Celano Boethius of Dacia on the Highest Good

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BOETHIUS OF DACIA: 'ON THE HIGHEST GOOD'

Author(s): ANTHONY J. CELANOReviewed work(s):Source: Traditio, Vol. 43 (1987), pp. 199-214Published by: Fordham UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27831203 .

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BOETHIUS

OF DACIA: ON

THE

HIGHEST

GOOD'

By

ANTHONY

J.

CELANO

The

name

Boethius of

Dacia

evokes

today

an

image

of

a

radical

thinker,

who

championed

the

cause

of

philosophical

freedom,

even

at

the

expense

of his

religious

beliefs.

His

writings

have earned

him,

together

with his

contempo

rary,

Siger

of

Brabant,

the title of leader of the 'Latin

Averroists'

or

'Hetero

dox Aristotelians.'1 Boethius' treatise

on

the

highest good

has contributed

greatly

to the

modern

opinion

of Boethius

as a

radical thinker.

M.

Grabmann,

who rediscovered

the De

summo

bono,

considered

the

work

to

be

a

clear

expres

sion of the anti-Christian

tendencies inherent in

'Latin

Averroism';

and P.

Mandonnet

saw

the short treatise

to

be the

most

radical

expression

of

a

pro

gram

of the

natural

life,

the

purest

rationalism,

and

a

total denial of the

Christian

order.2

More

recently,

this view has been

modified

by

F. Van

Steen

berghen

and

his

students,

who

argue

that

Boethius

of

Dacia is

indeed

a

Chris

tian

thinker,

and in

no

way

excludes

'supernatural

beatitude' from his notion

of the

highest

good. They

point

out

that,

as a teacher of Aristotelian

philoso

phy,

Boethius'

main

concern

is the

summum

bonum

which

can

be

attained

on

earth.

As

a

result,

the

De

summo

bono

is

a

characteristic

product

of

the Arts

Faculty

at

Paris.3

The

opposing

views

on

the

opusculum

of

Boethius lead

us

to

consider

first

the

nature and

origin

of

the

work itself. We

must

ask

ourselves whether

the

De

1

The

term

'Latin

Averroism,'

whose main

proponent

is

P.

Mandonnet,

Siger

de

Brabant

et

l'averro?sme latin

au

XIIIe si?cle

(Louvain

1911),

has

a

long history.

More

recently,

F.

Van

Steenberghen,

objecting

strongly

to the

designation

of the Arts masters at Paris as 'Aver

roists,'

proposed

the alternative 'heterodox

Aristotelians,'

in

Siger

de

Brabant

d'apr?s

ses

uvres

in?dites

(Louvain 1931-1942)

and

Ma?tre

Siger

de

Brabant

(Louvain-Paris 1977).

See

also

R.

Hissette,

'?tienne

Tempier

et

ses

condemnations,'

Recherches de

th?ologie

ancienne

et

m?di?vale

47

(1980)

231-70.

Neither

term

does

justice

to the

varied

teachings

of the masters

so

designated,

but 'Aristotelian' is

preferable

to

'Averroist.' For

Boethius'

own

place

in

the

history

of

thirteenth-century

philosophy

see

B.

Bazan,

'La

r?conciliation

de

la

foi et

de

la

raison: ?tait-elle

possible

pour

les aristot?liens radicaux?'

Dialogue

19

(1980)

235-54;

for

Boethius'

understanding

of

the

autonomy

of

philosophy,

see

P.

Wilpert,

'Boethius

von

Dacien

?

Die Autonomie des

Philosophen,'

Miscellanea

Mediaevalia

3

(1964)

135-52.

2

M.

Grabmann,

'Die

Opuscula

De

summo

bono

sive

De

vita

philosophi

und De

sompniis

des

Boethius v. Dacien,' Mittelalterliches Geistesleben II (Munich 1936) 220-24; idem, Neukaufge

fundene

Werke

des Boethius

v.

Dacien und

Siger

v.

Brabant

(Sb.

Akad....

M?nchen

1924).

247;

P.

Mandonnet,

'Note

compl?mentaire

sur

Bo?ce

de

Dacie,'

Revue des

sciences

philosophiques

et

th?ologiques

2

(1933)

250.

3

F. Van

Steenberghen,

La

philosophie

au

XII si?cle

(Louvain-Paris

1966)

404;

R.

His

sette,

Enqu?te

sur

les 219 articles condamn?s ? Paris le

7

Mars

1277

(Louvain-Paris

1977)

17.



200

TRADITIO

summo

bono

is

truly

a

radical

departure

from the

teachings

of

Boethius'

con

temporaries

in

the Parisian Arts

Faculty,

or

merely

the

product

of

a more

daring

use

of

Aristotelian

terminology.

We

should

note,

first of

all,

that

some

features

of the

De

summo

bono

are

not

very

characteristic

of the

literary

activ

ity

of Boethius'

contemporaries

in the

Arts

Faculty

at Paris around 1270.4

In

the De

summo

bono

Boethius

uses

terms,

such

as

beatitudo

in

futura

vita

and

beatitudo

humana,

which

are

rarely

found

in the

writings

of his

colleagues

in the

Parisian

Arts

Faculty.5

His

concepts

of future beatitude

and

earthly

beatitude

correspond

directly

to

notions

found

in

Thomas

Aquinas'

Summa

Theologiae

I?11,

qq.

2-5.

The

Summa

can

hardly

be called

representative

of the

work of

the Arts

masters,

but

its

influence

on

the doctrine of

the De

summo

bono

is

undeniable.6 Because

of

the

presence

of both

theological

and

philosophical

concepts

in the

De

summo

bono,

we

cannot

say

that the work is

unquestionably

the result

of Boethius'

magisterial

activity

in

the

Arts

Faculty.7

Rather

than

conjecturing

on

the

place

of

origin

of the

treatise,

we

should look

to

the

text

itself

in order

to

determine the

place

of the De

summo

bono in thirteenth-cen

tury

thought.

Boethius

himself

tells

us

that

his treatise

is written

about the

first

principle,

which

is

the

philosophical

term for deus

gloriosus.

This is

a

very

unusual

way

for a master of the

thirteenth-century

Parisian Arts

Faculty

to consider the

final end

for

man.

Albert

the Great and

Thomas

Aquinas,

for

example,

refuse

to

consider

God

when

discussing

the

highest

human

good

in their

commentar

ies

on

the Nicomachean

Ethics

of

Aristotle.

They

prefer

to

concentrate

upon

the

operations

of

man,

whose

virtuous

activities

constitute

happiness;

or

in

4

The

most

recent editor of

the De

summo

bono

(DSB)

gives

1270

as

the

approximate

date

of

composition;

he offers

no

explanation

concerning

the

purpose

or

place

of

origin

of

the

work:

N. G.

Green-Pedersen,

Boetii Daci

opera,

opuscula:

De

aeternitate

mundi,

De

summo

bono,

De

somniis

(Corpus

philosophorum

danicorum medii aevi 6.2;

Copenhagen

1976)

xlvi-xlviii.

5

Thomas

Aquinas,

in the

Sentendo

libri Ethicorum

[Sent]

(ed.

R.-A.

Gauthier,

Opera

omnia

iussu edita

Leonis

XIII

P.

M. 47.1-2

[Rome

1969]

51.74-76),

attacks those

who

confuse

Aristotle's

concept

of

happiness

with the

Christian

ideal

of beatitude: 'Ex

quo

patet

quod

felicitas

de

qua

Philosophus

loquitur

non

consistit

in

ilia

continuatione

ad

intelligentiam

separatam

per quam

homo

intelligat

omnia,

ut

quidam

posuerunt.'

