CASES JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Abejo vs Dela Cruz

SYLLABUS

1.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAWS;

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; A MERE SUCCESSOR

DOES NOT BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT

COMMITMENTS OF ITS PREDECESSOR; EXCEPTION; CASE AT

BAR. The Court agrees that as a mere successor of Metro in the arrastre operations in the South Harbor, Marina did not become

responsible for the employment commitments of the latter. The rule on

this matter is well-settled. Nevertheless, we should not disregard

Paragraph 7, under which Marina expressly agreed to absorb the

employees of Metro as a condition of the permit granted by the PPA. In

fact, conformably to that stipulation, Marina did absorb the majority of

Metro's personnel, including some of its security force. This circumstance

modifies the general rule as far as this case is concerned and renders

pointless all debate on whether or not Metro's employees automatically

became Marina's employees. They did not, of course, following the

general rule; but they became so by virtue of Paragraph 7 of the terms

and conditions of the permit.

Decision

On July 19, 1986, the Philippine Ports Authority canceled its arrastre

management contract with Metro Port Services, Inc. and directly assumed

the cargo handling operations in the South Harbor of Manila.

Two days later, it awarded a permit to Marina Port Services to undertake

arrastre services in the same port, subject inter alia to the following

stipulation embodied in Paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions of the

said permit:

Labor and personnel of previous operator, except those

positions of trust and confidence, shall be absorbed by

grantee. Labor or employees benefits provided for under

existing CBA shall likewise be honored.

Marina retained the bulk of the 2,700-man personnel of Metro but refused

to continue the employment of 65 of the 123 persons constituting the

security force. The guards excluded were served with notices of

separation effective on various dates during the period from July 19 to

August 24, 1986. Their reaction was to file a complaint for illegal

dismissal and damages with the Department of Labor and Employment

on August 5, 1986. LexLib

After submission of position papers by the parties, Labor Arbiter

Crescencio R. Iniego held in favor of the complainants. In a decision

dated December 22, 1986, he ordered their reinstatement without loss of

seniority rights and payment of back salaries, moral and exemplary

damages and attorney's fees. 1

On October 30, 1987, his decision was affirmed by the respondent

National Labor Relations Commission except for the award of moral and

exemplary damages, which was deleted. 2 The motion for reconsideration

was denied on November 23, 1987. 3

The petitioner then came to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion

on the part of the public respondent. We issued a temporary restraining

order on January 6, 1988, 4and required comments from the respondents,

to which a reply was submitted, followed by a rejoinder and then a sur-

rejoinder. On October 10, 1988, we gave due course to the petition and

called for the submission of simultaneous memoranda, which were both

filed on February 13, 1989.

The petitioner contends specifically that: a) it had no pre-existing

employer-employee relationship with the private respondents; (b)

Paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions of the permit should be

interpreted by a court of law and not the NLRC; and c) Marina was not

obligated to re-hire the private respondents because it had no license to

maintain a security agency.

On the first issue, the petitioner contends that Metro and Marina are

entirely different entities; hence, the latter is not bound by the contracts

entered into by the former. The private respondents were employed by

Metro, not Marina. Marina did not even succeed Metro in the arrastre

operations because it derived its permit directly from the Philippine Ports

Authority after that office took over the said operations from Metro.

Consequently, the private respondents had no valid claim for

reinstatement against Marina.

The Court agrees that as a mere successor of Metro in the arrastre

operations in the South Harbor, Marina did not become responsible for

the employment commitments of the latter. The rule on this matter is

well-settled. 5 Nevertheless, we should not disregard Paragraph 7, under

which Marina expressly agreed to absorb the employees of Metro as a

condition of the permit granted by the PPA. In fact, conformably to that

stipulation, Marina did absorb the majority of Metro's personnel,

including some of its security force. This circumstance modifies the

general rule as far as this case is concerned and renders pointless all

debate on whether or not Metro's employees automatically became

Marina's employees. They did not, of course, following the general rule;

but they became so by virtue of Paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions

of the permit.

Did the absorbed employees include the private respondents?

The petitioner maintains that they had no right to be re-hired because they

were occupying positions of trust and confidence as members of the

security force and so came under the exception in Paragraph 7. In support

of this view, it cites the following excerpt from the decision in San

Miguel Corporation v. NLRC: 6

In Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Court of

Appeals (1 SCRA 1251), we held that where an

employee occupies a position of trust and confidence, as

where he is entrusted with confidential or delicate

matters, or where the custody, handling, or care and

protection of the employer's property, acts tending to

show untrustworthiness may constitute a just cause for

dismissal, or of loss of employer's confidence.

