Center Business Integrity Strategy

Good Practice Note – Center Business Integrity Strategy 1

Center Business Integrity Strategy

Part of a series of notes to help Centers review their own Center internal management processes from the point of view of managing risks and promoting good governance and value for money, and to identify where improvement efforts could be focused. The good

practices described in this series of notes should not be interpreted as minimum standards as not all may be applicable to every Center.

SUMMARY This Note recommends that all Centers establish a documented and systematic strategy that guides trustees, staff and others who work for or under the “shelter” of the Center on appropriate practice to promote integrity in the Center’s conduct of business transactions and to avoid practices, including corrupt practices, that run – or appear to run – counter to this. A documented strategy would provide confidence to donors and other stakeholders of the Center that the Center is meeting emerging international good practice in this area; allow Centers to respond confidently to external parties who may wish to scrutinize the Center in this regard; and protect the Center in the event of allegations being made of corrupt practice by or involving the Center. The strategy should be comprehensive by addressing (a) integrity with regard to financial and administrative activities which are internal to the Center; (b) integrity in a Center’s dealings with partners, contractors, job applicants and others seeking to obtain grants or work with the Center; (c) integrity with regard to engagements of the Center’s engagements with public officials in the countries in which the Center works; and (d) integrity of partners in relation to activities financed by research sub-grants from the Center. This Note promotes the following good practices that should form part of a Center business integrity strategy:

• Adopt and communicate Board-approved written policies that promote a culture of business integrity and ensure that all trustees, staff, visiting scientists, fellows, consultants and others working for the Center or under the Center’s shelter:


eir work for the Center;

according to these standards;

where they think such

•

• Doc

rest when they join or when conditions

s. The general approach minate

e a

ng ed

iteria for ensuring such transactions meet accepted business f

•

understand the standards of business integrity expected, know what practices are prohibited inthis regard, and engage in open discussion of situations where the right approach may not be clear;

are clear that this applies to all persons associated with the Center in whatever manner, in the course of th

are provided with orientation material that helps them understand the standards and the types of activities that are acceptable or not

are informed of the mechanisms by which the implementation of the policies are monitored and evaluated;

ces that they notice are provided with information on how to report instanstandards are being breached; and understand the consequences for failure to observe the standards.

Include in the Center annual enterprise risk analysis a specific assessment of the risks, and mitigating controls, associated with maintaining a high standard of business integrity.

ument and communicate policies and procedures for: managing conflict of interest of trustees and staff. This should include a provision for trustees and staff to register any known potential conflicts of intechange that give rise to a new potential conflict of interest.

the procurement of goods and services that are consistent with the CGIAR Procurement Guidelines. Procurement of services should be interpreted broadly as including not only consultant selections but also the sub-contracting of research to partnerin all such procurement should be to promote transparent, competitive processes that elithe incentives for any corrupt practices in the process; staff on how to handle the offer of gifts made to them; the making of facilitation payments to public officials. These are payments made to inducpublic official to perform their functions properly and expeditiously. Based on the prevaililaws and policies of host and Center donor countries, facilitation payments should be prohibitexcept when forced under clearly demonstrated conditions of duress;

the making of gifts to public officials and donations to institutions. These policies and procedures should provide the crcriteria and are not misconstrued as bribes, facilitation payments or the improper transfer opublic resources into private hands; and

the making of payments to public officials for the provision of additional services that are supplementary to their normal official duties.

Ensure that any agency arrangements entered into by the Center are not solely for the purpose of hiding facilitation payments, and establish and monitor such arrangements in a way that the agents


• ent

ce of “off-the-books” accounts or “slush

whe

• Fina ority should provide that Center managers or other staff should

appr

• Parto th

• Doc s for:

l od (sale, donation, handover to a recycler, scrap, destruction), and the selection of buyers

ria, oice of disposal method (sale, donation,

destruction) and the selection of buyers or recipients of donated item; and human resources policies and procedures for recruitment, promotion and termination of staff

that provide for transparent, objective processes based on the Center’s needs and the merits of the candidates against pre-established criteria.

• Establish systems for staff or others to be able to report observation of non-compliance with the Center’s business integrity policies, and for the Center to act appropriately and promptly on these reports.

• Take prompt action, in accordance with Center disciplinary policies and with the terms of contracts with consultants, agents, partners and other, on any proved instance of corruption. The obligations of, and desirability for, the Center to make a criminal complaint concerning the corrupt activity should be systematically considered on a case by case basis.

shall apply, in their business dealings on behalf of the Center, the same policies on facilitation payments that apply to Center staff.

In accordance with CGIAR Financial Guidelines, financial systems should be maintained that require all financial transactions to be properly and accurately recorded in the “corporate” financial records of the Center, and subject to periodic external audit as part of the annual financial statemaudit and (in selected areas) by internal audit. The existenfunds” should be prohibited. Positive confirmation of adherence to this policy by financial managers and regional managers should be included in any internal annual representation of risks and controls

re such representations are implemented by the Center.

ncial rules or delegations of authnot approve transactions in which they are to beneficiaries, even if they would otherwise have

oval authority for these kind or value of transactions.

ners who have been sub-contracted by the Centers to undertake research should be made aware e Center business integrity strategy and be required to adhere to the same pf rinciples in the

projects for which they have been sub-contracted.

ument and communicate policies and procedure the disposal by the Center of surplus assets. These should, provide for transparent processes

using pre-established criteria, for the identification of items for disposal, the choice of disposamethor recipients of donated items;

the disposal by sale or other methods of Center crop or animal production that is surplus to research needs. These should provide for transparent processes, against pre-established critefor the identification of production to be disposed, the ch


Center Business Integrity Strategy INTRODUCTION As public international organizations, the CGIAR Centers are conscious of the need to take measures to encourage the highest standards of business integrity concerning the use of their resources, whether by trustees, staff or others who have decision making power over or access to these resources. More recently there has been a growing awareness that more needs to be done to show compliance, in the way the Centers operate, with donor requirements, international conventions and national laws concerning the prevention of bribery of public officials, money laundering and terrorism financing. In general, Center policies, procedures and systems which are aimed at all these aspects of business integrity currently exist in a variety of forms, with varying degrees of emphasis or completeness. Orientation of existing and new staff, fellows, visiting scientists, consultants, partners and others with regard to these policies is often ad hoc and not always comprehensive. For CGIAR Centers, the business integrity risks in their various forms can be quite different – both qualitatively and quantitatively – from those of the large international development financing and implementing institutions, or of the private sector multi-national corporations. However there are indeed such risks which must be managed. Failure to do so may, notwithstanding a relatively small value of money involved, lead to events which can damage the reputation of the Centers with their donors, can attract costly donor investigations, and can potentially attract blacklisting and civil and criminal liability on the Centers, trustees and staff – not only in the host country jurisdictions but in the jurisdictions of their countries of citizenship or residence. The international anti-corruption regulatory environment has tightened in recent years, in some cases to a point of zero tolerance to all forms of corruption, and with greater penalties for non-compliance. The fact that this regulatory environment is primarily aimed at significantly higher value business transactions than CGIAR Centers are ever likely to be involved in is not a reason for complacency. There are growing demands on all organizations with international operations to not only proactively promote a high level of business integrity in their activities and manage the associated risks, but be seen to be doing this in a very explicit and systematic fashion. The emerging standard of good practice for all organizations which operate internationally, whether publicly funded or not, or non-profit in nature or not, is to have a comprehensive business integrity strategy which is:


whose implementation is supported by policies, procedures and systems which are monitored and

gy to

o

of allegations being made of corrupt practice by or involving the Center. This guidance is also applicable to CGIAR System joint ventures, including Challenge Programs and other System-wide

r

ain h

e armonized their definition of corrupt practice to mean “the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting,

direct or indirect benefit); corruption in a Center’s dealings with partners, contractors, job applicants

• communicated to all relevant parties and

•periodically evaluated for effectiveness.

The purpose of this note is to guide Centers on good practice for establishing a documented stratepromote integrity in the conduct of business transactions and to avoid practices, including corrupt practices, that run – or appear to run – counter to this; to provide confidence to donors and other stakeholders of the Center that the Center is meeting emerging international good practice in this area; tmeet the standards of external parties who may wish to scrutinize the strategy; and to protect the Center in the event

Programs.

WHAT IS CORRUPTION? Business integrity is about more than just avoiding corruption. However much of the literature, treatiesand laws concerning business integrity focus on corruption, and anti-corruption policies and proceduresmust be an important element of a comprehensive business integrity strategy. There is no universal ocomprehensive definition of corrupt behavior. Transparency International, a leading international anti-corruption NGO, defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” Private gmay be broadly interpreted to include both direct personal gain and gain for the organization for whicthe concerned individual works. In February 2006, the international financial institutions1 havhdirectly or indirectly, anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party”. These definitions will be used for the purpose of this Good Practice Note. They cover internal corruption (bribes and other types of favors exchanged between a Center’s trustees or staff to obtain a

1 The African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.


ter corruption by partners in

lation to activities financed by research sub-grants from the Center.

e

uption is a articularly difficult area for any organization with international operations to manage.

a

in order to

ven if the local laws are not enforced, expatriates now have their own home country laws to obey.

in

and others seeking to obtain grants or work with the Center; corrupt practices engaged in by a Cenvis-à-vis public officials in the countries in which the Center works; and re The bribing of public officials has received a lot of attention in recent international conventions. The 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, the 1999 OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption, the 1999 Council of EuropCivil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, and the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption, all focus on this. One of the reasons for this attention is that this aspect of corrp National legislation which prohibits the offering to or acceptance of bribes by public officials of the country has probably been on the books for some time in all the countries in which the CGIAR Centers work, and most likely such prohibitions will apply regardless of whether the payment is made to obtainspecial favor from the official or is made to just induce them to perform their functions in a proper or expeditious manner. Whether or not such laws have been or are currently enforced varies considerably. What is new is that all OECD member countries plus quite a number of other countries have, implement the OECD Convention, the Inter-American Convention or the Council of Europe Conventions, begun implementing legislation with extraterritorial reach to criminalize such payments made by their citizens/residents regardless that these payments have been made outside the country2. In other words trustees, staff, fellows, visiting scientists, consultants and others who are working for or under the shelter of the Centers can also be criminally liable in their home countries for such paymentsmade by them, made on their authority, or allowed by them either by commission or omission. Thus,e The main variation in these new laws is the extent to which they exempt the payment of so-called “facilitation” payments – payments to foreign officials to get them to perform their duties properly or

2 The first such country to have such legislation was the United States, with the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The United States passed the 1998 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act to bring the 1977 legislation into conformance with the OECD Convention. The status of legislative actions by the 36 state parties to the OECD Convention can be reviewed at www.oecd.org

http://www.oecd.org/


the inal offense. The issue of

cilitation payments is addressed in more detail later in this note.

r ich

onal

inal offense in many countries additional to e host country by virtue of this legislation.

laundering of proceeds of crime, and in financing criminal activities including terrorist activities.

LEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE BUSINESS INTEGRITY STRATEGY

usiness Integrity Policies

e n

Good Practice Note on Codes of Conduct is

nder preparation by the CGIAR Internal Auditing Unit.

an expeditious manner. The OECD Convention exempts them from its coverage, as do many of the enabling laws of the member countries. However, some legislation such as that in Denmark and United Kingdom make no exceptions and make such payments a crimfa Centers undertake procurement of goods and services, make grants of funds for research purposes, offecontracts of consultancies and longer term employment, and are the source of other benefits for whthere are competing interests in the host country, regionally or internationally. They are therefore potential targets for corrupt activities or accusations of such. In fact the OECD and other internaticonventions and the related national enabling legislation are as much directed to stamping out the bribery of officials of public international organizations as they are to government officials. Bribing a CGIAR Center official to make a favorable decision is a crimth Money laundering and terrorism financing are related concepts to corruption, and are difficult to separate from it. These activities often, though not exclusively, rely on corrupt practice to flourish. Business integrity controls employed by organizations generally also protect them against involvementin

E

B A Center Code of Conduct (or Code of Ethics) could provide an appropriate vehicle for documenting thgeneral Center policy on business integrity, the monitoring of compliance and enforcement. Policy obusiness integrity, along with related conflict of interest elements, could be part of a broad Code of Conduct which would also cover other subjects as well. These should express explicit attitudes towardbusiness integrity and emphasize expectations. A separateu


•

• s in

nd

• ff to

make appropriate decisions even when faced with unexpected or "grey-area" situations. Effective programs will also involve staff in active learning through case studies and group discussions.

Good practice Adopt and communicate Board-approved written policies that promote a culture of business integrity and ensure that all trustees, staff, visiting scientists, fellows, consultants and others working for the Center or under the Center’s shelter:

• understand the standards of business integrity expected, know what practices are prohibited in this regard, and engage in open discussion of situations where the right approach may not be clear;

• are clear that this applies to all persons associated with the Center in whatever manner, in the course of their work for the Center;

• are provided with orientation material that helps them understand the standards and the types of activities that are regarded as acceptable or not under the standards;

• are informed of the mechanisms by which the implementation of the policies are monitored and evaluated;

• are provided with information on how to report instances that they notice where they think such standards are being breached; and

• understand the consequences for failure to observe the Center standards.