Albert

the

Great,

in

his

Lectura

[Led.],

does likewise:

'Dicendum,

quod

felicitas

non

est

quaedam

generalis

beatitudo

et

ordinatio

totius

animae

secundum

omnes

potentias,

sicut

quidam

dicunt,

sed

operatio

secundum

determinatam

virtutem,

scilicet

prudentiam,

et

determinatam

potentiam,

scilicet

rationem'

(Super

Ethica

commentum

et

quaestiones

Alberti

Magni

Opera

omnia

[M?nster

1968]

14.1.1.

75.71-76.74).

6

Indeed, three manuscripts attribute the De summo bono to Thomas Aquinas: DSB xlvi.

7

G.

Saj?

compares

the

parallel

passages

of Boethius'

De

summo

bono and his De

generatione

et

corruptione,

and concludes

that the

former

work influenced

the latter.

Boethii Daci

opera,

Quaestiones

de

generatione

et

corruptione

(Corpus

philosophorum

danicorum

medii aevi

5.1;

Copenhagen

1972)

xi-xv.

The

style

of

both works

is

similar,

and

the

passages

in the De

generatione

provide

little

help

in

determing

the

place

of

origin

of

the

DSB.



BOETHIUS

OF DACIA

201

Thomas' terminology they restrict themselves to the finis quo while relegating

the

finis

cuius

to another branch

of

inquiry.8

A

concentration

upon

the

earthly

end

for

man,

to

the exclusion

of

his

supernatural

end,

is

not,

however,

a

feature

of

the

De

summo

bono;

the

theological

considerations

of

imperfect

and

perfect

beatitude,

and

their

interdependence,

are

found in this work.9

We

must

then

take Boethius

at

his

word,

and consider this treatise

to

con

cern

the

highest

good,

which

can

be

understood

in

the

following

different

ways:

the

highest

good

simply;

the

highest

good

for

man

in the

afterlife;

the

highest

good

for

man

in this life.

All these elements

are

considered

in the

De

summo

bono and contribute to

a

certain confusion concerning its purpose. We

can

offer

here

no

conclusive

statements

on

the

origin

of this

work,

because

it

contains

such

tightly

woven

strands of

philosophical

and

theological

argu

ments. Even

the

last lines of

the

treatise

seem

somehow

self-contradictory;

after

praising

the

rational life of the

philosopher,

Boethius concludes the work

with

what

can

easily

be

considered

a

prayer:

The first

principle,

however,

concerning

which

this discourse

was

made,

is

God,

glorious

and

sublime,

who is

blessed forever

and

ever,

Amen.'10 Boethius

seems

to

indicate here that the

intellectual

activity

of

the

philosopher,

whose

study

of the

causes

of

being

leads

him

to

an awareness

of the first

cause,

resembles the immediate

intellec

tual

knowledge

of

God,

which

the

perfectly

blessed

enjoy.

Thus the

philoso

pher's

imperfect

knowledge

of

God leads

to

the absolute

perfection

of the

intellect.

Boethius

makes this conclusion

explicit

when he

discusses the rela

tion

between

perfect

and

imperfect

beatitude,

as we

shall

see

below.

The De

summo

bono,

then,

cannot

be considered

a

purely

philosophical

work

in the

manner

of

the usual

products

of the Arts

masters.

It is

a

much

more

complex

discourse,

containing

both

a

consideration

of

the

Christian

belief in

perfect

beatitude

and

philosophical

arguments

on

the role of the first

principle

8

Sent.

29.26-34;

the

finis

cuius and the

finis

quo

are

explained

most

fully

in

Summa

Theologiae (S.

Th.)

I?11

1.8: 'Finis

dupliciter

dicitur,

scilicet

cuius,

et

quo;

idest

ipsa

res

in

qua

ratio

boni

invenitur

et

usus

sive

adeptio

illius rei.

. .

.'

Albert's

description

of

the

subject

matter

of Aristotelian

moral

philosophy

is similar

to that

of

Boethius:

'Dicendum,

quod

summum

dicitur

dupliciter:

vel

simpliciter,

et

sic

est

unum

tantum,

quod

est

deus;

et

sic

non

quaeritur

hic. Vel

summum

alicui...

et

sic

quaeritur

summum

bonum

hominis

. .

.'

(Lect.

33.74-81).

The

origin

of the twofold

distinction within

the end

is

Aristotle,

De

anima 2.4

(415b20-21;

cf.

415b2-3).

The

direct

source

for the

thirteenth-century

commentators

is Aver

roes'

commentary

on

the De

anima:

Commentarium

magnum

in

Aristotelis

De anima libros

(ed.

F.

S.

Crawford,

Corpus

commentariorum

Averrois in Aristotelem

6.1

[Cambridge,

Mass.

1953]

183-84).

The first use of the distinction within the end, with

respect

to Christian beatitude, is

inWilliam

of

Auxerre's

Summa

aurea:

see

R.

Guindon,

B?atitude

et

th?ologie

morale chez

saint

Thomas

d'Aquin (Ottawa

1956)

54.

9

DSB

372.75-78.

10

'Primum autem

princ?pium,

de

quo

sermo

factus

est,

est

deus

gloriosus

et

sublimis,

qui

est benedictus

in

saecula saeculorum. Amen.'

DSB

377.242-44.



202

TRADITIO

in the human good. In the language of the time, Boethius' opusculum deter

mines

the

way

in which the

finis

cuius affects the

finis

quo.

Let

us now

turn

our

attention

to

the

specific

doctrines

of the De

summo

bono,

in

order

to

see

how Boethius understands this

relationship.

Boethius

opens

his discussion

on

the

highest

good

with

a

statement

that

summarizes

his

interpretation

of the first six

chapters

of Aristotle's

Nicoma

chean Ethics: 'Since

in

every

species

of

being

there is

some

highest possible

good

and

man

is

a

certain

species

of

being,

it is

necessary

that

some

highest

good

be

possible

to

man.'11

These

opening

lines

are

derived from

Aristotle's

description

of the

good

found

at

the

beginning

of the

Nicomachean

Ethics,

and

include Aristotle's assertion that

man

must

have his

own

specific

good.

Boe

thius does

not

attribute these

positions

directly

to

Aristotle,

most

likely

be

cause

they

were

so

well-known

at

the

time.

After

stating

that

man

as

a

species

of

being

must

have

a

highest

good,

Boethius declares his

specific

topic

to

be the

summum

sibi,

which is here the

highest

good

attainable

by

man.

Boethius refrains

from

an

extensive

con

sideration of

the

summum

bonum

absolute,

because

he

wishes

to

investigate

only

that

good

which

can

be known

by

reason

(per

rationem inv

estig emus).12

Must

we

then,

like

Grabmaiin,

Mandonnet,

and

even

Van

Steenberghen,

understand

the

words

per

rationem

investigemus

to

exclude

any

religious

con

siderations

from

the treatise

?13

Despite

his claim

to

investigate

the

good

by

reason,

Boethius considers both

perfect

and

imperfect

beatitude,

and the

way

inwhich

the

highest

earthly

good

for

man

contributes to

his

ultimate

goal

as

a

Christian.14

These

are

hardly

the

concerns

of

a

man

who

expresses

anti-Chris

tian

tendencies

or

totally

denies the

Christian

order. When Boethius

says

that

he will

investigate

only

the

summum

bonum

hominis,

he

does

not

thereby

exclude God

from the discussion. For

man

to

obtain his

ultimate

end,

he must

know

God;

there

is,

according

to

Boethius,

no

greater

good

which

man can

attain 'than a

cognition

of the

totality

of

beings

which emanate from the first

principle

and therefore

a

cognition

of

the

first

principle

itself

as

far

as

such

cognition

is

possible.'15

The De

summo

bono

turns

out to

be

not

merely

an

explanation

of the

Aristotelian

notion of

happiness

in

the usual

manner

of his

predecessors

in the Arts

Faculty,

who

concentrated

on

the human

activities;

it

is also

a

consideration

of the

ultimate

end,

or

object,

of these

activities. It is to

Boethius' credit that

he

recognized

that God

played

an

important

role inAris

11DSB 369.1-3. See J. Schneider, Das Gute und die Liebe nach der Lehre Albert des Grossen

(Munich-Paderborn-Vienna

1967).

