Challenges for JMSDF after the Post-Cold War Era ...In this Chapter, the authors study these changes...

JJMSDF Staff College Review Volume 2 English version (Selected)

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Challenges for JMSDF after the Post-Cold War Era

SUGIMOTO Yoichi, HIRAYAMA Shigetoshi INOUE Takashi, USHIROGATA Keitaro

Introduction – Anchors aweigh – “Annual Report on the Japanese Economy in 1956” (subtitled “Growth of Japanese Economy and Its Modernization”) issued in July 1956 stated in its conclusion that “Japan is no longer in the post-war period1.” A half century has passed since “the post-war period” was over, and more than 20 years since the Cold War era – in which the world feared a collision of East and West – was ended. We expected that new, peaceful days would come “after the end of the Cold War.” However, as Hubert Vedrine said, what we saw in the post-Cold War period was the blast of ethnic conflicts and religious disputes which had been contained in the international community in the Cold War period, and the reality was that “in globalized world, terrorism is also global2.” Although in the Cold War era there was the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the “balance of power” of the two superpowers worked really well and a variety of international systems to support the stability of the polarized world were developed in this period3. Right now it is the transition that the mono-polar world led by the United States after the end of the Cold War changes to the multi-polar world. The multi-polar world that human beings had experienced in the past few centuries was the world where the neighboring powers located on the western edge of the “World Island,” which was called Europe, had contested with each other. However, the multi-polar world that we now live in is the globalized world where human beings are mutually dependent although they live under different political systems and have different values because of a variety of different races and religions. This is the first

1 The Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on the Japanese Economy 1956, Printing

Bureau of the Ministry of Finance of Japan, 1956. 2 Huvert Vedrine, History strikes back, Brookings institution press, 2008, pp. 17-18 3 Tetsuya Umemoto, The US Global Strategy and the International Order, Minerva-shobo, 2010, p. 21.


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experience in the world history. It is impossible to give a firm answer to the question of what international order can work in this new multi-polar world and if the balance of power, for example, can function as it worked in Europe in the past. We are now in the midst of change where the “complication of an interconnected global environment where economic power, access to resources, and cutting edge technologies are redefining national power4.” And, the speed of change is being ever accelerated. Let’s turn our eyes to Japan. Japan is the sixth largest maritime nation in the world with a total of approximately 4.47 million square kilometers of territorial waters and exclusive economic zone5. As Japan is surrounded by waters in all directions, 99.7% of total tonnage of imports and exports is transported by ocean shipping. As Japan’s lifeline, shipping is of paramount importance for Japan to support its economy and its citizens’ life6. Marine container cargo movement of Japan amounts to about 12% of the world’s total volume. Thus, Japan’s shipping business supports amenities of the world’s life7 . Peace and stability of vast water areas and enormously long sea lanes for Japan’s shipping cannot be maintained only by Japan’s own efforts, but by a variety of international schemes, such as the Japan-US alliance, and many countries’ international contributions. However, as Kyoichi Tachikawa pointed out, it is actually the case that “Japan is not very conscious of the fact that it enjoys the benefits of today’s stable international order, nor is it well aware of how such order is established and maintained8.” On the other hand, Eiichi Funada mentioned that “the Gulf War and the 4 Juan Zarate, “Playing a New Geoeconomic Game” 2012 Global Forecast, CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/2012-global-forecast (Last access date: May 9, 2012). 5 Total size of territorial waters and exclusive economic zone of Japan is about twelve times larger than its land territory. Its coastline is about 35 thousand kilometers long (equivalent to 88% of the earth’s circumference), and it is the sixth longest in the world. 6 Annual Marine Report in 2011, Maritime Bureau of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2011, http://www.mlit.go.jp/maritime/kaijireport/kairepo10.html (Last access date: May 21, 2012). 7 The Japanese Shipowners’ Association, “SHIPPING NOW” p. 2, http://www.jsanet.or.jp/data/pdf/shippingnow2012a.pdf (Last access date: October 1, 2012). 8 Kyoichi Tachikawa, “Sea Power,” Kyoichi Tachikawa, et al. (Eds.), Sea Power – Its Theory and Practice –, Fuyo Shobo Press, 2008, p. 57.


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detachment of the minesweeping squadron of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) after the end of the Gulf War were the real turning point of the security policy of Japan. Japan has learnt from a series of these events that in the post-Cold War era a regional conflict even in a very remote area may pose a threat to Japan’s safety and that in some situations Japan may be required to utilize its defense capacity in order to protect its own interest and the interest of the international society9.” Thus, the view of Japanese citizens on maritime security is changing, and this change reflects the expansion of roles of JMSDF. During the periods after the end of the Cold War and after the end of the post-Cold War era, JMSDF has been expanded its role of conventional “defense of Japan” to conduct various activities for regional stabilization, and cooperation for antiterrorist measures, etc. In response to the demands of the times, JMSDF has carried out a variety of missions and navy men and women on site have dedicated their efforts. International situations are still uncertain and the conflicts with neighboring countries over the territory become more than mere diplomatic issues. These situations cause problems in maritime security and generate sources of discord. High expectations are placed on JMSDF in these situations. In the paper contributed to the JMSDF’s periodical “Hatou10” in 2008 titled “Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in the New Maritime Era11 ,” RADM Tomohisa Takei, then-Director General of Operation and Planning Department, Maritime Staff Office, JMSDF, presented the objectives of JMSDF to cope with the international situations at the time and the directions to which JMSDF should go to achieve such objectives. The objectives and the measures to achieve them proposed in Takei (2008) remain to be thought-provoking even in light of the today’s international situations. However, the international situations have

