Causes of World War I - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia

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The rulers of Germany, France, Russia,

Austria-Hungary, and the United

Kingdom attempting to keep the lid on

the simmering cauldron of imperialist

and nationalist tensions in the Balkans

to prevent a general European war.

They were successful in 1912 and

1913 but did not succeed in 1914.

France began general mobilization

against Germany on 1 August. Three

days later, Germany declared war on

France. Here, on 2 August, Parisians

cheer French lancers off to fight the

Germans.

Causes of World War IFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The causes of World War I, which began in central Europe in July

1914, included many intertwined factors, such as the conflicts and

hostility of the four decades leading up to the war. Militarism, alliances,

imperialism, and nationalism played major roles in the conflict as well.

However, the immediate origins of the war lay in the decisions taken bystatesmen and generals during the July Crisis of 1914, casus belli for

which was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and

his wife by Gavrilo Princip, an irredentist Serb.[1]

The crisis came after a long and difficult series of diplomatic clashes

between the Great Powers (Italy, France, Germany, Great Britain,

Austria-Hungarian Empire and Russia) over European and colonial

issues in the decade before 1914 that had left tensions high. In turn these

diplomatic clashes can be traced to changes in the balance of power in

Europe since 1867.

[2]

The more immediate cause for the war wastensions over territory in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary competed with

Serbia and Russia for territory and influence in the region and they

pulled the rest of the Great Powers into the conflict through their various

alliances and treaties.

The topic of the causes of World War I is one of the most studied in all

of world history. Scholars have differed significantly in their

interpretations of the event.

Contents

1 Background

2 Overview

3 Domestic political factors

3.1 German domestic politics

3.2 French domestic politics

3.3 Changes in Austria

4 International relations

4.1 Imperialism

4.2 Web of alliances

4.3 Arms Race

4.3.1 AngloGerman naval race

5 Technical/Military Factors

5.1 Over by Christmas

5.2 Primacy of the offensive and war by timetable

5.3 von Schlieffen Plan

5.4 British security issues

6 Specific events

es of World War I - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causes_of_Wor

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Declaration of a state of war from the

German Empire in 1914.

The alliance situation in central

Europe in 1914

6.1 FrancoPrussian War (18701871)

6.2 War in Sight crisis

6.3 Austrian-Serbian tensions and Bosnian Annexation

Crisis

6.4 The Balkan Wars (19121913)

7 Historiography

8 See also

9 References10 Further reading

11 External links

Background

From the time of the Balkan Wars, which had increased the size of

Serbia, it had been the opinion of leading Austrian officials (most notably

the Foreign Minister, Count Leopold von Berchtold) that Austria would

have to wage a "preventive war" to greatly weaken or destroy Serbia asa state in order to maintain the dual monarchy which held extensive

Serb-populated Balkan territories.[3]

Between January 1913 and January

1914, Chief of the General Staff Count Franz Conrad von Htzendorf

advocated a preventive war against Serbia twenty-four times.[3]

Serbia expanded its territory at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and

Bulgaria[4]

under the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest. Regarding the

expansion of Serbia as an unacceptable increase in the power of an

unfriendly state and in order to weaken Serbia, the Austrian government

threatened war in the autumn of 1912 if Serbs were to acquire a port

from the Turks.[4]

Austria appealed for German support, only to be

rebuffed at first.[4]

In November 1912 Russia, humiliated by its inability to support Serbia

during the Bosnian crisis of 1908 or the First Balkan War, announced a

major reconstruction of its military.

On November 28, in partial reaction to the Russian move, German Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow told

the Reichstag, the German parliament, that If Austria is forced, for whatever reason, to fight for its position as

a Great Power, then we must stand by her.[4]

As a result, British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey responded

by warning Prince Karl Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, that if Germany offered Austria ablank cheque for war in the Balkans, then the consequences of such a policy would be incalculable. To

reinforce this point, R. B. Haldane, the Germanophile Lord Chancellor, met with Prince Lichnowsky to offer an

explicit warning that if Germany were to upset the balance of power in Europe by trying to destroy either

France or Russia as powers, Britain would have no other choice but to fight the Reich.[4]

With the recently announced Russian military reconstruction and certain British communications, the possibility

of war was a prime topic at the German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912 in Berlin, an informal

meeting of some of Germany's top military leadership called on short notice by the Kaiser.[4]

Attending the

conference were Wilhelm II, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz - the Naval State Secretary, Admiral Georg Alexander


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von Mller, the Chief of the German Imperial Naval Cabinet (Marinekabinett), General von Moltke - the

Armys Chief of Staff, Admiral August von Heeringen - the Chief of the Naval General Staff and (probably)

General Moriz von Lyncker, the Chief of the German Imperial Military Cabinet.[4] The presence of the leaders

of both the German Army and Navy at this War Council attests to its importance. However, Chancellor

Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and General Josias von Heeringen, the Prussian Minister of War, were not

invited.[5]

Wilhelm II called British balance of power principles idiocy, but agreed that Haldanes statement was a

desirable clarification of British policy.[4]

His opinion was that Austria should attack Serbia that December,

and if Russia supports the Serbs, which she evidently doesthen war would be unavoidable for us, too,[4]

and that would be better than going to war after Russia completed the massive modernization and expansion of

their army that they had just begun. Moltke agreed. In his professional military opinion a war is unavoidable

and the sooner the better.[4]

Moltke wanted to launch an immediate attack.[6]

Both Wilhelm II and the Army leadership agreed that if a war were necessary it were best launched soon.

Admiral Tirpitz, however, asked for a postponement of the great fight for one and a half years [4] because the

Navy was not ready for a general war that included Britain as an opponent. He insisted that the completion of

the construction of the U-boat base at Heligoland and the widening of the Kiel Canal were the Navys

prerequisites for war.[4]

As the British historian John Rhl has commented, the date for completion of the

widening of the Kiel Canal was the summer of 1914.[6]

Though Moltke objected to the postponement of the war

as unacceptable, Wilhelm sided with Tirpitz.[4]

Moltke agreed to a postponement only reluctantly.[6]

Historians more sympathetic to the government of Wilhelm II often reject the importance of this War Council as

only showing the thinking and recommendations of those present, with no decisions taken. They often cite the

passage from Admiral Mllers diary, which states: That was the end of the conference. The result amounted to

nothing.[6]

Certainly the only decision taken was to do nothing.