12

DSB

369.4-7.

13

See

above,

.

2.

14

See

below,

pp.

213-214.

15

DSB

371.47-51.



BOETHIUS

OF DACIA

203

totelian ethics (Eth. Nie. 10.8, 1178b22-32). Moreover, he sees no fundamental

opposition

between

the

philosopher's

desire

to

know the first

being

and the

believer's love

of

God.

In this

way,

Boethius' work is similar to the

Summa

Theologiae.

In his search

to

discover

the

activities

in

which

the

highest

human

good

consists,

Boethius

follows

very

closely

Aristotle's doctrine

on

human

happi

ness.

Like

Aristotle,

Boethius

quickly

rejects

the

actions which

are

produced

by

the

vegetative

and

sensitive

powers

of the soul

as

possible

explanations

of

the human

good.

Sensation

and

growth

are common

to

lower

forms of

life,

and,

as

such,

are

inadequate descriptions

of

the

human

good.

Boethius

con

cludes

that the

highest

human

capability

resides

in the

intellect,

and that the

best

life consists

in

using

the

intellect

in

order

to

contemplate

and

to

act

morally.16

In

his

brief

summary

of the Aristotelian notion of

happiness,

Boethius

real

izes that Aristotle's

e a

a

consists

in

the exercise of

both

rational faculties

of

the

soul.

In

asserting

that the human

good

encompasses

both

speculation

and moral

actions,

Boethius follows

very

closely

the

interpretation

of

Aristot

le's Ethics

found in Thomas

Aquinas'

Sententia

libri Ethicorum.

Like

Thomas,

Boethius

argues

that for each rational

power

of the soul

there

is

a

highest

possible

good.

The

speculative

power

of the intellect attains its summum

bonum in the

cognition

of truth and

the

delight

therein;

for

the

practical

intel

lect,

the

operation

of

good

and

the

delight

therein constitute the

highest

good.17

Boethius concludes

that the

highest

human

good

is

both

knowing

truth

and

performing

morally good

actions,

and

the

pleasure

that both these activi

ties

bring.18

Throughout

the

treatise,

Boethius

stresses

the

necessity

of

per

forming

morally

good

actions

in

attaining

the human

good.

Indeed,

a

great

16

DSB

369.7-14.

Note that Boethius

says:

Optima

virtus

hominis

ratio et

intellectus

est;

est enim summum regimen vitae humanae tarn in speculando quam in operando' (italics mine).

The distinction

between ratio and

intellectus is derived

from

Etnica Nicomachea

[E. N.]

2.1

(1138b34-1139al5),

where Aristotle

distinguishes

between intellectual and moral virtues.

17

DSB

370.20-24,

and

371.32-34;

see

Sent.

58.84-90,

where Thomas

argues

that

felicitas

consists

in

both

the active and

contemplative

life:

'.

..

sed felix habet

perfectam

virtu

tem

...

ergo

iste

semper

vel

maxime

poterit operari

in

vita activa

quae

sunt

secundum virtu

tem

et

speculari

in

vita

contemplativa.'

18

DSB

371.62-65.

The

position

of Boethius and

Thomas

is

almost

universally

rejected

in

the

thirteenth

century

in

favor

of that of

Albert,

who

sees

in the E.

N.

two

distinct

types

of

happiness,

civil and

contemplative:

'Et sic secundum

duos

ordines duo

sunt

summa

bona

hominis,

quorum

tarnen

unum

ordinatur

ad

alterum,

scilicet civilis ad

contemplativam'

(Led.

33.7-10).

The

anonymous

commentator

on

the

E.

N. of

MS Vat. lat. 2172

(V), following

Albert,

gives

the

common

interpretation

of Aristotle's notion of

happiness

in the

late thir

teenth

century:

'Duplex

est felicitas:

contemplativa,

et

ista consistit in

speculacione

veritatis

et

maxime

respectu

primorum

encium.

...

Alia

est felicitas

practica,

et

ista consistit

in

usu

prudencie

et

operibus

virtuosis'

(fol.

6va).

See

also R.-A.

Gauthier,

Trois commentaires aver

ro?stes

sur

l'?thique

?

Nicomaque,'

Archives

d'histoire doctrinale

et

litt?raire

du

moyen-?ge

16

(1947-48)

269-93.



204

TRADITIO

portion of the rest of the work attempts to demonstrate how a man who

speculates

upon

the

truth will best know which actions he should

perform.19

Finally,

Boethius' insistence

upon

the

role of

pleasure

in the human

good

recalls

vividly

Aristotle's assertion that the

operations

of

intellectual and

moral

virtue

are

most

pleasurable.20

Although

Boethius claims the

highest good

must

consist

in both

intellectual

and moral

virtues, he,

as

a

thinker

in the

Aristotelian

tradition,

cannot

deny

the

superiority

of

speculation.

He

argues

that

ultimately

all other

actions

are

directed

to

the

one

supreme

action,

which is the

contemplation

of

truth.21

Without

denying

the moral

superiority

of the

philosopher,22

Boethius

considers

the

primary

function

of

a

philosopher

to

be

the

contemplation

of

truth,

and

praises

the human

intellect

because

of

its

kinship

with the

divine. Boethius

further

compares

the intellect

with the

best

imaginable entity

in the

totality

of

being,

and concludes

that both

are

worthy

of the

designation

'divine.'

It

is this

divine

portion

of the

human

soul

that

separates

man

from the beasts.23

Boethius' claim

that the

supreme

human act

is

the

contemplation

of truth

leads him

to

a

consideration

of the

object

of

intellectual

activity.

He makes it

clear

that the human desire for

knowledge

can never

be satiated until

man

knows

ens

increatum.

Citing

Averro?s,

Boethius

argues

that all

men

naturally

desire knowledge of the divine.24 This section marks an important transition in

the

subject

matter of the De

summo

bono;

from

now

on,

Boethius

speaks

of the

summum

bonum

in

different

terms

from

those

we

have

previously

encountered.

No

longer

does he restrict himself

solely

to

a

consideration of the human

activi

ties which

comprise

the human

good;

he will

now

treat

the

object

of the

phi

losopher's

knowledge.

Although

Boethius

limits

his

arguments

on

the

object

of

intellection

to

philosophical

ones,

he

leaves

no

doubt

as

to

the

identity

of the

object

of

human

speculation.

The

object,

or

the

finis

cuius,

of human

happi

ness

is the

first

cause,

the

uncreated

being,

the

first

principle.25

These last

three terms are used in the De summo bono to refer to deus gloriosus etsublimis,

as

Boethius himself

clearly

admits.26

As

a

result,

we

must

consider

the

purpose

19

DSB 374.149-375.64.

20

E.

.

1.8

(1099a7-23).

21

DSB

375.165-70;

E.

.

10.7

(1177al2-18).

22

DSB 375.163-64:

'.

.

.

ideo

philosophus

est

facilius virtuosus

quam

alius.'

23

DSB

370.20-24;

E.

N.

10.7

(1177b26-1178a8).

24

DSB

375.170-73.

25

DSB

375-77,

passim.

Such

terms

are common

in

commentaries

on

the E.

.

in

the late

thirteenth

century:

e.g.