9 Eiichi Funada, “Sea Power and the Japan-US Defense Cooperation,” Kyoichi Tachikawa, et al. (Eds.), Sea Power – Its Theory and Practice –, Fuyo Shobo Press, 2008, p. 298. 10 Hatau is a periodical of a group of people in JMSDF studying art of war. Purpose of the club is to “contribute to improvement of members’ knowledge in art of warfare and relevant general knowledge in broad areas including strategies, tactics, logistics, command and control, history of warfare, operations and tasks.” 11 Tomohisa Takei, “Japan Maritime Self Defense Force in the New Maritime Era”, Hatou, Vol. 34, No. 4, November 2008, pp. 2-29 Please refer to the following URL to see the full text of this paper: http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/topics-column/images/c-030/c-030_eng.pdf


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slightly changed from those written in Takei (2008), and such changes are proven by several examples, such as an advance of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) into the oceans backed by the significant expansion of China’s military forces, the Great East Japan Earthquake, and new defense strategy of the United States (“Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” in January 2012), etc. Therefore, it is the fact that JMSDF is required to establish new strategic concepts with broader perspective for the future. Takei (2008) stated that “For fellow ‘Hatou’ readers, consider the future of JMSDF using this paper as a trigger for future discussion12.” This paper is intended to give an answer to Takei’s request four years ago. In this paper, the authors would like to consider how the Japan’s maritime defense should be in the new, significantly changing security environment. For this purpose, we first study the interdependent and globalized world order with diversified values which human beings have never experienced and the future security environment that Japan will face. Then, we will consider future vision of the Japan’s maritime defense. Chapter 1: Challenges to the conventional ideas of international

community and changes in the concept of international community Fareed Zakaria stated that “There have been three tectonic power shift over the last five hundred years, fundamental changes in the distribution of power that have reshaped international life – its politics, economics, and culture. The first was the rise of Western world, a process that began in the fifteenth century and accelerated dramatically in the late eighteenth century. The second shift, which took place in the closing years of the nineteenth century, was the rise of the United States. We are now living through the third great power shift of modern era. It could be called ‘the rise of the rest’13.” It is no wonder that our conventional ideas of international situations would be changing when the significant changes as are described by Zakarai would be happening in the world.

12 Ibid., p. 28. 13 Fareed Zakaria, The post-American world, W.W.Norton, 2009, pp. 1-2.


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In this Chapter, the authors study these changes focusing on “actors,” “location of activities” and “actions,” which are the elements of international community. (1) Re-emergence of sovereign states After the end of the Cold War, international institutions, such as the United Nations and non-state actors represented mainly by NGOs (non-governmental organizations) come under the spotlight in terms of their active roles in restoration of peace in the failed states. Jessica T. Mathews stated in 1997 that “They (national governments) are sharing powers – including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty – with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The steady concentration of power in the hand of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while14.” Akihiko Tanaka developed a hypothesis about the characteristics of international politics described above and called it as “new medievalism.” The reason for this name is resemblance between the European Middle Ages before modern times and the contemporary world. In the former period, Europe was constituted not only by the Holy Roman Empire and other kingdoms but also by civil bodies, such as principalities, chivalric orders, city-states and leagues of towns, as well as religious bodies, such as the Roman Catholic Church, the Bishops and religious orders, all of which had extremely complex relationships with each other. This situation is very similar to the contemporary world where many different kinds of non-state actors emerge including multinational corporations, inter-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, and very complex relationships are built up among sovereign states and non-state actors15. However, 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the reality of today is, as described by Joseph S. Nye, that “world government is not around the corner. And 14 Jessica Matthews, “Power Shift”, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1997, Vol. 76, p. 50. 15 Akihiko Tanaka, World Politics – Japan’s Diplomacy in Globalization, Chikuma-shobo, 2000, pp. 33-39.


