Ceed raport_migration_ii_web3

A one-way ticket?Migration in Europe from the perspective of CEE countries

Shared experience, common development

CEED

A one-way ticket? Migration in Europe from the perspective of CEE countries

Published by the Central and Eastern Europe Development Institute

(CEED Institute) Warsaw 2015

© CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE 2015

www.ceedinstitute.org

No reproduction of any part of this report may take place without the written permission of the CEED Institute

Authors:

Prof. Maciej Duszczyk, CEED Institute Expert,

Institute of Social Policy,

Centre of Migration Research, University of Warsaw

Kamil Matuszczyk, Institute of Social Policy, University of Warsaw

To quote this report:

Duszczyk M., Matuszczyk K. (2015), A one-way ticket? Migration in Europe from the perspective of CEE countries,

Central and Eastern Europe Development Institute, Warsaw 2015

This report has been prepared in cooperation with the Work Service.

Work Service is the Poland’s largest HR company providing innovative workforce solutions ranging from permanent placement

and temporary staffing, to outplacement and outsourcing services throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Work Service S.A.

Gwiaździsta 66, 53-413 Wrocław, Poland

phone: (+48) 71 37 10 900

e-mail: [email protected]

www: workservice.com

The CEED Institute, founded by Dr. Jan Kulczyk in 2010, is a think-tank whose aim is to promote the achievements and

economic potential the CEE countries. Its ambition is to support business initiatives, as well as debates on indispensable

reforms in the region, including measures to boost sustainable growth and innovative capacities. The objective of the CEED

Institute is the dissemination of ideas and projects on how best to improve efficiency and competitiveness of the CEE region.

CEED Institute

Krucza 24/26, 00-526 Warsaw, Poland

phone: (+48) 882 054 546

e-mail: [email protected]

www: ceedinstitute.org

Contents

Introduction

Migrations from the perspective of CEE countries – what has changed in recent yearsMigrations within the European Union – stabilisation but with some exceptionsForeigners in EU member states – growth in the significance of internal migrationsImmigration to CEE countries from other EU member states and third countries – are they slowly becoming immigration states?The migration balance in EU member states Main conclusions from the chapter

What does a Polish emigrant think about going abroad and returning? Research methodologyDemographic features of the respondentsDiscussion of the research resultsSummary Main conclusions from the chapter

Will immigrants solve the problems of Central and Eastern Europe? Migration and demographyDemand for immigrants in the European Union Immigration attractiveness of European states SummaryMain conclusions from the chapterAppendix

Migration scenarios for CEE countries – or what can happen in the futureYouth about migrationsWho is most mobile and who will be needed in labour markets of CEE countries?Migration scenarios SummaryMain conclusions from the chapter

Conclusion

References

Chapter I:

Chapter II:

Chapter III:

Chapter IV:

3

9

12121617

2023

262626273536

40404347515253

565657606263

64

67

Migration processes and their effects are a problem which constantly interests experts, politicians and the public. They also play an increasing part in media discussions. Unfortunately, many unverified hypotheses and unjustified conclusions are drawn in them. In many cases this creates a false picture both of the effects of Poles emigrating to other EU member states and of the influx of foreigners into Poland. At the same time, we have to realise that migration is part of our present reality, i.e. a modern, free-market and democratic Europe. Some Poles make use of this freedom to try their luck abroad. After a period abroad, many of them will return to Poland, but at the same time Poland will be an increasingly attractive place for foreigners to try their luck for a better future. That is why it is very important not to speak of migration as a phenomenon to be prevented, but rather in terms of how to exploit it. This requires honest and balanced reports which can form the basis for debate on the subject and for formulating conclusions. Undoubtedly the latest as well as the earlier report by the CEED Institute on migration are studies that attempt to honestly present the problem of migration in modern-day Poland and ask questions to which we must find an answer. In the latest report, showing that many Poles working abroad do not abandon the idea of wanting to return to Poland is of particular importance. Their relationship to Poland is generally positive, which dispels the myth about expatriates not wishing to return to their home country. Also very interesting is the attempt to come up with an indicator which would specify the attractiveness of various countries with respect to migration. This attempt has allowed many interesting conclusions to be drawn. I would encourage you to read the report and discuss the points raised in it.

Władysław Kosiniak-KamyszThe Polish Minister of Labour and Social Policy

4

Immigrants have historically provided one of the greatest competitive advantages and played a major role in the countries’ growth. Today, in the globalized world a question arises whether we should leave the migration processes on their own or rather try to advisedly manage them with the countries competing to keep and attract the human potential? The key aim of the second CEED Institute report on migrations is to provide a complex picture of the processes in Europe (Central and Eastern Europe in particular) and display the short- and long-term benefits for all the stakeholders involved.

We wish to show various ways migrations might be perceived and trigger a debate on their prospective impact by creating the index of migration attractiveness of the states of the European Union. We also strive to answer the compelling question whether the CEE states are able to withstand the “brain drain” competition with the EU-15 states regarding the scope of highly skilled immigrants successfully attracted.

For our parents and the generations past, their home was their entire world. Today, the world has become our home. In this new reality, the policy makers from our region have been faced with a new challenge to rearrange and refurbish our portion of the global home. To provide solutions and create opportunities that would make our region an attractive part of the world worth staying at and returning to.

Jan KulczykFounder of the CEED Institute, International entrepreneur, Founder of Kulczyk Investments.

5

Migration process from the CEE region is a major economic and social challenge for most of the CEE countries. CEED Institute is the leading think-tank organization focusing on this phenomenon and our first report had gained significant popularity among experts, politicians and media. This report is our second publication covering the same topic. It provides a wide range of updated information and also includes the scenario analysis.

We have been used to hearing about the “Polish plumber” – cliché which symbolizes the fear of cost effective Central and Eastern European labour threatening the job market in the Western Europe. But every coin has a flip side. It seems like we place much less emphasis on the loss of human capital in the CEE countries. In the second Chapter of our report we can learn an interesting perspective of a Polish emigrant who goes abroad and then decides to return. This research produces many interesting pieces of information related to the motivations behind leaving and fears and hopes concerned with living abroad as well as plans for the future. Thanks to this report we may better understand the true reasons behind emigration and the challenges we face with keeping our people at home.

The final chapter presents four scenarios for migration development in the next five years. Because of migration and ageing population these years will be very decisive for our countries. I am confident our report will be a vital voice in a productive discussion about how to stimulate economic development. It may also help those who shape the social policies to make better and more informed decisions.

Indrek NeiveltEstonian businessman,Member of the Programme BoardCEED Institute.

6

Polish companies and Polish citizens participate in the development of the European labour market. They are able to freely use the benefits offered by the wealthier economies, in particular those of Germany, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The majority of more than 2 million migrant Poles work in these countries, the bulk of whom have settled there permanently. Conclusions from the analysis of economic migration should be utilized when designing the Polish labour market. Although in 2013 the number of people who emigrated from Poland to find a job was higher than before (according to estimates of the Central Statistical Office by approx. 70,000), we still have a surplus of labour resources. From this viewpoint, we can say that we are not concerned about the outflow of workers, as unemployment still remains at a two-digit level. On the other hand, the growing shortage of workers in selected occupational groups is an important factor. Willingness of doctors or IT professionals to emigrate is a cause of concern. A major challenge is to keep the eminent professionals in the country, since higher earnings are the main stimulus to leave. Until we catch up with the West in terms of wages and salaries, a greater market liberalization in hiring workers from the East will be necessary. This will solve the problem of the temporary lack of professionals in Poland.

Tomasz MisiakPresident of the Management Board of Work Service S.A.

7

Introduction

The first report of the CEED Institute about migrations in Central and Eastern Europe was received with great interest by experts, politicians and the media. A wide-ranging debate was sparked by the results of analyses demonstrating the consequences of the emigration of nationals of CEE countries to other EU member states. At the same time, discussions also concerned challenges related to immigration. In this context, solutions were sought that would help CEE countries avoid the problems experienced by states with a high proportion of foreigners within society, and which are related to failure to utilise the potential of foreigners and to problems with their integration. During the debate about migration from the perspective of CEE countries, the idea emerged that there is a need to supplement the report with the results of empirical research conducted among emigrants and to carry out analyses that would help answer the question whether CEE countries are ready to receive greater numbers of immigrants and how they can compete against better developed states in attracting highly skilled foreigners. This report provides a response to these proposals. It complements the first report on migrations in the CEE region, while updating it with the most recent data published within the last six months.

Such updates constitute the major part of Chapter I. Among other things, we managed to update the figures related to the scale of emigration and return migrations. Moreover, new data concerning emigration trends is presented. The period that elapsed since publication of the first report was too short for any fundamental changes to take place in the trends that we see in migration processes. At the same time, the updated data yielded new pieces of information, which may be relevant from the viewpoint of the long-term consequences that we deal with of migration both within the EU and from third countries to the EU.

Chapter II describes the results of empirical research performed among Poles working abroad who have been recruited by Work Service, one of the biggest employment agencies. This research produced many interesting pieces of information, concerning the motivations for leaving, fears and hopes related to living abroad, and – what is particularly important – plans for the future. On the basis of the research, we call into question, among other things, a factor indicated in other studies as influencing the willingness to stay abroad related to emigrants’ negative views about Poland. In the research results presented in Chapter II, respondents cited strictly economic and family reasons for their decision to stay abroad or return from abroad. Political factors were of absolutely tertiary relevance.

Chapter III describes issues connected with immigration. It consists mainly of an index of migration attractiveness of the member states of the European Union. It was developed just for this report with the aim of attempting to answer the question whether CEE states can successfully compete against the EU-15 states in attracting highly skilled immigrants. The index of migration attractiveness of the states is a proposal – a project – which requires a lot of discussion. If the concept of developing such an index generates interest, it will be updated and published annually, so as to enable regular study of changes in the attractiveness of European states for immigrants.

Chapter IV is a kind of recapitulation of Chapters I and II of the CEED Institute report on migrations. It presents four scenarios for the development of migration processes until 2020. They all seem likely and their emergence will depend mainly on the actions of the government related to stimulation of economic development and enhancing of living standards. There is no doubt that this is directly correlated with the propensity to emigrate and the attractiveness of a given state for foreigners. In the case of countries where the most negative scenario for the development of migration processes materialises, we will be dealing with the decline of their competitiveness and – in the long run – with real impoverishment of their nationals. But if the most positive scenario for development of migration processes materialises, this could contribute to rapid narrowing by a given country of the gap separating it from the best developed EU states and consequently for dynamic improvement of the living standards of its residents.

Migrations are a social, economic and political phenomenon that fuel constant debate. The second report of the CEED Institute on migrations has the ambition to bring order into this debate and put it on the right track. We hope this goal has been at least partially attained.

9

Chapter IMigrations from the perspective of CEE countries

– what has changed in recent years

The period that has elapsed since publication of the first report about migration from the perspective of CEE countries is too short for the changes taking place to be considered fundamental. It must be borne in mind that migration processes, unless we deal with such events as wars or natural disasters, take place slowly. An impulse for a change in the scale of migration can also come from such events as the lifting or introduction of restrictions on movements of people. No such factors were present in either 2013 or 2014. Nevertheless, the migration processes taking place in the European Union remain a matter of great interest to both politicians and public opinion, which makes it essential to monitor and draw conclusions regarding trends. It is to be expected that in 2015 the issue of free movement of workers and emigration to the EU from third countries will be back on the EU’s agenda. This assumption is supported by the statement made by the new President of the European

1Council after his appointment to the position.

Migrations within the European Union – stabilisation but with some exceptions

An analysis of Eurostat data shows that in 2013 the percentage of EU citizens residing in a different member state than their country of origin was the same as a year earlier. The situation was quite similar in the period 2009-2010 ( ).

It would be a mistake to draw far-reaching conclusions from an analysis of the data contained in the chart above. Nevertheless one can venture to indicate certain relationships. Eurostat data suggests that in early 2013 the number of citizens of CEE countries residing in the EU-15 states increased by 114,000. This means that in view of the data contained in Chart 1, a decline in the number of migrating citizens of EU-15 states was recorded in that period. At the same time, the growth in the number of citizens of CEE countries residing in the EU-15 in the analysed period was very moderate and lower than in preceding years. On this basis, one can assume that 2013

2and 2014 were years of stabilisation of migration processes taking place within the European Union.

Chart 1

Chapter IMigrations from the perspective of CEE countries – what has changed in recent years

Chart 1 Changes in the percentage of EU citizens residing in a different member state than their country of origin

Source: Own work based on Population by sex, age group and citizenship, Eurostat

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

2007

2.1

2008

2.4

2009

2.5

2010

2.5

2011

2.6

2012

2.8

2013

2.8

1The statement by Donald Tusk during the press conference after his appointment to the position of the President of the European Council, announcing future efforts to meet the demands of the United Kingdom related to changes in the rules governing movement of workers within the EU.

This conclusion is based on estimates. At the time of writing, not all required data for 2013 and 2014 is available. The last complete set of data is for 2012. 2

12

Growth in the number of the citizens of CEE countries residing in the EU-15 was recorded in all states of the region except Romania, where the number of citizens of that state in EU-15 countries declined slightly. Also notable is the significant growth in the number of citizens of Hungary and Latvia remaining in emigration ( ). Moreover, it must be stressed that, although small, the growth in the number of citizens of CEE countries residing in EU-15 states continued the trend from previous years, despite expectations that the worsening of the situation in the labour markets in EU-15 states resulting from the crisis would reduce emigrations and increase the scale of returns. This would mean that the number of the citizens of CEE countries staying in emigration should have dropped, something that did not happen in 2012 and perhaps neither in 2013 nor in 2014, for any country except Romania.

