Challenges in restoring fiscal sustainability Federal Planning Bureau 27 October 2009 Jørgen...
-
Upload
franklin-combes -
Category
Documents
-
view
215 -
download
1
Transcript of Challenges in restoring fiscal sustainability Federal Planning Bureau 27 October 2009 Jørgen...
Challenges in restoring fiscal sustainability
Federal Planning Bureau 27 October 2009
Jørgen ElmeskovActing Chief Economist
Economics Department
Outline
1. The contours of the fiscal consolidation
challenge
2. What experience tells us about ways to
consolidate
Synchronisation and international spilloversimply negative demand effects
Fiscal consolidation equivalent to 1% of own-country GDP
Note: Own country” effect corresponds to the own country multiplier weighted by the country’s share in OECD GDP. The “spillover“ is calculated as the effect of other OECD countries consolidation on own-country GDP as a share of the total GDP effect on that country when all OECD countries consolidate at the same time
Source: OECD Global model.
Source of change:
Impact of change on:Total OECD
Of which “own
country”1
United States
JapanEuro area
GDP effects, % differences from baseline: 2011
United States -0.9 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.3Japan 0.0 -0.8 0.0 -0.2 -0.1Euro area -0.1 -0.1 -0.8 -0.3 -0.2OECD -1.2 -1.3 -1.1 -1.1Spillover as % of own-country effect 26% 54% 32%
Policy rates have been cut to very low levels
Source: US Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, European Central Bank.
Per cent
Higher government debt tends to raise long-term interest rates
Spread between long-term and short-term interest rates versus gross government debt in % of GDP
Note: Bars represent average across all OECD countries for which data are available over the period 1994 to 2008. Short-term interest rates are typically rates on 3-month Treasury bills and long-term interest rates those on 10-year government bonds.
Source: OECD.
Strong signalling of commitment is needed
Various commitment devices to raise credibility:
₋ Reform pension/health system now₋ Little up-front demand impact₋ Had to be done anyway – hence signalling rather than
paying for crisis
₋ Fiscal rules₋ Empirical evidence: rules are associated with
consolidation success₋ But causality is not so clear₋ (Re-)establishing credibility after the crisis may be hard
₋ Fiscal transparency
The shape of consolidation affects its outcome
Source: based on Guichard et al. (2007).
Share of primary current expenditure cut in the primary balance adjustment
Size of adjustment(percentage point)
Probability to reach a primary balance that stabilises debt
Share of social spending cut in the primary balance adjustment
Arguments why the shape of consolidation could matter
• Why is consolidation more likely to succeed if based on (social) spending cuts?
• Signal of determination
• Avoids potentially inflationary tax hikes• Allows monetary policy accommodation• Empirical evidence: accommodation seems to increase
choice of successful consolidation
• The findings could be spurious
Raising public sector efficiency
Potential gains from moving to national best practiceSaving in teaching staff for unchanged output
Source: Sutherland et al. (2007)
Per cent
Effect of a drop in the NAIRU by 1 percentage point on financial balance
Source: OECD
Percentage point of nominal GDP
Ranking of tax in terms of their negative effect on long-term growth
More distortiveCorporate tax
Personal income tax
Consumption tax (and other property tax)
Tax on immovable propertyLess distortive
A glimmer of hope?
• Fiscal consolidation is more likely when the fiscal situation is bad.
• It is also more likely to succeed when initiated in a bad fiscal and economic situation.