:

'Cum

in

bono

separato,

quod

est

prima

causa,

aliqualiter

consistit

humana felicitas . . .'

(V,

fol.

7rb).

The

commentary

of James of Douai

(?)

names God as the

extrinsic end

for

man

(finis cuius):

'.

.

.

qui

finis sit

oper?ci?

hominis

bene

tarnen

est

propter

alium finem

extrinsecum,

scilicet

finem

ultimum

simpliciter,

qui

est

deus'

(MS

Paris,

B.N.

lat.

14698

[J],

fol.

133va).

See

R.-A.

Gauthier,

'Les

Questiones

supra

librum

Ethicorum

de

Pierre

d'Auvergne,'

Revue du

moyen

?ge

latin

20

(1964)

233-60.

26

DSB 377.210-13.



BOETHIUS

OF DACIA

205

of Boethius' treatise truly

to

be

a

consideration of the highest good, God

himself,

and

how God affects

the

summum

bonum

hominis.

In

a

most

impor

tant

way

?

i.e.,

as

the

object

of human

speculation

?

God

is

the

highest

human

good,

concerning

which

the

opusculum

was

written.

We

see

now

that

Boethius does

not

restrict himself

to

a

discussion

of the

human

end in

terms

of human

activity

alone.

The

idea that God is the

sum

mum

bonum hominis

opens

the

way

for

some

philosophical

considerations

on

the

nature of the

object

of human intellection.

Because

the final end of human

knowledge

consists

in

contemplation

of

the

divine,

Boethius

does

not

believe

that

an

examination

of the

uncreated

being

lies

entirely

outside the

scope

of

his work.

As

a

result,

Boethius considers

the

problem

of

summum

bonum

homi

nis from

two

points

of view:

(1)

the most

common

way

for

a

master

of the

thirteenth-century

Parisian

Arts

Faculty,

the activities of

human

reason,

or

the

finis quo;27 (2)

the

manner

in which Thomas

Aquinas

discusses God

in

the

Summa

Theologiae

as

the

object

of human

intellection,

or

the

finis

cuius.28

Until

the time

of

the

De

summo

bono

this

second

way

of

considering

the human

end had been dismissed

as

irrelevant

to

the

study

of

the

human

good by

reason

alone. Because Aristotle had considered

the

question

of the idea of the

good

as

appropriate

to

another

branch of

philosophy,

Boethius'

predecessors

in the

Arts

Faculty

who

composed

commentaries

on

the

Nicomachean Ethics did like

wise.29

Boethius,

however,

is

not

writing

a

commentary

on

the

text

of the

Nicomachean

Ethics,

but

an

exposition

of

a

problem

arising

from his

reading

of

Aristotle. His main

concern

is the

way

in

which the

highest

good

affects

the

summum

bonum hominis.

His

consideration of

the

relation between

God and

the

human

good

marks

a

decisive

point

in the

history

of moral

philosophy

in

the

thirteenth

century.

The

commentators

on

the

Nicomachean Ethics of the

late thirteenth

century,

most

likely

influenced

by

his

De

summo

bono and

Thomas'

Summa

Theologiae,

will

now

regard

God,

as

the

finis

cuius,

to

be

an

integral

part

of their work on moral

philosophy.30

27

See

above,

.

8.

28

S.

Th.

I?II,

qq.

2-5

are

concerned

mainly

with

the

way

in

which

God

is

necessary

to

human

beatitude. See

specifically

S. Th.

I?11

1.8: 'Finis

dupliciter

dicitur,

scilicet cuius

et

quo;

idest

ipsa

res

in

qua

ratio boni invenitur

et

usus

sive

adeptio

rei.

...

Si

ergo

loquamur

de

ultimo fine hominis

quantum

ad

ipsam

rem

quae

est

finis hominis

et

omnium aliarum

rerum.

Si

autem

loquamur

de

ultimo fine

hominis

quantum

ad

consecutionem finis.

.

.

.

Nam

homo

et

aliae

rationales

creaturae

consequuntur

ultimum

finem

cognoscendo

et

amando

Deum.

. .

.'

See

also

the

perceptive

comments

of

W.

Kluxen,

Philosophische

Ethik

bei Thomas

.

Aquin

(Mainz 1964) 120-21.

29

E.

.

1.6

(1096b30-35);

DSB

376,

passim.

Cf. the

opinions

of

Albert

and

Thomas,

who

consider the

concern

of

ethics

to

be

human activities

alone

(Led.

31.31-81;

Sent.

14.14-21).

30

Boethius' main contribution

to

the

study

of ethics

in

the

thirteenth

century

is his realiza

tion

that

the

divine

plays

an

important

role

in

Aristotle's

Ethics;

see

J.

Dudley,

Gott

und

e

a

bei

Aristoteles

(Frankfurt

a.

M.

1981).

Boethius'

influence

can

be

seen

in

Peter of



206

TRADITIO

In his

investigation

of the

highest good,

Boethius,

despite

his claim

to

inves

tigate

his

topic through

reason

alone,

considers

a

very

important

tenet

of

faith:

that

man

expects

beatitude after

his death. Boethius'

mere use

of

the word

beatitudo

to

describe

human

perfection,

instead

of

the

more

usual

felicitas,

betrays

his

sensitivity

to

the

theological question

of

the

relationship

between

man's

life

on

earth and his

hope

for

a

future reward.31 Boethius first

claims the

highest

good

to be

beatitudo

humana,

which he defines

as

the

cognition

of

truth,

the

operation

of

good,

and the

delight

in each.32 What Boethius has

given

here

is

his

understanding

of

Aristotle's

definition for human

happiness,

which,

as

we

have

said,

is almost

always

referred

to

in the

writings

of

his

contemporaries

in

the Arts

Faculty

as

felicitas33

We

must

first ask ourselves whether Boethius has confused the

philosophical

description

of

the

human

good

as

happiness

with the

theological

understanding

ofman's end

as

heavenly

beatitude.

The

way

in

which he continues

to

discuss

beatitude

seems

to

indicate

some

confusion about his

own

philosophical

ideal

of human

perfection

on

earth.

He

says

that for the sake of beatitude

society

should

be

ordered

by

military

and

legislative

means

so

that the citizens

are

given

the best

possible

chance

to

achieve

their

goals.

He

then claims that this

beatitude is

the

greatest good

which

man can

receive

from God

and which

God

can

give

toman in this life.34

At first

glance

Boethius' assertion that God

grants

beatitude

may

lead

us

to

conclude

that Boethius

has altered

the method of

investigating

the human

good by

reason.

If God

grants

human

beatitude,

then

all Boethius' talk

con

cerning

intellectual

and moral virtue

is

merely

a

prelude

to

his

specific

inten

Auvergne's

questions

on

the E. N.: 'Cum dicitur

quod

finis

omnium est

prima

causa,

non

est

de

consideracione

civilis

scientie,

dicendum

quod

hoc

verum

est

secundum substanciam

suam.

Nichil

tarnen

prohibet ipsam

esse

de

consideracione civilis doctrine

in

quantum

operaciones

considerate a civili sciencie ordinantur ad

ipsum' (MS Leipzig,

Universit?tsbibliothek

1386,

[L]

fol.

118ra_b).

See

my

article 'Peter of

Auvergne's

Questiones

supra

librum Ethicorum:

A

Critical Text and

Study,'

Mediaeval Studies

(1986)

1-110;

also

R.-A.

Gauthier,

'Les

Questio

nes

.

.

.'

(above,

n.

25).

31

The

difference between

felicitas

and beatitudo is

clearly

stated

by

Robert

Kilwardby

in

his De

sortu

scientiarum: 'The

spiritual good

according

to

Catholics

as

well

as

ancient

philoso

phers

is

beatitude,

which

philosophers

call

happiness;

while the Catholics

prefer

beatitude.

