Challenges for Int'l Dev. Coop.

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Regional Governance Architecture FES Briefing Paper February 2006

New Powers for Global Change?

Challenges for InternationalDevelopment Cooperation:

The Case of Brasil

CATRINA SCHLÄGER



The Case of Brasil FES Briefing Paper 3 | March 2007

cant volumes of funds and do not condition theaid they provide - are becoming serious competi-tors for the OECD donors, particularly on the Af-rican continent. By comparison, Brazil hasproven more modest as a donor: between 1998and 2004 it made a total of US$ 15 million

available for 119 development measures (Alten-burg and Weikert 2006: 34).

However, an in-depth analysis of Brazil’s quali-ties as a donor is highly instructive, and someobservers are convinced that Brazil - unlikeChina and India - gears its donor activities“much less to its own short-term economic andpolitical interests” (Altenburg and Weikert 2006:34). Brazil works consistently as an advocate andinitiator of South-South cooperation in the inter-est of the global South. Furthermore, Brazil notis not only active as a classic bilateral donor, it is

also engaged in innovative multilateral and tri-lateral forms of cooperation. In many sectorsBrazil has also built expertise of its own whichcan be used by other countries as a guideline foraction designed to improve socioeconomic de-velopment. In this respect Brazil could serve as amodel for other emerging donors.

Against this background, the following sectionwill look into the extent to which Brazil, as anemerging donor, is gaining influence on interna-tional donor structures. This will require an analy-sis of Brazil’s development engagement in terms

of the formulation and orientation of the techni-cal cooperation (TC) and financial cooperation (FC)it provides. A deeper look will also be taken intothe South-South cooperation between Brazil andAfrica as a means of coming up with a compre-hensive assessment of Brazil’s qualities as a donor.The findings of this analysis will then be used towork out some of the challenges that Brazil as anemerging donor presents for the internationalcommunity as well as some of the chances it of-fers for a sustainable development policy.

2 Brazil – a rising power as anadvocate of the global South

Brazil exercises its role as a rising power by en-gaging in consistent efforts to expand and stra-tegically anchor South-South cooperation, and indoing so, it has proven to be a constructive actorin shaping the architecture of global governance.Brazil’s rise to the role of a global actor in worldpolitical affairs is reflected on the one hand inthe fact that it is generally accepted, even bysome important industrialized countries, as a co-operation partner and is on the other hand ac-

knowledged by other emerging and developingnations in its role as an advocate of the global

South. One of the reasons why this SouthAmerican country has won the recognition andthe trust of the global South is that it sees itselfas an “’intermediary’ between the ‘weak’ andthe ‘strong’” (Soares and Hill 2006: 27). Withoutits repeatedly underscored commitment to multi-

lateralism, though, Brazil would not have risento the status of an actor of such significance.

While Brazil’s growing economic strength is anadditional factor responsible for the growinglyimportant global role it plays, Brazil’s interna-tional role as a political actor is determined forthe most part by the country’s relevance and ac-tivities abroad. Brazil’s activities as a donor arelinked with the country’s external strategy of ex-panding South-South cooperation.

Even though Brazil is ambitiously involved in

shaping the architecture of global governance,the South American country continues to rank asa middle-income country - and thus as a devel-oping country. While Brazil is generally rankedamong the emerging economic powers in thecontext of the BRIC country group,

2and the

country’s performance on socio-economic indi-cators has begun to show signs of improvement,Brazil is still forced to contend with a goodnumber of substantial development deficits.

Brazil as a power actively involved inshaping the international order

Many members of the international communityaccept Brazil as a “like-minded ally” and there-fore accord to it a central role on the stage ofworld politics. To cite an example, Brazil, to-gether with the Group of Four (G4), which in-cludes Germany, Japan, and India alongside Bra-zil, worked vigorously for a reform of the UN Se-curity Council and the establishment of a num-ber of additional permanent seats on the council.Brazil’s international importance is further un-derscored by its participation in the “outreach”of the G8’s summits and ministerials.

In joining forces with India and South Africa to setup the IBSA Dialogue Forum,

3 President Luiz

2BRIC is an acronym formed from the initial lettersBrazil, Russia, India, and China. It is anticipatedthat these countries will develop an enormouseconomic potential over the coming 50 years, per-haps even outperforming the established G7 pow-ers.