For all CEE countries, growth in the percentage of emigrants was recorded ( ). In percentage terms, this growth is greater than would follow from the growth of the overall number of the citizens of CEE countries residing in EU-15 ( ). This results from declining populations of the states of the region. For example, Romania saw a decline in the number of emigrants accompanied by a rise in their percentage share

3of the population. For several years, Romania has recorded population decline, and consequently despite the reduction in the number of citizens of that country residing abroad, their percentage share in the total population has grown.

Only in the case of Slovakia, the Czech Republic became the main destination state, while Germany remains the main recipient of Slovaks among EU-15 states.

Table 1

Table 2

Table 1

Table 1

Bulgaria

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

TOTAL

Estimates of the number of citizens of CEE countries residing in the EU-15 and the related percentage change

180

45

140

100

455

410

210

345

140

25

240

2004-2012(%)

Source: Own calculation based on Population by sex, age group and citizenship, Eurostat and D. Holland et al., Labour mobility within the EU: the impact of enlargement and transitional arrangements, NIESR Discussion Paper no. 379, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London 2011.

482,000

108,000

68,000

184,000

128,000

254,000

1,798,000

2,400,000

158,000

43,000

5,623,000

2012

437,000

105,000

59,000

152,000

80,000

193,000

1,497,000

2,218,000

166,000

41,000

4,948,000

2010

333,000

113,000

45,000

131,000

57,000

167,000

1,328,000

1,640,000

150,000

38,000

4,002,000

2008

229,000

71,000

34,000

92,000

32,000

99,000

776,000

882,000

99,000

36,000

2,350,000

2006

171,000

74,000

28,000

92,000

23,000

50,000

580,000

541,000

66,000

34,000

1,659,000

2004

505,000

112,000

75,000

221,000

141,000

268,000

1,883,000

2,322,000

165,000

45,000

5,737,000

2013

195

50

170

140

515

440

225

330

150

30

245

2004-2013(%)

3At the same time, it must be pointed out that in 2014 Eurostat revised data concerning populations of member states. If those differences are very slight for the majority of states, in the case of Romania the correction exceeds 1 million people.

As concerns the main states receiving emigrants from CEE countries, no significant changes took place.

13

The limited growth in the number of the citizens of CEE countries residing in emigration recorded in 2012 was also accompanied by a growth in the scale of return migrations in the case of a majority of the states of the region. Compared to 2011, more citizens returned to Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The greatest increase in the number of returning migrants was recorded by Poland (33%) and Romania (12%). The remaining states recorded a decline in the number of return migrants. Estonia recorded a decline of 33%, Slovenia 21%, the Czech Republic 20% and Croatia 12% ( ).Table 3

Table 2

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Lithuania

Latvia

Poland

Slovakia

Slovenia

Romania

EU-11 citizens residing in the EU-15 on 1 January 2013 and main destination countries

Spain

Germany

Germany

Finland

Germany

United Kingdom

United Kingdom

United Kingdom

Czech Republic/Germany

Germany

Italy

Main destination stateCountry of origin

Source: Own calculation based on Population by sex, age group and citizenship, Eurostat, D. Holland et al., Labour mobility within the EU: the impact of enlargement and transitional arrangements, NIESR Discussion Paper no. 379, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London 2011 and OECD, International Migration Outlook 2013, OECD Publishing 2013

6.90

8.00

1.10

5.70

2.20

9.00

7.00

4.90

3.00

2.20

11.60

Percentage ofemigrants in 2013

(%)

7,285,000

4,262,000

10,516,000

1,320,000

9,909,000

2,972,000

2,024,000

38,533,000

5,411,000

2,059,000

20,020,000

Population

505,000

340,000

112,000

75,000

221,000

268,000

141,000

1,883,000

165,000

45,000

2,322,000

Emigrantsin EU-15

6.60

7.60

1.00

5.15

1.85

8.40

6.20

4.70

2.90

2.10

11.20

Percentage ofemigrants in 2012

(%)

Table 3

Bulgaria

Czech Republic

Estonia

Croatia

Latvia

Lithuania

Hungary

Poland

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

Return migrants and their share in total immigrants

Source: Own calculation based on Immigration by sex, age group and citizenship, Eurostat

35

20

58

47

72

87

40

62

93

18

46

2012% of total

immigrantsreturn

4,964

6,765

1,532

4,208

9,637

17,357

13,362

135,910

155,613

2,741

2,479

30

55

55

72

89

20

65

94

24

22

2011% of total

immigrantsreturn

8,141

2,034

4,720

7,373

14,012

5,504

101,945

138,397

3,318

1,078

38

57

11

80

6

69

91

18

8

2010% of total

immigrantsreturn

18,267

1,611

254

4,153

1,635

107,378

136,799

2,711

1,111

29

43

19

74

8

75

92

10

8

2009% of total

immigrantsreturn

21,744

1,655

521

4,821

2,312

142,348

124,936

2,903

1,205

14

Comparison of the data from Tables 1 and 3 demonstrates that 2012 witnessed an increase in the dynamics of migration processes between CEE countries and EU-15 states. In the majority of cases, there was growth in the number of citizens residing abroad, despite the increased scale of return migrations, leading to the conclusion that emigration increased as well. This means that the number of people with migration experiences is also on the rise.

In 2014 the European Commission published a report enabling comparisons between member states of the European Union in terms of mobility rates and length of stay abroad of citizens of a given state ( ). The data suggests that in the majority of CEE countries, citizens of those states remain in emigration for up to 10 years. At the same time, this group still contains a large number of people who left the analysed countries not earlier than five years ago. In their case, there is a real chance that they will decide to return to their countries of origin. The situation is quite different in such countries as Portugal, Ireland or Spain (so-called old emigration states within the European Union). In these cases, most emigrants reside abroad for more than 10 years.

Chart 2

Chart 2 Mobility rates by sending country – mobile EU citizens living in another EU member state, by years of residence (age group 15-64, 2013, in % of working-age population of country of citizenship)

Source: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/27_skills_gaps_and_labour_mobility.pdf 0.02.04.06.08.010.012.014.0

Latvia

Lithuania

Romania

Cyprus

Bulgaria

Luxembourg

Poland

Estonia

Slovakia

Hungary

Portugal

Ireland

Greece

Netherlands

Austria

Croatia

Belgium

Czech Republic

Denmark

Italy

Finland

Spain

France

Sweden

Germany

United Kingdom

16.0

More than 10 years

5 to 10 years

Less than 5 years

15

Foreigners in EU member states – growth in the significance of internal migrations

The debate we are having in the European Union leads one to the conclusion that a majority of member states tend to favour restricting immigration from third countries. Here arguments about the negative impact of immigration on the labour market and an increase in social unrest prevail. However many of those arguments are strictly populist in nature and are not based on reliable research results.

An analysis of Eurostat data demonstrated that 2013 saw a reversal of the trend concerning inflow of foreigners from third countries that had been observed since 2007 ( ). The number of foreigners residing in EU states dropped. The coming years will provide an answer to the question whether this is just a one-year decline, as it was in 2006 and 2007, or whether this will be a multi-year trend.

Despite relative stabilisation of migration processes within the EU manifested in the moderate growth in the number of the citizens of CEE countries residing in EU-15 states and a decline in the number of third country nationals in the EU-27, the European immigration states recorded a rise in the percentage of foreigners in the total population. In the case of Germany and the United Kingdom, it was mainly citizens of member states, chiefly from CEE countries, who were responsible for this growth. In the case of France we could observe a growth in the number of immigrants mainly from third countries ( ).

Chart 3

Table 4

Chart 3Changes in the population of third country nationals residing in EU-28 countries, 2004-2013 (in millions)

25

20

15

10

5

0

2004 200620072008200920102011 2013

20.420.720.019.318.719.017.4

16.4

2005 2012

20.4 20.5


Table 4

Germany

France

United Kingdom

EU citizens residing in the most populated EU-28 states, 2012 and 2013 (in %)

3.70

2.15

3.85


Citizens of other EU member statesTotalCountry

Non-nationals

2012 2013

3.40

2.10

3.70

9.40

6.20

7.70

2012 2013

9.05

5.90

7.60

16

The situation in the states with the greatest percentages of immigrants in the population varied greatly. For example a growth in the proportion of foreigners was recorded in Luxembourg. This process concerned both EU citizens and third country nationals. The percentage of foreigners residing in that state approaches 50%. At the same time, a decline was recorded in Cyprus and Latvia, but in the former a slight increase in the number of EU citizens residing on the island was observed ( ).

Immigration to CEE countries from other EU member states and third countries – are they slowly becoming immigration states?

To get a full picture of migration processes taking place within CEE countries, it is also necessary to 4analyse Eurostat data presenting in detail immigration to those countries. This data suggests that in 2012

a majority of the states of the region recorded growth in the inflow of foreigners both from EU member states and from third countries. In Croatia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, immigration growth was recorded both from EU member states and third countries. Estonia recorded a growth in immigration from EU member states and a decline from third countries. The opposite happened in the case of Hungary. Latvia and Slovenia recorded a decline in immigration in the cases of both aforementioned groups of states ( and

5). Those trends illustrate the highly diversified picture of CEE countries as concerns immigration processes. It must be assumed that the scale of immigration is influenced not only by the economic situation of a given state, but also by immigration policy. This may explain another year of growth in immigration to Poland, but its decline in the case of Hungary and Slovakia. The situation is similar in Latvia and Estonia, which have recently decided to make their regulations governing the inflow of Russian citizens more stringent.

Table 5

Table 6Chart 4

Table 5

Luxembourg

Cyprus

Latvia

EU members states with the largest share of foreigners in the total population, 2012 and 2013 (in %)

38.4

13.0

0.3



Non-nationals

2012 2013

37.9

12.6

0.3

44.5

19.6

15.6

2012 2013

43.8

21.0

16.3

4The statistics presented so far have shown the share of foreigners in the population of a given country. One notable exception is data concerning return migrations to CEE countries.

When the calculations were made, comparable data for Bulgaria and Romania was missing. 5

17

Table 6

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

Immigration from EU-27 states and from third countries to CEE countries, 2011 and 2012

45

28

44

6

51

15

30

30

30

18

82

Source: Own work based on Immigration by five year age group, sex and citizenship, Eurostat

% of immigrantsTotalCountry

EU-27

2011 2012

28

56

4

55

19

30

25

37

18

84

4,136

1,342

12,075

70

10,358

539

738

24,446

3,450

2,179

2,418

2011 2012

1,052

10,706

62

12,451

1,085

503

13,896

3,412

1,990

3,162

Main country of origin

Greece

Slovenia

Slovakia

Finland

Romania

Germany

Latvia

Germany

Italy

Croatia

Hungary

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovenia

Slovakia

55

72

56

94

49

85

70

70

70

82

18

% of immigrantsTotalCountry

Third countries

2011 2012

72

44

96

45

81

70

75

63

82

16

4,989

3,409

15,495

1,036

9,981

3,127

1,748

57,070

8,151

10,102

522

2011 2012

2,758

8,265

1,612

9,854

4,687

1,170

41,116

5,864

8,775

589

Main country of origin

Turkey

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ukraine

Russia

Ukraine

Russia

Russia

Ukraine

Turkey

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ukraine

18

A detailed analysis of the changes in the share of foreigners in the populations of CEE countries that took place in the period 2012-2013 demonstrated that, compared to the previous year, in 2013 still the greatest number of foreigners resided in Latvia and Estonia, although in both cases a decline in the percentage of foreigners in the total populations was observed (by 0.7 and 0.8 percentage points (pp) respectively). Hungary also recorded a decline in the share of foreigners. A growth in this share was recorded in Slovenia (by 0.2 pp), Romania (by >0.2 pp), Bulgaria (by 0.1 pp). In the remaining states, the situation in 2013 was the same as in the previous year ( ). Table 7

Czech Republic

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Slovakia

Romania

Hungary

Slovenia

110,000

100,000

90,000

80,000

70,000

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

2005

Chart 4Inflow of immigrants to CEE countries from EU-27 countries and third countries, 2005-2012

2006 2008 2010 20112007 2009


(since 2008)

2012

19

Table 7

Latvia

Estonia

Slovenia

Czech Republic

Hungary

Slovakia

Croatia

Bulgaria

Romania

Poland

The share of foreigners in CEE countries, 2012 and 2013 (in %)

0.30

0.60

0.30

1.50

0.80

1.00

0.20

0.20

0.10

0.05



Non-nationals

2012 2013

0.30

1.10

0.30

1.40

1.30

1.00

0.10

0.03

0.05

15.60

14.90

4.40

4.00

1.40

1.30

0.70

0.60

0.40

0.15

2012 2013

16.30

15.70

4.20

4.00

2.10

1.30

0.50

0.17

0.15

On the basis of the data from the above table, one should also point out the decline in the number of EU citizens residing in Estonia (by 0.5 pp) and in Hungary (by 0.5 pp). A growth was recorded in the case of the Czech Republic (by 0.1 pp), Bulgaria (by 0.1 pp) and Romania (by < 0.1 pp).

