Cases of Civ1

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060 Petitioner, Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, - versus - PERALTA, BERSAMIN,* ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ. MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated: OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. September 13, 2010 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N CARPIO, J.: The Case Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. The Antecedent Facts The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision: On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City). On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The Decision of the Trial Court The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 [3] holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED. SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City denied the motion. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City. The Decision of the Court of Appeals In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting. Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Issue The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner. The Ruling of this Court The petition has no merit. Civil Case Must be InstitutedBefore the Criminal Case Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

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The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005. [8] Respondent’s petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Questionin Criminal Case for Parricide Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[11]

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, [12] which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” [13] The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. [16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that “the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.”[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”[19]

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867. SO ORDERED.

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 164435 Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA, andPERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: September 29, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N PERALTA, J.:














This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution[2] dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside. On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:

INFORMATION The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as

follows: That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.

Contrary to law.

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial proceeded.

The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.

On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000). On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1). Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000). On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E). In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City x x x. x x x x Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.

Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of

prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum. This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of accused’s

bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.

Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.[3]

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed

bigamy when she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975

marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,[4] denied reconsideration and ruled that “[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.”[5]

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where petitioner alleges that:

V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.

V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF

PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.






V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT

CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED. V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE

OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUELSANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE. V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT

IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW. The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the

prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[6] the Court categorically stated that:

x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x

x x x x

x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting . In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage . Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x[7]

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,[8] where it was held thus:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.[9]

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy make any difference.[10] As held in Tenebro, “[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.”[11]

Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that “[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years,” while Article 91 states that “[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x .”

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note

that the party who raises a fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-serving. [12] Thus, for petitioner’s defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.

A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present sufficient evidence to support her

allegation. Petitioner’s testimony that her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:

x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother – the person who allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.[13]

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,[14] “the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on

which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents],” as opposed to being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage.[15] Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.[16]












Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.

However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment[17] to be void ab initioon account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its

Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996]ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-

VALDES,respondents.D E C I S I O NVITUG, J.:

The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties to the contract.

The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated

22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, [1] in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with."Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes."The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the other."(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions ofArticles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision."Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages."[2] (Italics ours)

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.

In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares."In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."[3] (Italics supplied)

In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership."The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property."[4]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held controlling; he argues that:

"I"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated."II"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses."III"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129."IV"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay."[5]

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases;[6] it provides:"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership."In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household."Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation."When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation."

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"[7] of the Code.

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Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."[8] Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.

Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —

(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation [9] or declaration of nullity of the marriage.[10]

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife ),only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.[11]

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, [12] of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43,[13] relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40[14] of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41[15] and 42,[16] of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.

FERNANDO GO, petitioner, vs. MICHAEL TAN and LOLITA TAN, respondents.D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Procedural rules are intended to aid the courts in the dispensation of justice. Hence, when a stringent application of those rules would thwart, rather than promote substantial rights of litigants, the Court is allowed to exempt certain cases from its operation. This is one such case.

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 36929, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10552, “Michael Tan and Lolita Tan vs. Fernando Go, Juanito Siy and William Siy,” for specific performance and damages.

Fernando Go, as owner, and Michael Tan, as lessee, entered into a Contract of Lease [2] dated December 14, 1989 over three parcels of land measuring 4,939 sq. m., more or less, located in Quezon City. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the lease agreement provide:“4. IMPROVEMENTS – The LESSEE can make any improvements such as constructing buildings in the leased premises at his own expense and account, any and all improvements introduced and/or built thereon shall automatically belong to the LESSOR without any obligation on the part of the LESSOR to reimburse the LESSEE for cost and expenses incurred in the improvements at the termination or expiration of this contract.“Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, the Lessee, during the currency of the foregoing contract of lease with a term of five (5) years, has agreed to pay at his own expense, the real estate taxes, dues and assessments that may be due on the land subject hereof and all the improvements that the Lessee may introduce thereon in accordance herewith, provided that each tax receipt for the quarterly or yearly payment shall be presented to the Lessor immediately after such quarterly or yearly payment of the said real estate tax is made, it being understood however, that failure on the part of the Lessee to strictly comply with his obligation herein shall be considered a breach of the term of this contract of lease and therefore, the Lessor, at his option, may take appropriate action permissible under the premises.“5. SUBLEASE – The LESSEE shall not sublet or sublease in whole or in part the leased premises nor assign this CONTRACT OF LEASE to any party, and any sublease of said premises or any assignment of such Contract of Lease shall be null and void, and the LESSOR shall have the right to terminate this contract at once.”

Later, Fernando learned that Michael was subleasing the property to brothers Juanito and William Siy, in violation of the lease contract.Before Fernando could file his complaint for illegal detainer against Michael, the latter, joined by his mother Lolita Tan, filed with the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City Civil Case No. Q-91-10552 for specific performance and damages with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and prohibitory and mandatory injunction against Fernando and brothers Juanito and William Siy.

In their complaint, the Tans basically alleged that Fernando and the Siy brothers conspired to harass them for the purpose of evicting them from the property; that while Michael paid Fernando P72,000.00 as advanced rent for the first eight (8) months, however, the latter issued a receipt stating that the payment “shall be applied to the last six (6) months rent” at P12,000.00 a month, instead of only P9,000.00 as agreed upon; that Fernando required Michael to execute promissory notes payable monthly during the entire duration of the lease contract; that Fernando, taking advantage of Michael’s youth, made him sign those promissory notes; that brothers Juanito and William Siy joined Fernando in disturbing them in their peaceful possession of the property; and, that Fernando was ejecting them from the premises after they introduced substantial improvements thereon.

On November 8, 1991, the trial court issued a TRO directing Fernando and the Siy brothers to desist from disturbing Tans’ possession of the leased premises.

Meanwhile, Fernando, unaware of the TRO, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City a complaint for illegal detainer against Michael and Lolita Tan, docketed as Civil Case No. 5132. Eventually, the case was decided in favor of Fernando. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City issued a preliminary mandatory injunction against Fernando ordering him to return possession of the property to Michael and Lolita Tan. Fernando then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 28640. Subsequently, the said court annulled the Decision issued by the RTC, prompting Michael and Lolita to file with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 110439. But their petition was dismissed in a Resolution dated July 28, 1993.

Going back to the Tans’ complaint for specific performance, on November 20, 1991, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction enjoining Fernando and the Siy brothers from disturbing the “status quo of the parties under the contract of lease.” The court also ordered Fernando to explain why he should not be cited in contempt of court for filing an illegal detainer case against the Tans in violation of the TRO dated November 8, 1991.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/sep2003/130330.htm#_ftn2











During the hearing of the Tans’ application for prohibitory and mandatory injunction on November 25, 1991, the trial judge asked Atty. De Guzman, Fernando’s counsel, whether he has filed an answer to the complaint of Michael and Lolita. When Atty. De Guzman replied in the negative, the judge remarked that the court “will wait for you to file your answer.” Thereupon, the hearing was deferred. Incidentally, that was the last day for Fernando to file his answer.

The next day, November 26, Fernando, relying on the comment of the judge, filed a motion for extension of time to submit his answer. On the same day, the Tans filed a motion to declare Fernando in default for his failure to file his answer seasonably. Fernando opposed this motion. The incidents were set for hearing on November 29, 1991. Thereupon, he filed a motion for postponement of this hearing.

On November 29, 1991, only the Tans and their counsel were present. The trial court then issued an order denying Fernando’s motion for postponement and declaring him in default for failure to file an answer on time. On that same day, it conducted an ex parte hearing and allowed the Tans to present their evidence.

Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated November 29, 1991 declaring him in default and another motion to nullify the proceedings and/or reception of evidence. However, the motions were denied by the trial court in an order dated January 8, 1992.

On January 20, 1992, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of Michael and Lolita Tan, the dispositive portion of which reads:“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby partially rendered for the plaintiffs ordering defendant Fernando L. Go:1. To maintain his lessee, plaintiff Michael Tan, in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises for the entire duration of their contract, subject to the terms and provisions of the contract of lease (Exh. B);2. Ordering defendant Fernando L. Go to desist from committing any further act or entering into any further scheme aimed at ousting the plaintiff from their peaceful possession of the premises in contravention of the contract of lease (Exh. B);3. Commanding defendant Fernando L. Go to return to the plaintiffs the total sum of P171,000.00, representing the rentals collected in advance, plus interest at the legal rate to be reckoned from filing of the complaint up to full payment, less such amounts necessary to be applied as rentals for the months of September, October, November and December, 1991, and January, 1992, unless already paid for by plaintiffs;4. Sentencing defendant Fernando L. Go to pay to the plaintiffs actual damages of P200,000.00; moral damages of P100,000.00; and exemplary damages of P50,000.00;5. Ordering defendant Fernando L. Go to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00; and6. Ordering defendant Fernando L. Go to pay costs of suit.“SO ORDERED.”

From this Decision, Fernando appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC Decision but deleted paragraphs 1 and 2 for having become moot and academic because Michael and Lolita Tan had been evicted from the leased premises, thus:“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that paragraphs one and two of the dispositive portion thereof are deleted for having become moot and academic. Costs against the appellant.“SO ORDERED.”[3]

Paragraph 1 ordered Fernando to desist from disturbing the Tans in their peaceful possession of the premises; while paragraph 2 commanded Fernando to return to the TansP171,000.00, representing the rentals he collected in advance.

Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.Petitioner contends that when the RTC judge declared in open court, “we will wait for you to file your answer,” he impliedly granted an

extension within which an answer could be filed. Petitioner further contends that since the period to file it has not yet expired, the trial court prematurely declared him in default.

Actually, the trial court, during the hearing of the application for preliminary mandatory injunction, did not grant petitioner any extension of time to file an answer. Petitioner had until that day to file his answer but he failed to do so, inadvertently relying upon the trial judge’s utterance that the court will wait for his answer.

This Court, in numerous cases, has afforded party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities. In this regard, we have often admonished courts to be liberal in setting aside orders of default as default judgments are frowned upon and looked with disfavor for they may amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the defendant. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized that this Court is empowered to suspend its operation, or except a particular case from its operation, when the rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. Oft-cited is the rule that it is a far better and more prudent course of action for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.[4]

Moreover, issuance of orders of default should be the exception, rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.[5] Here, the record is bereft of any evidence which would show that petitioner’s failure to answer was due to an apparent scheme to delay the proceedings or to flagrantly transgress the rules. While petitioner’s reliance on the judge’s remarks during the hearing for the preliminary mandatory injunction may be misplaced, however, there is no showing of any taint of stubbornness and bad faith on his part.

The fundamental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each litigant every opportunity to present evidence on his behalf in order that substantial justice is achieved. Court litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities.[6]

If petitioner will not be given a chance to air his side or raise his defenses vis-a-vis respondents’ claims for damages which were awarded to them by the trial court ex parte, the same may result in injustice to him. We are, therefore, convinced that setting aside the order of default and the judgment by default of the lower court is in order. Although respondents Michael Tan and his mother have been evicted in the premises, there still remains a controversy regarding damages allegedly sustained by them by reason of petitioner’s alleged illegal acts. By conducting a full blown trial, both parties will be able to present their evidence, thus affording them the opportunity to enforce and protect their respective rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED with MODIFICATION. We affirm its ruling considering as moot the Order of the trial court commanding petitioner to maintain respondents in peaceful possession of the premises and to desist from committing any act aimed in ousting them because they have been evicted therefrom.

However, the Court of Appeals’ ruling upholding the validity of the trial court’s Order declaring petitioner in default is REVERSED and its judgment by default is SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to allow petitioner to file his answer to the complaint and to conduct the proper proceedings on respondents’ claim for damages and attorney’s fees against petitioner and to render judgment with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.D E C I S I O NABAD, J.:This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.The IndictmentThe public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1

The Facts and the Case

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_182835_2010.html#fnt1





The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008,8affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.The Issues PresentedThe principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.The subordinate issues are:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional rights; and4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.

The Court’s RulingsSection 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.x x x xSection 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:x x x xh. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:x x x x5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9









R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.SO ORDERED.

FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent.x-----------------------------------------xOFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent.x-----------------------------------------xOFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, and COURT STENOGRAPHER VICTORIA C. JAMORA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondents.x-----------------------------------------x

A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (Formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263- RTC/ Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City)







SYLVIA SANTOS, Complainant, -versus- JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City, Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093

PUNO, C.J.,

CARPIO,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ, andMENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 23, 2010x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x D E C I S I O N PER CURIAM: These consolidated cases[1] stemmed from the administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua. A decision has been rendered in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, entitled Sylvia Santos v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, from which the respondent sought reconsideration. The immediately preceding case was consolidated with the subsequent administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge in a Resolution dated April 14, 2009 of the Court en banc.A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ

In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), Francisco P. Ocampo charged respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In his letter-complaint dated April 24, 2007 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Francisco Ocampo stated that he was the

respondent in Special Proceedings (SP) No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo, which was pending before the sala of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.

On November 27, 2006, Francisco Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo, filed a petition claiming the sole custody of their minor

daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P. Ocampo (Francesca), born on June 1, 1994, and Ma. Fatima Patricia A. Ocampo (Fatima), born on October 13, 1995. Summons was served upon Francisco Ocampo on December 12, 2006 and the case was set for hearing the following day, December 13, 2006.

During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judge issued an Order enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their

minor daughters out of the country without the court's permission and directing him to allow his wife, Milan, visitation rights over their minor daughters in their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Since then, Milan exercised visitation rights over the minors and communicated with them through their cellular phones. Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that he and Milan were residents and registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He then served written interrogatories to his wife, and presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove that his wife was not really a resident of Makati City.

In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo questioned the dismissal of his

motion since Milan never presented any evidence to controvert the evidence which he submitted in support of his motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in an

Order dated April 3, 2007. On even date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support ofP50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for medication and education.

Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing the TPO as the period to file his answer had not yet expired when

respondent Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give monthly support of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his wife alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the absence of any factual finding as to the resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. In directing the payment of support to his wife, respondent Judge also ignored the factual circumstances relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the pendency of the legal separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment.

Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter of life and death. When her branch sheriff was not available, respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff to implement the Order. Around 6:00 a.m. on April 5, 2007, a Maundy Thursday, the sheriff dispatched by respondent Judge barged into the home of Francisco Ocampo’s parents in Baguio City and woke up all the occupants therein. At that time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor daughters and family were having their Holy Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and opened the rooms against the will of the occupants and without regard to their privacy. When the sheriff learned that Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused from their sleep, even as Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his minor daughters to his wife. The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay the support ofP50,000.00 right there and then, although he was told by Francisco that he did not have such amount of money. Francesca and Fatima refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco Ocampo told them to go with him.

Francisco Ocampo then filed a motion for inhibition, as well as an urgent ex parte motion to recall or rectify the Order dated April 3, 2007,

but both motions were denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated April 13, 2007.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/07-2630-RTJ%20.htm#_ftn1

The irregular acts attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua are as follows: (1) she denied the motion to dismiss filed by Francisco Ocampo, respondent therein, despite overwhelming evidence submitted that therein petitioner was not a resident of Makati City; (2) she scheduled the hearing of the case immediately a day after the summons was served on therein respondent; (3) she issued a TPO despite the fact that therein respondent's period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed; (4) she ordered the payment of support without sufficient basis; and (5) she caused the implementation of the TPO over-zealously, even designating a special sheriff to serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday. These, coupled with complainant Ocampo's account that respondent Judge demanded money from his wife, constitute the first set of charges filed against her.

In her Comment,[2] respondent Judge explained that the order setting SP No. M-6375 for hearing on the petitioner's application for a TPO

and Hold Departure Order was issued on December 8, 2006, a Friday, and was received for service by the Process Server on the same day. Based on the officer's return, the Order was attempted to be served twice by the Process Server on December 11, 2006, a Monday, at complainant Francisco Ocampo's house, but nobody was there. OnDecember 12, 2006, substituted service was resorted to by the Process Server.

Respondent Judge stated that the hearing could not have been set earlier since the court calendar was full, nor later, because December

13, 2006 was the last hearing date, before the court went on Christmas recess, for cases requiring the presence of the public prosecutor. While Francisco Ocampo may have felt harassed by the suddenness of the court hearing, respondent Judge professed that she did not have such intention. The nature of therein petitioner's prayers required immediate action by the court and the December 8, 2006 Order could have been served on him on December 11, 2006, but, as previously mentioned, was unsuccessful.

Respondent Judge pointed out that had complainant Ocampo really felt harassed by the suddenness of the hearing, he could have

complained during the hearing of December 13, 2006. Nonetheless, he never brought such issue to the attention of the court, until the filing of the administrative complaint, or four (4) months after the fact. At any rate, the scheduled hearing on December 13, 2006 did not push through because Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the same day. Francisco Ocampo himself set the hearing of his motion for reconsideration of the Order dated March 22, 2007 Order (which denied the Motion to Dismiss) on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday. For utter lack of merit, reconsideration was denied and the TPO was issued on the same day.

Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO was anchored on the provision of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262. The

Court also took into account the provisions of Articles 176 and 220 of the Family Code, which deal with the right of the mother to exercise parental authority over illegitimate children and her right to keep them in her company. Moreover, Francisco Ocampo’s contention in his Answer that he was not contesting his wife’s claim that the subject minors were not his children bolstered the propriety of the award of custody over the subject minors to his wife, Milan.

Respondent Judge asserted that she was not over-zealous in causing the implementation of the TPO, as the law itself mandates that the

court order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent. The Order that directed the implementation of the TPO was dated April 4, 2007, and it was received byMilan's counsel on the same day. Sheriff Manuel Q. Tangangco was deputized to serve it since the Branch Sheriff was not available. Milan Ocampo herself and her counsel coordinated with the sheriff regarding its service, also on the same day. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua explained that had she opted to defer action on Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO as well as its implementation, it would have been Milan who would have charged her administratively, considering that thePetition was filed as early as November 23, 2006, but the proceedings on the merits were delayed due to the filing by Francisco Ocampo of a Motion to Dismiss. In fact, therein petitioner, Milan Ocampo, filed on February 1, 2007 an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Petitioner's Application for a Permanent Protection Order, etc.),claiming that Francisco Ocampo's motion to dismiss was purely dilatory.

As regards the date, time and manner the TPO was served by the sheriff, respondent Judge maintained that she was not privy to it, since

the said TPO would have been served on April 4, 2007, pursuant to the Order bearing the same date. The sheriff's arrogance, if any, was his personal accountability.

Respondent Judge noted that the Sheriff’s Report and handwritten notation on the lower portion of the Order dated April 3, 2007, which

was also signed by Kagawad Artemio S. Zaparita of Baguio City and SP04 Arthur A. Curno of the Baguio City Police, stated that respondent Francisco Ocampo voluntarily turned over the custody of subject minors to the petitioner. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, the subject minors themselves belied the claims of Francisco Ocampo regarding the alleged arbitrary manner the TPO was served by the sheriff. Respondent Judge also pointed out that the court did not receive any complaint from Francisco Ocampo or anyone concerned about the manner the TPO was served. It was only in the present administrative complaint that the same was raised, leading to the inference that Francisco Ocampo’s claims were concocted.

Respondent Judge maintained that it was irrelevant that the subject minors may not have been in danger, but were safe in the custody of complainant Francisco Ocampo. The court arrived at a preliminary determination that Milan, being the biological mother and the subject minors being her illegitimate children, was entitled to custody over them. Moreover, Milan may have been granted and was exercising visitation rights over subject minors, yet the duration thereof, as stated in the Order dated December 13, 2006, was only until the court resolved complainant Ocampo's Motion to Dismiss, which was resolved with finality on April 3, 2007. Further, there is a whale of a difference between exercise of visitation rights and custody. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, subject minors, who were over seven years old, declared that they preferred to stay with their mother, Milan Ocampo, and likewise confirmed the physical violence committed by complainant Francisco Ocampo against Milan Ocampo.

According to respondent Judge, Milan Ocampo’s prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) was

anchored mainly on R.A. No. 9262. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9262 is explicit that the TPO should be issued by the court on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO, based on R.A. No. 9262, was incorporated in the Petition that was filed as early as November 23, 2006. Thus, it was not necessary for the court to await the filing of complainant Ocampo's Answer or the expiry of the period within which to file it before issuing the TPO.

Respondent Judge explained that the award of support was in favor of Milan alone as the legal wife of complainant Ocampo. This was

clarified in an Order dated April 16, 2007. Among Milan's prayers in her Petition was for an award of monthly support of not less than P150,000.00, but the court awarded only P50,000.00, as that was the amount found reasonable by it. At any rate, the support granted by the court was only temporary. Likewise, although complainant Francisco Ocampo had not yet complied with the directive to give support as alleged by Milan, the court did not impose a sanction against him precisely because the court was then completing the hearing for the issuance of a TPO. Moreover, Francisco Ocampo had really no reason to complain about the award of support, because the directive to provide monthly support was already held in abeyance in the Order dated May 2, 2007.

