Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22579             February 23, 1968

ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner, vs.HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

          In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in the negative. We sustain him.

          The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow.

FACTS: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia."

On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character.

On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

          Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.

          In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.

          Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are

automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article. . . ." 2

          This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first be declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."

          To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question — we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ."

          The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

          Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

          WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With costs.1äwphï1.ñët

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

RULING!!!

((**The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that

the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

))

 

S u n d a y , A u g u s t 1 2 , 2 0 1 2

LANDICHO VS RELOVA Case Digest

LANDICHO V. RELOVA

Facts:On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I,

presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendantElvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

Issue: Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.

Ruling:Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a

civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue. "The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the

Search

criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16874             February 27, 1961

DIOSDADO S. MENDIOLA, DOMINGO B. JOLA, TEODORO G. DE LA CRUZ, and HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., petitioners, vs.HON. HIGINO MACADAEG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, PABLO ROMAN, RAMON RACELIS, ARMANDO ABAD, JR., JUAN J. BUENAFE, LUCIANO BUENAFE, HELMUTH HOLLNSTEINER, CONSUELO S. PEREZ, MELCHOR TUAZON, JR., MARIA TERESA CONUI, and VICENTE R. DE LEON, respondents.

Laurel Law Offices for petitioners.Norberto S. Quisumbing for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and/or mandamus filed by the City Fiscal of Manila, together with Diosdado Mendiola, Domingo Jola, and Teodoro C. de la Cruz, minority stockholders of the Republic Savings Bank, seeking to nullify the preliminary writ of injunction issued in Civil Case No. 41454 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, restraining the petitioner City Fiscal from proceeding with his investigation of a complaint for falsification of public and/or commercial documents filed against respondents Pablo Roman, Ramon Racelis, Armando Abad, Jr., Juan J. Buenafe, Luciano Buenafe, Helmuth Hollnsteiner, Consuelo S. Perez, Melchor Tuazon, Jr., Maria Teresa Conui, and Vicente R. de Leon.

The antecedents are as follows: .

In a letter-complaint dated March 2, 1959, later amended on May 9, 1959, and filed with the City Fiscal of Manila,

Diosdado S. Mendiola, Domingo B. Jola, and Teodoro S. de la Cruz, minority stockholders of the Republic Savings Bank, accused Pablo Roman, Ramon Racelis Luciano F. Buenafe, Juan J. Buenafe, Maria Teresa Conui, and Vicente R. de Leon (officials and employees of the Republic Savings Bank), together with Helmuth Hollnsteiner, Armando Abad, Jr., Consuelo Salazar-Perez, Melchor Tuazon, Jr., John Doe, Peter Doe, James Doe, Richard Doe, and Mary Doe, of the crime of falsification of public and/or commercial documents under Article 171, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, and Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Sections 75, 76, 77, 78, 83, and 87 of the Banking Act (Republic Act 337), allegedly committed by the respondents Bank officials and employees, in connivance with the other respondents, in preparing or causing the preparation of the following documents: .

Deeds of absolute sale.

(1) Four deeds of absolute sale, all dated December 10 1957, by virtue of which Pablo M. Sarangaya purportedly sold and conveyed ownership of the properties separately described therein unto Felizardo Africa, Honorato Galang, Raul Suarez, and Conrado Enrile, respectively. These deeds were all signed by Melchor Tuazon, Jr. and Peter Doe, as witnesses, and notarized and acknowledged by Armando Abad, Jr.

(2) Four deeds of mortgage, all dated December 11, 1957, allegedly executed by vendee Africa, Galang, Suarez, and Enrile in favor of the Republic Savings Bank, to secure their respective loans of P85,000.00, P210,000.00, P250,000.00, and P200,000.00, incurred to pay the balance of the purchase price of the

aforementioned properties. Said deeds of mortgage were witnessed by Maria Teresa Conui and John Doe, and notarized and acknowledged by Luciano F. Buenafe.

(3) Four deeds of sale with assumption of mortgage, all dated September 3, 1958, allegedly executed by Felizardo Africa, Honorato Galang, Raul Suarez, and Conrado Enrile, the first two in favor of the Beneficial Financing Corporation of which Consuelo S. Perez is the President and majority stockholder, and the other two in favor of Consuelo Salazar-Perez personally.

Specifically, the charge was that respondents made untruthful statements in the respective narration of facts, by causing it to appear in said deeds that the alleged vendees Africa, Galang, Suarez, and Enrile took part in the acts and proceedings indicated therein when in fact they did not; that by the unlawful and deliberate preparation, execution, and accomplishment of the aforementioned documents, the Register of Deeds of Rizal was induced to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title for each of said properties, and the registration thereof in the names of Africa, Galang, Suarez, and Enrile, and to register the deeds of mortgage allegedly executed by the purchasers in favor of the Republic Savings Bank, as well as the supposed subsequent sale of the same properties, subject to said mortgages, in favor of Consuelo Salazar-Perez and the Beneficial Financing Corporation (of which Mrs. Perez is the President and majority stockholder); that by virtue of such fraudulent transactions, respondents were able to cause the unlawful disbursement of the funds of the Republic Savings Bank in the total sum of P745,000.00 in violation of their trust and which could not have been accomplished without the misrepresentations and falsifications complained of. This complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 6876 of the City Fiscal's Office.

With full knowledge of the filing of this complaint in the respondent City Fiscal's Office, and notwithstanding the summons issued by this official, the Beneficial Financing Corporation and Consuelo Salazar-Perez, on April 3, 1959, entered into a contract with Top Service, Inc. whereby they promised to sell to the latter the four (4) parcels of land for the sum of P794,764.30 for the first two parcels, and P597,031.30 for the last two parcels. Subsequently, Beneficial Financing Corporation conveyed the two parcels of land it obtained from Africa and Galang to Mrs. Perez who thereby became the owner of the four parcels. There-after, respondents filed a motion to quash the criminal complaint and an alternative motion to postpone the investigation on the ground that the nullity of the mortgage contracts is a prejudicial question to the charge for falsification. Evidently to bolster up this theory, Top Service, Inc. subsequently instituted in the Court of First Instance of Pasig (Civil Case No. 5584) an action against Consuelo Salazar-Perez purportedly "to quiet title" of Mrs. Perez, alleging, among others, the agreement to sell secured in its favor in virtue of which plaintiff averred to have already paid the total amount of P50,000.00 as advance payment, and was to undertake, as it did undertake, to subdivide the parcels of land into small lots, lay out streets and plazas; that it had already spent more than P300,000.00 and was expected to spend around P1,000,000.00 more to complete the subdivision work; that it learned of the filing by the three minority stockholders of the Republic Savings Bank of the complaint for falsification involving the parcels subject of their contract; that such proceeding was prejudicial to its lights, title, and interest under the aforementioned promise to sell. Thus, it was prayed that the court render judgment "to remove such cloud or to quiet the title of the aforesaid real property".

The defendant, Consuelo Salazar-Perez answered the complaint denying the alleged falsification and asserting the validity of her title over the said properties.