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non-state actors present new challenges to government, they do not replace states16.” In other words, the world does not go in the direction that the power of sovereign states is transferred to non-state actors, such as international organizations, NGOs, etc. Rather, the international systems surpassing sovereign states become dysfunctional, and the roles of sovereign states as decision-makers and their importance as main actors of the international politics are positively re-valued. So, sovereign states are emerging again. (2) Challenge to freedom of navigation During the period of Pax Britannica, the British Empire controlled seas of the world, and it sought the freedom of navigation. In the period when the US Navy replaced the Royal Navy and is leading and controlling maritime activities, main roles of the US Navy and the naval forces of the West are to maintain the peace of the sea which facilitates free trade and to keep the international order of the sea in a way to promote the free market economy. The international order of the sea is being challenged today. For example, having successfully transformed it into the second largest economy in the world, China adopts its own interpretation of the law of the sea – very different from the conventional one – to restrict freedom of activities of foreign warships in China’s exclusive economic zone. China also makes its own allegation of sovereignty of the sea not in accordance with the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea. It claims the concept of “Ocean Territory,” under which China retains the sovereignty of the sea area as if it had exclusively “owned” such “ocean territory.” These are serious challenges to the freedom of navigation. However, no international system functions to make a judgment on these issues, and they are left to the negotiations between the countries concerned. As Kenneth N. Waltz mentioned, “National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation17.” Therefore, if a dispute over the “sea” – where the freedom of navigation might be threatened or the areas covered by the 16 Joseph S. Nye Jr., David Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: an introduction to theory and history (8th ed.), Longman, 2011, p.2 17 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, 2010, p. 113.


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sovereignty claims might be overlapping – cannot be solved through negotiation, there is a risk that it would be escalated into a conflict in the future. (3) Justice required Since ancient times, troops are required to be lethal. In the modern age, warfare is considered to be distinguished from needless slaughter and harm. Therefore, the law of armed conflicts is established and warfare must be legal under that law. In addition, it is considered that use of force is allowed only if the UN Security Council resolution is adopted. So, legitimacy becomes one of the indispensable requirements for military actions. At present in the 21st century, we are posed an additional challenge that warfare must look (morally) right. In other words, it is not sufficient in these days that our action is right, but it must be viewed to be right. In the theory of international relations, it has been thought that ethics have limitations in international relations. Nye and Welch mentioned four reasons for the limits on ethics in international relation as follows: “One is the weak international consensus on values. Second, states are not individuals. States are abstractions, and although their leaders are individuals, statesmen are judged differently than when they act as individuals.” “A third reason ethics plays a lesser role in international politics is the complexity of causation.” “Finally, there is the argument that the institutions of international society are particularly weak and that disjunction between order and justice is greater in international than domestic politics18.” However, as Michael Walzer pointed out, “justice has become, in all Western countries, one of the tests that any proposed military strategy or tactic has to meet19.” So, the ethical aspect is so important that no one can ignore it any more in the use of military force. Nowadays all the details of use of military force are reported by international media to everywhere across the world. In this situation, an “assertion to be made by the state that its use of military force is right” becomes increasingly important. The relation with media is as important as military 18 Nye, Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: an introduction to theory and history, pp. 22-23. 19 Michael Walzer, Arguing about war, Yale University Press, 2004, p. 12.


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combat. Actions taken by us must be reported by CNN, for example, that we are morally right. Otherwise, we may lose both domestic and international support and may spoil a good cause of war even though we win military battles. Walzer further pointed out in relation to the Gulf War that “(political) necessities were shaped in turn by the media coverage of the war – by the immediate access of the media to the battle and of people the world over to the media20.” He added that transmission of information through the Internet made it possible that “the media are omnipresent, and the whole world is watching21.” In relation to this point, the US President Bill Clinton issued the “President Decision Direction – PDD 6822” in April 1999 to address the problems identified during the military missions in Kosovo and Haiti. Under the PDD 68, the system is established to influence foreign audiences in support of US foreign policy and to counteract propaganda by enemies of the United States23. In 2001 when the anti-US sentiment was heightened in the Muslim countries which stemmed from the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the US Defense Science Board (DSB) set out the “strategic communications” (SC) for the first time in its report24. In order to avoid needless hostilities, the United States begins to take the strategy to disseminate accurate information of its strategic intention in an appropriate manner when it conducts military intervention in international conflicts. Nowadays, JMSDF is expected to broaden its range of activities along with the diversifications of the roles of the Japan Self-Defense Force. In such situation, it is the time for JMSDF to understand that it is required to pay careful attention to “strategic communications.”

20 Ibid., p. 11. 21 Ibid., p. 11. 22 Federation of American Scientists, International Public Information (IPI) Presidential Decision Directive PDD68, 30 April 1999, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm (Last access date: October 12, 2012). 23 Tetsuya Yano, “Development in the US Strategic Communication (SC) Policy,” NIDS Journal of Defense and Security, Vol. 13, No. 3, March 2011, p. 3. 24 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination, October 2001, pp. 2. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA396312.pdf (Last access date: October 12, 2012).


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Chapter 2: Overview of regional situations In order to figure out what the Japan’s maritime defense capacity should be in international situations where conventional ideas have been changing, it is important to understand the world of “today” and in the “future” in which Japan is situated. In this Chapter, we look over the regional situations surrounding Japan objectively. In doing so, first, we take a helicopter view of the entire world, and then, look into the current status and the future prospect of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the latter of which have more impact on Japan directly. (1) Trends in international situations Looking around today’s security environment surrounding Japan: in North Korea the extremely alien dictatorship of Kim Jong-un is being established; we have to tentatively accept domestically-oriented and diplomatically-unstable attitudes in some major countries including China, South Korea and the United States due to change in their leadership; Russia is modernizing its far-east military forces; and the United States cuts military expenditure and reviews its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. These are some of the various factors that will have a diversified impact on Japan’s fate in the coming decade or two. European countries are facing serious debt crisis, and it is unclear to what extent they can respond to the expectations of the United States that has reviewed its strategy and will cut military expenditure. In particular, the sharing of roles and responsibilities between the US and Europe for the stabilization in the Middle-East will have a direct link with the US military realignment which may define the level of the US present in the Asia-Pacific. This will have a direct consequence on the need of cost to be paid by Japan for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. So, we are required to pay careful attention to the relationship between the US and Europe. In addition, if the European Union will lift the arms embargo against China, this will have a significant impact on the military balance in the Asia-Pacific. In this respect, there seems to be a perception gap between the US and Europe on China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific and its impact on the regional security. So, this may affect Japan’s security environment significantly. Matsuzaki