Beatitude

according

to

the

truth

of the

Catholic faith

cannot

be

fully

attained

in the

mortal

life...'

(De

ortu

scientiarum,

ed.

A.

C.

Judy

[Toronto 1976]

124

[my trans.]).

The word

felicitas,

when unmodified

by

terms

such

as

in

futura

vita

or

divina,

almost

always

refers

to

the

philosophical

concept

of

happiness.

For

a

discussion of

the

problem

of beatitude

in this

era, see the introduction to my article mentioned above (n. 30).

32

DSB

371.65-67.

33

See

above,

n.

32. Robert Grosseteste

always

translates

e

a

a

as

felicitas.

See

his

Ethica Nicomachea

in

Aristoteles Latinus 26.1-3.4

(Leiden

1974).

34

DSB

372.72-73:

'Hoc enim

est

maius

bonum

quod

homo

a

deo

recip?re

potest

et

quod

deus homini

dare

potest

in hac vita.'



BOETHIUS

OF

DACIA

207

tion, i.e., to describe the way inwhich God grants to man the human good.

Thus,

we are

forced

to

view the

De

summo

bono

as

a

work that

contradicts

itself:

on

the

one

hand,

Boethius

claims

to

investigate

the

human

good by

reason

alone;

on

the

other,

he asserts

unequivocally

that God

causes

human

happiness.

If

God is said

to

be

the

cause

of human

perfection,

then

Boethius

would

be forced

to admit that

man,

being

unable

to

affect the first

cause,

must

passively

await divine intervention. Even

reason,

which

Boethius

prizes

greatly,

could

never

ensure

that God

'grant'

human

happiness.

In

order

to

understand the

significance

of

Boethius' assertion that

God

gives

man

beati

tude we must first determine the exact meaning of beatitudo humana.

The

key

to

understanding

Boethius'

doctrine

of

beatitude lies in

the

writings

of his

predecessors,

who

see

in

the

Nicomachean Ethics

a

notion of

beatitude

which is distinct

from that

of

happiness.

In

chapters

9 and 10 of

Book

I,

Aristotle discusses

the

effects

of

fortune

upon

the human

good.

In

the

course

of his discussion he

introduces

the

term

'beatitude'

(

a

a

).

Modern

scholars

have

long

asserted

that

in the

Nicomachean

Ethics

happiness

(e

a

-

a)

and beatitude

or

blessedness

(

a

a

)

mean more

or

less

the

same

thing,

and

that Aristotle

uses

them

interchangeably.35

It is not

my

intention

here

to

examine

in

detail Aristotle's doctrine of

beatitude;

we

may simply

note

that Aristotle

implies

a

distinction between the essential

element of

happiness,

which is

the

exercise

of

virtue,

and

a

supremely

blissful

life,

which is

marked

by

an

abundance

of material benefits.36

The

medieval

interpretation

of the Aristotelian

concept

of

earthly

beatitude

has

its

origin

in Eustratius'

commentary

on

the

Nicomachean

Ethics,

which

was

translated

into Latin

by

Bobert Grosseteste

in

1246-1247.37 In his

discussion

of the

Aristotelian

notion

of the

human

good,

Eustratius excludes

external

or

corporeal

goods

from the

essence

of

happiness.38

Eustratius

argues

that

only

those virtues which result

from

mental activities constitute the essential

na

ture of

Aristotelian

political,

or

earthly, happiness.

As

a

result,

misfortunes

35

Foremost

among

them

are

R.-A. Gauthier and

Y.

Jolif,

L'?thique

?

Nicomaque

(Louvain

1970)

translation

and

commentary,

note

ad

1101a7. Also J. A.

Stewart,

Notes

on

theNicoma

chean

Ethics

of

Aristotle

(Oxford 1892),

whose note

on

1101a6 summarizes the usual

position

of

modern scholars: 'The distinction

between

e

a

and

a

a

is not

carefully

observed

by

Aristotle.'

36

See

my

article 'Aristotle

on

Beatitude,'

Ancient

Philosophy

5

(1985)

205-14,

which

ex

amines E.

N.

1.9-10.

37D. A.

Callus,

'The Date of Grosseteste's Translation and Commentaries on the Pseudo

Dionysius

and the Nicomachean

Ethics,'

Recherches

de

th?ologie

ancienne

et

m?di?vale

14

(1947)

200-209.

38

Eustratii

Metropolitani

Nicaeae

Enarraiio

in

primum

Aristotelis

moralium ad Nicoma

chum

(ed.

H. P. F.

Mercken;

The

Greek

Commentaries

on

the

'Nicomachean

Ethics'

of

Aristotle

[Leiden

1973] 147).



208

TRADITIO

and calamities, such as those that Aristotle describes, 'do not alter the sub

stance

of

happiness,

but somewhat restrict and

impede

beatitude,

bringing

sad

ness

and

impeding

many

an

operation.'39

In

recognizing

the distinction be

tween

the

terms

'beatitude' and

'happiness,'

Eustratius understands the

use

of

the word

a

a

(beatus)

in

the Nicomachean Ethics

to

signify

a

refinement of

the Aristotelian

concept

of

e a a

(felicitas),

for he

notes

that

'he

is

blessed

in his civil affairs

(beatus

in

politicis)

who has

an

abundance

of

every

sort

of

good.'40

Although

Eustratius

sees a

separate

philosophical

notion of

beatitude in

Aristotle's Ethics, he adds his

own

decidedly Christian interpretation to Aris

totle's claim that

men

who

live

according

to

complete

virtue and

who have

sufficient external

goods

will be

'blessed,

as

men.'41 Eustratius

interprets

this

line

to

mean

that

men are

blessed

according

to

human

life,

which

is

subject

to

many

changes during

earthly

existence. Because

beatitude

on

earth is

de

pendent

on

good

fortune,

and is thus

fragile

and

mutable,

Eustratius views

the

words

'blessed

as

men'

as

an

expression

of

Aristotle's belief

in

another

type

of

beatitude.

According

to

Eustratius,

Aristotle claims

men

can

be blessed

only

as

men,

because 'there is another

species

of

beatitude of

an

intellectual and

divine

nature, having

its

existence without

movement,

and

sustaining

no

change

whatsoever.'42

The

commentary

of

Eustratius

had

a

profound impact

on

the thirteenth

century

commentators

on

the

Nicomachean Ethics. His

understanding

of

earthly

beatitude

as a

concept

distinct

from,

though

related

to,

the Aristotel

ian notion

of

happiness

was

widely accepted

in

the

writings

of the Arts Masters

at

Paris. His realization

of

the

conflicting

claims of

the

philosopher's

beatitude

and the Christian's final end influenced both the

philosophical

and the theo

logical

discussion of Aristotle's

moral

philosophy

in

the second half of the

thirteenth

century,

although

his

understanding

of the words 'blessed

as

men,'

as

an

implication

of

the

Aristotelian doctrine of future

beatitude,

was

not

universally accepted.

Let

us

turn

our

attention

now

to

those

thinkers

who,

having

been influenced

by

the

commentary

of

Eustratius,

had the

greatest

impact

on

the doctrine of Boethius' De

summo

bono:

Albert the Great and

Thomas

Aquinas.

39

Ibid. 160:

converso

autem

accidentia

et

opposite

ei

quod

est

bene

substantiam

quidem

felicitatis

non

alterant,

angustant

autem

quodammodo

et

impediunt

beatitudinem,

tristitias

inferentia et multam

operationem

impediunt'

(italics added).

40

Ibid. 163: 'Interim

autem

igitur

non

erit

beatus,

si

ipsi

accidant infortunia

qualia

et

Priamo.

