CENTCOM Update

CENTCOM UpdateCenter for a New American Security

GEN David H. Petraeus11 June 2009

2

Agenda

• CENTCOM Strategic Approach• Three Major Challenge Areas• Understanding the Surge• Counterinsurgency Guidelines• Anaconda Strategy versus Al Qaeda in Iraq• Security Trends in Iraq• Afghanistan Security Trends• Situation in Pakistan• Full Spectrum Operations• Battle of Sadr City• Questions

3

CENTCOM Strategic Approach

Prevent Proliferation

ProtectTrade Routes

Deter Aggression

Counter Piracy

Defeat Extremist Networks

Enable Partners

Enable Partners

Enable Partners

Build Multi-lateralPartnerships



Enable Partners



Counter Weapons Smuggling

4

Three Major Challenge Areas

Iraq:• Substantial progress since surge... • Still fragile and reversible...• Less fragile since provincial elections.

Afghanistan:• Situation has deteriorated over last two years…• Must reverse downward trends…• Requires well-resourced, comprehensive counterinsurgency approach.

Pakistan:• Significant challenges from extremists…• Major operations in NWFP and FATA…• Recognition of need to “clear—hold—build” in order to sustain gains.

5

Understanding the Surge In Iraq

Signal of commitment

Increase in US forces

Growth in Iraqi Security Forces

Employment of counterinsurgency concepts

Surge =

6

Counterinsurgency Guidelines

Secure and serve the people

Live among the people

Employ a comprehensive approach

Generate unity of effort

Pursue the enemy relentlessly

Hold cleared areas

Separate “irreconcilables” from “reconcilables”

Promote reconciliation

Conduct conditions-based transitions

Be first with the truth

Live our values

Exercise initiative

Learn and adapt

7

Anaconda Strategy versus Al Qaeda in Iraq

Ansaral Sunna

OtherGroups

Al Qaeda in Iraq

AQI Needs

Ideology

Weapons

MoneyForeignFighters

SafeHavens

PopularSupport

Commandand Control

ConventionalForce Ops

Counter-TerroristForce Ops

Iraqi Conventional& Special Force Ops

Sons of Iraq

PoliticalReconciliation(Laws/policies)

ReligiousEngagement

InformationOperations

Jobs Programs

Services

Internet

Armed Unmanned Aerial VehiclesIntel, Surveillance& Recon PlatformsIntel Fusion

Education

Work withSource Countries

Border Ports of EntryImprovements

AQ Senior LeaderGuidance

TribalAwakenings

Interagency

DetaineeReleases

Strategic Communications

SyriaEngagement

Non-kinetics

DetaineeOps

Kinetics

Intelligence

Politics

Counterinsurgencyin Detention Facilities

Counter Ethno-Sectarian Pressures

8

0

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-May

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25-J

un-0

406

-Aug

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17-S

ep-0

429

-Oct

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10-D

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421

-Jan

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04-M

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515

-Apr

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27-M

ay-0

508

-Jul

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07-D

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718

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30-J

an-0

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24-A

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-09

Attacks Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government OrganizationsBombs (IEDs and Mines), Both Found and ExplodedSniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms AttacksMortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks

Militia Uprising and First Fallujah

Baghdad Security Plan,15 February 2007

Ramadan16OCT-14NOV04

5OCT-4NOV0524SEP-23OCT0613SEP-13OCT071 SEP-29SEP08

Samarra mosque bombing,

22 February 2006

Parliamentary elections,

15 December 2005

Iraqi elections,30 January 2005 Basrah and Sadr

City Operations,25 March 2008

Surge of Offensives

Second Fallujah

Battle of Najaf Constitutional

referendum,15 October 2005

Diyala Operations

Mother of Two Springs II

15 Oct 2008

Security Incidents in Iraq

Source: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 06-Jun-09.

Ramadan18 OCT – 14 NOV 04

5 OCT – 4 NOV 0524 SEP – 23 OCT 0613 SEP – 13 OCT 071 SEP – 28 SEP 08

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

9

Violent Civilian Deaths

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000Ja

n-06

Feb-

06M

ar-0

6A

pr-0

6M

ay-0

6Ju

n-06

Jul-0

6A

ug-0

6Se

p-06

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-06

Nov

-06

Dec

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Jan-

07Fe

b-07

Mar

-07

Apr

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May

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07Ju

l-07

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07O

ct-0

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ec-0

7Ja

n-08

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ar-0

8A

pr-0

8M

ay-0

8Ju

n-08

Jul-0

8A

ug-0

8Se

p-08

Oct

-08

Nov

-08

Dec

-08

Jan-

09Fe

b-09

Mar

-09

Apr

-09

May

-09

Iraqi and Coalition DataCoalition Data

Sources: SIGACTS III Coalition and Iraqi reports as of 06-Jun-09.