Respondent Judge stated that Francisco Ocampo's allegations regarding Milan's adulterous relationships and the legal separation case do

not have any bearing on SP No. M-6375. She further asserted that, as can be gleaned from the records, the courses of action taken by the counsel of complainant Francisco

Ocampo did not conform to normal rules of procedure. One, on April 10, 2007, he filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, but two days later, or on April 12, 2007, he still filed an Urgent Ex ParteMotion to Recall or Rectify Order dated April 3, 2007. Two, on April 24, 2007, he filed the instant administrative complaint, but two days later, or on April 26, 2007, he still filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion dated April 23, 2007 with Ex Parte Motion for Examination of the Minors, and a day later, on April 24, 2007, filed a Second Motion to Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua asseverated that from all appearances, the administrative complaint was filed for the sole objective of compelling her to inhibit herself from handling SP No. M-6375. Three, on May 11, 2007, he filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, which was an indication that complainant Ocampo did not really have any genuine administrative cause of action against her. As things turned out, all that complainant Ocampo wanted to hear from the subject minors was their declaration that they preferred to stay with their mother. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049


In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the OCA, through then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the

Office of the Chief Justice in a Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the reports about the rampant selling of TPOs and PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.

The said reports were thereafter confirmed by Judges Winlove M. Dumayas, Marissa Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny

Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, particularly with respect to SP Case No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, a child custody case.

In a Resolution[3] dated June 5, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the Memorandum of Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock as a

complaint for gross ignorance and gross misconduct against Judge Arcaya-Chua, directed respondent Judge to file a Comment on the complaint within 10 days from receipt of notice, and suspended respondent Judge pending resolution of the administrative case.

It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a TPO in the said case, granting, among others, the custody of the subject minor,

Rafi Pulliam, to therein petitioner, Albert Chang Tan, and directing therein respondent, Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away from the home and office of Chang Tan as well as from the school of the subject minor. Per the sheriff's return dated May 8, 2007, the Order was not fully implemented insofar as the custody of the subject minor was directed to be turned over to Chang Tan. This development irked Chang Tan, resulting in a heated argument between Chang Tan and the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Branch 144. Chang Tan insisted that a break open order be issued or that the sheriff be permitted to enter the premises of Pulliam's house to search for the child and then bring her to court. On the same day, May 8, 2007, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua issued an order authorizing the sheriff “to enter the open premises where subject minor may be found for the purpose of turning over custody to petitioner, but is admonished to maintain peace and order in the conduct thereof.”

According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua received money from Chang Tan in exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts clearly indicate that she was remiss in issuing the TPO. Her speedy issuance of the Orders dated May 7, 2007 and May 8, 2007 not only showed her unusual interest in the case, but it also appeared that the Order dated May 8, 2007 was tailor-fitted to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in the latter's heated argument with the OIC of Branch 144.

OCA also pointed out that it was not the only case wherein respondent Judge displayed unusual interest. On April 17, 2007, Judge

Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles of RTC, Branch 143, Makati City issued an order in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) v. Moreno, setting the application for a writ of preliminary attachment for hearing on May 9, 2007. In view of the leave of absence of Judge Galapate-Laguilles, respondent Judge was later designated as the pairing judge. On April 20, 2007, respondent, as pairing judge, cancelled the previously scheduled May 9, 2007 hearing and re-scheduled the hearing to April 23,2007, where she ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of RCBC. According to OCA, what was highly suspicious in respondent’s actuation was that there was really no urgency in the application for a writ of preliminary attachment.

In her Comment[4] dated June 9, 2007, respondent Judge explained that SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie

Estrella Pulliam, was originally raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 60 under Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen. After Judge Macaraig-Guillen recused from the case, it was re-raffled to her branch on April 30, 2007, and the records of the case were transmitted to her on the same day.

Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is justified under Sections 8 and 15 of R.A. No. 9262, as well as under Circular

No. 03-04-04-SC, which specifically applies to a petition for custody of minors. Contrary to OCA’s finding that the application filed by petitioner Chang Tan in SP No. M-6373 did not contain the requisite allegation of violence committed by therein respondent Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17 of the Application was explicit that a complaint for child abuse was filed against Stephanie Pulliam, based on, among other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi wherein she enumerated the many abuses that her mother had committed upon her. The complaint for child abuse was attached as an annex to the Application as well as to the Petition. Other annexes attached to the Application, mentioning in detail the acts of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and Rafi herself, as well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez.

Respondent Judge stated that although Article 176 of the Family Code provides that an illegitimate child shall be under the parental

authority of the mother, an exception is when the court orders otherwise. The mother may be divested of her parental authority over her illegitimate child when the court finds compelling reasons to do so. In all cases involving a child, his best interest is of paramount consideration. The court awarded provisional custody over the subject minor and a TPO in favor of therein petitioner Chang Tan, but effective for a period of 30 days only, after a careful consideration of the allegations in the pleadings and the supporting documentary evidence. Rafi was already more than seven years old at the time the Order dated May 7, 2007 was issued, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth.

Respondent Judge countered that the Order dated May 7, 2007 was not speedily issued. As was her standard operating procedure with

respect to newly raffled and re-raffled cases, she immediately studied the records of SP No. M-6373. Even before Chang Tan's Application was filed on May 4, 2007, she had already arrived at a preliminary determination that the issuance of a Provisional Order and a TPO was warranted. She also studied Chang Tan's Application on the same day it was filed, a Friday. Her study thereof continued the following day, a Saturday, also in her office. She was then planning to avail of her forfeitable leave of absence of 30 days in June 2007, inasmuch as she did not avail of the same the previous year. To expedite the resolution of motions and preparation of decisions, and to avoid being saddled with much work on her return from her leave, she had been reporting to her office on alternate Saturdays beginning April 2007. SP No. M-6373 was not the only case that she studied on that Saturday, but other cases as well. Her study of SP No. M-6373 resumed on Monday, May 7, 2007, which culminated in the issuance of an Order at almost lunchtime of the same day. Granting that the one week period in which she issued the May 7, 2007 Order may be considered speedy, such circumstance should not be taken against her as she was really a fast worker. She was accustomed to speedy preparation of orders and decisions as a result of her training in the Supreme Court as a Court Attorney for 13 years.

Respondent Judge maintained that it was necessary to implement the Order dated May 7, 2007 at once, because the courts are so

mandated to cause the immediate implementation of the TPO under Section 15, R.A. No. 9262. As regards the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of Branch 144, respondent Judge surmised that the same could

be merely concocted, as it was neither reported to her nor brought to her attention. Moreover, the doors of her chambers were always wide open and she could have clearly heard it if it really transpired.

Respondent Judge averred that during the hearing dated May 11, 2007, she gave a directive holding in abeyance further implementation

of the May 7, 2007 Order. Thus, she asserted that if she really received money or anything from Chang Tan or from anybody in his behalf, she would have ensured complete implementation of the Order dated May 7, 2007, instead of holding it in abeyance. Moreover, she should have declared Pulliam and her counsel guilty of the indirect contempt charge against them if it were really true that she received money from Chang Tan.

Respondent Judge stated that if it were true that she had been engaged in rampant selling of TPO/PPO or any order in her branch, she

and her family would not have found themselves in such state of financial drain after she had been preventively suspended. As regards her participation in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Moreno, respondent

Judge narrated that an Ex ParteMotion for Immediate Resolution of Prayer for the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Attachment was forwarded to her sala being the Pairing Judge of Branch 143. Immediately after reading the motion, she inquired from the Clerk of Court of Branch 143 about the alleged leave of absence of therein Presiding Judge Zenaida Galapate Laguilles. She learned that Judge Galapate-Laguilles indeed left for the United States on April 19, 2007 to attend a convention on Intellectual Property and would be back on May 7, 2007. She likewise gathered information from the same Branch Clerk of Court that Judge Galapate-Laguilles's trip abroad was the reason behind the Application's setting on May 9, 2007, not because the Presiding Judge did not see any urgency in the Application. The Presiding Judge also lacked ample time to act thereon



since she had a previously scheduled leave of absence. Thus, she determined from the allegations in the ex parte Motion and the Complaint the urgency to act on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. She also took into account the following: (1) the circumstance of prolonged absence of the Presiding Judge of Branch 143; (2) the reason for the setting on May 9, 2007; and (3) the mandatory wordings of Supreme Court Circular No. 19-98, i.e., “the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of all cases thereat as acting judge therein.”

Respondent Judge explained that she granted the Application because the allegations in the complaint were adequately supported by

documentary and testimonial evidence. She received the records of the RCBC Case on April 20, 2007, a Friday, and as was her standard practice, immediately studied them. She continued her study of the records, and the records of other cases, on April 21, 2007, a Saturday, and on April 23, 2007, a Monday, which culminated in the preparation of the Order on the same day.

In her Supplemental Comment[5] dated June 22, 2007, respondent Judge added that the manner by which the incidents in the Chang Tan

and RCBC cases were resolved must not be taken in isolation, but in relation to the manner all incidents were resolved and all decisions and orders were rendered in her sala, such that she resolved all incidents and rendered all her rulings immediately.

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141

In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the Judicial Audit Case), a judicial audit was conducted on May 15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, following reports of alleged irregularities committed by respondent.

In a Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 by the OCA to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock

submitted for the Court’s consideration the initial report of the Judicial Audit Team, informing the Court of an incident that happened on May 17, 2007 in Branch 144 of the RTC of Makati City.

The initial audit report stated that as early as May 12, 2007, a Saturday, the Court ordered the padlocking of Branch 144 and assigned

guards thereat on a 24-hour basis. Before the audit team began its audit on May 15, 2007, the members made it clear to OIC Victoria C. Jamora and the court personnel present that actions on the records, including stitching should be held in abeyance and that no records should be brought outside the court until after the audit.

At 8:05 a.m. of May 17, 2007, the guards on duty, Joel Gregorio and Alexander Dayap, noticed Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I of

Branch 144, disposing a plastic bag. The guards followed Indicio, and retrieved the plastic bag from a trash bin located right outside the court. The plastic bag was surrendered to the audit team and was found to contain copies of marriage certificates of marriages solemnized by Judge Chua numbering to hundreds. When confronted, Indicio stated that he was disposing the documents upon respondent Judge's instruction made several days ago. He could not offer any explanation why he chose to dispose of the documents that morning despite the ongoing audit. He, nonetheless, disclosed that there were other bags for disposal still kept inside the room where the stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C. Jamora, held office. The bags, when retrieved, turned out to contain more copies of marriage certificates. Jamora explained to the audit team that she was aware of the copies of marriage certificates being kept inside their room. However, she alleged that she had no control over them, because matters pertaining to solemnization of marriages were personally handled by Judge Arcaya-Chua.

In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged in connection with the 1,975 copies of marriage certificates for

marriages she solemnized for the period covering January 2004 to April 2007 for the following acts: (1) for allegedly ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose of the said copies of marriage certificates; (2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization fees of one thousand eight hundred nine (1,809) marriages as verified from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Makati City and the RTC, OCC, Makati City, thereby depriving the Court of the said fees in the total amount of Five Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos (P542,700.00) at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) per marriage; and (3) for failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases.[6]

In a Resolution[7] dated September 16, 2008, the Court resolved to consider the Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 of the OCA as a formal complaint against respondent Judge; require respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora to comment on the Memorandum within 10 days from notice thereof; and refer A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 to Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

On February 10, 2009, respondent Judge filed her Affidavit,[8] in lieu of Comment, on the OCA Memorandum dated August 10, 2007. Re: Ordering Salvador Indicio, Jr. to dispose of the copies of marriage certificates In regard to the disposal of the marriage certificates, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recounted that in the second week of April 2007,

she, with the help of Noel Umipig (a City Hall employee detailed to her sala), started to pack her personal belongings in anticipation of the impending transfer of her sala from the Gusali ng Katarungan to the Makati City Hall. She asked Umipig to discard her piles of yellowish scratch papers. Umipig put her scratch papers inside big plastic bags and then tied the bags. They also emptied the steel cabinet in her chambers which contained, among other things, the files of marriage certificates, as well as official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees. She previously bundled the said marriage certificates according to month and year of solemnization of the weddings, improvising paper bundles for the purpose. Umipig then put all the marriage certificates inside four, more or less, big plastic bags and placed them in the small room that was between her chambers and the stenographers' room. They were kept untied so that it would be easy to add or get a file. Immediately thereafter, Umipig asked permission to go home as he was then getting allergic reactions due to the dust, then took with him the bags of scratch papers out of her chambers to be thrown away. The following morning, she noticed that there were red patches on the face and arms of Umipig so she did not ask him anymore for help. She removed the official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees from the worn-out boxes, wrapped them with approximately six paper bundles then placed them inside the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates.

In the first week of May 2007, she was told by the City Hall Engineer that the transfer to the Makati City Hall would not push through yet

because the furnitures were not complete and portions of the holding room were still being painted. She was told to just standby and to wait for an update about the schedule of transfer. With that advice, she did not find it necessary to return the files of marriage certificates and official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees inside the steel cabinet.

About the second week of May 2007, upon learning that the bags of garbage had accumulated, she reminded Salvador Indicio, Jr. to

throw them away. On May 15, 2007, she was placed under preventive suspension. On May 18, 2007, Indicio told her, through telephone, that he was caught the previous day throwing marriage certificates that were placed in plastic bags. He explained that he thought those bags contained the garbage that she asked him to throw away the previous week. She was then outraged by the news and scolded Indicio, telling him that under the law, it is her duty to maintain copies of marriage certificates being the solemnizing officer. In fact, Indicio stated in his affidavit that her specific instruction was "to dispose all the garbage which were stocked" in her sala and "it just turned out that what the plastic bag contained were copies of marriage contracts." Thus, Indicio simply mistook the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates and official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees to be the garbage that she instructed him the previous week to throw away.

Respondent Judge stressed that she did not and would not have ordered Indicio to dispose of the copies of the marriage certificates, citing

the haphazard manner in which Indicio disposed of the same, and the fact that she had nothing to hide and that she would gain nothing by the disposal thereof.

Re: Unpaid marriage solemnization fees Respondent Judge averred that the best proofs of payment of the marriage solemnization fees were the official receipts. She categorically

stated that all the official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees were inside the plastic bags, together with the marriage certificates.





She stressed that she could not have allowed non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, because it is of public knowledge that she

had been solemnizing a big number of weddings per day, aside from the fact that she had solemnized weddings of several celebrities, which also included celebrities as sponsors; thus, attracting the attention of many court employees. She was also aware of the consequences of solemnizing a marriage without the solemnization fee so she was very meticulous when it came to checking, among other things, whether there was an official receipt evidencing payment of said fee. She also knew that the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City would not allow the registration of a marriage certificate if there was no accompanying official receipt of payment of the marriage solemnization fee. Moreover, considering the pervading financial crisis everywhere, any person would not part with his money without demanding an official receipt. No couple or nobody had ever complained about the absence of the official receipt of the marriage solemnization fee. Further, the Audit Team found from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City that all the marriage certificates of the weddings that she solemnized were duly registered therein.

Respondent Judge also pointed out that the respective Clerks of Court of the OCC of the MeTC and RTC adopted a wrong and unreliable

procedure in verifying from their records whether there was payment of the marriage solemnization fees, simply because most of the dates of the wedding indicated in the marriage certificates were not the same as the dates indicated in the official receipts. She explained that a couple would often pay the solemnization fee at a certain date, but the solemnization of the wedding would take place on another date for one reason or another. Thus, when the Clerks of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court checked the dates from the copies of their official receipts on file, the dates did not reflect payment of the fees, because payments were made on dates different from the wedding dates.

Re: Failure to reflect the marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases

Respondent Judge related that the Monthly Reports of cases were typed by her staff, namely: Civil-in-Charge Celedonio Hornachos and

Criminal-in-Charge Mary Jane Rafael. As regards the number of marriages solemnized, they would inquire from her and she would then give them the figure as stated in her own logbook. When the Reports were turned over to her for signature, she would first verify the entries from her own logbook before affixing her signature. Thus, she was shocked when she learned that the Court’s copy of the Reports contained incorrect figures and was different from that which she signed.

She asserted that she could not have failed to reflect the correct number of marriages in the Monthly Reports, because apart from the fact

that she was very meticulous in the accuracy of the entries, she had nothing to gain by not reflecting the correct figures of solemnized marriages. She believed that the blank and incorrect figures appearing in the number of marriages solemnized in the Monthly Reports from January

2004 to March 2007 were the handiwork of Umipig, who most probably tampered the same, because of a serious grudge against her. She added that it was also Umipig who transferred the plastic bags of marriage certificates and official receipts from the small room to the stenographer's room in an attempt to expose the big number of weddings that she had solemnized, which, through his machinations, were not reflected in the Monthly Reports.

Re: Compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code, and violation of Circular No. 9-98[9]

Respondent Judge claimed that she solemnized the marriages inside her chambers or courtroom, and as proof thereof, she pointed to the

entry in the marriage certificates reflecting the place of solemnization. On few occasions, she had also solemnized weddings in a house or place designated by both contracting parties, but not without the required affidavit of request. She explained that she was able to solemnize many weddings per day, because the rites took only about 10 minutes and involved a maximum of eight couples per batch.

She stressed that neither did she demand nor receive money for solemnization of marriages, and only the official receipts of the

solemnization fees were given to her. In regard to Victoria Jamora, she explained in her Amended Comment dated October 2, 2008 that she failed to reflect in the Monthly

Report of Cases the correct number of marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua for the following reasons:1. She was not instructed by Judge Arcaya-Chua to be present during the marriage ceremony;2. She had no personal knowledge of the actual number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge;3. She merely relied on the entries in the Monthly Report as to the number of marriages solemnized. The Monthly Report was

prepared by Jane Rafael, who was in charge of criminal cases. When she asked Rafael why there were only such number of marriages solemnized from June 2005 to April 2007, Rafael replied that was the advice of respondent Judge. Besides, Judge Arcaya-Chua signed the reports. As a subordinate designated by respondent Judge as OIC, she was not in a position to question her superior, Judge Arcaya-Chua, and signed in good faith the Monthly Reports in question.

The administrative case was again referred to Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation,

report and recommendation. The Investigation of the Administrative Complaints On October 9, 2008, Investigator Justice Salazar-Fernando scheduled the consolidated cases for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on October 23,

2008. During the hearing on October 23, 2008 of A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ ( the Ocampo Case), complainant Francisco Ocampo

appeared with his counsel, Atty. Jose Aliling IV, while Atty. James Navarrete and Atty. Fe C. Aguila appeared for OCA. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua appeared in her own behalf. During the said hearing, complainant Ocampo submitted a Supplemental Affidavit and additional documentary evidence.[10] Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua also furnished complainant Ocampo's counsel with a copy of her Affidavit, which incorporated her Comments in the two cases, the Supplemental Comment, the Motion to Recall Preventive Suspension and the Motion to Resolve. Complainant Ocampo testified on direct examination, affirming the truth of the contents of his Complaint and the authenticity of the annexes attached thereto. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cross-examined him, but reserved further cross-examination as to the Supplemental Affidavit. Hearing resumed the following day, October 24, 2008, and respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cross-examined complainant Ocampo specifically on hisSupplemental Affidavit. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked complainant Ocampo questions.

During the hearing on October 29, 2008, complainant Ocampo submitted his Offer of Documentary Evidence. Respondent Judge Arcaya-

Chua testified on direct examination, whereby she affirmed the statements in her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, and identified her exhibits, after which, she was cross-examined by complainant Ocampo's counsel. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua questions. Thereafter, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case and formally offered her documentary evidence, insofar as OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ was concerned. For the guidance and information of Justice Salazar-Fernando, the entire original records of SP No. M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo, was ordered brought to her office.

On November 3, 2008, OCA started presenting evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case). Judge Zenaida T.

Galapate-Laguilles testified and submitted her Affidavit, and was cross-examined, and was asked questions on redirect-examination. The scheduled hearing for November 4, 2008 was cancelled due to the unavailability of two (2) witnesses, namely, Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino.

Hearing on the case resumed on November 10, 2008. OCA presented Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino,

who both submitted their Affidavits, which were considered as their testimony on direct. They were questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando and cross-examined by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. Court records pertaining to SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K.S. Chang Tan v. Stephanie N. Estrella Pulliam, were likewise directed to be brought to the office of Justice Salazar-Fernando for reference and information.