After the issues in said civil case have thus been apparently joined, the respondents in I.S. No. 6976 of the City Fiscal's Office reiterated their motion to quash or suspend the investigation of the criminal complaint, inviting attention to the civil action filed in Pasig and insisting that the same is an existing prejudicial civil question that warrants the suspension of the preliminary investigation. Upon its denial by the investigating fiscal, respondents appealed to the City Fiscal. Ruling that a decision in Civil Case No. 5584, filed in Pasig, purportedly to quiet title over the properties involved therein, is not essential to the determination of the criminal liability of the respondents for falsification as charged in the complaint, the City Fiscal ordered the continuation of the preliminary investigation, setting the same for September 16, 1959, at 1:30 P.M. On the appointed date, but before the actual investigation could take place, however, the City Fiscal received a writ of preliminary injunction, issued ex-parte by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 41454,1 enjoining him to refrain from conducting the preliminary investigation of I.S. 6976. Their separate motions to dismiss the case and to dissolve the injunction having been denied, the City Fiscal, together with the complainants in the criminal investigation, filed the instant petition for the purpose heretofore stated, viz, to stated aside the preliminary writ of injunction restraining the City Fiscal from proceeding with his investigation.

The only question to be resolved in this instance is whether the proceedings in I.S. No. 6976 of the City Fiscal's Office may be stopped or suspended pending the final determination of the question involved in Civil Case No. 5584 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) or, differently stated, whether Civil Case No. 5584 is a prejudicial civil action to the falsification ease subject of I.S. No. 6976.

In the leading case of De Leon v. Mabanag (70 Phil. 202), cited by both parties, this Court, providing the criteria of when a prejudicial civil question exists, stated:

. . .por regla general, el tribunal que entiende de un asunto criminal tiene competencia para decidir cuestiones prejudiciales, para solo el efecto de la represion, cuando tales cuestiones aparezcan tan intimamente ligadas al hecho punible que sea racionalmente impossible su separacion. Pero el articulo 4. consagra una excepcion, y es cuando la question prejudicial sea determinante de la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado, en cuyo caso el tribunal que conoce de la causa criminal debe suspender esta y hacer que se falle la question prejudicial en juicio civil o administrativo. Esto es exactamente lo que ocurre ahora La falsification del documento V-1, o mejor dicho, los hechos en que cosisten la misma y su sustitucion durante el curso del juicio afectan directamente a la moralidad del recurrente como miembro del foro y es deber de este Tribunal determiner si el mismo es culpable de malas practicas determination que constituvo en este caso la cuestion prejudicial de caracter administrativo que debe resolverse separadamente en el expedients administrativo en vista de que determinara a su vez la culpabilidad o inocencia del recurrente en relacion con el proceso criminal por el delito de falsification. . . . La necesidad de suspender la investigacion preliminar que ha iniciado el recurrido asi como la incoacion del proceso criminal por el delito de falsification del documento V-1 resulta mas patente si se considera que la falsedad del documento y su sustitucion se hallan aun sub-judice y si este Tribunal decidiese que el mismo es genuino y no ha sido sustituido y por consiguiente el recurrente no es culpable de malas practicas, tal fallo estaria en pugna con el critirio sustantado por el recurrido."(Emphasis supplied.)

ISSUE: Under the foregoing doctrine, for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending its (civil case) final determination, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issues or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

HELD: In the case at bar, the burden of the criminal complaint (I.S. No. 6976) is that the falsification therein charged had caused the fraudulent and illegal disbursements of he funds of the Republic Savings Bank in violation of the Banking Law and of the Revised Penal Code. The validity of the transfers of ownership over the land is but an incident. Consequently, even if the ownership of Consuelo Salazar-Perez is upheld in the case to quiet title, such a decision will not finally conclude that the herein respondents, who are not parties to the said civil action, are innocent of the falsification that enabled them to obtain through fraudulent misrepresentations and false narration of facts in the public documents, the illegal disbursements of the bank's funds in the way of loans.

Moreover, the civil case is an action between Top Service, Inc. and Consuelo Salazar-Perez alone. Both parties are interests in the same proposition, the clearing of doubt in the title of Mrs. Perez, In such a situation, who would raise the question of falsification of the documents relied on by both parties? How could a judgment rendered under such circumstances be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents who could not be bound by the decision without their intervention or the intervention of those who charge the falsification? Clearly, the issue in Civil. Case No. 5594 does not constitute a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the investigation, sought to be conducted by the petitioner City Fiscal, of the criminal complaint for falsification filed in his office ahead of the civil case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and the preliminary injunction issued by the respondent court (in Civil Case No. 41454) restraining the City Fiscal of Manila from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 6976 dissolved. Costs are taxed against the respondents, petitioners in said Civil Case No. 41454. So ordered.

Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 A complaint against the City Fiscal and complainants Mendiola, Jola, and De la Cruz, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the City Fiscal from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 6976, and for the declaration, after trial, that a prejudicial question exists in Civil Case No. 5584 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, vs.HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.

Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.

Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.

City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

 

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.

In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.

A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.

The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case. 5

HELD: The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case ofLandicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:

**The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still

subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995

ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, petitioners, vs.HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL, respondents.

 

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, at Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners oral motion for the suspension of their arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled: "People of the Philippines v. Isabelo Apa; Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan," as well as their motion for reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772 otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. The information alleges:

That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapulapu City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [herein

petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan], conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of the absence or tolerance of the said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B of Opon Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13250, situated in Agus Lapulapu City, whereon they constructed their respective residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused have deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her damage and prejudice because despite repeated demands the said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the premises above-mentioned.

Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. 1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them.

On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had to enter their plea (not guilty) to the charge.

On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the court in its order dated September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

HELD: We hold that it is.

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2 Rule 111, §5 provides:

Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but to private respondent and against the latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession of a portion of "her property" by building their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion of her land to her damage and prejudice.

Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners criminal liability for squatting.

In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil case rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and her husband and declared the lot in question to be owned in common by the spouses and the petitioners as inheritance from their parents Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the decision in that case is not yet final because they have filed a motion for new trial, the point is that whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of ownership, such resolution will be determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are co-owners of the lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because they are as much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as are the private respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her family. 3

Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of a land can be ejected from his property since the only issue in such a case is the right to its physical possession. Consequently, they contend, he can also be prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law.

The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner of a piece of land can be ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in the case at bar, no such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather private respondent claims the right to possession based on her claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been resolved with finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if the civil case is decided and terminated adversely against petitioners. Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal case.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111244.  December 15, 1997]

ARTURO ALANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A. LANZANAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO CARLOS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28150 which affirmed in toto the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37[2] denying petitioner’s motion for the suspension of proceeding of Criminal Case No. 90-84933, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Arturo Alano” as well as his motion for reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 90-84933 is a prosecution for the crime of estafa.  The information[3] alleges:

“That on or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, pretending to be still the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he had previously sold the same to the said Roberto S. Carlos for P30,000.00, sold the aforesaid property for the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy

forP87,900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said parcel of land, to the damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine currency.

Contrary to law.”