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(2012) deals with this point in detail25. In the Middle-East, there are some countries which are politically unstable or suffer weak ruling power. Risks exist that those countries will turn into failed states or religious fundamentalists. There is also the risk that they will connect to international terrorist organizations. Concerning the Palestinian problem, George Ball pointed out that “One option is to settle, another is to fight, a third to let matters fester in a state that is neither war nor peace.” “Yet, unhappily for everyone, there is little prospect that the political authorities on either side can muster the cohesion and domestic consensus that will permit them to take the painful initiative and make the accommodations necessary to a settlement.26” This means that no one has any clue to a solution at the moment and it is highly probable that the current situation will continue in the near future. In Africa, there is no specific indication that the political and economic backwardness will improve shortly. In the past decade, Africa has been filled with darkness, such as the civil wars and the ensuing massacre in Rwanda and Sudan, and the failed state Somalia and the piracy problem. It is unlikely in the near-future in Africa that we no longer see any riots, genocide, failed states, and so forth. (2) Security environment surrounding Japan Characteristics of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region are as follows: Military tensions exist in the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan after the end of the Cold War; traditional hostilities remain unsolved including territorial disputes in the the Takeshima Islands (Liancourt Rocks) and the Northern Territories; there are political and ideological differences as well as economic, ethnic, religious or territorial discrepancies or disputes which may possibly be developed into military conflicts under certain conditions27; the region is composed

25 Miyuki Matsuzaki, “EU’s Lifting of Arms Embargo against China – Influence given by the United States,” JMSDF Staff College Review Vol. 2, No. 1, May 2012, pp. 45-63. 26 George W. Ball, “Slogans and Realities”, Foreign Affairs, Jul 1969, pp. 627-628. 27 The National Institute for Defense Studies, Problems of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region, The National Institute for Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense of Japan and Military Strategy Research Center of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, March 2008, p. 8.


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of a variety of countries with different political systems, different economic structures or difference in maturity. These are the factors which may endanger the stability of the security environment in the region. The US new defense strategy “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” issued in January 2012 picks up the following keywords: (i) rebalancing U.S. Forces with emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, (ii) building partners, and (iii) the integration of capacities28. It is reasonably understood that the United States has difficulty in performing the role of “world’s policeman” on its own against the background that the cut in defense budget comes to reality. It is also imaginable that the US will require its allies and friends to bear an appropriate level of various burden. Christopher Layne pointed out that, coming to a turning point, the United States is facing both “decline” and “imperial overstretch.” It may place more emphasis on “offshore balancing strategy” which is its new strategy. In that case, the United States will reduce its overseas presence, reset the strategic priorities and transfer the burden to the countries in East Asia and Europe. The United States will refrain from ground force’s intervention, and will concentrate the resources in the navy and air force29. In the meantime, the Japan-US alliance is considered to be working effectively in years to come. However, as mentioned in the third report issued by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye concerning the US-Japan alliance in August 201230, Japan and the US may reach the common understanding that, taking its new roles and missions into account, Japan must undertake more responsibility for defense both of its homeland and of areas that Japan and the US jointly cover. In that case, it is expected that the review of the current “Guideline for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” will be accelerated.

28 “Dempsey explains Defense Strategy at Nation’s Oldest ‘Think Tank’” JCS hp http://www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?ID=900 (Last access date: May 1, 2012). 29 Christopher Layne, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing” The National Interest, January 12, 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405 (Last access date: June 12, 2012). 30 Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, “The U.S-Japan Alliance Anchoring Stability in Asia - A Report of the CSIS Japan Chair August 2012,” http://csis.org/publication/120810_Armitage_USJapanAlliance_Web.pdf (Last access date: August 23, 2012).


