Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253 March 2, 2007

FACTS

• Case is a petition for certoriari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed,with modifications, ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance anddamages filed by Lacap against RP

• Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and twoother contractors were pre-qualified

• Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain baranggay, andthereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and labor in connection with

• On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fountit 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH

• DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved final release of funds dueto Lacap’s license as contractor having expired

• Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that theContractors License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by acontractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract

• DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no paymentwas issued

• On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint for Specific Performance and Damagesagainst petitioner before the RTC.14

• On September 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed aMotion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of actionand that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action since respondent did notappeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove the claim.

• Following the submission of respondent’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss,the RTC issued anOrder dated March 11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.

• On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking the defenses of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of non-suability of the State

• Following trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 a decision ordering DPWH to payLacap for the contract of the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit

• CA affirmed the decision but lowered interest to 6%

ISSUE

WON a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects

RULING

A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does notexonerate him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:“

SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attemptsto submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in asupervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing alicense to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file thelicense certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof inobtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay afine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.

The "plain meaningrule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free fromambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into bya contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for paymentof the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Suchpayment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

People v Jabinal

Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was

entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

RULING:

Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

The appellant was acquitted.

Another source:

FACTS: In this case, petitioners Gauvain and Bernadita Benzonan want a review on the decision made by herein respondent Court of Appeals – sustaining the right of private respondent Pe to repurchase a parcel of land sold to petitioners. It started when respondent Pe was granted parcel of lands acquired through free patent, however, Pe then mortgaged the lot to DPB; developed it into commercial complex. Failed to pay the mortgaged, DBP foreclosed the lot; Pe leased it to DBP; the former failed to redeem such property within one year period; DBP sold it to petitioners Benzonan. Then Pe filed a complaint to repurchase. The RTC and CA affirmed and granted the claim to repurchase. Petitioners filed a complaint against CA, alledging, among other issues, that the latter erred in its decision re. the five-year period in foreclosure sale by not relying on the doctrine in Monge v. Angeles and instead relied on the ruling in Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court which was applied retroactively. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in its decision regarding the foreclosure sale by not applying the doctrinal law ruled in Monge v. Angeles and instead

applied retroactively the ruling in the case Belisario v. IAC?

HELD: Yes.

REASONING:

At the time of the foreclosure sale issue, the prevailing jurisprudence was still the Monge case, hence, it is the doctrine that should be applied in the case at bar. However, the respondent court applied the rulings in Belisario case in 1988 thereby rendering a decision in favor of the private respondent. But the Supreme Court sustained the claims of the petitioners. The Court said that though they are bound by decisions pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code, the Court also stressed that: “while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which states that “laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided””. Moreover, the Court emphasized that “when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied PROSPECTIVELY xxx.” Therefore, respondents cannot rely on the Belisario ruling because it should be applied prospectively and not the contrary. CA erred in its decision regarding this case. Wherefore, such decision was reversed and set aside.