G.R. No. L-14689 July 26, 1960

G.R. No. L-14689 July 26, 1960GENERAL MARITIME STEVEDORES' UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.SOUTH SEA SHIPPING LINE, ET AL.,respondents.Felix S. Falgui for petitioners.Antonio T. Tirona for CIR.Carlos E. Santiago for respondent Union.German G. Lee for respondent Shipping Line.MONTEMAYOR,J.:This is a petition forcertiorarito review an order the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), dated September 23, 1958, dismissing the petition for certification election filed by the General Maritime Stevedores' Union, later referred to as GMSU, and its co-petitioners, as well as the order of the courten bancdenying the motion for re-consideration. The purpose of the petition to review is set aside the order of dismissal and to give due course to GMSU petition for certification election.Acting on a petition dated October 23, 1953 of the United Seamen's Union of the Philippines, later referred to as USUP, in case No. 43-MC, the CIR issued an order dated February 28, 1955, directing that an election be held among the unlicensed members and crew of the respondent South Sea Shipping Lines, later referred to as Shipping Lines. In said order, the USUP and GMSU were considered eligible to be voted for. The certification election was held on April 15 and June 10, 1955, after which the CIR issued another order dated June 17, 1955, certifying USUP as the exclusive bargaining representative of the laborers and employees of the Shipping Lines. On June 28, 1957, a collective bargaining agreement was entered into between the Shipping Line and the USUP. Art. 10 of the agreement provided as follows:This Agreement shall take effect on July 21, 1957, to continue in full force and effect for two (2) years until July 20, 1959 and thereafter for another period of two (2) years, unless either party shall notify the other in writing not less than sixty (60) days prior to the expiration date hereof of its intention or election to terminate the agreement as of the end of the current term.GMSU insists that the agreement entered into was but a renewal of an agreement between the USUP and Shipping Line entered into sometime in 1955. This statement seems to have been confirmed by the Shipping Line in its answer where it stated that "after the above-mentioned order (referring to the order dated June 17, 1955) or to be specific, on June 28, 1955, a collective bargaining agreement. ... entered into between the respondent."On April 30, 1958, that is a little more than two years after the holding of the last certification election, GMSU and its co-petitioners filed with the CIR a petition for certification election, Case No. 546-MC, later numbered as Case No. 547-MC, alleging that there were two labor unions, to which were unlicensed crew members of the Shipping Line, namely, the GMSU and the USUP; that as members of the GMSU petitioners constituted 10% of all the unlicensed crew members of the Shipping Line; and that there had not been a certification election within twelve months before the filing of the petition.The Shipping Line in its answer, expressed its attitude of strict neutrality and its willingness to abide by the order of the CIR although in its amended answer, it also alleged that it considered the existing collective bargaining agreement between itself and the USUP as binding until annulled.The USUP intervened and filed a motion for dismissal of the petition claiming that there was an existing collective bargaining agreement between itself and the Shipping Line entered on June 28, 1957, for a period of two years up to July 26, 1959, which period was reasonable, and which agreement contained reasonable conditions of employment, and that the existence of such agreement barred another certification election. As already stated, the CIR granted the motion to dismiss and refused to give due course to the GMSU's petition for certification election.To support its order, the CIR invoked the "contract-bar rule", explaining that the then existing contract between the Shipping Line and the USUP, which was for a period of two years, up to July 20, 1959, contained provisions regarding wages, closed shops, check off, grievances, machinery and other conditions regarding employment relationships. According to the CIR, these circumstances plus the fact that there was no showing that the contracting union was company dominated support the validity and reasonableness of the agreement between the Shipping Line and the USUP, the duly certified bargaining representative, and that the existence of such contract barred the holding of a certification election. The CIR further stated:The "contract-bar rule" isproceduralwhich this Court in its discretion mayapplyor waive as the facts of any given case may demand in the interest of stability and fairness in collective bargaining agreements. (Case No. 54 MC-Cebu, PCLUE,vs. Caltex, June 25, 1957). the facts of the present case considered,, it is the opinion of this Court that the policies of the Industrial Peace Act of promoting stable, sound employer-employee relations is effectuated by collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration. The contract between the intervenor and the company falls under this criterion.The GMSU, however, equally maintains that it is mandatory for the CIR to order a certification election once a petition is signed and submitted by at least 10% of all the workers in a bargaining unit; and it is also shown that no certification election had been held within twelve months prior to the filing of such petition pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 (b) and (c), Republic Act No. 875, the pertinent portions of which read:(b) Whenever a question arising concerning the representation of employees, the Court may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties in writing the name of the labor organization that has been designated or selected for the appropriate bargaining unit. ... Such a balloting shall be known as "certification election" and the Court shall not order certifications in the same unit more often than once intwelve months. The organization receiving the majority votes casts in such election shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of such employees.(c) In an instance where a petition is filedby at least ten percentof the employees in the appropriate unit requesting an election,it shall be mandatory on the Courtto order an election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees for the appropriate bargaining unit.The GMSU has expressed fear that if a certification election was not held as per its petition, the agreement between the respondent under its renewal clause, may again be renewed with or without modification by the parties as a result of which, the existence of the contract as renewed may again be utilized as an argument for barring a subsequent petition for certification election, thereby completely depriving petitioners of the right and opportunity to prove that they constituted the majority of the workers and employees of the Shipping Line.What is meant by the "Contract-Bar Policy"? When ever a substantial number of employees in an appropriate bargaining agreement desires to be represented by a union or organization other than that which had negotiated a collective bargaining contract with the management, the CIR is faced with the dilemma of the right of contract or the right of representation:Whenever a contract is urged as a bar, the Board is faced with the problem of balancing two separate interests of employees and society which the act was designated to protect; the interest in such stability is as essential to encourage the effective collective bargaining, and the sometimes conflicting interest in the freedom of employees to select andchangetheir representatives. In furtherance of the purpose of the act, we have repeatedly held that employees are entitled to change their representatives, if they so desire, at reasonable intervals, or controversy, that a collective bargaining contract may preclude a determination of representatives for a reasonable period. (Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 NLRD 927).It sometimes occurs that representation petitions are brought when a bargaining contract already exists. There is then a question of whether the Board shall respect the contract and let it constitute a bar or institute proceedings despite the contract. (Bowman, Public Control of Labor Relations, p. 135.)As a solution to this problem, there are three possibilities:One solution of the problem would be to hold that a collective bargaining agreement valid when made is a bar to a new certification throughout its existence, regardless of the length of its term. . . .A second solution is to hold that employees may shift their allegiance during the term of the agreement but that the contract continues in force with the new union simply replacing the old. . . .The solution to the problem which the National Labor-Relations Board has adopted lies between the extremes:"The board has normally refused to proceed to an election, in the presence of a collective bargaining contract where the contract granted exclusive recognition is to be effective only for a reasonable period and was negotiated by a union representing at the time a majority of the employees(in an appropriate unit)prior to any claim by a rival labor organization". (Cox, Cases on Labor Law, pp. 497-498).The National Labor Relations Board, later referred to as the Board, which is the counterpart of our CIR, regards the conflict as one which requires it to strike a balance between the desirability of achieving stability in industrial relations secured through bargaining, on the one hand, and the benefits flowing from the grant to employee full freedom in their choice of representative, on the other.But the conflict implicit in the situation is so clear that the Board has recognized the necessity for some solution. While it is apparent that the board will not allow the existence of an agreement to preclude all change, on the other hand has not suggested absolute abrogation of the contract. (51 Yale Law Journal p. 470, Change of Bargaining Representative).In resolving this conflict, the Board "initially took the unqualified view thatthe existence of agreements was no bar to certificationof bargaining representatives." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. 2, p. 901). So, in the Matter of New England Transportation Co. (1936) 1 NLRB 130, the Board directed an election despite existing contracts between the company and an employees' association:The whole process of collective bargaining and unrestricted choice of representatives assumes the freedom of the employees to change their representatives, while at the same time continuing the existing agreements under which the representatives must function. ... These representatives are, of course, free to bargain with respect to the termination of an existing contract.The above ruling gave support to the doctrine of substitution whereby a change of representatives would alter an existing contract only by "substituting the new union for the old under its substantive terms" (51 Yale Law Journal, Change of Bargaining Representatives, p. 466). However, the Board subsequently took the position that a collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration is "in the interest of the stability of industrial relations", a bar to certification elections. (Vol. 2, Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 902). Thus, evolved the "contract-bar policy".In adopting the "contract-bar policy", the Board, however, was careful in refusing to announce an inflexible rule as to its authority, and whenever possible, it avoided a determination of the contract's effect on its power of certification election:. . . Again the Board is bounded by no stereotyped procedure; rather, the Board exercises discretion to let the circumstances determine whether proceedings shall go on. . . .This Board action was not charted by Congress, but the dilemma of right of contract or right of representation is real. The resolution of the dilemma is not to decide whether the primary purpose of the Act is to insure employee freedom to choose representatives, or to encourage collective contracts, for either choice leaves an unsatisfactory situation. Hence the Board's compromise seems wise, even though it is in a sense contradictory. Such Board flexibility and the refusal to draw sharp rules open the door to criticism, but the dilemma demonstrated the necessity of giving broad discretionary power to an administrative agency. (Public Control of Labor Relations, Bowman, p. 135, 137).The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, recognizing the Board's power