3The “India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Fo-rum” was founded in 2003 on Lula’s initiative; it iscommitted to democratic values, a multilateral sys-

tem of global governance, and the goal of povertyreduction (Gratius and Zilla 2006: 3)




Inácio Lula da Silva created a South-South coop-eration with a new and influential dynamic and atthe same time underlined his sincerity concerningmultilateral South cooperation. In assuming thechair within the G20 in the framework of theWTO Doha Development Round, Brazil both

demonstrated and enormously strengthened itsbargaining power in the world trade regime.

The success of the “Lula Group”4

may also serveas an illustration of the role that Brazil plays asan actor of global change. Together with thepresidents of France and Chile, President LuizInácio Lula da Silva launched the initiative “Ac-tion against Hunger and Poverty” with the aimof coming up with alternative financing instru-ments for development (Kage 2006: 1).

Brazil has also stepped up its participation in UN

missions in recent years, taking on responsibilityas a global player for peace and security in theworld. The UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti hasbeen under Brazilian leadership since 2004, andBrazil has contributed 1,200 troops, the largestcontingent involved in the mission. In 1999 Bra-zil participated in the UN peacekeeping missionin East Timor, contributing police forces. Fur-thermore, Brazil took part in the UN observermissions in El Salvador and in Mozambique andcontributed 1,300 troops for the UN mission inAngola.

In hosting the UN Conference for Environmentand Development (UNCED) in 1992, Brazil madean important contribution to the architecture ofglobal governance. Brazil’s membership in nu-merous regional and international regimes andorganizations may be seen as a reflection of thevision guiding Brazil’s foreign policy.

5

So aspiring – and yet at the same time sopoor

Since it opened its markets, Brazil’s efforts to-ward integration into the world market have

proven successful, and the country was also ableto survive the 1998 economic crisis relatively un-scathed. Brazil, with its population of 185 million,has now become the world’s ninth-largest econ-omy. In addition to developing into an attractivebond market, Brazil is also active as a global in-

4 Consisting of: Algeria, Brazil, Chile, France, Ger-

many, and Spain.5

Brazil as a member of the Organization of Ameri-can States (OAS), the Rio Group, the Inter-American Development Bank, the African Devel-opment Bank, the International Monetary Fund,

the World Bank, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNI-DO, ILO, and many other institutions.

vestor: The multinational corporations PetrobasS.A. and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce

6operate

worldwide. On the whole, Brazil has now be-come the sixth-largest investor in the group ofdeveloping countries (UNCTAD 2006: 20).

The country’s good economic development, to-gether with the numerous social programs put inplace by the Lula government, has led to a goodnumber of poverty-reduction effects. This in turnhas had positive effects on Brazil’s ranking onthe Human Development Index (HDI), which in-dicates that quality of life in Brazil has steadilyimproved. Comparing Brazil with other risingpowers, we find that the country ranks roughly10 places ahead of China and 50 places aheadof India. All in all, though, Brazil is still a countryfaced with substantial development deficits. So-cial inequality and income poverty continue to

be widespread. Even though Brazil no longer hasa dubious top international position on the Ginicoefficient (10

th ranking in 2004, 2nd place in1989), the richest 10% of the country’s popula-tion continues to hold 45% of the country’swealth. According to UNDP data, 22% of Brazil-ians live below the national poverty line andhave to get by on US$ 2 per day (UNDP 2006b).

These mixed findings indicate that while Brazilremains a net recipient of ODA, developmentcooperation (DC) with the country has altered.For example, the German Federal Ministry for

Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)classifies Brazil as an anchor country,

7meaning

the German government will seek to developdeepened cooperation with it on special issueswith a view to making use of Brazil’s regionalimportance as a catalyst.

Of the rising powers China, India, and South Af-rica, Brazil receives the lowest amounts of ODAprovided by international donors: in 2005 ODAaccounted for only 0.023% of Brazil’s gross na-tional income (China: 0.075%, India: 0.109%).The technical cooperation share of the overallODA Brazil receives - roughly US$ 180 million -has been at a stable level since the mid-1990s.Brazil’s largest bilateral donor is Japan, followedby Germany, France, and the US. More than40% of the bilateral DC the country receives is

6 Petrobas (Petrolio Brasiliero S.A.) is a state-ownedBrazilian enterprise in the energy sector. CVRD(Companhia Vale do Rio Doce) is a Brazilian miningcompany.

