I: IntroductionPhilippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. and Court of Industrial Relations (1973)FACTS:Union officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc. (PBM) were dismissed for allegedly violating the no strike-no lockout provision of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) after staging a mass demonstration at Malacaang. PBMEO was set to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969 against abuses of the Pasig police, where employees on the first, regular, and third shifts will participate. PBMEO informed company two days before the said demonstration and asked to excuse all the workers participating. But a day before the demonstration, PBM said the rally should not prejudice normal office operations, thus employees without prior filing of a leave of absence who fail to report for the first and regular shifts on March 4 shall be dismissed for violating their CBA. However, union officers said there was no violation because the demonstration was against the Pasig police and not the company. They added that the rally was an exercise of their freedom of speech. In a decision penned by Judge Joaquin Salvador of the Court of Industrial Relations, eight of the Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization (PBMEO) officers were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and were thus removed as employees of PBM. PBMEO filed a motion for reconsideration, which CIR dismissed the motion for passing two days late from the 10-day deadline the court allowed. ISSUE:Whether the workers who joined the strike violated the CBARULING:No. The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. "The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.

SIMON, JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTSFACTS:On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners " to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to engage in business".On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.The Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo,et.al".

ISSUE:Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?

HELD:No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII,Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to " investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights". The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.

II: 3 INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849

FACTS:Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. "The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.

DUE PROCESS

Definition:Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA 849

FACTS:Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.

ISSUE:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violates the due process clause?

HELD: No. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or it violates the due process clause.There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.

Dartmouth College v WoodwardIn 1769 the King of England granted a charter to Dartmouth College. This document spelled out the purpose of the school, set up the structure to govern it, and gave land to the college. In 1816, the state legislature of New Hampshire passed laws that revised the charter. These laws changed the school from private to public. They changed the duties of the trustees. They changed how the trustees were selected.The existing trustees filed suit. They claimed that the legislature violated the Constitution. They said that Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution prevented a state from "impairing" (that is, weakening or canceling) a contract.IssueWhether or not a state legislature can change the charter of a college?HELD: No.The Court struck down the law, so Dartmouth continued as a private college. Chief Justice Marshall said that the charter was, in essence, a contract between the King and the trustees. Even though we were no longer a royal colony, the contract is still valid because the Constitution says that a state cannot pass laws to impair a contract. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term "contract" referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to "the political relations between the government and its citizens

Property:AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORP. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FACTS:In 1984, Glorious Sun (Glorious) was found guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of importations by the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB), as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled.Glorious then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that its right to due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by evidence.The Court issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings. However, Glorious subsequently filed a motion to withdraw its petition, which was granted. Glorious then filed another motion to dismiss, which was duly noted by the court.Two years later, Glorious filed with the GTEB a petition for restitution of its export quota and requested for a reconsideration of the previous decision by the GTEB. In addition to alleging that it was denied due process, it also contended that the GTEB decision to cancel its quotas was due to duress and threats from former Minister Ongpin in order to transfer Glorious quotas to Marcos crony-owned corporations Del Soleil Apparel Manufacturing and American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). This petition was denied.Thereafter, an appeal was brought to the Office of the President. AIFC sought to intervene claiming that the GTEB decision had long become final.The Office of the President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings.

ISSUEWON Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB decision.

HELD:NOThe court held that although factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be disregarded if they are not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest.Clearly, the right of Gloriuos to due process was violated. Glorious export quota allocation, which initially was a privilege, evolved into some form of property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer it to another.

Crespo vs Provincial Board 160 SCRA 66FACTS:Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, NuevaEcija, in the local elections of 1967. On 25January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with administratively, with the Provincial Board of NuevaEcija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185.On 15February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T.Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51preventivelysuspending petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao,Nueva Ecija.In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the administrative case. According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in ResolutionNo.51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section5 of Republic ActNo. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of the truth orfalsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and elementary principles of due process. On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner was denied due process?HELD:Yes. It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law.Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. A fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without the right to notice and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due process was initially concerned with fair procedure.Due process is the equivalent of law of the land which means "The general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society. As porting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due process.