Poland still remains the country with the lowest share of foreigners (0.15% of the entire population). This concerns both EU citizens, and third country nationals.

An analysis of the states from which the greatest number of foreigners come to CEE countries indicates that a very high level of diversity regarding directions of migrants’ inflow is accompanied by maintenance of the migration networks created in the past ( ). In the case of the states in the Balkan region, migrations take place mainly between them. Among EU member states, the largest number of Greeks migrate to Bulgaria, Slovaks to the Czech Republic, Finns to Estonia, Romanians to Hungary, Germans to Latvia and Poland, Latvians to Lithuania, Italians to Romania, and Hungarians to Slovakia. It must be assumed that among those immigrants there are also people who changed citizenship and returned to their state of origin/birth. Moreover, it can be seen that migrations take place mainly between states bordering with each other.

The permanence of migration networks is also confirmed by an analysis of inflows from third countries. In the case of the Baltic states, despite the introduction of restrictions, citizens of the Russian Federation still constitute the largest group of immigrants. In the case of Slovenia and Croatia, the largest group consists of citizens of Bosnia and Hercegovina, i.e. one of the states that emerged after the collapse of Yugoslavia. Ukrainians traditionally go to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Turks go to Bulgaria and Romania. It can be pointed out that as with immigration from EU member states, the inflow of third country nationals to CEE countries takes place mainly from states neighbouring them.

The migration balance in EU member states

The most recent data for 2012 and estimates for 2013 presenting the migration balance indicate several changes related to migration processes taking place within the European Union. Nevertheless, these cannot be considered fundamental. As Chart 5 shows, in 2013 the greatest value of net migrations was recorded by Italy (19.7 per 1,000 inhabitants – this is three times the level of the previous year) and Luxembourg (19 – an increase of 0.1%). The biggest negative migration balance in 2013 was recorded in Cyprus (-13.9 per 1,000 inhabitants; in 2012 it was -0.7) and Lithuania (-7.1; in 2012 it was -5.8). Ireland, which rated last in the previous year, improved its position going four places up. At the same time, it improved its net migration rate only slightly.

Table 6

20

In 2013 the rate was -5.6, while in 2012 it amounted to -7.6. In the course of one year, the difference between the countries with the highest and lowest net migration rates changed too (in 2013 the difference was 33.6 points, while in 2012 it was 26.5 points).

The CEE countries that recorded a positive net migration rate in 2013 were Hungary (0.6), Slovakia (0.4) and Slovenia (0.2). Other states recorded a negative net migration rate, with Latvia having the lowest rate (-7.1). In the case of such countries as Hungary, Romania, Latvia or the Czech Republic there was a perceptibly significant decline in the net migration rate. In the case of Latvia, the rate was 1.3 percentage points. Hungary recorded a decline of 1 pp, while Romania and the Czech Republic saw a slump of 1.1 pp. Consequently in 2013 those two states recorded a negative net migration rate, whereas in 2012 it was positive in both cases. Both in 2012 and in 2013 Latvia had a negative migration balance. A different situation took place in Estonia and Lithuania. Both those states improved their net migration rate: Estonia by 3.7 pp and Lithuania by 1.7 pp. However both those states still recorded a negative migration balance.

The changes in net migration rates in other states were minimal. For example, in Poland, the net migration rate dropped by 0.3 percentage points from -0.2 in 2012 to -0.5 in 2013, and in Croatia by -0.3 pp, from -0.9 in 2012 to -1.2 in 2013. In Slovakia there was a decline of 0.2 pp, and in Slovenia 0.1 pp. However, both those states recorded a positive migration balance ( ). Chart 5

Chart 5Migration balance in EU-28 countries, 2013 (per 1,000 inhabitants)

Source: Crude rate of net migration plus adjustment (Per 1000 inhabitants), Eurostat 2014 -15-10-5 05 101520

Italy

Luxembourg

Malta

Sweden

Austria

Germany

Denmark

Finland

United Kingdom

Belgium

Netherlands

France

Hungary

Slovakia

Slovenia

Czech Republic

Bulgaria

Romania

Poland

Croatia

Estonia

Portugal

Greece

Spain

Ireland

Lithuania

Latvia

Cyprus

19.7

19.0

7.6

6.9

6.6

5.8

3.8

3.3

3.1

2.3

1.2

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.2

-0.1

-0.2

-0.3

-0.5

-1.2

-2.0

-3.5

-4.7

-5.5

-5.6

-5.7

-7.1

-13.9

21

Recently Eurostat published new data, which helps to show trends as regards migrations within the EU and from third countries. An analysis of this data indicates that the share of citizens of EU member states among migrants is increasing while the share of third country nationals among them is declining ( ). This is a practical confirmation of the political decisions of recent years aimed at restricting immigration from third countries while not introducing any significant hindrances to free movement of workers. It should be noted,

sthowever, that the European Union enlargements made in the 21 century changed the status of citizens of new member states. They have become internal migrants. This was bound to result in changes in migration statistics. Nevertheless, the decline in the share of the third country nationals among migrants also continued in no-enlargement years, so it can be assumed that migrations within the EU to a small extent substitute for immigration from third countries. Such a conclusion might change if we could estimate the illegal inflow of third country nationals into the EU. However, this is an impossible task given the lack of data and reliable analytical methodologies.

Due to the long process of collection and publication of comparable data, analyses of migration processes are bound to be performed with a certain delay (usually two years). This hampers, but does not preclude, the drawing of conclusions and making of short-term recommendations. As the results of analyses presented in Chapter I have shown, the changes in migration flows within a given year are very small. At the same time, they indicate both maintenance of the existing trends (migrations between CEE countries and the EU-15) and the shaping of new relationships (a decline of immigration from third countries). Conclusions drawn from those analyses should be taken into account when economic and social strategies are being developed. Failure to take migration trends into account may lead do erroneous conclusions and to other mistakes being made on that basis. Analyses of migration processes are particularly important when demographic changes and their outcomes, particularly in the labour market, are forecast.

Chart 6

Chart 6Share of citizens of EU member states and third country nationals in the period 2010-2012 in the EU-27 (in %)

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Other EU-27 countries

Third countries

38.2

61.

8

201320122011

39.3

60

.7

40

.259

.8Source: Own work based on Population by sex, age group and citizenship, Eurostat

22

The data for 2012 and estimates for 2013 as regards migration processes taking place within the European Union indicate that we are dealing with a stabilisation of the migration situation. The number of EU citizens residing in a member state other than their state of origin has remained virtually unchanged.

Despite the stable migration situation, the number of citizens of CEE countries in EU-15 states increased again. Growth was recorded in all states of the region besides Romania. However, the scale of return migrations also increased in the same period. This means that migration flows between CEE countries and the EU-15 increased. 2012 and 2013 proved to be the next years when expectations that migration flows would diminish failed to materialise. But, at the same time, the growth in the number of the citizens of CEE countries residing in the EU-15 is lower than in previous years.

The number of foreigners residing in the European Union on 1 January 2013 was lower than in 2011 and 2012. At the same time the situation was varied in the case of CEE countries. In Croatia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, growth in the scale of immigration from third countries was recorded. Other states recorded declines. It should also be pointed out that the states receiving the largest number of foreigners, i.e. Germany, France and the United Kingdom, once again recorded a growth in the percentage of foreigners in the total population.

No fundamental changes took place in the migration balance of EU member states. Italy recorded the greatest growth with regard to net migration rate, while Cyprus recorded the greatest drop. In the case of CEE countries, we were dealing with quite a large variety of situations. In 2013 an improvement in the net migration rate was recorded in Estonia and Lithuania, while deterioration was noted in Hungary, Romania, Latvia and the Czech Republic. The situation remained virtually unchanged in other states.

Comparison of the directions of migrations taking place within the EU shows that in recent years we have been dealing with an increase in the share of citizens of EU member states accompanied by a decline in the share of third country nationals.

Main conclusions from the chapter:

1

5

2

3

4

23

Chapter IIWhat does a Polish emigrant think

about going abroad and returning?

Chapter IIWhat does a Polish emigrant think about going abroad and returning?

Many studies conducted both in Poland and abroad have addressed the issue of defining the profile of Polish emigrants, identifying the reasons underlying their decision to leave Poland and plans for the future. Due to the impossibility of defining a collective precisely, none of those studies was representative, and in a majority of cases respondents were selected using a method called “snowball sampling”. Consequently, the research results show only a part of migration reality and should not be generalised to apply to an entire collective of emigrants. But, at the same time, the results of such research have provided many useful pieces of information, which could have not been acquired through other methods, e.g. expert opinion surveys or analyses of statistical data. Therefore, it is desirable to conduct qualitative research among emigrants in order to determine their opinions and needs to the greatest possible extent.

This chapter presents results of qualitative research carried out among Poles working abroad who have been recruited by one of the biggest employment agencies in Poland, i.e. Work Service S.A.

Research methodology

When the research sample was created, the database of Work Service contained 2,355 people who undertook work abroad through the agency. On this basis, a cluster sample containing 235 persons was eventually established. Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI) were performed by employees of the call-in centre of Work Service. The CATIs were performed in late August and early September 2014 and had been preceded by a pilot survey covering eight respondents. Despite the fact that the persons undertaking the survey were faced with a number of refusals and in a number of cases the persons completing the questionnaire failed to provide answers to all the questions, the research enabled collection of interesting empirical material, an analysis of which is presented in this chapter. Due to the constraints involved, the report only contains charts with breakdowns into sectors. It was decided that they contribute the greatest added value to source literature. Both the questionnaire as well as the full report on this research are available on the website of the CEED Institute.

Demographic features of the respondents

Men overwhelmingly prevailed among the respondents who took part in the research. Women constituted a mere 12.8% of all respondents. Such a selection followed mainly from the specifics of the main database of Work Service, where women were in a decisive minority, and the sectors in which workers recruited by the agency are employed. For that reason, in a majority of cases this chapter foregoes detailed analyses by sex. In a major simplification, one can state that the results of the research can become a source of knowledge about the opinions of emigrants recruited by employment agencies and employed in four sectors (industry, construction, manufacturing, services) in states such as Germany, France and Belgium.

At the time of sample selection and performance of the interviews, in contrast to sex, a significant diversity in the age of respondents was obtained. The best represented were people aged 21-25 (22.4% of the respondents) and aged 26-30 (21%). The smallest was the group of respondents aged 31-35 (17.6%). Persons aged 36-40 accounted for 20.6%, while those aged over 40 accounted for 18.4% of the respondents. This selection of respondents by age was similar to the profiles of Polish emigrants acquired in other studies. They stress their young age (under 40). In the analysed research, such respondents constituted over 80% of the entire group, i.e. a decisive majority.

26

Moreover, the study obtained a great diversity of respondents by sectors in which they were employed abroad. The biggest group was comprised by workers employed in the manufacturing sector (32.4%), while the smallest consisted of those working in industry (15.7%). Representatives of services and construction accounted for 26.8% and 25.1% respectively.

The respondents who participated in the research worked in three European Union member states: Germany, Belgium and France. Most of them worked in Germany (55.8%). France (25.5%) came second and Belgium third (nearly 18.7%). Such geographical distribution of the employment of emigrants brings a significant added value to the knowledge about the most recent emigrations of Poles. Most analyses performed after 2004 have focused mainly on the United Kingdom, Ireland and Scandinavia (chiefly Norway), i.e. the countries to which the greatest number of Poles went after the accession to the European Union, while research describing the situation and position of Poles going to the states of “typical” emigration have been neglected.

Discussion of the research results

The reasons underlying the decision to undertake work abroad is one of the issues most frequently addressed in the discussion about emigration. In many papers it is claimed that the main reason for leaving Poland is unemployment. But the analysis of the answers of respondents in this study indicated that most of them had a job in Poland, but were not satisfied with the remuneration they received. In every sector, such an answer was provided by over 70% of the respondents. Therefore, the major factor stimulating employment migration was the opportunity to obtain salaries higher than those available in Poland ( ). Having no job in Poland was most frequently indicated in the case of workers employed in industry (over 34% of the respondents), while it was least frequently cited by those working in the construction sector (almost 12%). At the same time, the latter group most frequently pointed out they wanted to try their hands at working abroad (35.6%) and that they wanted to acquire new qualifications (23.7%). Approximately 30% of respondents working in manufacturing and services named lack of employment as their reason for leaving Poland.

Reasons for undertaking employment abroad

Chart 7

Chart 7Reasons for undertaking employment abroad with a breakdown by sector (not more than two answers, in %)

I had a job in Poland but wages were too low

No job in Poland

I wanted to try my hands at working abroad

I wanted to obtain new qualifications

I received a specific job offer abroad

I was encouraged by family/friends

Other

Construction sector (n=59)

Manufacturing (n=75)

Industry (n=35)

Services (n=63)

79.674.674.3

84.1

11.928.0

34.330.2

35.624.0

11.427.0

23.79.3

11.414.3

5.116.0

8.611.1

1.76.7

11.411.1

11.96.7

8.66.3

27

As has been already pointed out, financial considerations were the most important reason for undertaking employment abroad. The respondents had jobs in Poland, but their salaries were too low. In the breakdown by age group, this answer was most frequently given by persons aged 21-25 (86.5%), and least frequently by those aged 31-35 (72.5%). The answer “I wanted to try my hands at working abroad” was most frequently given by people in the oldest age group, the over-40-year-olds (39.5%). Lack of employment in Poland was most frequently cited as the reason to leave by people aged 36-40 (42.6%). This answer was given least frequently by respondents in the two youngest age groups. One respondent in four aged over 40 stressed their willingness to acquire new qualifications as the reason for undertaking employment abroad.