Historians more sympathetic to the Entente, such as British historian John Rhl, sometimes rather ambitiously

interpret these words of Admiral Mller (an advocate of launching a war soon) as saying that "nothing" was

decided for 1912-13, but that war was decided on for the summer of 1914.[6]

Rhl is on safer ground when he

argues that even if this War Council did not reach a binding decision - which it clearly did not - it did

nonetheless offer a clear view of their intentions,[6]

or at least their thoughts, which were that if there was going

to be a war, the German Army wanted it before the new Russian armaments program began to bear fruit.[6]

Entente sympathetic historians such as Rhl see this conference in which "The result amounted to nothing[6]

as

setting a clear deadline when a war was to begin, namely the summer of 1914.[6]

With the November 1912 announcement of the Russian Great Military Programme, the leadership of the

German Army began clamoring even more strongly for a preventive war against Russia.[3][4]

Moltke declared

that Germany could not win the arms race with France, Britain and Russia, which she herself had begun in 1911

because the financial structure of the German state, which gave the Reich government little power to tax, meant

Germany would bankrupt herself in an arms race.[4]

As such, Moltke from late 1912 onwards was the leading

advocate for a general war, and the sooner the better.[4]

Throughout May and June 1914, Moltke engaged in an almost ultimative demand for a German preventive

war against Russia in 1914.[6]

The German Foreign Secretary, Gottlieb von Jagow, reported on a discussion

with Moltke at the end of May 1914:


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Moltke described to me his opinion of our military situation. The prospects of the future oppressed

him heavily. In two or three years Russia would have completed her armaments. The military

superiority of our enemies would then be so great that he did not know how he could overcome

them. Today we would still be a match for them. In his opinion there was no alternative to making

preventive war in order to defeat the enemy while we still had a chance of victory. The Chief of the

General Staff therefore proposed that I should conduct a policy with the aim of provoking a war in

the near future. [6]

The new French President Raymond Poincar, who took office in 1913, was favourable to improving relations

with Germany.[7]

In January 1914 Poincar became the first French President to dine at the German Embassy in

Paris.[7]

Poincar was more interested in the idea of French expansion in the Middle East than a war of revenge

to regain Alsace-Lorraine. Had theReich been interested in improved relations with France before August 1914

the opportunity was available, but the leadership of the Reich lacked such interests, and preferred a policy of

war to destroy France. Because of Frances smaller economy and population, by 1913 French leaders had

largely accepted that France by itself could never defeat Germany.[8]

In May 1914, Serbian politics were polarized between two factions, one headed by the Prime Minister Nikola

Pai, and the other by the radical nationalist chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevi,

known by his codename Apis.[9] In that month, due to Colonel Dimitrigjevics intrigues, King Peter dismissed

Pais government.[9] The Russian Minister in Belgrade intervened to have Pais government restored.[9]

Pai, though he often talked tough in public, knew that Serbia was near-bankrupt and, having suffered heavy

casualties in the Balkan Wars and in the suppression of a December 1913 Albanian revolt in Kosovo, needed

peace.[9]

Since Russia also favoured peace in the Balkans, from the Russian viewpoint it was desirable to keep

Pai in power.[9]

It was in the midst of this political crisis that politically powerful members of the Serbian

military armed and trained three Bosnian students as assassins and sent them into Austria-Hungary.[10]

Overview

See also: Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and July Crisis

Although the chain of events unleashed by the assassination triggered the war, the war's origins go deeper,

involving national politics, cultures, economics, and a complex web of alliances and counterbalances that had

developed between the various European powers since 1870.

Some of the most important long term or structural causes are:

The growth of nationalism across Europe

Unresolved territorial disputes

Intricate system of alliancesThe perceived breakdown of the balance of power in Europe

Misperceptions of intent e.g., the German belief the United Kingdom would remain neutral[11][12]

Convoluted and fragmented governance

Delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications

Arms races of the previous decades

Previous military planning[13]

Imperial and colonial rivalry for wealth, power and prestige

Economic and military rivalry in industry and trade e.g.,Pig War (Serbia)


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The various categories of explanation for World War I correspond to different historians' overall methods. Most

historians and popular commentators include causes from more than one category of explanation to provide a

rounded account of the causes of the war. The deepest distinction among these accounts is that between stories

which find it to have been the inevitable and predictable outcome of certain factors, and those which describe it

as an arbitrary and unfortunate mistake[citation needed].

In attributing causes for the war, historians and academics had to deal with an unprecedented flood of memoirs

and official documents, released as each country involved tried to avoid blame for starting the war. Early

releases of information by governments, particularly those released for use by the "Commission on the

Responsibility of the Authors of the War" were shown to be incomplete and biased. In addition some

documents, especially diplomatic cables between Russia and France, were found to have been doctored. Even in

later decades however, when much more information had been released, historians from the same culture have

been shown to come to differing conclusions on the causes of the war.[14]

Domestic political factors

German domestic politics

Left wing parties, especially the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) made large gains in the 1912

German election. German government at the time was still dominated by the Prussian Junkers who feared the

rise of these left wing parties. Fritz Fischer famously argued that they delibrately sought an external war to

distract the population and whip up patriotic support for the government.[15]

Russia was in the midst of a large

scale military build-up and reform which was to be completed in 1916-17.

Other authors argue that German conservatives were ambivalent about a war, worrying that losing a war would

have disastrous consequences, and even a successful war might alienate the population if it were lengthy or

difficult.[16]

French domestic politics

The situation in France was quite different from that in Germany but yielded the same results. More than a

century after the French Revolution, there was still a fierce struggle between the left-wing French government

and its right-wing opponents, including monarchists and "Bonapartists." A "good old war" was seen by both

sides (with the exception of Jean Jaurs) as a way to solve this crisis thanks to a nationalistic reflex. For

example, on July 29, after he had returned from the summit in St. Petersburg, President Poincar was asked if

war could be avoided. He is reported to have replied: "It would be a great pity. We should never again find

conditions better."[17]

The left-wing government thought it would be an opportunity to implement social reforms[citation needed]

(income tax was implemented in July 1914) and the right-wing politicians hoped that their connections with the

army's leaders could give them the opportunity to regain power.[citation needed]

Russian bribery under Poincar's

careful direction of the French press from July 1912 to 1914 played a role in creating the proper French political

environment for the war.[18] Prime Minister and then President Poincar was a strong hawk. In 1913 Poincar

predicted war for 1914.[19]

In 1920 at the University of Paris, thinking back to his own student days, Poincar

remarked "I have not been able to see any reason for my generation living, except the hope of recovering our

lost provinces (Alsace-Lorraine; Poincar was born in Lorraine)."[20]


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Ethno-linguistic map of AustriaHungary in 1910

Changes in Austria

In 1867, the Austrian Empire fundamentally changed its governmental structure, becoming the Dual Monarchy

of Austria-Hungary. For hundreds of years, the empire had been run in an essentially feudal manner with a

German-speaking aristocracy at its head. However, with the threat represented by an emergence of nationalism

within the empire's many component ethnicities, some elements, including Emperor Franz Joseph, decided that a

compromise would have to be made in order to preserve the power of the German aristocracy. In 1867, the

usgleich was agreed upon which made the Magyar elite in Hungary almost equal partners in the government of

Austria-Hungary.

This arrangement fostered a tremendous

degree of dissatisfaction amongst many in

the traditional German ruling classes.[21]

Some of them considered theAusgleich to

have been a calamity because it often

frustrated their intentions in the governance

of Austria-Hungary.[22]

For example, it was

extremely difficult for Austria-Hungary to

form a coherent foreign policy that suitedthe interests of both the German and Magyar

elite.[23]

Throughout the fifty years from 1867 to

1914, it proved difficult to reach adequate

compromises in the governance of Austria-

Hungary, leading many to search for

non-diplomatic solutions. At the same time a

form of social Darwinism became popular

amongst many in the Austrian half of the

government which emphasised the primacy of armed struggle between nations, and the need for nations to arm

themselves for an ultimate struggle for survival.[24][25]

As a result, at least two distinct strains of thought advocated war with Serbia, often unified in the same people.

