Certification ReportThis certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product...

Certification Report

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0186-2004

for

SafeGuard® Easy, Version 3.20 SR1for Microsoft Windows® 2000

from

Utimaco Safeware AG

- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn

Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 BonnPhone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111

BSI-DSZ-CC-0186-2004

SafeGuard® Easy, Version 3.20 SR1

for Microsoft Windows® 2000

from

Utimaco Safeware AGCommon Criteria Arrangement

The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation,Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with CommonCriteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.

Evaluation Results:

Functions: Product specific Security TargetCommon Criteria part 2 conformant

Assurance Package: Common Criteria part 3 conformantEAL3

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluatedconfiguration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification schemeof the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluationfacility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.

Bonn, 24. September 2004

The President of the Federal Officefor Information Security

Dr. Helmbrecht L.S. SOGIS-MRA

The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryptionand decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for InformationSecurity or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warrantyof the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation thatrecognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

BSI-DSZ-CC-0186-2004 Certification Report

V

Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has thetask of issuing certificates for information technology products.Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or adistributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the productaccording to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognisedsecurity criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by theBSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. Thisreport contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and thedetailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the securityfunctionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength andweaknesses) and instructions for the user.

1 Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of

17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0186-2004

VI

Contents

Part A: Certification

Part B: Certification Results

Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria


A-1

A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid downin the following:

• BSIG2

• BSI Certification Ordinance3

• BSI Schedule of Costs4

• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (FederalMinistry of the Interior)

• DIN EN 45011 standard

• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)

• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15

• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)

- Part 1, Version 0.6

- Part 2, Version 1.0

• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme(AIS)

The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance ofthe certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and CommonMethodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteriarecognition arrangement committees.

2 Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of

17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 28343 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for

Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

4 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838

5 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in theBundesanzeiger p. 19445


A-2

2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countriesa mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates arebased on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates

The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based onITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by thenational bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Thisagreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended toinclude certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).

2.2 CC - Certificates

An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition ofcertificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and includingEAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of ProtectionProfiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodiesof Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israeljoined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austriain November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan inNovember 2003.


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3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniformprocedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product SafeGuard® Easy, Version 3.20 SR16 for Microsoft Windows®

20007 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product SafeGuard® Easy, Version 3.20 SR1 for MicrosoftWindows® 2000 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The T-Systems GEIGmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8 recognised by BSI.

The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Utimaco Safeware AG.

The certification is concluded with• the comparability check and• the production of this Certification Report.

This work was completed by the BSI on 24. September 2004.

The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as

given in the following report, are observed,• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in

the following report.

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicatedhere. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, inaccordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does notreveal any security deficiencies.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength offunctions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of theCertification Report.

6 Service Release 17 Microsoft Windows® 2000 is called in the following only Windows 2000.8 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility


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4 Publication

The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B -20.

The product SafeGuard® Easy, Version 3.20 SR1 for Windows 2000 has beenincluded in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly(see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtainedfrom BSI-Infoline 0228/9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor9 ofthe product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-mentioned website.

9 Utimaco Safeware AG, Hohemarkstraße 22, D-61440 Oberursel


B-1

B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,

• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and

• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.


B-2

Contents of the certification results

1 Executive Summary 3

2 Identification of the TOE 8

3 Security Policy 8

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9

5 Architectural Information 11

6 Documentation 13

7 IT Product Testing 13

8 Evaluated Configuration 15

9 Results of the Evaluation 16

10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations 17

11 Annexes 18

12 Security Target 18

13 Definitions 18

14 Bibliography 20


B-3

1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SafeGuard® Easy, Version 3.20 SR1 forWindows 2000.

SafeGuard Easy (SGE) is a software product to ensure secure access to dataon Personal Computers (PCs). It works on a high security level but is easy toinstall, maintain and use.This product under evaluation is designed for the Microsoft operating systemWindows 2000. (Versions of SGE also are available for other PC operatingsystems, but are not part of this evaluation).The security of SGE prevents unauthorised users from access to all data on thehard disk(s) of a PC operating under the named operating system.Basically, the security provided by SGE bases upon the encryption of entirehard disk partitions. User authentication is done by PBA (Pre BootAuthentication) prior to booting the operating system. In this way, the access todata is restricted to authorised individuals only.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of(i) the installable program code including the installation program of

SafeGuard® Easy, Version 3.20 SR1 for Windows 2000, Englishand German program version, delivered on the SafeGuard Easyprogram CD-ROM, identified as “[SafeGuard® Easy 3.20 SR1]”,where only the following parts of the installed programs implementthe security functionality of the TOE:(a) the system kernel of SGE,(b) the master boot record of SGE,(c) the drivers needed for encrypting and decrypting user data,(d) the installation program and the administration program,