7“Anchor countries are rising economic and politicalpowers without whose engagement it is practically

unthinkable to solve current and future worldproblems” (Altenburg and Weikert 2006: 1).




concentrated on “program assistance,” withmultisectoral development approaches account-ing for roughly 15% of this ODA and 12% go-ing into the education sector.

3 Brazil’s development policy - an

instrument of its foreign policySince the 1970s Brazil has made its appearanceas a development donor under the heading ofhorizontal or South-South cooperation. Brazilsees its own position as hybrid in nature: “Brazilbelongs simultaneously to both the industrializedand the developing worlds, where modernityand backwardness live side by side” (Ministériodas Relações Exteriores (MRE) 2006). It is fromthis ambivalent position as well as from the criti-cism it levels against the self-interest-dominateddevelopment policy of the industrialized coun-

tries that Brazil derives both the mandate for itsdonor activities and a claim to internationalleadership in the interest of the countries of theSouth. Consequently, Brazil’s foreign ministryhas a skeptical to critical stance toward the in-dustrialized countries: “The perspective on theproblems and the solutions proposed by devel-oped countries have not always correspondedwith the concerns of the developing countries,since rich nations have tended to focus their at-tention on a selective agenda of issues on whichthey wanted to take immediate action and on

those claiming the full support, just as immedi-ately, of the so-called Third World” (MRE 2006).

Traditionally, Brazil’s foreign policy has alwaysbeen linked with a development agenda. Thislink has become even stronger under PresidentLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva: “The government’sfight against poverty and unequal income distri-bution at home and its assertive and activist for-eign policy can be viewed as two sides of thesame coin” (Soares and Hirst 2006: 21).

Brazil has in recent years undertaken steps toprofessionalize its development policy (and inparticular the technical cooperation it provides)and to give it greater political (foreign-policy)relevance. Brazil does distinguish here betweenSouth-South cooperation, development coopera-tion, technical and financial cooperation, andtrade and investment. However, it sees devel-opment policy essentially as a component of its“South-South cooperation” approach to foreignpolicy.

Brazil has stated its commitment not to orientthe development aid it provides to its own na-

tional financial and/or material interests. TheBrazilian government regards development pol-

icy as a contribution to international security andpeace policy. Against this background Brazil’scommitment to multilateralism, noninterference,and the peaceful resolution of conflict must beseen as an important principle of Brazil’s foreignpolicy that at the same time has implications for

development policy.

Brazil’s technical cooperation: A model forother emerging donors?

Brazil sees its South engagement as an instru-ment of foreign policy that strengthens its ties tocertain regions and countries that are accordedhigh priority among the country’s national andforeign-policy interests. This is the reason whythe Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), setup in 1987, is anchored in the foreign ministryas an autonomous working unit. The priorities of

South-South cooperation derive primarily fromthe pledges and obligations made by the presi-dent or foreign minister on the occasion of offi-cial visits. On the whole, Brazil maintains coop-eration agreements with 53 bilateral partners;these agreements place technical (and to someextent also cultural and scientific) cooperation inthe binding framework of international law. Onestriking aspect here is that, far from being fo-cused on Latin America, Brazil’s engagementalso has a pronounced supraregional orientation.

In keeping with Brazil’s foreign-policy commit-

ments, 38% of the development aid (TC funds)it made available in 2003 were concentrated onSouth American countries, with two-thirds ofthis going to Paraguay. The lusophone Africancountries received 34% of the aid provided byBrazil, most of which went to Angola and SaoTome and Principe. Twenty-two percent of theoverall volume of Brazilian DC went to EastTimor. The Central American region, includingthe Caribbean, received a mere 6% of the de-velopment aid Brazil provided in this period;Haiti was the major beneficiary here.

8

As a non-OECD member, Brazil reports neitherpublicly nor on the basis of DAC criteria on itsDC budget, and for this reason there are no ex-ternally validated data available on the subject.According to Brazilian data, the ABC had a totalof US$ 12 million available for TC measures be-tween 2000 and 2004.