In order to deal with political deadlock, some reasoned that more Slavs needed to be brought into Austria-

Hungary in order to dilute the power of the Magyar elite. With more Slavs, the South Slavs of Austria-Hungary

could force a new political compromise in which the Germans would be able to play the Magyars against the

South Slavs.[26]

Other variations on this theme existed, but the essential idea was to cure internal stagnation

through external conquest.

Another fear was that the South Slavs, primarily under the leadership of Serbia, were organizing for a war

against Austria-Hungary, and even all of Germanic civilization. Some leaders, such as Conrad von Htzendorf,

argued that Serbia must be dealt with before it became too powerful to defeat militarily.[27]

A powerful contingent within the Austro-Hungarian government was motivated by these thoughts and

advocated war with Serbia long before the war began. Prominent members of this group included Leopold von

Berchtold, Alexander von Hoyos, and Johann von Forgch. Although many other members of the government,

notably Franz Ferdinand, Franz Joseph, and many Hungarian politicians did not believe that a violent struggle

with Serbia would necessarily solve any of Austria-Hungary's problems, the hawkish elements did exert a strong


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Map of the world with the participants in World War I prior to the

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Allies are depicted in green, the Central

Powers in orange and neutral countries in grey.

influence on government policy, holding key positions.[26]

Samuel R. Williamson has emphasized the role of Austria-Hungary in starting the war. Convinced Serbian

nationalism and Russian Balkan ambitions were disintegrating the Empire, Austria-Hungary hoped for a limited

war against Serbia and that strong German support would force Russia to keep out of the war and weaken its

Balkan prestige.[28]

International relations

Imperialism

See also: New Imperialism

Some scholars have attributed the start of

the war to imperialism.[29]

Countries such as

the United Kingdom and France

accumulated great wealth in the late 19th

century through their control of trade inforeign resources, markets, territories, and

people.[citation needed] Other empires,

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia

all hoped to do so as well in economic

advantage. Their frustrated ambitions, and

British policies of strategic exclusion created

tensions. In addition, the limits of natural

resources in many European nations began

to slowly alter trade balance, and make

national industries seek new territories rich in natural resources.[citation needed]

Commercial interests contributed

substantially to Anglo-German rivalry during the scramble for tropical Africa. This was the scene of sharpest

conflict between certain German and British commercial interests. There have been two partitions of Africa.

One involved the actual imposition of political boundaries across the continent during the last quarter of the

nineteenth century; the other, which actually commenced in the mid-nineteenth century, consisted of the

so-called 'business' partition. In southern Africa the latter partition followed rapidly upon the discoveries of

diamonds and gold in 1867 and 1886 respectively. An integral part of this second partition was the expansion in

the interior of British capital interests, primarily the British South Africa Company and mining companies such

as De Beers. After 1886 the Witwatersrand goldfields prompted feverish activity among European as well as

British capitalists. It was soon felt in Whitehall that German commercial penetration in particular constituted a

direct threat to Britain's continued economic and political hegemony south of the Limpopo. Amid the expanding

web of German business on the Rand, the most contentious operations were those of the German-financedN.Z.A.S.M. or Netherlands South African Railway Company, which possessed a railway monopoly in the

Transvaal.

Rivalries for not just colonies, but colonial trade and trade routes developed between the emerging economic

powers and the incumbent great powers. Although still argued differently according to historical perspectives on

the path to war, this rivalry was illustrated in the Berlin-Baghdad Railway, which would have given German

industry access to Iraqi oil, and German trade a southern port in the Persian Gulf. A history of this railroad in

the context of World War I has arrived to describe the German interests in countering the British Empire at a

global level, and Turkey's interest in countering their Russian rivals at a regional level.[30]

As stated by a


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contemporary 'man on the ground' at the time, Jastrow wrote "It was felt in England that if, as Napoleon is said

to have remarked, Antwerp in the hands of a great continental power was a pistol leveled at the English coast,

Bagdad and the Persian Gulf in the hands of Germany (or any other strong power) would be a 42-centimetre

gun pointed at India." [31] On other side, "...public opinion in Germany was feasting on visions of Cairo,

Baghdad, and Tehran, and the possibility of evading the British blockade through outlets to the Indian Ocean."[32]

Britain's initial strategic exclusion of others from northern access to a Persian Gulf port in the creation of

Kuwait by treaty as a protected, subsidized client state showed political recognition of the importance of the

issue.[33]

If outcome is revealing, by the close of the war this political recognition was re-emphasized in themilitary effort to capture the railway itself, recounted with perspective in a contemporary history: "On the 26th

Aleppo fell, and on the 28th we reached Muslimieh, that junction on the Baghdad railway on which longing eyes

had been cast as the nodal point in the conflict of German and other ambitions in the East."[34]

The Treaty of

Versailles explicitly removed all German ownership thereafter, which without Ottoman rule left access to

Mesopotamian and Persian oil, and northern access to a southern port in British hands alone.

Rivalries among the great powers were exacerbated starting in the 1880s by the scramble for colonies which

brought much of Africa and Asia under European rule in the following quarter-century, it also created great

Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian tensions and crises that prevented a British alliance with either until the early

twentieth century. Otto von Bismarck disliked the idea of an overseas empire, but pursued a colonial policy to

court domestic political support. This started Anglo-German tensions since German acquisitions in Africa and

the Pacific threatened to impinge upon British strategic and commercial interests. Bismarck supported French

colonization in Africa because it diverted government attention and resources away from continental Europe

and revanchism. In spite of all of Bismarck's deft diplomatic maneuvering, in 1890 he was forced to resign by

the new Kaiser (Wilhelm II). His successor, Leo von Caprivi, was the last German Chancellor who was

successful in calming Anglo-German tensions. After his loss of office in 1894, German policy led to greater

conflicts with the other colonial powers.

The status of Morocco had been guaranteed by international agreement, and when France attempted to greatly

expand its influence there without the assent of all the other signatories Germany opposed it prompting the

Moroccan Crises, the Tangier Crisis of 1905 and the Agadir Crisis of 1911. The intent of German policy was to

drive a wedge between the British and French, but in both cases produced the opposite effect and Germany was

isolated diplomatically, most notably lacking the support of Italy despite Italian membership in the Triple

Alliance. The French protectorate over Morocco was established officially in 1912.

In 1914, there were no outstanding colonial conflicts, Africa essentially having been claimed fully, apart from

Ethiopia, for several years. However, the competitive mentality, as well as a fear of "being left behind" in the

competition for the world's resources may have played a role in the decisions to begin the conflict.[citation needed]

Web of alliances

A loose web of alliances around the European nations (many of them requiring participants to agree to

collective defense if attacked):

Treaty of London, 1839, about the neutrality of Belgium

German-Austrian treaty (1879) or Dual Alliance

Italy joining Germany and Austria in 1882

Franco-Russian Alliance (1894)

The "Entente Cordiale" between Britain and France (1904) which left the northern coast of France

undefended, and the separate "entente" between Britain and Russia (1907) forming the Triple Entente


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European military alliances shortly after outbreak of

war.