(ii) the User's Guide for using and administrating SGE, called"SafeGuard Easy – Data protection by encryption – Version 3.20SR1, User’s Manual, Utimaco Safeware AG, 2003” (EnglishVersion, pdf file) and"SafeGuard Easy – Zugangsschutz durch Verschlüsselung –Version 3.20 SR1, Handbuch, Utimaco Safeware AG, 2003"(German Version, pdf file)

(iii) the User's Guide Enhancement for secure operation, called"SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20 SR1 – Manual for certificationcompliant operation – Utimaco Safeware AG, September 2004"(English Version) and"SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20 SR1 – Handbuch für denzertifizierungskonformen Betrieb – Utimaco Safeware AG,September 2004" (German Version)


B-4

The IT product SafeGuard Easy,Version 3.20 SR1 for Windows 2000 wasevaluated by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 15.September 2004. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)10

recognised by BSI.

The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Utimaco Safeware AG.

1.1 Assurance package

The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurancecomponents and classes defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. The TOEmeets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL3 (EvaluationAssurance Level 3).

1.2 Functionality

TOE security functional requirements taken from Part 2 of the CC [1]

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generationFCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destructionFCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operationFDP_ACC.1 Subset access controlFDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based on access controlFDP_ETC.1 Export of user data without security attributesFDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributesFIA_UID.2 User identification before any actionFIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any actionFMT_SMR.1 Security rolesFMT.MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviourFMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributesFMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributesFMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisationFMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data

Tabelle B1: TOE security functional requirements

1.3 Strength of Function

The TOE’s minimum strength of function is rated ‘SOF-medium’. The strength offunction is only claimed for the security function “Pre Boot Authentication (PBA)”(refer to [6], chapter7.1.1). There is no strength applied to the security function“Protection of Data on Hard Disk Partitions” because the assessment ofcrytographic strength is out of scope.

10 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility


B-5

1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)addressed by the evaluated IT product

The following threats should be averted by the TOE:

<T.ACCESS> An unauthorised individual <S.UNAU> attempts to perform asubstantial access <ACC.SUB> to any data stored onencrypted hard disk partitions <D.USER>. This attack isexpected to be performed after having the PC switched off.("Substantial access" means reading, writing or modifyinginformation; "any data" means data files, program files,operating system files and file system information).

<T.MANAGE> An unauthorised individual <S.UNAU> attempts to performTOE management operations (changing the protection statusof the TOE or modifying other TSF data <D.TSF>). This attackis expected to be performed when the PC is not in operationalstate.

There were no organisational security policies defined.

1.5 Special configuration requirements

System configuration during installation:The following settings have to be selected during the installation and firstconfiguration of SafeGuard Easy:

• Installation Type: Complete System• Installation Options: None of the options “Secure Auto Logon” (SAL),

“Configuration File Wizard”, “Response Code Wizard” and “AutomaticSmartCard Logon” (SCAL) shall be selected.

• Installation Mode: Define system settings interactively• Encryption Mode: Standard (full hard disk encryption)• Workstation settings: PBA enabled (“Password at system start”) and

hidden password entry set• Workstation settings: Minimum password length: 8 characters. Caution:

This requires an explicit modification of the initial default settings, which inthis case is 6 characters.

• Encryption Algorithm for hard disk encryption: AES-128, AES-256,Rijndael-256, DES or IDEA

• Encryption keys: It is strongly recommended to select a random key forhard disk encryption. When despite defining a hard disk encryption keymanually, it has to be observed, that the maximum number of randomlyselected characters is input (max. 32 characters). Trivial keys (like”123456" or ”aaaaaaaa", for example) shall not be used, because theycould easily be guessed by an attacker (please see also [10] and [11]).

Caution: Once you have selected random key, do not edit the Key orRepeat Key Field any more.


B-6

• Selection of passwords: To prevent passwords from being guessed orsystematically tested (dictionary attack) do not choose passwords fromyour private environment (e.g. names of family members or otherrelatives). Also do not choose trivial passwords like ASCII or keyboardsequences (e.g. “abcdefgh”, 12345678..” or “asdfghjk...”). SafeGuard Easytests passwords for triviality and issues an appropriate warning. (pleasesee also “Error Corrections of User’s Manual” at the end of this brochure).Inserting one ore more of the allowed special characters like “$%&?=...”increases resistance against dictionary attacks significantly.

• Master Boot Record: From MBR Protection select “Standard Action”,“Display Warning” and “Restore MBR”. The selection “MBR Options” withits subcategory “Keep original MBR” is with Windows 2000 available onlyon Compaq PCs having a bootable setup partition. Please select thisoption only when needed to correctly operate your PC.