to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the purpose of the Act, gave the Board broad discretion to apply the "contract-bar policy", as it saw fit, thus:The Board's rule that the existence of a valid written and signed bargaining agreement between an employer and an appropriate bargaining representative is a bar to a certification proceedings for a different representation, if applicable to the facts in this case, is a procedural rule which the Board in its discretion may apply or waive as the facts of the given case may demand in the interest of stability and fairness in collective bargaining agreements. The Board is not the slave of its rules." National Labor Relations Boardvs. Grace Co. 184 Fed. 2nd p. 126 (U. S. Circuit Ct. of App., 8th Circuit.)Where "contract bar policy" of National Labor Relations Board, along with exceptions thereto, as applicable to representation proceedings, were solely of board's creation, board could reasonably expand or restrict such policy as it saw fit. (Syllabus) Kearney & Treacker Corp.vs. National Labor Relations Board, 210 Fed. 2nd p. 852 (U.S. Circuit Ct. of App., 7th Circuit)During the period "when the techniques and potentialities of collective bargaining were first being slowly developed under the encouragement and protection of Federal Legislation", the Board laid greater emphasis upon the right of laborers to select their respective frequently than upon prolonged adherence to the bargaining agreement. (General Motors Corporation, 102 NLRB 1140). As a result, when the contract-bar policy was first initiated, only one-year contracts were held to be a bar to certification election. (e.g., M & J Tracy, Inc. 12 NLRB 936 (1939); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 8 NLRB 508 (1938) Hubinger Company, 3 NLRB 802)The net result of the Broad's viewpoint that collective bargaining agreements of reasonable duration will constitute a bar to certification, but that agreements unduly long which have been in effect for at least a year will not constitute a bar is, when read in connection with the cases, equivalent to the rule that collective bargaining agreements prevent proceedings for a period of one year from the time of their execution. (2 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 905).Thus, in the case ofSuperior Electric Products Co., NLRB(1948), the collective bargaining agreement of one year duration entered into at the time when the contracting union represented a majority of the respondent-employees was held to be a bar to certification election. And in the Metro Goldwyn Mayer case, 7 NLRB 662, involving collective bargaining agreement of five years duration, the Board granted the petition for election filed after the agreement had run one year with a reiteration of its belief that employees' "choice of their representatives could not be shackled for an unduly long period just because of the existence of a contract." However, in 1947, the Board held that thereafter, it would regard a two year contract as a bar to an election until its expiration, because collective bargaining had:So emerged from a stage of trial and error (that) the time has come when stability of industrial relations can better be served, without unreasonably restricting employees in their right to change representatives, by refusing to interfere with bargaining relations secured by collective agreements for two years' duration. (Matter of Reed Roller Bit Co. 72 NLRB 927 (1947).In the light of our experience in administering the Act, we believe that a contract for a term of 2 years cannot be said to be of unreasonable duration. ... For large masses of employees collective bargaining has but recently emerged from a stage of trial and error, during which its techniques and full potentialities were being slowly developed under the encouragement and protection of the Act. To have insisted in the past upon prolonged adherence to a bargaining agent, once chosen, would have been wholly incompatible with this experimental and transitional period. It was especially necessary, therefore to lay emphasis upon the right of workers to select and change their representatives. Now, however, the emphasis can better be placed elsewhere.HOWEVER, in 1953, the same Board announced that:The time has arrived when stability of labor relations can be better served, without unreasonably restricting employees in their right to change representatives, by holding as a bar collective bargaining agreements even for 5 years' duration (when) a substantial part of the industry concerned is covered by contracts with a similar term.In the case of General Motors Corporation, 102 NLRB 1140 (1953), involving a five years contract, the Board refused to order a certification election despite the lapse of more than 2 1/2 years since the agreement became effective. From all this, it may be seen that the National Labor Relations Board has not adopted an iron-clad policy, rigid and fixed, but rather one to be applied according to the changing conditions and industrial practices.In this jurisdiction, we have had occasion to apply the "contract-bar policy". In the case ofPhilippine Long Distance Employees' Union vs. PLDT and Free Telephone Workers Union, 97 Phil., 424; 51 Off. Gaz. [9] 4519, through Mr. Justice Bengzon, we made the following observation:It is interesting to note in this regard that in the United States, where we copied the present Industrial Peace Act, an existing collective bargaining contract with a union is a bar to subsequent certification election when ... it has a definite and reasonable period to run and has not been in existence for too long a period (history, industry and customs may affect reasonableness of the contract term ... . (Werne Law of Labor Relations, p. 27 citing U.S. Finishing Co. 63 NLRB 575). Normally, the National Labor Relations Board have been in existence for more than years, as no obstacle to determining bargaining representatives. (Werneop cit. pp. 28-29, citing several cases.). . . as this contract between the Company and the petitioner was signed December 1, 1951, it had been in operation more thantwo yearsin August, 1954 when the certification election was ordered. It is thereforeno barto the certification even under American Labor Laws.In a subsequent case,Acoje Mines and Acoje United Workers Union vs. Acoje Labor Union and Acoje Mining Co. Inc., 105 Phil., 814; 56 Off. Gaz. (6) 1157, on the issue of whether or not upon submission of a petition for certification election by at least 10% of all the workers in a bargaining union, it is mandatory for the CIR to order a certification election with no exceptions, pursuant to Section 12 (c), Republic Act No. 875, through the same Justice, we made the following statement:The above command of the Court is not so absolute as it may appear at first glance. The statute itself expressly recognizes one exception: When a certification election had occured within one year. And the judicial administrative agencies have found two exceptions:where there is an unexpired bargaining agreement not exceeding two yearsand when there is a pending charge of company domination of one of the labor unions intending to participate in the election.After reviewing the cases decided by the NLRB of the United States and our cases, we have arrived at the conclusion that it is reasonable and proper that when there is a bargaining contract for more than a year, it is too early to hold a certification election within a year from the effectivity of said bargaining agreement; also that a two year bargaining contract is not too long for the purpose of barring a certification election. For this purpose, a bargaining agreement may run for three, even four years, but in such case, it is equally advisable that to decide whether or not within those three or four years, a certification election should not be held, may well be left to the sound discretion of the CIR, considering the conditions involved in the case, particularly, the terms and conditions of the bargaining contract.We also hold that where the bargaining contract is to run for more than two years, the principle of substitution may well be adopted and enforced by the CIR to the effect that after two years of the life of bargaining agreement, a certification election may be allowed by the CIR; that if a bargaining agent other than the union or organization that executed the contract, is elected, said new agent would have to respect said contract, but that it may bargain with the management for the shortening of the life of the contract if it considers it too long, or refuse to renew the contract pursuant to an automatic renewal clause.On September 15, 1959, while this case was still pending in this Tribunal, petitioner filed a manifestation to the effect that the contract between the USUP and the Shipping Line had expired on June 28, 1959, and that the same had not been renewed. We asked for the comment of the other party. the respondent United Seamen's Union in its counter manifestation dated July 6, 1960, stated that the collective bargaining agreement involved, executed on July 28, 1957, was automatically renewed for a period of two years from July 28, 1959 to July 28 1961, pursuant to the automatic renewal clause, for the reason that neither party notified the other in writing not less than sixty days prior to the expiration date, of its desire to terminate the agreement. So, it would appear that the contract will still be effective up to July 28, 1961, that is to say, about a year from today.According to the claim or contention of the petitioners the bargaining agreement of July 28, 1957 was but a renewal of the same or similar agreement of July 1955, so that the bargaining agreement has been in existence for about five years, which is too long a period within which a certification election has not been held.In view of the foregoing, we believe and hold that the appealed order of the CIR dismissing the petition for certification election and refusing to allow the selection of a new bargaining agent, was valid under the circumstances obtaining at the time. However, inasmuch as there has been a renewal of the bargaining agreement for another two years and because it seems that the present agreement is but a renewal of the one entered into way back in 1955, so that until the expiration of the present agreement, about six years shall have passed, it is advisable that a new certification election be held. For this purpose, this case is hereby remanded to the CIR, so that the petition for certification can be entertained, admitted and given due course, and that a certification election be held, with the understanding that if a bargaining agent other tan the one that negotiated and executed the present bargaining contract, is elected, said new agent would have to respect the present bargaining agreement, but without prejudice to its negotiating with the company for a shortening of the period of the life of the contract, refuse to renew it when it expires, if it so desires, and otherwise represent and protect the interest of the members of the bargaining unit, all of course, within the terms and purview of the bargaining contract. No costs.G.R. No. L-8138 August 20, 1955PLDT EMPLOYEES' UNION,petitioner,vs.PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS' UNION, (PAPLU),respondents.Julio R. Tingzon, Jr., Pedro M. Icamina and Oscar G. Nolasco for petitioner.Perkins, Ponce Enrile and Associates for respondent company.Cid, Villaluz and Associates for respondent union.BENGZON,Acting C.J.:On September 30, 1953, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, a public utility corporation locally organized, filed in the Court of Industrial Relations a petition for certificate under section 12 of Republic Act No. 875. It alleged that, a week before, it received from the Free Telephone Workers' Union notice of its desire to bargain collectively; that until the receipt of such notice, the Company believed the only legitimate labor organization existing therein was the PLDT Employees Union with which it had signed a collectively bargaining agreement still in operation; and that said Company was in no position to determine which of the two Unions represented the majority of the workers. Therefore it requested that an investigation be conducted for the purpose of determining the proper collective bargaining agency for its employees, and in the event such investigation fails to determine the proper agency that an order be issued requiring the holding of a certification election.Upon its petition, the PLDT Employees Union was allowed to intervene, and on October 21, 1953 it submitted a motion to dismiss, which as amended, claimed that it had a collective bargaining agreement in force until September 14, 1954, and that a favorable action by the Court on the