9In a report to the UNDP

High-Level Committee on the Review of Techni-cal Cooperation among Developing Countries

8For these data, see Stamm 2005: 16.

9 For comparison: Germany’s TC budget for 2004

amounted to approximately US$ 2.4 billion(OECD/DAC Stastics).




(HLC), however, the Brazilian rapporteur pointsout that these reports allow to include not onlythe financial resources provided by the ABC butalso the services of other organizations involvedin implementation. He therefore notes: “that it isestimated that each US$ 1.00 spent should be

multiplied by ten, since its execution partners areinstitutions that do not charge for their partici-pation nor for the know-how they contribute”(HLC 2003: 2). According to this very rough cal-culation, the volume of development aid Brazilprovided between 2000 and 2004 would haveamounted to US$ 120 million; yet even at thatlevel Brazil’s TC budget remains very small.

According to Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, oneprinciple of Brazilian development policy is thatprovision of Brazilian TC funds is made depend-ent neither on Brazilian national commercial in-

terests nor on conditionalities for recipient coun-tries (ABC 2006: 16). In this context Brazil re-ported to the HLC: “The focus of Brazil’s technicalcooperation strategy has sought not to stimulatedependence, not to condition aid to profits orcommercial benefits. Nor is it meant to be im-posed” (HLC 2003: 1, 2). Brazil thus deviatesfrom the political approach adopted by the OECDdonors, viz. to make ODA conditional on criteriasuch as rule of law, human rights protection, orpoverty-oriented policies.

Still, the TC provided by Brazil in 2004 was

keyed to the following political guidelines:

prioritization of technical cooperation pro-grams that help to intensify relations bet-ween Brazil and partner countries (countiesof paramount priority for Brazil’s foreign po-licy);

support for projects in line with nationalprograms and priorities of recipient count-ries;

priority for projects that entail multiplier ef-fects and hold promise of sustainability afterproject completion;

priority for projects that promise the grea-test success and avoid any pulverizing wasteof funds;

preference for projects in which recipientcountries participate by mobilizing funds oftheir own.

Official presentations repeatedly state that theaim of Brazil’s technical cooperation is to em-bark on a “partnership for development” with

the recipient country: “to improve people’sstandard of living, to foster sustainable growth

and to promote social development” (HLC 2003:1). Transfer of know-how and efforts tostrengthen institutional structures in partnercountries are seen as keys to development thatare worthy of being promoted through advisoryservices, capacity-building measures, and tech-

nology transfer.

Brazil’s TC has a broad institutional base: theABC is responsible for basic coordination func-tions, and over 120 additional institutions are in-volved in implementation. The main institutionactive in South-South cooperation in the healthsector is the Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, which hasties to Brazil’s health ministry. Together with SE-NAI (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Indus-trial), a training and capacity-building organiza-tion, Brazil builds and develops vocational train-ing centers in partner countries.

When it comes to setting priorities in substan-tive-conceptual terms, Brazil can draw on itsown experiences as a developing country, and itfocuses on areas in which the country has accu-mulated expertise of its own: “Most of the pro-posals of technical cooperation presented to theGovernment of Brazil are related to sharing ourexperiences in implementing these solutions”(HLC 2003: 2). Accordingly, the ABC focuses onsocioeconomic development factors: basic andadult education, agriculture, vocational training,health, alternative energies, and the environ-ment. In addition, Brazil offers TC funds for pub-lic administration reform and further develop-ment of the SME sector.

10With its focus on the

sustainable development of human resources,Brazil’s DC approach appears to differ substan-tially from the approach pursued by China andIndia, with its focus on infrastructure measures.

The “export hits” of Brazilian TC are, e.g. in theeducation sector, the Bolsa Escola Program andthe Literacy Program. Both are national pro-grams that have achieved excellent effects inBrazil. The Brazilian program for combatingHIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases alsoenjoys an excellent reputation amongOECD/DAC donors. In the field of renewable en-ergies Brazil is seen internationally as a pioneerin ethanol production, which achieves verybroadly effective income effects in addition topositive environmental effects in that it com-bines industrial (agrobusiness) and traditional(small farmers) cultivation structures. However,there is no way to tell whether and to what ex-tent the transfer of these Brazilian programs into

10Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)




other national contexts has met with success.The programs that have already been imple-mented have not been evaluated or the resultshave not been made public.

