into 3 categories:Old Age Security Program ($29 billion in 05-06,
financed out of government revenue)Pension Plans ($32.8 billion in 05-06, financed by
payroll taxes on employees and employers)RPP and RRSP ($57.7 billion, covered in
Economics of Taxation)
Chapter 12: Public Pensions
Why Public PensionsEffects of Public PensionsOld Age Security ProgramCanada Pension PlanConclusion
Why Public PensionsThe justification for publicly provided retirement
income include the “usual suspects”:PaternalismRedistribution Adverse selection
As well as pension-specific justifications:The Samaritan’s dilemma
PaternalismThe government pay provide public retirement
income due to a sense of paternalism arising from 2 sources:
1)People who don’t plan for the future (due to nearsightedness or high discount factors)
2)People who inaccurately plan for the future (not considering future costs or inflation)
One may still ask if it is right for the government to force saving for old age
RedistributionOld Age Security Program has redistributive elements
because:
1)It is funded out of taxes, which are redistributive
2)Old Age Pension has a clawback
3)The Guaranteed Income Supplement is a NIT This setup is preferable to welfare because:
1)The elderly have unique characteristics which are best met by a unique plan
2)Income support through a “pension” is less stigmatic than collecting welfare
3)Intergenerational redistribution is allowed for (if one generation is in a recession and the next is well off)
The Samaritan’s DilemmaSociety wants to take care of the elderly, BUT, if
a young person knows he will be taken care, of, he has an incentive NOT to save for the future.
The Canada Pension Plan, RPP, and RRSP portion of Retirement Income, through required payroll contributions, forces individuals to work towards their retirement income somewhat.
Perhaps the Old Age Security Program still suffers slightly from this attitude
1976-1991 Monthly Labor Force Flows, in 1000’s.
Unemployment in Canada
Labour force participation rate – labour force as a percentage of working age populationAverage 64.8% between 1976-1991
Employment rate – employment as a percentage of working age populationAverage 59% between 1976-1991
Unemployment rate – unemployment as a percentage OF LABOR FORCE
-Note that discouraged workers are not considered to be in the labor force
Unemployment in Canada
Unemployment depends on:People who lose their jobs and look for a new
onePeople who find jobsUnemployed who drop out of labor force
(discouraged workers, students, homemakers)People who enter labour force and look for
work
“TRUE” UNEMPLOYMENT?
Should discouraged workers be considered?Are some unemployed actually looking for
work?How do we take workers who want more hours
into account? (partially unemployed)There are even difficulties in definition
Labour Market T
rends
Labour Market TrendsLabour participation and employment rate has
increased, due to dramatic increase in participation rate of married females
These rates have fluctuated with the economy and the unemployment rate
Unemployment Trends
-Canadian unemployment has increased since the 1950’s (4.2%)
-This unemployment has been decreasing since 1995
-Note the US-Can gap
Provincial Unemployment
-Note that duration of unemployment can be as significant than unemployment rate
Demographic Unemployment
Unemployment notes-in 2005, percentage of unemployed that
remained unemployed for a year are:
Canada: 9.6% US: 11.8%
France: 42.5% Germany: 54%
-Men had higher unemployment, but for a shorter time
-Younger people have higher unemployment
-Less education is correlated with higher unemployment
Why Employment Insurance?Two key reasons lie behind government provision
of employment insurance:
1)Market Failure (moral hazard, adverse selection, economic cycles)
2)Income Redistribution
Market Failure – Adverse SelectionSome people (young males without high
school) have higher unemployment and therefore higher demand for employment insurance
This results in high premiums…Which results in unappealing insurance for low
risk individuals…Which raises premiums even higher
Government insurance avoids adverse selection by offering premiums based on AVERAGE expected loss to EVERYONE
Market Failure – Moral HazardEmployers can fire their workers, deciding
whether they use employment insuranceUnemployed can lengthen their unemployment
time, affecting the amount of EI they receive
Government insurance can’t eliminate Moral Hazard, but it limits it through:
Offering no EI for the first few weeks of unemployment
Only paying a portion of employed earningsSimilar to a deductible in typical insurance
Market Failure – Econ. CyclesDuring a recession, employment insurance
claims riseDuring an expansion, employment insurance
claims fall
The government is better equipped to borrow and save to weather these movement