Settings for additional users:When defining new users for an installation of SafeGuard Easy, it shall be inmind, that in the scope of certification all users are on the same level as theuser “System”. So the following settings for a new user are required:

• Simplified Remote logon: off• Template: none• Expiration date: no expiration• Change password at next logon: no• Password change: no period to change password• Rights: all available rights set

Note: During installation SafeGuard Easy creates a user named “User”, whoinitially does have neither a password nor any rights set. Since user namescannot be changed, you shall delete this user and create new ones withmeaningful names following the above rules.

1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment

Hardware Requirements

The TOE runs on personal computer systems with following minimumrequirements:• microprocessor Intel Pentium (or successor type like Pentium II) or

compatible device, with 32-bit internal operation, suitable for Windows2000

• minimum system RAM of 32 MB,• hard disk with a minimum of 4 MB free storage,• CD-ROM drive for installation.

The TOE supports furthermore following hardware devices:• up to four hard disks:

hard disks may be accessed via IDE, Advanced IDE or SCSI controller,


B-7

Because of its security measures, SGE is especially suitable for the protectionof user data on mobile computers.

Software Requirements

Operating System:

The version of SGE under this evaluation is provided for the following operatingsystem:

Microsoft Windows 2000(Professional and Server, International versions for support of Westerncharacter sets)

SGE works with all available file systems under Windows 2000: FAT, FAT32,NTFS4, and NTFS5 (EFS).

Application Software Requirements:

The TOE is working together with all application software, which is released forthe mentioned operating system platform. However, application software, whichis not using the respective Application Programming Interface of the OSplatform for disk access, but circumventing some layers of the disk accesssystem, may read encrypted sectors from the disk and therefore may notrecognise the file structure on the disk correctly. Such software may also writeplain text data directly onto a protected device. Then these data are notprotected by the TOE against unauthorised disclosure.

In practice, such software has not been known to the vendor, except for specialhard disk repair and copy functions. Using such software for hard disk repairand copy functions, while the TOE is installed, is not advised, as this also may -in extreme consequence - damage the TOE installation.

Connectivity Aspects:

SGE works on any PC which meets hardware and software requirements, notregarding, if the PC is stand alone or if it is connected over a data line to anyother computer system.Data connection may include:• Connection to a LAN (Local Area Network) or a WAN (Wide Area

Network) by Ethernet, Arcnet or others• Remote access connection to another computer system via serial line

(serial cable, modem, USB connection).In these cases it must be observed, that the security from SGE extends only tothe local disk drives, and that there is no encryption of virtual drives in networkenvironments.Security may be inactive, when the secured PC is operated while connected toanother computer system and parts of the PC's hard disk(s) are accessible toother users or programs (via shared partitions/drives/volumes, directories orfiles) within this connection. In this case, any user having access to thoseshares has access to the plain text data stored in it.For these reasons, the threats defined for the TOE restrict denial of access forunauthorised users to the state, where the PC is not in operational state and the


B-8

unauthorised individual tries to access data by anyhow setting the PC intooperation or removing the hard disk from the PC and examining the deviceseparately.Also attention has to be paid to the fact, that, when the PC -with the TOEinstalled on it- is operated in connection to any other computer system, it mightbe possible for unauthorised individuals to manipulate the TOE in a way, that itssecurity functionality can be circumvented or deactivated (e.g. by installing“Trojan Horse”-type programs/scripts). Therefore no partition-/drive-/volume-,directory- or file-shares shall be defined on a PC secured by the TOE.When the TOE is operated in a network with connection to the Internet, acorrectly installed and maintained firewall system shall be established toprevent access to the protected PC’s hard disk(s) and memory by unauthorisedindividuals from outside.

1.7 Disclaimers

The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in theCertificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed inthis Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT productby the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisationthat recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the ITproduct by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to thiscertificate, is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification of the TOE

SafeGuard® Easy, Version 3.20 SR1 for Windows2000, English and German programm version

Version 3.20 SR1 CD-ROM

“SafeGuard® Easy Version 3.20 SR1 – Dataprotection by encryption – Windows® 95,Windows® 98 SE, Windows® NT 4.0,Windows® 2000, Windows® XP –User’s Manual, Utimaco Safeware AG, 2003”(English Version)

Version 3.20 SR12003

.pdf-file

“SafeGuard® Easy Version 3.20 SR1 – Zugangsschutz durch Verschlüsselung – Windows® 95, Windows® 98 SE, Windows® NT4.0, Windows® 2000, Windows® XP – Handbuch,Utimaco Safeware AG, 2003" (German Version)

Version 3.20 SR12003

.pdf-file

“SafeGuard® Easy Version 3.20 SR1 – Manual forcertification compliant operation – UtimacoSafeware AG, September 2004" (English Version)

Version 3.20 SR1September 2004

paper

“SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20 SR1 – Handbuchfür den zertifizierungskonformen Betrieb –Utimaco Safeware AG, September 2004"(German Version)