Executive Secretary v CA G.R. No. 131719. May 25, 2004. FACTS: The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 RA 8042 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional Section 2, paragraph (g), Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (j), (l) and (m), Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b), and Sections 9 and 10 of the law, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the assailed provisions of the law. Petitioner claims that great majority of the duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped or suspended their operations for fear of being prosecuted under the provisions of a law that are unjust and unconstitutional.

CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO 127980 FACTS: : IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92), LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATIONON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT. ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-92ONMARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIERRESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND HEARING THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A aPROFESSION HAS TAKEN ON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ENJOY THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY RETIREMENTBlock v RutherfordFacts of the Case Respondents were inmates being held in Los Angeles County Central Jail (Central Jail) prior to their trials. Central Jail did not allow inmates to have contact visits with spouses, children, or other guests. Central Jail also prohibited inmates from watching the irregularly-scheduled shakedown searches of their own cells. Respondents sued in district court and argued that these practices violated their civil rights under Section 1983 of the United States Code. The district court agreed with respondents claim that an inmates right to embrace his family is a matter of great importance and outweighs the minimal risks the contact visits posed. The district court held that low-risk detainees should be allowed contact visits if they are incarcerated for more than a month. The district court also held that inmates should be allowed to watch searches of their cells from a distance because the shakedowns often resulted in prison officials removing or destroying the inmates personal property.Issue Whether or the the Los Angeles County Central Jails practice of prohibiting detainees from having contact visits and from being present while their cells were searched violates due process.HELD: No. The Court held that Central Jails policies worked to further the governments reasonable and legitimate interest in ensuring the safety of jail officials and visitors. The Court cited the extensive precedent that gave discretion to prison officials in enacting policies and procedures that they deem necessary to preserve internal order and security.VillarealChavez v Romulo, in his capacity as the executive sec.FACTS: GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane. ISSUE:Whether or not the revocation of the PTCFOR is a violation of the right to property.tHELD: No.In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.A mere license by the State is always revocable.Procedural Due Process Publication RequirementTANADA VS TUVERA 136 SCRA 27Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo Taada et al seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan Tuvera (then executive secretary to President Ferdinand) Marcos to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters of Instructions(LOIs), Proclamations(PPs), Executive Orders(EOs), and Administrative Orders(AOs) issued by the then president. ISSUE: Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they shall take effect.HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present case where the president may on his own issue laws. The clear objective of this provision is to give the public general adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. Publication is indispensable.

PITC vs Angeles

FACTS:PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for importation from the Peoples Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.Republic vs Extelcom, [373 SCRA 316; GR 147096, January 15, 2002]FACTS: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures.Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase on its own initiative were deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center. ISSUE: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force and effect in granting provisional authority.

HELD: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and regulations can take effectJudicial ProceedingBANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA

FactsEngracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action. ISSUE: Whether or not due process of law was observed.HELD: No.As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely necessary.The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendants last known address constitute denial of due process?The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has not been infringed. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA,

FACTS:On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto andNancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquinowent to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman isthere to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was alreadybriefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomedand asked them to sit down. They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about thebreakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket,and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initialpayment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruitersaid that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore.Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and wererequired to submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview,Lourdes gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her thatshe was authorized to receive the money.Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of thePhilippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call froman unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitmentconducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include thesurveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, acertain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where therecruitment was reportedly being undertaken.Upon arriving at the reportedarea at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be anapplicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where hewas able to see around six (6) persons in the sala. Ramos even heard awoman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk about the possible employment shehas to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have tocomply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-dataform in hand. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the CriminalInvestigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter.A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, araid was executed.Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment. Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment inlarge scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining andpenalizing said crime.First,accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the LaborCode defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus,violates the due process clause..ISSUES: Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwiseknown as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the dueprocess clause.