EI and Income RedistributionEI naturally redistributes wealth from those who
don’t suffer employment loss to those who doSince some people have claims more often and
longer claims, there is even more redistribution
IS Employment Insurance good as an income redistribution program?There are those who agree…(next slide)There are those who disagree…(2 slides hence)
EI and Income Redistribution YESEmployment Insurance supplements social
assistancePeople receiving EI may not need welfare programs
Some argue that Employment Insurance has less of a work disincentive than typical welfareThere is no implicit tax rate on earningsEI requires a certain level of work, and therefore is
similar to “workfare” (Osberg, 1995)
EI helps those who normally have employment while social assistance helps those who have limited ability to be self-supporting
EI and Income Redistribution NOEmployment Insurance does a poor job of
redistributing income to the poorPeople in equal positions are not treated equally
(horizontal equity)Tax burdens are not distributed fairly across people
with different abilities to pay (vertical equity)
Employment Insurance causes major labour market distortions (firms and workers)
EI History – 1930’s1933 – 25% unemployment, 15% “on relief”
“On relief” largely covered by provincial and municipal governments
1935 social insurance program ruled ultra vires; outside the federal government’s jurisdiction
1867 Constitution Act amended (by federal and provincial governments) to allow for federal unemployment insurance
EI History –1940’s and 1950’s1940 Unemployment Insurance Act
Covered jobs with MODERATE risk of unemployment (not high or low risk) 42% of labour force
50% of wage benefits, plus 15% if marriedlasting for 1/5 of days worked in last 5 years, minus
1/3 of days already claimed in last 3 years
1950’s – UI extended to seasonal workers and “self-employed” fishermen
EI History –1971 Reforms1971 Unemployment Insurance Act (Bill C-229)
Covered 93% of labor force (including self-employed)
Minimum eligibility – 8 weeks of workBenefit 66% of wage, 75% with dependents
Had a maximum insurable earnings levelSickness and maternity benefits increasedDuration linked to weeks worked in qualifying period
Increased when national unemployment exeeded 4%Increased when regional unemployment exceeded
national by 1-3% (regional extended benefits)
EI History –1971 Reform ImpactUnemployment was constant between 1971
and 1972, yet:People covered: 5.4 million to 7.8 millionWeeks of benefits: 22.6 million to 30.5 millionAverage weekly payment: $40.28 to $61.79Expenditure more than tripled:
$0.59 billion to $1.87 billion
Expenditure rose from 0.8% of GNP in 1971 to 2.1% in 1975
EI History –1975 ReformsThose who quit or were fired from misconduct
couldn’t claim for 6 weeks (up from 3)Age limit reduced to 65 years (from 70)75% dependent coverage eliminated (all 66%)
Increased benefits became linked to an 8 year moving average, instead of 4% trigger
EI History –1977 ReformsNew entrants, re-entrants to labor force and
people with repeated claims needed more weeks of employment to qualifyExemptions for repeat claimants in high-
unemployment regions
Benefits reduced to 60% of wage (from 66%)High income earners clawed back at 30% in net
income was 1.5 times maximum insurable earnings
EI History –1980’sUnemployment went from 7.6% (1981) to
11.9% (1983)Benefits rose from $4.76 billion to $10.1 billionMacdonald Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (1985) concluded:UI increased unemployment rates since 1971Income redistribution should be replaced by a NIT
The commission was opposed by Altantic Canada and labor movement and was never adopted
EI History –1980’s1989 Bill C-21 did some changes:
UI funds could be used for training, relocation assistance, and other employment measures
This was meant to fight long-term unemploymentRepeat users no longer had different qualification
provisionsUI became entirely funded by employer and
employee contributions (no general fund government funding) (as of 1991-1992)
EI History –1990’sUnemployment rose to 11.3%, causing an UI
deficitGovernment increased employee and employer
contributionsThis may have lead to more lay-offs
1993 benefits reduced to 57% (from 60%)Those who quit without just cause became ineligible
for UI benefits
EI History –1990’s1994 – UI eligibility in high unemployment
regions increased to 12 weeks (from 10)20 weeks was required in other regions
Benefits could last from 17 to 50 weeks depending on weeks worked and regional unemployment
Benefit reduced to 55% (from 57%)But raised to 60% for low-income recipients with
dependents
Employee contributions increased again
EI History –1996 Reforms1996 Employment Insurance Act eligibility:
Eligibility based on HOURS of last 52 weeks420-700, depending on unemployment rate910 hours for new entrants to labor force and