Version 3.20 SR1September 2004

paper


B-9

3 Security Policy

SafeGuard Easy is a software product installed on a PC to preventunauthorised access to user data stored on hard disk partitions. In this context,user data means all files on hard disk partitions, i.e. data files, program files andeven files of the operating system. The protection of the user data stored onhard disk partitions is realised by encryption. Encryption guarantees theconfidentiality of data and is done on sector level - not on file level. Thisprovides the advantage of being independent from the behaviour of applicationprograms and processing files difficult to handle, like temporary file areas orpaging files of the operating system.User identification and authentication is done by PBA (Pre Boot Authentication)prior to booting the operating system. Only after a successful authentication, theuser has access to the data on the hard disk partition. In this way, the access todata is restricted to the authorised individuals only. On a running system, afterauthentication, the encryption is completely transparent to the user, so that he isnormally not aware of the security mechanisms behind. After shutting down theoperating system and switching off the PC, the entire hard disk partitions areencrypted and therefore secured. Booting the PC from any devicecircumventing PBA results in a view to encrypted hard disk partitions.Authentication bases upon user names and secret passwords. Thecryptographic key necessary to encrypt the user data stored on the hard disk isencrypted with the password of each user and is secured in this way.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

4.1 Usage assumptions

The following measures have to be taken, as long as SafeGuard Easy isinstalled on a PC:• The configuration selected during installation shall not be modified later.

Especially the encryption of the hard disk partitions shall not be switchedoff.

• The logical access to the hard disk(s) after booting from floppy disk or adifferent boot device is protected, when the recommended systemconfiguration is correctly installed. However, to obtain an additionalprotection of the system against spying out a SafeGuard Easy passwordwith the help of a ”Trojan Horse“ program, the PC has to be securedagainst booting from any other device than the hard disk by appropriatemeasures. This provides protection against "Trojan Horse" attacks withinthe normal environment of an authorized user. In case of a stolen PC the"Trojan Horse" attack is not relevant, because the intermediate "help" ofan authorized user is not available.


B-10

• Each user has to keep his selected password(s) secret. It isrecommended not to record passwords either manually or electronically.If despite of this passwords are written down, the records have to be keptin a secret place.

• A Challenge Code (cf. Manual, par. 6.4) shall not be generated nor sentto anyone else. If an attacker gets hold of both the Challenge- and thecorresponding Response Code, the password for the current installationmay be disclosed. If nevertheless this function is used, it must beensured, that challenge and response is transmitted via secure channelsand a secure identification of the requesting user takes place.

• If the safety feature “Kernel Backup” is used, the created backups haveto be stored on removable media and kept in a secure place.

• Within an authorized user’s normal environment it might be possible, toreplace the user’s original PC by an externally identical but speciallyprepared one. This can only be detected by checking the identity of thePC prior to identification to PBA.

• When leaving the workstation for a short time the Windows screenblanking should be enabled (button [Lock workstation]); leaving theworkstation for a longer period of time, the PC should be switched off andthen rebooted.

4.2 Environmental assumptions

• The PC, where SafeGuard Easy is installed, and the environment, where thePC is operated by any authorized user has to be secured against devices,which are capable of recording the password entered by an authorized user.Such devices may be keyboard grabbers in the cable between keyboard andPC, which are able to record the keystrokes as well as video camerascapturing the user during password entry.

4.3 Clarification of scope

The threats listed below have to be averted in order to support the TOE securitycapabilities but are not addressed by the TOE itself. They have to be addressedby the operating environment of the TOE (for detailed information about thethreats refer to the Security Target [6]).

The following threats should be averted by the environment:

<T.PASSW> An unauthorised individual <S.UNAU> gets the password<D.PASSW> of an authorised individual <S.USER> (any userknowing any valid user name/password combination of thecurrent installation). This includes password recording usinghardware devices or software tools. In the case of passworddisclosure, an unauthorised person becomes an authorisedperson. As a consequence, there is no longer protectionagainst <T.ACCESS> and <T.MANAGE>.


B-11

<T.INTRUD> An intruder <S.UNAU> succeeds in placing non-trustedsoftware on the PC’s hard disk designed to attack (disclose ormodify) the TOE software or its TSF data <D.TSF>. Theattacker’s program will be executed by the authorised user(Trojan horse), unnoticed (virus), or accidentally (both).With such an attack, the attacker attempts (i) to disclosecryptographic keys or passwords in order to break orcircumvent the certain security functions of the TOE, or (ii) tomodify software of the TOE to cause the TOE’s securityfunctions or measures to fail or to operate against the securitypolicy. In either cases, the attacker attempts to succeed inperforming <T.ACCESS> or <T.MANAGE>.