At the time the research was conducted, a decisive majority of respondents were satisfied with their decision to undertake employment abroad. Such an answer was given by 84.5% of the respondents in the construction sector, 87.7% of those working in manufacturing, 91.7% of those working in industry, and 91.9% of respondents working in services ( ).

The data contained in Chart 8 suggests that answers unambiguously indicating dissatisfaction with undertaking of employment abroad were given extremely rarely. In the case of industry and services, not a single respondent gave such answer. However, other research results suggest that a large group of Poles are not satisfied with working abroad. The positive answers obtained in this study can result from several circumstances. First, persons who agreed to provide answers were satisfied while those having different opinions simply refused to take part in the survey. Second, people hired through employment agencies can be frequently satisfied simply because they had to do virtually nothing to obtain employment abroad. And last but not least, those people were employed in Germany, France and Belgium, where standards concerning observance of employee rights are very stringent and employees are very rarely exploited.

The analysis of the answers to the question concerning satisfaction with undertaking of employment abroad indicated a broad consensus in terms of the age of respondents. Differences in answers were minimal. The most satisfied were the respondents aged 36-40 (almost 91.5% were satisfied), while the least satisfied were persons aged 26-30 (almost 86% were satisfied).

Satisfaction with undertaking employment abroad

Chart 8

Chart 8Satisfaction with undertaking employment abroad with a breakdown by sector (in %)

Satisfied

Dissatisfied

Hard to say



Industry (n=36)

Services (n=62)

84.587.7

91.691.9

5.24.1

0.00.0

10.38.28.48.1

28

As has already been indicated, financial considerations were the main reason for going abroad. Therefore, to evaluate the decision to leave Poland, it is essential to determine whether there has been a real improvement in the financial situation of a given respondent. Over 90% of the respondents declared that working abroad improved their financial situation. Such answers were most frequently given by people working in manufacturing (98.6%). At the same time almost all respondents of the oldest and youngest age groups answered that working abroad improved their financial situation ( ).

Among other positive factors related to migration, respondents indicated improved self-esteem. For example, nearly half the respondents working in services cited this factor. Such answer was given also by 44.4% of the respondents working in industry, 39.3% of those in the construction sector and 30.1% of those employed in manufacturing.

One in three respondents working in manufacturing and services pointed out that leaving Poland enabled them to acquire new qualifications, which they will use after returning to Poland.

Chart 9

Chart 9Impact of undertaking employment abroad on lives of emigrants with a breakdown by sector (any number of answers, in %)

Improvementof financial situation

Improvementof self-esteem

(I succeeded abroad)

Acquiring newqualifications

Disappointmentwith employment

conditions

Family problems

Other



Industry (n=36)

Services (n=61)

91.098.6

94.495.0

39.330.1

44.449.2

26.832.9

16.732.8

8.92.7

0.03.3

8.96.8

5.51.6

3.64.1

8.31.6

29

Fears related to going abroad

Chart 10

Among all respondents the most important fear related to going abroad was the fear of being cheated. It was ticked by 35% of all respondents. Not much less, namely 31%, indicated family-related fears such as longing or fear of family problems caused by the departure. 10% stated they feared their skills would prove too poor and they would lose their job fast.

An analysis of the answers of the respondents with a breakdown into the sectors in which they were employed indicated a very high level of convergence ( ). The largest group, almost 60% of the respondents working in manufacturing, feared they would be cheated abroad (e.g. they would not receive the agreed-upon remuneration). Such answers were given also by 38% of the respondents working in services, 32% of the respondents in the construction sector and 17.6% of those working in industry. This means that the issue of the reliability of employers, particularly in the manufacturing sector, likely leaves much to be desired. It should be assumed that respondents either themselves experienced situations where remuneration was not paid or obtained such information from credible sources. The number of answers strongly points out that there is a problem of failure to pay wages or of wages for performed work being substandard. But there were also issues connected with family. Most frequently (38%), problems connected with family relations in the context of undertaking employment abroad were indicated by workers in the construction sector, and least frequently by those working in industry (23.5%). Other problems were indicated much more rarely, with answers not exceeding 10%.

Chart 10Fears related to going abroad with a breakdown by sector (any number of answers, )in %

I will be cheated (e.g. I will not receivethe agreed remuneration, I will not

get a job and will have to returnto the home country)

Fears related to the family(e.g. longing or fear of family problems

caused by going abroad)

My skills/competences will provetoo poor and I will lose

the job fast

Difficulties with adjustment

Fear of aversion to Polesamong residents of the country

where I will work

I will become illand will have toreturn to Poland

None of the above



Industry (n=17)

Services (n=50)

32.057.4

17.638.0

38.027.8

23.532.0

24.020.4

23.518.0

20.020.4

29.420.0

18.020.4

0.010.0

16.011.1

0.010.0

24.018.5

35.328.0

30

Fears related to being cheated abroad (e.g. not receiving the agreed upon remuneration) were expressed most frequently by respondents aged 26-30 (57.1%). Such fears were expressed by a much smaller percentage of persons aged 36-40 (22.6%).

The analysis of answers to the questions concerning fears related to going abroad indicates that problems with payment of remuneration are most feared by persons aged 26-30 employed in the manufacturing sector. This is a very important piece of information, requiring in-depth qualitative research, which would help explain why people in this age group employed in manufacturing much more frequently than others indicate the possibility of being cheated when they undertake employment abroad.

Over 30% of the respondents of the group aged over 26 pointed out to fears related to family. In the youngest age group, one in four respondents gave such an answer. On the other hand, 31.4% of the respondents aged 26-30 feared before going abroad that their skills would prove to be too poor and that they would have problems with adjustment. More than 40% of the respondents aged 36-40 and 28% of respondents from the oldest and the youngest age group, respectively, did not express any of the aforementioned fears.

Despite the reservations pointed out above, it seems important to analyse the answers by the sex of the respondents. Family issues as negative consequences of employment emigration were more frequently cited by women. Such issues were cited by nearly 41% of female respondents and only 30% of male respondents. This shows that emigration entails greater emotional costs for women than for men. Generally, it indicates that there are additional challenges connected with the phenomenon of so-called feminisation of migration, i.e. slowly progressing domination of women in migration processes, not only in Poland and Europe, but also globally.

A majority of the respondents are planning in the near future to extend their employment abroad or to go abroad again ( ). Respondents working in the manufacturing sector were absolutely certain that they would continue working abroad (97.3% of the respondents). It is interesting that they made such declarations despite their fears of not receiving their due remuneration, which was identified in the analysis of answers to the previous questions. Respondents employed in industry were not much less resolved (89%). In the case of those employed in the construction sector and services, the percentage of respondents certain to continue employment abroad was significantly lower, although in their case as well positive answers definitely dominate – 80.7% of the respondents in the construction sector and 73.8% of those employed in services, respectively.

The largest percentage of the respondents interested in extending their employment abroad or going abroad again consisted of people aged 26-30 (91.5%.) and aged over 40 (92.9%). People of the youngest age group displayed the lowest level of interest in extending employment abroad (73.1%).

Plans for the future

Chart 11

Chart 11Declarations of the respondents concerning plans to continue employment abroad with a breakdown by sector (in %)

Yes

No

I don’t know



Industry (n=36)

Services (n=61)

80.797.2

89.073.8

10.51.4

5.511.5

8.81.4

5.514.7

31

Declarations regarding continuation of employment abroad should be compared with the willingness of respondents to remain permanently in emigration. As one can easily imagine, plans to remain abroad permanently are much more rarely stated than the willingness to continue employment emigration for some more time ( ). Among the respondents, a willingness to stay abroad was most frequently expressed by those working in industry (61.1%), followed closely by persons working in the manufacturing sector (54.8%). Among respondents working in services, only 37.7% stated that were giving serious consideration to remaining abroad permanently. Even less frequently were such plans stated by those employed in the construction sector (31.6%). In the case of the latter sector, the percentage of respondents ruling out staying abroad was higher than those declaring a willingness to remain abroad permanently.

Significant differences regarding declarations about plans for the future were identified by the age of the respondents. Respondents aged 26-30 most frequently plan to stay abroad permanently (61.7%). In the case of other age groups, the percentage of those willing to remain abroad does not exceed 50%. In the youngest age group (21-25), 46.2% consider staying abroad permanently, while 8 percent fewer respondents still do not know what decision they will make. In the oldest age group, only slightly more than 35% of the respondents are planning to stay abroad. In their case, declarations on only temporary employment abroad dominated, which translates into a willingness to return to Poland.

An analysis of answers given to the question about plans for the future with a breakdown by age indicates that generally speaking elderly, more experienced persons less frequently declare a willingness to stay abroad permanently. Young people, whose situation in the Polish labour market is particularly difficult, are determined not only to continue employment abroad, but also to stay there permanently. This is a very negative trend requiring action by the Polish government.

The most important reason underlying the willingness to stay abroad is the conviction that this will lead to improvement of living conditions. Such an answer was given by 30% of the respondents declaring a willingness to stay in emigration permanently. Over one-fourth (26%) answered that they have permanent employment there, and 16% indicated financial matters.

Chart 12

Chart 12Declaration of the respondents concerning willingness to stay abroad permanently with a breakdown by sector (in %)

Yes

No

I don’t know



Industry (n=36)

Services (n=61)

31.654.8

61.137.7

42.116.4

13.931.1

26.328.8

25.031.2

32

The most optimistic about their prospects in the labour markets of the receiving states are employees working in the construction sector, while the least optimistic are those employed in manufacturing and services ( ). Over 70% of the respondents employed in the construction sector stated that they had a permanent job abroad or good chances of getting one. Nearly half (46.1%) of the respondents also answered they felt more secure abroad with regard to the labour market. Among the respondents working in the manufacturing sector, “only” 56.4% answered that they considered staying abroad because they had a permanent job there, and 53.8% thought their living conditions would improve there.

For people working in industry, the most important argument in favour of staying abroad was the fact they had a permanent job. This was indicated by 68% of the respondents in that group. At the same time, 56% of the respondents employed in this sector named the opportunity to improve their living conditions as the main reason underlying their willingness to stay abroad. This argument was also indicated by the biggest group from among those employed in services, namely 61.5%. Equally important for them was having a permanent job (57.7%).

As can be inferred from the provided answers, security in labour market is the decisive factor in declarations to stay abroad. The level of wages is less important. This probably means that declarations about staying abroad would change if the Polish labour market offered more stable employment conditions. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that factors mentioned in some other studies related to bad perceptions of Poland as one of the major reasons underlying the decision to leave Poland and declarations on staying abroad have not been confirmed by this study.

Issues related to the labour market were also dominant among the reasons for staying abroad within certain age groups. The fact of having a permanent job abroad or prospects for obtaining one as the factor behind the decision to stay in emigration permanently was most frequently indicated by people aged 36-40 (66.7%), while it was cited least frequently by respondents in the oldest age group (52.8%). Here again the issue of diversity of answers by age has surfaced. An opportunity to improve living conditions by staying abroad is most frequently perceived by people aged over 40 (76.9%), and least frequently by respondents aged 31-35 (40%). Over 60% of 21-25 year-olds and 36-40 year-olds feel more secure abroad with regard to the labour market. For the oldest respondents, the possibility of taking advantage of benefits that are missing in Poland is much more important than for younger respondents.

Chart 13

Chart 13Reasons for staying abroad with a breakdown by sector (any number of answers, in %)

I have a permanent jobabroad or good chances

of obtaining one

I feel more secure abroad regarding labour market

(even if I lose a job I will get it back fast)

I will be able to take advantage of the benefits that are

missing in Poland

I will improve my living conditions abroad

My family wants to leave

I no longer want to live in Poland



Industry (n=25)

Services (n=26)

70.656.4

68.057.7

47.135.9

68.046.1

52.910.3

20.026.9

64.753.8

56.061.5

29.428.2

44.034.6

11.812.8

4.03.8

33

If the main reasons underlying the decisions of Poles to go abroad and the willingness to stay abroad revealed in this study were financial factors and those related to security in the labour market, then the decisions to return to Poland are mainly motivated by family factors. Almost 40% of the respondents named opposition from families against continuation of the stay abroad as the main factor stimulating the decision to return. In the case of 27.3% of the respondents, the main reason underlying declarations on returning was the belief in the possibility of obtaining employment in Poland or the fact of already having a job. On the other hand, 15.2% of the respondents could not imagine living permanently outside Poland and 9.1% stated they can use their qualifications better in Poland.

Definitely, family reasons were named most frequently (almost 70%) as the reason underlying the decision to return to the home country by respondents in the construction sector ( ). Almost half of them answered they could not imagine living permanently outside Poland, and 36.4% stated that they have a job in Poland or a chance of obtaining one. Similar arguments were named by persons employed in industry. Among employees of the manufacturing sector, 54.5% answered that their families opposed their stay abroad for longer, and 45.5% had a job in Poland, so they did not want to leave Poland permanently. Almost half of those working in services could not imagine living permanently outside Poland, and 43.5% had a job in Poland or a chance of finding one.