Brazil’s TC is oriented to three axes: the bi-, tri-

and multilateral. The lion’s share of Brazil’s TC istransacted on the basis of bilateral cooperationagreements. But Brazil is becoming increasinglyengaged in multilateral forums. Most of this TCinvolves advanced training measures providedvia the Brazilian Cooperation Fund, created in1995 under the auspices of the OAS. For exam-ple, in 2003 a course on “diplomatic practices”was conducted in El Salvador for participantsfrom Central America. In the framework of theCommunity of Portuguese Language Countries(CPLP)

11Brazil is working for the development of

vocational education centers in the lusophone

developing countries.

The trilateral or triangular cooperation betweenBrazil (as an emerging donor), an OECD donor,and a developing country is a new form of de-velopment cooperation (see Altenburg andWeikert 2006). Here the three parties jointly plan,finance, and implement the projects involved.Trilateral cooperation is usually found in sectorsin which the emerging donors have expertise oftheir own. Thus far Brazil has launched triangu-lar cooperation projects together with the JapanInternational Cooperation Agency (JICA) in the

educational and agricultural sectors; every year120 experts from Latin America and Africa par-ticipate in these projects. Together with the Ca-nadian International Development Agency(CIDA), Brazil has carried out immunization pro-grams in Haiti. And together with the United Na-tions Population Fund, Brazil has initiated a pro-gram designed to promote the international dis-semination of its health program for familyplanning, reproductive health, and combatingAIDS in Latin American and lusophone countries.

The great unknown:Brazil’s financial cooperation

While there is extensive documentation availableon the orientation of Brazil’s technical coopera-tion, this is not at all the case when it comes tothe conception, guidelines, structure, and vol-ume of the FC Brazil provides. Brazil’s FC ap-

11

The CPLP (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Por-tuguesa) was founded in 1996 to promote coop-eration between Portuguese-speaking countries. Itsmembers are Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-

Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and Sao Tome andPríncipe; East Timor has observer status.

pears to be coordinated mainly by a small subdi-vision of the finance ministry that is also respon-sible for developing export credit lines andtransacting bi- and multilateral debt relief.

As a member of the Paris Club with observer

status, Brazil has participated in numerous multi-lateral debt relief measures, primarily in favor ofAfrican countries.

12Under the auspices of the

HIPC Initiative13

the Brazilian finance ministry hascancelled the following debt: Mozambique: US$369 million; Tanzania: US$ 10 million; Maurita-nia: US$ 9 million; and Guinea-Bissau: US$ 5million. Clearly the regional focus of Brazilian FCis on Africa.

The IMF and World Bank see Brazil as a memberof the group of emerging creditors;

14 and they

have observed that the financial aid provided by

the emerging creditors has increased sharply inrecent years. After China and Kuwait, Brazil isthe third-largest emerging creditor that providesloans to low-income countries.

15The largest

claims that Brazil currently holds as an emergingcreditor are against Angola (8% of GDP),Guinea-Bissau (4% of GDP), and the Republic ofthe Congo (3% of GDP) (IMF and World Bank2006: 8). Since Brazil provides technical coopera-tion without any conditionalities, it is perhapssafe to assume that it also provides financial aidwithout conditioning it on compliance with rule-of-law or human rights principles.

In addition to multilateral debt relief via the ParisClub, Brazil also underscores its basic multilateralposition by contributing to multilateral forums.Via the IBSA Dialogue Forum, Brazil, togetherwith India and South Africa, has made US$ 1million p.a. available for the “UNDP Fund forPublic Health, Education, Sanitation and FoodSecurity Projects.”

12 Among others: Congo, Nigeria, Gabon, Senegal,DR Congo, Zambia, Mauritania, Tanzania, Mozam-bique, Guinea, Bolivia, Guinea-Bissau and Ghana.

13 A 1999 G8 initiative in favor of debt relief for heav-ily indebted poor countries (HIPC).

14The IMF and the World Bank regard Brazil, China,India, Korea, Kuwait, und Saudi Arabia as emerg-ing creditors.