This complex set of treaties binding various players in

Europe together before the war sometimes is thought to

have been misunderstood by contemporary political leaders.

The traditionalist theory of "Entangling Alliances" has been

shown to be mistaken; The Triple Entente between Russia,

France and the United Kingdom did not in fact force any of

those powers to mobilize because it was not a military

treaty. Mobilization by a relatively minor player would not

have had a cascading effect that could rapidly run out of

control, involving every country. The crisis between

Austria-Hungary and Serbia could have been a localized

issue. This is how Austria-Hungary's declaration of war

against Serbia resulted in Britain declaring war on Germany:

June 28, 1914: Serbian irredentists assassinate

Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria.

July 23: Austria-Hungary, following their own secret enquiry, sends an ultimatum to Serbia, containing

several very severe demands. In particular, they gave only forty-eight hours within which to comply.

Whilst both Great Britain and Russia sympathised with many of the demands, both agreed the timescale

was far too short. Both nevertheless advised Serbia to comply.

July 24: Germany officially declares support for Austria's position.

July 24: Sir Edward Grey, speaking for the British government, asks that Germany, France, Italy and

Great Britain, "who had no direct interests in Serbia, should act together for the sake of peace

simultaneously."[35]

July 25: The Serbian government replies to Austria, and agrees to most of the demands. However, certain

demands brought into question her survival as an independent nation. On these points they asked that the

Hague Tribunal arbitrate.

July 25: Russia enters a period preparatory to war and mobilization begins on all frontiers. Government

decides on a partial mobilization in principle to begin on July 29.

July 25: Serbia mobilizes its army; responds to Austro-Hungarian demarch with less than full acceptance;Austria-Hungary breaks diplomatic relations with Serbia.

July 26: Serbia reservists accidentally violate Austro-Hungarian border at Temes-Kubin.[36]

July 26: Russia having agreed to stand aside whilst others conferred, a meeting is organised to take place

between ambassadors from Great Britain, Germany, Italy and France to discuss the crisis. Germany

declines the invitation.

July 27: Sir Edward Grey meets the German ambassador independently. A telegram to Berlin after the

meeting states "Other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and

Serbiaas long as Germany would work to keep peace I would keep closely in touch."

July 28: Austria-Hungary, having failed to accept Serbia's response of the 25th, declares war on Serbia.

Mobilisation against Serbia begins.

July 29: Russian general mobilization is ordered, and then changed to partial mobilization.July 29: Sir Edward Grey appeals to Germany to intervene to maintain peace.

July 29: The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Goschen, is informed by the German Chancellor

that Germany is contemplating war with France, and furthermore, wishes to send its army through

Belgium. He tries to secure Britain's neutrality in such an action.

July 30: Russian general mobilization is reordered at 5:00 P.M.

July 31: Austrian general mobilization is ordered.

July 31: Germany enters a period preparatory to war.

July 31: Germany sends an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that they halt military preparations within

twelve hours.


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July 31: Both France and Germany are asked by Britain to declare their support for the ongoing neutrality

of Belgium. France agrees to this. Germany does not respond.

August 1 (3 A.M.): The King of Great Britain personally telegraphs the Tsar of Russia.

August 1: French general mobilization is ordered.

August 1: German general mobilization is ordered.

August 1: Germany declares war against Russia.

August 1: The Tsar responds to the king's telegram, stating "I would gladly have accepted your proposals

had not the German ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war."

August 2: Germany and The Ottoman Empire sign a secret treaty.[37] entrenching the Ottoman-German

Alliance

August 3: Germany, after France declines (See Note) its demand to remain neutral,[38]

declares war on

France. Germany states to Belgium that she would "treat her as an enemy" if she did not allow free

passage of German troops across her lands.

August 3: Britain, expecting German naval attack on the northern French coast, states that Britain would

give "all the protection in its powers."

August 4: Germany invades Belgium according to the modified Schlieffen Plan.

August 4 (midnight): Having failed to receive notice from Germany assuring the neutrality of Belgium,

Britain declares war on Germany.

August 6: Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.August 23: Japan, honouring the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, declares war on Germany.

Note: French Prime Minister Rene Viviani merely replied to the German ultimatum that "France will act in

accordance with her interests."[38]

Had the French agreed to remain neutral, the German Ambassador was

authorized to ask the French to temporarily surrender the Fortresses of Toul and Verdun as a guarantee of

neutrality.

Arms Race

As David Stevenson has put it, "A self-reinforcing cycle of heightened military preparednesswas an essential

element in the conjuncture that led to disasterThe armaments racewas a necessary precondition for theoutbreak of hostilities". David Herrmann goes further, arguing that the fear that "windows of opportunity for

victorious wars" were closing, "the arms race did precipitate the First World War". If Archduke Franz Ferdinand

had been assassinated in 1904 or even in 1911, Herrmann speculates, there might have been no war; it was "the

armaments raceand the speculation about imminent or preventive wars" which made his death in 1914 the

trigger for war.[39]

The naval strength of the powers in 1914

Country Personnel

Large

Naval Vessels (Dreadnoughts) Tonnage

Russia 54,000 4 328,000

France 68,000 10 731,000

Britain 209,000 29 2,205,000

TOTAL 331,000 43 3,264,000

Germany 79,000 17 1,019,000


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Austria-Hungary 16,000 4 249,000

TOTAL 95,000 21 1,268,000

(Source: Ferguson 1999, p. 85)

Some historians see the German naval build-up as the principal cause of deteriorating Anglo-German relations.

The overwhelming British response, however, proved to Germany that its efforts were unlikely to equal the

Royal Navy. In 1900, the British had a 3.7:1 tonnage advantage over Germany; in 1910 the ratio was 2.3:1 and

in 1914, 2.1:1. Ferguson argues that "so decisive was the British victory in the naval arms race that it is hard to

regard it as in any meaningful sense a cause of the First World War".[40]

This ignores the fact that the

Kaiserliche Marine had narrowed the gap by nearly half, and that the Royal Navy had long intended to be

stronger than any two potential opponents; the United States Navy was in a period of growth, making the

German gains very ominous. Technological changes, with oil- rather than coal-fuelled ships, decreasing

refuelling time while increasing speed and range, and with superior armour and artillery also would favour the

growing and newer German fleet.

The Russian Tsar had originally proposed The Hague peace conference of 1899 and the second conference of1907 for the purpose of disarmament, which was supported by all the signatories except for Germany. Germany

also did not want to agree to binding arbitration and mediation. The Kaiser was concerned that the United States

would propose disarmament measures, which he opposed.

AngloGerman naval race

Main article: World War I naval arms race

Motivated by Wilhelm IIs enthusiasm for an expanded German navy, Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz

championed four Fleet Acts from 1898 to 1912 and from 1903 to 1910, the Royal Navy embarked on its own

massive expansion to keep ahead of the Germans. This competition came to focus on the revolutionary new

ships based on theDreadnought, which was launched in 1906.