Beatus

enim ille

est

in

politicis

qui

secundum

omnem

speciem

bonorum abundat.'

There

can

be

no

question

here that

Eustratius'

concept

of

beatitude is

purely

philosophical.

41

a

a

'a

(beatos,

ut

homines):

E.

.

1.10

(1101a20).

42

Enarratio

[above,

.

38]

166.



BOETHIUS

OF DACIA

209

Albert the Great raises the question of

the

possibility ofworldly beatitude

when

discussing

Aristotle's

response

to

Solon's

dilemma.

According

to

Albert

in the

Lectura,

Solon

did

not want to

say

that

a man

must

be

dead

to

be

happy,

but rather

he

must

be

beyond

life's

changing

fortunes

to

be

judged

happy.

For

only

when

a

man

is dead and

beyond

any

possibility

of

performing

actions

contrary

to

those of

a

happy

man

can

he be

safely

said

to

have been

a

happy

man.

Albert calls

this

problem

more

pertinent

to

logic

than

to

ethics.43 Albert

later

refines

his

position

in his

paraphrase

of

Aristotle's

Nicomachean Ethics

as

follows:

certainly

when

we

speak

of

a

happy

man,

we

speak

of

a

living

man,

even

if it

is

only

after his death that

he

can

first

safely

be

called

happy.

Albert

concentrates

upon

the

way

inwhich

we can

safely

call

someone

happy;

but he

goes

on

to

distinguish

between

the essential

nature

of

happiness

and the

mate

rial

benefits

which

one

may

accumulate

throughout

one's lifetime.

Albert

says

that the

perfect good

may

be

considered

as

happiness

secundum

esse,

which

consists

in

the

operation

of

virtue,

or as

happiness

secundum

posse,

which

includes virtuous actions

as

well

as

all

possible

external

goods.44

Solon's

argu

ment,

Albert

concludes,

pertains only

to

the

second

way

of

considering

happi

ness: we

wait until after

a

man's death

in order

to

judge correctly

concerning

that

happiness

which

encompasses

all

external

goods,

but

even

to

say

a

man

cannot be called happy when he is performing the essential activities of happi

ness

is absurd.

Albert

argues,

in

the

Lectura,

that

if

one

considers

happiness

secundum

esse,

one

must

say

that

it

lacks

nothing

of

itself,

consists

in

the

exercise

of

reason,

and

need

not

endure until the final

moment

of life.

If,

on

the

other

hand,

one

considers

happiness

according

to

every

mode

which

can

possibly

occur

to

it

(felicitas

secundum

posse),

then

one

must

conclude

that

human

happiness

is

made

more

perfect

by

the contentment

of

a

happy

death.45

This second

man

ner

of

considering happiness corresponds directly

to

Eustratius' notion

of

bea

tus in politicis. In fact, Albert uses the term beatus felicitate civili to denote

that

happiness whereby

a

man

has

everything

which he

may

desire

on

earth.

Still,

Albert

admits

that

even

one

who is blessed

on

earth

is

not

the

same

as a

felix

simpliciter,

whose

every

possible

desire

is

fulfilled after

death.46

43

Led. 60.78-86. See

A.

Pelzer,

'Le

cours

in?dit d'Albert le

Grand

sur

la

Morale

?

Nico

maque

recueilli

et

r?dig?

par

S. Thomas

d'Aquin,'

Revue

n?oscolastique

de

philosophie

24

(1922)

333-61,

479-520.

44

Ethicorum

libri X

(

=

Para.):

Opera

omnia

(Paris 1891)

1.7.14.127b;

cf. Led.

22.37-45,

where

felicitas

secundum essentiam is

compared

with

felicitas

in

maxime

posse,

which

denotes

happiness together with an abundance of external

goods.

45

Led.

69.68-72.

46

Led. 52.46-50:

'Dicendum,

quod

felix

simpliciter

habet

quae

vult

simpliciter,

sed hoc

non

in

vita,

sed beatus felicitate civili habet

omnia

quae

vult,

secundum

statum,

non

simpliciter,

dummodo

voluntas

sit ordinata.'

Albert

uses

the words

felix simpliciter

here

in

order

to

distinguish

heavenly

beatitude from

his

notion of

earthly

beatitude

(beatus

felicitate

civili).



210

TRADITIO

Like

Eustratius,

Albert realizes that Aristotle's

concept

of beatitude is

not

the

same

as

that

of

the Christian

faith,

and he understands Aristotle's words

to

be

an

explicit

rejection

of the

possibility

of

perfect

beatitude in this life:

Et

non

oportet

ut

mos

exspectetur,

ut

tune

vere

[ed.

Vives:

viri]

beati dican

tur.

Tales

autem dicimus

ut

homines

quibus

non

competit

supercoelestium

beatitudo

et

divina;

quia

ad illam homo

non

potest

ex

his

quae

hominis

sunt.47

Albert

argues

that

even

Aristotle,

the

pagan

philosopher,

realized the

imper

fect

nature of

man;

by

excluding

man

from

perfect

beatitude,

Aristotle distin

guished human beings from the gods and the spirits.48 In his comments on the

Ethics

of

Aristotle,

Albert is

content to

restrict himself

to

a

mere

mention of

perfect

beatitude.

He considers this

idea

to

lie

outside

the realm

of moral

philosophy,

because

otherworldly

beatitude

cannot

be

investigated

by

philo

sophical

reasoning.

The

happiness

which

is

characterized

by

divine

contempla

tion is

something

to

be

believed

in,

not to

be

investigated

by

reason.49

The work

of Albert the

Great,

together

with

the

commentary

of

Eustratius,

set

the

direction formuch of the

discussion

on

the notion of

happiness

in

the

second half

of the thirteenth

century.50

Nowhere is their

influence

more

ap

parent than in Thomas Aquinas' teachings on Aristotelian happiness and be

atitude.51

Thomas views the dilemma of

Solon

to

be

primarily

a

question

about

the

possibility

of

happiness

on

earth.

Thomas refutes the

opinion

of

Solon,

who

wished

to

reserve

judgment

on

the

quality

of

a

human life until

after

a

man's

death,

by appealing

to

the

nature

of

happiness.

Thomas

argues

that

if

we

follow the

turns

of

fortune,

and

must

continually

revise

our

opinion

throughout

the

course

of

a

person's

lifetime,

we

must then

concede

that

happi

ness

is indeed

weakly

based.

Such

constant re-evaluation belies the true nature

of

happiness,

defined

by

the

Philosopher

as

the

enduring operation

of virtue.52

Solon's

mistake, according

to

Thomas,

lies

in

his failure

to

see

the correct

place

of

external

goods

in

human

happiness.

Like

Albert,

Thomas finds

the

solution

to

Solon's dilemma

in the

distinction between

felicitas

secundum

opti

mum

quod

esse

potest

and

felicitas

secundum

esse.

Happiness

considered accord

ing

to its

essence can

be attained

during

one's

lifetime,

and

nothing

prevents

us

from

calling

a

virtuous

man

happy

before his death. On

the

other

hand,

if

happiness

is

thought

of

as

the maximum

enjoyment

of all

possible things,

or

47

Para.

1.7.15.127b.

48

Led. 69.39-44.

49

Led.

17.50-55, 57-58,

75-78.

50

R.-A.

Gauthier,

'Trois commentaires

..

.'

(above,

.

18)

244-69.

51

See the introduction

by

R.-A. Gauthier

to

L'?thique

?

Nicomaque

(above,

n.

35),

esp.

130-31.

52

Sent.

55.139-48.