those entering after 2 years600 hours for sickness, maternity, or parental
benefitsFishing benefits depend on earnings in a fishing
season ($2500 to $4200 depending on regional unemployment)
This change took part time work and seasonal work into account much better
EI History –1996 Reforms Benefits55% of insurable earnings, to a maximum of
$39,000 (reduced from $42,380)This has held constant, allowing a maximum $413
payment per weekLow-income claimants with children can get a
Family Supplement to increase their benefits to 80% (family income less than $25,921)
Incomes exceeding $48,750 repay 30% of benefits2 week waiting periodCoverage time depends on hours of work and
regional unemployment rate Week limits for maternity, sickness, and paternal
Labour Market Effects of EIMoral Hazard problems exist if:
a) An insured individual can affect the probability and magnitude of a loss and
b) This changing behaviour is unobservableMoral Hazard doesn’t focus on those who
abuse and cheat the systemMoral Hazard can apply to both employers and
employees
Labour Market Effects of EISome studies (Grubel et al. 1975) found that an
increase in EI generosity increased the unemployment rate
But other studies (Corak 1994) found no aggregate effect (but he allowed for non-aggregate effects)
Other factors affect the unemployment rate aside from EI
Labour Market Effects of EIThe labour market effects of the Canadian
Employment Insurance System can be divied into:
1)Direct Effects (layoffs, quits, duration of employment, labour force participation)
2)Systemic Effects (industrial mix, labour mobility, education)
3)Macroeconomic Effects (automatic stabilizing effects)
Direct EffectsUnemployment is caused by:
1)Seasonal variations in demand
2)Business cycle fluctuations in demand
3)Long term trends in the economy
EI is aimed at the second cause. Seasonal layoffs are predictable and therefore
not an insurance riskTrends require retraining or moving, not
temporary income replacement
Direct Effects - LayoffsFrom 1980 to 1988,
58% of lost jobs were permanent layoffs 21% temporary layoffs21% quitting (Baker et al, 1996)
When a firm needs to cut costs, including labour, it can reduce hours or lay offWith EI, laying (which has EI support) off is more
attractive than reducing hours (which has no EI support)
Therefore EI encourages layoffs
Some firms (incl. gov.) may design job length according to minimum EI work requirements
Direct Effects - QuitsPrior to 1993, workers who quit got UI in
Canada but not the states, resulting in:Equal job quitting in Canada and the US20.6 weeks average unemployment in Canada11.2 weeks average unemployment in US
(Baker et al, 1996)
If EI applies to quitters, the unemployment rate is increased by longer job searches
Direct Effects – Unemployment Duration
Better EI benefits can lengthen the time people spend looking for “the perfect job”This increases the unemployment rate
BUTThis extra time spent searching can lead to a
better fitThis leads to better labour market performanceThis leads to lower job turnoverThis decreases the unemployment rate
Direct Effects – Labor Force Participation
All workers pay the same EI premiums, but marginal workers who are often unemployed benefit moreTherefore marginal workers are encouraged to join
the labour force by better EI benefitsIf the number of jobs is constant, this increases
unemployment
Sharis and Kuch (1978) found EI increased the labor force, especially among married females
Systemic Effects– Industrial Mix
EI Premiums vary with wageThis relationship doesn’t vary among industries
Premiums are NOT based on expected EI benefits or layoff likelihoodThis does vary among industries
This causes seasonal jobs and small firms to gain more benefits that they pay in
EI therefore subsidizes seasonal and volatile work by taxing stable employment
(See table in future slide)
Benefit-Tax Ratios 2004
High=More Benefits than Premiums
Systemic Effects– Labor Mobility
EI provides greater support to industries and provinces with higher unemployment rates
EI gives Unemployed workers the support to move to a lower-unemployment area and find a job, increasing labor mobility
BUTEI also DECREASES the income gain from
moving, decreasing labor mobilityStudies are inconclusive, plus 70% of people
change provinces for non-work reasons
Benefit-Tax Ratios 2004
High=More Benefits than Premiums
Systemic Effects– Education
If EI is generous, there is a greater opportunity cost to stay in school instead of entering the workforce (especially in seasonal industries)
In the 1970’s many young people in rural Atlantic Canada chose a “pogey”/Employment Insurance lifestyle over education
Yet in 1991, a greater percentage of young people in Atlantic Canada attended university than the national average.