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China will remain to be assertive in claiming its sovereignty in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as well as its territorial rights over the islands in those Seas. It will continue to take coercive behaviors by law enforcement agencies, to engage in modernization of its military forces at a fast pace focusing more on navy and air force, to enhance their activities, and to try to build its capacity for A2/AD (Anti-Access & Area-Denial). Together with the least transparency in its intention, it is very difficult to calculate and predict China’s influence on peace and stability in the region. China has a lot of domestic problems, such as the aging population with the low birth rate and income disparity. It would be difficult to see a quick solution in the near future. China will soon overtake the United States in economic power and will progress to the world’s superpower. However, in order to avoid public dissatisfaction and criticism being directed to the Communist Party of China and to use external issues to divert the public eye from domestic problems, China would possibly maintain its tough stance against foreign countries, and in particular, portray Japan a potential “foreign enemy.” The primary objective of the North Korea is to maintain the dictatorship under “Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s Juche philosophy.” The only realistic option to achieve this is “status quo.” North Korea will not make any significant policy change and will continue its brinkmanship diplomacy making provocation and compromise alternatively. It continues its efforts for nuclear development and ballistic missile deployment, which it believes, by building on its success, to deter foreign attacks and to attract public respect domestically. A variety of disputes existing in the Southeast Asia can be narrowed down to the following four issues: (i) allegedly overlapping sovereignty in the South China Sea; (ii) vaguely defined “nine-dash line” asserted by China; (iii) different interpretations adopted by the United States and China over the freedom of military activities in the EEZ; and (iv) the confrontation between China and ASEAN members in establishing the “Code of Conduct.” In every issue, China is involved. Particularly, in the dispute of sovereignty in the South China Sea and territorial rights over the islands in that Sea, the fixed division remains to be in existence between China as a regional power and the coast countries as a group of small countries. It is expected that the countries disputing against China want to strengthen their ties with Japan, the US, India or other countries to confront


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China diplomatically and militarily. Chapter 3: New challenges to Japan’s maritime defense capacity In the new situations where conventional ideas of the international community have been changing and the countries’ interests are intricately intertwined with each other as a result of globalization, Japan is exposed to a variety of difficult issues – e.g. the rise of China – due to the harsh security environment surrounding Japan. How should Japan deal with these issues? Japan’s main field of operations to face its challenges would be the sea, and its maritime defense capacity is expected to make a significant contribution to operations. Therefore, it is no doubt that JMSDF is a leading force for Japan’s future security. In this Chapter, bearing the idea on what the future JMSDF should be, we try to clarify the JMSDF’s current status and the direction to which JMSDF should go from now on. (1) To which direction should JMSDF go? The Basic Policy for National Defense adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in 1957 provided that “The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel any such aggression, with the aim of protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are founded on democracy31.” Having started from the efforts to achieve this objective, JMSDF has been developing necessary defense power and has been conducting education and training not only to protect the sovereignty, territory and citizens of Japan from a variety of threats but also to defend sea lanes which are indispensable to the existence and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation and a trading nation. JMSDF’s efforts made thus far to secure the “existence and prosperity of Japan” can be said to be “local,” meaning that they are limited in the surrounding

31 Basic Policy of National Defense, adopted by the National Defense Council and Cabinet on May 20, 1957.


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areas of Japan due to the JMSDF’s ability. Japan has relied on the US Navy to fill the shortage of its maritime defense capacity. At the same time, JMSDF has sometimes complemented the activities of the US Navy; thereby JMSDF has developed the basis of Japan’s maritime defense capacity. The relationship between JMSDF and the US Navy is, metaphorically speaking, the “shield-and-spear” relation, under which JMSDF and the US Navy have been sharing roles. We try to show the position of JMSDF in the coordinate with two fixed perpendicular directed lines, of which the vertical line shows maritime defense capability with a lower side indicating “complementary” and an upper side indicating “self-reliant,” and of which the horizontal line shows the coverage of the Japan’s maritime defense capacity with a left side meaning “local” and a right side meaning “global.” In this coordinate, the position of JMSDF before the end of the Cold War is shown in the third quadrant (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Position of JMSDF in the period between its foundation and the Cold War era

(depicted by the authors)

After the Cold War ended, Japan has been required not only to protect “its existence and prosperity” but also to contribute to the “peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region” as well as “improvement in the global security environment.” If we try to show the today’s position of JMSDF in the coordinate, JMSDF’s capability remains to be “complimentary” for the US Navy and its area coverage is expanding from “local” to “global,” which means its position in the coordinate

Self-reliant

Local Global

Complementary

Cold War era


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moving to the middle of the horizontal line (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Position of JMSDF in the post-Cold war era (depicted by the authors)

In the future, the United States will face difficulty in solely maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The US presence in the region will change in accordance with its strategy under the “offshore balancing” strategy. Meanwhile, China, a newly rising power, will increasingly be strengthened, and will have a significant impact on the regional security with its unclear intention. In order to firmly secure Japan’s security in this situation, it is necessary to maintain the solid Japan-US alliance. This requires Japan to appropriately take over from the US its roles and burdens in response to the US global strategy. In other words, Japan has to take a wider range of responsibilities for regional security in order to remain to be the most important US ally (i.e. the US partner). If the US Navy reduces its overseas presence globally or reduces it temporarily in the Asia-Pacific region due to, for example, its involvement in the conflict in the Middle East or other areas, JMSDF is required to be capable of assuring regional peace and stability on behalf of the US Navy. At present, JMSDF lacks a certain level of “self-reliance” to achieve this. Looking at its future status as mentioned above, the direction to which JMSDF should go is to increase its self-reliant capability which is required to effectively and firmly maintain the alliance with the US Navy – such alliance