15 Compared with the overall volume of the fundsmade available by the traditional OECD donors, theshare of the credit provided by Brazil is still verysmall. China and Kuwait, the group’s the largestlenders, hold claims amounting to US$ 5 billionand US$ 2.5 billion, respectively; there are no con-

crete data available on the credit that Brazil pro-vides (IMF and World Bank 2006: 8).




4 Brazil’s South-South cooperationwith Africa: Genuine solidarity,enriched with numerous self-interests

Africa has moved increasingly into the focal in-

terest of the rising powers: In keeping with Bra-zil’s foreign policy strategy, President Luiz InácioLula da Silva has put South-South cooperationwith the African continent on a permanent foot-ing. Among the declared objectives of Brazil’sAfrica policy: “One is to set foot in what is seenas one of the last commercial frontiers of theworld. The other to help Brazil become a globalplayer in international affairs” (Zanini and Sor-bara 2007).

As Brazil sees the matter, far from being classi-fied as the “lost continent,” Africa should be

courted as a potential business location andsource of energy supplies. One feature typical ofBrazil’s efforts to further develop South-Southpartnership include “soft” public declarations ofsolidarity on the one hand and “hard“ economic,political, technical, and financial cooperation onthe other.

Brazil’s main competitors for access to Africanmarkets and natural resources are China and In-dia. Trade experts view Brazil’s cultural ties withAfrica as a comparative advantage. Cultural linksbetween Brazil and Africa are very close histori-

cally, although they have been revitalized only inrecent years. This is underscored by the five offi-cial visits that President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’shas paid to 17 African countries since 2003 aswell as by the deeply symbolic reopening oftwelve embassies. During his first official visit inAfrica, the Brazilian president conjured up thecultural roots shared by Africa and Brazil andadmitted that Brazil is indebted to Africa:“Brazilian society was built on the work, thesweat and blood of Africans” (Africa Recovery2004: 3). The president also emphasized that -after Nigeria - Brazil is home to the largest blackpopulation in the world. It is in particular thePortuguese language that closely links thelusophone countries of Africa to Brazil, and thisis the reason why the central focus of Brazil’sSouth-South cooperation is on this countrygroup.Africa’s growing relevance for Brazil is mostclearly reflected in increased volumes of tradeand investment. Between 2002 and 2006 Brazil-ian trade with African countries tripled, reachingnearly US$ 13 billion in 2006.

16Brazil’s trade

16 By comparison, in 2004 trade between China andAfrica already amounted to US$ 40 billion, and it is

with the SACU17

region had already increased by224% between 2003 and 2005, 98% of whichwas concentrated in South Africa. Brazil’s tradewith the African CPLP countries increased by283% during the same time period, with Angolaalone accounting for 90% of this figure. Brazil’s

most important exports include food and indus-trial goods; it imports fossil fuels in return. In2006 Brazil’s largest oil suppliers were Nigeria,Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Angola. On the otherhand, at present the Latin American regional en-ergy market seems to play as good as no role forBrazil’s energy policy. Brazilian multinationalcorporations have also discovered Africa as aninteresting business location; only recently theBrazilian mining company CVRD invested US$ 2billion in the construction of a coal mine in Mo-zambique (Africa Research Bulletin 2006: 17110).

According to the Global Development FinanceReport, Brazil also has “considerable investmentsin Angola and Nigeria” (World Bank 2006: 112).Even though these figures may seem impressive,they also show that other economic regions likethe USA, the EU, and Latin America still enjoypriority for Brazil, that Brazil is only one playeramong many on the African continent, and thatits economic activities are limited to individualcountries.

At the end of November 2006, on the initiativeof President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the first

“Africa-South America Summit” (ASA) was heldin Nigeria; its objective was to expand the South-South cooperation between the two regions. Inhis opening address President Luiz Inácio Lula daSilva made a plea for the two regions to con-verge on the international stage: “The associa-tion between our two regions had never been sonecessary before (...) We should become awarethat the collective way out is the only possibleone” (Radio Mundo Real 2006). In this sense,the participating countries committed them-selves, in the summit’s final declaration, to de-mocratization of international relations, reformof the UN and the Security Council, and expan-sion of South-South cooperation “for the mutualbenefit of the states and peoples of the two re-gions” (Declaration, ASA Summit). With thisagreement Brazil has secured the support of theAfrican countries in its pursuit of a permanentseat on the UN Security Council.

set to more than double over the course of thecoming five years (Hofmann, 2006: 6).