10

High Profile Attacks (Explosions)

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140M

ay-0

6Ju

n-06

Jul-0

6A

ug-0

6Se

p-06

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Nov

-06

Dec

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Jan-

07Fe

b-07

Mar

-07

Apr

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May

-07

Jun-

07Ju

l- 07

Aug

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07O

ct-0

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ov-0

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n-08

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ar-0

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pr-0

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ay-0

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n-08

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p-08

Oct

-08

Nov

-08

Dec

-08

Jan-

09Fe

b-09

Mar

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Apr

-09

May

-09

TotalCar BombsSuicide Car BombsSuicide Vests

Source: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 06-Jun-09.

11

Al Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni Insurgents

Winter 2006-2007 Winter 2008-2009

Baghdad Baghdad

12Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 3 Jun. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 8-JUN-09

Security Incidents in Afghanistan

2008 20092007200620052004

0

50

100

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250

300

350

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Jan-

04Fe

b-04

Mar

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Presidential Elections

October 04

Parliamentary Elections

18 September 05

Transfer ofAuthority to ISAF

31 July 2006

Serena Hotel Attack14 January 2008

Victory Day Attack

27 April 08

Sar-e Poza Prison Break13 June 2008

Attacks Against Afghanistan Infrastructure and Government OrganizationsBombs (IED and Mines), Both Found and ExplodedAmbush, grenade, RPG, and Other Small Arms AttacksMortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks

Ramadan18 OCT – 14 NOV 04

5 OCT – 4 NOV 0524 SEP – 23 OCT 0613 SEP – 13 OCT 071 SEP – 28 SEP 08

13

Afghanistan Security Incidents: 2008

13

14

TF HELMAND

RC W (HERAT)

(-)

RC E (BAGRAM)

X

XX

TF ORUZGAN

TF KANDAHAR

III

(-)X RC N (MAZARI SHARIF)

X

X

II

TF ZABOLII

TF SPARTANX

TF WHITE EAGLE

TF Tigre

RC S (KANDAHAR)

XX

III

1 COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE (Kandahar, Qalat, Tarin Kowt)

1

Current Dispositionand Planned Additional US Forces

2

2 MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (Bastion, Garmsir, Eastern Farah)

TF CURRAHEE

TF DUKE

X

X

XXXX

XRC C (KABUL)

HQ ISAF/USFOR-A

4 AIRBORNE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM + ADVISORS

3 STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (Spin Boldak, Qalat, Shah Wali Kot, Maywand)

34

Legend

X

X In Theater at Start of 2009Additional Forces

X

XX

X X4/82

CSTC-A

US Forces in Afghanistan

48th

15

Situation in Pakistan

AFGHANISTAN

Kabul

200 km

1000

Bannu

FC400km

Thal

Peshawar

XXXHQ

Miram Shah

Wana

FC

Khar

FC

MingoraKhwazakhela

Frontier Corps Wing(s)

FCRegular Army

Ongoing or Recent Operations

Kohat

KohatHangu

X

Jandola

Kalam

BunerLower

Dir

Swat

Dera Ismail Khan

Islamabad

XXXX

XX

XX

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

FC

X

XX

AFGHANISTAN

Kabul

200 km

1000

Bannu

FC400km

Thal

Peshawar

XXXHQ

Miram Shah

Wana

FC

Khar

FC

MingoraKhwazakhela

Frontier Corps Wing(s)

FCRegular Army


Kohat

KohatHangu

XX

Jandola

Kalam

BunerLower

Dir

Swat

Dera Ismail Khan

Islamabad

XXXXXXXX

XXXX

XXXX

FCFC

FCFC

FCFC

FCFC

FCFC

FCFC

FCFC

FCFC

XX

XXXX

16

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICTIncreasing ViolenceStable Peace

GeneralWarInsurgencyUnstable

Peace

Offense

Defense

Defense

Offense

Defense

Offense Offense

Defense

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

OPERATIONAL THEMES

FM 3-0: Full Spectrum Operations

17

ISF ISF

RAVEN

X

3/4 ID

RAVEN RAVEN

The Battle of Sadr City: March-April 2008

GMLRSSOF

Tact

ical

Ope

ratio

nal

S

trat

egic

2 PREDATORS

JSTARS

GLOBAL HAWK

EP-3/EPX

U2

National

Other Assets: Other Government Agencies, SIGINT Elements, Deployable Ground Station, Sniper Teams, SOF ISR, Phased Array Radar Pods on CAS