In 1913, there was intense internal debate about new ships due to the growing influence of John Fisher's ideas

and increasing financial constraints. It is now generally accepted by historians that in early-mid 1914 the

Germans adopted a policy of building submarines instead of new dreadnoughts and destroyers, effectively

abandoning the two power standard, but kept this new policy secret so that other powers would be delayed in

following suit.[41]

Although the naval race as such was abandoned by the Germans before the war broke out, it had been one of

the chief factors in the United Kingdom joining the Triple Entente and therefore important in the formation ofthe alliance system as a whole.

Technical/Military Factors

Over by Christmas

Both sides believed, and publicly stated, that the war would end soon. The Kaiser told his troops that they would

be "home before the leaves have fallen from the trees", and one German officer stated that he expected to be in

Paris by Sedantag, about six weeks away; the country only stockpiled enough potassium nitrate for gunpowder


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for six months. Russian officers similarly expected to be in Berlin in six weeks, and those who suggested that the

war would last for six months were considered pessimists. Von Moltke and his French counterpart Joseph Joffre

were among the few who expected a long war, but neither adjusted his nation's military plans for such an event;

the new British Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener was the only leading official on either side to both

expect a long war ("three years" or longer, he told an amazed colleague) and act accordingly, immediately

building an army of millions of soldiers who would fight for years. [42]:158-159

Some authors such as Niall Ferguson argue that the belief in a swift war has been greatly exaggerated since the

war.[16] He argues that the military planners, especially in Germany, were aware of the potential for a long war,

as shown by the Willy-Nicky telegraphic correspondence between the emperors of Russia and Germany. He also

argues that most informed people considered a swift war unlikely. However, it was in the belligerent

governments' interests to convince their populaces that the war would be brief through skillful use of

propaganda, since such a message encouraged men to join the offensive, made the war seem less serious and

promoted general high spirits.

Primacy of the offensive and war by timetable

See also: Cult of the offensive

Military theorists of the time generally held that seizing the offensive was extremely important. This theory

encouraged all belligerents to strike first in order to gain the advantage. The window for diplomacy was

shortened by this attitude. Most planners wanted to begin mobilization as quickly as possible to avoid being

caught on the defensive.

Some historians assert that mobilization schedules were so rigid that once it was begun, they could not be

cancelled without massive disruption of the country and military disorganization and so diplomatic overtures

conducted after the mobilizations had begun were ignored.[43]

However in practice these timetables were not

always decisive. The Tsar ordered general mobilization canceled on July 29 despite his chief of staff's objections

that this was impossible.[44]

A similar cancellation was made in Germany by the Kaiser on August 1 over the

same objections,[45] although in theory Germany should have been the country most firmly bound by its

mobilization schedule. Barbara Tuchman offers another explanation in the Guns of Augustthat the nations

involved were concerned about falling behind their adversaries in mobilization. According to Tuchman,war

pressed against every frontier. Suddenly dismayed, governments struggled and twisted to fend it off. It was no

use. Agents at frontiers were reporting every cavalry patrol as a deployment to beat the mobilization gun.

General staffs, goaded by their relentless timetables, were pounding the table for the signal to move lest their

opponents gain an hour's head start. Appalled upon the brink, the chiefs of state who would be ultimately

responsible for their country's fate attempted to back away but the pull of military schedules dragged them

forward.[46]

von Schlieffen Plan

Germany's strategic vulnerability, sandwiched between its allied rivals, led to the development of the audacious

(and incredibly expensive) Schlieffen Plan. Its aim was to knock France instantly out of contention, before

Russia had time to mobilize its gigantic human reserves. It aimed to accomplish this task within 6 weeks.

Germany could then turn her full resources to meeting the Russian threat. Although Count Alfred von Schlieffen

initially conceived the plan before his retirement in 1906, Japan's defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of

1904 exposed Russia's organizational weakness and added greatly to the plan's credibility.

The plan called for a rapid German mobilization, sweeping through the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium,


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Map of the Schlieffen Plan and planned French counter-

offensives

into France. Schlieffen called for overwhelming

numbers on the far right flank, the northernmost

spearhead of the force with only minimum troops

making up the arm and axis of the formation as well

as a minimum force stationed on the Russian eastern

front.

Schlieffen was replaced by Helmuth von Moltke,

and in 190708 Moltke adjusted the plan, reducingthe proportional distribution of the forces, lessening

the crucial right wing in favor of a slightly more

defensive strategy. Also, judging Holland unlikely to

grant permission to cross its borders, the plan was

revised to make a direct move through Belgium and

an artillery assault on the Belgian city of Lige. With

the rail lines and the unprecedented firepower the

German army brought, Moltke did not expect any

significant defense of the fortress.

The significance of the Schlieffen Plan is that it forced German military planners to prepare for a pre-emptive

strike when war was deemed unavoidable; otherwise Russia would have time to mobilize, and Germany would

be crushed by Russia's massive army. On August 1, Kaiser Wilhelm II briefly became convinced that it might be

possible to ensure French and British neutrality and cancelled the plan despite the objections of the Chief of

Staff that this could not be done and resuming it only when the offer of a neutral France and Britain was

withdrawn.[45]

It appears that no war planners in any country had prepared effectively for the Schlieffen Plan. The French were

not concerned about such a move because they were confident that their offensive, Plan XVII, would break the

German center and cut off the German right wing moving through Belgium and because German forces were

expected to be tied down by an early Russian offensive in East Prussia.

British security issues

In explaining why neutral Britain went to war with Germany, Kennedy (1980) recognized it was critical for war

that Germany become economically more powerful than Britain, but he downplays the disputes over economic

trade imperialism, the Baghdad Railway, confrontations in Eastern Europe, high-charged political rhetoric and

domestic pressure-groups. Germany's reliance time and again on sheer power, while Britain increasingly

appealed to moral sensibilities, played a role, especially in seeing the invasion of Belgium as a necessary military

tactic or a profound moral crime. The German invasion of Belgium was not important because the British

decision had already been made and the British were more concerned with the fate of France(pp 45762).

Kennedy argues that by far the main reason was London's fear that a repeat of 1870when Prussia and the

German states smashed Francewould mean Germany, with a powerful army and navy, would control the

English Channel, and northwest France. British policy makers insisted that would be a catastrophe for British

security.[47]

Specific events

FrancoPrussian War (18701871)


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Napoleon III and Bismarck after the

1870 Battle of Sedan, of the Franco-

Prussian War.

Many of the direct origins of World War I can be seen in the results and

consequences of the Franco-Prussian War. This conflict brought the

establishment of a powerful and dynamic Germany, causing what was

seen as a displacement or unbalancing of power: this new and prosperous

nation had the industrial and military potential to threaten Europe, and

particularly the already established European powers. Germanys

nationalism, its natural resources, its economic strengths and its

ambitions sparked colonial and military rivalries with other nations,

particularly the Anglo-German naval arms race.