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch 68.  The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103 and entitled “Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, et al.,” concerns the nullity of the sale and recovery of possession and damages.   In the aforementioned Civil Case, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale of said parcel of land made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was previously sold to them.  In his answer, petitioner contends that he never sold the property to the private respondents and that his signature appearing in the deed of absolute sale in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent.  At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was filed on March 1, 1985, five years before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.

On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioner’s motion as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals seeking the nullification of the assailed order.

On July 26, 1993,[4] the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, the decretal portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding no merit to the petition, the same is hereby DISMISSED, with cost against petitioner.”

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: The only issue in this petition is whether the pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed against the petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of absolute sale in favor of private respondent was a forgery, such that there was no second sale covering the said parcel of land.  Otherwise stated, if the Court in the said Civil Case rules that the first sale to herein private respondent was null and void, due to the forgery of petitioner’s signature in the first deed of sale, it follows that the criminal case for estafa would not prosper.

While at first blush there seems to be merit in petitioner’s claim, we are compelled to affirm the Court of Appeals’ findings.

The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved such resolution would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action. [5] In other words, if both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied.[6]

On the basis of the foregoing and a perusal of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, the disposition of the issue raised need not unduly detain us.  We have already ruled that a criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale of property) is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the defense of the alleged vendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed.[7]

Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial question involved, the Court of Appeals still affirmed the Order of the trial court denying petitioner’s motion for the suspension of the proceeding on the ground that petitioner, in the stipulation of facts, had already admitted during the pre-trial order dated October 5, 1990 of the criminal case the validity of his signature in the first deed of sale between him and the private respondent, as well as his subsequent acknowledgment of his signature in twenty-three (23) cash vouchers evidencing the payments made by the  private respondent. [8] Moreover, it was also noted by the Court of Appeals that petitioner even wrote to the private respondent offering to refund whatever sum the latter had paid.[9]

In this regard, the pre-trial provision on criminal procedure found in Rule 118 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Sec. 2.  Pre-trial conference; subjects. x x x.  The pre-trial conference shall consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining

(b)Stipulation of facts”

From the foregoing, there is no question that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties [10] and by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the defense waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit.[11]

Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by the petitioner resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf.  While it is true that the right to present evidence is guaranteed under the Constitution,[12] this right may be waived expressly or impliedly.[13]

Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a procedural matter, the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused.  After all, the doctrine of waiver is made solely for the benefit and protection  of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large.[14]

Accordingly, petitioner’s  admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial  of the criminal  amounts to a waiver  of his defense of forgery in the civil case.  Hence, we have no reason to nullify such waiver, it being not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.[15] Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner himself.  As such, the rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies. [16]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated  July 26, 1993 is AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148193.  January 16, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the May 31, 2001 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which reversed and set aside the January 23, 2001 order[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 7668-00 denying respondent’s motion for deferment of arraignment.

Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz,[4] represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a 42,443 square meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 687599 in the name of Cecilia de la Cruz.  They further represented that they acquired said lot, which was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu.  Relying on the representations of respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned lot.

In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over the subject lot.   PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to respondent and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is not on file with the Register of Deeds.

In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu.  Despite written and verbal demands, respondent and his mother refused to return the amount of P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.

On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, an action for “Injunctive Relief” docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other John Does. [5] Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.

On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for “Damages and Attachment,” docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. [6] Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and pendency of Civil Case No. SCA 1759.[7]

On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.[8]

On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381.[9]On January 27, 2000, the trial court denied respondent’s motion.

A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27, 2001.[10]

Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa through falsification case.[11] The Court of Appeals granted respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a resolution dated March 19, 2001.[12]

On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the trial court and permanently enjoining it from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case until the civil cases for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall have been finally decided.

Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed against the respondent.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.  The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.  It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.  For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.[13]

If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied.   It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.  If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. [14]

HELD: In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.  The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot.  Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability.   An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents.  Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil

Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.

Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document.  Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.[15] Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party.  It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.  In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Thus, in Rojas v. People,[16] the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee.  Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed.  The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:

… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 “Caterpillar” Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was “free from all liens and encumbrances” will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides: “In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.” (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not made with “grave abuse of discretion.”

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.  As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED.  The May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed with the arraignment and trial in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. 

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x  

D E C I S I O N

  CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

 

            This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the (1) Resolution[1] dated 5 March 2001 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 entitled, “Francisco Magestrado v. Hon. Estrella T. Estrada, in her capacity as the

Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 83 of Quezon City, People of the Philippines and Elena M. Librojo,”

which dismissed petitioner Francisco Magestrado’s Petition for Certiorari for being the wrong remedy; and

(2)  Resolution[2] dated 3 May 2001 of the same Court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

 

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo   filed a criminal complaint[3] for perjury against petitioner with the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.

 

After the filing of petitioner’s counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor

recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner.  Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine

Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon

City.  Pertinent portions of the information are hereby quoted as follows:

           That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an untruthful statement under oath upon a material matter before a competent officer authorized to receive and administer oath and which the law so require, to wit:  the said accused subscribe and swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc. No. 168, Page No. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely alleging that he lost Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-173163, which document was used in support of a Petition For Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as LRC# Q-10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and assigned to Branch 99 of the said court, to which said Francisco M. Mag[e]strado signed and swore on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No. CLXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit and petition are false, the truth of the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and as a  consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan, thus, making untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elena M. Librojo.[4]

 

          The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43, where it was docketed as Criminal Case No.

90721 entitled, “People of the Philippinesv. Francisco Magestrado.”

         

          On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion[5] for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question.

Petitioner alleged that  Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of

Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved first

before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related

to the issues raised in the criminal action. 

          On 14 July 1999, MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order [6] denying petitioner’s motion for suspension of proceedings, thus:

 Acting on the “Motion for Suspension of Proceedings” filed by the [herein petitioner

Magestrado], thru counsel, and the “Comment and Opposition thereto, the Court after an evaluation of the same, finds the aforesaid motion without merit, hence, is hereby DENIED, it appearing that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil actions is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Hence, the trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning.

  

On 17 August 1999, a motion[7] for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but was denied by the MeTC in an Order[8] dated 19 October 1999.

 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a

prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, on the ground that  MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the  proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

 On 14 March 2000, RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of

preliminary injunction, reasoning thus: 

Scrutinizing the complaints and answers in the civil cases abovementioned, in relation to the criminal action for PERJURY, this Court opines and so holds that there is no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of the criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases.  The civil cases are principally for determination whether or not a loan was obtained by petitioner and whether or not he executed the deed of real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163, whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes upon petitioner the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to support his petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 173163. Whether or not he committed perjury is the issue in the criminal case which may be resolved independently of the civil cases. Note that the affidavit of loss was executed in support of the petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 which petition was raffled to Branch 99 of the RTC.  x x x.[10]

  

Again, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [11] but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83 in an Order[12] dated 21 December 2000.

 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari[13] under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63293.  Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358, and in effect sustaining the denial by MeTC-Branch 43 of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721, as well as his subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof.