SOF ISR

COUNTERFIRE RADAR

SHADOW SHADOW

AIR WEAPONS TEAM

SHADOW

AEROSTAT

RAID

Green Dart UAV

17

24/7 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

AIR WEAPONS TEAM

AIR WEAPONS TEAM

AEROSTAT

18

4th of July Reenlistment Ceremony

Questions

20

Yemen, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea

0

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9

Successful Hijackings/Acts of PiracyUnsuccessful Attemps / Other Attacks

Monthly Acts of Piracy off Somali Coast

Source: US Navy Central, through 14 May 09

21

Joint Campaign Plan Design

NEAR TERM LONG TERM(NLT JUL 09)(NLT JUL 08)

INTERMEDIATE TERM

Supporting ActivitiesEngagement for Reconciliation

Capacity BuildingRule of Law Development

Good Governance PromotionStrategic Communications

Lead Conditions-basedtransitionsPartner

Overwatch

PartnerLead

OverwatchOverwatch

SUSTAINABLESECURITY

NATIONAL

Development

Conditions-basedtransitions

ReconciliationLOCALIZEDSECURITY

Lines ofOperation

POLITICAL

SECURITY

ECONOMIC

DIPLOMATIC

POLITICAL

SECURITY

ECONOMIC

DIPLOMATIC

INFO

RM

ATIO

NA

L M

EAN

S

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22

DEC 06 APR 07 SEP 07

DensityLeast Most

Ethno-Sectarian Violence in Baghdad

Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.

75% Shi’a 75% Sunni51% Shi’a / 25% Sunni 51% Sunni / 25% Shi’aSunni, Shi’a, Christian Mixed - Muslim

Shi’a, Christian

MAY 09

0

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ay-0

9

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths All of IraqBaghdad Security Districts

Sources: CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports) as of 06-Jun-09; weekly beginning 01-May-06

23

Jaysh al Mahdi and Shi’a Extremists

Winter 2007-2008 Fall 2008

Baghdad

Basra

Baghdad

Basra

24

Infantry, Armor, Special Operations, National Police, and Emergency Response Unit Battalions

Over 81% or 149 of 183 Iraqi Army Combat Battalions are “in the lead” for operations

ISF Combat Battalion Operational Readiness Assessment

Source: Iraqi Assistance Group. As of 20 APR 09.

Current184 Total BNs

2 Years142 Total BNs

1 Year132 Total BNs

Baseline89 Total BNs

ORA = Operational Readiness Assessment

0

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b-09

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-09

April 2006—43% in the lead or 52 of 121 Battalions

ORA 1 ORA 2 ORA 3 ORA 4

3 Years185 Total BNs

25

Lessons Learned: The Strategic COIN Command

Multi-National Force-Iraq is a strategic-level HQ optimized with an arsenal of COIN tools/subordinate commands:•An operational command (MNC-I)•A command to generate, train, and equip indigenous security forces (MNSTC-I)•A reconstruction command (Gulf Region Division, Army Corps of Engineers)•A detention command conducting “COIN inside the wire” and helping with the Iraqi corrections system (TF-134)•A Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) to facilitate reconciliation with hostile factions and take them off the battlefield, supported by a Strategic Debriefing Element (SDE) to “map” the enemy

•A robust Pol-Mil and Econ staff to reinforce Embassy partners and help execute the Joint Campaign Plan (CJ9)•An element to fight the war of information (IO Task Force) and an element to “be first with the truth” (Strat Comms/Media OpsCenter)

•Fusion cells (joint MNF-I/USEMB elements) for Energy, Medical, and other critical areas•An intel structure to support all of the above (CIOC, DIA Forward Element, etc.)