During the hearing on November 11, 2008, the Executive Judge of the RTC of Makati City, Judge Winlove Dumayas, appeared, and

questions were propounded to him by Justice Salazar-Fernando, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Atty. James Navarrete from OCA. In order to expedite the proceedings, respondent Judge was allowed to present her defense, and marked in evidence several documents,

[11] which formed part of her direct testimony. Since the documents submitted by respondent Judge were voluminous, Atty. Navarrete was given until November 20, 2008 to conduct his cross-examination.

On November 25, 2008, Atty. James Navarrete continued with the marking of additional documents and submitted in evidence his exhibits.

[12] Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was cross-examined by Atty. Navarrete. Respondent Judge was also allowed to ask Atty. Navarrete some questions. Thereafter, respondent Judge submitted her Formal Offer of Evidence. Atty. Navarrete was given until November 27, 2008 to file his Opposition, while respondent Judge was given five days to file her Counter-Manifestation.

On November 26, 2008, Atty. Navarrete filed his Comment, interposing no objection to respondent's Formal Offer of Exhibits. On December 2, 2008, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed a Counter-Manifestation and Motion to Correct Transcript of Stenographic

Notes. On January 16, 2009, Justice Salazar-Fernando received the rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge

Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Court Stenographer Victoria Jamora, formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263-RTC, Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City), which he noted to have been consolidated with A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua) per Resolution of the Court en banc dated January 15, 2008.

Since A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was not included in the earlier investigation, Justice Salazar-Fernando set A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 for hearing

on February 8, 2009. Hearing on A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 started on February 10, 2009, during which the counsels for OCA and respondent stenographer Victoria

Jamora appeared. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua also attended the hearing. OCA proposed several stipulations for admission to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. She admitted that she solemnized marriages while

she was the Judge of the MeTC, Branch 63, Makati City and RTC, Branch 144, Makati City. After going over the certificates of marriage from January 2004 to August 2004, she admitted that she solemnized those marriages. She also admitted that she solemnized marriages in her chambers or inside her courtroom, except for two other marriages that she could not remember, but proper documents were presented to her. She further admitted that payments of solemnizing fees must be paid before conducting or solemnizing the marriage, and as part of her regular duties, she signed the Monthly Reports.

Hearing resumed on February 18, 2009. OCA presented Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, who testified on the incident that occurred on May 17,

2007, which led to the inventory of the certificates of marriage, and the audit conducted on May 15-17, 2007. Atty. Corcelles-Aguila's affidavit[13] formed part of the records of the case.

In the hearing of March 3, 2009, OCA presented Salvador Indicio, Jr., Arnel Magsombol, Lucia Ticman and Joel Gregorio as its witnesses.

The witnesses were questioned by OCA, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Justice Salazar-Fernando. Per request of OCA, notice of hearing was sent to German Averia, for him to appear on the next scheduled hearing as the last witness of OCA.

In the hearing of March 23, 2009, German Averia testified in his capacity as Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Statistical Records Division,

Court Management Office (CMO) of the Supreme Court. He confirmed having issued certifications and inventory on the monthly report of cases submitted by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua to the CMO in compliance with Administrative Circular No. 4-2004. In the same hearing, the counsel for OCA categorically stated that their evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was limited only to the alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriage as well as the falsification of the monthly reports.[14]

With the continuance of the investigation on April 8, 2009, OCA presented in evidence the originals of the monthly reports, and

the certified true copies of the monthly reports, whose originals were unavailable. OCA, thereafter, rested its case. In the same hearing, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua started presenting her exhibits.[15] She manifested that her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit would serve as her testimony on direct examination.

On April 21, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented additional exhibits. [16] Her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, as well as the Affidavit of her son, Robert Maurice Chua, formed part of their direct testimonies. Respondent Judge was, thereafter, cross-examined by OCA.

During the hearing on May 5, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua offered in evidence her Second Supplemental Affidavit. She also

presented additional exhibits.[17] Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's daughter, Beau Mairi Chua testified, with her Affidavit constituting her direct testimony. No cross-examination was conducted on her by the opposing counsel. Respondent Jamora also testified as witness for respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.

At the resumption of the hearing on May 18, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recalled respondent Jamora to the stand and

propounded additional questions. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case after respondent Jamora's testimony. Respondent Jamora, thereafter, testified in her own behalf, with her Amended Comment constituting her direct testimony. No cross-examination was conducted on her by OCA. Respondent Jamora, thereafter, rested her case.

With the conformity of the parties, Justice Salazar-Fernando directed them to file their respective memorandum. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed her memorandum on July 21, 2009, while respondent Jamora filed her memorandum on August 3, 2009. OCA did not file a memorandum; hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando deemed that it waived the filing of its memorandum. Per this Court's Resolution dated August 24, 2009, the case was submitted for report and recommendation to the Supreme Court.

Findings of the Investigating Justice Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case)

In regard to the denial of the Motion to Dismiss in the Ocampo Case, without necessarily ruling on the correctness of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua’s Order, Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge's disposition thereof fell within the ambit of discretion vested upon her as a judge. Not giving credence to the evidence presented by the movants with respect to the residence of Milan Ocampo was well within her judicial discretion. Assuming the same was erroneous, no administrative liability attached thereon in the absence of sufficient evidence that she ruled in such manner, because of a corrupt or dishonest motive, bad faith, fraud or malice. The evidence presented by complainant Ocampo as to Milan's residence might constitute proof of her "domicile," but such evidence was not necessarilyirreconcilable with the fact that Milan might be maintaining residence elsewhere other than Meycauayan, Bulacan, considering her estranged relationship with complainant Ocampo.

As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's

explanation acceptable. The order setting the case for hearing on December 13, 2006 was issued on December 8, 2006. Thus, there was an interim of at least five days from the issuance of the order and the date of the scheduled hearing. It did not appear that respondent Judge had any hand in the belated service of the notice to the complainant. Justice Salazar-Fernando held that respondent Judge cannot be faulted as to the alleged suddenness of the said hearing, because a prayer for TPO requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that respect, no wrong-doing, fraud, bad faith, malice or even arbitrariness can be attributed to respondent Judge.








According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged precipitate issuance of the TPO had no leg to stand on. Respondent Judge Arcaya-

Chua correctly stated that the issuance of the TPO can be made upon the filing of the application after ex parte determination by the judge that the same be issued. This is in accordance with Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9262, thus:

SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refer to the protection order issued by

the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.[18]

Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even before complainant Ocampo could file his answer was neither irregular nor improper.

Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent Judge issued the TPO. A preliminary determination of the facts

of the case justified the issuance of the TPO as it appeared that the subject minors therein were the illegitimate children of the petitioner, Milan Ocampo, having been conceived through artificial insemination without the required written authorization or ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco Ocampo. The pertinent provision of the Family Code states:

ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or

both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. Moreover, Milan Ocampo appended evidence of complainant Ocampo's alleged perversity and violent behavior. A sworn affidavit [19] of

Emelita S. Valentino, narrating alleged perverse behavior of complainant Ocampo, as well as the certification [20] from the Philippine National Police of Meycauayan, stating acts of violence committed by complainant Ocampo on Milan, were appended to the Petition. The totality of the evidence thus presented, while not exactly conclusive, justified a prima facie determination of the necessity of a TPO.

While Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's objections to the matter of support apt and plausible, the same could

be merely considered as an error of judgment or an abuse of discretion, but respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cannot be held administratively liable thereon. Considering that the matter of support therein was merely provisional, respondent Judge could not be faulted for readily granting the prayer for support without further evaluating evidence with respect thereto. Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in that respect was not gross, the same having been brought about by an innocuous reliance on the Rule on Provisional Orders, A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC. Under the said rule, provisional orders for protection and support may be issued without hearing. However, the said rule specifically applies to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage or legal separation. In this case, the matter of support was among the principal reliefs sought for in the petition for custody.

Justice Salazar-Fernando found that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's alleged over-zealousness in causing the immediate implementation of the TPO was without solid basis. A TPO, much like a TRO in civil cases, is required to be served immediately, precisely to serve its purpose as a protective relief. Respondent Judge issued the TPO on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday, right after the hearing on complainant Ocampo's motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to dismiss.She clarified that the date of the hearing on the motion for reconsideration on April 3, 2007 was set by complainant Ocampo's counsel himself. The following day,April 4, 2007, a Holy Wednesday, she directed the implementation of the TPO. Hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper or wayward in the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the case. There was no evidence that respondent Judge purposely sought the issuance of the TPO during the Holy Week, as it was complainant Ocampo's counsel himself who, wittingly or unwittingly, chose the hearing date. Considering the urgency and immediacy of a TPO, it was not improper or illegal that respondent Judge caused its immediate implementation.

Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge could not have been privy to the brazen manner in which the TPO was served

by the designated sheriff. In the first place, it was only the designated sheriff, Sheriff Tangangco, who was administratively charged by complainant Ocampo for the allegedly offensive manner the TPO was served. As correctly argued by respondent Judge, such was the personal accountability of Sheriff Tangangco.

Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's allegation of bribery against respondent Judge to be hearsay. During

the hearing conducted by Justice Salazar-Fernando on October 24, 2007, complainant Ocampo confirmed that he had no personal knowledge of the alleged bribery of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.

Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case) should be dismissed. She stated

that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.[21] She cited Español v. Mupas,[22] which held thus:

x x x While the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, nonetheless, we have repeatedly stated that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his or her official duties. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when the complainant relies mainly on secondhand information to prove the charges against the respondent, the complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. The Court cannot give credence to charges based on mere credence or speculation. As we held in a recent case:

Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent.[23]

Findings in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 ( the Chang Tan/RCBC Case)

Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that in the Chang Tan Case, the OCA primarily asserted that the TPO issued by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua could not be legally justified under R.A. No. 9262, because the said law applies only if the applicant for TPO is a woman.

The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA on that score. R.A. No. 9262 is known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and

Their Children Act of 2004. It is specifically applicable to "women and their children," not to men. Thus, while the TPO may be justified with respect to the protection accorded the minor, the same is not legally tenable with respect to the petitioner, Albert Chang Tan. Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife.Certainly, such a TPO would be absurd. Hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent







Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in this regard to be gross ignorance of the law. She cited the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. in Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Baguio-Benguet Chapter v. Pamintuan,[24] which stated, thus:

When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elementary a rule, a law or a principle in the

discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority (De Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001). When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000).

Justice Salazar-Fernando averred that as a family court judge, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua should be the last person to err in the

application of R.A. No. 9262, and, in this case, issue a TPO applied for a man, purportedly to protect the latter against his wife. Such is unthinkable under R.A. No. 9262. A careful evaluation of the records in the Chang Tan Case showed that there was not even any allegation of violence committed by Stephanie Pulliam against her husband, Chang Tan. Thus, Justice Salazar-Fernando found that the TPO against Stephanie, insofar as it directed the latter to stay away from the home and office of petitioner, to cease and desist from harassing, intimidating or threatening petitioner and to refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of petitioner, was anomalous.

Be that as it may, with respect to the issue of custody, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's reasons for

granting custody over subject minor to Albert Chang Tan to be legally tenable. While not exactly conclusive, the evidence relied upon by respondent Judge in granting custody in favor of Chang Tan was substantial enough to warrant a prima facie determination that a TPO in favor of the minor was necessary and would serve her paramount interest. Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper in respondent Judge's reliance on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez and the statements ofyaya Josie Leynes and the subject minor herself, Rafi Pulliam, which all confirmed that Stephanie has not been a good influence to her daughter, Rafi. As far as the latter's paramount interest was concerned, Stephanie was not the ideal person to whom custody should be awarded. On this premise, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's award of temporary custody to the father could be justified. However, Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that she does not necessarily affirm the correctness of the custody award to the father, Chang Tan, since respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's Order dated May 7, 2007 was annulled and set aside by the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated October 31, 2007.[25]

In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua allegedly displayed in the said case, Justice

Salazar-Fernando found no substantial evidence to support such allegations. The OCA's Memorandum itself admitted that there was no proof that respondent Judge received money from Chang Tan.

Moreover, not one of the witnesses of OCA confirmed having personally witnessed the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and

the OIC of the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, except for their secondhand accounts that they heard that such incident actually transpired. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it speculative to attribute the commission of bribery or wrongdoing to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua solely on such account. The Investigating Justice stated that respondent Judge appeared to have no personal or actual participation in that incident, because the "heated argument" was allegedly between Chang Tan and the OIC, Victoria Jamora.

As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in the RCBC Case, Justice Salazar-

Fernando found no evidence against respondent of any irregularity or undue interest in the case. Respondent convincingly elaborated the circumstances surrounding her issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, particularly the manner in which she studied and evaluated the application for the writ. Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced that while the order granting the writ was indeed speedily issued the ex parte hearing on the application having been held on a Friday, followed immediately by the issuance of the writ on the succeeding business day, a Monday there was really nothing impossible or irregular in such feat. Per respondent’s account, she had been unofficially reporting for work on Saturdays during that time and she did not have to evaluate the totality of the evidence for the purpose of ruling on the propriety of issuing the writ. Further, considering respondent's habit of immediately disposing pending motions before her court, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister significance to the speedy issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The Investigating Justice also found respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the writ of preliminary attachment to be apt.

Justice Salazar-Fernando held that in the absence of evidence that she was motivated by any dishonest or corrupt motive in issuing the

writ, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is entitled to the presumption that she regularly performed her duties. She cited, thus:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint. Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue interest cannot be presumed, specially weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and to the rich. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, it was held that bare allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. In Sinnott v. Barte, it was further held, mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge.[26]

Findings in the Judicial Audit Case (Re: Marriage Certificates and Monthly Reports) Justice Salazar-Fernando found that there is substantial evidence of an anomaly in respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's solemnization of

marriages in her court and failure to reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly Reports. The Investigating Justice stated that at once, the timing of the disposal of the marriage certificates, which were said to have been

contained in four (4) plastic bags, is highly suspect, because it occurred during the time the judicial audit was being conducted. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted the fact that she ordered Salvador Indicio, Jr., her utility worker, to dispose of some garbage contained in blue plastic bags. However, as regards the timing of disposal, she explained that she ordered Indicio to dispose of her garbage on the second week of May, days before the judicial audit.[27] Such fact was confirmed by Indicio in his testimony.[28] He testified that he was ordered by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua to dispose of the garbage on May 9, 2007. Indicio stated that the garbage was due for disposal onMay 14, 2007, but since it was election day, the disposal of the garbage was postponed until May 17, 2007, at which time, the disposal of the plastic bags caught the attention of the security detail of the Supreme Court.

The Investigating Justice stated that based on the foregoing account, if the order to dispose of the garbage was indeed made on May 9,

2007, it is perplexing why such a simple task of throwing away a garbage of barely four plastic bags, which would take only a couple of minutes to accomplish, could tarry for several days. Why no attempt to dispose of the supposed garbage was made on May 9, 10, and 11 (May 12 & 13 were Saturday and Sunday, respectively, while May 14 was Election Day, and May 15 to 17 was the period of judicial audit) was not sufficiently explained. The logical implication is that the order to dispose could not have been made on May 9, 2007, but more likely later when the judicial audit was already being conducted. Such conclusion jibes with the account of Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, one of the members of the judicial audit team, that upon being immediately confronted why he chose that particular day to dispose of the supposed garbage despite the ongoing audit, Indicio "could not offer any explanation."[29] Indicio could not remember the exact date when the order to dispose of the garbage was made by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. He testified, thus:







CROSS-EXAMINATION JUDGE CHUA:

You mentioned in your Affidavit and in your testimony this morning that you executed an Affidavit on May 17 and the throwing away of the garbage was also done at 8:00 o’clock in the morning of May 17 upon my instruction. When did I give my instruction to you to throw away the garbage?

MR. INDICIO:

You told me before the audit to throw all your trash.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Did you know when that particular day was?

MR. INDICIO:

That was election day, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Election day of May, 2007?

MR. INDICIO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Was that the exact date when Judge Chua told you to throw the garbage?

MR. INDICIO:

Yes, Your Honor. JUDGE CHUA:

May I draw your attention to paragraph 2 of your Affidavit. This was subscribed to on May 17. So the last week that you mentioned here was a week before May 17. You mentioned here that last week, I was instructed by the Presiding Judge to dispose of the garbage which were stocked in her branch. Do you confirm the statement in paragraph 2 of your Affidavit?

MR. INDICIO:

Judge Chua told me to throw the garbage because it was election day.

JUDGE CHUA:

I am sorry, Your Honor, but I do not get the fact straight.May I draw your attention now to paragraph 5 of your Affidavit. You said here that the said garbage was scheduled to be disposed last May 14, 2007. However, since it was election day, same was not collected.

MR. INDICIO:

Yes, ma’am, it was scheduled on May 14, but the janitor was busy so it was only on May 17 that he had an opportunity to throw it.

JUDGE CHUA:

To clarify the matter, Mr. Indicio, when did I give the instruction to you to throw away the garbage?

MR. INDICIO:

I was told before the audit.

JUDGE CHUA:The audit was conducted on May 15 up to May 17. Based on paragraph 2 of your Affidavit, I gave the instruction to you a week before May 17, so I gave the instruction to you probably on May 10, is that what you are saying?

MR. INDICIO:

I do not remember the exact date but I was instructed by Judge Chua. xxxx JUSTICE FERNANDO: When you told us that before the audit was conducted, Judge Chua already instructed you to throw those garbage bags placed inside the stenographer’s room, how many days after that instruction was given to you did you comply with her instruction?

MR. INDICIO:

Eight (8) days, Your Honor.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

So if you instructed Beldad to throw those garbage bags on May 17 minus 8 that would be May 9, is that correct?

MR. INDICIO:

Yes, your Honor.[30]

According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, apart from the timing of the disposal, the manner of disposing the plastic bags of marriage

certificates was also open to suspicion. Although there were four plastic bags ready for disposal, which according to Indicio himself were really not too heavy,[31] only one was taken out by the janitor to be disposed, leaving three other plastic bags inside the courtroom. Taking out the plastic bags one by one could have been purposely sought to surreptitiously remove the said bags from the courtroom, and avoid detection by the security personnel detailed by the judicial audit team.

Justice Salazar-Fernando noted that despite repeated references to the supposed garbage, which were allegedly contained in similar

plastic bags containing the marriage certificates, the whereabouts of the said plastic bags of garbage were never accounted for. If what were mistakenly attempted to be disposed of by Indicio were the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates, the plastic bags containing the garbage could have been found elsewhere in the courtroom. However, as things turned out, there were really no plastic bags of garbage, but only more plastic bags of marriage certificates. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's account of the plastic bags of garbage was unsubstantiated.

The Investigating Justice did not give credence to respondent Judge’s theory as to why the plastic bags of marriage certificates were

found in the stenographer's room, causing Indicio to mistake it for the garbage which she supposedly ordered him to dispose of. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua theorized that a certain Noel Umipig, a casual employee in her staff, who harbored a deep-seated grudge against her for not being able to borrow money from her, could have been responsible in transferring the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her chambers to the stenographer's room before her courtroom was padlocked. According to her, Umipig could have heard of the impending administrative investigation on her. Hence, to expose the big number of weddings she had been solemnizing, which, purportedly, through Umipig' s machinations had not been reflected in her monthly reports, Umipig could have taken out the plastic bags of marriage certificates from the small room in her chambers and transferred them to the stenographer's room, so that once the plastic bags were taken out to the garbage can along the corridor, the documents would be discovered by the audit team.

Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge’s theory difficult to swallow. According to her, it was fantastic that respondent Judge attached too much cunning to Umipig for the latter to have deviously perpetrated all the acts being attributed to him. If the intention was only to expose the big number of weddings, it is hard to understand why Umipig would have to go the difficult way of trespassing on her chambers when all he would have to do was spread rumors about the weddings, as he had been wont to do, per respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's own account.

In regard to the non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, the certifications [32] issued by the Clerks of Court of the MeTC and RTC

of Makati City attest to the fact that out of the 1,975 marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 166 marriages were paid the corresponding solemnization fees. Justice Salazar-Fernando found no reason to doubt the reliability or integrity of the said certifications, the contents of which were confirmed by Arnel Magsombol and Lucila Ticman, the same persons who personally verified from their records whether or not the solemnization fees of the marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were paid.

Respondent Judge assailed the reliability of the procedure undertaken by Magsombol and Ticman in verifying the payment of

solemnization fees, positing that they could have merely relied on the dates of the wedding as stated in the marriage certificates, which were often not the same dates stated in the receipts. She contended that most parties paid their solemnization fee on a date different from their wedding; hence, the dates of the receipts would not be the same date as that of the wedding. Thus, respondent Judge postulated that when Magsombol and Ticman verified payment of the solemnization fees based on the dates of the wedding as stated in the marriage certificates, they would find no receipt to show payment of the solemnization fees, because payment was made on some other date.