The analysis of the factors underlying decisions about returning to Poland after the end of employment indicated that it was persons aged 31 or older who most frequently indicated an aversion on the part of their families to their staying abroad as an argument for giving up emigration. This is most likely because a large number of younger persons have not started their own family yet, so opposition from a spouse does not apply in their case. At the same time, 57.1% of the respondents aged 26-30 cannot imagine living permanently outside Poland, or alternatively have a job in Poland or a chance of obtaining one. One respondent in three in the youngest age group answered they would not stay abroad because they could not imagine living permanently outside Poland.

Chart 14

Chart 14Main reasons underlying decisions to return with a breakdown by sector (any number of answers, in %)

My family is against leaving

I cannot imagine living permanently

outside Poland

I have a job in Poland or good chances of obtaining one

In Poland I can use my qualifications better

I don't feel secure abroad

I don't like social relations

abroad



Industry (n=7)

Services (n=23)

69.754.5

71.430.4

45.436.4

71.447.8

36.445.4

28.643.5

24.218.2

28.630.4

21.227.3

14.321.7

15.118.2

28.613.0

34

The post-accession emigrations of Poles are the topic of many studies, academic papers as well as critical articles in newspapers. This is mainly due to the desire to find answers to questions about the causes and effects of processes that proved to be far more significant than had been earlier expected. It is also essential to identify the factors that are currently decisive for declarations by emigrants of their willingness to stay abroad or to return to Poland. As has been already indicated in the introduction, although unrepresentative, this study produced many interesting results that expand our knowledge of the most recent emigrations of Poles. This is attributable first and foremost to the fact that the research was conducted among a specific group of Polish workers employed abroad, namely those recruited by one of the dominant employment agencies in the Polish market, and by the fact that they undertook employment in those states that have hardly been covered by recent studies. This concerns Germany in particular, a country that did not open up its labour market until 2011, i.e. seven years after the United Kingdom and Ireland, which have dominated migration analyses performed by both Polish and foreign researchers in recent years. A particularly valuable aspect of this research is the dedication of a lot of space to the issue of factors influencing specific migration decisions of Poles. The opinions of the respondents presented in this report definitely constitute a basis for drawing conclusions and developing programmes and instruments that might influence decisions to emigrate, stay abroad or return to Poland. Let’s hope there will be as many returns in the near future as possible.

Summary

35

Financial issues remain the main reasons underlying employment emigration of Poles. Unemployment is of much lesser importance. A decisive majority of respondents had a job in Poland, but the remuneration they received was unsatisfactory for them and therefore they made the decision to emigrate. Hence, one can state that it is the level of remuneration, not the level of unemployment, where one should look for a solution to the issue of employment emigration of Poles.

Poles employed abroad who took part in the research are overwhelmingly satisfied with employment abroad. No significant differences have been identified regarding respondents’ sectors of employment or age. But the research results are definitely affected by the fact that the respondents were recruited by employment agencies and sent directly to employers and by the fact that they worked in Belgium, France and Germany, because both wages and employment standards in those countries are among the best in the world.

As a result of undertaking employment abroad, the respondents improved their financial situation. Over 90% of the respondents were of this opinion. Many of them, in the range of 30-50%, depending on the sector, also improved their self-esteem. This is because they succeeded abroad.

The most frequent fear related to going abroad is the fear of not receiving due remuneration. It must be stressed that this fear was universal (e.g. over 57% of those employed in the manufacturing sector expressed such a fear) despite the fact that the respondents were employed through an agency registered in Poland, i.e. one offering greater certainty of remuneration than is the case when job-seekers find employment on their own. This means that the issue of employers cheating migrant workers is still a problem despite the fact that migration takes place under the framework of free movement of persons.

A decisive majority of the respondents declared a willingness to continue working abroad, but at the same time a much smaller group was certain that such employment would turn into permanent emigration. This means that respondents treat employment abroad as a temporary opportunity to enhance their remuneration. The most sceptical as concerns staying abroad permanently were respondents employed in the construction sector, while the most willing to move abroad permanently were employees of the industrial sector.


1

2

3

4

5

36

The most important reason for declarations about staying abroad was the conviction that such a decision would lead to improvement of living conditions and having a permanent job in the state of employment. Therefore, financial factors and those related to security in the labour market again prove to be the primary pro-emigration factors underlying decisions to stay abroad permanently.

The main factors behind return to the home country are family-related. Respondents stated that opposition of their family to continuation of employment abroad led to the decision to return. At the same time, over one-fourth of the respondents pointed out that the fact of having a job in Poland is very important for them as a factor in favour of returning. This shows again that the respondents were quite optimistic about their chances of finding employment in Poland, while the level of remuneration was a problem.

This research did not confirm the opinion, based on other studies, that aversion to Poland as a country is both a pro-emigration factor and one that matters for decisions to stay abroad permanently.

6

7

8

37

Chapter IIIWill immigrants solve the problems

of Central and Eastern Europe?

Chapter IIIWill immigrants solve the problems of Central and Eastern Europe?

In the first report of the CEED Institute on migrations in Central and Eastern Europe, a lot of attention was devoted to the issue of the transformation of CEE countries from typical emigration into emigration-immigration states, i.e. ones sharing migration-related features with a majority of European Union member states. This report continues those deliberations, but instead of focusing on presentation of the scale and directions of the inflow of foreigners into CEE countries, it demonstrates the factors that should be taken into consideration when decisions concerning immigration policy are made. We will also attempt to answer the question of whether CEE countries can be attractive to employment immigrants and consequently compete against the EU-15 states in attracting those foreigners that bring the greatest benefits to their economies.

Migration and demography

In the vast majority of papers describing the potential consequences of the inflow of foreigners into a given state, demographic issues are mentioned first. Foreigners who decide to stay in the receiving state may contribute to varying degrees to limiting the adverse outcomes of a declining population and an ageing society. However, there is a consensus that given the pace of these changes, the inflow of foreigners will not by itself solve these problems, but can become an element of a wider package of measures. Despite frequent anti-immigration rhetoric, immigration is still treated by those in power as an instrument for coping with demographic challenges. This approach should also be taken by CEE countries. However, one reservation must be made initially.

There are many examples of states, which, although not very populous or large in area, are nevertheless among the best developed countries in the world. This is attributable to a very good population structure and adoption of a model optimising the use of the potential of their people. Given such an approach, it turns out that the role of immigrants can be far greater in resolving demographic problems than is recognised in many analyses of the

6impact of immigration on population size. The fact is that the population structure of foreigners residing in the EU-28 states is definitely better than that of indigenes. Chart 15 suggests that foreigners are definitely younger than indigenes. The greatest differences in population structures are found between age groups with the greatest occupational activity, i.e. 20-44 year-olds ( ). This means that without immigration the population structure in the EU-28 would be much worse than it is now.

Chart 15

It is not the size of the population per se that is problematic, but its structure (shares of occupationally active and passive people in the population structure of a given state).

6These analyses, for example, demonstrate the impact of immigration on the total fertility rate. Women immigrants are supposed to have higher total fertility rates, which would positively counter the effects of the declining population size of a given state.

40

Chart 15Age pyramid with a breakdown into non-nationals and nationals. Data for the EU-28 (in %)

95-99

90-94

85-89

80-84

75-79

70-74

65-69

60-64

55-59

50-54

45-49

40-44

35-39

30-34

25-29

20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9

0-4

02 46810121402468101214

ageFemales Males

Nationals

Non-nationals

Source: Own calculations on the basis of: Population by sex, age group and citizenship (migr_pop1ctz), Population by sex, age and broad group of citizenship (migr_pop2ctz), Eurostat

41

We find a similar situation if we separate data for CEE countries from the data for the entire EU-28. In the case of CEE countries as well, foreigners living there are younger than indigenes, but the differences are smaller than in the case of all EU-28 states ( ). This means that within the European Union it is the EU-15 states that are greatly improving their population structure, which positively translates into competitiveness and the ability to cope with demographic challenges.

Chart 16

Chart 16Age pyramid with a breakdown into non-nationals and nationals. Data for the EU-11 (in %)

95-99

90-94

85-89

80-84

75-79

70-74

65-69

60-64

55-59

50-54

45-49

40-44

35-39

30-34

25-29

20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9

0-4

0 2 4 6 8 1012024681012

ageFemales Males

Nationals

Non-nationals

Source: Own calculations on the basis of: Population by sex, age group and citizenship (migr_pop1ctz), Population by sex, age and broad group of citizenship (migr_pop2ctz), Eurostat

42

One more major conclusion follows from comparison of the two age pyramids. The general data for the EU-28 suggests that both in the case of female and male foreigners, their impact on “rejuvenation” of the population of the receiving states is comparable. But when we analyse the age pyramid for the EU-11, it is clearly visible that males contribute to a much greater extent to improvement of the population structures of those states. This probably means that CEE countries are at an early stage of transformation towards the emigration-immigration model. Given this situation and despite the processes of feminisation of migration, we are dealing rather with immigration of males, who only after some time bring their families in (family reunion process). But they must make sure that the decision to immigrate is the right one. Big differences in the age pyramids between female foreigners and male foreigners in the EU-11 countries may result from still limited scale of decisions on family reunions, which have already become a part of the experiences of the EU-15 states.

Demand for immigrants in the European Union

In the previous section it was shown that the inflow of immigrants is extremely important for dealing with demographic problems related to disturbances in population structure. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the demand for foreigners is not the same in specific labour market segments. Most frequently the greatest demand for foreigners from employers is in the professions where there is a shortage of indigenous workers, and concerns both highly skilled workers, in whose case salaries are of minor importance because these individuals have unique skills, and those workers whose lower requirements regarding remuneration are of the greatest importance. The latter situation can lead to rivalry between immigrants and nationals. One can assume that indigenes are ready to undertake employment in a given profession or sector, but for a higher remuneration than immigrants. However employers are often not willing to meet their expectations because they have cheaper workers available from abroad. In this case, it is the role of the governments of particular states to consider whether to block access to the labour market for foreigners and consequently stimulate salary rises, risking however an expansion of the grey economy or relocation of economic activity to wherever labour costs are lower.

Research by an international company ManpowerGroup suggests that in the vast majority of European Economic Area (EEA) member states there are significant shortages of highly skilled employees with unique skills (commonly called talents). But the greatest shortage of talents is found in CEE countries – in Hungary and Bulgaria ( ). Chart 17

Chart 17Talent shortage in selected EEA member states, 2014 (in %)

Source: The Talent Shortage Continues: How the Ever Changing Role of HR Can Bridge the Gap, ManpowerGroup 2014, p. 4

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Hun

gary

Bulgaria

Austria

Greece

German

y

Roman

ia

Italy

Finlan

d

Poland

Swed

en

Slovak

ia

Fran

ce

Norway

Sloven

ia

Belgium

United King

dom

Czech Re

public

Nethe

rlan

ds

Spain

Irelan

d

45 4442 42

40 40

34 33 33 33

22 21 20 19

13 12 11

53 2

43

The data contained in Chart 17 shows that an inflow of even a significant number of foreigners characterised by unique skills would not result in deterioration of the situation in the labour market, or in enhanced competition between foreigners and indigenes. In this context, the problem rather is to find the instruments that would stimulate inflow of this category of foreigners than to restrict their inflow. Therefore the vast majority of EU member states pursue a policy of removing obstacles to the migration of highly skilled workers rather than imposing restrictions on them.

As has been already mentioned, highly skilled workers contribute a lot to the competitiveness of the states where they are employed. International comparisons show that the US is by far the state that derives the greatest benefits from the immigration of highly skilled workers ( ). It is followed by Canada, but with much poorer results. Two European countries that have been striving for years to acquire highly skilled workers, i.e. Germany and the United Kingdom, came third and fourth, respectively. Among CEE countries, Poland and Hungary were covered in the ranking, but they came out in the group of states at the very bottom of the ranking. This means that CEE states definitely lose out in the competition for highly qualified immigrants, which adversely impacts their development prospects.

Table 8

In recent years we have witnessed at least a dozen initiatives aimed at increasing the inflow of highly skilled foreigners into the European Union. For example, in the year 2000, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder announced establishment of a dedicated programme targeted at foreigners employed in the IT sector who would like to undertake employment in Germany. 20,000 “green cards” were offered to these types of immigrants. The programme was only moderately successful, because slightly more than 17,000 of the “green cards” were distributed, which means the quota was not met. In 2004 the programme came to an end. A similar concept was put forward by the European Commission, which announced introduction of a directive on the so-called Blue Card targeted at highly skilled foreigners. After long negotiations, the directive introducing the Blue Card entered into force in 2009, but it proved a failure. Within five years of the directive’s implementation, only a few thousand Blue Cards were issued in all member states. Moreover, the United Kingdom introduced a scoring system that granted many privileges to highly skilled workers. Among CEE countries, the Czech Republic had its own programme targeting highly skilled workers. The examples above show that attracting highly skilled workers to given states is an extremely difficult task and one with a high risk of failure.

Acquisition of highly skilled workers by EU member states

44

The demand for foreigners is generated both in the first, more attractive, and the second labour 7market segments. The analyses of demand in the labour market demonstrate that demand for the latter is much

greater! This is mainly because sectors requiring unique skills employ much fewer workers than labour-intensive ones do. The situation is aggravated by the growing demand for highly skilled workers in the home care sector, which is the result of demographic transformations. While those persons do not need to have unique skills, they do need to be high skilled in provision of care.