Self-reliant Local Global

Complementary

Cold War ear End of Post- Cold War era

Post-Cold War era


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works as both “shield” and “spear.” If we try to specify this in the coordinate, the position of JMSDF should be “shifted to the center of the two perpendicular lines” by making a 90-degree turn to the upper side from the previous shift at the direction of “global” (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Future position of JMSDF (depicted by the authors)

(2) Roles to be undertaken by JMSDF Due to the cut in defense expenditures in the United States and the downward trend in Europe, Japan is required to fulfil more significant roles for the international community while appropriately applying the limited budget due to the strained Japan’s state finances. More in particular, departing from its complementary role to the US Navy, JMSDF must be capable of taking over a reasonable level of burden from the US Navy and of dealing with security issues independently by increasing integration with Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces. Meanwhile, there are various unstable factors in the vicinity of Japan, such as China’s foray into the sea and North Korea’s nuclear development. To cope with this situation, Japan needs to strengthen the friendly relations with ASEAN members and other neighboring countries and to support their capacity building. In the globalized international community, it is no longer possible to defend sea lanes – which are Japan’s lifeline – solely by Japan, but it requires to establish cooperative relations not only with the US and Europe but also with neighboring

Self-reliant

Local Global

Complementary

Cold War era

End of Post- Cold War era

Post-Cold War era

Post-Post-Cold War era


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countries including China and Southeast Asian countries and with outer regions including Middle Eastern countries. Under such circumstances, JMSDF needs to be capable of dealing with all of the security situations ranging from those in peacetime to those in warfare. JMSDF must be structured appropriately to achieve its objectives that are required in these various situations in the future by flexibly changing its capacity while keeping its core capability – required after the end of the post-Cold War era as described above – as a basis of its existence. If we try to illustrate this in the coordinate, the center circle as shown in Figure 3 indicates JMSDF’s capability which is the basis for future change in its capacity; the future objectives will be positioned in each of the quadrants depending on the capacity that JMSDF needs to obtain and the area that JMSDF is required to cover; and JMSDF’s change in its capacity required to achieve these objectives (which is called “capacity shift”) is shown by the stretch of the center circle to cover the objectives positioned in the quadrants. In the following sections, we will take up four of the future objectives to be achieved by JMSDF and will position them in the coordinate. Then, we shall study the roles to be performed by JMSDF and the form of the “capacity shift” in the coordinate. (i) Defense of Japan A. Roles

� To ensure peace and stability of Japan � To establish and maintain highly flexible and adaptable maritime

defense capacity tightly integrated with Ground Defense Force and Air Defense Force to protect Japan’s territory; to deter attacks and invasions against Japan by its own efforts; if the deterrence fails, to defeat the invasion as in an early stage as possible and eliminate threats.

� To support law enforcement in the sea area under the jurisdiction of Japan � Every country has a maritime law enforcement agency for the front

line of maritime security. In Japan it is Japan Coast Guard. If a maritime incident is intensified in a way that exceeds the capacity of


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Japan Coast Guard, JMSDF should come to the front line. This is not desirable as it manifests the escalation of the incident. Therefore, JMSDF has to maintain close cooperation with Japan Coast Guard in its law enforcement activities and to support it in improvement of its ability.

B. Form of “capacity shift” � Objective of “Defense of Japan” have the “local” nature, requiring the

ultimate highest level of self-reliance. It means that this objective lies in the second quadrant in the coordinate. The form of “capacity shift” is shown in Figure 4:

Figure 4: The first capacity shift


(ii) Regional stabilization A. Roles

� To contribute to establishment of regional security frameworks under international norms �To improve relationships and strengthen cooperation with neighboring

countries and countries adjacent to sea lanes of Japan through defense exchanges

� To contribute to capacity building of countries in the region, in particular, capacity building of their navy and law enforcement agency

Self-reliant

Local Global

Complementary

Defense of Japan


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� To gather information through ISR and to share intelligence with allies and friends

� To contribute to the establishment of common rules � To perform a balancer role for countries in the region in cooperation with

the United States � To carry out disaster relief and humanitarian assistance

B. Form of “capacity shift” � Objective of “regional stabilization” equally requires self-reliant capability

and complementary capability. At the same time it widely ranges from “local” to “global.” Therefore, it locates in the center of the coordinate. The form of “capacity shift” is shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5: The second capacity shift (depicted by the authors)

(iii) Improvement in global security environment A. Roles

� To participate in international efforts to establish international norms for maritime security

� To engage in international cooperation beyond the region; in particular, in cooperation with the US and Europe, to engage in international cooperation activities for regional stabilization in order to protect Japan’s globalized interest.