<T.DIRECT> Non-trusted software, which does not use the respectiveApplication Programming Interface of the OS platform for diskaccess, but directly accesses the hard disk by circumventinglayers of the disk access system, is placed on the PC’s harddisk or executed while the computer is operated. In this case,the threat <T.ACCESS> is no longer averted.

Furthermore SGE is not intended to be used on servers in a network(however it will work there).

SGE can not guarantee complete integrity of data, as e.g. sectors of the harddisk are not physically write protected. So, for example, the hard disk may beformatted, if it is possible to boot the system from a different booting devicethan the built-in hard disk. Usually, physical sector modifications on anencrypted hard disk will be detected, because (after decryption) they will atleast generate unuseful random nonsense data.

Floppy disk encryption and device encryption of removable devices are notincluded within the scope of the certified security functions.

5 Architectural Information

The SGE 3.20 SR1 hard disk protection is a software (SW) consisting of thefollowing main components:Real mode kernel working on BIOS level, together with a modified Master BootRecord, Windows 32-bit filter driver, and administration and installationprograms; here this mainly refers to the SafeGuard Easy 32-bit administrationapplication.


B-12

Additionally a real mode program can be generated to be started from an externbootable medium (e.g. floppy disk) called Emergency Administration Program.A top level description and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOEdescription of the “Security Target”, [6]. The complete software description andthe complete instruction set of the SGE 3.20 SR1 hard disk protection can befound in the Guidance Documents [8], [9], [10] and [11].For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the componentsmentioned above are realized within the software.

TSF enforcing non TSF enforcing

Subsystems of main component [C1], Real mode kernel working on BIOSlevel, together with a modified Master Boot Record:

[S1.2] PBA Module [S1.1] Modified Master Boot Record

[S1.3] PBA Support Module

[S1.4] Real Mode Kernel Data Handler

[S1.5] Real Mode Encryption Driver &Plugins

Subsystems of main component [C2], Windows 32-bit filter driver:

[S2.1] Windows 32-bit Filter DriverFrame

[S2.2] Windows 32-bit Crypto Modules

Subsystems of main component [C3], Administration and installationprograms:

[S3.1] Main Installation Program [S3.4] Device and Floppy EncryptionSwitching Program

[S3.2] Deinstallation Program [S3.5] Emergency Disk Wizard

[S3.3] Windows 32-bit AdministrationProgram

[S3.7] Response Generator

[S3.6] Windows 16-bit EmergencyAdministration Program

[S3.8] Configuration File Wizard

Table B5: Subsystems defined by the High-Level Design catogorized into TSP enforcing and other


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6 Documentation

The following documents are provided for a customer, who purchases the TOE:

SafeGuard® Easy Version 3.20 Service Release 1– Data Protection by Encryption –– Windows® 95, Windows® 98 SE,Windows® NT 4.0, Windows® 2000, Windows® XP – User’s Manual,Utimaco Safeware AG, 2003 (English Version, pdf file) [8]

SafeGuard® Easy Version 3.20 Service Release 1– Zugangsschutz durch Verschlüsselung –– Windows® 95, Windows® 98SE, Windows® NT 4.0, Windows® 2000, Windows® XP – Handbuch,Utimaco Safeware AG, 2003 (German Version, pdf file) [9]

SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20 SR1, – Manual for certification compliantoperation – Utimaco Safeware AG, September 2004 (English Version) [10]

SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20 SR1 – Handbuch für denzertifizierungskonformen Betrieb – Utimaco Safeware AG, September 2004(German Version) [11]

Table B6: Documentation delivered with the TOE

7 IT Product Testing

The test effort provided by the developer is described in the documents‘Functional Test for Certified Operation’ [12] and ‘Test Documentation’ [13]. Thelatter comprises the test plan and sufficiency rationales that has to be providedfor the assurance requirements given by the class ATE and has to be seen asan overview document. The test preparation, procedures, expected and actualresults are included by ‘Functional Test for Certified Operation’ [12].The developer additionally provided a ‘Testspecification’ [14] that comprises thewhole functional testing effort for the product SGE 3.20 SR1. Most of thesetests are not applicable to the TOE that has to be installed and operated withstrict value settings to meet the CC conformant configuration.The developer tested the TOE on two different hardware environments (PC withIDE hard disk (>8 MB) with a NTFS partition and a PC with a IDE hard disk(>16 MB) with two FAT32 partitions). Both environments were operated withWindows 2000. The configuration was set with valid parameters with respect tothe ‘Security Target’ [6] and the guidance [8], [9], [10] and [11]. The TOEconformant parameters are especially specified in the supplementary guidance[10] and [11].All of the performed tests are manually executed, guided by the test descriptionspecified in ‘Functional Test for Certified Operation’ [12]. These tests directlyinfluence the user interfaces. The developer divided the test cases into thefunctional units of the TOE as specified within the FSP. For this, the test cases