Table 8

USA

Canada

Germany

United Kingdom

Australia

France

United Arab Emirates

Spain

Switzerland

Netherlands

Belgium

Austria

Ireland

Portugal

Sweden

New Zeland

Greece

Mexico

Luxembourg

Norway

Denmark

Poland

Hungary

Finland

Significant contribution of highly skilled immigrants to economies (2007 GDP at PPP)

Host country

Source: Stimulating Economies through Forecasting Talent Mobility, World Economic Forum, 2010, p. 11

12

22

9

11

26

9

87

5

20

9

9

10

15

12

8

22

7

1

39

5

5

1

4

2

1,661

274

254

227

197

184

128

73

60

55

35

31

28

27

27

25

23

18

16

14

9

8

7

4

Share of highly skilled migrantsin highly skilled workforce

(%)

Average contribution of highly skilledimmigrants to GDP

(US$ billions)

7Labour market is divided into two segments. The first segment contains well-paid, highly prestigious jobs, with a lot of potential for pursuing career path. The second segment includes poorly paid jobs with low prestige, offering very limited career development potential. So to receive a higher remuneration and obtain an opportunity to continue career development path, one needs to change a profession and transit from the first into the second labour market segment. A majority of employment immigrants find jobs in the second labour market segment.

45

Table 9

AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

ES

FI

FR

GR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

NO

EU-12

EU-15

EU-27

Unemployment rate assumptions (age 15-64, in %)

Source: The 2012 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodology, European Economy, 2011, p. 319

4.1

7.4

7.5

4.7

6.2

6.1

4.8

8.2

8.9

6.6

7.5

8.1

7.8

7.1

7.3

8.6

4.3

8.8

6.7

3.5

7.4

8

6.7

6.5

6

8.1

5.9

3.3

7.3

6.8

6.9

.0

.0

2030

4.1

7.4

7.7

4.9

6.3

6.1

4.8

10.9

12.6

6.6

7.7

8.9

9.5

10

7.3

12.4

4.3

13.3

6.7

3.5

7.5

9.6

6.8

6.6

7.1

10.4

6.3

3.4

8

7.5

7.5

.0

.0

2025

4.1

7.6

8.2

5.3

6.4

6.1

4.8

14.0

17.2

6.6

8

10.6

11.4

13.4

7.3

16.7

4.5

18.3

6.8

3.5

7.6

11.6

6.9

6.6

8.3

13.1

6.9

3.4

8.8

8.3

8.4

.0

2020

4.5

8.4

10.5

6.8

7.3

7.2

7.5

17.2

20.2

8.6

9.4

12.8

11.3

13.7

8.5

18.1

4.4

19

6.9

4.5

9.8

11.4

7.6

8.5

7.4

14.4

8

3.6

10

9.7

9.7

.0

.0

.0

2010

The results of an analysis of job offers posted on a European job mobility portal confirm the fact that demand for employees is particularly frequent in the second segment of the labour market. The professions with the greatest shortages include: housekeeping and restaurant services workers (Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Finland, France, Portugal) and financial and sales associate professionals (Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden). Other professions for which employers from EU member states frequently look for employees through EURES are:

Shop salespersons and demonstrators (Austria,Greece, Estonia)

Domestic and related helpers, cleaners and launderers (Cyprus, Estonia, Malta)Metal moulders, welders, sheet metal workers (Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia)Building frame and related trades workers: (Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovenia)

All the above professions can be deemed as characteristic of the second segment of the labour market.

One of the main fears related to the growing inflow of foreigners is deterioration of the labour market situation, which may result from enhanced rivalry between nationals and non-nationals. In the report pub-lished several months ago, we showed that such situations are rare and limited to just a few employment sectors. To complement this thesis, one can cite the argument that an increase in unemployment in receiving states attributable to an inflow of foreigners in the coming years is even less likely than today. This is because of demographic change and shrinking labour resources. A forecast developed by the European Commission clearly shows that in all EU member states, including CEE countries, the unemployment rate will decline despite the expected increase in the inflow of foreigners entering the labour market ( ).

•

•

•

•

Table 9

46

The aforementioned demographic changes are forcing particular states to take measures that are intended to meet the foreseen challenges. Quite certainly the increased inflow of immigrants, although unable to solve demographic problems, may become one of the factors contributing to maintenance of a population structure that is optimal for economic and social development. Data published by the World Bank suggests that CEE countries will be affected by demographic change to a high degree and consequently they should be interested in getting an inflow of foreigners. For example, Poland should allow the entry of nearly 800,000 immigrants by 2020. This would enable maintenance of the current ratios between active and passive persons in the labour market. In the case of the Czech Republic, the needed number of immigrants is nearly 500,000, and in the case of Bulgaria – nearly 120,000 ( ).

Nevertheless, the figures contained in Table 10 should not be deemed very realistic. One can hardly expect states such as Poland or the Czech Republic to be able to accept and, crucially, to integrate into the labour market such a high number of immigrants, particularly as they would have to come from countries of different cultures. The data of the World Bank has very clearly demonstrated the challenges faced by CEE countries.

Immigration attractiveness of European states

Migration processes in the world take place along historically shaped paths. Only in very few cases do they lead through CEE countries. One can indicate here, among other things, the inflow of Ukrainians to Poland and the Czech Republic, where they undertake mainly short-term employment. In this connection, we have asked ourselves in this report whether in the coming years some new paths can be traced, a greater proportion of which will lead to CEE countries than today? To answer this question, an index will be created showing the attractiveness of particular CEE countries for immigrants. It was built through identification of the indicators that seem to be decisive for foreigners who undertake migration and are interested in finding employment outside their country of origin. The index of attractiveness for immigrants takes into account neither migration networks nor migration policy. Therefore we focused on objective socio-economic criteria. The index was developed with the use of the same indicators separately for CEE countries and EU-15 states, and then the results for both samples were compared to show the competition both within CEE countries and EU-15 states, but also within the entire EU. The study leaves out only Malta and Cyprus in recognition that their situation is different from that of the other states. This, however, does not influence the conclusions drawn on the basis of the performed analyses.

The selection of the indicators used to create the index was based on the criteria of universality, availability and relative transparency (a description of the indicators can be found in the appendix). The ranking of states was based on ratings according to the value of a given indicator. So, a state with the best value for a given indicator was assigned a score of 11 points (for CEE countries) or of 15 points (for EU-15 states), while a state with the poorest value for a given indicator was assigned a score of 1 point. For example, the state with the lowest unemployment level among CEE countries was assigned 11 points, while the one with the highest unemployment level received 1 point. Consequently, a ranking list of states was created for each indicator. The assigned scores were added, which enabled development of a ranking list in terms of attractiveness for immigrants and of the index. The state with the highest score (EU-11 and EU-15) was deemed to be the most attractive for immigration. The state with the lowest score was considered to be the least attractive for foreigners. At the same time, CEE countries and EU-15 states were compared. The state with the best result under a given indicator received 26 points, while the one with the worst result received 1 point.

Table 10

Table 10

WAP needed in 2020 to keep LF/Pop constant

Number of migrants needed using ILO projection

Results of projection exercise to estimate net migration needs by 2020 in three countries

Estimation

WAP = working age population LF/Pop= ratio of labour force to population

Source: Demographic Change and Labor Markets, p. 85, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/publications/454763-1181939083693/chaw_073-116_ch02.pdf (accessed on: 19.10.2014)

7,030,000

491,000

Czech Republic

26,422,000

789,000

Poland

4,726,000

119,000

Bulgaria

47

Migration attractiveness of CEE countries

Table 11

Table 11

An analysis of the indicators used to create the index of attractiveness of European states for immigrants showed that among CEE countries, the Czech Republic is likely to be the most attractive for foreigners ( ). Slovenia was rated second, while Estonia was third. Romania and Bulgaria proved to be the least attractive for foreigners. The performed analysis suggests that although the degree of economic development (measured as GDP per capita) is a significant variable and greatly influences the attractiveness of a given country for immigrants, the Czech Republic, which leads the ranking, is worse developed than Slovenia, but still its position is attributable to its low unemployment level and threat of poverty. Similarly, Poland is rated higher than Slovakia ( ), although income per capita is much lower there.

Table 11

Czech Republic

Slovenia

Estonia

Poland

Slovakia

Hungary

Lithuania

Latvia

Croatia

Romania

Bulgaria

Attractiveness of CEE countries for immigrants (the best result for a given indicator – 11 points, the worst result – 1 point)

***

#11

#14

#31

#23

#19

#21

#46

#39

#26

#35

#32

23%

41%

38%

57%

37%

31%

45%

19%

41%

50%

37%

Low

Medium

Medium

Low

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

High

High

36,201

52,039

26,562

20,803

21,579

22,657

18,664

19,605

21,169

11,191

13,693

39.4

40.2

34.3

42.6

40.1

37.4

34.6

34.9

40.6

42.2

34.1

6.6

6.7

7.6

11.9

10.2

26.8

16.0

24.0

14.7

28.5

43.0

10,649

14,286

8,556

9,122

9,568

7,512

7,352

6,615

7,258

3,737

6,056

72.2

62.7

75.9

67.0

66.4

67.0

73.0

68.7

60.4

65.5

65.7

8.6

14.5

18.6

17.3

12.8

14.3

20.6

19.4

19.5

22.4

21.0

73.3

70.1

74.9

67.4

69.8

65.7

72.7

73.8

64.1

64.3

68.6

19,845

23,289

18,783

13,648

18,047

13,481

15,538

15,375

13,608

9,499

7,499

7.0

10.1

8.6

10.3

14.2

10.2

11.8

11.9

17.3

7.1

13.0

111

100

90

89

87

68

65

57

51

46

31

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

*

Coun

try

Pla

ce

Poi

nts

Une

mpl

oym

ent

rate

GD

P pe

r ca

pita

Act

ivit

y ra

te

At r

isk

of p

over

ty r

ate

afte

r so

cial

tra

nsfe

r

Inde

x o

f Eco

nom

ic F

reed

om

Med

ian

– eq

uiva

lised

net

inco

me

in P

PS

Seve

re m

ater

ial d

epri

vati

on r

ate

Hap

py P

lane

t In

dex

Wea

lth

Soci

al u

nres

t

Posi

tive

impa

ct o

f im

mig

rati

on

Glo

bal P

eace

Inde

x

**

estimate by the report’s authorsthe following scores were assigned: low – 11 points, medium – 6 points, high – 1 point

Source: See Appendix, page 53

48

Migration attractiveness of EU-15 states

Table 12As has been already mentioned, an analysis was performed for EU-15 states similar to the one done for

CEE countries. It demonstrated that the most attractive state for immigrants is Sweden ( ). Luxembourg came in second, while Denmark was rated third. Portugal and Greece proved to be the least attractive for immigrants among the EU-15 states. As in the case of CEE countries, the affluence of a given state was relevant for the rating of that state, but this variable was not the decisive factor.

Table 12

Sweden

Luxembourg

Denmark

Austria

Netherlands

Finland

Germany

United Kingdom

France

Belgium

Ireland

Italy

Spain

Portugal

Greece

Migration attractiveness of EU-15 states (the best result for a given indicator – 15 points, the worst result – 1 point)

***

#11

#7

#2

#3

#20

#6

#17

#47

#48

#9

#13

#34

#26

#18

#86

81%

72%

64%

47%

67%

66%

63%

55%

51%

46%

55%

47%

55%

65%

32%

Low

Very low

Very low

Very low

Medium

Low

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

High

Very high

232,106

241,695

194,032

163,382

142,521

133,485

157,882

186,768

224,523

198,253

134,235

195,925

99,214

71,193

83,442

46.2

29.0

36.6

47.1

43.1

42.7

47.2

47.9

46.5

37.1

42.4

46.4

44.1

38.7

40.5

1.4

1.8

3.8

4.2

2.5

2.5

5.4

8.3

5.1

5.1

9.8

12.4

6.2

10.9

20.3

20,527

27,266

19,108

20,925

19,355

19,116

19,334

16,469

19,380

19.791

16,188

15,342

14.238

9,508

9,093

73.1

74.2

76.1

72.4

74.2

73.4

73.4

74.9

63.5

69.9

76.2

60.9

67.2

63.5

55.7

14.8

15.9

12.3

14.4

10.4

11.8

16.1

15.9

13.7

15.1

15.7

19.1

20.4

18.7

23.1

80.5

70.6

77.3

76.3

79.7

73.7

77.8

76.6

71.2

67.4

69.8

63.9

74.3

73.4

67.2

60,430

110,697

59,832

50,547

50,793

49,147

46,269

41,787

42,503

46,878

50,503

35,926

29,863

21,733

21,956

8.0

5.9

7.0

4.9

6.7

8.2

5.2

7.6

10.3

8.4

13.1

12.2

26.1

16.4

27.5

144

138

133

132

129

117

114

100

94

91

86

59

59

51

19

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

12

14

15

Coun

try

Pla

ce

Poi

nts

Une

mpl

oym

ent

rate

GD

P pe

r ca

pita

Act

ivit

y ra

te

At r

isk

of p

over

ty r

ate

afte

r so

cial

tra

nsfe

r

Inde

x o

f Eco

nom

ic F

reed

om

Med

ian

– eq

uiva

lised

net

inco

me

in P

PS

Seve

re m

ater

ial d

epri

vati

on r

ate

Hap

py P

lane

t In

dex

Wea

lth

Soci

al u

nres

t

Posi

tive

impa

ct o

f im

mig

rati

on

Glo

bal P

eace

Inde

x

data for 2012the following scores were assigned: very low – 15 points, low – 11 points, medium – 8 points, high – 4 points, very high – 1 point

* * *

**

Source: See Appendix, page 53

49

Attractiveness of CEE countries against the background of the EU-15

Table 13

Comparison of the results of analyses performed for CEE countries and EU-15 states showed that in terms of migration attractiveness this division is already partially outdated ( ). Although the first eleven places were taken by EU-15 states, the Czech Republic was rated twelfth. Right behind them came Slovenia and Estonia, which bettered Italy, among others. The last position but one was taken by Greece, but this may be due to the huge economic problems still experienced by the country as a result of the economic crisis. At the same time, it must be pointed out that differences between some states are minimal and the ranking results may change greatly in the coming years.