This general policy should be translated into specific policies and procedures relevant to particular aspects of the Center operations which are vulnerable to violations of business integrity, including corrupt practices. These can be incorporated into specific written policies and procedures which cover these operations, e.g. procurement policies, research partnership policies, financial policies, human resources policies, manuals for the management of fixed assets and stores, experimental station manuals and outreach office standard operating procedures. The policies should be:

• published in a manner that they are easily found for reference when needed;

• given visible strong support by senior management;

explained as part of the orientation of new staff, visiting scientists, fellows, consultants and others when they start working for or at the Center;

accompanied by other explanatory material that guides staff on what to do in various situations where the risk of corruption may arise. Embedding questions and answers and real-life scenarioethics codes or other supplementary materials help make policies more concrete and memorable; a

supported by inclusion in ongoing training programs on applying the Center Code of Conduct. Successful training programs will communicate not only the specific dos and don'ts of a Center's business integrity policy, but the thinking and values that lie behind that policy. This allows sta


Business Integrity Risk Analysis

All Centers are now implementing enterprise risk management systems that require at least annual assessment, at an enterprise level, of the risks facing the Center. These usually comprise some combination of detailed, “bottom up” analyses by line units or locations and a more strategically oriented “top down” risk analysis by the senior management and ultimately the Board. The CGIAR Internal Auditing Unit has published a separate Good Practice Note on Enterprise Risk Management. Centers should ensure that the risks of corruption are considered in both types of analyses and that assessments of the effectiveness of the Center’s business integrity strategy are also included in the overall enterprise risk management assessment reported to the Board.

Managing Conflicts of Interest

Good practice Include in the Center annual enterprise risk analyses a specific assessment of the risks, and mitigating controls, associated with maintaining a high standard of business integrity.

Good practice Document and communicate policies for managing conflict of interest of trustees and staff. This should include a provision for trustees and staff to register any known potential conflicts of interest when they join or when conditions change that give rise to a new potential conflict of interest.

Conflicts of interest arise when decision makers also have a personal interest in the outcome of the decisions they are making because of some benefit they, their families or associates may derive from the decision. Organizations handle this by ensuring that potential conflicts of interest are known so that no individual with a personal interest of this nature participates in the decision making around it. Either they are not assigned decision making powers in the area, or if the potential conflict is limited to a particular transaction in an area where they would not normally be conflicted, they must recuse themselves from the decision on that transaction. Conflicts of interest are usually addressed by the CGIAR Centers through Codes of Conduct and/or Board of Trustees Handbooks. In general, new trustees and staff are expected to self-assess and declare any potential conflicts of interest and recuse themselves from any decision-making process when such conflicts actually arise.. A Center’s business integrity strategy will be strengthened if new trustees and new staff at managerial level are required to positively affirm that they have no known conflicts of


interest likely to interfere with their decision making ability. If they have, these should be formally registered. In response to recent corruption cases in organizations of the UN System, these organizations have also implemented processes whereby the senior officials of the organizations must disclose their and their families’ personal financial interests on an annual basis. The international financial institutions, including the World Bank, have also implemented similar requirements. So far, it has not been suggested that relatively small international organizations such as the CGIAR Centers should emulate this. However, trends regarding this practice among the public international organizations will continue to be monitored by the CGIAR Internal Audit Unit.

Internal Procurement of Goods and Services

Good practice Document and communicate policies and procedures for the procurement of goods and services that are consistent with the CGIAR Procurement Guidelines. Procurement of services should be interpreted broadly as including not only consultant selections but also the sub-contracting of research to partners. The general approach in all such procurement should be to promote transparent, competitive processes that eliminate the incentives for any corrupt practices in the process and allow Centers and Programs to respond confidently to any questions about the integrity or fairness of selection decisions.

Centers are required to ensure that their procurement policies are aligned with the CGIAR Procurement Guidelines. The spirit of these Guidelines, which are based on World Bank procurement policies, is to promote transparent, competitive processes that, among other things, seek to eliminate the opportunity for any corrupt practices to insert themselves in the process. In very brief summary, a Center adhering to these principles should ensure that all significant value procurement is subject to open competition where possible, and limits to competition or direct contracting (“single sourcing” or “no-bid contracting”) are only employed where open competition is certain to be not possible or efficient in relation to the value of the contract. Procurement of services should be interpreted broadly as including not only consultant selections but also the sub-contracting of research to partners. This can include both commissioned research and contracts awarded under a competitive grants scheme. The CGIAR Procurement Guidelines require update to provide more guidance to Centers on their application to research sub-contracting, and a review process has been launched by the CGIAR Secretariat with a view to presenting an updated Guideline for CGIAR approval in late 2007. Important elements of a system for managing the business integrity risks around procurement are:


• ere

, this should be supported by an

•

• municated to criteria (and usually

• •

during the bid submission period; ensuring that the evaluators assigned have no relationship with any potential bidder to preserve the

ll as actual, objectivity.

Receipt of Gifts

• a well documented process of the procurement steps, prior to issuing requests for expressions of interest, pre-qualification submissions, and proposals, that is published and available to any potential bidder;

documented justification for any decision to single source or restrict the competition, approved exante by an appropriate level of senior management according to pre-established criteria. Whpossible, and in the case of procurement of significant valueindependent or independently-verifiable market analysis;

for procurement of significant value or complexity that is subject to competition, the use of an evaluation panel comprising individuals who are technically qualified in the area in question, in order to review and assess the technical merits of proposals, and make recommendations for award;

selection criteria, weightings and scoring methods that are established ex ante, and comevaluators in a way that they are applied consistently to all proposals. Selection the weightings) should be publicized to potential bidders in the requests for proposals;

thorough documentation of evaluations against the pre-established criteria; and

for procurement of significant value, a tender process which is controlled to protect the integrity of the process. This includes setting and observing a tender deadline; obtaining (physically or electronically) sealed bids that are only opened after the deadline; scrupulously rejecting bids received after the deadline; having separate bids where there are both technical and price selectioncriteria and reviewing and evaluating the technical proposal before considering the price proposal; ensuring that all bidders have equal access to the same information regarding the request for proposal and to the results of any question and answer process

appearance of, as we

Good practice Document and communicate policies and guidelines to staff on how to handle the offer of gifts made to them.