Justice Salazar-Fernando did not believe the foregoing postulation of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in the light of the categorical

declarations of Magsombol and Ticman that they did not merely based their verification on the dates of the wedding, but, specifically, they verified the payment of solemnization fees based on the names of the contracting parties to the wedding. Pertinent portions of the testimonies of Magsombol and Ticman state as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION x x x x ATTY. BUGTAS:

So how did you verify these marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua? MR. MAGSOMBOL;

I checked the names that were handed to me one by one. ATTY. BUGTAS:

Did you check all the records? MR. MAGSOMBOL:

Yes, I based on the daily cash collection records beginning the first day of January 2004 up to the last day of office of December 2005.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Are your daily cash collection records complete from January 2004 to December 2005? MR. MAGSOMBOL:

Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

How about the other basis which you said, receipts? MR. MAGSOMBOL:

In our daily collection report, we indicate the OR number. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Did you also check those OR numbers and the receipts? MR. MAGSOMBOL:

Yes, I matched the daily collection to the receipts which I brought with me, Your Honor. xxxx




JUSTICE FERNANDO:So in the years 2004 and 2005, marriages solemnized by the MeTC Judge were supposed to be recorded in your daily cash collection book?

MR. MAGSOMBOL:

Yes, Your Honor, the ones that are being paid. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

So if they are not paid, they do not appear in your book? MR. MAGSOMBOL:

Yes, we don’t know if the marriage happened or not. xxxx (Direct Examination of Lucila D. Ticman) JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Did you verify from your records if the solemnization fees of the marriages that were listed in the document were paid? MS. TICMAN:


What was the result of your verification? MS. TICMAN:

Only 20 parties paid the solemnization fees. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Only 20? Twenty out of?ATTY. BUGTAS:

More than a thousand, Your Honor. 1,300 plus. x x x x JUSTICE FERNANDO:

What was the basis of your findings? MS. TICMAN:

My basis Your Honor is the one coming from the Supreme Court, and the names supplied us by the Supreme Court were verified by us if they were paid or not.

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

What documents did you check to determine whether the fees were paid or not? MS. TICMAN:

The Certificates of Marriage. x x x x ATTY. BUGTAS:

What documents or records did you examine in order to determine the marriages that paid the corresponding fees? MS. TICMAN:

The logbook of the Accounting Section and official receipts. x x x x ATTY. BUGTAS:

Based on your records or receipt that you have, you can inform the inquiring party whether that person or party paid the corresponding fees or not?

MS. TICMAN:Yes, sir. ATTY. BUGTAS:

In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, based on your records, you enumerated just 20 marriages as appearing to have paid the corresponding fees.

MS. TICMAN:

Yes, sir. ATTY. BUGTAS:

But based on the records available, the Supreme Court furnished you with a list numbering around 1,344 names of parties for verification but you came out with an Affidavit enumerating only those parties that paid the corresponding fees. Is there a possibility that the contracting parties paid the fees, but your records would not reflect their names?

MS. TICMAN:

No, sir. ATTY. BUGTAS:

So only those that paid will appear in your records.

MS. TICMAN:Yes, sir.

ATTY. BUGTAS:

If a party did not pay, his or her name will not appear in your records?

MS. TICMAN:Yes, sir.

xxxx ATTY. BUGTAS:

In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, you stated that after a thorough examination of the records of this office (referring to your office) has been ascertained that only 20 marriages have been paid in the OCC RTC Makati city, and you enumerated the 20 marriages that paid the corresponding fees based on your records.

When you say you thoroughly examined, can you tell us whether the examination was thorough enough so that your Affidavit is accurate as to its contents?

MS. TICMAN:

We examined our logbook one by one, the names of the parties given by the Supreme Court.[33]

Justice Salazar-Fernando was fully convinced by the findings of Magsombol and Ticman that the solemnization fees of a substantial

number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were unpaid. As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's failure to reflect the marriages in her monthly reports, Justice Salazar-Fernando found

respondent Judge’s defense of forgery, nay tampering, to be unsubstantiated. She carefully perused respondent Judge’s signatures in the monthly reports and compared the same to her signatures in the pleadings, which she submitted during the investigation, as well as in the orders and decisions contained in the records, and found no substantial discrepancies therein or any indication that the same had been forged. According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, while all her signatures did not exactly appear to be 100 percent similar, there was no reason to suppose that her signatures in the monthly reports and other signatures extant in the records were not signed by one and the same person. Moreover, Justice Salazar-Fernando failed to see any tell-tale signs of tampering, and this could be the reason why respondent Judge herself withdrew such defense.

Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved the argument of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua that the anomaly attributed to her was the work of

Umipig. The Investigating Justice found it incredible that since January 2004 up to April 2007 or for a period of more than three years, Umipig had been silently working on his sinister scheme, patiently and clandestinely forging respondent Judge's signatures in her monthly reports as vengeance for not lending him money. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it difficult to imagine how Umipig could have harbored such a deep-seated grudge against respondent Judge just because the latter refused to loan him money for his enrolment in law school, which purportedly was the reason why Umipig failed to become a lawyer.

Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented text messages allegedly coming from Umipig to show the latter's extreme hatred of her. The

Investigating Justice stated that apart from the fact that it could not be established that it was indeed Umipig who sent the text messages, the tenor of the text messages did not show that Umipig was the author of all the anomalies relating to the marriage certificates and monthly reports. Respondent Judge quoted Umipig saying, "Hindi bale, may ebidensya naman ako laban sa inyo," which, according to her, could only betray the fact that Umipig had indeed been up to something. According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, Umipig’s statement could only confirm the existence of the anomalies in respondent Judge’s court, rather than attribute authorship to Umipig for the anomalies pertaining to the marriage certificates and monthly reports.

Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua’s procedure of signing the monthly reports ahead of her

OIC to be irregular, since it is contrary to prevailing procedure and protocol. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted that she signed the monthly reports first before her OIC, Ms. Mabalot, during her stint in the MeTC, or Ms. Jamora, in the RTC. Respondent Judge testified, thus:

x x x x JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Could you repeat the statement? JUDGE CHUA:

I signed the monthly reports at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Your Honor, and then the following morning at around 8:00 o’ clock, I would see the reports on top of the table of Ornachos or Rafael still unsigned by Mabalot or Jamora. My focus was on the typewritten name of Mabalot or Jamora without their signatures. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

And you expect the reports to be signed on the same afternoon when you signed? JUDGE CHUA:

Not necessarily, Your Honor, but my point is I showed to Ornachos or Rafael that I have signed the monthly reports. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Do you have to sign first before the clerk of court? JUDGE CHUA:

With due respect to Mrs. Jamora, Your Honor, because the branch clerk of court of MeTC Branch 63 was not a lawyer because she was assigned on detail to the OCC a few months ago and Mrs. Jamora, likewise, is not a lawyer so I would rather do the checking myself, sign and then require them to affix their signatures. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

Contrary to the usual procedure that the Judge would sign last? JUDGE CHUA:


In your case, you sign first before the OIC? JUDGE CHUA:

Yes, Your Honor.[34]

Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved respondent Judge’s justification for signing first before her OIC, reasoning that it does not take a

lawyer to know what to indicate in the monthly reports, let alone the mechanical task of indicating how many cases were disposed or how many marriages were solemnized in a month.



As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code concerning the place of solemnization of the marriage, the Investigating Justice found no evidence that would show that she disregarded the strictures of the said provision. There is also no concrete evidence showing that respondent Judge demanded and/or received money from the contracting parties for solemnizing the marriage. However, it can be inferred that respondent Judge financially benefited from solemnizing the numerous marriages by the fact that these were not correctly reflected in the monthly reports and insufficient solemnizing fees were paid to the court.

Anent respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua’s liability in this case, Justice Salazar-Fernando stated:

x x x [T]aken as a whole, the undersigned Investigator respectfully submits that there is convincing and substantial evidence to support a finding that anomalies were committed in respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court with respect to the solemnization of marriages. The circumstances magnificently fit together: plastic bags containing about 1,975 marriage certificates were surreptitiously being spirited out of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court during the occasion of the judicial audit; when confronted, the person seen disposing the plastic bags stated that he was acting upon the order of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua; when verified, the solemnization fees of the marriages covered by the said marriage certificates were found to have not been paid; despite openly admitting having solemnized all the weddings covered by the said marriage certificates, the monthly reports of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua reflected only a very minimal number of weddings solemnized. Taken together, the circumstances lead to no other conclusion that irregularities were obviously perpetrated by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in solemnizing marriages in her court. In regard to respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's culpability, Justice Salazar-Fernando found sufficient reasons to hold her

accountable for her signatures in the monthly reports. She cannot feign ignorance as to the correct number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge. Jamora’s justification that she could not have questioned respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even if there were erroneous entries in the monthly reports is in itself pregnant with admission that something anomalous could have indeed been taking place. She testified, thus:

JUSTICE FERNANDO:

So you affixed your signature without knowing whether the report is accurate or not? MS. JAMORA:

Your Honor, to answer honestly, I was not in the position to question my superior Judge Chua. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

So, by force of circumstances, you just affixed your signature without any question asked, whether they are correct, inaccurate, incomplete, you just affixed your signature. Is that your job as OIC?

ATTY. VILLANUEVA:

Your Honor, I think she stated her position already in her Comment. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

That is why I am asking her for confirmation. MS. JAMORA:

Yes, Your Honor. ATTY. VILLANUEVA:

More or less, that is the substance of her Comment, Your Honor. JUSTICE FERNANDO:

So without knowing anything about the figures, you just affixed your signature because you saw already the signature of Rafael and the signature of Judge Chua?

MS. JAMORA:

Yes, Your Honor.[35]

Justice Salazar-Fernando found unacceptable respondent Jamora's pretended ignorance of the incorrectness of the monthly reports she

had been signing, let alone the figures relating to the number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge. He stressed that it does not take a lawyer to count or at least approximate the number of weddings that respondent Judge had been solemnizing in her court, considering the unusually big number of weddings she had solemnized. Knowing the figures stated in the monthly reports to be incorrect, Jamora condoned the wrongdoing, if she was actually not a willing participant, by affixing her signatures therein.

Justice Salazar-Fernando held that the reprehensible act or omission of respondent Jamora constitutes dishonesty amounting to grave

misconduct. Moreover, she stated that during the investigation, it was revealed that although Jamora was an OIC Clerk of Court, she had no knowledge of her duties and responsibilities, and had neither control over the employees under her nor did what was expected of her.

Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Jamora's plea for compassion and understanding, citing the fact that she was not a

lawyer and that the position of OIC Clerk of Court was merely thrust upon her by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, which she reluctantly accepted, was hollow, because her transgression did not have any connection with her status as a non-lawyer or being a reluctant OIC. Her insistence upon her ignorance or lack of knowledge of the incorrectness of the figures stated in the monthly reports, specifically on the number of marriages solemnized, aggravates her offense as it makes a mockery of her oath.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Justice Salazar-Fernando. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable

doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[36]

In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, there is substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua did not report in her Monthly Reports[37] the

actual number of marriages she solemnized during her stint in the MeTC, Makati City, Branch 63 and in the RTC, Makati City, Branch 144, and that the solemnization fees that were paid did not correspond to the number of marriages that were solemnized by her.

The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge Arcaya-Chua reported zero or a lesser number of marriages solemnized by

her compared with the marriage certificates that were seized from her office. Just to mention a portion of the evidence submitted against her: In April 2004, she reported[38] that she did not solemnized any marriage, but there were 29 marriage certificates issued on the said month contained in the plastic bags that were taken from her office. [39] In May 2004, she reported[40] that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 36 marriage certificates issued on the said month were found in the same plastic bags.[41] In June 2004, she likewise reported[42] that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 45 marriage certificates issued on the said month were contained in the plastic bags.[43] From November 2005 to March 2007, her Monthly Reports[44] indicated that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 1,068 marriage certificates issued by her during the said period are in the custody of the Court.[45]












Atty. Neptali D. Abasta, Clerk of Court V, OCC, MeTC, Makati City, in his Certification[46] dated June 8, 2007, stated that only 146 of the marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua from January 2004 to June 13, 2005 paid the corresponding marriage fee. Moreover, Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., Clerk of Court VII, OCC, RTC, Makati City, declared in his Certification[47] dated June 8, 2007 that from the list furnished by this Court of marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 20 marriages were paid to the said office per RTC official receipts covering the period from June 14, 2005 to April 2007. Hence, out of the 1,975 marriage certificates discovered in Branch 144, only a total of 166 marriages were paid.

In the light of the substantial evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame to Noel Umipig absent any proof of weight that he forged

her signature in the Monthly Reports. In regard to respondent Victoria Jamora, her signature on the Monthly Reports represented that she attested to the correctness thereof;

hence, it is presumed that she verified or should have verified the facts stated therein. The Monthly Reports specifically state that the signatories thereto, including Victoria Jamora, “declare under oath that the information in this Monthly Report is true and correct to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to the provisions of existing rules/administrative circulars.”

Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of Branch 144 from July 2005 to April 2007. [48] It is incredible that Victoria

Jamora, as OIC, was unaware of the big number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge from November 5 to March 2007, which totaled 1,068 marriages per the confiscated marriage certificates, but she attested in the Monthly Reports for the said period that no marriage was ever solemnized. Thus, the Investigating Justice correctly stated that she knew that the figures stated in the Monthly Reports were incorrect, but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein, if she was not actually a willing participant.

The Court sustains the findings of Justice Salvador-Fernando in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and

Victoria Jamora are guilty of gross misconduct. In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court upholds the finding of Justice Salvador-Fernando that respondent

Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9292, known as the Anti–Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9292.

In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the Court sustains the recommendation of Justice Salvador-Fernando that the

case be dismissed in the absence of substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is liable for the charge of “harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.”

We now resolve the motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093 In A.M. RTJ-07-2093, Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against Judge Arcaya-Chua for serious misconduct and

dishonesty. Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judge’s husband, alleged that in the first week of September 2002, she asked respondent’s help regarding the cases of her friend, Emerita Muñoz, pending before the Supreme Court. At that time, respondent was the Presiding Judge of the MeTC of Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent, a former employee of the Supreme Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for the speedy resolution of the said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave respondent P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latter’s chamber. When complainant followed up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other party was offering P10 million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return the P100,000.00; however, respondent could no longer be contacted.[49]

In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denied the charges against her and averred that in the months adverted to by

complainant, she (respondent) was facing protests, damaging newspaper reports and administrative cases which caused her hypertension; thus, she could not have agreed to the supposed transaction of complainant. When she became a judge, complainant asked a lot of favors from her, and knowing that she worked as a Court Attorney of the Supreme Court, complainant asked her to talk to a certain Mario Tolosa of the Third Division, to whom complainant gave P50,000.00 for a favorable resolution of Muñoz’ cases. Respondent declined. Thereafter, complainant started spreading malicious imputations against her. On April 23, 2005, complainant begged respondent to talk to anyone in the Third Division to recover the money she gave Tolosa. Respondent again refused. Complainant then repeatedly tried to talk to her until April 25, 2005when complainant threatened to file a case against respondent with the Supreme Court. Complainant sent two demand letters addressed to respondent's court asking for the return of the P100,000.00 complainant allegedly gave her, which letters were read by respondent's Clerk of Court. Complainant also told respondent's husband, outside respondent's house, that she (respondent) was corrupt, as she asked for money in order to settle cases in court. Respondent filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against Honor and Unjust Vexation against complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case against her.[50]

The Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred this case to Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals for

investigation, report and recommendation. During the preliminary conference held on September 4, 2007, complainant manifested her desire to move for the dismissal of her

complaint against respondent.[51] In a Verified Manifestation[52] dated September 6, 2007, complainant stated that in the latter part of August 2007, she and respondent had a long and serious discussion about the dispute and bad feelings between them; that after a sincere exchange of views, it dawned on complainant that her accusation against respondent was brought about by misunderstanding, confusion and misapprehension of facts concerning the incident subject of the present administrative case; that for the sake of unity and harmonious relations in their family, the complainant and respondent had reconciled and restored friendly relations with each other; and that in view of the foregoing, complainant was no longer interested in pursuing her administrative case against respondent.

In her Report dated October 5, 2007, Justice Buzon recommended the dismissal of the administrative case in view of paucity of evidence

upon which a conclusion could be drawn, brought about by the withdrawal by Santos of her complaint and her failure and refusal to prove the allegations in her Complaint.

In a Resolution[53] dated December 5, 2007, the Court, adopting the recommendation of Justice Buzon, dismissed the complaint against

respondent for lack of evidence. The Court, in the same Resolution, also ordered complainant to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of Court for filing an unfounded verified Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against respondent.

Complainant submitted her Compliance dated January 6, 2008 stating that: x x x x 2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable Court, her administrative complaint against Judge Evelyn Ar[c]aya-Chua is not

unfounded; 3. All the allegations therein are true and based on respondent’s personal knowledge;









4. The main reason why respondent did not anymore pursue her complaint was because of the pressure of her family to forgive Judge Chua, for the sake of unity and harmony in the family, given the fact that Judge Chua’s husband is her nephew;

5. On several occasions in August 2007, Judge Chua, her husband and their children came to respondent’s house and pleaded for forgiveness. Later, respondent’s sister, husband and children, as well as her close friends persuaded her to forgive Judge Chua and let bygones be bygones, for the sake of peace and unity in the family;

6. It is solely due to the foregoing events as well as for humane reasons that respondent gave up her complaint against Judge

Chua.[54] In its Resolution[55] dated March 3, 2008, the Court found that complainant's compliance was not satisfactory, and that she was trifling with

court processes. The Court then resolved to reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a more severe penalty would be imposed on her in the event of a repetition of the sameoffense; recall the Resolution of the Court dated December 5, 2007; reopen the administrative case against respondent; direct Justice Rebecca D. Salvador[56] to conduct an investigation and submit her report and recommendation; and directed complainant to attend all hearings scheduled by Justice Salvador under pain of contempt of court.

In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador found sufficient grounds to hold respondent liable for the offenses

charged and recommended that respondent be administratively penalized for grave misconduct and dishonesty. Justice Salvador’s findings, as stated in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, are as follows:

Justice Salvador found that: complainant was able to present substantial evidence in support of her complaint against respondent; while respondent denied that she asked for and received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a favorable decision on Muñoz' cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in her office in September 2002, claiming only a different reason for such meeting; that is, complainant was there to console her for the protests against respondent at the time; respondent claims to have incurred complainant's ire for declining complainant’s request for favors in June 2004; however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant asked her to talk to Mario Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not heard of Tolosa before; however, it was respondent's comment and her husband's affidavit which stated that complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on absence without leave; it was respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme Court who stood to know who Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to believe that respondent knew and associated with Muñoz prior to the parties' falling out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua (Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muñoz was introduced to them by complainant in September 2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed, however, that the topic of case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a complaint for grave oral defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June 20, 2005 before complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it cannot be denied, however, that respondent at the time had already been served complainant's demand letters dated April 28, 2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as a lawyer, to reply to complainant’s first demand letter, was unusual; considering complainant’s advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim--that complainant's motive for filing the administrative case was respondent's refusal to give in to complainant's request to intercede in the cases of the latter's friend--was too paltry an explanation for complainant's willingness to expend the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her; complainant’s compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint against respondent, stated that the allegations in her complaint were true and based on personal knowledge, and it was only because of respondent and their family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that she gave up her complaint against respondent.[57]

During the hearing conducted on September 3, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador observed that although complainant appeared weary of the demands entailed by the administrative case, she staunchly stood pat over the veracity of her complaint and the reasons why she decided to withdraw the same. According to Justice Salvador, respondent had no reason to ask forgiveness from complainant, if indeed complainant falsely instituted the administrative case against her.

Justice Salvador also gave weight to complainant’s testimony that the return of the money by respondent, in addition to familial interests,

induced her to withdraw the complaint. The Court sustained the findings and recommendation of Justice Salvador, and rendered decision against respondent Judge Arcaya-

Chua, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits. She is WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar act in the future shall merit a more severe penalty.[58]

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that: (1) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate the failure of Sylvia Santos to present Emerita Muñoz, from whom

Santos procured the P100,000.00, in the proceedings before Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador;(2) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate that one of the bases for the dismissal of the present case of 5

December 2007 was the Affidavit of Retraction filed by Muñoz on 12 January 2006;(3) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the finding of Justice Salvador that [respondent] did not refute Santos’

declaration during the clarificatory hearing that [respondent] returned the money to her;(4) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the other findings of Justice Salvador; and(5) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in not considering [respondent’s] testimonial and documentary evidence.[59]

Respondent prayed that Stenographer Diana Tenerife be directed to submit to this Court the fully transcribed stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September 17, 2008 and to submit her tape of the proceedings on the said date, and that her motion for reconsideration be granted and that the instant case be dismissed.