Fully partnered and in coordination with:•US Embassy and all its interagency elements

•A counterterrorism command (TF-714)•An embedded JIATF that includes a threat financing cell

•The United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)•An element dedicated to commercial development (“Brinkley Group” – TF Business Stabilization Ops)

COMMNF-I

SCJS

Coordination

MNSTC-IMNC-I GRD JCC-IA

CJ1/4/8

CHAPCOS JASGSJA

CJ6CJ2

CIOC/DFE/SDE

CJ3 CJ9 FSECCJ5

JIATF Threat Financing TFBSO

CT Command(TF-714)

TF-134

UNAMI

Strat Comms/MOC

US Embassy

IOTF

Traditional staff augmented for strategic C2 of a COIN campaign as it evolved in Iraq—Afghanistan HQs will require similar optimization

26

ISAF/USFOR-A Organized for a COIN Campaign

Coordination

Proposed Sections

CSTC-A JCC-IA

J4 J6J2

CIOC

J3/5/7 J1

JIATF

Opnl HQsCT Command

(TF-714)

UNAMA

Strat Comms/MOC

US Embassy

Augmentation of ISAF/USFOR-A HQs would provide Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A and US Ambassador, Kabul with the additional staff tools

necessary to ensure a comprehensive COIN approach.

CDR USFOR-A

CJ5 CJ1/4/8CJ9 CJ2 CJ3

TFBSO

FSEC

Detention

ISAF USFOR-A

Strat CommsAEngDist

Senior Civilian Rep

CN JIATF

Threat Financing

DIA Fwd Elem

Strat Debrief

IO TF

COM ISAF

27

RC-Central Security Incidents

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 3 Jun. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 8-JUN-09