The giving of gifts by an organization to other organizations and to their officials is a well established element of building and celebrating relationships. It takes on different levels of significance and attention depending on the country, but it is always present in some way. Host countries, partner institutions, local communities, and suppliers of goods and services with a long standing relationship with a Center often seek to recognize, through gift giving, their relationship with the Center, trustees and particular staff that they interact with on a regular basis. Gifts may be offered in the form of physical


ems, services or hospitality/entertainment. Centers have an obligation to control the receipt of gifts by

st. The general principle regarding eipt of gifts is that trustees and staff must avoid any activity that could compromise, or appear to

e Center. Gifts should

•

ably

• lue, and a value limit should be set (e.g. US$100) for

•

• ction would damage the relationship of the Center with the host country, institution

g

ch as eds will

• rporate customers as part of an established promotion and

based on the level of business with these customers; and should be applied so that the Center benefits from these: e.g. used for operational travel where there is a transparent method of determining the use of the travel and selecting the staff to whose operational travel the benefits will be applied; or awarded to staff members under clear pre-established criteria as part of an established staff performance incentive scheme.

ittheir trustees and staff to ensure that this practice does not expose them or the Center to accusations of corruption. Policies relating to receipt of gifts can be documented in Center Codes of Conduct and Boards of Trustees Handbooks, in the section dealing with conflict of interereccompromise, their judgment or objectivity in the performance of their duties for thnot be accepted in any way that would contravene this principle.

Specific criteria which could be mentioned in a policy on receipt of gifts include:

no third parties should in any way be led to believe by a trustee or staff member that a gift is required or anticipated;

• gifts should not be accepted where the nature, value, timing or source of the gift could be reasonconstrued as a bribe to influence a decision concerning the provider of the gift;

gifts accepted should always be of nominal vagifts which may be personally retained by the individual trustee or staff recipient;

a lower or even zero limit for gifts that may be accepted without registration and which may be personally retained should be applied to sensitive staff positions such as procurement officers and persons supervising travel agency contracts;

gifts of goods or services which are above the established value limit should be discouraged, but if offered and if rejeor other offeror, then the gift should be declared to a designated senior manager of the Center (e.the Board Secretary, the Director of Corporate Services, the Director of Finance); it should be registered; and it should be disposed or shared in accordance with a pre-established process suby donation to a local community assistance organization, or by auction for which the procebe donated; and

gifts received in the form of free air tickets or upgrades should only be accepted where they are offered by the airlines or agents to all co


that the public official actually carries out his or her function lawfully, properly and expeditiously.

a f

yments does not fall within the ambit of these laws for the purpose of criminalization in ese countries.

al laws which make this distinction, facilitation

• nse or other official document that qualifies a person to do business in the

providing telecommunications, power or water services;

protecting perishable items from deterioration.

Facilitation Payments

Good practice Document and communicate policies and guidelines to staff on the making of facilitation payments to a public official. These are payments made to induce the public official to perform their functions properly and expeditiously. Based on the prevailing laws and policies of host and Center donor countries, facilitation payments should be prohibited except when forced under clearly demonstrated conditions of duress.

A distinction has long been drawn in discussions about public corruption between:

• making bribes/providing kickbacks to induce a public official to make a decision that discriminates in favor of the briber, and

• facilitation payments (either in cash or other forms of benefit) of a minor nature which are made so

Facilitation payments are usually made to public officials of governments in countries which are not yet able to establish fully effective and honest public administration and criminal justice systems and, as result, the practice has permeated the routine decision-making by officials concerning the delivery opublic services. This distinction is made in the OECD Convention and in the enabling laws for the Convention in some (but not all) countries that have ratified the Convention. In such cases, the making of facilitation path As defined under the OECD Convention and nationpayments may be made to induce such actions as:

granting a permit, licelocation or territory;

• processing visas and work permits;

• providing normal police protection or mail delivery;

• scheduling regulatory inspections;

•• loading and unloading cargo; and

•


s,

c view

re to e essential services and permits needed to operate in the location or to avoid retaliation in

me form. In other words, the payments are made under duress, and the requirement to make payment

small value

cou

On organizations to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to facilitation payments, in particular:

•

A

tically, exposed to prosecution in their home countries, where these countries

e h a

Center should accept.

Such payments fall within this category provided they do not involve a decision to award new businescontinue existing business, or set the terms of new or existing business. This distinction has been made not because facilitation payments are condoned but because applyingextra-territorial criminalization through anti-bribery legislation has been widely considered to be impractical. The exception in the Convention and national laws is controversial. A pragmatiwould hold that facilitation payments are often made involuntarily, when the public officials involvedare part of an organized scheme which offers the maker of the payment no viable recourse if they areceive thsois a form of extortion by the public official(s) concerned. The distinction also recognizes the impracticality of expecting law enforcement in one country mounting investigations intofacilitation payments by citizens and residents when made in a foreign land to officials of another

ntry.

the other hand, and aside from the moral considerations, there are a number of good reasons for

• The corrosive nature of allowing such payments on the ethical climate of the organization and the ability to enforce policies on the more serious corrupt practices;

• Perceptions by staff that business integrity and anti-fraud policies are not applied evenly, particularlyif they see staff fired for petty theft but at the same time see organizational sanctioning of facilitation transactions;

Whether or not host country legislation is enforced or not, such facilitation payments are usually technically illegal and, in a politically-charged environment, evidence that such payments are madeby the organization could used selectively against it; and

• The difficulty of really distinguishing between what is a facilitation payment and what is a bribe.request for a facilitation payment made by an official is often made ambiguously. An organizationmay be in a weak position if it has inadvertently, or due to a control weakness, breached some regulation or law and the “facilitation payment” can then be defined as a bribe to “make the problemgo away”. The organization may be exposed if a prosecutor or judge determines differently to the organization or individual concerned as to what is an acceptable transaction.

Another good reason for Centers to adopt a zero-tolerance approach to facilitation payments is that, otherwise, trustees and staff who are involved in decisions about tolerating or making such payments ould be, at least theorec

have enacted enabling legislation for the OECD or other international anti-bribery conventions but which have eliminated the exception for facilitation payments. Research for this Note confirmed that this is the currently case with the United Kingdom (under its 2002 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act) and Denmark, but there may be other countries where this is also true. While the exposure may bconsidered to be low in terms of likelihood, it is of potentially high impact and therefore not one whic


and

itation payment or bribe. Where, through inadvertence or control weakness the enter finds itself in breach of an applicable host country law or regulation, it should follow the host

country laws and regulations with regard to settling the infraction, and not seek to lower the cost through dministration and judicial system of the

ost country concerned is in such disarray that this course of action is not feasible, then this should trigger a wider assessment of how the Center can appropriately manage to operate in the country under

nment licenses. These dealings require expert knowledge of laws, systems nd procedures for which the organization does not have, or does not wish to retain in-house, the

harges

The Rules to Combat Extortion and Bribery in International

although it principally relates to sales agents or local representatives of business enterprises, it can be

“En

•

Perhaps obvious, but useful to remind in any business integrity strategy, is that a Center should have good systems and processes to ensure that all relevant host country laws and regulations are known observed by the Center, so as to eliminate any weakness that any public official might exploit to seek and insist on a facilC

a facilitation payment or bribe. In situations where the public ah

such conditions.