Respondent’s prayer for submission to this Court of the fully transcribed stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September 17, 2008 is an attempt to clarify alleged inaccuracies in the said transcript of stenographic notes. The Court notes that respondent Judge had earlier filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008 on this matter, which was already resolved in the Resolution of the Court promulgated on February 13, 2009, thus:

Respondent filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008, claiming that there were significant omissions of testimonies in the

Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) particularly in the statement “Ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera;” and that such question was also beyond the scope of clarificatory questions that may be propounded, as nowhere in the previous testimonies of complainant, either in the direct or the cross-examination, did she mention the return of the money, and it was only during the clarifiactory hearing that it surfaces; thus, she (respondent) was deprived of her right to cross-examine complainant. Respondent prayed that corrections on the TSN be made, or that the testimonies of complainant – that “the money was returned to me” and “ibinalik naman ho nila and pera” – be stricken off; and in case the correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her manifestation that the said testimony of complainant was given only during the clarificatory hearing and, in effect, without an opportunity for her to cross-examine the complainant.







In the Resolution dated November 26, 2008, the Court denied respondent’s prayer that the corrections on the TSN be made, and that the subject testimonies of complainant be stricken off. The Court, however, granted her prayer and noted her Manifestation that the subject testimony was given only during the clarificatory hearing and in effect without granting her an opportunity to cross-examine complainant about the same.[60]

Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present Emerita Muñoz, from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, during the proceedings before Justice Salvador was fatal to Santos’ claims against her, and, on that basis alone, provided a reason to dismiss the present case.

The Court is not persuaded. Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00, and her testimony alone, found credible in this case, is sufficient to

prove the administrative liability of respondent. Contrary to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in sustaining the findings of Investigating Justice Salvador, took into consideration the

testimonial and documentary evidence presented by her. The Court reiterates its statement in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, thus: x x x [M]ost telling of all the circumstances pointing to respondent’s guilt is the unwavering stance of complainant that respondent did solicit and receive P100,000.00 from her in order to facilitate a favorable ruling in Muñoz’ cases.

As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when repeatedly asked during the hearing, was consistent in her testimony:

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:At the start of this afternoon’s proceedings, you affirmed the truth of the matters stated in your verified complaint?

MS. SANTOS:Opo.

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:And according to you they are based on your personal knowledge?

MS. SANTOS:My complaint is true. That is all true.

x x x x

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:Ano ba ang totoo?

MS. SANTOS:Ang sabi ko sa kanya, “Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi napakatagal na ng kaso niya. Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi.” Ang sabi niya, “Sige, Tita, tutulungan ko.”

Evelyn, sasabihin ko and totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin.

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:Just tell us what happened.

MS. SANTOS:Sabi niya, "Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng P100,000.00 at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa loob ng tatlong buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa iyo ang P50,000.00." Which is true ha. Sinabi ko doon sa humihingi ng pabor sa akin. Okay siya. Dumating ang panahon. It took already years walang nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang ginigipit nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya. Sabi ko, "Evelyn, kahit konti magbigay ka sa akin para maibigay ko kay Emelita." Unang-una iyang Emelita may utang sa akin ng P20,000.00 sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng alahas. Bumili sya.

JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:Your honor, at this point, may I request that the complainant be told not to continue with her testimony because she is already through with her direct examination.

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the record. Complainant's testimony during the clarificatory hearing also revealed her true reasons for withdrawing her complaint.

As borne out by the records and correctly pointed out by Justice Salvador in her Report: J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:I have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel. Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on September 7, 2007, and which had been marked as Exhibits "1," "1-A," "l-B" and submarkings for respondent. You stated in the verified complaint that the accusation against respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and confusion. Please clarify what do you mean by "the accusation against respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts and confusion"? MS. SANTOS:Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan na kami’t nagkabatian. Sa totoo lang po Justice, matagal kaming hindi nagkibuan. Ngayon, dahil nakiusap nga po sila sa akin, kaya ako naman ho, sige, pinatawad ko na sila dahil pamilya ko ho sila, ang asawa niya. Kung hindi lang ho anak ng kapatid ko yan, baka ewan ko, baka hindi ko tuluyan iyan.

J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:So it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which you misunderstood or misapprehended?

MS. SANTOS:Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga ho, sa pakiusap po nila na magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho, tama na. Iyan po ang buong katotohanan, Justice.[61]



These testimonies on record are evidence against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. The Investigating Justice observed the demeanor of complainant and found her a credible witness. It is settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. [62] The Court found no reason to depart from such rule since Justice Salvador’s observations and findings are supported by the records.

The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 is violative of the provisions of the New Code of Judicial

Conduct, thus: Canon 1, Sec. 4. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or

judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Canon 2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in

the view of a reasonable observer. Canon 2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the

judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. Canon 4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Administrative Sanctions Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be based on the provisions of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,

[63] while disciplinary action against respondent Victoria Jamora will be based on the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, serious charges include gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial

Conduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure. Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if the respondent Judge is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following

sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense and punished with dismissal for the first offense.

The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernando’s finding that respondent Victoria Jamora is guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-

08-2141. The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernando’s finding that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

and gross misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively. Respondent Judge’s motion for reconsideration is denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.

The Court has held:

All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that the administration of justice is a

mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels, are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression.

Those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity have no place in the judiciary. xxx This

Court will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the people’s faith in the judiciary.[64]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that: 1. in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the charges against Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,

Branch 144 isDISMISSED.

2. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and punished with SUSPENSION from office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits.

3. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, the motion for reconsideration of Judge Arcaya-Chua is DENIED for lack of merit. The penalty of SUSPENSION from office for a period of six (6) months without salary and other benefits imposed upon her is RETAINED.

4. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality.

5. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is found GUILTY of grave misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality.

Immediately upon service on Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Victoria C. Jamora of this decision, they are deemed to have vacated

their respective office, and their authority to act as Judge and Court Stenographer, respectively, are considered automatically terminated. These consolidated administrative cases are referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation

regarding the possible disbarment of Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua from the practice of the legal profession. SO ORDERED.




G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner, vs.GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.D E C I S I O NABAD, J.:This case is about a mother’s claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed father.The Facts and the CaseIn February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-071 for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.2 In filling out the blanks in thepro-forma complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial support3 from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer on the latter’s Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the child’s father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Vallecera’s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolina’s petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the child’s father; that the signature appearing on the child’s Certificate of Live Birth is not his; that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolina’s son and granting him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order,5 with an admonition that she first file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition for review directly with this Court.The Issue PresentedThe sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for her child.The Court’s RulingDolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence.6 Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child.1avvphil But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the father. He of course vigorously denied this.To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.7 The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation.9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.10

Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.11

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family. 12 Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City’s Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina’s action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.SO ORDERED.

Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda de BatocaelGR No. 146683, November 22, 2001

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

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Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner,vs.HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the Resolution 4 dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.

Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus –

However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property. x x x

x x x x

As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds. 7

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial court’s Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting therefrom the amount respondent spent for the preservation, maintenance and development of the aforesaid real property including the depreciation cost of the house or in the alternative to SELL the house and lot in the event respondent does not have the means to reimburse the petitioner out of her own money and from the proceeds thereof, reimburse the petitioner of the cost of the land and the house deducting the expenses for its maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent. Should there be profit, the same shall be divided in proportion to the equity each has over the property. The case is REMANDED to the lower court for reception of evidence as to the amount claimed by the respondents for the preservation and maintenance of the property. SO ORDERED. 8

Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT.

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Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines; that respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same; and that respondent’s purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property.

Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds.

The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property.

The petition has merit.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held:

Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens’ hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x xx x x xIf the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant’s words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court.11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. 12His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15

Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.

Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16

Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis added)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying









reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

VILLEGAS vs. LINGAN and ATTY. CARREONG.R. No. 153839; June 29, 2007AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] dated November 28, 2001 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 55837, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated December 19, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tuguegarao, Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5036; and the CA Resolution[2] dated June 10, 2002, denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Isaac Villegas (petitioner). This case originated from a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Instrument with Damages filed by the petitioner against Victor Lingan (respondent) and Atty. Ernesto Carreon as the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. The respondent filed his Answer and pre-trial ensued. The RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order wherein it declared that no factual issue exists and that the sole legal issue to be resolved is: Whether or not the power of attorney is a general power of attorney or a special power of attorney. Corrolarily, whether upon the terms thereof, the attorney-in-fact Gloria Roa Catral, had authority, or none at all, to execute the deed of sale in favor of [respondent] Victor Lingan.[3] On the basis of the pre-trial order and upon motion of counsel for petitioner, without any objections from respondent, the case was submitted for summary judgment. As found by the RTC and confirmed by the CA, the undisputed facts are as follows: [Petitioner] Isaac Villegas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, known as Lot 2637-C of the Subdivision plan Psd.2-01-019664, being a portion of Lot 2637, Cad. 151, containing an area of 1,267 square meters, more or less, situated at Bgy. Pengue, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-63809 of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan. In order to secure the payment of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) the [petitioner] constituted a real estate mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said loan and mortgage was subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF). When the [petitioner] failed to settle his loan, the real estate mortgage he constituted over the property was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and, as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder at such public auction, a certificate of sheriff’s sale was issued and, thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds on March 8, 1996. By virtue of a power of attorney executed by [petitioner’s] wife, Marilou C. Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the latter redeemed the property from the HMDF. x x x[4] On May 17, 1996, Gloria R. Catral (Catral), by virtue of the same power of attorney, executed a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent.[5] Petitioner claims that the power of attorney executed in favor of Catral, petitioner’s mother-in-law, created a principal-agent relationship only between his wife, Marilou Catral-Villegas (Marilou) as principal, and Catral, as agent, and then only for the latter to administer the properties of the former; that he never authorized Catral to administer his properties, particularly, herein subject property; and that Catral had no authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent, since from the very wordings of the power of attorney, she had no special authority to sell or convey any specific real property.[6] On December 19, 1996, the RTC dismissed the Complaint, ruling that the tenor of the power of attorney in question is broad enough to include the authority to sell any property of the principal, who, in this case, is the petitioner; that the act of the agent, Catral, in executing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent was within her power or authority; that the power “to enter into any and all contracts and agreements” qualified the said power of attorney as a special power of attorney; that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binds the principal, herein petitioner; that the authority to sell came from both the petitioner and his wife, Marilou, since the petitioner himself signed the power of attorney affirming the authority of the agent, Catral; and that even if Catral in fact exceeded her authority, the act is deemed to have been performed within the scope of the agent’s authority if such is within the terms of the power of attorney as written. Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed the adverse judgment to the CA claiming that the trial court erred in finding that there was a principal-agent relationship between petitioner and Catral; and that the trial court erred in concluding that the power of attorney is a special power of attorney with an authority to sell.[7] On November 28, 2001, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, affirming in toto the RTC Judgment and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.[8] The CA held that when the redemption of the property had been made by Catral by virtue of a General Power of Attorney executed in her favor by Marilou, it follows that the petitioner is no longer the owner of the subject property but his wife, Marilou; that the issue as to whether the power of attorney was a special or general one is of no moment, because the petitioner was no longer the owner of the property when it was sold; in other words, any disposition of the property needs no power of attorney from the petitioner himself; that the petitioner signed the General Power of Attorney above the word “conforme,” connoting an implied admission that he was not anymore the owner of the said property; and, finally, that the Deed of Sale between Marilou (through Catral) and respondent is valid. Hence, herein Petition, on the following grounds: I. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF THE CASE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT DID NOT MATTER WHETHER OR NOT THE GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY OR A SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY WAS ISSUED IN THIS INSTANT CASE. II. IT IS FURTHER SUBMITTED THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF VICTOR LINGAN.[9] In his Memorandum, petitioner argues that the general power of attorney of Catral did not clothe her with authority to sell the property of petitioner; and that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between the respondent and Catral was not valid.[10] On the other hand, respondent, in his Memoranda, contends that the petitioner has no cause of action against him. He maintains that petitioner lost his ownership of the property after it was extra-judicially foreclosed and sold to HMDF; that what was left for petitioner was only the right of

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/june2007/153839.htm#_ftn10










redemption, a right he shared with his wife; that if there was really a legal defect in the sale, the person who has the legal standing and the right to question the validity of the sale in his name is Marilou, the person who exercised the right of redemption and the person in whom the right to dispose legally resides; and that Marilou has all this time remained passive.[11] The petition must fail. There are two principal issues raised by the pleadings in the present petition that must be resolved: First, whether Marilou, the wife of the petitioner, as successor-in-interest, may validly redeem the property in question; and second, whether the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondent. Was there a valid redemption effected by Marilou? The answer is in the affirmative. Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides: Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (emphasis supplied) Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: SEC. 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. –Real property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the following persons: (a) The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property; x x x x The “successor-in-interest” of the judgment debtor referred to in the above provision includes a person who succeeds to his property by operation of law, or a person with a joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs.[12] Section 33, Rule 39, Rules of Court, states: SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. – If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it. Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property at the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (emphasis supplied) Under the above provision, petitioner could have redeemed the property from Marilou after she had redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the records of this case do not show that petitioner exercised said right. Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption.[13] And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property. Clearly, therefore, Marilou, as owner, had the right to sell the property to another. This brings us to the resolution of the second issue -- whether petitioner has a cause of action against respondent -- and the answer is in the negative. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.[14] In the present case, there is no property right that exists in favor of the petitioner, and, with more reason, no such obligation arises in behalf of the defendant, herein respondent, to respect such right. There was no violation of a legal right of the petitioner. It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in behalf of the petitioner—Marilou did not act as agent of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised the right of redemption in her own right as successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Under the circumstances, should there be any right violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou, petitioner’s wife. The property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid cause of action against the respondent. Consequently, the question whether Catral had validly sold the subject property to respondent by virtue of the General Power of Attorney executed by Marilou, is not within the realm of the Court’s jurisdiction to resolve in this case as said issue is not properly raised by the right person, Marilou. Divested of all interest over the property, the petitioner has ceased to be the proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding only between the contracting parties,[15] then only the parties, as well as the third person who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the validity of the agency or the violation of the terms and conditions found therein. This rule is a corollary of the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest. The Court cannot grant the relief prayed for in petitioner’s Complaint as to damages, considering that the issue on damages was deemed waived when the parties limited themselves to the legal issue arrived at during the pre-trial in the RTC.[16] WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.







ANTONIA R. DELA PEÑA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEÑA vs. GEMMA REMILYN C. AVILA and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO.,G.R. No. 187490; February 8, 2012PEREZ, J.: The Facts

The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together with the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia), “married to Antegono A. Dela Peña” (Antegono) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-32315 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.[4] On 7 May 1996, Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons, Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 which, pursuant to the Promissory Note the former executed in favor of the latter, was payable on or before 7 July 1996, with interest pegged at 5% per month.[5] On the very same day, Antonia also executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing the payment of said loan obligation. The deed provided, in part, that “(t)his contract is for a period of Three (3) months from the date of this instrument”.[6]

On 4 November 1997, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma), for the stated consideration of P600,000.00.[7] Utilizing the document, Gemma caused the cancellation of TCT No. N-32315 as well as the issuance of TCT No. 337834 of the Marikina City Registry of Deeds, naming her as the owner of the subject realty.[8] On 26 November 1997, Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel in favor of respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company [now Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-BPI), to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.[9] As evidenced by the Promissory Notes she executed from 12 December 1997 to 10 March 1998,[10] Gemma obtained the following loans from Visayas Avenue Branch of the FEBTC-BPI, in the aggregate sum of P1,200,000.00, to wit:

On 3 March 1998, in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the effect, among others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which had been titled in the name of Gemma under TCT No. 32315; and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated.[11] As a consequence, Antonia’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim was inscribed on TCT No. 337834 as Entry No. 501099 on 10 March 1998.[12] In view of Gemma’s failure to pay the principal as well as the accumulated interest and penalties on the loans she obtained, on the other hand, FEBTC-BPI caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property. As the highest bidder at the public auction conducted in the premises,[13] FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of the Marikina registry.[14]

On 18 May 1998, Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela Peña (Alvin), filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale docketed before Branch 272 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City as Civil Case No. 98-445-MK. Claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property, the Dela Peñas alleged, among other matters, that the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who had, by then, already died; that despite its intended 1998 maturity date, the due date of the loan secured by the mortgage was shortened by Gemma who, taking advantage of her “proximate relationship” with Aguila, altered the same to 1997; and, that the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma was executed by Antonia who was misled into believing that the transfer was necessary for the loan the former promised to procure on her behalf from FEBTC-BPI. In addition to the annulment of said Deed of Absolute Sale for being simulated and derogatory of Alvin’s successional rights, the Dela Peñas sought the reconveyance of the property as well as the grant of their claims for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and the costs.[15]

Served with summons, Gemma specifically denied the material allegations of the foregoing complaint in her 1 July 1998 answer. Maintaining that the realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who misrepresented that her husband was still alive, Gemma averred that the former failed to pay the P250,000.00 loan she obtained from Aguila on its stipulated 7 July 1996 maturity; that approached to help prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage constituted on the property, she agreed to settle the outstanding obligation to Aguila and to extend Antonia a P50,000.00 loan, with interest pegged at 10% per month; that to pay back the foregoing accommodations, Antonia agreed to the use of the property as collateral for a loan to be obtained by her from FEBTC-BPI, hence, the execution of the impugned Deed of Absolute Sale; and, that conformably with the foregoing agreement, she obtained loans in the total sum of P1,200,000.00 from FEBTC-BPI and applied the proceeds thereof to the sums owed by Antonia. Together with the dismissal of the complaint, Gemma also prayed for the grant of her counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and the costs.[16]

On 25 September 1999, the Dela Peñas filed a supplemental complaint, impleading FEBTC-BPI as additional defendant. Calling attention to Antonia’s 3 March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the Notice of Lis Pendens they purportedly caused to be annotated on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999, the Dela Peñas alleged that FEBTC-BPI was in bad faith when it purchased the property at public auction on 15 March 1999.[17] In their 12 November 1999 answer, FEBTC-BPI, in turn, asserted that the property was already titled in Gemma’s name when she executed the 26 November 1997 real estate mortgage thereon, to secure the payment of the loans she obtained in the sum of P1,200,000.00; and, that not being privy to Antonia’s transaction with Gemma and unaware of any adverse claim on the property, it was a mortgagee in good faith, entitled to foreclose the mortgage upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans she obtained. Seeking the dismissal of the complaint and the grant of its counterclaims for damages against the Dela Peñas, FEBTC-BPI alternatively interposed cross-claims against Gemma for the payment of the subject loans, the accumulated interests and penalties thereon as well as such sums for which it may be held liable in the premises.[18]

On 14 April 2000, the RTC issued the order terminating the pre-trial stage and declaring Gemma in default for failure to attend the pre-trial settings and to engage the services of a new lawyer despite due notice and the withdrawal of her counsel of record.[19] In support of their complaint, Antonia[20] and Alvin[21] both took the witness stand and, by way of corroborative evidence, presented the testimony of one Alessandro Almoden[22] who claimed to have referred Antonia to Gemma for the purpose of obtaining a loan. By way of defense evidence, on the other hand, FEBTC-BPI adduced the oral evidence elicited from Eleanor Abellare, its Account Officer who handled Gemma’s loans,[23] and Zenaida Torres, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner who, after analyzing Antonia’s specimen signatures on the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale,[24] issued NBI Questioned Documents Report No. 482-802 to the effect, among others, that said signatures were written by one and the same person.[25]

On 18 December 2007, the RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. Brushing aside FEBTC-BPI’s claim of good faith,[26] the RTC disposed of the case in the following wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, as follows: 1). Declaring the Deed of Absolute dated November 04, 1997 in favor of defendant, [Gemma] as null and void; 2). Ordering defendant [FEBTC-BPI] to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of the [Dela Peñas] involving the subject property now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 415392 in the name of [FEBTC-BPI]; 3). Ordering [Gemma] to pay the [Dela Peñas] the following:a). the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages; andb). the amount of P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and

c). costs of the suit

On the cross-claim, [Gemma] is hereby ordered to pay [FEBTC-BPI] the amount of P2,029,317.17 as of November 10, 1999, with twelve (12%) percent interest per annum until fully paid. SO ORDERED.[27]