A legacy of animosity grew between France and Germany following the

German annexation of parts of the formerly French territory of Alsace-

Lorraine. The annexation caused widespread resentment in France,

giving rise to the desire for revenge, known as revanchism. French sentiments wanted to avenge military and

territorial losses, and the displacement of France as the pre-eminent continental military power. French defeat in

the war had sparked political instability, culminating in a revolution and the formation of the French Third

Republic. Bismarck was wary of this during his later years and tried to placate the French by encouraging their

overseas expansion. However, anti-German sentiment remained. A FrancoGerman colonial entente that was

made in 1884 in protest of an AngloPortuguese agreement in West Africa proved short-lived after apro-imperialist government under Jules Ferry in France fell in 1885.

War in Sight crisis

France quickly recovered from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. France paid its war remunerations and

began to build its military strength again. Bismarck allowed the idea that Germany was planning a preventative

war against France to be leaked through a German newspaper so that this recovery could not be realized.

However, the Dreikaiserbund sided with France rather than with Germany, forcing Bismarck to back down.

Austrian-Serbian tensions and Bosnian Annexation Crisis

Main articles: May Overthrow, Pig War (Serbia), and Bosnian crisis

On night between June 10/11 1903, a group of

Serbian officers assassinated unpopular King

Alexander I of Serbia. The Serbian parliament

elected Peter Karaorevi as the new king of

Serbia. Dynastic change for consequence had

rallying Serbian on Russia and France rather than on

Austria-Hungary as it was case during rule of

Obrenovi dynasty. Serbian desire to relieve itself of

Austrian influence provoked the Pig War, an

economic conflict, from which Serbia eventually

came out as the victor.

Austria-Hungary, desirous of solidifying its position

in Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexed the provinces on

October 6, 1908.[48]

The annexation set off a wave

of protests and diplomatic maneuvers that became

known as the Bosnian crisis, or annexation crisis.

The crisis continued until April 1909, when the


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Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazarannexation received grudging international approval

through amendment of the Treaty of Berlin. During

the crisis, relations between Austria-Hungary, on the

one hand, and Russia and Serbia, on the other, were permanently damaged.

After an exchange of letters outlining a possible deal, Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky and Austro-

Hungarian Foreign Minister Alois Aehrenthal met privately at Buchlau Castle in Moravia on September 16,

1908. At Buchlau the two agreed that Austria-Hungary could annex the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, which Austria-Hungary occupied and administered since 1878 under a mandate from the Treaty ofBerlin. In return, Austria-Hungary would withdraw its troops from the Ottoman Sanjak of Novibazar and

support Russia in its efforts to amend the Treaty of Berlin to allow Russian war ships to navigate the Straits of

Constantinople during times of war. The two jointly agreed not to oppose Bulgarian independence.

While Izvolsky moved slowly from capital to capital vacationing and seeking international support for opening

the Straits, Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary moved swiftly. On October 5, Bulgaria declared its independence

from the Ottoman Empire. The next day, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina. On October 7, Austria-

Hungary announced its withdrawal from the Sanjak of Novi Pazar. Russia, unable to obtain Britain's assent to

Russia's Straits proposal, joined Serbia in assuming an attitude of protest. Britain lodged a milder protest, taking

the position that annexation was a matter concerning Europe, not a bilateral issue, and so a conference should

be held. France fell in line behind Britain. Italy proposed that the conference be held in Italy. German opposition

to the conference and complex diplomatic maneuvering scuttled the conference. On February 20, 1909, the

Ottoman Empire, acquiesced to the annexation and received 2.2 million from Austria-Hungary.[49]

Austria-Hungary began releasing secret documents in which Russia, since 1878, had repeatedly stated that

Austria-Hungary had a free hand in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar. At the same time,

Germany stated it would only continue its active involvement in negotiations if Russia accepted the annexation.

Under these pressures, Russia agreed to the annexation,[50]

and persuaded Serbia to do the same. The Treaty of

Berlin then was amended by correspondence between capitals from April 7 to April 19, 1909, to reflect the

annexation.

The Balkan Wars (19121913)

Main articles: First Balkan War and Second Balkan War

The Balkan Wars in 1912-1913 led to increased international tension between Russia and Austria as well as a

strengthening of Serbia and a weakening of Turkey and Bulgaria which might otherwise have kept Serbia in

check thus disrupting the balance of power in Europe in favor of Russia.

Russia initially agreed to avoid territorial changes, but later in 1912 supported Serbia's demand for an Albanian

port. An international conference was held in London in 1912-1913 where it was agreed to create an

independent Albania, however both Serbia and Montenegro refused to comply. After an Austrian, and then aninternational naval demonstration in early 1912 and Russia's withdrawal of support Serbia backed down.

Montenegro was not as compliant and on May 2, the Austrian council of ministers met and decided to give

Montenegro a last chance to comply and if it would not then to resort to military action, however seeing the

Austrian military preparations the Montenegrins requested the ultimatum be delayed and complied.[51]

The Serbian government having failed to get Albania now demanded that the other spoils of the First Balkan

War be reapportioned, and Russia failed to pressure it to back down. Serbia and Greece allied against Bulgaria,

which responded with a preemptive strike against their forces beginning the Second Balkan War.[52]

The

Bulgarian army however crumbled quickly when Turkey and Romania joined the war.


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Louis P. Bnzet's map of "Europe As

It Should Be" (1918), depicting

imagined nations based on ethnic and

linguistic criteria. Bnzet's bookThe

World War and What was Behind It

(1918) blamed on German aggression

combined with perceived threats to the

traditional social order from radicals

and ethnic nationalists.

The Balkan Wars strained the German/Austro-Hungarian alliance. The attitude of the German government to

Austrian requests of support against Serbia was initially both divided and inconsistent. However, after the

German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912, it was clear that Germany was not ready to support Austria-

Hungary in a war against Serbia and her likely allies.

In addition, German diplomacy before, during, and after the Second Balkan War was pro-Greek and

pro-Romanian and in opposition with Austria-Hungary's increasingly pro-Bulgarian views. The result was

tremendous damage to Austro-German relations. Austrian foreign minister Leopold von Berchtold remarked to

German ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky in July 1913 that "Austria-Hungary might as well belong to the

other grouping for all the good Berlin had been".[53]

In September 1913, it was learned that Serbia was moving into Albania and Russia was doing nothing to restrain

it while the Serbian government would not guarantee to respect Albania's territorial integrity and suggested there

would be some frontier modifications. In October 1913, it was decided by the council of ministers that Serbia be

sent a warning followed by an ultimatum, that Germany and Italy be notified that there would be some action

and asked for support, and that spies be sent to ascertain if there was an actual withdrawal. Serbia responded to

the warning with defiance and the Ultimatum was dispatched on October 17 and received the following day

demanding that Serbia evacuate Albanian territory within eight days. Serbia complied, and the Kaiser made a

congratulatory visit to Vienna to try to fix some of the damage done earlier in the year.[54]

The conflicts demonstrated that a localized war in the Balkans could alter the balance of power without

provoking general war and reinforced the attitude in the Austrian government. That had been developing since

the Bosnian annexation crisis that ultimatums were the only effective means of influencing Serbia and that

Russia would not back its refusal with force. They also dealt catastrophic damage to the Habsburg economy.