17 The Southern African Customs Union was founded

in 1969 and is made up of 5 southern Africancountries.




Furthermore, the summit also created the Africa-South America Cooperative Forum (ASACOF),whose activities are to be coordinated by Braziland Nigeria. The cooperation wishes of themember countries center on agriculture, tradeand investment, energy, technologies, water re-

sources, and tourism. It remains to be seen whatkind of dynamic the forum will develop and towhat extent it will succeed in implementing thegoals it has set.

Just as with other rising powers, Brazil’s case in-volves a combination of foreign-trade, foreign-policy, and development-policy interests. This isreflected most clearly in the list of recipients ofBrazilian financial aid. Although there are onlyisolated reports available on Brazil’s financial co-operation, it is safe to assume that Brazil’s can-cellation of US$ 1 billion of debt for African

countries has mainly benefited resource-richcountries (World Bank 2006: 109).

Like other rising powers, Brazil is working on theAfrican continent to reduce poverty there and tohelp its partners reach the MDGs, and it doesnot tie its aid to conditions like “good govern-ance” or “respect for human rights.” Generallyspeaking, however, there are two factors tokeep in mind in assessing Brazil’s developmentpolicy: one is that Brazil is only a relatively smallactor in Africa compared with other rising pow-ers; the other is that Brazil’s DC in Africa is con-

centrated on the long-term development of hu-man resources, and not mainly on investment inthe physical infrastructure it needs to optimizeresource extraction.

In 2005 the ABC carried out 54 bilateral TC projects in Africa, 35 of them in the continent’s lu-sophone countries (Angola, Cape Verde,Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Sao Tome andPrincipe). The focal points included (vocational)training, agriculture, and efforts to combatHIV/AIDS. In Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mo-zambique Brazil is offering vocational trainingcenters as a means of support for efforts to rein-tegrate ex-combatants into society, in this waycontributing to peacebuilding processes. Brazil iscooperating with Mozambique, Sao Tome andPrincipe, and Angola with a view to strengthen-ing local agricultural research institutes. SaoTome and Principe, Namibia, and Guinea-Bissauare benefiting from transfers of technology andknow-how for specific cropping methods or cul-tivated plants. All of the lusophone countries, aswell as Botswana, Burundi, and Burkina Faso,are receiving support from Brazil for their efforts

to combat HIV/AIDS; here Brazil can have re-course to the successes with which its own

strategy has met. Brazil has, in the CPLP frame-work, provided assistance in developing two re-gional centers of excellence: a regional centerfor business development in Angola and a re-gional center for public administration in Mo-zambique. Even though Brazil’s development

policy is in part not in line with the OECD/DACcriteria, its development engagement may beseen as more positive than that of other emerg-ing donors.

5 Chances and risks of an enlargeddonor community: Constructivedialogue in the place ofoversimplification

The overall concept of “South-South coopera-tion” is a central theme throughout the wholeof Brazil’s foreign policy. There is every reason to

welcome Brazil’s proactive and constructivecommitment to the global South, and its sus-tainability could be boosted by, among others,the IBSA alliance and the Africa-South AmericaCooperative Forum. If we look behind the rheto-ric of a partnership of mutual benefit, we findthat the benefits do not appear to be reaped byBrazil alone. But one thing that must be seen asproblematical in the context of “South-Southcooperation” is the blurred boundaries betweenthe individual components involved.

Viewed in isolation, Brazil appears - looked at in

terms of the data presently available on the vol-ume of the funds it provides - to be a relativelysmall emerging donor. Particularly in comparisonto other emerging donors and established OECDdonors, Brazil’s DC budget is very small. Thismeans that in the near future Brazil’s South-South engagement will not significantly affectthe international donor structures, i.e. Brazilcannot be expected to mobilize funds exceedingthose of any one OECD donor.

Compared with the development policy of theOECD countries, the most striking deficits in Bra-zil’s DC include in particular a lack transparencyconcerning funding volumes and award criteria.There is no mechanism in Brazil that would re-quire the government to report on how DCfunds are used. In this connection there is goodreason to question the Brazilian noninterferenceguideline and the country’s policy of providingDC without conditionalities.