Self-reliant

Local Global Complementary

Regional stabilization


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� To provide cooperation for non-proliferation of mass-destruction weapons � To secure strategic access (to contribute to establishment of stable

international community) � To carry out activities for, and provide assistance in, ensuring security in

sea lanes, overseas production bases and markets of Japan � To strengthen cooperation with the US and to increase capability for

international communications B. Form of “capacity shift”

� Objective of “improvement in global security environment” requires both efforts of Japan itself and efforts from a viewpoint of strengthening the Japan-US alliance. So, it requires both self-reliant capability and complementary capability equally. The area coverage tends to be “global.” Therefore, it locates in the center of the first quadrant and the fourth quadrant and spread on the horizontal line. The form of “capacity shift” is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6: The third capacity shift

(depicted by the authors) (iv) Linkage from sea to land A. Roles

� To advance into coastal areas which may affect maritime safety and stability

Self-reliant

Local Global Complementary

Improvement in global security environment


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� To cooperate for rebuilding of the countries or areas which were degenerated into a nest of international terrorism (support for the failed states)

� To cooperate for UN peace keeping operations B. Form of “capacity shift”

� Objective of “linkage from sea to land” involves a wide range of geographical areas from “local” to “global.” As it concerns to provide effective support consistently in various areas, it tends to require self-reliant capability. Therefore, it directs to the upper side in the coordinate. The form of “capacity shift” is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: The fourth capacity shift


In summary, Japan’s maritime defense capacity in the future is required to achieve its objectives by changing its capacity in response to the requirements of these objectives (as illustrated by the deformation of the circles in the above coordinate) on the basis of its basic capability (which is shown in the center of the coordinate). For this purpose, JMSDF should not limit its capacity to meet a specific objective, but must increase its flexibility and diverseness to achieve all objectives (which are positioned in all quadrants), and thus sets its future direction.

Self-reliant

Local Global

Complementary

Linkage from sea to land


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Chapter 4: “Capacity” needed for steering new course In order to realize what JMSDF should be in the future and to ensure that JMSDF consistently satisfies its requirements as described in the previous Chapter, it is necessary for JMSDF to expand its comprehensive capacity (which is indicated by the increase of area of the center circle shown in the above coordinate) and also to maximize its flexibility which is indigenous to it and to fully utilize its multifunctional capacity to attain all objectives (which is indicated by the enlargement of deformed circles spread in the quadrants). In this connection, JMSDF must have the following capacities which have been demanded for a long period of time: “deterrence” which enables JMSDF to confront the threats against the country’s security environment; and “command of the sea” and “sea denial” which are needed if the deterrence fails. However, in order to exert these capacities effectively, JMSDF at the moment needs the assistance of the United States, which is dependent on the firmness of the Japan-US alliance. In sum, JMSDF must acquire the “capacity” to support the “deterrence,” “command of the sea” and “sea denial” which is currently fulfilled by the US Navy in the Asia-Pacific region in addition to JMSDF’s current “capacity” to contribute to the defense of Japan. Furthermore, JMSDF must at all times maintain strong ties with the US to cope with any situations. In this Chapter, we would like to specify each of JMSDF’s own “capacities” which are necessary for JMSDF to perform the above-mentioned functions and to complete the “capacity shift” as mentioned above (in the coordinate, successful shifting of capacities is illustrated by enlargement of the deformed circles). (1) Access capability from sea to land If the deterrence fails, the “command of the sea” is lost and the islands in the home waters are occupied, we must conduct an “amphibious operation” to recapture the occupied islands. To secure our advantage in the operation, we must have the capacity to project our armed force from the sea to certain points of the land. In other words, we must have the means to secure the “access from sea to land” whenever we need it. Meanwhile, such capacity and means can be used in peacetime to carry out effective humanitarian assistance or disaster relief, and


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also to support for capacity building of neighboring countries. In this respect, the access capability from sea to land is considered as one of the important elements of Japan’s national power. In the Great East Japan Earthquake, JMSDF conducted, by using its destroyers and their on-board helicopters and boats, search and rescue activities for disaster victims, transportation of goods, information gathering and other activities to save many lives in the coastal areas isolated due to disruption of roads or breakdown loss of other access means for rescue activities. As the access capability from sea to land is essential to conduct a variety of operations in coastal areas at an advantage, it should be considered that development and expansion of “seabasing function32” – the function to conduct operations from a combatant ship floating off the coast using it as an operating base – is one of the goals to be achieved by JMSDF in the near future. With the “seabasing function” as one of its core capabilities, JMSDF can provide the basis for integration of its various capacities – including maritime transportation, information gathering, searching and risk elimination including minesweeping, etc. – with the basic transportation capacity of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the terminal transportation capacity of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. Troops composed in this way can have the access capability from sea to land being controlled by one commander in a joint manner and combining each of capabilities currently owned by Japan Self-Defense Forces. This means the “reformation” of existing defense capacities. Through this reformation, it is expected that JSDF is able to maintain its strategic posture of defense-orientation without new armament, produce a certain deterrent effect in peacetime and suppress an escalation of conflict. Importance of “seabasing function” and measures to materialize it are discussed partly in Shimodaira (2012)33.

32 “Lessons Learnt from the Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (Interim Report)” Ministry of Defense of Japan, August 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/pdf/k_chukan.pdf (Last access date: October 31, 2012). 33 Takuya Shimodaira, “Future of Seabasing – Basic Policy of National Defense (2010) and the post-Great East Japan Earthquake – “ JMSDF Staff College Review Vol. 2 No. 1, May 2012.