Use of agents to make facilitation payments

Good practice Ensure that any agency arrangements entered into by the Center are not solely for the purpose of hiding facilitation payments, and establish and monitor such arrangements in a way that the agents shall apply, in their business dealings on behalf of the Center, the same policies on facilitation payments that apply to Center staff.

As a matter of efficiency, organizations often engage agents to help them with dealing with various interactions with public institutions, particularly with regard to the importing and exporting of goods, and the obtaining of goverarequisite qualified and knowledgeable staff. However agencies have also often been used by organizations as a way to hide facilitation payments made in the course of such dealings – i.e. move them off the books and out of the (direct) hands of the organization. In the current climate of low andzero tolerance, such maneuvers are being increasingly scrutinized and found to be no defense to cof promoting corruption.

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Business Transactions, particularly Article 3, provide guidance on this matter in relation to bribery, and

applied to other agents used by both profit and non-profit organizations. Article 3 provides that terprises should take measures reasonably within their power to ensure:

That any payment made to any agent represents no more than an appropriate remuneration for legitimate services provided by such agent;


.”

To are prohibited to be made by organization staff,

Am

•

• Agencies should be covered by written contracts that oblige the agent to adhere to all relevant laws as well as the Center’s business integrity policies.

• t encouraged to offer bribes or facilitating contracts and reasonably in line with

normal remuneration in the local market for such services. In the course of evaluating potential agents, red flags like requesting payment of fees to offshore bank accounts, requiring a substantial

to be paid upfront ahead of delivering the services, or marketing the service on the of the

acilitation payments made under duress

Not situ sential service to operate, safeguard its staff or physical

zero or

• That no part of any such payment is passed on by the agent as a bribe or otherwise in contravention of these Rules of Conduct; and

• That they maintain a record of the names and terms of employment of all agents who are retained by them in connection with transactions with public bodies or State enterprises. This record should be available for inspection by auditors and, upon specific request, by appropriate, duly authorised governmental authorities under condition of confidentiality

the extent that facilitation payments as well as bribes

the same rules as above will be applicable to facilitation payments.

ong the measures Centers can take to control this “back door” exposure are:

undertaking reasonable due diligence with regard to the selection of agents, to ensure they are locallyreputable, are not involved in any criminal investigations or litigation regarding their business conduct and have sound business practice on this matter.

Agent compensation should be structured so they are nopayments. Compensation should be clearly based on the

portion of the feebasis of “connections” should trigger extreme caution by the Center and possible elimination agent from consideration.

F

Good practice Carefully define the conditions under which duress may be invoked as a defense to making facilitation payments, and ensure that such payments are thoroughly documented and reported within the Center. The documentation should also include steps taken by the Center with host au horities to eliminate the source of the duress. t

withstanding that the Center may have a zero-tolerance policy on facilitation payments, there will beations where the Center may not obtain an es

assets, or ensure that it does not incur major financial costs without making facilitation payments. A -tolerance policy should provide for situations of duress, where requests made by public officials f


faci de incl

•

• f member, or deterioration of essential, perishable items, which will result in

considerable additional costs to the Center;

fusal ly

ith recognized privileges and immunities and a non-rage on host governments to take

f unsuccessful, the Center should at least

properly recorded and well documented. Even the OECD Convention enabling legislation which istinguishes and excludes facilitation payments still requires that organizations which make such

tation requirements if they include the:

• particulars of the routine government action that was sought to be facilitated or expedited; and

signature or other means of identifying the staff member or agent who made the payment to the official(s).

ested that the Center should also systematically document the steps it has taken, as

the Center, based on an established review process within the Center. The payments should be posted or

litation payments are extortionate. Conditions where a defense of duress could be reasonably maude:

The payment is requested of a staff member or an agent by an official under threat of physical detention or harm;

Refusal to pay on the spot, with no time to seek recourse to superior officials, will result in certain delay in travel of a staf

• The requirement for facilitation payments is part of a widespread, organized scheme wherein reto pay a minor official and complain to his or her superiors will not settle the matter, but probabresult not only in continued insistence of the payment but possibly further retaliation against the Center. This will be a more effective defense if the Center has previously sought – without success– recourse to host governments to eliminate this problem. Compared with private companies,

nal organizations wCenters as public internatioprofit character would be expected to have and use greater leveaction to protect the Centers against such schemes. Even itry and be seen to try.

In such cases the payments are on par with losses due to robbery, and the transactions should be

dpayments should record as much detail of the payments as possible as soon as possible after the event has occurred. Legislation researched for this Note provides that records would be compliant with thedocumen

• value of the benefit made;

• date of the conduct by which the benefit was made;

• identity of the public official(s) who received the benefit;

• In addition, it is sugga result of the event, to seek the host government’s assistance to stop similar requests being made in future. The Center should ensure that such facilitation payments are approved by properly delegated authority inand described in the corporate accounting system in a manner that they can be readily segregated freporting and auditing purposes.


od , who provide the source of much of their workforce. Host country

ften provide gifts of recognition and donations of various kinds.

Thibus nd dondo not lar ind Policies regarding the making of gifts and donations can be included in codes of conduct or in the

see incl

cials should be made in line

Making of Gifts and Donations and Provision of Hospitality/Entertainment

Centers seek to publicize their activities and promote the results of their work, not only with their partners in the national agricultural research systems, but also with the host governments at national, provincial/state and local levels. Centers also aim to be good residents in their host countries and goneighbors to their local communitiescommunities, partners and host authorities often provide sincere support to the Center is a myriad of ways, often intangible, that can never be fully set out in host agreements, memoranda of understanding or other formalized arrangements and in total can represent a significant and incalculable in-kind contribution to the Center. To celebrate and reciprocate this type of in-kind support that it receives, Centers o

s is an area which is generally very well handled by Centers, but it is important for any Center iness integrity strategy to ensure that all staff who are involved in decision-making about gifts aations clearly understand the acceptable parameters. This is to ensure that such gifts and donations

not become a “back door” for the making of bribes or facilitation payments of public officials, or do embroil the Center in any accusations of favoritism in local politics or to towards any particuividuals for corrupt reasons.

financial rules of the Centers. In general, only gifts which the Center is happy (and indeed anxious) to reported in public should be made. Recommended criteria for the making of gifts and donationsude:

• Gifts to individuals who are occupying active positions as public officonnection with their serving in their organization or government; be modest in value and inwith any rules of the organization or government to which the recipient belongs; be preferably closely connected in nature to the work of the Center (e.g. book on the Center, promotional plaque orother presentational item showing the recipients name, promotional material, promotional clothing items); be made publicly, or at least among a gathering of Center and institution officials, in conjunction with events to recognize the relationship between the Center and the institution/government; be reported publicly in the Center’s website and newsletters and if possible in the local media.