BOETHIUS

OF

DACIA

211

the status congregatione omnium bonorum, then we would do well to wait and

judge

a

man

happy

only

after he is

beyond

the

effect of fortune.53

Thomas'

distinction

between

happiness

secundum

esse

and

happiness

secun

dum

optimum

possibile

is

taken

directly

from

the work of

Albert the

Great,

and

the

latter

concept

corresponds

directly

to

Eustratius' notion of

beatus

in

politi

cis

or

Aristotle's beatus

ut

homo.

It

is clear

to

Thomas that

the

notion

of the

maximum

possible happiness,

or

blessedness in the

civil

life,

refers

to

the

enjoyment

of

an

abundance

of

external

goods along

with the

exercise of vir

tuous

actions.

When Thomas

speaks

of

a

man,

for

example,

who loses

the

respect

of

his

fellow

citizens,

this loss of

an

external

good

does

not

take

away

his

happiness,

but rather 'tarnishes

(his)

beatitude'

(coinquinat

beatitudi

nem).5*

On

the other

hand,

if

a

man

enjoys

an

abundance

of

exterior

goods,

his

lifewill be

more

blessed

(beatior),

because such

goods

embellish

or

contribute

to

the

operations

of

virtue.55 For Thomas the words

beatus

and

felix

are

not

synonyms;

beatus,

in

Thomas'

commentary

on

the

Nicomachean

Ethics,

means

exactly

what it

means

forEustratius

and

Albert:

a man

who is blessed with

an

abundance

of material

benefits,

and who

performs

virtuous

actions.

Thomas'

own

understanding

of

the notion of

worldly

beatitude

ismade

clear

in the oft-cited

passage

of his

commentary,

where he refers to

Aristotle's

phrase

'blessed, as men.' Thomas says: 'wewill call those blessed who, among

the

living

in this

life,

have

now

and will have in the future

all the

things

mentioned above.'56

All those

things

mentioned above

are none

other than

the

external

goods

which

make

a man

beatus in

politicis.

The

reference

to

the

possession

of these

goods

in the future

tense

assures

us

that Thomas

considers

the

question

in

terms

of the dilemma

of

Solon:

can

we

call

a man

happy

during

his

lifetime

? Thomas

argues

that because

the

products

of

good

fortune

are

not

the

essential

characteristic

of human

happiness,

Aristotle

must

have

a

distinct

concept

of

a

purely

earthly

beatitude.57

Thomas,

like Eustratius and

Albert

53

Sent.

59.198-60.215.

The

designation

of the

highest

good

as

the

status

congregatione

omnium

bonorum is

taken from

Boethius,

De

cons.

phil.

3,

pr.

2

(CCL 94.38),

and is

common

in

thirteenth-century

commentaries

on

the

E.

N.

54

Sent.

47.159-62:

'Et

quantum

ad

hoc subdit

quod

denudari

quibusdam

exteriorum bono

rum

coinquinat

beatitudinem,

in

quantum

scilicet

reddit hominem

aliqualiter contemptibilis

in

oculis

aliorum.'

55

Sent.

58.116-59.120:

'Si

bona,

conf?rent ad hoc

quod

vita hominis sit beatior

quia.

. .

felicitas

indiget

exterioribus

bonis

vei

ad decorem

vei

in

quantum

sunt instrumenta

operatio

nis

secundum

virtutem.'

56

Sent.

60.215-22:

'Et si

ita

est ut

dictum

est

(beatos

dicemus)

illos de

numero

viventium

in hac vita

quibus

existunt in

praesenti

et existent in futuro ea

quae

dicta

sunt;

quia

ista

videntur

non

usquequaque

attingere

ad conditiones

supra

de

felicitate

positas,

subdit

quod

tales dicimus

beatos

sicut

homines,

qui

in

hac vita mutabilitati subiecta

non

possunt

perfec

tam

beatitudinem

habere.'

57

See

my

article

'Aristotle

on

Beatitude'

(above,

n.

36)

where

I

argue

that Thomas' inter

pretation

of the

text of Aristotle

is

essentially

correct.



212

TRADITIO

before

him,

sees

the clearest

expression

of the

concept

of

earthly

beatitude

in

the words

beatos,

ut

homines,

which

signify

the

mutability

and

imperfect

nature

of

human

beatitude.

Thomas'

discussion

of Aristotle's

concept

of beatitude leads him to

compare

the

philosopher's

beatitude

with that of the

Christian faith. He

argues

that

because

Aristotle realized that the

highest

state

that

men can

achieve

on

earth

is

blessedness,

which

can

be

lost

in

various

ways,

he left

open

the

question

of

other-worldly

beatitude.

Because

beatitude after death

can

never

be

lost,

Tho

mas

concludes

that it

must

be

more

perfect

than that

described

by

Aristotle

in

his Ethics.58

Although

Thomas is reluctant to discuss the

theological

concept

of Christian

beatitude when

commenting

on

the

words of the

Philosopher,

he

does

not

hesitate

to

compare

the

various claims

of the

philosophers

and the

theologians

in his

Summa

Theologiae.

There Thomas

consistently

substitutes the

words

beatitudo

imperfecta

for

felicitas

when

discussing

the

philosophical

ideal of

hap

piness.

In

the

theological

work,

Thomas

is most

interested in

showing

the

relationship

between the

good

life

on

earth

and

the

hope

of

future reward.

Thomas divides beatitude into

two

kinds:

perfect

and

imperfect. Imperfect

beatitude

corresponds

to

the notion of

happiness

that

is found in the

Nicoma

chean Ethics, and consists primarily in contemplation and secondarily in the

operation

of the

practical

intellect. Perfect beatitude consists

solely

in the

vision of

God,

and

can

be attained

only

after death.59 No

longer

is

Thomas

interested

merely

in the

philosophical

distinction

between

happiness according

to

its

essence

and

happiness

according

to

all

possible

benefits,

as

he

was

in

his

commentary

on

the

text

of

Aristotle; here,

he is

examining

both the

philo

sophical

and the

theological

ideas

of

the human

good.

In the

Summa,

Thomas understands the words

beati,

ut

homines

to be

Aris

totle's

denial

of the

possibility

of the

achievement

of

absolute

perfection

on

earth. As

a

result,

Aristotle

posited only imperfect

beatitude,

which

is the

highest

good

attainable

on

earth.60

Because

imperfect

beatitude

can

be

lost

through

the effects

of

ill fortune

and because

even

true

happiness

(felicitas

secundum

esse)

can

be

lost

by

turning

away

from virtuous

actions,

Thomas

58

H.

P.

F.

Mercken

speaks

of

a

transformation

of

Aristotle's Ethics into Christian

theology

in

the

Sent.:

see

H. P. F.

Mercken,

'Transformation

of the

Ethics

of

Aristotle in

the

Moral

Philosophy

of Thomas

Aquinas,'

Tommaso

d'Aquino

nel

suo

settimo

centenario,

Atti del

congresso

internazionale

(Rome-Naples

1974)

5.151-56.

Mercken,

following

Gauthier,

'Trois

commentaires

.

.

.'

(above

.

18),

may

be

correct

in

ascribing

a

transformation of Aristotle's

doctrine in the Summa Theologiae, but not in the Sent., where Thomas remains true to the

intention

of Aristotle.

The

following

discussion of

Aquinas'

concept

of

beatitude is

a sum

mary

of

my

'The

Concept

of

Worldly

Beatitude

in

the

Writings

of

Thomas

Aquinas,'

Journal

of

the

istory

of hilosophy

(1987).

59

S. Th.

I?II

3.5;

I?II

4.5.

60

S.

Th.

I?II

3.2,

ad

4.



BOETHIUS

OF

DACIA

213

concludes that Aristotle's ideal is somehow imperfect, especially when com

pared

to

eternal blessedness.61

The

relationship

between

imperfect

and

perfect

beatitude

in

Thomas'

Summa

is

complex

and

need

not

concern

us

here.

