Chapter 11: Political Risk Keith Head Sauder School of Business UBC.

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Chapter 11: Political Risk Keith Head Sauder School of Business UBC

Transcript of Chapter 11: Political Risk Keith Head Sauder School of Business UBC.

Page 1: Chapter 11: Political Risk Keith Head Sauder School of Business UBC.

Chapter 11: Political Risk

Keith HeadSauder School of Business

UBC

Page 2: Chapter 11: Political Risk Keith Head Sauder School of Business UBC.

Take-away

• Political risk analysis is the attempt to predict tomorrow’s “hot spots” and then avoid them, insure against losses, or prepare to minimize loss through rapid exit.

• Political risk strategy follows a 4-step plan to influence host government actions.

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Analysis vs Strategy

• Analysis: When the actions of host governments are beyond the influence of individual firms, like the weather.– Risk is exogenous.

• Strategy: When the MNE’s actions have an important influence on the host government’s decisions.– Risk is endogenous.

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Responses to Exogenous Risk

• Forecast the “hot spots”* and avoid them.

• Invest in potential hot spots, but prepare in advance for rapid evacuation.

• Invest in potential hot spots, but insure investments against possible losses.

*Hot spot: an area of political, military, or civil unrest usually considered dangerous

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Questions re “On coups and coverage”

• Where do the dangers lie? Which countries are “hot spots”?Aon 2009 Risk Map

• What events can be insured against?• Who provides the insurance?• How common are disputes?• How common are payouts on claims?• Are all risks insurable?

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Insurable Risks

• expropriation• “non-repossession”• war and political violence• cancellation of operating licences• exchange transfer problems• import and export embargoes

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Case studies in Political Risk

• Metalclad in Mexico• Hugo Chavez and foreign firms in

Venezuela– Orinoco oil basin (ExxonMobil)– Sidor, the steel maker– banks

• Enron in India• Bre-X in Indonesia• Lithium in Bolivia

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Political Strategy: a 4-step plan

1. Understand host government’s objectives.

2. Catalogue host government’s policy options.

3. Calculate host government’s bargaining power.

4. Enhance the MNEs strategic position.

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1. What do host governments want from foreign investors?

• Capital inflow• Tax revenue• Job creation

– More jobs– Better jobs (high wages)

• “Improvement” in trade balance (net export outflow)

• Technology (intellectual capital) inflow

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2. How do governments get what they want from the MNE?• Jobs:

– minimum employment– restricted use of expatriates– incentives to choose backward areas

• Improved trade balance:– Export requirements– Domestic content requirements

• Technology transfer:– Forced use of local joint venture partners

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3. What gives a government the bargaining power to get what it

wants?• Uniquely valuable country

characteristics– A large, protected market– A scarce natural resource

• Investment decisions by the MNE that are irreversible (or very costly to reverse)

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4. How can the MNE improve its own strategic position?

• Make “friends” with powerful people• Strategic Delay

– MNE can punish host gov’t by cancelling investments that have not been done yet

– Holding back even when it is inefficient

• Make “credible threats”*– Invest in strategic alternatives– Build a reputation for toughness*credible threats: promised responses that are not bluffs,

the firm really will follow through.

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Is the MNE’s threat credible?

Approve$10m subsidy*

Deny$10m subsidy

Host Gov’t

MNE

Shut plant

Keep plant

MNEpayoff

Host Gov’tpayoff-5+10=5

-5

-15

17-10=7

17

Keep plant

0

-15 0Shut plant

*subsidy not paid if firm shuts plant

MNE

Page 14: Chapter 11: Political Risk Keith Head Sauder School of Business UBC.

Strategic alternatives make the threat credible

Approve$10m subsidy*

Deny$10m subsidy

Host Gov’t

MNE

Shut plant

Keep plant

MNEpayoff

Host Gov’tpayoff-5+10=5

-5

-15

17-10=7

17

Keep plant

0

-15 0Shut plant

*subsidy not paid if firm shuts plant

[-5=0]

[-5=-10]

[+10=-5]

[+10=-5]

MNE