Good practice Document and communicate policies and procedures for the making of gifts to public officials and donations to institutions. These policies and procedures should provide the criteria for ensuring such transactions meet accepted business criteria and are not misconstrued as bribes, facilitation payments or the improper transfer of public resources into private hands.


ugh there is some greater tolerance of higher value items, particularly if the

sed and inable process should be in place for identifying and selecting organizations for the

a donation event.

Donations should be made publicly, reported in the Center’s website and newsletters and if possible

er

• ct logos (and donor recognition where

Attention by project managers to how project assets are being used during project monitoring visits

ospitality/entertainment is provided by Centers to partner and government officials primarily in the form of meals and refreshments. In the case of Centers with accommodation and recreational facilities

ort costs of hey are coming from their offices to visit the Centers. This is an area in which

enters are traditionally frugal, but it is useful to affirm policy on this as part of a business integrity rategy. The principal criteria to be considered are that:

• Gifts upon retirement from active service of former public officials should generally follow the samecriteria as above, thoofficial concerned has had a very long association with the Center. Nonetheless the gift should not be so expensive or elaborate as to encourage talk of “paybacks”.

• Gifts or donations should not be made to political parties or groups.

• Donations of funds, goods or services for local community purposes should not be made to individuals but to governmental entities or organizations of a non-profit nature whose aims relate tothe well-being of the community. These organizations should be reputable within the community. Where a number of organizations “compete” for donations in their field of activity, an unbiaclearly explapurpose of making a donation. An example where this issue may arise is in the selection of schools or health clinics in the local area to include in

• Receipt of the donations should be fully documented, including full information about what is being donated and acknowledgement from the recipient institutions.

•in the local media.

Another aspect which is usually very well policed by the Centers is the use of research project assets by officials. Some partner or governmental officials may be tempted to treat project-funded vehicles, computers or other assets as gifts for their personal use or use by their families. Various controls ovthis risk include:

• The formalization of the handover of project-funded assets to partner institutions through letters ofexchange recording the handover of the items,

Marking the assets with partner institution and projeapplicable);

• For large transfers, public ceremonies and media reporting to emphasize the nature and expected use of the assets by the recipient institution; and

•and prompt follow up with the partner institution in the event of any reported or observed misuse of project assets.

H

on campus it may also include provision of these facilities at no charge, and associated transpthe officials, when tCst


t/hospitality of the official is permitted under host country laws and civil service

the entertainment/hospitality should be connected with meetings and events related to the activities

he host

rtainment

Cen egy dev ment; research project planning, implementation kickoff, review

gue on d officials from other government agencies in the developing countries are strongly encouraged to

enerally, payments by Centers of public officials’ travel costs to attend such workshops and

conferences, whether in-country or internationally, are considered legitimate payments. They are more her

nrestricted funds.

onetheless it is desirable, in any business integrity strategy, for Centers to document the criteria they funding is not exploited for corrupt purposes or have the appearance of

contributing to corrupt practices. Criteria which may be included in any documented policy could include:

• the entertainmenregulations;

•of the Center, in which the official is participating;

• is not of a scale that is substantially different from the hospitality/entertainment provided to any other visitors and guests of similar status and for similar such meetings and events; and

• reimbursement of associated costs such as transport costs to the event are both customary in tcountry and also permitted under host country laws and civil service regulations.

It must be said that, generally, Center budgets do not permit the kind of lavish hospitality/ enteof the type that multi-national corporations are sometimes criticized for, so the opportunities to cross accepted lines do not usually arise!

Payment of Expenses of Public Officials to Attend Workshops and Conferences

Good practice Doc policies and procedures for payments of expenses of public officials to ument and communicateattend workshops and conferences.

ters hold or sponsor workshops and conferences for a variety of purposes including research stratelopment; research policy develop

and completion; disseminate research results; and promote national, regional and international dialoresearch issues. Research partners from the national and regional agricultural research systems an

participate in these events. Often this participation requires funding of the related travel costs.

G

usually funded through restricted research projects funded by donors and managed by the Centers, ratthan from the Centers’ own u Nuse to ensure that this type of


be selected on a transparent basis that can be easily linked to the purposes of the

The selections of participants should be consistent with the established rules of the partner

ys

ayment of Public Officials for Additional Services (Honoraria and “Top

thei quately

be aprowhe

g

or t an be said ld be

e

However, this is not always feasible and or indirectly via partners who are

plementing research sub-contracts, the following criteria should be applied:

• Attendees shouldworkshop or conference;

•organization or government, and have the formal, written approval of their institutions;

• Standards of travel and per diems or expense reimbursement to be applied in computing the funding of the public officials’ travel costs should be linked to other standards used by the Center and by other international organizations;

• The computation of the public officials’ per diems or daily expense reimbursements should be readily linked to the program of the workshop or conference, plus reasonable travel and rest daonly.

• Financing of the public officials’ travel should be eligible under the donor grant agreement governing the use of the funds to be sourced.

PUp” Arrangements)

Good practice Document and communicate policies and procedures for the making of payments to public officials for the provision of additional services that are supplementary to their normal official duties.

In some countries public officials may be legally permitted to undertake private employment outside

r normal official hours. This is usually permitted by governments which have difficulty aderemunerating their civil servants, and who wish to provide them with a legal avenue to earn additional income without resorting to seeking bribes or facilitation payments. Examples include police who may

llowed to work as security guards when off duty, or officials allowed to undertake consultancies vided they do not create conflicts of interest with their official duties. There is also the situation re officials are permitted to obtain honoraria or “top ups” of their salaries from implementing

anizations when engaged on special projects which require significant additionor al overtime. Without going into the arguments whether such arrangements are conducive or not to good public administration

he effective provision of the public services for which the officials are primarily employed, it c that they create a particular “grey zone”, where there is a distinct risk that such payments cou

n as promoting civil service corruption. se As such, they are usually best avoided entirely by the Centers. in considering whether to enter into such arrangements directly,im


ts should be prohibited where they contravene the host country laws and civil

ered essential to the effective implementation of a research project, such arrangements should be made with the

to host cumentation of the duties for which the “top up” is being made, and

inancial Systems, Accounting and Auditing

ines provide extensive uidance and external auditors are required to independently audit and report on the Center’s

,

for tion or research project produce; unspent funds

• such arrangemenservice regulations;

• such arrangements should be avoided where there are alternatives available to the hiring of public officials (e.g. using instead private security services which do not employ “moonlighting” policemen, or using experts who work as consultants on a full time basis);

• where there is no appropriate alternative, and such arrangements are consid

government institution rather than with any individual officials;

• any payments which can be regarded as “top ups” of public officials’ salaries should be explicitly agreed in writing with the government institution, including certification that they conformcountry laws and regulations, doconfirmation that the official concerned is permitted by the principal employer to undertake these duties in addition to his or her normal job and to receive such payments; and

• “Top up” arrangements should never be entered into in relation to public officials who also make or recommend key decisions within the host government regarding the relationship between the government and the Center. This includes decisions on the making of government financial contributions to the Center or counterpart funding to Center research projects.