Macroeconomic Effects –Automatic Stabilization Effects
If EI benefits paid out increase and total premiums decrease in a recession AND
EI premium incomes increase and benefits paid out decrease during a boom THEN
EI acts as an automatic economy stabilizerThis does seem to occur in the recessions of the
early 1980’s and the early 1990’s and the boom of the later 1980’s BUT
EI structure has changed over time (especially increasing premiums and disallowing long-term deficits), reducing this effect
EI Revenue Minus Expenditure
Distributional Effects of Employment Insurance
Like many government programs, EI can have a variety of distributional effects, which can be divided into:
1)Distribution of Benefits
2)Financing
3)Regional Redistribution
4)Experience-Rated Premiums
5)Coverage
Distributional Effects – Distribution of Benefits
In the following slide, we see that individuals with income between $10K and $25k make only 31.6% of the labour force but make up 50.5% of claimantsEI does have redistributed effect
BUT
Higher incomes receive higher benefits (often even after clawbacks)
EI often doesn’t affect lowest-income households (disabled, single parents, part-time workers, etc.)
Distributional Effects – Distribution of Benefits
Distributional Effects – Financing
2006 Premiums are $1.87 for employees and $2.62 for employers (per $100) up to a maximum insurable earnings of $39,000Premiums are effectively a “payroll tax”
Studies show EI burden often falls on the employees (as opposed to employers)
Since very low (don’t work) and very high (many investments) income earners often are less a part of EI, its financing has only limited, imperfect optimal income redistribution
Distributional Effects – Regional Redistribution
EI tends to redistribute income from West to East (Quebec and Atlantic)
EI also therefore redistributes income to primary industries (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and trapping) and construction from other industries
EI violates horizontal equity (equal treatment of equals), since two identical people in different unemployment regions have different minimum work requirements
Distributional Effects – Experience-Rated Premiums
In the US, employers who lay off frequently have higher premiums (similar to auto insurance and high-risk drivers)
In Canada, this would mean higher premiums in industries such as construction,
therefore lower wagesLower premiums other industries, therefore higher
wages
BUTSome low wage jobs have high layoff rates
Distributional Effects – Experience-Rated Premiums
Experience-rated premiums tend to DECREASE unemployment, as firms have a penalty for layoffsHigh layoff industries would contract as low layoff
industries would increase
Unemployment would increase short term as workers move from high to low layoff industries
Quebec and Atlantic Canada have many high layoff industries, and would greatly suffer
Distributional Effects – Coverage (2005 Table)
EI covered 43.4% of unemployedGov. claims EI covers 80% of target; it is not meant to
cover some categories
Employment Insurance Conclusion
EI has Insurance and Income Redistribution characteristics (based on loss and need)
Insurance Characteristics:Only contributors are covered Higher income have higher loses therefore higher
benefits
Income Redistribution CharacteristicsLow-income benefit enhanced through Family
supplementHigh-income benefits are clawed back
Employment Insurance Conclusion
Problem of Insurance and Income RedistributionBalancing two goals may prevent doing either goal
wellPerhaps there should be 2 separate programs?But even 2 separate programs would interact
EI reforms (such as hour-based eligibility) have been improvements, but issues and tensions remain even after over 25 years
Chapter 11 Conclusion
Unemployment has increased since 1950, with fluctuations
Unemployment insurance has been essential, but often seen as increasing unemploymentEI affects unemployment through impact on
layoffs, quits, employment duration, labor force participation, industrial mix, labor mobility, education, and automatic stabilization
EI is a government program due to insurance failure due to market failure and adverse selection
Chapter 11 Conclusion
EI has many income distribution effects:Transfers to primary industries and
constructionTransfers to Quebec and Atlantic Canada
In 1996, EI eligibility changed to hour-based
Changes over time have improved EI, but the tension between insurance and income redistribution remains