Aggrieved, FEBTC-BPI perfected the appeal which was docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. CV No. 90485. On 31 March 2009 the CA’s Second Division rendered the herein assailed decision, reversing the RTC’s appealed decision, upon the following findings and conclusions: (a) the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peñas to prove that the same was acquired during Antonia’s marriage to Antegono; (b) having misled Gemma into believing that the property was exclusively hers, Antonia is barred from seeking the annulment of the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale; (c) Antonia’s claim that her signature was forged is belied by her admission in the pleadings that she was misled by Gemma into executing said Deed of Absolute Sale and by NBI Questioned Document Report No. 482-802; and, (d) FEBTC-BPI is a mortgagee in good faith and for value since Gemma’s 26 November 1997 execution of the real estate mortgage in its favor predated Antonia’s 3 March 1998 Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the 10 December 1999 annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834.[28]

The IssuesThe Dela Peñas seek the reversal of the assailed 31 March 2009 CA decision upon the affirmative of following issues, to wit:1) Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by TCT No. N-32315 conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña; 2) Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia to (Gemma); and 3. Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding (FEBTC-BPI) a mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith.[29]

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership,[30] proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.[31] In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court categorically ruled as follows: Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.[33] As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Peñas did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonia’s bare and uncorroborated assertion that the property was purchased when she was already married,[34] the record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained. When queried about the matter during his cross-examination, even Alvin admitted that his sole basis for saying that the property was owned by his parents was Antonia’s unilateral pronouncement to the effect.[35] Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired,[36] we find that the CA cannot be faulted for ruling that the realty in litigation was Antonia’s exclusive property. Not having established the time of acquisition of the property, the Dela Peñas insist that the registration thereof in the name of “Antonia R. Dela Peña, of legal age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Peña” should have already sufficiently established its conjugal nature. Confronted with the same issue in the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals,[37] this Court ruled, however, that the phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. “Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.”[38] Viewed in light of the paraphernal nature of the property, the CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying Antonia’s 4 November 1997 sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.[39] That Antonia treated the realty as her own exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization thereof as security for the payment of the P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.[40] Despite Gemma’s forfeiture of the right to present evidence on her behalf, her alleged alteration of the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to shorten the maturity of the loan secured thereby was also properly brushed aside by the CA. The double lie inherent in Antonia’s assertion that the same deed was altered by Gemma to shorten the maturity of the loan to “1997 instead of 1998” is instantly evident from paragraph 1 of the document which, consistent with 7 July 1996 maturity date provided in the Promissory Note she executed,[41] specifically stated that “(t)his contract is for a period of Three (3) months from the date of this instrument.”[42] Antonia’s evident lack of credibility also impels us to uphold the CA’s rejection of her version of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma. In disavowing authorship of the signature appearing on said deed,[43] Antonia contradicted the allegation in the Dela Peñas’ complaint that she was misled by Gemma into signing the same document.[44] The rule is well-settled that judicial admissions like those made in the pleadings are binding and cannot be contradicted, absent any showing that the same was made thru palpable mistake.[45] Alongside that appearing on the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage she admitted executing in favor of Aguila, Antonia’s signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was, moreover, found to have been written by one and the same person in Questioned Document Report No. 482-802 prepared by Zenaida Torres, the NBI Document Examiner to whom said specimen signatures were submitted for analysis.[46] Parenthetically, this conclusion is borne out by our comparison of the same signatures. For all of Antonia’s denial of her receipt of any consideration for the sale of the property in favor of Gemma,[47] the evidence on record also lend credence to Gemma’s version of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the assailed 4 November 1997 Deed of

Absolute Sale. Consistent with Gemma’s claim that said deed was executed to facilitate the loans she obtained from FEBTC-BPI which were agreed to be used as payment of the sums she expended to settle the outstanding obligation to Aguila and the P50,000.00 she loaned Antonia,[48] the latter admitted during her direct examination that she did not pay the loan she obtained from Aguila.[49] Presented as witness of the Dela Peñas, Alessandro Almoden also admitted that Gemma had extended a loan in the sum of P50,000.00 in favor of Antonia. Notably, Alessandro Almoden’s claim that the title to the property had been delivered to Gemma as a consequence of the transaction[50] is at odds with Antonia’s claim that she presented said document to the Registry of Deeds when she verified the status of the property prior to the filing of the complaint from which the instant suit originated.[51] With the material contradictions in the Dela Peña’s evidence, the CA cannot be faulted for upholding the validity of the impugned 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute Sale. Having been duly notarized, said deed is a public document which carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.[52] Regarded as evidence of the facts therein expressed in a clear, unequivocal manner,[53] public documents enjoy a presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity.[54] The burden of proof to overcome said presumptions lies with the party contesting the notarial document[55] like the Dela Peñas who, unfortunately, failed to discharge said onus. Absent clear and convincing evidence to contradict the same, we find that the CA correctly pronounced the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid and binding between Antonia and Gemma. Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage debt,[56] FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well within its rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the property upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans secured thereby. Executed on 26 November 1997, the mortgage predated Antonia’s filing of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Register of Deeds of Marikina on 3 March 1998 and the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. 337834 on 10 December 1999. “The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfilment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.”[57] When the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee consequently has the right to foreclose the mortgage, sell the property, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of the unpaid loan.[58] Finally, the resolution of this case cannot be affected by the principles that banks like FEBTC-BPI are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in that their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest[59] and their standard practice is to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners thereof, hence, the inapplicability of the general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to them.[60] The validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Antonia in favor of Gemma having been upheld, FEBTC-BPI’s supposed failure to ascertain the ownership of the property has been rendered immaterial for the purpose of determining the validity of the mortgage executed in its favor as well as the subsequent extrajudicial foreclosure thereof. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed CA Decision dated 31 March 2009 is, accordingly, AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, [G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004]CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 27, 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33585, as well as the Resolution[2] on April 2, 1996 denying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The impugned decision granted the private respondent’s petition for certiorari and set aside the Orders of the trial court dated December 15, 1993[3] and February 17, 1994[4] nullifying the attachment of 100,000 shares of stocks of the Citycorp Investment Philippines under the name of petitioner Alfredo Ching.

The following facts are undisputed:

On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum.[5] As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00.[6] The loan was subsequently renewed on various dates, the last renewal having been made on December 4, 1980.[7]

Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of P13,000,000.00 payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29, 1981.[8] This was renewed once for a period of one month.[9]

The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 142729 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XVIII.[10] In its application for a writ of preliminary attachment, the ABC averred that the “defendants are guilty of fraud in incurring the obligations upon which the present action is brought[11] in that they falsely represented themselves to be in a financial position to pay their obligation upon maturity thereof.”[12] Its supporting affidavit stated, inter alia, that the “[d]efendants have removed or disposed of their properties, or [are] ABOUT to do so, with intent to defraud their creditors.”[13]

On August 26, 1981, after an ex-parte hearing, the trial court issued an Order denying the ABC’s application for a writ of preliminary attachment. The trial court decreed that the grounds alleged in the application and that of its supporting affidavit “are all conclusions of fact and of law” which do not warrant the issuance of the writ prayed for.[14] On motion for reconsideration, however, the trial court, in an Order dated September 14, 1981, reconsidered its previous order and granted the ABC’s application for a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of P12,700,000. The order, in relevant part, stated:

With respect to the second ground relied upon for the grant of the writ of preliminary attachment ex-parte, which is the alleged disposal of properties by the defendants with intent to defraud creditors as provided in Sec. 1(e) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the affidavits can only

barely justify the issuance of said writ as against the defendant Alfredo Ching who has allegedly bound himself jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the defendant corporation’s obligation to the plaintiff as a surety thereof.

WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary attachment issue as against the defendant Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of this Court to attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching not exceeding P12,612,972.82 in value, which are within the jurisdiction of this Court and not exempt from execution upon, the filing by plaintiff of a bond duly approved by this Court in the sum of Twelve Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P12,700,000.00) executed in favor of the defendant Alfredo Ching to secure the payment by plaintiff to him of all the costs which may be adjudged in his favor and all damages he may sustain by reason of the attachment if the court shall finally adjudge that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Upon the ABC’s posting of the requisite bond, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment. Subsequently, summonses were served on the defendants,[16] save Chung Kiat Hua who could not be found.

Meanwhile, on April 1, 1982, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as SEC Case No. 2250, at the same time seeking the PBMCI’s rehabilitation.[17]

On July 9, 1982, the SEC issued an Order placing the PBMCI’s business, including its assets and liabilities, under rehabilitation receivership, and ordered that “all actions for claims listed in Schedule “A” of the petition pending before any court or tribunal are hereby suspended in whatever stage the same may be until further orders from the Commission.”[18] The ABC was among the PBMCI’s creditors named in the said schedule.

Subsequently, on January 31, 1983, the PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or motion to suspend the proceedings in Civil Case No. 142729 invoking the PBMCI’s pending application for suspension of payments (which Ching co-signed) and over which the SEC had already assumed jurisdiction.[19] On February 4, 1983, the ABC filed its Opposition thereto.[20]

In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.[21]

Thereafter, in an Order dated September 16, 1983, the trial court partially granted the aforementioned motion by suspending the proceedings only with respect to the PBMCI. It denied Ching’s motion to dismiss the complaint/or suspend the proceedings and pointed out that P.D. No. 1758 only concerns the activities of corporations, partnerships and associations and was never intended to regulate and/or control activities of individuals. Thus, it directed the individual defendants to file their answers.[22]

Instead of filing an answer, Ching filed on January 14, 1984 a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the same ground of the pendency of SEC Case No. 2250. This motion met the opposition from the ABC.[23]

On January 20, 1984, Tañedo filed his Answer with counterclaim and cross-claim.[24] Ching eventually filed his Answer on July 12, 1984.[25]

On October 25, 1984, long after submitting their answers, Ching filed an Omnibus Motion,[26] again praying for the dismissal of the complaint or suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the July 9, 1982 Injunctive Order issued in SEC Case No. 2250. He averred that as a surety of the PBMCI, he must also necessarily benefit from the defenses of his principal. The ABC opposed Ching’s omnibus motion.

Emilio Y. Tañedo, thereafter, filed his own Omnibus Motion[27] praying for the dismissal of the complaint, arguing that the ABC had “abandoned and waived” its right to proceed against the continuing guaranty by its act of resorting to preliminary attachment.

On December 17, 1986, the ABC filed a Motion to Reduce the amount of his preliminary attachment bond from P12,700,000 to P6,350,000.[28] Alfredo Ching opposed the motion,[29] but on April 2, 1987, the court issued an Order setting the incident for further hearing on May 28, 1987 at 8:30 a.m. for the parties to adduce evidence on the actual value of the properties of Alfredo Ching levied on by the sheriff.[30]

On March 2, 1988, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the ABC and rendered the attachment bond of P6,350,000.[31]

On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. She, likewise, alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she was a third-party claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the properties.[32] She attached therewith a copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo Ching.[33]

The ABC filed a comment on the motion to quash preliminary attachment and/or motion to expunge records, contending that:

2.1 The supposed movant, Encarnacion T. Ching, is not a party to this present case; thus, she has no personality to file any motion before this Honorable Court;

2.2 Said supposed movant did not file any Motion for Intervention pursuant to Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court;

2.3 Said Motion cannot even be construed to be in the nature of a Third-Party Claim conformably with Sec. 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.

3. Furthermore, assuming in gracia argumenti that the supposed movant has the required personality, her Motion cannot be acted upon by this Honorable Court as the above-entitled case is still in the archives and the proceedings thereon still remains suspended. And there is no previous Motion to revive the same.[34]

The ABC also alleged that the motion was barred by prescription or by laches because the shares of stocks were in custodia legis.

During the hearing of the motion, Encarnacion T. Ching adduced in evidence her marriage contract to Alfredo Ching to prove that they were married on January 8, 1960;[35] the articles of incorporation of Citycorp Investment Philippines dated May 14, 1979;[36] and, the General Information Sheet of the corporation showing that petitioner Alfredo Ching was a member of the Board of Directors of the said corporation and was one of its top twenty stockholders.

On December 10, 1993, the Spouses Ching filed their Reply/Opposition to the motion to expunge records.

Acting on the aforementioned motion, the trial court issued on December 15, 1993 an Order[37] lifting the writ of preliminary attachment on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff to return the said stocks to the petitioners. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion to Quash Preliminary Attachment, dated November 9, 1993, is hereby granted. Let the writ of preliminary attachment subject matter of said motion, be quashed and lifted with respect to the attached 100,000 common shares of stock of Citycorp Investment Philippines in the name of the defendant Alfredo Ching, the said shares of stock to be returned to him and his movant-spouse by Deputy Sheriff Apolonio A. Golfo who effected the levy thereon on July 26, 1983, or by whoever may be presently in possession thereof.

SO ORDERED.[38]

The plaintiff Allied Banking Corporation filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order but denied the same on February 17, 1994. The petitioner bank forthwith filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 33585, for the nullification of the said order of the court, contending that:

1. The respondent Judge exceeded his authority thereby acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of, and granting a “Motion” filed by a complete stranger to the case.

2. The respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in lifting the writ of preliminary attachment without any basis in fact and in law, and contrary to established jurisprudence on the matter.[39]

On November 27, 1995, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED, hereby setting aside the questioned orders (dated December 15, 1993 and February 17, 1994) for being null and void.

SO ORDERED.[40]

The CA sustained the contention of the private respondent and set aside the assailed orders. According to the CA, the RTC deprived the private respondent of its right to file a bond under Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner Encarnacion T. Ching was not a party in the trial court; hence, she had no right of action to have the levy annulled with a motion for that purpose. Her remedy in such case was to file a separate action against the private respondent to nullify the levy on the 100,000 Citycorp shares of stocks. The court stated that even assuming that Encarnacion T. Ching had the right to file the said motion, the same was barred by laches.

Citing Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[41] the CA ruled that the presumption in Article 160 of the New Civil Code shall not apply where, as in this case, the petitioner-spouses failed to prove the source of the money used to acquire the shares of stock. It held that the levied shares of stocks belonged to Alfredo Ching, as evidenced by the fact that the said shares were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp solely under his name. Thus, according to the appellate court, the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders. The petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 2, 1996.

The petitioner-spouses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, asserting that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders in their favor; hence, the CA erred in reversing the same. They aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. 160,[42] and that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching.[43] According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.[44] And, contrary to the ruling of the CA, where conjugal assets are attached in a collection suit on an obligation contracted by the husband, the wife should exhaust her motion to quash in the main case and not file a separate suit.[45] Furthermore, the petitioners contend that under Art. 125 of the Family Code, the petitioner-husband’s gratuitous suretyship is null and void ab initio,[46] and that the share of one of the spouses in the conjugal partnership remains inchoate until the dissolution and liquidation of the partnership.[47]

In its comment on the petition, the private respondent asserts that the CA correctly granted its petition for certiorari nullifying the assailed order. It contends that the CA correctly relied on the ruling of this Court in Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court. Citing Cobb-Perez v. Lantin and G-Tractors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the private respondent alleges that the continuing guaranty and suretyship executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching in pursuit of his profession or business. Furthermore, according to the private respondent, the right of the petitioner-wife to a share in the conjugal partnership property is merely inchoate before the dissolution of the partnership; as such, she had no right to file the said motion to quash the levy on attachment of the shares of stocks.

The issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines; (b) whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.

On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners that the petitioner-wife had the right to file the said motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case No. 142729.[48]

In Ong v. Tating,[49] we held that the sheriff may attach only those properties of the defendant against whom a writ of attachment has been issued by the court. When the sheriff erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the property of a third person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest, the superior authority of the court which has authorized the execution may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same case. Upon application of the third person, the court shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment, more specifically if he has indeed levied on attachment and taken hold of property not belonging to the plaintiff. If so, the court may then order the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third person. In resolving the motion of the third party, the court does not and cannot pass upon the question of the title to the property with any character of finality. It can treat the matter only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. If the claimant’s proof does not persuade the court of the validity of the title, or right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied by the court. The aggrieved third party may also avail himself of the remedy of “terceria” by executing an affidavit of his title or right of possession over the property levied on attachment and serving the same to the office making the levy and the adverse party. Such party may also file an action to nullify the levy with damages resulting from the unlawful levy and seizure, which should be a totally separate and distinct action from the former case. The above-mentioned remedies are cumulative and any one of them may be resorted to by one third-party claimant without availing of the other remedies.[50]

In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief.

On the second issue, we find and so hold that the CA erred in setting aside and reversing the orders of the RTC. The private respondent, the petitioner in the CA, was burdened to prove that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal purpose to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the tribunal, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment and is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[51]

It was incumbent upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strong demonstration that the RTC acted whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to, and even decide of, the controversy before certiorari will lie. A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of its jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed.[52]

After a comprehensive review of the records of the RTC and of the CA, we find and so hold that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals,[53] we held that it is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same.[54]

In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.[55] The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.[56] The private respondent’s reliance on the rulings of this Court in Maramba v. Lozano[57] and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Banzon[58] is misplaced. In the Maramba case, we held that where there is no showing as to when the property was acquired, the fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is determinative of the ownership of the property. The principle was reiterated in the Associated Insurance case where the uncontroverted evidence showed that the shares of stocks were acquired during the marriage of the petitioners.

Instead of fortifying the contention of the respondents, the ruling of this Court in Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court[59] buttresses the case for the petitioners. In that case, we ruled that he who claims that property acquired by the spouses during their marriage is not conjugal partnership property but belongs to one of them as his personal property is burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to purchase the same. In this case, the private respondent claimed that the petitioner-husband acquired the shares of stocks from the Citycorp Investment Philippines in his own name as the owner thereof. It was, thus, the burden of the private respondent to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the petitioner-husband alone. As held by the trial court, the private respondent failed to adduce evidence to prove this assertion.

The CA, likewise, erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business. The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account of PBMCI under Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code.

Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article 121[2 and 3][60] of the Family Code of the Philippines) provides:

Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.

The petitioner-husband signed the continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement as security for the payment of the loan obtained by the PBMCI from the private respondent in the amount of P38,000,000. In Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[61] this Court ruled “that the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.”

For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.[62]

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.[63]

It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the petitioner-husband’s career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.[64]

This is different from the situation where the husband borrows money or receives services to be used for his own business or profession. In the Ayala case, we ruled that it is such a contract that is one within the term “obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Thus:

(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term “… obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or

profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.[65]

The Court held in the same case that the rulings of the Court in Cobb-Perez and G-Tractors, Inc. are not controlling because the husband, in those cases, contracted the obligation for his own business. In this case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The assailed orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK - LAOAG BRANCHG.R. No. 170166; April 6, 2011CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 170166 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 17 October 2005 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76845. The appellate court granted the appeal filed by the Philippine National Bank – Laoag Branch (PNB). The appellate court reversed the 29 June 2001 Decision of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City (trial court) in Civil Case No. 7803.

The trial court declared the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by spouses Jose A. Ros3 (Ros) and Estrella Aguete (Aguete) (collectively, petitioners), as well as the subsequent foreclosure proceedings, void. Aside from payment of attorney’s fees, the trial court also ordered PNB to vacate the subject property to give way to petitioners’ possession.

The Facts

The appellate court narrated the facts as follows:

On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the Court of First Instance, Ilocos Norte docketed as Civil Case No. 7803.

The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Laoag City.

The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land – Lot No. 9161 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978.

Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property – a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property – interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.1avvphi1

In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-appellees’ own acts [of]

omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.4]

The Trial Court’s Ruling

On 29 June 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision5 in favor of petitioners. The trial court declared that Aguete did not sign the loan documents, did not appear before the Notary Public to acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did not receive the loan proceeds from PNB, and was not aware of the loan until PNB notified her in 14 August 1978 that she and her family should vacate the mortgaged property because of the expiration of the redemption period. Under the Civil Code, the effective law at the time of the transaction, Ros could not encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without Aguete’s consent. Aguete may, during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of the contract her husband entered into without her consent, especially in the present case where her consent is required. The trial court, however, ruled that its decision is without prejudice to the right of action of PNB to recover the amount of the loan and its interests from Ros.