It is

sufficient

to note

that

those who

are

called blessed

in

this

life

participate

in

future beatitude. We

cannot

speak

of

perfect

beatitude for the

living,

because

one

cannot

attain the

obiectum beatitudinis

secundum

seipsum,

namely

God,

during

one's lifetime.

Thomas admits

only

that

earthly

beatitude

is

somehow similar

to true

beati

tude.62

The commentaries ofEustratius, Albert, and Thomas

on

the first book of the

Nicomachean Ethics

form

the intellectual

background

to

Boethius' treatise

on

the

highest

good,

but

it

is the

Summa

Theologiae

that

is the

direct

source

for

Boethius'

notion of beatitude. When Boethius

argues

that human

beatitude

depends

on

God's

beneficence

and that

man

receives beatitude from

God,

he

is

not

transforming

the rational ethics

of

Aristotle into

a

doctrine of

faith.

Rather,

he

is

offering

an

interpretation

of

Aristotle similar

to

that of his

prede

cessors:

Boethius'

notion of the

highest

human

good

that

can

be

investigated

entirely

by

reason

turns

out to

be Eustratius'

beatus

in

politicis,

Albert's

felici

tas secundum

posse,

and Thomas'

beatitudo

imperfecta.

Boethius' insistence

upon

the

necessity

of

an

orderly

society

and

a

long

life,

and

upon

God's

role in

the

production

of the

highest

human

good,

assures

the

reader that he is

speak

ing

here

not

of the

essence

of

happiness

?

which consists

in

the

operation

of

virtue alone

?

but of

happiness

together

with

a

significant

measure

of

mate

rial

prosperity,

i.e.,

the Aristotelian

concept

of beatitude.63 Thus Boethius

can

claim

that

God

grants

beatitude

in

that

he

provides

external

goods

which lie

beyond

an

individual's

control,

while

maintaining

that

the

essence

of

happi

ness

is due

primarily

to

the human

activities

of the

intellect.

Boethius,

like

Thomas,

takes the

opportunity

to

mention

briefly

the relation

between

the

philosopher's

concept

of beatitude and the

theologian's

ideal of

blessedness.

His account of

the

way

in

which

imperfect

beatitude

participates

in

perfect

beatitude

closely

resembles Thomas'

position

in

the

Summa:

61

S. Th.

I?11

5.4: 'Dicendum

quod

si

loquamur

de

beatitudine

imperfecta, qualis

in

hac

vita

potest

haberi,

sic

potest

amitti.

Et

hoc

patet

in

felicitate

contemplativa,

quae

amittitur

vei

per

oblivionem

. . .

vei

per

aliquas occupationes.

. . .

Patet

enim

idem

in

felicitate

activa;

...

Si

autem remaneat

integra,

exteriores transmutationes

possunt

quidem

beatitudinem

per

turbare,

inquantum impediunt

multas

operationes

virtutum;

non

tarnen

possunt

earn

totaliter

auferre. ... Et

quia

beatitudo huius vitae amitti

potest, quod

videtur esse contra rationem

beatitudinis,

ideo

Philosophus

dicit

in I

Eth.

aliquos

esse

in

hac

vita

beatos

non

simpliciter,

sed

sicut

homines,

quorum

natura

mutatione

subiecta est.'

62

S. Th.

I?II

5.3,

ad

1.2-3.

63

DSB

371.65-372.75.

Note

that

Boethius

uses

the terms

eiiis hominis

beatitudo,

beatitudo

humana,

and beatitudo

in

hac vita

to

mean

the

same

thing

as

Thomas' beatitudo

imperfecta.



214

TRADITIO

Qui

enim

perfectior

est in

beatitudine,

quam

in

hac vita homini

possibile

esse

per

rationem

scimus,

ipse

propinquior

est beatitudini

quam

invita futura

per

fidem

expectamus.64

Even the

inclusion of

a

decidedly

theological

notion,

perfect

beatitude,

in

a

work

devoted

to

the

highest good

known

through

reason

does

not

entirely

demolish Boethius'

claim.

It

is

a

faith

transcending

reason

that leads

Boethius

to

proclaim

the

existence of

heavenly

beatitude,

as

it did

for

Boethius'

prede

cessors.

But

Boethius

implies

that it

is,

at

least,

not

contrary

to

reason

to

assume

that,

even

given

the

imperfect

nature

of

earthly

beatitude,

one

may

expect

a

type

of

perfect

beatitude.

Although

one

cannot

know for

certain

the

fate of the soul after death, faith teaches that itwill enjoy eternal perfection.65

The

appearance

in

Boethius'

discussion

of

elements

such

as

future

beatitude,

the divine

causality

of

earthly

beatitude,

and

even

the

source

of

sin,66

should

make

us

re-evaluate

the traditional

characterization of this

work

as

a

denial of

the

Christian

order,

or

even

as a

characteristic

product

of

the

Parisian

Arts

Faculty.67

A

pure

rationalist,

who is

expressing

anti-Christian

beliefs,

would

have

ignored

totally

the

question

of

the

relationship

between

perfect

and im

perfect

beatitude;

and

a

characteristic

product

of

the Arts

Faculty

would have

avoided

discussion of

God

as

the

object

of human

actions

(finis

cuius)

and the

divine

cause

of

beatitudo

imperfecta.

It is

more

correct to

state

that

the

title,

De summo

bono,

characterizes

perfectly

the aim of Boethius' treatise: to ex

plain

the

highest

good

for

man,

both

as

an

activity

and

as

the

object

of

that

activity. By

considering

Aristotle's

Ethics

in

light

of

both the

finis

cuius and

the

finis

quo,

Boethius sets

the

course

of the

discussion

on

the

human

good

for

decades

to

come.

The commentators

on

the

Nicomachean Ethics of

the last

quarter

of

the

thirteenth

century

do

not

hesitate

to

consider God

as

the

pos

sible

object

and

source

of

human

happiness,

in

works that

are

devoted

to

rational

inquiry.68

The

concerns

of

Boethius of

Dacia's De

summo

bono

become

the

central

questions

of late

thirteenth-century

moral

philosophy.69

Stonehill College

North

Easton,

Massachusetts

64

DSB

372.75-78.

65

Although

not

expressly

stated,

Boethius'

position

differs

little from

that found in

Peter

of

Auvergne's

questiones

on

the

Ethics: 'Dicendum

quod

felicitatem

dicimus

duplicem:

una

[unam L]

que

est ultima

perfectio

hominis

in

vita,

alia

est

post

mortem;

que

utrum

[est

L]

ipsius

animae

separate

ponamus

vel

aggregati

non

est

multum

curandum;

de

felicitate

autem

que

est

in

vita

facit

Philosophus

mencionem,

de

alia

autem

non,

et

ideo

similiter

faciamus'

(L,

fol.

122va;

edited

by

R.-A.

Gauthier,

'Les

Questiones

.

..'

[above,

n.

25]

244,

n.

24).

There is

no

trace

of the infamous

'double truth'

doctrine

on

the fate of

the

soul

in

the

DSB.

66 Sin is defined as the 'declinatio hominis ab ordine naturali': DSB 374.145-46.

67

See

above,

p.

206.

68

See

my

article

in

Mediaeval Studies

(above

n.

30);

also

R.-A.

Gauthier,

'Trois

commentai

res

..

.'

(above,

.

18)

270-93.

69

This

article

is

a

revised version

of

a

paper

read at

the

Centre

for

Medieval

Studies and

the

Pontifical Institute of

Mediaeval

Studies,

Toronto,

November

5,

1985.

Celano Boethius of Dacia on the Highest Good

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