petition would permit another labor organization in the same establishment to present to the employer another set of demands and compel said employer to bargain with itduring the lifetime of an existing bargaining agreement,thereby infringing the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts.The Free Telephone Workers' Union-hereafter designated respondentasserting that it represented the preponderant majority of the employees, manifested its willingness to let the investigation proceed; and answering the Employees' Union's motion to dismiss, it contended that the existing collective bargaining agreement constituted no legal objection, inasmuch as no certification election had been held within the preceding twelve months. As to the alleged impairment of the existing collective contract, it argued there was no such impairment, because 'the contract is between the company and the employees represented by the intervenor union who are the principals and can change their agent at will" by a majority which it is desired to ascertain.After considering the pleadings and the arguments, the Hon. Arsenio Roldan, Presiding Judge, dismissed the petition in December 1953 principally for the reason that the collective bargaining agreement between the intervenor and the company will expire on September 14, 1954, and that before such date it may not be changed nor amended.The respondent Workers' Union asked for reconsideration, which the intervenor opposed. On August 9, 1954 the Court of Industrial Relationsin banc,by majority vote, set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case for "determination of the appropriate collective bargaining unit, (agency) after which the holding of a certification election in accordance with law should be ordered", (if necessary).Hence this petition for reviewwhich takes the place of an appeal from the order of the Court of Industrial Relations.It is the general rule that only final judgments or orders are appealable to this Court. An interlocutory order may not be appealed. (Rule 41 sec. 2) "An order or judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, a final order is that which gives an end to the litigation . . . when the order or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory. For instance an order denying a motion of dismissal founded on lack of jurisdiction . . .is merely interlocutory,"1and is not appealable.It would seem from the foregoing that this petition for review or appeal of the intervenor is premature, the order denying its motion to dismiss not being a final order. The Industrial Court still had to determine the proper bargaining agency or direct a certification election. There was something to be done in the Industrial Court.We are aware, of course, that the law permitting appeals to this Court from "any order" of the Court of Industrial Relations does not in any line employ the word "final". But it is reasonable to suppose that Congress did not intend to disregard such well-known rule of orderly procedure, which is based partly upon the convenience of the appealing party itself, in the sense of forestalling useless appeals. In this case for example, if instead of appealing, the intervenor allowed the investigation to continue,and later it is declared to be the proper bargaining agency,then this appeal would have been useless. If it is not so declaredthen perhaps2it is time to appeal; not before. Before that time it may not claim to beaggrievedby the order remanding the case for ascertainment of the labor union which represents the majority.The assertion that the appealed order impairs petitioner's collective bargaining agreement is unfounded, because the tenor of the order precisely contemplates that any bargaining agreement between the Telephone Company and the newly-found bargaining agency will have effect only after September 14, 1954 when the (then) existing collective agreement could be properly terminated.On this point petitioner insists the respondent Court could not say the contract would expire on September 14, 1954, in view of the following stipulation in the bargaining agreement:that it is hereby mutually agreed upon by the parties that the duration of this Agreement shall be for a period of one year, counting from the date of its signing by said parties,with the understanding that it shall be considered renewed or extended from year to year thereafter, unless it is terminated by any one of the parties in writing to the other at least thirty days before it is proposed to expire.Petitioner takes the position that, far from automatically ceasing on September 14, 1954, the contract is automatically renewedunless it is denounced by one of the parties. Yet when the court mentioned September 14, 1954, it merely meant that according to the contract on that date it may be denounced or substituted by one of the parties; and the Telephone Company by filing the petition obviously and foresightedly manifested its intention to terminate such contract with petitioner, if and when, it is found that said petitioner no longer represented the majority of the Company's employees.3Furthermore, as explained by the Industrial Court."If a certification election is not held immediately, the agreement may be renewed with or without modification by the parties thereto and again it may be used as an argument to bar the subsequent holding of a certification election. The result would be to deprive entirely the Free Telephone Workers' Union (PAFLU) of an opportunity to prove that it, and not the PLDT Employees Union, has the majority status and, therefore, entitled to represent all the employees of the Company for collective bargaining purposes.It is interesting to note in this regard that in the United States, where we copied the present Industrial Peace Act an existing collective bargaining contract with a union is a bar to subsequent certification election when . . . it has a definite and reasonable period to run andhas not been in existencefor too long a period (history, industry and customs may affect reasonablesness of the contract term . . ..) (Werne Law of Labor Relations p. 27 citing U. S. Finishing Co. 63 NLRB 575.) Normally, the National Labor Relations Board is inclined to regard long-term contracts, which have been in existence for more than two years,as no obstacleto determining bargaining representatives. (Werne op. cit pp. 28-29 citing several cases.)A contract which provides for automatic renewal in the absence of notice by one of the contracting parties of intention to alter, modify or terminate it prior to a specified period preceding the termination date, will operate as a bar to an election. However, this rule does not apply where a contesting union has given timely notice to the employer or filed a petition with the Board reasonably prior to the specified date for automatic renewal. (Werne, op. cit p. 29 citing several Labor Board cases.)Explaining its position in detail, the National Labor Relations Board said in the case of Reed Roller Bit Co. 72 N. L. R. B. 927:Whenever a contract is urged as a bar, the Board is faced with the problem of balancing two separate interests of employees and society which the Act was designed to protect: the interest in such stability as is essential to encourage effective collective bargaining, and the sometimes conflicting interest in the freedom of the employees to select and change their representatives. In furtherance of the purposes of the Act, we have repeatedly held that employees are entitled to change their representatives, if they so desire, at reasonable intervals; or conversely, that a collective bargaining contract may preclude a determination of representatives for a reasonable period.In the light of our experience in administering the Act, we believe that a contract for a term of 2 years cannot be said to be of unreasonable duration. We have already held that 2-year contracts are presumptively of reasonable duration. In applying this rule, we have not discovered any compelling conditons which indicate that such agreements unduly limit the right of employees to change their representatives. Moreover, in entertaining rival petitions several months before the expiration of the numerous 1-year contracts which are made, we have found in many instances the contracting parties, having composed their differences and executed collective bargaining contracts after the expenditure of much time, effort and money, can feel truly secure in their respective positions only for the brief period of approximately 8 to 9 months.For large masses of employees collective bargaining has but recently emerged from a stage of trial and error, during which its techniques and full potentialities were being slowly developed under the encouragement and protection of the Act. To have insisted in the past upon prolonged adherence to a bargaining agent, once chosen, would have been wholly incompatible with this experimental and transitional period. It was especially necessary, therefore, to lay emphasis upon the right of workers to select and change their representatives. Now, however, the emphasis, can better be placed elsewhere. We think that the time has come when stability of industrial relations can be better served, without unreasonably restricting employees in their right to change representatives, by refusing to interfere with bargaining relations secured by collective agreements of 2 years' duration. (Mathews, Labor Relations And The Law (1953) p. 191-192.)Now then, as this contract between the Company and the petitioner was signed December 1, 1951, it had been in operation more than two years in August 1954 when the certification election was ordered. It is therefore no bar to the certification even under American labor views.By the way, this is not to hold that as a matter of law in this jurisdiction the two-year period is a definite term within which bargaining contracts are not to be disturbed. Indeed, the statute providing that certification elections shall not be ordered oftener than once a year, (Sec. 12 (b) R. A. 875) might give ground to the argument that a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and a labor union representing the majority of the laborers may be terminated, after a year, by a new majority organization. The quotations are herein made merely to exhibit some considerations that have influenced or may influence the courts in the exercise of their discretion in the matter.Anent the alleged impairment of its contract, petitioner should keep in mind the modern concept embodied in the New Civil Code, that labor contracts being impressed with common interest are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes, lockouts etc. (Art. 1700.)In view of the foregoing, this petition for review should be denied. To avoid misunderstandings however, it should be made clear that the next step is for the courta quoto determine after a speedy and appropriate hearing upon notice, the labor union that represents the majority of the such majority, then said court may order a cetification election in accordance with legal provisions.Petition denied with costs.[G.R. No. 107792.March 2, 1998]SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX(SMP-PIILU-TUCP),petitioners, vs.THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, PERMEX PRODUCER AND EXPORTER CORPORATION,respondents.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated October 8, 1992 and order dated November 12, 1992, of Undersecretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido Laguesma, ordering a certification election to be conducted among the employees of respondent company.The facts of the case are as follows. On January 15, 1991, a certification election was conducted among employees of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation (hereafter referred to as Permex Producer). The results of the elections were as follows:National Federation of Labor (NFL)- 235No Union- 466Spoiled Ballots-18Marked Ballots-9Challenged Ballots-7However, some employees of Permex Producer formeda labor organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department of Labor and Employment on March 11, 1991.The union later affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (PIILU).On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex-Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (SMP-PIILU), wrote the respondent company requesting recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of employees at the Permex Producer.On October 19, 1991 Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with it. The CBAwas ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the majority of the rank and file employees of Permex Producer.On December 13, 1991, it was certified by the DOLE.On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for certification election, but it was dismissed by Med-Arbiter Edgar B. Gongalos in an order dated August 20, 1992. Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. On October 8, 1992, the Secretary of Labor, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and ordered a certification election to be conducted among the rank and file employees at the Permex Producer, with the following choices:1.National Federation of Labor2.Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex3.No unionPetitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied in an order dated November 12, 1992. Hence, this petition.Two arguments are put forth in support of the petition.First, it is contended that petitioner has been recognized by the majority of the employees at Permex Produceras their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner argues that when a group of employees constituting themselves into an organization and claiming to represent a majority of the work force requests the employer to bargain collectively, the employer may do one of two things.First, if the employer is satisfied with the employees claim the employer may voluntarily recognize the union by merely bargaining collectively with it.The formal written confirmation is ordinarily stated in the collective bargaining agreement.Second, if on the other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, it may petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election.If the employer does not submit a petition for certification election, the union claiming to represent the employees may submit the petition so that it may be directly certified as the employees representative or a certification election may be held.The case ofIlaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-Calleja,[1]cited by the Solicitor General in his comment filed in behalf of the NLRC, is particularlyapropos.There, the union also requested voluntary recognition by the company.Instead of granting the request, the company petitioned for a certification election.The union moved to dismiss on the ground that it did not ask the company to bargain collectively with it.As its motion was denied, the union brought the matter to this Court.In sustaining the companys stand, this Court ruled:...Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that files a petition for a certification election if there is no certified bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment.If a union asks the employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining representative of the employees A CERTIFICATION WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the employees prerogative (not the employers) to determine whether they want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it should be. (emphasis supplied)In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should not have given its voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP when the latter asked for recognition as exclusive collective bargaining agent of the employees of the company.The company did not have the power to declare the union the exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of collective bargaining.Indeed, petitioners contention runs counter tothe trend towards the holding of certification election. By virtue of Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4, 1987,the direct certification previously allowed under the Labor Code had been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agents of the workers.[2]Certification election is the most effective and the most democratic way of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a company.[3]Petitioner argues that of the 763 qualified employees of Permex Producer, 479supported its application for registration with the DOLE and that when petitioner signed the CBA with the company, the CBA was ratified by 542 employees.Petitioner contends that such support by the majority of the employees justifies its finding that the CBA made by it is valid and binding.But it is not enoughthat a union has the support of the majority of the employees.It is equallyimportant that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself.[4]This is especially so because, in this case, the recognition given to the union came barely ten (10) months after the employees had voted no union in the certification election conducted in the company. As pointed out by respondent Secretary of Labor in his decision, there can be no determination of a bargaining representative within a year of the proclamation of the results of the certification election.[5]Here the results, which showed that 61% of the employees voted for no union, were certified only on February 25, 1991 but on December 1, 1991 Permex Producer already recognized the union and entered into a CBA with it.There is something dubious about the fact that just ten (10) months after the employees had voted that they did not want any union to represent them, they would beexpressing support for petitioner.The doubt is compounded by the fact that in sworn affidavitssome employees claimed that they had either been coerced or misled into signing a document which turned out to be in support of petitioner as its collective bargaining agent.Although there were retractions, we agree with the Solicitor General that retractions of statements by employees adverse to a company (or its favored union) are oftentimes tainted with coercion and intimidation.For how could one explain the seeming flip-flopping of position taken by the employees?The figures claimed by petitioner to have been given to it insupport cannot readily be accepted as true.Second.Petitioner invokes the contract-bar rule. They contend that under Arts. 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code and Book V, Rule 5, 3 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, a petition for certification election or motion for intervention may be entertained only within 60 days prior to the date of expiration of an existing collective bargaining agreement. The purpose of the rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. Excepted from the contract-bar rule are certain types of contracts which do not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the employees freedom of choice because it does not establish the kind of industrial peace contemplated by the law.[6]Such situation obtains in this case.The petitioner entered into a CBA with Permex Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees had not been established yet.WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and order of the respondent Secretary of Labor are AFFIRMED.[G.R. No. L-8049.May 9, 1956.]BUKLOD G SAULOG TRANSIT,Petitioner, vs. MARCIANO CASALLA, ET ALS.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPADILLA,J.:On 7 December 1953 theRespondents, 65 in number, employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc., filed in the Court of Industrial Relations a petition for a certification election, alleging that the total number of employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. was 583;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there were two labor organizations which represented the employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc., to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarythe Buklod g Saulog Transit and the Saulog Transit Employees Union (PFL);chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that the certification election prayed for was for the purpose of determining the sole bargaining representative of the employees in the Saulog Transit, Inc. On 23 December 1953 the president of the Buklod g Saulog Transit filed its answer stating that on 1 (15) July 1953 a collective bargaining agreement had been entered into by and between the Buklod g Saulog Transit, a duly registered union with the Department of Labor, on the one hand, and the Saulog Transit, Inc., on the other;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat on 5 December an election was held peacefully and orderly, the result thereof having been forwarded to the Department of Labor, against which election and the result thereof no protest as regards the legality thereof was lodged;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat having acquired a juridical personality from the time of its registration, on 15 July 1953 the Buklod g Saulog Transit entered into a collective bargaining contract already referred to covering the well-being of the members of which theRespondentswere still members. On 16 February 1954 the Saulog Transit, Inc. filed a pleading entitled Appearance and Manifestation averring that the allegation that theRespondentsconstituted 10 per cent of the total number of employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. was for the Court to determine;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that it had dealt and had been dealing with the Buklod g Saulog Transit in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between them, the Buklod g Saulog Transit representing the employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. as an industrial unit.After hearing, on 17 May 1954 the Court rendered judgment directing cralawthat a certification election be held among the employees and/or laborers of the Saulog Transit, Inc. at Pasay City, in accordance with section 12 of Republic Act No. 875, and in conformity with the Rules promulgated by this Court on September 4, 1953.All the employees and/or laborers whose names appear in the list submitted by the company and marked as Exhibits E to 7, attached to the records of this case, minus the supervisory personnel composed of the General Manager, Assistant General Manager, the two guards, one shift foreman, and one accountant, shall be eligible to vote.Let a copy of this order be furnished the Department of Labor for its information and guidance.A motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court in banc on 12 July 1954, the Buklod g Saulog Transit prays for a review of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated 17 May 1954 and the resolution of the Court in banc dated 12 July 1954 denying its motion for reconsideration.The logical inference that may be drawn from the order appealed from is that the Court of Industrial Relations could not determine or at least was in doubt as to which of the two labor unions named in the petition was the true choice of the laborers or employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. to represent them in all their dealings or for the purpose of collective bargaining with their employer as regards the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment, and for that reason the trial court ordered a certification election pursuant to section 12(b), Republic Act No. 875.The Court of Industrial Relations made the following findings:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryFrom the evidence, the following are explicit in the pleadings and documents as well as the testimonies submitted by the parties. It appears that the Saulog Transit, Inc. is engaged in the transportation business in Manila and surrounding cities and employs 583 workers including supervisory personnel;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there exists in the company two unions, namely, the Buklod g Saulog Transit, the intervenor in this case, and the Saulog Employees Union (PFL);chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat thePetitionersnumbering 65 are all employees of the company;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there exists a collective bargaining contract (Exhibit 10) dated July 15, 1953, between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod g Saulog Transit with a supplementary agreement (Exhibit 10-1) entered into on January 10, 1954, a month after the petition for certification election was filed and already being investigated by this Court.The fundamental issue to be resolved in the present case is whether or not an order of certification election shall issue on the basis of the evidence established.By stipulation of the parties it was agreed in open Court that instead of a petition for certification election confined to drivers and conductors as the appropriate bargaining unit in the Saulog Transit, Inc., the parties have agreed on the employers unit.At the hearing on January 16, 1954, counsel forPetitionermanifested in open Court that out of the 65 signatories to the petition, 3 are inspectors and inasmuch as the inspectors are supervisors he moved that they be stricken out of the petition, thereby leaving a total of 62 signatories to the petition.x x xx x xx x xThe evidence show that a total of 583 are employed in the Saulog Transit, Inc. Out of said number, the Court holds that the following should be excluded as they come