The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. DECLARING the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibit "C") and the subsequent foreclosure proceedings conducted thereon NULL and VOID;

2. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of the City of Laoag to cancel TCT No. T-15276 in the name of defendant PNB and revert the same in the name of plaintiffs spouses Joe Ros and Estrella Aguete;

3. ORDERING defendant to vacate and turnover the possession of the premises of the property in suit to the plaintiffs; and

4. ORDERING defendant to pay plaintiffs attorney’s fee and litigation expenses in the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.6]

PNB filed its Notice of Appeal7 of the trial court’s decision on 13 September 2001 and paid the corresponding fees. Petitioners filed on the same date a motion for execution pending appeal,8 which PNB opposed.9 In their comment to the opposition10 filed on 10 October 2001, petitioners stated that at the hearing of the motion on 3 October 2001, PNB’s lay representative had no objection to the execution of judgment pending appeal. Petitioners claimed that the house on the subject lot is dilapidated, a danger to life and limb, and should be demolished. Petitioners added that they obliged themselves to make the house habitable at a cost of not less P50,000.00. The repair cost would accrue to PNB’s benefit should the appellate court reverse the trial court. PNB continued to oppose petitioners’ motion.11

In an Order12 dated 8 May 2002, the trial court found petitioners’ motion for execution pending appeal improper because petitioners have made it clear that they were willing to wait for the appellate court’s decision. However, as a court of justice and equity, the trial court allowed petitioners to occupy the subject property with the condition that petitioners would voluntarily vacate the premises and waive recovery of improvements introduced should PNB prevail on appeal.

The Appellate Court’s Ruling

On 17 October 2005, the appellate court rendered its Decision13 and granted PNB’s appeal. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, and dismissed petitioners’ complaint.

The appellate court stated that the trial court concluded forgery without adequate proof; thus it was improper for the trial court to rely solely on Aguete’s testimony that her signatures on the loan documents were forged. The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her signatures on the documents knowingly and with her full consent.

Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros’ loan, the appellate court ruled that the conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. The records of the case reveal that the loan was used for the expansion of the family’s business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable against the conjugal partnership.

Petitioners filed the present petition for review before this Court on 9 December 2005.

The Issues

Petitioners assigned the following errors:

I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not giving weight to the findings and conclusions of the trial court, and in reversing and setting aside such findings and conclusions without stating specific contrary evidence;

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring the real estate mortgage valid;

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in declaring, without basis, that the loan contracted by husband Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine National Bank – Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family, aside from the fact that such had not been raised by respondent in its appeal.14]


The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court.

The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The subject property is thus considered part of the conjugal partnership of gains. The pertinent articles of the Civil Code provide:

Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them;

(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.

Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;

(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of either spouse or of the partnership;

(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;

(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;

(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of one of the spouses;

(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.

Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguete’s marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was acquired in 1968.15 There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros’ mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On the other hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and also denies affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan documents.

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.

The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.18 The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer.19 PNB was correct when it stated that petitioners’ omission to present other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal to petitioners’ cause.20 Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that Aguete’s signatures were really forged.

A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. Absent such, the presumption must be upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarial document lies on the one contesting the same. Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same.21]

Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no one can come before the courts with unclean hands.1avvphi1 In their memorandum before the trial court, petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged Aguete’s signatures.

Joe A. Ros in legal effect admitted in the complaint that the signatures of his wife in the questioned documents are forged, incriminating himself to criminal prosecution. If he were alive today, he would be prosecuted for forgery. This strengthens the testimony of his wife that her signatures on the questioned documents are not hers.

In filing the complaint, it must have been a remorse of conscience for having wronged his family; in forging the signature of his wife on the questioned documents; in squandering the P115,000.00 loan from the bank for himself, resulting in the foreclosure of the conjugal property; eviction of his family therefrom; and, exposure to public contempt, embarassment and ridicule.22]

The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco."23 In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not know where he "wasted the money."24 Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.25

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.26]

For this reason, we rule that Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76845 promulgated on 17 October 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

YOLANDA LEACHON CORPUZ, vs. SERGIO V. PASCUA, Sheriff III. Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires City, CaviteA.M. No. P-11-2972 September 28, 2011LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative case for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law filed by Yolanda Leachon Corpuz (Yolanda) against Sergio V. Pascua (Pascua), Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Trece Martires City, Cavite.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Upon the complaint of Alicia Panganiban (Panganiban), Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were instituted against Juanito Corpuz (Juanito) before the MTCC. In an Order[1] dated June 16, 2009, the MTCC approved the Compromise Agreement[2] dated May 25, 2009 executed between Panganiban and Juanito (in which Juanito promised to pay Panganiban the sum of P330,000.00) and dismissed provisionally Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082. On January 25, 2010, the MTCC allegedly rendered a judgment based on the Compromise Agreement, but there was no copy of said judgment in the records of this case. When Juanito failed to comply with his obligations under the Compromise Agreement, Panganiban filed Motions for Execution dated January 4, 2010 and February 25, 2010 of the MTCC judgment. On March 17, 2010, the MTCC acted favorably on Panganiban’s Motions and issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Sheriff of the MTCC of Trece Martires City, with the following decree:

NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to proceed to accused Juanito Corpuz who resides at No. 118 Lallana, Trece Martires City, for him to pay private complainant the amount of Php330,000.00 less the amount of Php50,000.00 allegedly paid for the first installment.

In (sic) the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, you shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt for execution, giving the latter, the option to immediately choose which property may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, you shall first levy on the personal properties of any and then on the real properties, if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the. You shall only (sic) so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, and make a report to this Court every thirty (30) days on the proceeding taken, until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires.[3]

On June 2, 2010, Yolanda, Juanito’s wife, and her daughter were in her office at the Cavite Provincial Engineering Office of Trece Martires City. At around three o’clock in the afternoon, Sheriff Pascua arrived at Yolanda’s office and demanded that Yolanda surrender the Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate No. 471, which was registered in Yolanda’s name, threatening to damage the said vehicle if Yolanda would refuse to do so. Sheriff Pascua tried to forcibly open the vehicle. Yolanda called her brother to ask for help. Yolanda’s brother arrived after one hour. Yolanda, with her daughter and brother, went out of the office to face Sheriff Pascua. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and to avoid further indignities, Yolanda surrendered the key to the vehicle to Sheriff Pascua, but she did not sign any document which Sheriff Pascua asked her to sign.

Offended, humiliated, and embarrassed, Yolanda was compelled to file the present administrative complaint[4] against Sheriff Pascua. In addition to the aforementioned incident on June 2, 2010, Yolanda alleged in her complaint that Sheriff Pascua kept possession of the vehicle and even used the same on several occasions for his personal use. Yolanda attached to her complaint pictures to prove that Sheriff Pascua, instead of parking the vehicle within the court premises, in accordance with the concept of custodia legis, parked the vehicle in the garage of his own house. Yolanda also claimed that her vehicle was illegally confiscated or levied upon by Sheriff Pascua because the Writ of Execution, which Sheriff Pascua was implementing, was issued against Juanito, Yolanda’s husband. Yolanda further pointed out that Sheriff Pascua has not yet posted the notice of sale of personal property, as required by Rule 39, Section 15 of the Rules of Court.

In his Comment,[5] Sheriff Pascua denied that he threatened and used force in levying upon the vehicle in question, and avowed that he was the one maligned when he served the Writ of Execution at Yolanda’s residence on April 21, 2010 and at Yolanda’s office on June 2, 2010. Yolanda delivered unsavory remarks in an unconscionable manner, maligning Sheriff Pascua in the presence of other people, during both occasions. When Sheriff Pascua first served the Writ of Execution, Yolanda uttered to him, "Ipaglalaban ko ng patayan kapag kumuha kayo ng gamit dito, matagal ko ng pag-aari ang mga ito."[6]

Sheriff Pascua averred that after the levy, he politely informed Yolanda that he would temporarily keep the vehicle at his place as there was no safe parking within the court premises. The lower floors of the building where the courts are located are being used as classrooms of the Cavite State University, and the vacant lot thereat serves as parking area for judges, prosecutors, and doctors and staff of the City Health Office. Sheriff Pascua believed that it was not safe to park the vehicle within the City Hall premises because of his personal experience, when the battery of his owner-type jeep, parked in the vicinity, was stolen. Sheriff Pascua already stated in the Sheriff’s Return dated June 4, 2010 that he was keeping temporary custody of Yolanda’s vehicle. He asserted that he never used the vehicle as he owns an owner-type jeep, which he uses for serving writs and other court processes, as well as for his family’s needs. He likewise contradicted Yolanda’s claim that no public auction has been scheduled. In fact, Yolanda already received on July 9, 2010 the Notice to Parties of Sheriff’s Public Auction Sale and Notice of Sale of Execution of Personal Property.

Lastly, Sheriff Pascua argued that he only took Yolanda’s vehicle after verification from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) that it was registered in Yolanda’s name. Yolanda is the wife of Juanito, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082, and the vehicle is their conjugal property, which could be levied upon in satisfaction of a Writ of Execution against Juanito.

Yolanda filed a Reply[7] dated September 17, 2010, belying the averments in Sheriff Pascua’s Comment. Yolanda insisted that Sheriff Pascua committed an error in levying upon the vehicle solely registered in her name to satisfy a Writ of Execution issued against her husband and an impropriety in parking the vehicle at his (Sheriff Pascua’s) home garage.

In his Rejoinder[8] dated October 5, 2010, Sheriff Pascua maintained that he acted in accordance with law. It was not his duty as sheriff to show proof that the personal property he was levying upon to execute the civil aspect of the judgment was conjugal; rather, the burden fell upon Yolanda to prove that the said property was paraphernal. Sheriff Pascua further reiterated that he never used Yolanda’s vehicle for his needs. The pictures submitted by Yolanda only showed that the vehicle was parked at his home garage. No picture or evidence was presented to prove that he used the vehicle. Sheriff Pascua lastly averred that he had no intention of delaying the public auction of the vehicle and was merely following the proper procedure for the reasonable appraisal of the same. He had already filed a Notice of Attachment/Levy upon Personal Property with the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City, requested certified true copies or photocopies of the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration of the vehicle to be used for the auction sale, and gave notice of the auction sale to Yolanda six days prior to the scheduled sale. He also gave Yolanda the opportunity to file a Third-Party Claim or proof that the vehicle was her paraphernal property, but Yolanda failed to file anything until the day of the auction sale.

On November 17, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its report,[9] with the following recommendation:

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for consideration of the Honorable Court our recommendation that:

1. The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

2. Sergio V. Pascua, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Trece Martires City, Cavite, be REPRIMANDED for impropriety in taking the vehicle and parking the same at his garage; and

3. Sergio V. Pascua, be SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day for Simple Neglect of Duty, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.[10]

In a Resolution[11] dated February 9, 2011, we required the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.

Sheriff Pascua[12] and Yolanda[13] submitted their Manifestations dated April 11, 2011 and April 12, 2011, respectively, stating that they were submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.

Resultantly, the case was already submitted for resolution.

After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that Sheriff Pascua, in levying upon Yolanda’s vehicle even though the judgment and writ he was implementing were against Juanito, then parking the same vehicle at his home garage, is guilty of simple misconduct.

A sheriff performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-bound to know the basic rules in the implementation of a writ of execution and be vigilant in the exercise of that authority.[14]

Sheriffs have the ministerial duty to implement writs of execution promptly. Their unreasonable failure or neglect to perform such function constitutes inefficiency and gross neglect of duty. When writs are placed in the hands of sheriffs, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable speed and promptness to execute such writs in accordance with their mandate.[15]

At the same time, sheriffs are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. Sheriffs, as officers of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in their behavior.[16]

In the instant case, Sheriff Pascua failed to live up to the standards of conduct for his position.

Despite the undisputed facts that the MTCC Judgment and Writ of Execution in Criminal Case Nos. 2079 to 2082 were against Juanito only, and the Toyota Town Ace Noah with Plate No. 471 was registered in Yolanda’s name solely, Sheriff Pascua proceeded to levy upon the vehicle, invoking the presumption that it was conjugal property.

The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone.[17] An execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man's goods shall not be sold for another man's debts.[18]

A sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The sheriff may be liable for enforcing execution on property belonging to a third party. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no justification, for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ.[19]

Sheriff Pascua cannot rely on the presumption that the vehicle is the conjugal property of Juanito and Yolanda.

Indeed, Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.[20] There is no such proof in the records of the present case.

Sheriff Pascua’s assertions of diligence do not exculpate him from administrative liability. After inquiry from the LTO, he already discovered that the vehicle was registered in Yolanda’s name only. This fact should have already prompted Sheriff Pascua to gather more information, such as when Juanito and Yolanda were married and when did Yolanda acquire the vehicle, which, in turn, would have determined whether or not Sheriff Pascua could already presume that the said vehicle is conjugal property.

Moreover, when Sheriff Pascua proceeded in levying upon Yolanda’s vehicle, he digressed far from the procedure laid down in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for the enforcement of judgments, pertinent portions of which read:

SEC. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. –

(a) Immediate payment on demand. – The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of payment. x x x.

x x x x

(b) Satisfaction by levy. – If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)

As the aforequoted provision clearly state, the levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor may be had by the executing sheriff only if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the full amount stated in the writ of execution. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check, or other mode acceptable to the judgment obligee, the judgment obligor is given the option to immediately choose which of his property or part thereof, not otherwise exempt from execution, may be levied upon sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option immediately, or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment. Therefore, the sheriff cannot and should not be the one to determine which property to levy if the judgment obligor cannot immediately pay because it is the judgment obligor who is given the option to choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon to satisfy the judgment.[21]

In this case, Sheriff Pascua totally ignored the established procedural rules. Without giving Juanito the opportunity to either pay his obligation under the MTCC judgment in cash, certified bank check, or any other mode of payment acceptable to Panganiban; or to choose which of his property may be levied upon to satisfy the same judgment, Sheriff Pascua immediately levied upon the vehicle that belonged to Juanito’s wife, Yolanda.

To make matters worse, Sheriff Pascua parked the vehicle at his home garage, believing that the parking area within the court premises was unsafe based on his personal experience.

In previous administrative cases, sheriffs had already proffered the same excuse, i.e., lack of court storage facilities for the property attached or levied upon, so as to justify their delivery of the said property to the party-creditors. In Caja v. Nanquil,[22] we rejected the excuse, thus:

Respondent sheriff argues that he never delivered said personal properties to the judgment creditor but merely kept the same in a secured place owned by the latter. He brought them there because the Sheriff’s Office and the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City had no

warehouse or place to keep levied personal properties. In support thereto, he presented John Aquino, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, who testified that they have no designated warehouse or building where sheriffs can keep levied personal properties. In so far as large motor vehicles, the practice as to where to keep them is left at the discretion of the sheriff.

Respondent sheriff’s argument that he kept the levied personal properties at the judgment creditor’s place because the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City does not have any warehouse or place to keep the same does not hold water. A levying officer must keep the levied properties securely in his custody. The levied property must be in the substantial presence and possession of the levying officer who cannot act as special deputy of any party litigant. They should not have been delivered to any of the parties or their representative. The court’s lack of storage facility to house the attached properties is no justification. Respondent sheriff could have deposited the same in a bonded warehouse or could have sought prior authorization from the court that issued the writ of execution.[23] (Underscoring supplied.)

Sheriff Pascua’s explanation for parking Yolanda’s vehicle at his home garage is just as unacceptable. Granted that it was unsafe to park the vehicle within the court premises, Sheriff Pascua should have kept the said vehicle in a bonded warehouse or sought prior authorization from the MTCC to park the same at another place. Although there is no evidence that Sheriff Pascua had also used the vehicle, the Court understands how easy it is for other people to suspect the same because the vehicle was parked at his home garage. Sheriff Pascua’s actuations smacked of unprofessionalism, blurring the line between his official functions and his personal life.

Time and again, the Court has held that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs play a significant role in the administration of justice. They are primarily responsible for the execution of a final judgment which is "the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law."[24] Thus, sheriffs must at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. As officers of the court, they are expected to uphold the norm of public accountability and to avoid any kind of behavior that would diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.[25] Measured against these standards, Sheriff Pascua disappointingly fell short.

The OCA recommends that Sheriff Pascua be held administratively liable for impropriety and simple neglect of duty. The Court though determines that Sheriff Pascua’s improper actions more appropriately constitute simple misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of an established rule of action. More particularly, misconduct is the unlawful behavior of a public officer. It means the "intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official."[26] In order for misconduct to constitute an administrative offense, it should be related to or connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.[27]

Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987) and Section 52(B)(2), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple misconduct is a less grave offense with a penalty ranging from suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.

WHEREFORE, respondent Sheriff Sergio V. Pascua is found GUILTY of simple misconduct and is SUSPENDED for TWO (2) MONTHS WITHOUT PAY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002]

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO, petitioner, vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA, respondents.KAPUNAN, J.:

The issue raised in this case is whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife’s written consent.

The present controversy had its beginning when petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an advertisement placed by respondents, the Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal.

As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, she was interested in buying the two properties so she negotiated for the purchase through a real estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by respondent spouses.[1] Petitioner made a visual inspection of the said lots with the real estate broker and was shown the tax declarations, real property tax payment receipts, location plans, and vicinity maps relating to the properties.[2] Thereafter, petitioner met with the vendors who turned out to be respondent spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the real estate broker.[3] After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of P1,500,000.00 for the Taytay property and P2,100,000.00 for the Makati property[4] to be paid on installment basis with downpayments of P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively, on April 15, 1992. The balance thereof was to be paid as follows[5]:

Taytay Property Makati Property

6th month P200,000.00 P300,000.0012th month 700,000.00 1,600,000.0018th month 500,000.00

This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto.[6] When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife’s conformity and consent to the sale.[7] The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner. The following day, petitioner, the real estate broker and Edilberto met in the latter’s office for the formal signing of the typewritten Contracts to Sell.[8] After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks, namely, UCPB Check No. 62807 dated April 15, 1992 for P200,000.00 and UCPB Check No. 62808 also dated April 15, 1992 for P100,000.00 in the presence of the real estate broker and an employee in Edilberto’s office.[9] The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife’s signature.

The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma, requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts.[10] To accommodate her queries, petitioner, accompanied by her lawyer, met with Edilberto and Norma and the real estate broker at Cafe Rizal in Makati.[11] During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts.[12]

When petitioner met again with respondent spouses and the real estate broker at Edilberto’s office for the formal affixing of Norma’s signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed “spot cash” for the full amount of the consideration.[13] Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma’s refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136 on April 29, 1992, to compel respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.

A Motion to Dismiss[14] was filed by respondents which was denied by the trial court in its Resolution of July 21, 1992.[15]

Respondents then filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim, alleging that it was an agreement between herein petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa that the sale of the subject properties was still subject to the approval and conformity of his wife Norma Camaisa.[16] Thereafter, when Norma refused to give her consent to the sale, her refusal was duly communicated by Edilberto to petitioner.[17] The checks issued by petitioner were returned to her by Edilberto and she accepted the same without any objection.[18] Respondent further claimed that the acceptance of the checks returned to petitioner signified her assent to the cancellation of the sale of the subject properties.[19] Respondent Norma denied that she ever participated in the negotiations for the sale of the subject properties and that she gave her consent and conformity to the same.[20]

On October 20, 1992, respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a Motion for Summary Judgment[21] asserting that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the basis of the pleadings and admission of the parties considering that the wife’s written consent was not obtained in the contract to sell, the subject conjugal properties belonging to respondents; hence, the contract was null and void.

On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of the consent of the wife since said wife who refused to give consent had not been shown to be incapacitated. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, considering these premises, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing the complaint and ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens by reason of its filing on TCT Nos. (464860) S-8724 and (464861) S-8725 of the Registry of Deeds at Makati and on TCT Nos. 295976 and 295971 of the Registry of Rizal.

2. Ordering plaintiff Thelma A. Jader to pay defendant spouses Norma and Edilberto Camaisa, FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) as Attorney’s Fees.

Costs against plaintiff.[22]

Petitioner, thus, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On November 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the trial court but deleted the award of P50,000.00 as damages and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

The Court of Appeals explained that the properties subject of the contracts were conjugal properties and as such, the consent of both spouses is necessary to give effect to the sale. Since private respondent Norma Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected. In fact, the downpayment was returned by respondent spouses and was accepted by petitioner. The Court of Appeals also stressed that the authority of the court to allow sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse is applicable only in cases where the said spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property.

Hence, the present recourse assigning the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ENTIRELY AND ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS ON THE TITLES OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES BY RESPONDENTS TO PETITIONER HAVE ALREADY BEEN PERFECTED, FOR AFTER THE LATTER PAID P300,000.00 DOWNPAYMENT, RESPONDENT MRS. CAMAISA NEVER OBJECTED TO STIPULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRICE, OBJECT AND TERMS OF PAYMENT IN THE CONTRACT TO SELL ALREADY SIGNED BY THE PETITIONER, RESPONDENT MR. CAMAISA AND WITNESSES MARKED AS ANNEX “G” IN THE COMPLAINT EXCEPT, FOR MINOR PROVISIONS ALREADY IMPLIED BY LAW, LIKE EJECTMENT OF TENANTS, SUBDIVISION OF TITLE AND RESCISSION IN CASE OF NONPAYMENT, WHICH PETITIONER READILY AGREED AND ACCEDED TO THEIR INCLUSION;

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT CONTRACT OF SALE IS CONSENSUAL AND IT IS PERFECTED BY THE MERE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES AND THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS ARE ARTICLES 1157, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1403, 1405 AND 1475 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND GOVERNED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUD.[23]

The Court does not find error in the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred when it entered a summary judgment in favor of respondent spouses there being a genuine issue of fact. Petitioner maintains that the issue of whether the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses was perfected is a question of fact necessitating a trial on the merits.