 On 5 March 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed[14] the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 on the ground

that petitioner’s remedy should have been an appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358.  The Court of Appeals ruled that:

 Is this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65  the correct and appropriate remedy?

We rule negatively.

The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may be appealed x x x under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules. Thus, the said rule provides:

Section 10. Time for filing memoranda on special cases. In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record x x x.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby DISMISSED.[15]

 

 The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration[16] in a Resolution[17] dated 3 May 2001.

 

          Hence, petitioner comes before us via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of

Court raising the following issues:

 1.      Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated March 14, 2000 denying

petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and her subsequent Order dated December 21, 2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed can only be reviewed by the Court of Appeals thru appeal under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

 2.      Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon

City, had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari and petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration on the ground of a prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the prevailing jurisprudence.

  

After consideration of the procedural and substantive issues raised by petitioner, we find the instant petition

to be without merit.

 

The procedural issue herein basically hinges on the proper remedy which petitioner should have availed

himself of before the Court of Appeals: an ordinary appeal or a petition for certiorari.  Petitioner claims that he

correctly questioned RTC-Branch 83’s Order of dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358

through a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.  Private respondent and public respondent People of

the Philippinesinsist that an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy. 

 

We agree with respondents.  We hold that the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitioner’s Petition

for Certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (and not under Rule 44, Section 10,

invoked by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 5 March 2001).

 

  The correct procedural recourse for petitioner was appeal, not only because RTC-Branch 83 did not

commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-

39358  but also because RTC-Branch 83’s Order of dismissal was a final order from which petitioners should have

appealed in accordance with Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.     

 

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more

can be done with it in the trial court.  In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court.  Au

contraire, an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards

the merits of the latter.[18]  RTC-Branch 83’s Order dated 14 March 2001 dismissing petitioner’s Petition

for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358 finally disposes of the said case and RTC-Branch 83 can do nothing more

with the case.

 

Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely

disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised Rules of Court to be

appealable.  The manner of appealing an RTC judgment or final order is also provided in Rule 41 as follows:

 

Section 2.  Modes of appeal. — 

            (a)     Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.  No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require.  In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.  

Certiorari generally lies only when there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy

available to petitioners.  Here, appeal was available.  It was adequate to deal with any question whether of fact or of

law, whether of error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion or error of judgment which the trial court might have

committed.  But petitioners instead filed a special civil action for certiorari. 

 

We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court lies only when “there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”[19]  Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal

a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,[20] certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal.[21]

 

As certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal, we have repeatedly emphasized that the perfection of

appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and that the

failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision of the trial court final and executory.  This rule is founded upon the

principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law but is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only

in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.  Neither can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules

of technicality must yield to the broader interest of substantial justice.  While every litigant must be given the amplest

opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from constraints of technicalities, the failure to

perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality.   It raises a jurisdictional problem as it

deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal.[22]

 

The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. [23]  A party

cannot substitute the special civil action ofcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of

appeal.  The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action

for certiorari.[24]  As this Court held in Fajardo v. Bautista[25]:

 Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari.  The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.  Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.   Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner’s own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.

  

On 21 December 2000, petitioner received a copy of the Order of the RTC-Branch 83 denying his motion for

reconsideration of the dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-99-39358; hence, he had until 18

January 2001 within which to file an appeal with the Court of Appeals.  The Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner

on 19 February 2001 with the Court of Appeals cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.  As petitioner

failed to file a timely appeal, RTC-Branch 83’s dismissal of his Petition for Certiorari had long become final and

executory.

 

For this procedural lapse, the Court of Appeals correctly denied outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by

petitioner before it.

 

Moreover, there are even more cogent reasons for denying the instant Petition on the merits.

 

In the Petition at bar, petitioner raises several substantive issues. Petitioner harps on the need for the

suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending before MeTC-Branch 43 based on a

prejudicial question still to be resolved in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 (for cancellation of mortgage) and Civil Case No.

Q-98-34349 (for collection of a sum of money) which are pending before other trial courts.

 

For clarity, we shall first discuss the allegations of petitioner in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34308

(for cancellation of mortgage) and that of private respondent in her complaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 (for

collection of a sum of money).

 

Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 is a complaint for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages filed

on 8 May 1988 by petitioner against private respondent with RTC-Branch 77.  Petitioner alleges that he purchased a

parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 thru private respondent, a real estate broker.  In

the process of negotiation, petitioner was pressured to sign a Deed of Sale prepared by private respondent .  Upon

signing the Deed of Sale, he noticed that the Deed was already signed by a certain Cristina Gonzales as attorney-in-

fact of vendor Spouses Guillermo and Amparo Galvez.  Petitioner demanded from private respondent a special

power of attorney and authority to sell, but the latter failed to present one.  Petitioner averred that private respondent

refused to deliver the certificate of title of the land despite execution and signing of the Deed of Sale and payment of

the consideration. Petitioner was thus compelled to engage the services of one Modesto Gazmin, Jr. who agreed,

for P100,000.00 to facilitate the filing of cases against private respondent; to deliver to petitioner the certificate of title

of the land; and/or to cancel the certificate of title in possession of private respondent.  However, Mr. Gazmin, Jr., did

nothing upon receipt of the amount of P100,000.00 from petitioner.  In fact, petitioner was even charged with perjury

before the Office of the City Prosecutor, all because of Mr. Gazmin, Jr.’s wrongdoing.  Petitioner further alleged that

he discovered the existence of a spurious Real Estate Mortgage which he allegedly signed in favor of private

respondent.  Petitioner categorically denied signing the mortgage document and it was private respondent who

falsified the same in order to justify her unlawful withholding of TCT No.  N-173163 from petitioner.  Thus, petitioner

prayed for:  

 1. The cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage dated August 2, 1997 as null and void; 2.  As well as to order [herein private respondent] to DELIVER the Owner’s Duplicate

Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 to [herein petitioner]; 3.  Condemning [private respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sums of a)  P100,000.00 as MORAL DAMAGES;

 b)  P50,000.00 as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;

 c)  P50,000.00 as Attorney’s fees and

 d)  Cost of suit.

 4. A general relief is likewise prayed for (sic) just and equitable under the premises.  

Civil  Case No. Q-98-34349,[26]  on  the  other hand, is a complaint for a sum of money with

a  motion  for  issuance  of a writ of attachment filed by private respondent against petitioner on 14 May 1988 before

RTC-Branch 84.  Private respondent alleges that petitioner obtained a loan from her in the amount of   P758,134.42

with a promise to pay on or before 30 August 1997.  As security for payment of the loan, petitioner executed a Deed

of Real Estate Mortgage covering a parcel of land registered under TCT No. N-173163.   Petitioner pleaded for

additional time to pay the said obligation, to which respondent agreed. But private respondent discovered sometime

in February 1998 that petitioner executed an affidavit of loss alleging that he lost the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT

No. N-173163, and succeeded in annotating said affidavit on the original copy of TCT No. N-173163 on file with the

Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Private respondent further alleges that she also discovered that petitioner filed a

petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98,

docketed as LRC Case No. Q-10052.  Private respondent demanded that petitioner pay his obligation, but the latter

refused to do so.  Resultantly, private respondent prayed for the following:

 A.                 That upon filing of this Complaint as well as the Affidavit of attachment and a

preliminary hearing thereon, as well as bond filed, a writ of preliminary attachment is (sic) by the Honorable Court ordering the Sheriff to levy [herein petitioner] property sufficient to answer [herein private respondent’s] claim in this action;

 B.                 That after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered in [private respondent’s]

favor as against [petitioner], ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of  P758,134.42 plus interest thereon at 5% per month from September 1997 up to the date of actual payment; actual damages in the sums of P70,000.00 each under paragraphs 11 and 12 of the complaint; P200,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; twenty (20%) of the principal claim as attorney’s fees plus P2,500.00 per appearance honorarium; and P60,000.00 as litigation expense before this Honorable Court.