HELD:No.Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must besufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. Section 13(b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evidenton its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void forvagueness. Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit theexercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by theConstitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generallyworded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot beconstitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that itfails to give adequate warning of the boundary between theconstitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissibleapplications of the statute.Administrative and Quasi Judicial ProceedingFABELLA V. CAFACTS:On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal. ISSUE:Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?HELD:YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.

Ang Tibay v CIR (1940) 69 Phil 635FACTS:Toribio claimed to have laid off workers due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory.The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for recon with the supreme court.In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations, the national labor union, the respondent, averred that. the shortage of soles has no factual basis, the scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of obligation with the Army, The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme, The company union was an employer dominated one,. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.,. Civil code shouldnt be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial origins., Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union, exhibits are inaccessible to respondents. The exhibits can reverse the judgment. ISSUE: Whether of not the Court of Industrial Relations is the proper venue for the trial?HELD: Yes There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with judicial and quasi-judicial functions for the purpose of settling disputes and relations between employers and employees. It can appeal to voluntary arbitration for dispute. It can also examine the industries in a locality by order of the president. There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which constitutes a departure from the separation of powers.The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is not bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include any matter necessary for solving the dispute.The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.

Republic v Pilpinas ShellPefianco v. Moral 322 SCRA 439FACTS:Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent for dishonesty. She was dismissed. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report. It was denied ISSUE: whether or not the denial of the copy of the DECS investigation Committee Reports deprive the respondent of her right to due processHELD:A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings andrecommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed againsthim. He is entitled only to the administrative decision and a reasonable opportunity to meet thecharges and the evidence presented during the hearings of the investigation committee.Respondent had been accorded these rights

Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual259 SCRA 604

FACTS: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered to conduct a discreet investigation by the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondents sala.In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice.In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report:On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day.At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between the pages of a blue book on top of his table.Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subjects right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).

On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him.

HELD: We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction. We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of due process.The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such vague accusations.While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a discreet investigation of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused before respondents court who could possibly be respondent judges virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called entrapment operation. The opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already.It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he scoured the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope. In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 oclock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judges chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judges chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondents chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judgeAtty. Napoleon S. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000

FACTS: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of Withdrawal, in conformity with his clients decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country although she was willing to testify at that time. HELD: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Court held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should change her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the charges against him. The only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The complainants failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being placed on the witness stand. The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.Lumiqued vs. ExeveaG.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997

FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.

ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 April 19, 2007)Facts:Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. ISSUE:WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bailHELD: A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.Academic Discipline GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITYFACTS:Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred from enrolment. The school claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they have been involved in activities that have disrupted classes and had conducted mass actions without the required permits ISSUE: Whether or not the students were denied due process.HELD:a. It is apparent that despite the accusations of alleged violations hurled by the school against the petitioners, the fact is that it had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein.Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.b. Under the Education Act of 1982, students have the right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, EXCEPT in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations. The petitioner were denied of this right, and were being disciplined without due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in *** (the) Manuel and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted. It has already been held in Berina vs. Philippine Maritime Institute, 117 SCRA 581, that it is illegal of a school to impose sanctions on students without conducting due investigation.c. Of course, all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its rules. In fact the maintenance of good school discipline is a duty specifically enjoined on every private school. The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that:* * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or their parents or guardians. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified.

d. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students:a. need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in court of justice;b. the proceedings may be summary;c. cross-examination is not an essential part thereof.But the S.C. said that the following minimum standards must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process:1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel;3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them; 4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.Alcuaz v. PSBA[GR 76353, 2 May 1988]

FACTS: Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma. Remedios Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit them.

HELD: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are:1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with.The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.NON VS. DAMES [185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990]FACTS: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline. ISSUE: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed.HELD: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG FACTS: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered. ISSUE: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.HELD: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University.Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. FACTS: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the University of the People, U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action. The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal "guilty." However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.

HELD: No.With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. With this the court ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised. Therefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadals right of due process