8/11/2019 cases on evidence

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LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE

G.R. No. 102784 February 28, 1996

FACTS:

Rose Lim arrived in Manila from Cebu City sometime in October, 1987 with her friend Aurelia

Nadera. On October 8, 1987, they went to the Williams Apartelle in Timog, Quezon City, where they metVictoria Suarez, a jewelry dealer. Suarez and Nadera knew each other since the latter often sold jewelry forthe former on commission basis. Nadera had previously introduced Rosa Lim to Suarez as a wealthybusinesswoman.

Lim was offered two pieces of jewelry by Suarez to wit: one (1) 3.35 carat diamond ring worthP169,000.00 and one (1) bracelet worth P170,000.00. The pieces were to be sold by Lim on commission.Accordingly, Lim signed a receipt prepared by Nadera for Suarez.On October 12, 1987 before departing for Cebu, petitioner called up Mrs. Suarez by telephone in order toinform her that she was no longer interested in the ring and bracelet. Mrs. Suarez replied that she was busyat the time and so, she instructed the petitioner to give the pieces of jewelry to Aurelia Nadera who would inturn give them back to the private complainant. The petitioner did as she was told and gave the two pieces

of jewelry to Nadera as evidenced by a handwritten receipt, dated October 12, 1987.Petitioner maintains that she cannot be liable for estafa since she never received the jewelries intrust or on commission basis from Vicky Suarez. The real agreement between her and the privaterespondent was a sale on credit with Mrs. Suarez as the owner-seller and petitioner as the buyer, asindicated by the bet that petitioner did not sign on the blank space provided for the signature of the personreceiving the jewelry but at the upper portion thereof immediately below the description of the items taken.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE APELLATE COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE PAROLEVIDENCE RULE WAS WAIVED WHEN THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR CROSS-EXAMINED THEPETITIONER AND AURELIA NADERA AND WHEN COMPLAINANT WAS CROSS-EXAMINED BY THECOUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER AS TO THE TRUE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEPARTIES WHEREIN IT WAS DISCLOSED THAT THE TRUE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES WAS ASALE OF JEWELRIES AND NOT WHAT WAS EMBODIED IN THE RECEIPT MARKED AS EXHIBIT "A"WHICH WAS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OFCONVICTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER.

RULING:

The SC ruled that weight of evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiorityof the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part ofthe judge trying the case. 17 In the case at bench, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave weightto the testimony of Vicky Suarez that she did not authorize Rosa Lim to return the pieces of jewelry toNadera. The respondent court, in affirming the trial court, said:. . . This claim (that the ring had been returned to Suarez thru Nadera) is disconcerting. It contravenes thevery terms of Exhibit A. The instruction by the complaining witness to appellant to deliver the ring to AureliaNadera is vehemently denied by the complaining witness, who declared that she did not authorize and/orinstruct appellant to do so. And thus, by delivering the ring to Aurelia without the express authority andconsent of the complaining witness, appellant assumed the right to dispose of the jewelry as if it were hers,thereby committing conversion, a clear breach of trust, punishable under Article 315, par. 1(b), RevisedPenal Code.

We shall not disturb this finding of the respondent court. It is well settled that we should notinterfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses, unless there appearsin the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or thesignificance of which has been misinterpreted. The reason is that the trial court is in a better position todetermine questions involving credibility having heard the witnesses and having observed their deportment

and manner of testifying during the trial.Thus the Supreme Court DENIED the petition and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby

AFFIRMED.

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SAPU-AN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

214 SCRA 701

FACTS:

The subject of this dispute is a 786 sq. m. lot situated in Valencia, Negros Oriental. It has been

occupied since the last World War by both the petitioners and the private respondents, who now mutuallyassert adverse claims of exclusive ownership over the property.The petitioners claim the land by virtue of separate sales made by the original owners, namely

Alfonsa Ohoy, Luciana Ohoy, Porfirio Ohoy and Maria Ohoy, to Candida Favor, Ceriaco Abiera, JosefaAbiera, and Roberto (or Edilberto) Abiera, the petitioners predecessors-in-interest.

For their part, the private respondents claim the same land by inheritance from their mother,Alfonsa Ohoy, who had in turn acquired it from her mother after the land had been partitioned among herchildren.

Both the petitioners and the private respondents say they have occupied and farmed the disputedland without objection from each other. The petitioners aver that it was they who gave permission to CalixtoTingcay to build his house on the land after World War II. The private respondents contend that it was they

who gave permission to petitioner Marcelina Sapu-an to build her house on the land, also after World WarII.In 1962, the petitioners allegedly demolished their old house and began constructing a bigger one

over the private respondents objections. When their protests were ignored, the private respondents suedthe petitioners for the recovery of the land, with damages.

At the trial, the plaintiffs presented four witnesses, among them Zacarias Villegas, who testified thathis mother, Maria Ohoy, did not own any share in the disputed lot and that it belonged exclusively toAlfonsa. He also said that he lived with the Tingcays for some time and that it was really Marcelina Sapu-anwho requested permission to live on the land. RTC decided in favour of Tingcay and was affirmed by theCA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent court failed or refused to apply to the presence case the "equiponderanceof evidence".

RULING:

The SC said that in determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on theissues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnessesmanner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts on which they are

testifying, the nature of such facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want ofinterest, and also their personal credibility as far as the same may legitimately appear at the trial. The courtmay also consider the number of witnesses, although the preponderance is not necessarily with thegreatest number.

It is settled that matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge who is in betterposition than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the testimonies ofwitnesses who have personally appeared before him.

Significantly, both the trial court and the respondent court found the credibility of Josefa Abiera tobe highly questionable.

It is true that the genuineness and due execution of the two deeds of sale presented in evidence bythe petitioners were not denied by the private respondents under oath, and that under Rule 8, Section 8, ofthe Rules of Court, the "genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unlessthe adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them." However, this rule applies only to the parties to thedocument and not, in the case at bar, to the private respondents. The reason is that they were not partiesto the deeds of sale but merely the heirs of the alleged vendors.

The SC concluded in favor of the private respondents based on the evidence of record and

affirmed the decision of the RTC and CA due to lack of a convincing showing that the challenged decisionwas reached arbitrarily or in disregard of such evidence. Thus, the petition is DENIED, with costs againstthe petitioners.