             [Petitioner] prays for such further relief in law, justice and equity.

  ISSUE: As to whether it is proper to suspend Criminal Case No. 90721 for perjury pending final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 and Civil Case No. Q-98-34308, we take into consideration Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

 Sec. 6.  Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. – A petition for suspension of the

criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.  When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

 Sec. 7.  Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are:  (a)

the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

  

The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid

two conflicting decisions.[27]

 

A prejudial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent

of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.  The prejudicial question must

be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in

another court or tribunal.  It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately

connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.[28]

 

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case

involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the

resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be

determined.

 

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the

criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil

case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the

resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be

determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.[29]

 

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in

the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity “that the civil case be determined first before

taking up the criminal case,” therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[30]  Neither is there

a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.[31]

 

However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and upon proper

application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case pending in

another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to

control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. 

Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first

action are settled, the second action should be stayed.[32]

 

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of

the cases on its dockets, considering its time and effort, those of counsel and the litigants.  But if proceedings must

be stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious litigations, conflicting

judgments, confusion between litigants and courts.  It bears stressing that whether or not the trial court would

suspend the proceedings in the criminal case before it is submitted to its sound discretion.[33]

 

Indeed, a judicial order issued pursuant to the court’s discretionary authority is not subject to reversal on

review unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion.  As the United States Supreme Court aptly declared in Landis v.

North American Co., “the burden of making out the justice and wisdom from the departure from the beaten truck lay

heavily on the petitioner, less an unwilling litigant is compelled to wait upon the outcome of a controversy to which he

is a stranger.  It is, thus, stated that only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one case is compelled to stand aside,

while a litigant in another, settling the rule of law that will define the rights of both is, after all, the parties before the

court are entitled to a just, speedy and plain determination of their case undetermined by the pendency of the

proceedings in another case.  After all, procedure was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote

the administration of justice.”[34]

 

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial

question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues

raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also determine the judgment

in the criminal case.

 

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 pending before RTC-

Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the determination of

whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate

mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No. N-173163.  On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before

MeTC-Branch 43, involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss

to support his request for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.

 

It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other.  Regardless

of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for

perjury.  The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing

whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.

 

MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of  Civil Case No. Q-98-34308 for

cancellation of mortgage before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 for collection of a sum of money

before RTC-Branch 84, do not pose a prejudicial question in the determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury

in Criminal Case No. 90721.  RTC-Branch 83, likewise, did not err in ruling that MeTC-Branch 43 did not commit

grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions dated 5 March 2001  and 3 May 2001of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit.  Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is hereby directed to proceed with the

hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to

the right of the accused to due process.  Costs against petitioner.

SECOND DIVISION                                                                   SY TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN         G.R. No. 174168SY, JOLIE ROSS TAN, ROMER                                 TAN, CHARLIE TAN, and JESSIE Present:JAMES TAN,                   Petitioners,                                        QUISUMBING, J.,

                                      Chairperson,                                                                   CARPIO MORALES,

                                                         TINGA,                  -  versus  -                                VELASCO, JR., and

NACHURA,  JJ.*

                               SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN        Promulgated:SY,                          Respondents.                          March 30, 2009 x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY,    G.R. No.  179438                    Petitioners,   

-         versus  -   SY TIONG SHIOU and JUANITA TAN,                   Respondents. x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x  

  

D E C I S I O N 

TINGA, J.:  

          These consolidated petitions involving the same parties. although related, dwell on  different issues. 

G.R. No. 174168.           

 

This is a petition for review[1] assailing the decision and resolution  of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May

2006 and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91416.[2]

 

          On  30 May 2003,  four criminal complaints were filed by Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy

(Spouses  Sy)  against  Sy Tiong Shiou, Juanita Tan Sy, Jolie Ross Tan, Romer Tan, Charlie Tan and Jessie James

Tan (Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.) before the  City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila.  The cases were later consolidated. Two of

the complaints, I.S. Nos. 03E-15285 and 03E-15286,[3] were for alleged  violation of Section 74 in relation to Section

144 of the Corporation Code.  In these complaints, the Spouses  Sy averred that they are stockholders and directors

of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation) who asked  Sy Tiong Shiou, et al., officers of the corporation, to allow

them to inspect the books and records of the business on three occasions to no avail.  In a letter[4] dated 21 May

2003, Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. denied the request, citing civil and intra-corporate cases pending in court. [5] 

 

          In the two other complaints, I.S. No. 03E-15287 and 03E-15288, [6] Sy Tiong Shiou was  charged with

falsification under Article 172, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and perjury under Article

183  of the RPC.  According to the Spouses  Sy, Sy Tiong Shiou executed under oath the 2003 General Information

Sheet (GIS)  wherein he falsely stated that the shareholdings of the Spouses  Sy had decreased  despite the fact that

they had not executed any conveyance of their shares.[7]

 

          Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.  argued before the prosecutor that the issues involved in the civil case for accounting and

damages pending before the RTC of Manila were intimately related to the two criminal complaints filed by the

Spouses  Sy against them, and thus constituted a prejudicial question that should require the suspension of the

criminal complaints.  They also argued that the Spouses  Sy’s  request for inspection was premature as the latter’s

concern may be properly addressed once an answer is filed in the civil case.  Sy Tiong Shiou, on the other hand,

denied the accusations against him, alleging that before the 2003 GIS was submitted to the Securities and Exchange

Commission (SEC), the same was shown to respondents, who at that time were the President/Chairman of the Board

and Assistant Treasurer of the corporation, and that they did not object to the entries in the GIS.  Sy Tiong Shiou also

argued that the issues raised in the pending civil case for accounting presented  a prejudicial question that

necessitated the suspension of criminal proceedings.