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are divided into concise parts, so that the security functions with their behaviourcould be sufficiently tested and assessed.To test the encryption and decryption behaviour of the TOE (hard disk interface)the developer analysed the hard disk with appropriate tools. Single sectors ofthe physical hard disk device are read out (Disk edit) in encrypted an decryptedmode. These data were analysed with a reference implementation (Crypto Test)of the cryptographic algorithms for equality.In case that the observed actual test results meet the expected test results thetester has confirmed this within the document ‘Functional Test for CertifiedOperation’ [12]. Therefore every test case comprises a table for the resultconfirmation. For each test the tester had to be named, and the results had tobe signed manually. The developer provided a copy of a completely filled outdocument version for the evaluation process.As required by the CEM [2], work unit [3:ATE_IND.2-11], the evaluator shallreport in the ETR the evaluator testing effort, outlining the testing approach,configuration, depth and results.The evaluators have carried out a subset of test cases to examine the correctimplementation of the security functions. The test subset chosen by theevaluators comprises two parts. The first part is given by a sample of developertests as specified in ‘Functional Test for Certified Operation’ [12] beingrepeated.The evaluators repeated the following tests:

1.1 Installation and Initial Hard Disk Encryption

1.2 Deinstallation and Final Hard Disk Decryption

1.3 Encryption Algorithms

1.8 Real Mode Encryption /Transistion to Protected Mode

2.1 PBA Installation

2.2 (a, b, c, d, e) PBA Authentication (correct password, invalid user namecheck, invalid password check, delay time after reboot, reset delayafter correct username and password entry)

2.3 (a, b, c) Password Change during PBA (Successful password changeafter authentication, behaviour on incorrect authentication, checksecurity attributes against insecure values)

3.1 Administration Program Login

3.2 Password Change with Administration Program

3.4 (a) Changing Default Settings within the TOE valid ranges (Increasepassword length)

3.5 (a, b, c) Emergency Administration (correct password, incorrectpassword entry check, system de-installation)


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The other test part comprises independent evaluator tests. These can bedevided into functional tests and penetration tests.The evaluator has carried out 19 individual test cases, comprising fivepenetration tests. Some independent tests have been adopted by the developerduring the evaluation process (e.g. Test 5, 6, 7 ,8, 11 and 14).For both parts of test activity the evaluators have repeated at least onedeveloper test for each TSF.Overall the evaluators would like to point out that the developer providedsufficient tests for each TSF. These tests have been verified and extended bythe evaluators as appropriate. Because of the positive testing results theevaluators are convinced that the TOE correctly implements the TSF.

8 Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is a software product to ensure secure access to and protection ofdata on Personal Computers (PCs). After installation the TOE provides atransparent encryption (write process) and decryption (read process) of the harddisk data for authorised users. Users are authorised by password authenticationprocesses.The TOE is defined uniquely by the name SafeGuard Easy 3.20 SR1 forWindows 2000 (short: SGE 3.20 SR1). Its implementation representation and its(unique) configuration are specified by the Configuration List the in appendicesof the document “SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20 SR1 – ConfigurationManagement Documentation, Utimaco Safeware AG, Version 1.02,12.08.2003“.The “Single Evaluation Report: Safe Guard Easy – Configuration Management”states that the product is uniquely referenced by a version number (3.20 SR1for the TOE). The configuration list is given by “SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20SR1 – Configuration List, Utimaco Safeware AG, Configuration List Version 1,11.07.2003” and “SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20SR1 – Configuration List forEvaluation Documentation, Utimaco Safeware AG, Configuration ListVersion 11, 07.09.2004”. The Version “3.20 SR1” is stored and printed on a CD-R.

SafeGuard® Easy 3.20 SR1,

Application for Windows 95 / 98 / Me /NT 4.0 / 2000 / XP

English German French

Copyright © 2003

Utimaco Safeware AG

Note: The evaluation started with the TOE version “SGE 3.0” and was changedduring the evaluation process to the version “SGE 3.20 SR1”. Between the twoversions of the TOE no security functionality has changed. A detailed analysis isgiven by “Differences SGE 3.20 SR1 vs 3.00”.


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The SafeGuard Easy program CD-ROM containing the installable program codeand the installation program was used to perform the TOE evaluator tests in theevaluator’s laboratory and at the developer’s site.The TOE used to perform the tests was provided by Utimaco in Oberursel. TheTOE is labelled as stated above.