Within the European Union, member states have limited freedom to shape visa and asylum policies, but they have still have sovereignty with regard to the pursuit of policies in the context of employment migration. This means that they can create and implement instruments which may both stimulate and hinder employment immigration. Those actions should be correlated with the attractiveness of a given state for immigrants. The more attractive states need to do very little because they will be the destinations of significant immigration anyway.The situation is different in the case of states with poor attractiveness for immigrants. In their case it seems that they should take political action to liberalise their approach to migration so as to become more attractive and consequently compete successfully with other states in the region.

To recapitulate the immigration attractiveness of EU-11 and EU-15 states, it can be stated that CEE countries should definitely rethink their immigration policy, because at present they lag behind a majority of EU-15 states in terms of attractiveness for immigrants despite regular improvements in their situation. The fact that the first eleven places in the ranking of migration attractiveness are taken by EU-15 states leaves no doubt in this respect. Unless they introduce very intensive migration policies aimed at attracting foreigners, for many more years to come CEE countries will lose the race to attract those immigrants who can make the greatest contribution to economic competitiveness and can positively contribute to resolution of demographic problems.

8Because it was necessary to convert the scores to able to create a ranking for all EU-26 states, certain small changes of the positions in the ranking between particular countries are possible compared to the ranking drawn up separately for EU-11 and EU-15. As an example, in the ranking drawn up for EU-11 states, Poland and Slovakia were rated in the same place, while in the ranking for all EU-26 states Slovakia is rated higher than Poland, but the differences are very small in general.

Table 13

Sweden

Austria

Denmark

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Finland

Germany

United Kingdom

Belgium

France

Ireland

Czech Republic

Slovenia

Spain

Estonia

Poland

Italy

Slovakia

Portugal

Hungary

Lithuania

Latvia

Romania

Croatia

Greece

Bulgaria

Recapitulation of migration attractiveness of EU states (the best result for a given indicator – 26 points, the worst result – 1 point; under ‘social unrest’ category the scores are as follows: very low 26 points, low 19 points, medium 13 points,

8high 7 points, very high 1 points)

–– –– –

266

257

257

250

250

240

236

204

191

188

188

178

152

152

140

136

135

134

132

105

98

87

80

75

65

55

Points

1

2

2

4

4

6

7

8

9

10

10

12

13

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Place

50

The projected demographic problems that we will be dealing with in the coming years and the ensuing changes in labour markets make it necessary to give serious consideration to the impact of employment immigration on coping with such challenges. However, public opinion in member states seems sceptical about the benefits to be derived from the inflow of more foreigners. This means that we will be having a debate about immigration as well as searching for solutions that will help attract new immigrants without aggravating the opposition of the public. The scenario outlined here led us to reflect on the demand for immigration in CEE countries, and investigate the attractiveness of those countries for immigrants. We recognised that within the EU competition for those immigrants (in the first and second labour market segments) who bring the greatest added value to the economies and societies of receiving states will be increasing. Unfortunately, the results of those analyses do not give grounds for optimism about CEE countries. It seems that unless they undertake actions in the field of immigration policy and move towards greater openness to immigration and integration, with very few exceptions they will lose out to the better developed EU member states.

Summary

51

An analysis of demographic pyramids with a breakdown into non-nationals and nationals demonstrated that immigrants comprise a younger social group than indigenes. This means that they exert a positive impact on population structures of particular states – by greatly rejuvenating them. However, this positive effect is better visible in EU-15 states than in EU-11 ones.

The labour markets of member states are generating a demand for workers in both the first and second segments of the labour market. But, if we look at absolute numbers, demand is much greater in the second than in the first segment. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that a highly skilled immigrant whose potential is properly used brings much more added value to the economy than a non-national employed in the second labour market segment. Therefore the rivalry of particular states to acquire highly skilled immigrants is definitely greater than in the case of immigrants with average and poor skills.

Due to the scope of the demographic processes and their importance for the labour market, the inflow of additional immigrants, particularly into the first labour market segment, does not translate into unemployment growth. Immigrants may be necessary for redressing the labour shortages that will arise in the coming years.

CEE countries are losing out to EU-15 states in terms of attractiveness to foreigners. The Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia are the most attractive among them. This means that if those countries want to enter the competition for foreigners who will positively contribute to their competitive-ness, they must undertake additional actions in the field of immigration policy, i.e. apply instruments stimulating the inflow of this category of foreigners. At the same time, it must be stressed that the European Union as a whole is losing the race against the United States, Canada and Australia with regard to the power to attract foreigners having the highest skills.


1

2

3

4

52

Appendix: Indicators used for the creation of the index of the attractiveness of European states for immigrants

Unemployment rate – Eurostat (Unemployment rate by sex and age groups, annual average), based on quarterly results of the EU Labour Force Survey, 2013.

GDP per capita – World Bank, in USD, 2013.

Activity rate – Eurostat (Employed and job-seekers as a percentage of the population aged 15-64), 2013 Q4.

At risk of poverty after social exclusion – Eurostat (At-risk-of poverty after social exclusion), the percentage of the population with incomes below 60% of the national average, 2013.

Index of Economic Freedom – published by The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation; using independent variables (50) divided into 10 categories, it describes the scope and degree of restrictions and limitations applied in the economic sphere in 186 states (including: taxes, wages and prices, property rights and trade policy). The lowest score denotes the greatest state intervention in the economy and least

theconomic freedom; Hong Kong is rated first (90.1 points), North Korea comes in last at 178 place (1.0 point), 2014.

Median equivalised net income in PPS – Eurostat (Mean and median equivalised net income), 2013.

Severe material deprivation rate – Eurostat (severe material deprivation rate, EU-SILC), percentage of the population that is unable to satisfy at least 4 out of 9 needs, 2013.

Happy Planet Index – an index launched in 2006 by the New Economics Foundation for measurement of welfare (in 151 countries), 2014.

Wealth per capita – Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook, in USD, 2013.

Social unrest – Economist Intelligence Unit; it measures institutional and political weaknesses in a given state, including: democratic crisis, weak government, income inequalities, low social security level and ethnic tensions, 2014.

Positive impact of immigration – the percentage of respondents who wholly agree with the statement that immigration “enriches” their country in economic and cultural terms (Awareness of Home Affairs, Eurobarometer, 2012. p. 34).

Global Peace Index – Institute For Economics and Peace; the index has measured the degree of harmony, peace and security in 162 countries since 2007; it uses 22 indicators, including: incidence of acts of terror, relations with neighbouring countries, percentage of refugees, political stability and homicide rates, 2014.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

53

Chapter IVMigration scenarios for CEE countries

– or what can happen in the future

Chapter IVMigration scenarios for CEE countries – or what can happen in the future

The challenges related to migrations and an analysis of the propensity to emigrate and stay abroad among nationals of CEE countries as well as the attractiveness of those states for potential immigrants, which were presented in previous chapters, urge us to reflect on possible scenarios for the future. Certainly any scenarios regarding the development of the migration situation are just projections and do not have to materialise, but at the same time designing such scenarios is highly relevant for decision-making concerning policies that might influence the scale of emigration from and immigration into a given state. But before we put forward specific scenarios, it seems advisable to present some additional data contributing to the shaping up the said scenarios.

Youth about migrations

In our analyses so far we have addressed the views of youth on migration only to a small extent, while it is mainly young persons, frequently immediately after completing their education, who decide to emigrate. Therefore getting to know their views is important for the building of migration scenarios. Table 14 suggests that emigration related to acquisition of new qualifications or undertaking of employment abroad is a universal alternative for youth from CEE countries. Only young people from the Czech Republic and Poland more rarely than the EU-28 average declare a willingness to go abroad in the coming years. A propensity for temporary emigration is most frequently displayed by young people from Slovenia, Croatia, Estonia and Romania ( ). Table 14

Table 14

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

EU-28

Propensity of youth from CEE countries to go abroad (in %)For each of the following statements regarding mobility within the European Union, please tell me whether it applies to you:

1

1

2

2

2

0

3

3

0

3

1

1

Source: European Youth in 2014, Eurobarometer, p. 21

Because of the crisis, you feelcompetent to study, undergotraining or work in an EU country other than(OUR COUNTRY)

Don't know

53

46

83

74

54

77

74

42

46

46

56

73

No

46

53

15

24

44

23

23

55

54

51

43

26

Yes

3

2

4

5

2

0

2

5

3

6

2

3

You want to study, undergo training or work in an EU country other than (OUR COUNTRY)

Don't know

39

35

56

34

45

51

41

52

37

41

34

54

No

58

63

40

61

53

49

57

43

60

53

64

43

Yes

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

You have already studied,undergone training or worked in an EU country other than (OUR COUNTRY), or you are currently doing it

Don't know

79

95

87

79

84

75

73

84

75

70

79

87

No

21

5

13

21

16

25

27

16

25

30

21

13

Yes

56

At the same time, comparative research suggests that it is the opportunity to obtain better salaries that most frequently motivates people to emigrate. This is confirmed by results of research presented in Chapter II of this report. In all CEE countries wages were indicated as the main stimulus to emigrate by 70-80% of the respondents ( ).

Who is most mobile and who will be needed in labour markets of CEE countries?

As we have shown in the previous chapter, emigration and immigration processes concern employees from both the first and the second labour market segments. At the same time, professions requiring high-level skills, for which there is a demand in the labour markets, are considered to be the most mobile ones. This is confirmed by analyses by the European Commission, whose results show that the most mobile professions are those in medicine (doctors of medicine, dental practitioners, and nurses) and technical professions (drivers, electricians etc.). Interestingly, teachers are also considered to be mobile ( ).

Table 15

Table 16

Table 15Main reasons behind the decision to go to work abroad (in %)What would be the main reasons why you would consider working in another EU member state? (Only the items mentioned by at least 10% of respondents at EU level are shown - multiple answers are possible)

Source: Internal Market Special Eurobarometer 398, October 2013, p. 58

50

26

28

22

17

16

13

10

6

1

0

EU-27

81

20

30

19

8

8

8

25

1

0

0

SK

80

31

30

35

9

11

17

26

4

0

0

SI

85

25

15

35

9

13

8

17

2

0

1

RO

78

24

14

23

6

10

9

14

3

0

0

PL

82

29

16

40

9

9

20

16

1

0

0

HU

78

19

18

24

7

14

4

27

2

0

0

LT

70

19

17

22

6

16

6

17

1

1

1

LV

79

15

28

24

12

13

1

21

4

1

1

EE

73

20

28

23

11

12

8

17

6

1

0

CZ

80

30

24

31

8

11

7

18

1

0

0

HR

89

26

18

31

9

8

1

15

0

0

2

BG

To get a better salary

You cannot find a job in (OUR COUNTRY)

Professional development or careeropportunities are better for your profession in other EU member states

To benefit from working conditions other than salary

You would like to live or work in a different country even if economic conditions are not much better there

For family or personal reasons

To pay lower taxes

There are better social guarantees foremployees in other EU member states

Other

None

Don't know

57

9The data contained in this table should be interpreted as follows: the host country under a given profession in a country column means that people from the country whose name is contained in the column’s header in that profession most frequently go to that particular host country to work.