The Court does not agree. A summary judgment is one granted by the court upon motion by a party for an expeditious settlement of a case, there appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact involved, and that therefore the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[24] A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both parties show that there is no genuine controversy as to the facts involved therein.

Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the sale of four parcels of land between petitioner and respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent Edilberto Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and the terms of payment, and a downpayment was paid by petitioner to the latter; and that respondent Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. The issue thus posed for resolution in the trial court was whether or not the contracts to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses were already perfected such that the latter could no longer back out of the agreement.

The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or

encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Underscoring ours.)

The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.

Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.[25]

Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.

The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.[26] In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife’s incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.

Under the foregoing facts, the motion for summary judgment was proper considering that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. The only issue to be resolved by the trial court was whether the contract to sell involving conjugal properties was valid without the written consent of the wife.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43421 AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 112014. December 5, 2000]

TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, petitioner, vs. GILDA L. JARDELEZA, ERNESTO L. JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO GIL L. JARDELEZA, and GLENDA L. JARDELEZA, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the order[1] dismissing Special Proceedings No. 4689 of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City for appointment of judicial guardian over the person and estate of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. on the ground that such guardianship is superfluous and will only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife, Mrs. Gilda L. Jardeleza, under the explicit provisions of Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were married long before 03 August 1988, when the Family Code took effect. The union produced five children, namely: petitioner, Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando, all surnamed L. Jardeleza.

On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a stroke and lapsed into comatose condition. To date, his condition has not materially improved.

On 06 June 1991, petitioner commenced with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City Special Proceedings No. 45689, a petition for appointment of judicial guardian over the person and property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and prayed for the issuance of letters of guardianship to his mother, Gilda L. Jardeleza.[2]

On 19 June 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing so that all persons concerned may appear and show cause if any why the petition should not be granted.[3]

On 3 July 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of guardianship to him, rather than to his mother, on the ground that she considered the property acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not want to be appointed guardian.[4]

On 09 August 1991, respondents filed with the trial court an opposition to the petition for guardianship and the motion for issuance of letters of guardianship to petitioner.[5]

On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for guardianship.[6] The trial court concluded, without explanation, that the petition is superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under the explicit provisions of Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.

On 17 September 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out that the Court of Appeals held in a case under Article 124 of the Family Code where the incapacitated spouse is incapable of being notified or unable to answer the petition, the procedural recourse is guardianship of the incapacitated spouse.[7]

On 24 September 1993, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration finding it unmeritorious.[8]

Hence, this petition.[9]

The petition raises a pure legal question, to wit: whether Article 124 of the Family Code renders “superfluous” the appointment of a judicial guardian over the person and estate of an incompetent married person.

Very recently, in a related case, we ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code was not applicable to the situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure was an application for appointment of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.[10]

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition, reverses and sets aside the resolutions of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, in Special Proceedings No. 4689.

The Court remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES DELA CRUZ vs. SPOUSES SEGOVIAG.R. No. 149801 June 26, 2008LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April 17, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64487, as reiterated in its Resolution2 of September 4, 2001, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 44 in its Civil Case No. 96-77509, an action for Nullity of Contract/Agreement with Damages thereat commenced by spouses Renato and Florinda dela Cruz (petitioners) against respondent spouses Gil and Leonila Segovia.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows.

Sometime in July 1985, petitioner Florinda dela Cruz (Florinda) wanted to purchase two (2) parcels of land located at Paltok Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Lot 503 with an apartment unit erected thereon and Lot 505 with a residential house. The two lots were being sold together for P180,000.00. Inasmuch as Florinda had only P144,000.00 at hand, she asked her sister, respondent Leonila Segovia (Leonila), to contribute P36,000.00 to complete the purchase price. The sisters agreed that Lot 503 and the apartment unit thereat would belong to Leonila upon full payment of its purchase price of P80,000.00, while Lot 505 with a residential house would belong to Florinda. The properties were then registered in the name of petitioner Renato dela Cruz married to Florinda. The parties, however, verbally agreed that Leonila and her family would stay at Lot 505 until she had fully paid for Lot 503.

Desiring to reduce the verbal agreement into writing, the parties executed and signed a handwritten covenant entitled Note of Agreement3 dated April 28, 1990, which read:

Ano mang oras o panahon maaring ilipat kay Mo/Gil Segovia [respondent] ang pag-aari ng sasakyan at bahay kung mababayaran nila ang P18,000 at P34,000 na balance sa Apt. na walang ano mang condition, interest at ano mang hangad hanggang year 1999.

Ang halagang P18,000 ay may interest na 2% hanggang sa ito ay mabayaran kay Flor dela Cruz [petitioner]. Ang halagang P34,000 ay walang interest at ito ay babayaran up to 1999. Ang upa sa apt. ay cocolectahin ni Flor kapalit sa residential house.

Ang ano mang mga gastos sa papeles ay sasagutin ni Mo/Gil Segovia [respondent] kung ililipat sa pangalan niya ang sasakyan na Pinoy Fierra-Van NEX 741. Ang pagbili sa lupa at bahay 503 Paltok ay ganoon din. (underscoring supplied)

Sometime in 1991, Linda Duval, a sister of Florinda and Leonila, arrived from the United States to attend their mother’s funeral. Linda noticed the strained relations between her two siblings. When she inquired about the status of her sisters’ agreement regarding Lot 503, Leonila informed Linda that the agreement was yet to be reduced into a formal contract. Linda offered to prepare a contract between Florinda and Leonila who acceded to the offer. Thus, on September 9, 1991, Florinda and Leonila signed an Agreement4 embodying the detailed scheme of payment for the lot covered by the sisters’ agreement, to wit:

We, Gil and Leonila Segovia, husband and wife, of legal age, residing at 505 A. Paltok Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, jointly agrees to pay Florinda dela Cruz the sum of P34,000.00 pesos Philippine currency in the following terms and conditions:

1. All previous contract or agreement is superseded by this existing contract.

2. Payment of the said amount will be payable in installment basis; in a monthly fashion respectively with no specific amount of payment within the period of ten (10) years; effectively after the contract is signed by both parties. P314.81 per month or P 3,1777.77 (sic) per year. And by the year 1999 will be P34,000.00.

3. The borrowers (Sps. Segovia) agree to put their real property located at 505 B Paltok St., Sta. Mesa, Mla., with TCT # 177862- Registry of deeds (public document) as guarantees for the above loan, which has a monthly rent of P1,200.00 and will be collected by the Lender (Florinda) as part of the agreement of the loan.

4. As part of the agreement, the borrowers will live in the Lender's house, located at 505 Paltok St. in exchange for her property rents.

5. The lender also agrees that the borrowers manage the collection of rents around the house and endorse said rents to the owner who is the Lender. Lender gives her full consent to the borrowers to sub-rent whatever rooms she chooses inside her premises.

6. If payment was not made after ten (10) years, the Lender will take ownership of the property described above.

7. If payment is made on or before the due date of the agreement, the Lender shall immediately take care of all the necessary action with regards to impediment, attachment, encumbrances to the property.

x x xAfter the Note of Agreement of April 28, 1990 and Agreement of September 9, 1991, Leonila continued paying the balance she owed Florinda. Particularly, she paid the amount of P10,000.00 in September 1990 and P7,555.44 on May 16, 1995. Finally, in October 1995, Leonila attempted to pay the remaining balance of P26,444.56 in full satisfaction of her obligation but Florinda refused to accept the same on the ground that, the ten-year period for the payment of the balance, reckoned from July 1985, the alleged date of the verbal agreement between them, had already expired. Thereafter Florinda demanded that Leonila and her family vacate the house at 505 Paltok Street, which prompted respondents to consign the P26,444.56 in court.5

On March 8, 1996, petitioners filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 44, a complaint for Nullity of Contract/Agreement with Damages on the ground that the Agreement executed on September 9, 1991 did not contain the true intention of the parties because Florinda’s consent thereto was vitiated by mistake. Allegedly, Florinda did not know that the agreement provided that the ten-year period for payment of the balance commenced from September 1991 and not from July 1985 which was her true intention.

On May 5, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for Nullity of Contract/Agreement with Damages and declaring the subject Agreement valid and subsisting. The decision’s dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations and a thorough examination of the evidence, and the pleadings together with the supporting documents, this Court finds the Agreement valid and subsisting – thus, the complaint filed by plaintiffs on March 8, 1996 is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.

The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the amount of P26,000.00 which is the remaining balance to complete the purchase price of the 503 Paltok Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila property to the plaintiffs afterwhich the latter and all the persons claiming under them, to surrender the ownership of 503 Paltok Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, vacate and to surrender possession thereof.

The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay defendants attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

The counterclaim is denied. SO ORDERED.6

In arriving at its decision, the RTC explained:

Granting arguendo, that Florinda dela Cruz’s allegation that she has not read the Agreement is true, signing a contract without fully knowing the stipulations does not vitiate consent. Prudence dictates that Florinda dela Cruz who presented the agreement for signature should acquaint herself first with the "fine prints" of a contract before stamping her approval thereto. As it is, the fact remains that Florinda dela Cruz signed the agreement voluntarily on September 9, 1991 binding themselves that the balance of P34,000.00 be paid in installments within ten (10) years upon signing the agreement or until 1999. Indeed, the evidence will show that Florinda dela Cruz voluntarily entered into the Agreement and participated in the preparation thereof and after it has been prepared, the same was read to and by the parties themselves including Florinda dela Cruz and later voluntarily affixed her signature. Renato dela Cruz was also present at the time of the signing of the Agreement and presented a copy thereof.

A further reading of the complaint in paragraph 7 thereof, it is clear from the allegations that the Agreement is a valid existing contract only it did not express the intention of the parties, which may be a ground for reformation of contract only under Article 1359 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that "when, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed."x x xThus, the four year period to file the action for annulment, assuming there were indeed mistakes therein which vitiated plaintiffs’ [petitioners] consent commenced to run on September 9, 1991. The action had already prescribed or lapsed and plaintiffs [petitioners] could no longer ask for the annulment of the agreement.

As to the contention that the subject agreement had no force and effect on account of the absence of the signature of Florinda’s husband, petitioner Renato dela Cruz (Renato), the RTC ruled to the contrary, thus:

Indeed, Renato dela Cruz did not sign the Agreement, however, he was present at the time the Agreement was signed by the parties and their witnesses, and the same was presented to him for his signature. In fact, attempts were even made to procure his signature, but plaintiff wife Florinda dela Cruz insisted that her signature already carries that of her husband Renato dela Cruz. The parties never insisted that Renato dela Cruz sign the Agreement as the wife has spoken. It is further observed that by his actuations Renato dela Cruz has agreed and has given his conformity to the agreement. He also did not object to the execution of the same at the time it was signed by his wife Florinda dela Cruz on September 9, 1991, even he was present and he was shown and furnished a copy of the said agreement.x x xIt must be pointed out that plaintiff Florinda dela Cruz always consult her husband, Renato dela Cruz on all matters respecting their transactions (pp. 42-43, tsn, Sept. 13, 1996; p. 25, tsn, Aug. 15, 1997).

So that the claim of Florinda dela Cruz that she has never informed her husband involving a very substantial property registered in his name, for ten years that it had allegedly been in effect and that she has been regularly collecting defendants staggered installment payments for the said property for a number of years lacks basis.

More, Renato’s claim that he was never aware of the agreement between the parties is doomed, since he was present at the time of the purchase of the property where he witnessed Leonila Segovia contributed their hard earned savings in the amount of P36,000.00 to complete their share to the purchase price of P180,000.00 of the properties in question, and who reminded defendants that the subject property will ultimately be theirs upon completion of their amortizations.

Finally, the RTC ruled that the action for annulment had already lapsed when the Complaint was filed on March 8, 1996.

The action for annulment shall be brought within four (4) years from the time of discovery of the mistake (Art. 1391, New Civil Code of the Philippines).

On the other hand, the defendants’ [respondents’] evidence that after the preparation by Linda Duval on September 9, 1991, the Agreement was read to and by the parties, shown and signed by the parties and furnished each a copy of the agreement. Therefore, it could not be said that plaintiffs [petitioners] were not aware of the terms and conditions of the Agreement and did not discover the alleged mistakes contained therein on September 9, 1991.

More, plaintiffs [petitioners] likewise never raise any objection nor declare that there were mistakes in the agreement. It was only on March 8, 1996 that the present action for annulment was filed.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal.7 Respondents too filed a Notice of Partial Appeal8 questioning the dismissal of their counter-claim for damages. Accordingly, the records of the case were elevated to the CA, where both appeals were docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64487.

The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC in its decision,9 promulgated on April 17, 2001. In so ruling, the CA also declared that, while the expiry date of the payment period was an important stipulation, it could not be considered as the substance of the contract nor the primary motivation for which the parties entered into the agreement. The substance of the Agreement was the sale of the property at 503 Paltok Street. The "mistake" that petitioners point to pertains to their interpretation of the contract, which is not a ground to annul the same. The CA found that the stipulations of the written agreement, signed on September 9, 1991, clearly intended to give the respondents ten (10) years from 1991 within which to effect payment of the balance of the consideration for the sale of the 503 property. In view of the explicit terms of the said written agreement, the verbal agreement of July 1985 was already of no moment.

The motion for reconsideration of petitioners was denied by the CA in the resolution dated September 4, 2001.

Aggrieved by the foregoing CA decision, petitioners elevated the case to this Court raising the following assignment of errors:

I.THE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AGREEMENT IS VALID AND SUBSISTING AND ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO SURRENDER OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO THE RESPONDENTS.

II.THE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER RENATO DELA CRUZ BY HIS ACTUATIONS HAD AGREED AND HAD GIVEN HIS CONFORMITY TO THE AGREEMENT.

We deny the petition.We agree with the two courts below when they declared that the four (4)-year period for filing an action for annulment of the September 9, 1991 Agreement, on ground of vitiated consent, had already lapsed when the complaint subject of the present controversy was filed on March 8, 1996.

This is in accordance with Article 1391 of the Civil Code, which pertinently reads:

Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.

This period shall begin:xxxIn case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.xxx.The complaint for Nullity of Contract/ Agreement with Damages was filed on March 7, 1996, while the agreement subject thereof was entered into on September 9, 1991. The Agreement was read to the parties before they affixed their signatures thereon. Petitioners were thereafter furnished a copy of the subject Agreement. Petitioners are presumed to have discovered the alleged mistake on September 9, 1991. Hence, the action for annulment which was filed four years and six months from the time of the discovery of the mistake had already prescribed. Evidently, the Agreement could no longer be set aside.

We also agree with the ruling that the absence of Renato’s signature in the September 9, 1991 Agreement bears little significance to its validity. Article 124 of the Family Code relied upon by petitioners provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

The foregoing provision finds no application in this case because the transaction between Florinda and Leonila in reality did not involve any disposition of property belonging to any of the sisters’ conjugal assets. It may be recalled that the agreement was for the acquisition of two lots which were being sold together for P180,000.00. Florinda who had only P144,000.00 asked Leonila to contribute P36,000.00 to complete the purchase price of said lots. With money pooled together, the sisters agreed that Lot 503 be valued at P80,000.00 and Lot 505 valued at P100,000.00. The P36,000.00 contribution of Leonila shall be applied to the 503 property which upon full payment of the remaining balance of P44,000.00 advanced by Florinda shall belong to Leonila. On the other hand, of Florinda’s P144,000.00 contribution, P 100,000.00 shall be considered as full payment for the purchase of the 505 property and the P44,000.00 which was the balance of the purchase price of Lot 503, as loan to Leonila. To secure payment of the loan, Lot 503 was provisionally registered in the name of petitioners. Hence Lot 503 was at the outset not intended to be part of the conjugal asset of the petitioners but only as a security for the payment of the P44,000.00 due from respondents.

Moreover, while Florinda’s husband did not affix his signature to the above-mentioned Agreement, we find no ground to disturb the uniform findings of the trial court and appellate court that Renato, by his actuations, agreed and gave his conformity to the Agreement. As found by the courts below, Renato’s consent to the Agreement was drawn from the fact that he was present at the time it was signed by the sisters and their witnesses; he had knowledge of the Agreement as it was presented to him for his signature, although he did not sign the same because his wife Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that of her husband; Renato witnessed the fact that Leonila contributed her hard earned savings in the amount of P36,000.00 to complete their share in the purchase price of the properties in question in the total amount of P180,000.00. The aforesaid factual findings of the courts below are beyond review at this stage.10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

IMELDA RELUCIO vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ[G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002]PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case is a petition for review on certiorari[1] seeking to set aside the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals that denied a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case against her inclusion as party defendant therein.

The Facts

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

“On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for “APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE, ETC.,” against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio, docketed as Spec. Proc. M-3630, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141. In the petition, private-respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.

“It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money, property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner Relucio.

“In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, he excluded the private respondent and their four children from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and the income or fruits there from. As such, defendant Lopez either did not place them in his name or otherwise removed, transferred, stashed away or concealed them from the private-respondent. He placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of petitioner Relucio.

“It was also averred that in the past twenty five years since defendant Lopez abandoned the private-respondent, he has sold, disposed of, alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed or stashed away properties, assets and income belonging to the conjugal partnership with the private-respondent and either spent the proceeds thereof for his sole benefit and that of petitioner Relucio and their two illegitimate children or permanently and fraudulently placed them beyond the reach of the private-respondent and their four children.

“On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her.

“An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.

“Subsequently thereafter, petitioner Relucio filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of the respondent Judge dated February 10, 1994 but the same was likewise denied in the Order dated May 31, 1994.”[3]

On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss.[4]

On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition.[5] On June 26, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[6] However, on April 6, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.[7]

Hence, this appeal.[8]

The Issues

1. Whether respondent’s petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner.

2. Whether petitioner’s inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication of the controversy.[9]


We grant the petition. We resolve the issues in seriatim.

First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the proceedings below. “A cause of action is an act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other.”[10] The elements of a cause of action are:

(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;

(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and

(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[11]

A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were admitted or proved.[12]

In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.[13]

Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in Special Proceedings M-3630, we assay its allegations.

In Part Two on the “Nature of [the] Complaint,” respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez summarized the causes of action alleged in the complaint below.

The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.

Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent’s causes of action were all against her husband.

The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit:

“If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property xxx”

The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons. Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband. Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of action exists.

The second cause of action is for an accounting “by respondent husband.”[14] The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage.

Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action can exist against petitioner on this ground.

Respondent’s alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’ share in the co-owned property “acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]”[15] and for the “dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent].”

The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share, if any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner.

Respondent’s asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez’ share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent’s favor, results in a breach of an obligation to respondent and gives rise to a cause of action.[16] Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.

The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger.

The action in Special Proceedings M-3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez’ own words, one by “an aggrieved wife against her husband.”[17] References to petitioner in the common and specific allegations of fact in the complaint are merely incidental, to set forth facts and circumstances that prove the causes of action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.

Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent’s claim for moral damages is against Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner.

To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have the character of an action for interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.

A real party in interest is one who stands “to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.”[18] In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M-3630.

If petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an action.[19] Petitioner’s participation in Special Proceedings M-3630 is not indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez’ conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.

Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.[20] In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community property with respondent.

The Judgment

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals.[21] The Court DISMISSES Special Proceedings M-3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141 as against petitioner.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A. GLINDO vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA,A.C. No. 9081; October 12, 2011CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña (Omaña).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINASBAYAN NG GUMACALALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;

2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar kung saan siya ay naninirahan;

4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd)ELENA MARANTALNagkasundo (Sgd)RODOLFO ESPINOSANagkasundoPINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑANotary PublicPTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;Page No. 97;Book No. XI;Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. Omaña presented Marantal’s "Sinumpaang Salaysay" (affidavit) to support her allegations and to

show that the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a letter of apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the document without Omaña’s knowledge, consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a "Karagdagang Salaysay" stating that Omaña arrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaña was not in her office when the contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated that Espinosa’s desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaña had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaña who first claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:

Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from the practice of law and for two years as a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied Omaña’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosa’s "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay."

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.1avvphi1

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a document entitled "Legal Separation" where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each other;6 preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against the other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herself notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence in doing her notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries9 or any member of his staff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void document, Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Omaña knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.10

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of law for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s notarial commission, if still existing, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Cases of Civ1

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