9 Results of the Evaluation

The verdicts of each Single Evaluation Report is given in the following table:

Single Evaluation Report Verdict

Security Target PASS

Functional Specification, incl. Correspondence Demonstration PASS

High-level Design, incl. Correspondence Demonstration PASS

Configuration Management PASS

Delivery and Operation PASS

Life Cycle support PASS

Guidance Documentation PASS

Test PASS

Vulnerability Assessment PASS

Table B9: Results of the Single Evaluation Reports

In accordance to the CEM [2] (together with the Final Interpretations accordingto [4]) the evaluators report here the conclusions of the evaluation, which willrelate to whether the TOE has satisfied its associated ST, in particular theoverall verdict as defined in CC Part 1 Chapter 5, and determined by applicationof the verdict assignment described in Section 1.4 of the CEM.The TOE was evaluated in accordance to the Evaluation Assurance LevelEAL3 provided by part 3 of the CC [1]. There where no augmentations:Therefore the evaluation is considered to be Part 3 Conformant.The Security Target [6] claims, that the TOE (SafeGuard Easy 3.20 SR1 forWindows 2000) will fulfil the TOE security functional requirements(Part 2 Conformant) given in chapter B 1.2 of this document that are takenfrom CC Part 2.

These security functional requirements are claimed to be realised by the TSF

<SF1> Pre Boot Authentication (PBA)<SF2> Protection of Data on Hard Disk Partitions<SF3> Installation and Secure Administration


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(for further details see [6]). The evaluation in accordance to EAL3 has shownthat the TOE security functional requirements are correctly realised by the threeTOE security functions. Thus, in realising these functional requirements, it isassured that the TOE meets the security objectives claimed in the “SecurityTarget” [6] effectively.The evaluators determines that the Security Target does not claim conformanceto a Protection Profile.The evaluators have checked that the statements of all Single EvaluationReports listed in above are valid and assessed with a PASS assessment.The classification of subsystems of the TOE as indicated in chapter B5 is valid.On the basis of the evaluation results of the Single Evaluation Reports theevaluators come to following verdict:

1. The requirements of the evaluation level EAL3 are fulfilled.2. The minimum strength of functions is: medium

The evaluation has shown that the TOE will effectively fulfil this strength offunction claim.

Note that there is no strength applied to the in <SF2> realised encryption /decryption mechanisms (DES, IDEA, AES-128, AES-256, Rijndael-256)because the assessment of cryptographic strength is out of scope.

10 Comments/Recommendations

Imposed conditions and directions to the developer

There are no imposed conditions or directions to the developer.

Recommendations and directions to the user

The guidance documentation [8], [9], [10] and [11] contains all necessaryinformation about the usage of the TOE.Besides the requirements

- to follow the instructions in the user guidance documents, especially inthe supplementary documentation ([10] and [11]) and

- to ensure fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in theSecurity Target (see [6]),

the evaluators have the following recommendation to the user of the TOE:

As the usage of the challenge response mechanism showed a vulnerabilityfacilitating access to a valid system password, the evaluators recommend theuser to block the response interface by setting up SYSTEM as the only user.With this a user is not able to generate a challenge at all and the chance ofmisuse is completely eliminated. It has to be stressed that [10] and [11] containsufficient information to guide the user or the administrator not to use thechallenge response mechanism.


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11 Annexes

none

12 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation(TOE) is provided within a separate document. This document represents thecomplete Security Target used for evaluation.

13 Definitions

13.1 Acronyms

BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / FederalOffice for Information Security

CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation

EAL Evaluation Assurance Level

IT Information Technology

PP Protection Profile

SF Security Function

SFP Security Function Policy

SOF Strength of Function

ST Security Target

TOE Target of Evaluation

TSC TSF Scope of Control

TSF TOE Security Functions

TSP TOE Security Policy

SGE SafeGuard Easy

PBA Pre Boot Authentication

13.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CCPart 3 to an EAL or assurance package.


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Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements notcontained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of theCC.

Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information andupon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon forenforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be usedas the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressingthe minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected securitybehaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows thatthe function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOEsecurity by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis showsthat the function provides adequate protection against straightforward orintentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attackpotential.

SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows thatthe function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned ororganised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attackpotential.

Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associatedadministrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of anevaluation.

TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, andfirmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of theTSP.

TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,protected and distributed within a TOE.

TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within aTOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.


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14 Bibliography

[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,Version 2.1, August 1999

[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,August 1999

[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)

[4] Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant forthe TOE.