0

5

10

15

20

Jan-

04Fe

b-04

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l-04

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ct-0

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n-05

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ar-0

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ay-0

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p-05

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b-06

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l-06

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ct-0

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n-07

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ar-0

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pr-0

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ay-0

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n-07

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7A

ug-0

7Se

p-07

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b-08

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l-08

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ct-0

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n-09

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ar-0

9A

pr-0

9M

ay-0

9


28

RC-East Security Incidents


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120

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180

Jan-

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b-04

Mar

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n-05

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5Se

p-05

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b-06

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ct-0

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n-07

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ar-0

7A

pr-0

7M

ay-0

7Ju

n-07

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7A

ug-0

7Se

p-07

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-07

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-07

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Jan-

08Fe

b-08

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-08

Apr

-08

May

-08

Jun-

08Ju

l-08

Aug

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08O

ct-0

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ay-0

9


29

RC-South Security Incidents


0

40

80

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Jan-

04Fe

b-04

Mar

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ct-0

4N

ov-0

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ec-0

4Ja

n-05

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ar-0

5A

pr-0

5M

ay-0

5Ju

n-05

Jul-0

5A

ug-0

5Se

p-05

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-05

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Dec

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Jan-

06Fe

b-06

Mar

-06

Apr

-06

May

-06

Jun-

06Ju

l-06

Aug

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Sep-

06O

ct-0

6N

ov-0

6D

ec-0

6Ja

n-07

Feb-

07M

ar-0

7A

pr-0

7M

ay-0

7Ju

n-07

Jul-0

7A

ug-0

7Se

p-07

Oct

-07

Nov

-07

Dec

-07

Jan-

08Fe

b-08

Mar

-08

Apr

-08

May

-08

Jun-

08Ju

l-08

Aug

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Sep-

08O

ct-0

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ov-0

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n-09

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ar-0

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pr-0

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9


30

RC-West Security Incidents


0

5

10

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Jan-

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b-04

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l-04

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ct-0

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ov-0

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ec-0

4Ja

n-05

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ar-0

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pr-0

5M

ay-0

5Ju

n-05

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5A

ug-0

5Se

p-05

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06Fe

b-06

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-06

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l-06

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ct-0

6N

ov-0

6D

ec-0

6Ja

n-07

Feb-

07M

ar-0

7A

pr-0

7M

ay-0

7Ju

n-07

Jul-0

7A

ug-0

7Se

p-07

Oct

-07

Nov

-07

Dec

-07

Jan-

08Fe

b-08

Mar

-08

Apr

-08

May

-08

Jun-

08Ju

l-08

Aug

-08

Sep-

08O

ct-0

8N

ov-0

8D

ec-0

8Ja

n-09

Feb-

09M

ar-0

9A

pr-0

9M

ay-0

9


31

RC-North Security Incidents


0

5

10

15

20

Jan-

04Fe

b-04

Mar

-04

Apr

-04

May

-04

Jun-

04Ju

l-04

Aug

-04

Sep-

04O

ct-0

4N

ov-0

4D

ec-0

4Ja

n-05

Feb-

05M

ar-0

5A

pr-0

5M

ay-0

5Ju

n-05

Jul-0

5A

ug-0

5Se

p-05

Oct

-05

Nov

-05

Dec

-05

Jan-

06Fe

b-06

Mar

-06

Apr

-06

May

-06

Jun-

06Ju

l-06

Aug

-06

Sep-

06O

ct-0

6N

ov-0

6D

ec-0

6Ja

n-07

Feb-

07M

ar-0

7A

pr-0

7M

ay-0

7Ju

n-07

Jul-0

7A

ug-0

7Se

p-07

Oct

-07

Nov

-07

Dec

-07

Jan-

08Fe

b-08

Mar

-08

Apr

-08

May

-08

Jun-

08Ju

l-08

Aug

-08

Sep-

08O

ct-0

8N

ov-0

8D

ec-0

8Ja

n-09

Feb-

09M

ar-0

9A

pr-0

9M

ay-0

9


32

Civilian, ANSF and ISAF Casualties

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

Jan-

04

Apr

-04

Jul-0

4

Oct

-04

Jan-

05

Apr

-05

Jul-0

5

Oct

-05

Jan-

06

Apr

-06

Jul-0

6

Oct

-06

Jan-

07

Apr

-07

Jul-0

7

Oct

-07

Jan-

08

Apr

-08

Jul-0

8

Oct

-08

Jan-

09

Apr

-09

Civilian KIAANSF KIAISAF/US KIA

Yearly Totals 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Civilian 125 101 429 534 718 225

ANSF 24 114 335 757 695 340

ISAF 11 29 78 103 249 93

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 20 May. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 25-May-09

33

0

5

10

15

20

25

Jan-

04Fe

b-04

Mar

-04

Apr

-04

May

-04

Jun-

04Ju

l-04

Aug

-04

Sep-

04O

ct-0

4N

ov-0

4D

ec-0

4Ja

n-05

Feb-

05M

ar-0

5A

pr-0

5M

ay-0

5Ju

n-05

Jul-0

5A

ug-0

5Se

p-05

Oct

-05

Nov

-05

Dec

-05

Jan-

06Fe

b-06

Mar

-06

Apr

-06

May

-06

Jun-

06Ju

l-06

Aug

-06

Sep-

06O

ct-0

6N

ov-0

6D

ec-0

6Ja

n-07

Feb-

07M

ar-0

7A

pr-0

7M

ay-0

7Ju

n-07

Jul-0

7A

ug-0

7Se

p-07

Oct

-07

Nov

-07

Dec

-07

Jan-

08Fe

b-08

Mar

-08

Apr

-08

May

-08

Jun-

08Ju

l-08

Aug

-08

Sep-

08O

ct-0

8N

ov-0

8D

ec-0

8Ja

n-09

Feb-

09M

ar-0

9A

pr-0

9M

ay-0

9

High Profile Attacks (Explosions)

Yearly Totals 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Person Borne 3 10 44 64 74 31

Suicide Vehicle 4 13 79 74 95 22

Vehicle IED 9 11 24 25 42 14

TotalPerson Borne IEDSuicide VehicleVehicle IED

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 20 May. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 25-May-09

34

Pakistan

35

Security Incidents in Pakistan

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Mar

-08

Apr

-08

May

-08

Jun-

08Ju

l-08

Aug

-08

Sep

-08

Oct

-08

Nov

-08

Dec

-08

Jan-

09F

eb-0

9M

ar-0

9A

pr-0

9M

ay-0

9

Attacks Against Infrastructure and Government Organizations IEDs, Mines, Suicide Attacks Small Arms Engagements, RPG, Grenades Indirect Fire Attacks, Mortars, Rocket