However, the analysis of Brazil’s technical coop-eration has also made clear what potential couldlie in technical South-South cooperation. In its

bi-, tri-, or multilateral cooperation Brazil worksfor development partnerships, placing emphasis




on socioeconomic development in partner coun-tries. Brazil could serve as a model for otheremerging donors in two ways: first, the use ithas made of its own development successes hasproven reasonable and promising; second, trian-gular cooperation between an emerging donor,

an OECD donor, and a low-income country pro-vide many positive learning effects for all of theparties involved.

On the whole, the emerging donors will, in thelong term, prove able to change the interna-tional donor structures, true to the notion“competition is good for business.” The discus-sion over normative standards for developmentcooperation will prove to be of central signifi-cance for possible changes in the internationaldonor community: What standards should applyuniversally in development cooperation? What

degree of transparency should be required? Andwhat about the conditionality on which the pro-vision of development aid is generally predicated?The basic normative principle presently sub-scribed to and defended by the OECD is cur-rently being challenged by the practices in whichthe emerging donors engage. The readiness toengage in dialogue that is emphasized by theOECD donors must be seen as one positive stepon the road to demonstratively integratingemerging donors into the established donorcommunity.

The OECD and the G8 are forums well suited toinitiate just such dialogue processes, althoughthey may approach their limits when the concernis to put principles and standards binding forboth emerging donors and established donorson a permanent and legal footing. For it is onlythe condition of “full membership” for theemerging donors in these multilateral bodiesthat could create the common ground neededto shape an array of highly different policy fieldsthat would measure up to the guiding vision of a

fair and multipolar world order. But whether ornot there is any such readiness on the part ofthe OECD or the G8 to expand cooperation, theprinciple question is and remains whether theemerging donors would at all be interested inaccepting - in the sense of integration - the list

of values embraced by OECD or G8, since thiswould require them to accept the “acquis com-munitaire.”

The ongoing debate over South-South coopera-tion between emerging donors and Africa is avery emotional one. In the eyes of some Westerndevelopment experts, the activities of the emerg-ing donors are “operations that disregard hu-man rights” and serve primarily to secure na-tional energy requirements. While the motiva-tion for the engagement of the emerging donorsin countries like Angola or Sudan is in fact highly

doubtful, one can only agree with Jeffrey Sachs’view of the matter: “It is a caricature to say thatthe new donor countries are only in it for theirown self-interest - and the traditional donorcountries are there out of the goodness of theirhearts.” The activities of old and new donorscannot be measured using two different stan-dards.

A debate focusing only on development policywould necessarily fall short of the mark. Instead,OECD and non-OECD countries also need toreach agreement on coherent and transparentapproaches to policy-making on the one handand trade and investment standards on theother. Such dialogues should be conducted bothwithin the OECD and G8 communities and withthe emerging donors.

About the author:

Catrina Schläger is a staff member with the De-velopment Policy Department of the FriedrichEbert Stiftung in Berlin.




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Friedrich-Ebert-StiftungHiroshimastrasse 1710785 BerlinGermanyTel.: ++49-30-26-935-914Fax: ++49-30-26-935-959Roswitha Kiewitt@fes de

Selected further FES publications on "New Powers for Global Change"

Challenges for International Development Cooperation: The Case of China

Katharina Hofmann

Briefing Paper 15-06, FES Berlin, November 2006

India's Role in the Emerging World Order

Ummu Salma Bava

Briefing Paper 4-07, FES New Delhi, March 2007

South Africa's Global Strategy and Status

Chris Landsberg

Briefing Paper 16-06, FES Johannesburg, November 2006

China's Role in the Emerging World Order

Hans J. Giessmann

Briefing Paper 13-06, FES Beijing, October 2006

Egypt's Foreign Policy in Global Change -

The Egyptian Role in Regional and International Politics

Mohamed Kadry SaidBriefing Paper 11-06, FES Cairo, October 2006

Mexico – a Reluctant Middle Power?

Olga Pellicer

FES Briefing Papers, FES New York, June 2006

More information is available on:

www.fes.de/globalization

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily the ones of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for whichthe author works.

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Challenges for Int'l Dev. Coop.

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