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(2) Ballistic Missile Defense Despite the efforts of the international community, proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass-destruction is continuing. In the vicinity of our country, Russia and China have nuclear missiles and North Korea is actively engaging in the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense is based on the multi-tier defense system consisting of an upper-tier defense through the SM-3 equipped 6 Aegis destroyers and a lower-tier defense through the Patriot PAC-334 missile system. It is possible that, in order to counter Japan’s ballistic missile defense, the neighboring countries may expand missile deployment or provide missiles with intercept-avoidance capability (by maneuvering missiles at a terminal phase to avoid interceptions). To cope with this situation, it is necessary to improve the capacity of anti-ballistic missiles system, such as expansion of defense range, improvement of reliability, etc. and to prepare a means of neutralizing missiles before their launch. (3) Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) As a basis for supporting the aforementioned capacities, a superior ability in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance is required. In many cases, success in maritime operation is dependent on whether we can group and maintaining a single display of all existing conditions relevant to the operation, which is named Common Operational Picture (COP). Information obtained through patrol and surveillance activities plays an important role in making political judgment at an early stage of operation. In addition, information at a strategic level is particularly important, and must be analyzed constantly and deeply not only in terms of military capability of potential adversaries but also a variety of factors including their politics, economy, finance, traditions, history and culture. In order to do this, it is necessary to enhance and upgrade IT-related equipment adopting the most updated scientific technologies and to develop highly-skilled intelligence analyst in a planned

34 Ministry of Defense of Japan (Ed.), Defense of Japan in 2012, 2012, p. 126.


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manner. However, it must be noted that intelligence is always incomplete and should not be accepted and believed blindly. A commander should at any time be prepared to make his judgment and decision even when only incomplete intelligence is available to him. Conclusion: New horizon In this paper, we have discussed the concept of maritime defense capacity which is changing along with the development of the international community that is facing new challenges. Taking the future security environment into account, we have studied the current position of JMSDF and to which course it should steer. We have also studied how JMSDF should expand its capacities on the basis of its current capabilities and how it should approach to achieving its future objectives. We have presented our study results in this paper. Samuel P. Huntington warned the US Navy which was said to have become useless and was questioned about the reason for existence after WWII that “if the service does not possess a well defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by the service upon the resources of society.35” “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1977 and beyond (1976NDPG)” prepared in the Cold War era primarily focused on military contingency. “The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and beyond (1995 NDPG)” prepared after the end of the Cold War expanded the roles of our country’s defense capacity from the defense of Japan to include response to domestic emergencies, such as the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake or the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway. “The National Defense Program Guidelines for 2005 and beyond (“2004NDPG)” emphasized the threats posed by non-governmental organizations, an example of which was the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the US. The current “National Defense Program Guidelines for 2011

35 Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” Proceedings, Vol.80, No.5, May 1954, http://blog.usni.org/2009/03/09/from-our-archive-national-policy-and-the-transoceanic-navy-by-samuel-p-huntington/ (last access date: May 21, 2012).


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and beyond (2010NDPG)” has reviewed the “Basic Defense Concept” which was literally the basis of building of Japan’s defense capacity and has presented the “Dynamic Defense Concept” instead. Japan has consistently entrusted a major part of national security to the United States, and put priority on the economic development. In his statement that “Maintaining the asymmetric alliance with the United States, relying on U.S. forces based in Japan, refusing to adopt offensive rules of engagement, and continuing a cheap ride with limited defense budgets, all point toward the extension, rather than the discarding, of Japan’s post-war grand strategy. The Yoshida Doctrine is not in tatters, it has been updated,36” Richard J. Samuels criticizes Japan’s light-armed and economic- development-prioritized policy between the 1950s and the 1980s. This policy has resulted in the current unbalanced defense capacity of Japan. The world is quickly changing from the “post-Cold War era” – in which the United States led the mono-polar world as only one super power – through the 9.11 terrorist attacks to “the period after the end of post-Cold War era (post-post-Cold War era)” – in which the multi-polar structured world has come out. We believe that we had completely departed from the Cold War concept, and have adjusted ourselves to the security environment in the after-Cold War era as well as the post-Cold War era. However, has the world have been moving further forward? Layne (2012) emphasizes the necessity to keep up the changes of the times by saying that “history never ends, that change is always inevitable, that nations and civilizations rise and fall, and that no era can last forever. Now it can be seen that the post-World War II era … is the Old Order – and it is and Old Order in crisis, which means it is nearing its end. History, as always, is moving forward.37” We, the JMSDF, have to continue to change in response to the changes in the times. The current security environment has already begun to change, and will

36 Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, Cornell University Press, 2008, p.107. 37 Christopher Layne, “The Global Power Shift from West to East” The National Interest, May-June 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-global-power -shift-west-east-6796> Accessed on June 25, 2012.


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never stop changing. JMSDF has to stand before a variety of challenges posed by the “post-post-Cold War era.” “Japan is no longer in the post-Cold War period.”

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily represent the Ministry of Defense or the Japan Self-Defense Force.

Challenges for JMSDF after the Post-Cold War Era ...In this Chapter, the authors study these changes...

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