F

Good practice In accordance with CGIAR Financial Guidelines, financial systems should be maintained that require all financial transactions to be properly and accurately recorded in the “corporate” financial records of the Center, and subject to periodic external audit as part of the annual financial statement audit and (in selected areas) by internal audit. The existence of “off-the-books” accounts or “slush funds” should be prohibited. Positive confirmation of adherence to this policy by financial managers and regional managers should be included in any internal annual representation of risks and controls where such representations are implemented by the Center.

In general, Centers have implemented financial systems and accounting and auditing arrangements which conform to business integrity good practice. The CGIAR Financial Guidelgcompliance with these Guidelines. One area where Centers may become vulnerable to corrupt activities is the existence of “off-the-books”accounts which do not appear in the Center’s official, corporate financial records. They may be created

example, by proceeds from sales of experimental sta


ds; or g ts pro make bribes or facilitation payments in contravention

C may be inappropriately distributed outside of the scope of Center policies in a way t could threaten the reputation of the Center.

to

nters should give attention to in their financial rules or delegations of authority is

ys determined by the Board, so control in this area is well established in the CGIAR System;

should in l

albeit a

ard

ays be subject to ex ante review by e Board Chair or even the full Board, and reported to the Board.

sitting in closed project accounts and (incorrectly) written off for various reasons in the official recorrants received in regional offices and not reported to or monitored by headquarters. Such accounvide an opportunity to create “slush funds” to

of enter policies, or tha is perceived as corrupt and which Center financial policies should provide that such off-the-books accounts are prohibited and this should be communicated to all staff responsible for handling funds and maintaining accounting records. Internal systems of risk and control self-assessments and representations should include this aspect in their coverage. ICARDA for example requires all heads of regional offices to positively confirm on an annual basis, as part of the certification of a detailed checklist, that there are no bank or cash accounts being operated outside the Center’s corporate financial system. These representations will be subject periodic internal audit whenever the locations are audited.

Good practice Financial rules or delegations of authority should provide that Center managers or other staff should not approve transactions in which they are to be beneficiaries, even if they would otherwise have approval authority for these kind or value of transaction.

One aspect which Cethe approval of the transactions of the Director General. The main types of such transactions are:

• Remuneration (salaries and allowances) – these are alwa

• Non-monetary benefits such as provision of housing and vehicles, membership fees, and spouse travel – these, or at least the standards under which they are provided, should be approved by the Board as part of the remuneration package;

• Travel expenses;

• Vehicle operating expenses; and

• Entertainment allowance expenses. Practice presently varies among Centers in how these are handled. Non-repetitive transactions all cases be subject to the same processing as those for other staff, and thus subject to the same internacontrol checking. They should be subject to ex ante review/approval by another Center official, subordinate to the Director General. A good practice is for such transactions to be periodically reported to and reviewed by the Board Chair or Audit Committee of the Board on an ex post basis. Making routine, frequent transactions such as travel-related transactions subject to ex ante approval by BoChairs is widely considered impractical. Special or unusual transactions benefiting the Director General, particularly those of significant financial value, should alwth


CGIAR Centers, Challenge Programs and other System-wide Programs work extensively with national agricultural research systems, with advanced research institutions, and with a variety of national, regional and international NGOs. There is a significant resource flow from Centers and Programs hosted by Centers to partners, mainly through research project sub-contracting. Centers’ appetite for risk with regard to research partners cannot be unduly low. They work in parts of the world where partner capacity to deliver may be low, but partner participation is still vital for achievement of project outputs and impact. They also work in countries where the corruption environment is rated as high by international observers. Centers therefore need to apply a considered approach to decisions about working with particular partners. Corruption within partners in the expenditure of funds transferred to them can result in reputational and financial risks for the Centers vis-à-vis donors. If detected, the related expenditures cannot be claimed by Centers from restricted donor grants as eligible use of the funds. Centers must then seek reimbursement of the funds from the partners, but if this is not possible the Center will, in effect, then have to finance these expenditures from its unrestricted funds (on par with absorbing a loss due to theft). At a minimum, Centers should inform its partners of its buiness integrity policies, and require, preferably by incorporation into partnership contracts, an acknowledgement and commitment from the partners to take appropriate measures to apply those policies in the use of grant funds received from the Centers.

Research Sub-Contracting

Good practice Partners who have been sub-contracted by the Centers to undertake research should be made aware of the Center business integrity strategy and be required to adhere to the same principles in the projects for which they have been sub-contracted.


nd in some cases skills testing, background checks

• ork targets and display of key behaviors that have been pre-established as relevant

stem

• embers

Processes and criteria for termination of staff (including selection of staff for involuntary redundancy) that can withstand accusations of bias, favoritism, self serving or retaliation against whistle blowers.

Recruitment, Promotion and Termination

Good practice Document and communicate human resources policies and procedures for recruitment, promotion and termination (including redundancy) of staff that provide for transparent, objective processes based on the Center’s needs and the merits of the candidates against pre-established criteria.

Center human resource policies and procedure manuals provide the platform for documenting recruitment, promotion and termination processes. While transparent, objective processes should be in place primarily to ensure that the human resources of the Center are managed to optimize effectiveness, they also serve to guard against any appearance of or actual corrupt practice in the decision making in these areas. The criteria which promote transparency and objectivity include:

• Competitive recruitment processes that are based on pre-established selection criteria relevant to the responsibilities of the position and the Centers requirements;

• Evaluations of candidates by and recommendation of selections from a committee, based on applications, interviews, independent references aand qualification/past employment verifications;

Performance management systems that evaluate incumbent performance based on documented achievement of wto the position;

• Promotions based on a documented track record produced by the performance management syand transparent evaluation against internal or external competitors for the higher level position;

Clear policies related to recruitment of relatives of staff, including how “relative” is defined;

• Clear policies related to assignment of staff within the Center organization when the staff mare married or are domestic partners of each other, or otherwise have a close, personal relationshipwhere a supervisory relationship in the workplace may present conflicts of interest; and

•


•

worn ay for the item), or when the items are to be

• sis unless it can be documented that only one recycler is available in the local area for

• Sold assets should not be released to the buyer without the agreed payment for the items having been received.