 

          On 29 December 2003, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the suspension of the

criminal complaints for violation of the Corporation Code and the dismissal of the criminal complaints for falsification

and perjury against Sy Tiong Shiou.[8]  The reviewing prosecutor approved the resolution. The Spouses  Sy  moved

for the reconsideration  of the resolution, but their motion was denied on 14 June 2004.[9]  The Spouses  Sy

thereupon filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice  (DOJ),  which the latter denied in a resolution

issued on 02 September 2004.[10] Their subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the resolution

of 20 July 2005.[11]

 

          The Spouses  Sy elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari,

imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ.  The appellate court granted the petition[12] and directed

the City Prosecutor’s Office to file the appropriate informations  against Sy Tiong Shiou,  et al. for violation of Section

74, in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code and of Articles 172 and 183 of the RPC.  The appellate

court  ruled that the civil case for accounting and damages cannot be deemed prejudicial to the maintenance or

prosecution of a criminal action for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code since a

finding in the civil case that respondents mishandled or misappropriated the funds would not be determinative of their

guilt or innocence in the criminal complaint.  In the same manner, the criminal complaints for falsification and/or

perjury should not have been dismissed on the ground of prejudicial question because the accounting case is

unrelated  and not necessarily determinative of the success or failure of the falsification or perjury

charges.   Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that  there was probable cause that Sy Tiong Shiou had committed

falsification and that the City of Manila where the 2003 GIS was executed is the proper venue for the institution of the

perjury charges.  Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. sought reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but their motion was

denied.[13]

                

          On 2 April 2008, the Court ordered the consolidation  of G.R. No. 179438 with G.R. No. 174168.[14]

 

          Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argue that findings of the DOJ in affirming, modifying or reversing the recommendations

of the public prosecutor cannot be the subject of certiorari or review of the Court of Appeals because the DOJ is not a

quasi-judicial body within the purview of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.   Petitioners rely on the separate

opinion of former Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[15] wherein he wrote that this

Court should not be called upon to determine the existence of probable cause, as there is no provision of law

authorizing an aggrieved party to petition for such a determination. [16] In any event, they argue, assuming without

admitting that the findings of the DOJ may be subject to judicial review under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court, the DOJ has not committed any grave abuse of discretion in affirming the findings of the City Prosecutor of

Manila. They claim that the Spouses Sy’s  request for inspection was not made in good faith and that their motives

were tainted with the intention to harass and to intimidate Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.   from pursuing the criminal and civil

cases  pending before the prosecutor’s office and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,  Branch 46. Thus, to

accede to the Spouses Sy’s request would pose serious threats to the existence of the corporation. [17]  Sy Tiong

Shiou, et al.  aver that the RTC had already denied the motion for production and inspection and instead ordered

petitioners to make the corporate records available to the appointed independent auditor.   Hence, the DOJ did not

commit any grave abuse of discretion in affirming the recommendation of the City Prosecutor of Manila. [18]  They

further argue that adherence to the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the accounting case is unrelated to, and not

necessarily determinative of the success of, the criminal complaint for falsification and/or perjury would unnecessarily

indict petitioner Sy Tiong Shiou for the said offenses he may not have committed but only because of an outcome

unfavorable to him  in the civil action.[19]

 

          Indeed, a preliminary proceeding is not a quasi-judicial function and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency

exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of

probable cause.[20]  Moreover, it is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether

there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be subjected to the

expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution. [21]  This Court has adopted a policy of

non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient

latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for

the filing of information against the supposed offender.[22]

 

 

 

 

 

As in every rule, however, there are settled exceptions.  Hence, the principle of non-interference does not

apply when there is grave abuse of discretion which would authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition for

certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[23]

 

          As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ gravely abused its discretion when it suspended the

hearing of the charges for violation of the Corporation Code on the ground of prejudicial question and when it

dismissed  the criminal complaints.

 

          A prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both

pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may

proceed since howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative  juris et de jure of the

guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.  The reason  behind the principle of prejudicial question is to

avoid two conflicting decisions.  It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or

intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or

not the criminal action may proceed.[24]  

 

 

 

 

The civil action and the criminal cases do not involve any prejudicial question. 

 

          The civil action for accounting and damages, Civil Case No. 03-106456 pending before the RTC Manila,

Branch 46, seeks the issuance of an order compelling the Spouses Sy to render a full, complete and true accounting

of all the amounts, proceeds and fund paid to, received and earned by the corporation since 1993 and to restitute  it

such amounts, proceeds and funds which  the Spouses   Sy have misappropriated.  The criminal cases, on the other

hand, charge that the Spouses Sy were illegally prevented from getting inside company premises and from inspecting

company records, and that Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the entries in the GIS, specifically the Spouses  Sy’s  shares in

the corporation.  Surely, the civil case  presents no prejudicial question to the criminal cases since a finding that the

Spouses Sy mishandled  the funds will have no effect on the determination of guilt in the complaint for violation of

Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code; the civil case  concerns the validity of Sy Tiong Shiou’s

refusal to allow inspection of the records, while in the  falsification and perjury cases, what is material is the veracity

of the entries made by Sy Tiong Shiou in the sworn GIS.

 

Anent the issue of probable cause, the Court also finds that there is enough probable cause to warrant the

institution of the criminal cases.

 

 

 

The term  probable cause does not mean ‘actual and positive cause’ nor does it import absolute certainty.   It

is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.  Thus a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into

whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.  It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission

complained of constitutes the offense charged.  Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the

prosecution in support of the charge.[25]

 

 In order that probable cause to file a criminal case may be arrived at, or in order to engender the well-

founded belief that a crime has been committed, the elements of the crime charged should be present.   This is based

on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be–at the most–no criminal

offense.[26]

           Section 74 of the Corporation Code reads in part:  

x x x The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting

shall be open to inspection by any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his expense.      

Any officer or agent of the corporation who shall refuse to allow any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy excerpts from its records or minutes, in accordance with the provisions of this Code, shall be liable to such director, trustee, stockholder or member for damages, and in addition, shall be guilty of an offense which shall be punishable under Section 144 of this Code: Provided, That if such refusal is made pursuant to a resolution or order of the Board of Directors or Trustees, the liability under this section for such action shall be imposed upon the directors or trustees who voted for such refusal: and Provided, further, That it shall be a defense to any action under this section that the person demanding to examine and copy excerpts from the corporation's records and minutes has improperly used any information secured through any prior examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or of any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his demand.

 

          Meanwhile, Section 144 of the same Code provides:

 Sec. 144. Violations of the Code.—Violations of any of the provisions of this Code or its

amendments not otherwise specifically penalized therein shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos but not more than ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos or by imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) days but not more than five (5) years, or both, in the discretion of the court. If the violation is committed by a corporation, the same may, after notice and hearing, be dissolved in appropriate proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission: Provided, That such dissolution shall not preclude the institution of appropriate action against the director, trustee or officer of the corporation responsible for said violation: Provided, further, That nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal the other causes for dissolution of a corporation provided in this Code.