[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodicallyupdated list published also on the BSI Web-site

[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0186, Version 1.06.00, 2004-04-30,Utimaco Safeware AG

[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 08.09.2004 (confidentialdocument)

User Guidance Documentation:

[8] SafeGuard Easy – Data protection by encryption – Version 3.20SR1,User’s Manual, Utimaco Safeware AG, 2003

[9] SafeGuard Easy – Zugangsschutz durch Verschlüsselung – Version3.20SR1, Handbuch, Utimaco Safeware AG, 2003

[10] SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20SR1 – Manual for certification compliantoperation – Utimaco Safeware AG, September 2004

[11] SafeGuard Easy Version 3.20SR1 – Handbuch für denzertifizierungskonformen Betrieb – Utimaco Safeware AG, September2004

Testdocumentation:

[12] SafeGuard Easy Evaluation Documentation for SafeGuard EasyVersion 3.20SR1; Test Specification: Functional Test for CertifiedOperation, Roland Reinl, Version 1.03, 07.04.2004 (confidentialdocument)

[13] SafeGuard Easy Evaluation Documentation for SafeGuard EasyVersion 3.20SR1; Test Documentation, Roland Reinl, Version 1.03,31.03.2004 (confidential document)

[14] SafeGuard Easy Evaluation Documentation for SafeGuard EasyVersion 3.20SR1; Testspecification, Erwin Kümmel, Version 1.03,25.03.2004 (confidential document)


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C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008

The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that ismet by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presentedwith respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, ifapplicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirementsare based only upon functional components in Part 2

Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirementsinclude functional components not in Part 2

plus one of the following:

Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirementsare based only upon assurance components in Part 3

Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirementsinclude assurance requirements not in Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to setsof defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined namedfunctional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions orassurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformanceresult.

Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-definednamed functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functionsor assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part ofthe conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect toProtection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of theconformance result.


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CC Part 3:

Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)

„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown inTable 2.1.

Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated NameClass ACM:

Configurationmanagement

CM automation ACM_AUT

CM capabilities ACM_CAPCM scope ACM_SCP

Class ADO: Deliveryand operation

Delivery ADO_DEL

Installation, generation and start-up ADO_IGSClass ADV:

DevelopmentFunctional specification ADV_FSP

High-level design ADV_HLDImplementation representation ADV_IMPTSF internals ADV_INTLow-level design ADV_LLDRepresentation correspondence ADV_RCRSecurity policy modeling ADV_SPM

Class AGD: Guidancedocuments

Administrator guidance AGD_ADM

User guidance AGD_USRClass ALC: Life cycle

supportDevelopment security ALC_DVS

Flaw remediation ALC_FLRLife cycle definition ALC_LCDTools and techniques ALC_TAT

Class ATE: Tests Coverage ATE_COVDepth ATE_DPTFunctional tests ATE_FUNIndependent testing ATE_IND

Class AVA:Vulnerabilityassessment

Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA

Misuse AVA_MSUStrength of TOE security functions AVA_SOFVulnerability analysis AVA_VLA

Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“


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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)

„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balancesthe level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree ofassurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOEat the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during theoperational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included inthe EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirableassurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will beconsidered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provideutility.

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)

Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchicallyordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in theresulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurancelevels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchicallyordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. Theincrease in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of ahierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance componentsfrom other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components asdescribed in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more thanone component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of everycomponent are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations ofassurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurancecomponents (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or thesubstitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurancecomponent in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructsdefined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus aconstituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utilityand added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also beextended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.


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AssuranceClass

AssuranceFamily

Assurance Components byEvaluation Assurance Level

EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7Configurationmanagement

ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2

ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3

Delivery andoperation

ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3

ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4

ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3ADV_INT 1 2 3ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3

Guidancedocuments

AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1Life cyclesupport

ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2

ALC_FLRALC_LCD 1 2 2 3ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3

Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3

Vulnerabilityassessment

AVA_CCA 1 2 2

AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4

Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“


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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)

„Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but thethreats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independentassurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised withrespect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, includingindependent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidancedocumentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfullyconducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a mannerconsistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection againstidentified threats.“

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)

„Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of designinformation and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of thedeveloper than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should notrequire a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users requirea low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of readyavailability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise whensecuring legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked(chapter 6.2.3)

„Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positivesecurity engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sounddevelopment practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require amoderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigationof the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, andreviewed (chapter 6.2.4)

„Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive securityengineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,


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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is thehighest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existingproduct line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users requirea moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodityTOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested(chapter 6.2.5)

„Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineeringbased upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderateapplication of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably bedesigned and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely thatthe additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorousdevelopment without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users requirea high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require arigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable tospecialist security engineering techniques.“

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design andtested (chapter 6.2.6)

„Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of securityengineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce apremium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application inhigh risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additionalcosts.“

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested(chapter 6.2.7)

„Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremelyhigh risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused securityfunctionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“


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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)

AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions

„Objectives

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it maystill be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of itsunderlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their securitybehaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of thesecurity behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. Thequalification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)

AVA_VLA Vulnerability analysis

„Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or byother methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flawsthat will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interferewith or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“

„Application notes

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain thepresence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all theTOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. Thedeveloper is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allowthe evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for theevaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“

„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by thedeveloper. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE isresistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (forAVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“


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