Historiography

Main article: Historiography of the Causes of World War I

During the period immediately following the end of hostilities, Anglo-

American historians argued that Germany was solely responsible for the

start of the war. However, academic work in the English-speaking world

in the later 1920s and 1930s blamed participants more equally.

Since 1960, the tendency has been to reassert the guilt of Germany, i.e.,

The Berlin War Party, although some historians have argued for shared

guilt or pointed to the Entente.

See also

American entry into World War I

Causes of World War II

European Civil War

History of the Balkans

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^ Henig, Ruth B. (2002). The origins of the First World War. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-26205-4.1.

^ Lieven, D. C. B. (1983).Russia and the origins of the First World War. New York: St. Martin's Press.2.


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ISBN 0-312-69608-6.

âbc

Fromkin, David. Europe's last summer: who started the Great War in 1914?. New York : Knopf : 2004..

p. 102. ISBN 978-0375411564.

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hijklm

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York : Knopf : 2004.. pp. 8892. ISBN 978-0375411564.

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^ The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany by John C. G. Rhl; Translated by

Terence F. Cole, Cambridge University Press; 288 pages. p. 257.

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Rhl, John C G. 1914: Delusion or Design. Elek. pp. 2932. ISBN 0236154664.6.

^ ab Fromkin, David.Europe's last summer: who started the Great War in 1914?. New York : Knopf : 2004..pp. 8082. ISBN 978-0375411564.

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^ Howard, Michael Europe on the Eve of the First World War pages 21-34 from The Outbreak of World War I

edited by Holger Herwig, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997 page 26

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Fromkin, David. Europe's last summer: who started the Great War in 1914?. New York : Knopf : 2004..

pp. 12425. ISBN 978-0375411564.

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^ Dedijer, Vladimir. The Road to Sarajevo, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1966, p 39810.

^ Van Evera, Stephen. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." (Summer 1984), p. 62.11.

^ Fischer, Fritz. "War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914." trans. (1975), p. 69.12.

^ Sagan, Scott D. 1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability (1986)13.

^ Albertini (1965) page viii14.

^ * Fischer, Fritz Germany's Aims In the First World War, W. W. Norton; 1967 ISBN 0-393-05347-415.

^ ab Ferguson, Niall The Pity of WarBasic Books, 1999 ISBN 0-465-05712-816.

^ Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and his Times, Houghton Mifflin (1964) p. 43417.

^ Owen, Robert Latham. The Russian Imperial Conspiracy, 1892-1914, A and C Boni, New York, 1927, pp 78-8118.

^ Albertini, Luigi. Origins of the War of 1914, Oxford University Press, London, 1953, Vol II, pg. 19719.

^ Owen, Robert Latham. The Russian Imperial Conspiracy, 1892-1914, A and C Boni, New York, 1927, pp 9320.

^ Wank, Soloman (1997). "The Habsburg Empire". In Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen. After Empire:

Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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^ Garland, John (1997). "The Strength of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1914 (Part 1)"

(http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~semp/strength1.htm) .New Perspective. http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~semp

/strength1.htm. Retrieved May 15, 2010.

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^ Williamson, Samuel R. (1991).Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War. St. Martin's Press.

p. 15. ISBN 0-312-05239-1.

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^ Bridge, F.R. (2002). "The Foreign Policy of the Monarchy". In Mark Cornwall. The Last years of Austria-

Hungary. Exeter: University of Exeter Press. p. 26.

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^ Fellner, Fritz (1995). "Austria-Hungary". In Keith Wilson.Decisions for War. New York: St. Martin's Press.25.

âb

Leslie, John (1993). Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer. ed. "The Antecedents of Austria-Hungarys

War Aims". Wiener Beitrge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit20: 307394.

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^ Sked, Alan (1989). The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815-1918. Burnt Mill: Longman Group.

p. 254.

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^ Williamson, Samuel R. (1991).Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War. St. Martin's Press.

ISBN 0-312-05239-1.

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^ Bukharin, N., (1972), Imperialism and World Economy, (London).29.

^ Sean McMeekin, 'The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's bid for world power. 2010,

ISBN 978-0-674-05739-5

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^ Jastrow, 1917. page 97 in 'The War and the Bagdad Railway' (http://www.archive.org/details

/warandthebagdadr001985mbp)

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^ AF Pollard, 1919. 'A Short History of the Great War' accessible at (http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3

/pollard/HistoryWar.pdf)

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^ [1] (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35876.htm)33.

^ Pollard, 1919. 'A Short History of the Great War' chapter 19, p204. available at [2] (http://Socserv.mcmaster.ca

/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/pollard/HistoryWar.pdf)

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^ How War Came About Between Great Britain and Germany; H E Legge35.

^ Albertini, Luigi. Origins of the War of 1914, Oxford University Press, London, 1953, Vol II pp 461-462, 46536.

^ The Treaty of Alliance Between Germany and Turkey (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/turkgerm.htm) August37.


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2, 1914

^ab

Taylor, A. J. P. (1954). The Struggle For Mastery In Europe 1848-1918. Oxford University Press. p. 524.

ISBN 0-19-881270-1.

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^ Ferguson 1999, p. 82.39.

^ Ferguson 1999, pp. 8385.40.

^ Lambert, Nicholas A. "British Naval Policy, 1913-1914: Financial Limitation and Strategic Revolution" The

Journal of Modern History, 67, no.3 (1995), pages 623-626.

41.

^ Tuchman, Barbara (1962). The Guns of August. New York: Random House.42.

^ Taylor, A. J. P. "War by Timetable: How the First World War Began" (London, 1969)43. ^ Trachtenberg, Marc "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914" International Security Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990-1991),

141.

44.

^ab

Stevenson, David "War by Timetable? The Railway Race before 1914" Past and Present, 162 (1999), 192.

Also see Williamson Samuel R. Jr. and Ernest R. May "An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914" The

Journal of Modern History 79, (June 2007), 361-362, or Trachtenberg, Marc "The Meaning of Mobilization in

1914" International Security Vol. 15, No. 3 (1990-1991), 140-141.

45.

^ Tuchman, Barbara (1962). The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan. p. 72. ISBN 627515.46.

^ Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (1980) pp 464-7047.

^ Albertini, Luigi. Origins of the War of 1914, Enigma Books, New York, 2005, Vol I, p 218-21948.

^ Albertini, Luigi. Origins of the War of 1914, Enigma Books, New York, 2005, Vol I, p 27749.

^ Albertini, Luigi. Origins of the War of 1914, Enigma Books, New York, 2005, Vol I, p 28750.

^ Williamson, Samuel R. Jr.,Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 125-140.51.^ Williamson, Samuel R. Jr.,Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 143-145.52.

^ Williamson, Samuel R. Jr.,Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 147-149.53.

^ Williamson, Samuel R. Jr.,Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 151-154.54.