Disposal of Surplus Fixed Assets and Consumable Stores

Good practice Document and communicate procedures for the disposal by the Center of surplus items. These should provide for transparent processes using pre-established criteria, for the identification of items for disposal, the choice of disposal method (sale, donation, handover to recycler, scrap and destruction), and the selection of buyers or recipients of donated items.

Disposal of surplus fixed assets and consumable stores is not a significant activity of the Centers but is nonetheless an activity which can attract petty corruption or appearances of such, which can tarnish the Center’s reputation. The main criteria that Centers should apply to encourage business integrity in this area, and which should be reflected in the Centers’ policies on asset disposal, are as follows:

• The identification of assets for disposal by organizational units of the Center should be independently reviewed and approved within the Center. This may be done by the Finance or Materials Management units, or (in the case of special equipment) by other specialized units of the Center (e.g. the ICT department). Aside from ensuring that the items cannot be used elsewhere in the Center before being disposed, such a process can confirm that such assets are indeed appropriate to dispose for good business reasons rather than for the benefit of other parties;

Disposal by competitive sale (auction methods) should be the preferred method, with other methodssuch as recycling by third parties or scrap applied only when an appropriate authority (could be an asset disposal committee) confirms sale to be inappropriate (perhaps the items are so obsolete, out or damaged that it is unlikely anyone would pdonated (see earlier section of this Note on this);

Where assets are handed over to another entity for recycling, the recycler should be selected on a competitive bathis purpose;

• Sale to Center staff should only be made as part of a competitive sale process; and


Disposal of Surplus Center Crop or Animal Production

The same principles that apply to sale of assets (see section above) apply also to disposal of surplus crop or animal production. Centers should incorporate the principles in their policies and procedures in this area.

Reporting of Non-Compliance

Good practice Promulgate policies and procedures for the disposal by sale or other methods of Center crop or animal production that is surplus to research needs. These should provide for transparent processes, against pre-established criteria, for the identification of production to be disposed, the choice of disposal method (sale, donation, destruction) and the selection of buyers or recipients of donated items.

Good practice Establish systems for staff or others to be able to report observation of non-compliance with the Center’s business integrity policies, and to act promptly on these.

An effective system for staff and others to report observations of non-compliance with Center business integrity policies reinforces a Center’s commitment to these policies, provides an alternative channel to other information systems for the Board and senior management to learn of serious problems so that they can be fixed quickly, and protects the Center’s reputation against failure to take adequate measures to protect the institution against organizational misconduct. The CGIAR Internal Auditing Unit has published a separate Good Practice Note on Communications by Employees of Concerns about Corporate Compliance to provide information to the Centers on the establishment of an employee reporting system on such matters. Investigation of complaints about failures to observe policies on business integrity should be subject to Center Board oversight, typically the Audit Committee. The actual investigations may be undertaken by Center-assigned managers who are clearly independent of the activity to be examined, by Internal Audit or by independent investigators hired by the Center


Review of Compliance

Review of implementation of the business integrity strategy should be built into the Center’s risk management system and the Center internal audit work programs.

Enforcement

Good practice Implement measures to periodically review compliance. The results should be fed back into Center corruption risk assessments and refinements of the business integrity strategy.

Good practice Take prompt action, in accordance with Center disciplinary policies and contracts with partners, on any proved instance of corruption. The obligations and desirability for the Center to make a criminal complaint concerning the corrupt activity should be carefully considered.


Bibliography Listed below is a selection of publications reviewed during the research for this Note: Asian Development Bank, undated. Anti-Corruption Policies and Strategies, Manila, Philippines. Available electronically from www.adb.org Asian Development Bank, 2006. Final Report - Second Governance and Anti-Corruption Plan, Manila, Philippines. Available electronically from www.adb.org Business for Social Responsibility. 2003. Corruption and Bribery. BSR Business Briefs. Available electronically from www.bsr.org DANIDA, 2005. Danida Anti-Corruption Code of Conduct. Copenhagen, Denmark. Available electronically from www.danida-publikationer.dk Ethics Resource Center, 2003. Facilitation Payments: Whether considered custom or bribery, they put companies in a precarious position. Available electronically from http://www.ethics.org/resources/article_detail.cfm?ID=807 Financial Action Task Force. Interpretive Note to Special Recommendation VIII: Non Profit Organizations. Available electronically from www.fatf-gafi.org Gabriel, L and Stapenhurst, R with Thomas, M., 2001, The Role of Bilateral Donors in Fighting Corruption. Maastricht Anti-Corruption Conference April 2000, Netherlands Ministry for Development Cooperation. Published by the World Bank Institute, Washington DC, USA. Available electronically from www-wds.worldbank.org Inter-American Development Bank, 2001. Strengthening a Systemic Framework Against Corruption for the Inter-American Development Bank. Washington DC, USA. Available electronically from www.iadb.org International Chamber of Commerce, 1999. Rules to Combat Extortion and Bribery in International Business Transactions, Paris, France. Available electronically from www.iccbooks.com International Chamber of Commerce, 2003 Fighting Corruption – A Corporate Practices Manual. Paris, France. Available electronically for a fee from www.iccbooks.com Martin, J. G, 2004. Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley World. Available electronically from www.winstead.com

http://www.adb.org/

http://www.adb.org/

http://www.bsr.org/

http://www.danida-publikationer.dk/

http://www.ethics.org/resources/article_detail.cfm?ID=807

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/

http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000160016_20060104163306&searchMenuPK=64187283&theSitePK=523679

http://www.iadb.org/

http://www.iccbooks.com/


http://www.winstead.com/


SIDA, 2004. SIDA’s Anticorruption Regulation. Available electronically from http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=121&language=en_US Transparency International, 2006. Anti-Corruption Conventions in the Americas – What Civil Society Can Do To Make Them Work. Berlin, Germany Available electronically from www.transparency.org Vincke, F. and Heimann, F., 2003. Fighting Corruption – A Corporate Practices Manual. International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France. Available electronically for a fee from www.iccbooks.com

Wrage, A. and Mandernach, K., undated, Facilitation Payments, Business Against Corruption: Case stories and examples, Chapter 2A.IV, pp 69-79, United Nations Global Compact Office. Available electronically from http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/7.7/BACbookFINAL.pdf

Exposure Draft: First Release: October 13, 2006 Second Version: April 14, 2007 Author: John Fitzsimon

http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=121&language=en_US

http://www.transparency.org/


http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/7.7/BACbookFINAL.pdf

Center Business Integrity Strategy

Documents

Transcript of Center Business Integrity Strategy