Table 16The most mobile professions in CEE countries

9(2003/2004-2014)

Host countryProfession

Doctor of MedicineNurseSecondary School TeacherDental PractitionerPhysiotherapist

Doctor of MedicineSecondary School TeacherNursePhysiotherapistDental Practitioner

Doctor of MedicineNurseSecondary School TeacherDental Practitioner Veterinary Surgeon

Doctor of MedicineSecondary School TeacherNurseDental PractitionerPhysiotherapist

Doctor of MedicineSecondary School TeacherNurseDental PractitionerPharmacist

Secondary School TeacherDoctor of MedicineNurseAirline PilotDental Practitioner

Secondary School TeacherNurseDoctor of MedicinePhysiotherapistMason/Bricklayer

NurseDoctor of MedicineSecondary School TeacherDental PractitionerPhysiotherapist

NurseDoctor of MedicineSecondary School TeacherPhysiotherapistMaster Builder

Second-level NurseNurseDoctor of MedicineSecondary School TeacherVeterinary Surgeon

Bulgaria (2007-2014)

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania (2007-2014)

Slovakia

Slovenia

GermanyUnited KingdomUnited KingdomUnited KingdomUnited Kingdom

GermanyUnited KingdomUnited KingdomGermanyUnited Kingdom

United KingdomFinlandUnited KingdomUnited KingdomFinland

GermanyUnited KingdomAustriaUnited KingdomAustria

United KingdomGermanyUnited KingdomUnited KingdomUnited Kingdom

United KingdomUnited KingdomUnited KingdomLatviaUnited Kingdom

United KingdomUnited KingdomUnited KingdomUnited KingdomBelgium

ItalyGermanyUnited KingdomUnited KingdomItaly

Czech RepublicCzech RepublicUnited KingdomCzech RepublicAustria

AustriaAustriaUnited KingdomGermanyUnited Kingdom

12345

12345

12345

12345

12345

12345

12345

12345

12345

12345

Source: Developed by the author using data from: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?action=stat_ranking&b_services=false

58

Nevertheless, when analysing the data from the table above, one has to be aware that placement of a given profession on the list of the most mobile ones does not mean that the greatest number of people who migrated within the EU were under that category. On the contrary, the greatest mobility is found among employees with poor skills and graduates of tertiary educational facilities who failed to obtain employment in the labour market of their state of origin. Persons in the professions listed in Table 15 have enormous opportunities to obtain employment abroad, but they comprise a small group in total migration flows.

Previous years have shown that dynamic changes are taking place in labour markets regarding demand for given professions. The banking sector is the best example of those changes. The introduction of electronic banking has definitely changed the demand in specific professions. It generates new jobs in electronic banking support while reducing the number of jobs in traditional banking. The forecasts of changes in demand for different types of workers that will take place in the coming years indicate that demand for highly skilled workers will rise, while demand for poorly skilled ones will fall. Among CEE countries, the demand for highly skilled employees will grow at the fastest rate in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia ( ). These countries will face the greatest challenges in terms of how to respond to the demand from the labour market and whether the education system will cope with this challenge, and - if not - then how can they enter the competition to attract of immigrants of this type.

Table 17

Table 17

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

EU-28

Labour force by qualification in CEE countries 2013-2025

-6.4

0.2

3.1

-6.2

1.6

0.1

1.4

-1.1

-2.1

2.0

-1.5

1.3

Source: Cedefop, 2014

TOTAL

2013-2025(%)

3,171

1,720

5,439

653

4,413

1,087

1,545

17,435

9,745

2,773

994

246,516

2025

(000s)

3,388

1,717

5,277

696

4,344

1,086

1,524

17,630

9,951

2,719

1,009

243,254

2013

(000s)

-31.0

-43

-17.5

13

-26.8

19.2

-4.3

-33.9

1.4

-18

-46.3

-29.3

.0

.0

.0

LOW

2013-2025(%)

374

178

326

87

429

143

89

1,386

2,208

164

80

41,413

2025

(000s)

542

312

395

77

586

120

93

2,097

2,177

200

149

53,544

2013

(000s)

-10.3

5.9

-11.2

-23.7

-13.2

-26.0

-23.3

-33.5

-27.8

-13.6

-8.1

-3.9

MEDIUM

2013-2025(%)

1,604

1,013

3,258

258

2,141

436

600

6,261

3,692

1,588

487

109,377

2025

(000s)

1,788

957

3,667

338

2,467

589

782

9,412

5,111

1,839

530

113,751

2013

(000s)

12.8

18.6

52.7

9.6

42.8

34.1

31.7

60.0

44.4

50.3

29.4

20.6

HIGH

2013-2025(%)

1,193

530

1,855

308

1,843

507

856

9,789

3,845

1,022

427

95,726

2025

(000s)

1,058

447

1,215

281

1,291

378

650

6,120

2,663

680

330

75,959

2013

(000s)

59

Migration scenarios

The analyses performed both in the first report of the CEED Institute on migration and in this second part enable us to design several alternative scenarios, which may provide the necessary knowledge for taking migration policy measures. On the basis of the data collected in both reports, we propose four scenarios for the development of the migration situation in CEE countries. They are medium-term ones – until 2020. The descriptions of the scenarios are of a general nature, given the necessity to take into account all CEE countries in those scenarios, despite the significant differences between them. Scenario I:

Scenario II:

Scenario III:

Sustainable emigration and restricted foreigner inflow

Sustainable emigration and a definite growth in immigration

Increased scale of returns and restricted inflow of foreigners

This scenario assumes that the trends initiated in 2004, when emigration from CEE countries to other European Union member states started to increase, will be sustained and accompanied by application of a rather restrictive immigration policy. Under this scenario, there will be a further depopulation of the majority of CEE countries (perhaps except the Czech Republic and Slovenia) and a growing shortage in the labour markets caused by increased demand for workers from employers and growing difficulties in finding them. This will result from demographic processes (e.g. the exit of numerous age-group from the labour markets) and from emigration processes on the one hand, and from the low scale of the inflow of foreigners, on the other, with the latter precluding the redressing of labour market shortages. This scenario seems the most worrying one, resulting in deterioration of the competitiveness of the states of the region and preventing their catching up with the development level of the majority of EU-15 states. But, at the same time, it is a very realistic scenario.

The forecasts concerning emigration are parallel to those under Scenario I. The fundamental difference lies in the focus of the states of the region on compensating immigration, i.e. redressing of labour market shortages emerging as a result of emigration and demographic processes. This would entail the possibility – depending on the state – of annually receiving from several thousand (Baltic states) to tens of thousands (Poland, Romania) of immigrants annually. A higher immigration scale is very unlikely. This would help to slow down the pace of depopulation and relieve labour market shortages. While it would be impossible to reverse the negative trends and make up for the losses that have taken place since 2004, an inflow of foreigners would enable improvement of the population structure and consequently would lead to a potentially positive outcome for the labour market. Under this scenario, by 2020 the socio-economic situation of the states of the region would not change fundamentally. The development gap between the CEE countries and the best developed EU member states would remain, with the potential for a slight bridging of the gap. It also has to be assumed that this scenario is the most likely one for countries such as Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the least likely for the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania. The Baltic states, inhabited by a Russian minority, pursue a very restrictive immigration policy, while Bulgaria and Romania are the states least attractive for immigration.

Under this scenario, the trends in emigration processes would be reversed. This would translate into a reduced number of people going abroad and an increased number of those returning. As a result, the population sizes of the states of the region would be maintained, while return migrations would reduce labour market shortages. Moreover, it must be assumed that the difference between emigrations and return migrations would not be great. In the case of the Baltic states, it would amount to several thousand people, while in the case of Poland and Romania it would be in the range of 10,000 to 30,000 people annually. This would offset the migration losses we have experienced since 2004. At the same time, the present immigration policy would be upheld, which would translate into a very restricted inflow of foreigners into the states of the region (as in Scenario I). As a result of the processes outlined here, depopulation would be reduced (but this effect would be weaker than under Scenario I), but it would not be possible to ensure an adequate number of workers in response to the demand from employers.

60

Scenario IV:

On the one hand, the difference between emigrations and returns would be too small to offset the losses related to demographic processes, while, on the other, return migrants would be employed in sectors with relatively high wages (otherwise they would not return), so there would still be gaps in the second labour market segment, where foreigners may undertake employment under the complementarity principle. Under this scenario – as in Scenario II – a development gap between CEE countries and the best developed EU-15 states would be maintained. Only a slight narrowing of this gap is likely. This scenario must be deemed as the most likely for countries such as Poland or Bulgaria, while it is hardly likely for the Czech Republic or Slovenia, which have not recorded any significant emigration levels in recent years, so consequently large-scale return migrations are virtually out of the question.

This scenario assumes that the trends both in emigration and immigration processes will be reversed. On the one hand, the growth in the scale of return migrations accompanied by restriction of emigration and inflow of foreigners would result in the growth of the population of the states of the region and redressing of labour market shortages, but on the other hand, this would entail absorbing a significant number of new workers into the labour markets of particular states. However, assuming that migration processes will accelerate in the coming years, while the scale of return migrations and inflow of foreigners will not be very large, integration of those people should not be problematic. Moreover, it must be assumed that the coincidence of two processes, i.e. growth in the scale of returns and of immigration, would translate into good development prospects for CEE countries and the potential for narrowing the development gap separating them from EU-15 states faster than before. We would be dealing with a situation where the number of economically active citizens increases, which positively influences competitiveness and development prospects. But it cannot be assumed that the gap would be completely closed by 2020. But this scenario is highly unlikely, because it would entail the introduction of far-reaching changes in both the economic and migration policies of CEE states.

Growth in the scale of return migrations and an increased inflow of foreigners

61

The four scenarios presented above seem to be the only feasible ones in the perspective of 2020. We can hardly assume there will be large-scale returns from emigration or an inflow of thousands of foreigners. At the same time, various scenarios may unfold in particular CEE countries. The states closest to Scenario IV should be able to cope best both with demographic challenges and with challenges concerning socio-economic development. On the other hand, the states that fail to avoid Scenario I will lose their position and will continue to significantly lag behind other EU member states. This is particularly important in the time perspective of the year 2020, when structural funds currently used by CEE countries will probably be greatly reduced. The countries that take advantage of the coming years will have an opportunity to make another civilisational leap forward, while those that waste this time will remain on the margins of the European Union for many decades to come. Quite certainly, proper migration management will be an indispensable – although probably not the only – precondition for such a leap to take place.

Summary

62

CEE countries are still at risk of outflows of workers to other EU member states. This is evidenced by the statements of young people, who see opportunities to satisfy their needs through emigration. At the same time, the most mobile professions are those whose representatives are highly skilled. This can constitute an additional challenge to the states of the region, which will be related to the outflow of workers who bring the greatest added value to the economy.

In the coming years, the demand for workers both in the first and second labour market segments will grow in CEE countries. This will follow from sustained emigration processes and the dynamics of demographic changes. A particularly large number of shortages will appear in professions requiring high skills. At the same time, it must be assumed that the education system will not be able to prepare adequate numbers of well-educated graduates, who would be able to respond to the demand from employers.

Regarding the development of the migration situation in the CEE region, four scenarios are possible. They differ both in terms of the scale of emigration processes, return migrations and inflow of foreigners. The most alarming is Scenario I, which assumes both a sustained surplus of emigration over returns and a restricted inflow of foreigners. The most optimistic – but at the same time the least probable – is Scenario IV, which assumes a surplus of returns over emigration and a moderate, but constant inflow of foreigners, who relieve the emerging labour market shortages.

The states that are closest to Scenario IV should be able to improve their position within the EU. The states where Scenario I unfolds will be unable to bridge the development gaps separating them from the majority of EU-15 states.


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thThe 20 century was dubbed the age of migration. Many researchers and stpoliticians wonder whether this description also applies to the 21 century. The first years

of the new era do not support this view. It seems that the idea of free migration is currently in crisis. This is evidenced by the fact that many people are calling into question the benefits of migration and blaming migrants for declining living standards in the best developed societies of the world.

But we can hardly imagine the contemporary world without migration processes. A return to the days of full border checks, restricted access to labour markets within the EU, and refusals to grant refugee status to foreigners whose life or health is threatened in their states of origin is still a very distant prospect, but it cannot be completely ruled out. So are we in for a debate on introduction of restrictions instead of lifting them in the coming years?

This report rejects such a view and tries to show migrations from a different perspective. It focuses on describing migration processes in Europe, with a particular stress on CEE countries. It demonstrates the benefits derived by both sending states and receiving states, but at the same time it does not try to avoid answering difficult questions concerning, for example, competition in the labour market between foreigners and migrants. By creating the index of migration attractiveness of states and scenarios for development of migration processes in the coming years, it also shows how we can think about migrations and conduct a debate about their effects.

The analyses presented suggest that restricting migrations would be a huge mistake, and the outcomes of such decisions are very difficult to envisage now. Migrations have become a permanent and indispensable element of the contemporary world. But it is essential to find a new paradigm, which – assuming migrations are not restricted – will help both sending and receiving states derive benefits from them.

The role of CEE countries is very special here because they constitute the largest region in the world to be changing its status from an emigration to an emigration-immigration region. Consequently they still face the challenge of large-scale departures of their nationals, who seek their fortunes abroad, but at the same time are destinations for the nationals of many states, who hope for a prosperous future in them.

This paper, being the second part of the report of the CEED Institute on migrations, attempts to contribute to the present debate about migrations and answer many fundamental questions, but in such a way that the debate about restricting migrations recedes into the background and is replaced by a debate about the real opportunities and challenges we are dealing with currently. The perspective of CEE countries may prove to be of central importance in this context. On the one hand, the states of the region bear the costs of liberalisation of migration within the EU, but at the same time they derive many benefits from it. Moreover several of them are becoming increasingly attractive to immigrants, which allows them to start thinking about competing against the best developed countries of the world in attracting highly skilled immigrants. This is changing the way the region is perceived on the migration map of the world. We are convinced that a solid presentation of the migration situation in the region, and drawing of conclusions on this basis, will help put the discussion about migrations back on the right track and avoid limiting it mainly to populist slogans aimed at deriving short-term benefits in the coming elections.

Conclusion

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The report’s authors believe it is essential to have a discussion about the index of migration attractiveness of European states presented in Chapter III and the scenarios for development of migration processes presented in Chapter IV. We hope that this discussion will be as heated as the one that followed the publication of the first report of the CEED Institute on migration.

We invite you to join the discussion!

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