within the disqualifying category of supervisors, namely, one (1) assistant General Manager;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarytwo (2) guards;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryone (1) shift foreman;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand one (1) accountant. With regards to the 28 inspectors, which counsel forPetitionerscontends to be supervisors without presenting evidence on the matter, the Court is of the opinion that inspectors in transportation business by the nature of their work do not fall within the category of supervisors under Section 2 (k) of Republic Act No. 875.On the basis of those retractions, intervenor maintains that thePetitionercan only lay claim to forty-two (42) on their side and, therefore, this number no longer constitute ten (10%) per cent of all the employees in the company minus the supervisory personnel. On the subject of these retractions during the hearings of this case by the signatories to the petition, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts that it was their free and untrammeled will without pressure from without (within). It is to be noted that during one of the hearings of this case, counsel for intervenor presented a letter (Exhibit A) dated December 23, 1953, purportedly signed by 53 signatories to the petition addressed to Marciano Casalla, president of the Saulog Employees Union (PFL) and one of thePetitionersin this case, wherein it was stated that what they signed before Marciano Casalla was not what they really signed for. During the next hearing on January 19, 1954, counsel forPetitionerspresented a document (Exhibit B) dated January 9, 1954, addressed to the Court and purportedly signed by 21 out of the 53 signatories of the letter marked as Exhibit A, wherein it was stated that when the company knew of their signatures to the petition for certification election, they were told to sign the letter (Exhibit A) or else they will lose their jobs.Marciano Casalla testified at the hearings on January 19, 1954, when confronted with the aforementioned documents, that the signatories of Exhibit A told him that they were forced to sign said letter. Asked by counsel for intervenor how the signatories were forced to sign, he testified that some of the signatories told him that they did not like to sign;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat some told him they have to be rendered drunk first before they could sign;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that some could not ask for vale in the company unless they signed. (Recross examination of Marciano Cassalla, t.s.n., p. 27, hearing of January 19, 1954.).Again at the hearing on February 4, 1954, 16 signatories to the petition for certification election present signified in open court their desire for a certification election. Counsel for intervenor in an effort to refute what they have previously testified regarding their desire for a certification election presented affidavit previously signed by some of them. Feliciano Ignacio when shown the affidavit (Exhibit D-1) he previously signed stated that he signed said affidavit in his desire to work;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP. de Luna testified that he signed the affidavit (Exhibit 3) believing that it was for the return of the fund deposits and there was nothing mentioned about certification election;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGallardo testified that he signed the affidavit (Exhibits D-3 and D-4) in his desire to be employed;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryA. Alde testified that he signed the affidavit because he wanted to be assigned to a trip;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryN. Alcantara testified that he signed the affidavit because he was afraid to be rejected in his work.From the demeanor of the witnesses in the witness stand and the testimonies of the above-mentioned witnesses, the Court believes that those retractions could not destroy the desire of all signatories constituting, at least, ten (10%) per cent of the employees in the appropriate unit desiring a certification election. The manner in which the retractions were obtained more than convinces the Court of the need for a certification election so that the doubt as to the true bargaining representative will be finally resolved. Republic Act No. 875 states the remedy - a certification election. Besides, it should be noted that section 12 of Republic Act No. 875 speaks of the ten (10%) per cent at the time of the filing of the petition. Retractions and withdrawals, therefore, after the petition is filed cannot affect the number of thePetitionersat the time the petition is filed.Intervenor also offered in evidence a collective bargaining agreement it had with the Saulog Transit, Inc., marked as Exhibit 10 and contends that it is a bar to the petition for certification election. A careful scrutiny of such contract reveals that it does not touch in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment of all the employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a grievance procedure for drivers, conductors and inspectors who are members of the Buklod g Saulog.x x xx x xx x xFrom the evidence on record, it appears that a supplementary contract (Exhibit 10-1) providing for increase in pay, fixing of guarantee deposits nor conductors and drivers, granting of loans to immediate members of the family of the union employees in case of death, and granting daily bonus to drivers and conductors who have reached their daily quota of collection, have been executed between the Saulog Transit, Inc., and the Buklod g Saulog TransitcralawIn its brief thePetitionercontends that (1) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in holding that it did not lose jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the fact that theRespondents(Petitionersin the court below) were reduced to less than 10 per cent of the appropriate unit;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in its interpretation of section 13, Republic Act No. 875, relative to the kind of collective bargaining agreement which would constitute a bar to a certification election, and in declaring that Exhibit 10 (whether by itself or as supplemented by Exhibit 10-1) did not constitute a sufficient bar to a certification election. In support of its petition filed in the Court of Industrial Relations thePetitionerBuklod g Saulog Transit raised the following questions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary1.Does the collective bargaining agreement between the Buklod and the Saulog Transit, Inc. (consisting of Exhibits 10 [and] 10-1) conform as to contents to the bargaining contract contemplated in Section 13 of Republic Act 875? If so, is it a bar to certification election? (Exhibits 10 and 10-1 are Annexes D and E, respectively.)2.What is the effect of the holding of certification election on the collective bargaining agreement previously entered into by the parties mentioned in Question 1?The first error thePetitionerclaims the Court of Industrial Relations committed is not well taken, not only because of the rule laid down in cases decided under section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 559, consistently followed and maintained in this jurisdiction, 1 to the effect that the Court of Industrial Relations acquires jurisdiction of an industrial dispute upon the filing of a petition by 31 employees or laborers bringing such dispute to the Court for determination, and that a diminution in number by retraction or withdrawal of any of them does not divest it of its jurisdiction already acquired, but also because as found by the Court of Industrial Relations, the retraction by some members who originally had signed the petition was not of their own free will. The petition filed by 65 laborers or employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc., was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Industrial Relations, for their number was more than 10 percent of the laborers and employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc. 2It is argued that under and pursuant to section 13, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 875, which provides that In the absence of an agreement or other voluntary arrangement providing for a more expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it shall be the duty of an employer and the representative of his employees to bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Such duty to bargain collectively means the performance of the mutual obligation to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and in good faith, for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours, and/or other terms and conditions of employment, and of executing a written contract incorporating such agreement if requested by either party, or for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising under such agreement, but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make concession.there was no need or reason for ordering a certification election, because on 15 July 1953 thePetitionerBuklod g Saulog Transit and the Saulog Transit, Inc. had already entered into a collective bargaining agreement, as shown by Exhibit 10.The provisions of section 13, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 875, contemplate a situation not only where there had been no agreement entered into by and between employees or laborers and employer or management as to terms and conditions of employment, but also where there had been an agreement that leaves out many or some matters on which the parties should have stipulated, if the collective bargaining agreement is to achieve its purpose and aim industrial peace. 1The trial court found that the collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod g Saulog Transit on 15 July 1953 (Exhibit 10;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex D) does not touch in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment of all the employees in the company but seeks to establish merely a grievance procedure for drivers, conductors and inspectors who are members of the Buklod g Saulog. And even in the supplementary agreement (Exhibit 10-1;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex E), there is no clear-cut stipulation as to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions or employment. 2 In their reply theRespondentsclaim that such an agreement (Exhibit 10;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex D) and the supplementary agreement (Exhibit 11;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex E) have not been identified and offered in evidence and should not be taken into consideration. The trial court took, however, into consideration both agreements and found that the first agreement being incomplete does not bar a certification election;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand as to the supplementary agreement the Court held that it having been entered into after the filing of the petition for a certification election the same cannot and does not bar a certification election. The affidavit filed by the President of the Buklod g Saulog Transit (Annex F) is not mentioned in the order and resolution appealed from. It is clearly an effort on the part of thePetitionerto supply what was lacking in the two agreements already mentioned. The contention that as section 13, Republic Act No. 875, does not require that the agreement be in writing unless either party request that it be reduced to writing, thereby insinuating that there had been a verbal understanding before the written agreement was entered into, has no bearing and effect in a case where there is a written agreement which the Court of Industrial Relations found incomplete. In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the collective bargaining agreement entered into on 15 July 1953 is no bar to a certification election at the instance of at least 10 per cent of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit, pursuant to section 12, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), Republic Act No. 875.The second question raised by thePetitionerin support of its petition filed in the court below need not be passed upon. It has not arisen. Any pronouncement thereon would be obiter and not binding.The order and resolution appealed from are affirmed, with costs against thePetitioner.[G.R. No. 111245.January 31, 1997]SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA PACIFIC PLASTIC,petitioner,vs. HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of Labor, and MALAYANG NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG PACIFIC PLASTIC,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA,J.:

This is a special civil action forcertiorarito set aside the resolution, dated May 14, 1993, of respondent Undersecretary of Labor and the order of the Med-Arbiter of January 31, 1993, dismissing the election protest of petitioner Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic (SAMAHAN) and upholding the election of respondent Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Pacific Plastic (MNMPP) as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MNMPP are labor unions of rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation (PPC) in Valenzuela, Metro Manila.On August 24, 1990, MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification Election, alleging that there were more or less 130 rank and file employees at the PPC whom it was seeking to represent.[1]SAMAHAN countered by seeking the cancellation of MNMPPs union registration.As a result, MNMPPs petition to be certified as the bargaining agent was dismissed.MNMPP appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on March 5, 1991, reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding of a certification election among the rank and file employees of the PPC.The PPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but its motion was denied.Accordingly, the representation officer of the Secretary of Labor held a pre-election conference on May 6, 1991, during which the PPC was required to submit the list of its rank and file employees based on the company payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition.As respondent company failed to submit the list, it was given a stern warning by the Department of Labor (DOLE) that should it fail to appear at the next conference on June 3, 1991, the list to be submitted by petitioner MNMPP would be used as basis for determining the eligible voters.[2]But the PPC again failed to appear at the conference, prompting the Department of Labor Industrial Relations Division (DOLE-IRD) to issue a final warning.[3]Petitioner SAMAHAN also failed to appear at the June 3, 1991 conference.On June 18, 1991, it moved to defer the conference, alleging that proceedings for the cancellation of union registration of MNMPP were still pending resolution before the Med-Arbiter which constitute a prejudicial question and that there existed a collective bargaining agreement between PPC and SAMAHAN which was a bar to the certification election.[4]MNMPP opposed the motion, contending that the cancellation case had already been finally decided by the DOLE and that the execution of the subject CBA during the pendency of the representation case did not bar the holding of a certification election.[5]On August 23, 1991, the DOLE-IRD summoned respondent company once more, reiterating its warning that should the company fail to submit the list of its rank and file employees, the list to be submitted by private respondent MNMPP and petitioner SAMAHAN would be adopted as the list of qualified voters and the companys right to the exclusion proceedings would be deemed waived.[6]But again PPC did not comply with the DOLE order.Meanwhile, on September 23, 1991, SAMAHAN and MNMPP agreed to hold the certification election on October 29, 1991 on the basis of the list of employees submitted by MNMPP, without prejudice to the submission by petitioner SAMAHAN of its own list on October 17, 1991.[7]Thereafter, they agreed to postpone election to await the list of employees requested from the Social Security System.[8]On September 10, 1992, upon motion of MNMPP, the certification election was finally set for October 6, 1992.But SAMAHAN objected despite its agreement with MNMPP on September 23, 1991 to hold an election using the list furnished by the SSS.[9]It also objected to the participation of a third labor union, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) which in the meantime had filed a motion for intervention.Thereafter, SAMAHAN filed a Manifestation/Motion that it was not participating in the certification election and asked that the certification election held on the same day be nullified for the following reasons: (1) it did not receive notice of the certification as required by law; (2) its opposition to KAMAPIs motion to intervene and its opposition to setting the date of the certification election had not been resolved; (3) there were discrepancies in the list of voters submitted by the SSS; and (4) SAMAHANs President moved to strike out his signature at the back of the official ballot.[10]The certification election was held on October 6, 1992.Over SAMAHANs objection KAMAPI was allowed to participate.The following were results of the election:[11]No. of Eligible Voters..98

Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic,...56

Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic..2

Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino...0

No Union1

No. of Spoiled Ballots cast.3

Total no of Votes Cast..62

On October 9, 1992, SAMAHAN protested the result of the certification election alleging the same grounds alleged by it in its Manifestation/Motion of October 6, 1992. On October 15, 1992, MNMPP opposed the petition raising the following arguments: (1) that the mere filing of a motion for intervention will not suspend the holding of a certification election under Rule V, 5 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code; (2) that the results of the election showed that intervenor was resoundingly repudiated by the employees; (3) that it failed to specify the alleged discrepancies in the list of employees furnished by the SSS; and (4) that matters not raised during the election are deemed waived pursuant to Rule VI, 3 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.[12]In his order dated January 31, 1993, the Med-Arbiter, Tomas F. Falconitin, dismissed the election protest of SAMAHAN and upheld the election of MNMPP as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees at the PPC.On March 12, 1993, SAMAHAN appealed to the Secretary of Labor.It argued that its opposition to KAMAPIs Motion for Intervention should first be resolved before a certification election could be held and that the contract-bar rule should be applied.In addition, it contended that the use of the SSS list was in violation of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which prescribe the use of the company payroll as basis for the voters list.

On May 14, 1993, Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma denied the appeal of SAMAHAN and affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter.SAMAHAN moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied on July 29, 1993.Hence, this petition forcertiorari.

Petitioner contends:

1.The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is null and void on the ground that only 62 out of 130 employees participated in the activity.

2.The SSS lists indicating 98 covered employees cannot be used as substitute for three (3) monthly payrolls [sic] required for the purpose of determining the qualified voters and the majority vote needed in an election.

3.Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma committed a serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the election of respondent officers [sic] despite the absence of majority support which is 65 out of 130 admitted members in the bargaining unit.

4.Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma had abused his discretion in sustaining the med-arbiter despite the absence of any legal or factual support when he could otherwise declare failure of an election, thereby constituting his acts to have been done in excess of his authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and therefore his resolution and order issued pursuant thereof are considered to be null and void.[13]The petition has no merit.

First.The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is valid.Art. 256 of the Labor Code provides that in order to have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes.The certification election results show that more than a majority,i.e., 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters included in the list of employees obtained from the SSS, cast their votes.Hence, the legal requirement for a valid election was met.

The bone of contention actually concerns the propriety of utilizing the list of employees furnished by the SSS as basis for determining the total number of eligible voters in the bargaining unit.Petitioner claims that, according to the Implementing Rules, the basis for the list of eligible voters should have been the payroll three (3) months preceding the filing of the petition for certification election and that if this was done the 62 votes cast would be short of the majority because, instead of only 98 employees as shown in the SSS list, there were actually 130 as alleged in MNMPPs petition for certification election.

The contention is without merit.As petitioner itself says, the figure 130 is based on the allegation that MNMPP made in its petition for certification election that it was supported by at least 25% of the members of the bargaining unit.[14]Such statement was a mere approximation of the size of the bargaining unit that the petitioning union seeks to represent and cannot be used against MNMPP for this reason.

It should ideally be the payroll which should have been used for the purpose of the election.However, the unjustified refusal of a company to submit the payroll in its custody, despite efforts to make it produce it, compelled resort to the SSS list as the next best source of information.After all, the SSS list is a public record whose regularity is presumed.InPort Workers Union of the Philippines(PWUP)v.Undersecretary of Labor and Employment,[15]this Court underscored the policy of the Labor Code of encouraging the holding of a certification election as the definitive and certain way of ascertaining the choice of employees as to the labor organization in a collective bargaining unit.InTrade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services World Federation of Trade Unions v. Laguesma,[16]we reiterated this policy thus:It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.We have held that whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank and file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of certification election is the most democratic method of determining the employees choice of their bargaining representative.It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves.Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.

Insistence on the application of the Omnibus Implementing Rules could defeat this policy.Worse, it could facilitate fraud by employers who can easily suppress the payroll to prevent certification elections from being held.This Court has therefore consistently adhered to the principle announced inU.E. Automotive Employees v. Noriel[17]that where it concerns the weight to be accorded to the wishes of the majority as expressed in an election conducted fairly and honestly, certain provisions that may be considered mandatory before the voting takes place become thereafter merely directory in order that the wishes of the electorate prevail.Considering all the arguments presented above, we find no substantial reason to nullify the certification election conducted on October 6, 1992 on the basis of a mere technicality which finds no justification considering the facts of the case nor upon close examination of the true intent of the law to remove all impediments to the conduct of certification elections.

At all events petitioner must be deemed to have waived the objection based on this ground, considering that this objection was raised for the first time in petitioners appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter dismissing petitioners protest.[18]Even then, petitioners objection to the use of the SSS list was not that this was contrary to the requirement of the Implementing Rules that the payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition should be used but rather that the list contained some discrepancy[19] an allegation which petitioner failed to substantiate.

At the latest, petitioners objection to the use of the SSS should have been raised during the elections and formalized in its election protest.We agree with private respondent MNMPP in its Opposition to SAMAHANs election protest dated October 15, 1992 that under the Implementing Rules, grounds of protests not raised before the close of the proceedings and duly formalized within five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings are deemed waived.[20]Second.Petitioners contention in its Motion for Deferment of Pre-election Conference was that the CBA between it and the PPC signed during the pendency of the representation proceedings, rendered the certification election moot and academic.Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 4 provides:

The representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement registered before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement orduring the pendency of the representation case.This rule was applied in the case ofALU-TUCP v. Trajano[21]where we held that the representation case will not be adversely affected by a CBA registered before or during the freedom period or during the pendency of the representation case.InALU v. Calleja,[22]we also held that a CBA, which was prematurely renewed, is not a bar to the holding of a certification election.Hence, the CBA entered into between petitioner and PPC during the pendency of the representation case and after the filing of the petition for certification election on August 24, 1990, cannot possibly prejudice the certification election nor render it moot.Third.With respect to petitioners claim[23]that the proceedings for the cancellation of MNMPPs union registration was a prejudicial question, suffice it to say that as held in Association of Court of Appeals Employeesvs. Cal1eja,[24]certification election can be conducted despite pendency of a petition to cancel the union registration certificate.For the fact is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition for certification, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing its cancellation.WHEREFORE,the petition forcertiorariis DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 95013 September 21, 1994TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES/FEBRUARY SIX MOVEMENT TUPAS/FSM),petitioner,vs.HON BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, TRANSUNION CORPORATION-GLASS DIVISION, AND INTEGRATED LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO-PHILIPPINES),respondents.Alar, Comia, Manalo and Associates Law Offices for petitioner.Arcaya & Associates for Transunion Corp.-Glass Division.Francisco A. Mercado, Jr. for Integrated Labor Organization (ILO-Phils.)PUNO,J.:Petitioner Trade Unions of the Philippines-February Six Movement (TUPAS-FSM) seeks the reversal of theResolution, dated July 25, 1990, rendered by then Secretary of Labor and Employment Ruben D. Torres, In OS-MA-A-5-167-90, whichdismissed the petition for certification election filed by petitioner TUPAS-FSM for being prematurely filed.1The controlling facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:On March 23, 1990 TUPAS-FSM filed a petition for certification election with the Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), for the purpose of choosing a bargaining representative for the rank-and-file employees of Transunion Corporation's industrial plant, situated in Canlubang, Laguna, known as theTransunion Corporation-Glassware Division. Petitioner had then secured a Certification , datedMarch 22, 1990, issued by Tomas B. Bautista, Jr., Director IV of DOLE (Region IV), that "Transunion Corporation" has no existing collective bargaining agreement with any labor organization.2It appears, however, that before the filing of said petition, or on November 15, 1989,Integrated Labor Organization (ILO-Phils.)was duly certified by DOLE as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division.3OnNovember 28, 1989, a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was the forged between Transunion-Glassware Division and ILO-Phils. covering the company's rank-and-file employees, The CBA, with a five-year termfrom December 1, 1989 to December 1, 1994, was ratified by a great majority of the rank-and -filers on December 8, 1989.4In the meantime, the President of ILO-PHILS died. An inter-union conflict followed andthe subject CBA was filed with DOLE, for registration purposes, only on March 14, 1990,more or less, three (3) months from its execution. Finally, on May 4, 1990, the Certification of Registration was issued by DOLE through Regional Director Romeo A. Young.5ILO-Phils., intervened in the certification election proceedings initiated by TUPAS-FSM. It opposed the petition in view of the existing CBA between ILO and the Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division. It stresses that the petition for certification election should be entertained only during the freedom period, or sixty day before the expiration of the CBA. Med-Arbiter Orlando S. deal Cruz dismissed the petition on the ground of prematurity.TUPAS-FSM appealed contending: (1) that pursuant to Article 231 of the Labor Code. CBAs shall be file with the Regional Office of the DOLEwithin thirty (30) daysfrom the date of signing thereof; (2) that said requirement is mandatory, although it would not affect the enforceability of the CBA as between the parties thereto; and (3) since the CBA was filed outside the 30-day period specified under Article 231 of the Labor Code, the prohibition against certification election under Article 232 of the same Code should not apply to third parties such as petitioner.As stated earlier, the Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed the impugned Order of the Med-Arbiter, ruling that the belated submission of the CBA was excusable and that the requirement of the law was substantially complied with upon the filing of a copy of the CBApriorto the filing of the petition for certification election. TUPAS-FSM then filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was also denied, Hence, this petition forcertiorariwhere petitioner alleged:GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AMOUNTING TO LOSS OF JURISDICTION; andTHE RESOLUTION IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND THE LAW.The petition lacks merit.Petitioner raises both factual and legal issues in this present petition.First, the factual issues. Relying on the March 22, 1990 Dole Certification issued by Director Bautista, Jr.,supra, petitioner insists there was no existing CBA between Transunion Corporation and any labor organization when it filed its petition for certification election on March 23, 1990. To further strengthen its position, petitioner charges that the filing of the CBA wasantedatedto march 14, 1990, to make it appear that the same was already existing and filed before the filing of the petition for certification election. Petitioner also claims that since Article 231 of the Labor Code mandates DOLE to act on the CBA filed in its office within Five (5) days from date of filing thereof, the subject CBA was filed on April 30, 1990, or five (5) days before its registration on May 4, 1990.The argument deserves scant consideration. It is elementary that the special civil action forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to nullify or modify the proceedings before the concerned tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions who has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.6Following this hoary rule, it is inappropriate to review the factual findings of the Med-arbiter and the Secretary of Labor, regarding the date of filing of the CBA on March 14, 1990 prior to the filing of the petition for certification election; the company's voluntary recognition and DOLE's certification of ILO-PHILS. as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division; and the subsequent registration of the CBA. They are binding on this Court as they are supported by substantial evidence. In contrast, petitioners bare allegation pertaining to the "antedating" of the date of filing of the CBA is unsubstantiated and based purely on conjectures.It is crystal clear from the records that the rank-and- file employees of private respondent's Glassware Division are, at present, represented by ILO-PHILS. Hence, petitioner's reliance on the March 22, 1990 Certification issued by Director Bautista, Jr., is misplaced. The existence and filing of their CBA was confirmed in a Certification, dated April 24, 1990, issued by Director Romeo A. Young of DOLE-Region IV.7The Certification of ILO-PHILS. "as thesole and exclusive bargaining agentof the rank-and-file workers ofTransunion-Glassware Division," means it shall remain as such during the existence of the CBA, to the exclusion of other labor organizations, including petitioner, and no petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained, nor shall certification election be conducted, outside of the fifty-day freedom period immediately before the expiry date of the five-year term of the CBA.8We now resolved the legal issue. Petitioner points out that the subject CBA was filed beyond the 30-day period prescribed under Article 231 of the Labor Code. It also insists that under Article 232 of the Labor Code, the prohibition on the filing of a petition for certification election applies when the CBA had been duly registered and, in this case, since the CBA was not registered in accordance with the Art. 231, the prohibition will not apply. We disagree.Article 231 an s232 of the Labor Code read:Art. 231. Registry of unions and file of collective agreements. - . . . .Within thirty (30) days from the execution of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, the parties shall submit copies of the same directly to the Bureau or the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment for registration accompanied with verified proofs of its posting n two conspicuous places in the place of work and ratification by the majority of all the workers in the bargaining unit. The Bureau or Regional Office shall act upon the application for registration of such Collective Bargaining Agreement within five (5) days from receipts thereof. The Regional Office shall furnish the Bureau with a copy of the Collective Bargaining agreement within five (5) days form its submission.xxx xxx xxxArt. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election. The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification election or any other action which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing collective bargaining agreement affecting the parties except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.Corollary thereto, Article 253-A of the same Code reads:Art. 253-A. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. . . . .It appears that the procedural requirement of filing the CBA within 30 days from date of execution under Article 231 was not met. The subject CBA was executed on November 28, 1989. It was ratified on December 8, 1989, and then filed with DOLE for registration purposes on March 14, 1990. Be that as it may, the delay in the filing of the CBA was sufficiently explained,i.e., there was an inter-union conflict on who would succeed to the presidency of ILO-PHILS. The CBA was registered by the DOLE only on May 4, 1990. It would be injudicious for us to assume, as what petitioner did, that the said CBA was filed only on April 30, 1990, or five (5) days before its registration, on the unsupported surmise that it was done to suit the law that enjoins Regional Offices of Dole to act upon an application for registration of a CBA within five (5) days from its receipt thereof. In the absence of any substantial evidence that DOLE officials or personnel, in collusion with private respondent, had antedated the filing date of the CBA, the presumption on regularity in the performance of official functions hold.More importantly, non-compliance with the cited procedural requirement should not adversely affect the substantive validity of the CBA between ILO-PHILS and the Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division covering the company's rank and file employees. A collective bargaining agreement is more than a contract. It is highly impressed with public interest for it is an essential instrument to promote industrial peace. Hence, it bears the blessings not only of the employer and employ