Further reading

Albertini, Luigi. The Origins of the War of 1914, trans. Isabella M. Massey, 3 vols., London, Oxford University

Press, 1952

Barnes, Harry ElmerThe Genesis Of The World War; An Introduction To The Problem Of War Guilt, New York,

Knopf, 1929 OCLC 3300340 (http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/3300340)

Barnes, Harry ElmerIn Quest Of Truth And Justice: De-bunking The War Guilt Myth, New York: Arno Press, 1972,1928 ISBN 0-405-00414-1

Carter, Miranda Three Emperors: Three Cousins, Three Empires and the Road to the First World War. London,

Penguin, 2009. ISBN 978-0-670-91556-9

Engdahl, F.William,A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order (1994) ISBN

0-7453-2310-3

Evans, R. J. W. and Hartmut Pogge Von Strandman, eds. The Coming of the First World War(1990), essays by

scholars from both sides ISBN 0-19-822899-6

Fay, Sidney The Origins Of The World War, New York: Macmillan, 1929, 1928 OCLC 47080822

(http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/47080822) .

Ferguson, Niall The Pity of WarBasic Books, 1999 ISBN 0-465-05712-8

Fischer, FritzFrom Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German history, 1871-1945, Allen &

Unwin, 1986 ISBN 0-04-943043-2

Fischer, Fritz. Germany's Aims In the First World War, W. W. Norton; 1967 ISBN 0-393-05347-4

Fischer, Fritz. War of Illusions:German policies from 1911 to 1914 Norton, 1975 ISBN 0-393-05480-2

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The French Yellow Book(http://www.amazon.com/French-Yellow-

Book-Diplomatic-ebook/dp/B004J8HUMK/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1296587311&sr=8-2) : Diplomatic

Documents (1914)

Hawk, MikeEurope's Last Summer: Who Started The Great War in 1914?, Knopf 2004 ISBN 0-375-41156-9

Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics Cambridge University Press, 1981 ISBN 0-521-24018-2

Hamilton, Richard and Herwig, Holger. Decisions for War, 1914-1917Cambridge University Press, 2004 ISBN

0-521-83679-4

Henig, Ruth The Origins of the First World War (2002) ISBN 0-415-26205-4


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Hillgruber, Andreas Germany and the Two World Wars, Harvard University Press, 1981 ISBN 0-674-35321-8

Rolf Hobson.Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan (2002)

ISBN 0-391-04105-3

Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War (1984) ISBN 0-582-49016-2

Keiger, John F.V.France and the Origins of the First World War, St. Martin's Press, 1983 ISBN 0-312-30292-4

Kennedy, Paul The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, Allen & Unwin, 1980 ISBN 0-04-940060-6.

Kennedy, Paul M. (ed.). The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914. (1979) ISBN 0-04-940056-8

Knutsen, Torbjrn L. The Rise and Fall of World Orders Manchester University Press, 1999 ISBN 0-7190-4057-4

Kuliabin A. Semin S.Russia - a counterbalancing agent to the Asia. Zavtra Rossii, #28, 17 July 1997

(http://simon31.narod.ru/article-eng.htm)

Lee, Dwight E. ed. The Outbreak of the First World War: Who Was Responsible? (1958) OCLC 66082903

(http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/66082903) , readings from, multiple points of view

Lenin,Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism Progress Publishers, Moscow, (1978)

Leslie, John (1993). The Antecedents of Austria-Hungarys War Aims, Wiener Beitrge zur Geschichte der

NeuzeitElisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer (Eds.), 20: 307-394.

Leuer, Eric A.Die Mission Hoyos. Wie sterreichisch-ungarische Diplomaten den ersten Weltkrieg begannen ,

Centaurus Verlag, Freiburg i.Br., 2011 ISBN 978-3862260485

Lieven, D.C.BRussia and the Origins of the First World War, St. Martin's Press, 1983 ISBN 0-312-69608-6

Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera (eds.) Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War(2nd

ed., Princeton UP, 1991) ISBN 0-691-02349-2

Mayer, Arno The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War Croom Helm, 1981 ISBN0-394-51141-7

Pollard, A.F. 1919. 'A Short History of the Great War' accessible at [3] (http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/~econ

/ugcm/3ll3/pollard/HistoryWar.pdf)

Ponting, Clive (2002). Thirteen Days. Chatto & Windus.

Remak, Joachim The Origins of World War I, 1871-1914, 1967 ISBN 0-03-082839-2

Ritter, Gerhard Eine neue Kriegsschuldthese? pages 657-668 fromHistorische ZeitschriftVolume 194, June

1962, translated into English as Anti-Fischer: A New War-Guilt Thesis? pages 135-142 from The Outbreak of

World War One: Causes and Responsibilities, edited by Holger Herwig, 1997

Schroeder, Paul W. (2000)Embedded Counterfactuals and World War I as an Unavoidable War

(http://www.vlib.us/wwi/resources/archives/texts/t040829a/counter.html) (PDF file)

Snyder, Jack. CivilMilitary Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984, International Security 9 #1

(1984)Steiner, ZaraBritain and the Origins of the First World WarMacmillan Press, 1977 ISBN 0-312-09818-9

Stevenson, David. Cataclysm: The First World War As Political Tragedy (2004) major reinterpretation ISBN

0-465-08184-3

Stevenson, David. The First World War and International Politics (2005)

Strachan, Hew. The First World War: Volume I: To Arms (2004): the major scholarly synthesis. Thorough coverage

of 1914; Also: The First World War(2004): a 385pp version of his multivolume history

Taylor, A.J.P. War by Time-Table: How The First World War Began, Macdonald & Co., 1969 ISBN 0-356-04206-5

Tuchman, Barbara. The Guns of August, New York. The Macmillan Company, 1962. Describes the opening

diplomatic and military manoeuvres.

Turner, L. C. F. Origins of the First World War, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970. ISBN 0-393-09947-4

Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," in International Security 9

#1 (1984)

Wehler, Hans-Ulrich The German Empire, 1871-1918, Berg Publishers, 1985 ISBN 0-907582-22-2

Weikart, Richard,From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary ethics, Eugenics and Racism in Germany. 2004 ISBN

1-4039-6502-1

Williamson, Samuel R.Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, St. Martin's Press, 1991 ISBN

0-312-05239-1

Williamson, Jr., Samuel R. and Ernest R. May. "An Identity of Opinion: Historians and July 1914,"Journal of

Modern History, June 2007, Vol. 79 Issue 2, pp 335387 in JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/519317)

comprehensive historiography


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External links

Overview of Causes and Primary Sources (http://www.firstworldwar.com/origins/causes.htm)

Russia - Getting Too Strong for Germany (http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/historian

/hist_stone_01_russia.html) by Norman Stone

The Origins of World War One (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml) : An

article by Dr. Gary Sheffield at the BBC History site.

Kuliabin A. Semine S. Some of aspects of state national economy evolution in the system of theinternational economic order.- USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES FAR EAST DIVISION INSTITUTE

FOR ECONOMIC & INTERNATIONAL OCEAN STUDIES Vladivostok, 1991 (http://simon31.narod.ru

/syndromeofsocialism.htm)

The Evidenc in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by

the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia (http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/31457) by James

M. Beck

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