PakMil Operationsin Bajaur

Swat PeaceAgreement

PakMil Operations inDir, Buner, and Swat

Source: WebTAS Pakistan SIGACTS as of 03 June 09

36

Situation in Pakistan

AFGHANISTAN

Kabul

200 km

1000

Bannu

x3FC

XX7 HQ

X23

X22

400km

Thalx11FC

x6FC

Peshawar

X26

x7FC

XXX11 HQ

X102

x1FCx1FC

X6

X27

Miram Shah

X327

X117

X116

Wana XX9 HQ

x8FC

x9FCX

73

Khar

x5FC

MingoraKhwazakhela

XX37 HQ

X107

X88

X313

x4FC

Frontier Corps Wing(s)FC

Regular Army


x2FC

x2FC

Kohat

KohatHangu

XX19 HQ

X54

X28

X1AK

Jandola

Kalam

BunerLower

Dir

Swat

Dera Ismail Khan

AFGHANISTAN

Kabul

200 km

1000 200 km

1000

BannuBannu

x3FC x3x3FC

XX7 HQ

XX7 HQ

X23

X23

X22

X22

400km

Thalx11FC x11x11FC

x6FC x6x6FC

Peshawar

X26

x7FC

X26

X26

x7FC x7x7FC

XXX11 HQ

X102

x1FC

XXX11 HQ

XXX11 HQ

X102

X102

x1FC x1x1FCx1FC x1x1FC

X6

X6

X27

X27

Miram Shah

X327

X327

X117

X117

X116

X116

Wana XX9 HQ

x8FC

XX9 HQ

XX9 HQ

x8FC x8x8FC

x9FC x9x9FCX

73X

73

Khar

x5FC x5x5FC

MingoraMingoraKhwazakhelaKhwazakhela

XX37 HQ

X107

X88

X313

x4FC

XX37 HQ

XX37 HQ

X107

X107

X88

X88

X313

X313

x4FC x4x4FC

Frontier Corps Wing(s)FC

Regular Army


x2FC x2x2FC

x2FC x2x2FC

Kohat

KohatHangu

XX19 HQ

X54

X28

X1AK

XX19 HQ

XX19 HQ

X54

X54

X28

X28

X1AK

X1AK

Jandola

Kalam

BunerLower

Dir

Swat

Dera Ismail Khan

Islamabad

37

Counterinsurgency Campaign Design

Combat Operations

Civil Security Operations

Essential Services

Governance

Economic Development

Information Operations

Starting Conditions

Atti

tude

of P

opul

ace

End State

Insurgent Insurgent

Neutral or

Passive

Neutral or

Passive

Support Government

Support Government

Whole of Government Approach: An effective counterinsurgency campaign requires a comprehensive and fully integrated use of non-military and military institutions to

defeat the insurgency and address its root causes.

The Engine of Change

GEN David H. Petraeus

3939

Doctrine(Theory)

Combat/ContingencyOperations

Knowledge Management

LeaderDevelopment(Understanding)

CollectiveTraining

(Application)

LessonsLearned

(Feedback)

A Learning Organization(Leaders and Troopers who “get it”)

Engine of Change

40

Pre-9/11:Combat Operations

Today:Full Spectrum Operations

Doctrine(Theory)

Updated Doctrine

2006 Counterinsurgency

Operations (with Marine Corps)

Changes in Doctrine

2006 Army Leadership

“Modern Pentathlete”

2007 Training the

Force

2006 Human Intelligence

Collector Operations

2008 Full Spectrum

Operations

40

41

Pre-9/11:Combat Operations

Lecture-based “What to think”

Now:Full Spectrum Operations

Seminar-based “How to think”

LeaderDevelopment(Understanding)

Leader Development

Initiatives

Counterinsurgency focused curricula

Regional language and culture training

Arabic

Pashto

Contemporary reading lists

To name a few…

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

2005 2007 2009 2011 2013ACS Slots for Operational Career Field Greater civil schooling

opportunities

Changes in Leader Development

41

42

Pre-9/11:Short, violent force-on

force engagements

Today:Continuous, complex

counterinsurgency operations

CollectiveTraining

(Application)

Training Center

Modifications

Improvised Explosive Devices, car bombs, etc.

Hundreds of native-speaking, role players

Civil affairs essential… and all do it

Looks like Iraq or Afghanistan

Changes in Collective Training

42

43

Pre-9/11:Predominantly hard-copy

publications

Today:Electronic products, virtual communities, and websites

LessonsLearned(Feedback)

Since 2001

• Website averaging 19K “sessions” & 20K documents downloaded per month

• 65 Collection & Analysis Teams deployed since 9/11

• 641 publications (online and print)

• 1,180 requests for information answered in April (broke January’s record of 1,015)

Combat and Counterinsurgency OperationsSustainment OperationsInformation OperationsAdvisor Responsibilities

Full Spectrum products

Changes in Lessons Learned

43

44

Pre-9/11: Today:“Band of Bloggers” Funded virtual

communities



Tools

Simulations with the “Human Dimension”Language software

and toolsCommand Post

of the FutureBattle Command Knowledge System

Changes in Knowledge Management

44

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45

Pre-9/11 Today:Latest equipment & technology, designed for this environment

Rapidly Fielding New Equipment

Vehicles With Better Protection

New Tools for Intelligence Fusion

Changes in Equipping the Force

New Equipment

and Technology

(Tools)

Improved Weapons Systems

IED Defeat Technology

45

CENTCOM Update

Documents

Transcript of CENTCOM Update