 

          In the recent case of Ang-Abaya, et al.  v. Ang, et al.,[27] the Court had the occasion to enumerate the requisites

before  the penal provision under Section 144 of the Corporation Code may be applied  in a case of violation of a

stockholder or member’s right to inspect the corporate books/records as provided for under Section 74 of the

Corporation Code. The elements of the offense, as laid down in the case, are:

 First.  A director, trustee, stockholder or member has made a prior demand in writing for a

copy of excerpts from the corporation’s records or minutes; Second.  Any officer or agent of the concerned corporation shall refuse to allow the said

director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation to examine and copy said excerpts; Third.  If such refusal is made pursuant to a resolution or order of the board of directors or

trustees, the liability under this section for such action shall be imposed upon the directors or trustees who voted for such refusal; and,

 Fourth.  Where the officer or agent of the corporation sets up the defense that the person

demanding to examine and copy excerpts from the corporation’s records and minutes has improperly used any information secured through any prior examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or of any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his demand, the contrary must be shown or proved.[28]

  Thus, in a criminal complaint for violation of Section 74 of the Corporation Code, the defense of improper

use or motive is in the nature of a justifying circumstance that would exonerate those who raise and are able to prove the same.  Accordingly, where the corporation denies inspection on the ground of improper motive or purpose, the burden of proof is taken from the shareholder and placed on the corporation. [29]  However, where no such improper motive or purpose is alleged, and even though so alleged, it is not proved by the corporation, then there is no valid reason to deny the requested inspection.

 

In the instant case, however, the Court finds that the denial of inspection was predicated on the pending civil case against the Spouses  Sy.  This is evident from the  21 May 2003 letter of  Sy Tiong Shiou, et al.’s counsel[30] to  the Spouses  Sy,[31] which reads:

 Gentlemen: 

We write in behalf of our clients,  SY SIY HO, INC. ( Guan Yiac Hardware); SY TIONG SHIOU, JUANITA TAN SY; JOLIE ROSS TAN; CHARLIE TAN; ROMER TAN; and JESSE JAMES TAN,  relative to your letter dated 16 May 2003. Please be informed that a case for Accounting and Damages had already been filed against your clients, Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, denominated as Civil Case No. 03-106456.             We fully understand your desire for our clients to respond to your demands, however, under the prevailing circumstance this would not be advisable.  The concerns that you raised in your letter can later on be addressed after your clients shall have filed their responsive pleading  in the abovesaid case.             We trust that this response will at the moment be enough.[32]

  Even in their Joint Counter-Affidavit dated 23 September 2003, [33]  Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. did not make

any  allegation that “the person demanding to examine and copy excerpts from the corporation’s records and minutes has improperly used any information secured through any prior examination of the records or minutes of such corporation or of any other corporation, or was not acting in good faith or for a legitimate purpose in making his demand.” Instead, they merely reiterated the pendency of the civil case.   There being no allegation of improper motive, and it being undisputed that Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. denied Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy’s request for inspection, the Court rules and so holds  that the DOJ erred in dismissing the criminal charge for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code. 

 

          Now on the existence of probable cause for the  falsification and/or perjury charges. 

 

The Spouses Sy charge Sy Tiong Shiou with the offense of falsification of public documents under Article

171, paragraph 4; and/or perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The elements of falsification of

public documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful

statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;[34] (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts

was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.[35]   On the other hand, the  elements of perjury are: (a) that

the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or

affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or

affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and, (d) that the sworn statement or

affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.

 A General Information Sheet (GIS) is required to be filed within thirty (30) days following the date of the

annual or a special meeting, and must be certified and sworn to by the corporate secretary, or by the president, or any duly authorized officer of the corporation.[36]  From the records,  the 2003 GIS submitted to the SEC  on  8 April 2003 was  executed  under oath by Sy Tiong Shiou in Manila,  in his capacity as Vice President and General Manager.[37]     By executing the document under oath,  he, in effect, attested to the veracity[38] of its contents.  The Spouses  Sy claim that the entries in the GIS pertaining to them do not reflect the true number of shares that they own in the company.  They attached to their complaint the 2002 GIS of the company,  also executed by Sy Tiong Shiou, and compared the entries therein vis-a-vis the ones in the 2003 GIS.  The Spouses  Sy  noted the marked decrease in their shareholdings, averring that at no time after the execution of the 2002 GIS,   up to the time of the filing of their criminal complaints did they execute or authorize the execution of any document or deed transferring,

conveying or disposing their shares or any portion thereof; and thus there is absolutely no basis  for the figures reflected in the 2003 GIS.[39]  The Spouses  Sy   claim that the false statements were made by Sy Tiong Shiou with the wrongful intent of injuring them. All the elements of both offenses are sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavits.

 

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals’ holding, citing the case of Fabia v. Court of Appeals, that the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction no longer precludes the simultaneous filing of the criminal case with the corporate/civil

case.[40]   Moreover, the Court finds  that the City of Manila is the proper venue for the perjury charges, the GIS

having been subscribed and sworn to in the said place. Under Section 10(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court,

the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was

committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.[41]  In Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice,[42] the Court

held that the felony is consummated when the false statement is made. [43] Thus in this case, it was alleged that the

perjury  was committed when Sy Tiong Shiou subscribed and sworn to the GIS in the City of  Manila, thus, following

Section 10(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the City of Manila is the proper venue for the offense.

 

G. R. No. 179438.

 

          This petition assails the decision[44] and resolution[45]  of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May 2004 and 29 August

2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81897.

 

          On 3 February 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation), a family

corporation doing business under the name and style Guan Yiac Hardware, submitted a letter [46] to the

corporation’s  Board of Directors  (Board) stating that the control, supervision and administration of all corporate

funds were exercised by Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy (Spouses  Sy), corporate president and assistant treasurer,

respectively.  In the same letter, Juanita Tan disclosed that Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of

the corporation’s banks from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus the total bank remittances for the past years

were less than reflected in the corporate financial statements, accounting books and records.  Finally, Juanita Tan

sought to be free from any responsibility

 

over all corporate funds.  The Board granted Juanita Tan’s request and authorized the employment of an external

auditor to render a complete

audit of all the corporate accounting books and records. [47]  Consequently, the Board hired the accounting

firm Banaria, Banaria & Company.  In its Report[48] dated 5 April 2003, the accounting firm attributed to the

Spouses  Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994 to 2002.[49]

 

          A demand letter[50] was  subsequently served on the Spouses  Sy on 15 April 2003.  On the same date, the

children of the Spouses  Sy  allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and other important

documents. After the incident, the Spouses  Sy allegedly transferred residence and ceased reporting to the

corporation.  Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery against the Spouses Sy before the City

Prosecutor’s Office of Manila.[51]   A search warrant was subsequently issued by the Regional Trial Court.[52]

 

          On 26 April 2003, Sy Tiong Shiou, corporate Vice President and General Manager, called a special meeting to

be held on 6 May 2003 to fill up the positions vacated by the Spouses  Sy.  Sy Tiong Shiou was subsequently elected

as the new president and his wife, Juanita Tan, the new Vice President. [53]  Despite these developments,  Sy Chim

still  caused the issuance of a Notice of Stockholders meeting dated 11 June 2003 in his capacity as the alleged

corporate president.[54]

 

          Meanwhile, on 1 July 2003, the corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for Accounting

and Damages[55]  against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete and true accounting of all

the amounts paid to, received and earned by the company since 1993 and for the restitution of the said amount.[56] The complaint also prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy

Chim from calling a stockholders’ meeting on the ground of lack of authority.

 

          By way of Answer,[57]  the Spouses  Sy  averred that Sy Chim was  a mere figurehead and Felicidad Chan Sy

merely performed  clerical functions, as it was Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse,  Juanita Tan, who have been

authorized by the corporation’s by-laws to supervise, control and administer corporate funds, and as such were the

ones responsible for the unaccounted funds.  They assailed the meetings called by Sy Tiong Shiou on the grounds

that the same were held without notice to them and without their participation, in violation of the by-laws. The

Spouses  Sy also pursued their counter-claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

 

          On  9 September 2003, the Spouses  Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint,[58] praying

that their attached Third Party Complaint[59]  be allowed and admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse.  In the

said third-party complaint, the Spouses  Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the

corporation’s claim for misappropriating  corporate funds.

 

          On 8 October 2003, the trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint, and forthwith

directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan. [60]  On 16 January 2004, their counsel

allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were not furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as

well as a court order, which resulted in their having been declared in default for failure to file their answer to the third-

party complaint; thus,  they opted not to file a  motion for reconsideration anymore and instead filed a petition for

certiorari before the Court of Appeals.  

 

In  its Decision dated 26 May 2004,  the  Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and

Juanita Tan.[61]    The appellate court declared that  a third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim Rules of

Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules), it not being included in the

exclusive enumeration of allowed pleadings under Section 2, Rule 2  thereof. Moreover, even if such a pleading were

allowed, the admission of the third-party complaint  against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan still would have no basis

from the facts or the law and jurisprudence.[62]    The Court of Appeals also  ruled that the respondent judge

committed a manifest error amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting the third-party complaint and in summarily

declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their answer within the purported reglementary

period. The Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s 8 October 2003 Order  admitting the third-party complaint, as

well as the 19 December 2003 Order, declaring Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan in default for failure to file their

answer. The trial court was further ordered to dismiss the third-party complaint without prejudice to any action that the

corporation may separately file against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.[63] 

 

          The Spouses  Sy  filed a motion for reconsideration, but their motion was denied on 29 August 2007.[64]

 

          Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy argue before this Court that a third-party complaint is not excluded or

prohibited by the Interim Rules, and that the Court of Appeals erred in  ruling that their third- party complaint is not

actionable  because their action is not in respect of the corporation’s claims.  They add that the disallowance of the

third-party complaint will result in multiplicity of suits.

 

          The third-party complaint should be allowed.

 

          The conflicting provisions of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Inter-Corporate Controversies read:         Rule 1, Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings.—The following pleadings are prohibited:

(1) Motion to dismiss; (2) Motion for a bill of particulars; (3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of trial; (4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and (5) Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath.

 Rule 2, Sec.2. Pleadings allowed.—The only pleadings allowed to be filed under these Rules are the complaint, answer, compulsory counterclaims or cross-claims pleaded in the answer, and the answer to the counterclaims or cross-claims.[65]

  

There is a conflict, for while a third-party complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it

among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in

statutory construction, that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,  i.e., that every

part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the

whole enactment.[66]  Statutes, including rules, should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the

evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the

mischief and secure the benefits intended.  A statute should therefore be read with reference to its leading idea, and

its general purpose and intention should be gathered from the whole act, and this predominant purpose will prevail

over the literal import of particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as a

reason for expanding the signification of others, so that the interpretation may accord with the spirit of the entire act,

and so that the policy and object of the statute as a whole may be made effectual and operative to the widest

possible extent.[67] Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a

statute, as in the rules in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.[68]

 

This spirit and intent can be gleaned from Sec. 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules, which reads:

             Sec. 3. Construction.—These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective  of securing a just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.[69]

            

Now, a  third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person

not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief,

in respect of his opponent’s claim.    It is actually a complaint independent of, and separate and distinct from the

plaintiff’s complaint.  In fact, were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-party complaint would

have to be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party

defendant. Jurisprudence is consistent in declaring that the purpose of a third-party complaint is to avoid circuitry of

action and unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters arising

from one particular set of facts.[70]   

 

It thus appears that the summary nature of the proceedings  governed by the Interim Rules, and the

allowance of the filing of third-party complaints is premised on one objective—the expeditious disposition of cases.

Moreover, following the rule of liberal interpretation found in the Interim Rules, and taking into

consideration  the  suppletory  application of the Rules of Court under

 

Rule 1, Sec. 2[71] of the Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party complaint is not, and should not be prohibited

in controversies governed by the Interim Rules. The logic and justness of this conclusion are rendered beyond

question when it is considered that Sy Tiong Shiou  and Juanita Tan are not complete strangers to the litigation as in

fact they are the moving spirit  behind the filing of the principal complaint for accounting and damages against the

Spouses  Sy.

 

          The Court also rules that the third-party complaint of the Spouses  Sy should be admitted.   

 

          A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found to

exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a

third-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of the

plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant’s liability arises out of another

transaction.  The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant: (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter

to the defendant for contribution, indemnity,  subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct

 

liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff

and the defendant.[72] 

         

          In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and  the

third-party complaint must be examined.  A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the

defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant. [73]

 

          The complaint alleges that the Spouses  Sy, as officers of the corporation, have acted illegally in raiding its

corporate funds, hence they are duty bound to render a full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts,

proceeds and funds paid to, received and earned by the corporation since 1993  and to restitute to the corporation  all

such amounts, proceeds, and funds which they took and misappropriated for their own use and benefit, to the

damage and prejudice of the plaintiff and its stockholders.[74]   On the other hand, in the third-party complaint, the

Spouses  Sy claim that it is Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who had full and complete control of the day-to day

operations  and complete control and custody of the funds of the corporation, and

hence   they   are  the  ones  liable  for  any  shortfall  or  unaccounted

 

difference of the corporation’s  cash account. Thus, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan should render a full, complete

and true accounting of all the amounts, proceeds, funds paid to, received and earned  by the corporation since 1993,

including the amount attributed to the Spouses  Sy in the complaint for accounting and damages.  In their prayer, the

Spouses  Sy moved that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be declared as directly and solely liable in respect of the

corporation’s claim for accounting and damages, and that in the event that they, the Spouses  Sy, are adjudged liable

to the corporation, Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be ordered to pay all amounts necessary to discharge their

liability to the corporation by way of indemnity or reimbursement.  

 

 

The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita

Tan to the corporation for the very same claims which the corporation interposed against the Spouses   Sy.  It is clear

therefore that the Spouses  Sy’s third-party complaint is in respect of the plaintiff corporation’s claims, [75] and thus the

allowance of the third-party complaint is warranted.

 

 

 

 

WHEREFORE, these cases are resolved as follows:

 

G.R. No. 174168         

          The petition for review is DENIED.  The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 May

2006 and 8 August 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91416  are AFFIRMED. 

         

Costs against the petitioners.

 

G.R. No. 179438 

          The petition is GRANTED.   The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 26 May 2004 and 29

August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 81897 are SET ASIDE and the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of

Manila Branch 46 dated 8 October 2003 and 19 December 2003 areREINSTATED.

 

          SO ORDERED.