The above statement was mere obiter and not even

necessary for the determination of that case; and neither

was it intended as a categorical interpretation of the

phrase "trust and confidence." The reference to Lepanto

was for purposes of illustration only as that decision also

did not carry its own definition of the phrase in question.

The Court is therefore not limited by those cases in its

examination of when a position may be considered one

of trust and confidence, for the purpose at least of

determining the correct meaning of Paragraph 7. LLphil

As we see it, a strictly literal interpretation of the phrase

was not intended in Paragraph 7. On the contrary, we

feel that the reference intended was not to any employee

entrusted with the custody of company property but to a

higher category of employees not belonging to the rank-

and-file but holding managerial positions. As the

Solicitor General suggests:

The interpretation of the term trust and

confidence should be restricted to managerial

employees. Those who are vested with powers or

prerogatives to lay down management policies and or to

hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign

or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend

such managerial actions (Article 212(k), Labor Code of

the Philippines). The positions held by private

respondents (that of security services) which are by and

large limited to securing the employer's property as well

as its clients' property could hardly be considered as one

of trust and confidence under paragraph 7 of the

Additional Terms and Conditions of the Management

Contract. 7

To be sure, every employee must enjoy some degree of trust and

confidence from the employer as that is one reason why he was employed

in the first place. One certainly does not employ a person he distrusts.

Indeed, even the lowly janitor must enjoy that trust and confidence in

some measure if only because he is the one who opens the office in the

morning and closes it at night and in this sense is entrusted with the care

or protection of the employer's property. The keys he holds are the

symbol of that trust and confidence.

By the same token, the security guard must also be considered as

enjoying the trust and confidence of his employer, whose property he is

safeguarding. Like the janitor, he has access to this property. He too, is

charged with its care and protection.

Notably, however, and like the janitor again, he is entrusted only with

the physical task of protecting that property. The employer's trust and

confidence in him is limited to that ministerial function. He is not

entrusted, in the Labor Arbiter's words, "with the duties of safekeeping

and safeguarding company policies, management instructions, and

company secrets such as operation devices." He is not privy to these

confidential matters, which are shared only in the higher echelons of

management. It is the persons on such levels who, because they discharge

these sensitive duties, may be considered holding positions of trust and

confidence. The security guard does not belong in such category.

It follows that the Labor Arbiter did not err in interpreting Paragraph 7

and assuming jurisdiction over what is clearly a labor dispute involving

employer-employee relations.

Turning now to the alleged illegal dismissal of the private respondents,

we affirm first of all that loss of confidence is a valid ground for

dismissal under our labor laws. However, that ground, like any other

ground, must first be established in proper proceedings before an

employee can be lawfully dismissed. The following provisions in

the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, 8 which are here re-

stated as a reminder to all employers, prescribe the procedure to be

observed in any action of management against the employee:

Section 1.Security of tenure and due process. No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized

cause provided by law and after due process.

2.Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice

stating the particular acts or omission constituting the

grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of

work, the notice shall be served at the worker's last

known address. prLL

xxx xxx xxx

5.Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal

within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice.

The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity

to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of

his representative, if he so desires.

6.Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to

dismiss in stating clearly the reasons therefor.

The record shows that the above procedure was not followed by the

petitioner when it dismissed the private respondents. There was no

hearing conducted as required by the rules, only an alleged background

investigation that supposedly linked them to pilferages in the pier. No

charges were formally preferred against the private respondents nor

where they given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and

arbitrarily separated and served notices of termination in disregard of

their rights to due process and security of tenure.

The following pronouncements from this Court are appropriate:

Loss of confidence constitutes a just cause for

terminating an employer-employee relationship. But for

dismissal for loss of confidence to be warranted, there

should naturally be some basis for it. Unsupported by

sufficient proof, loss of confidence is without basis and

may not be successfully invoked as a ground for

dismissal. Loss of confidence as a ground for dismissal

has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse

by the employer of its prerogative, as it can easily be

subject to abuse because of its subjective nature.

The burden of proof rests upon the employer that the

dismissal is for cause, and the failure of the employer to

do so would mean that the dismissal is not justified. 9

xxx xxx xxx

Such a vague, all-encompassing pretext as loss of

confidence, if given the seal of approval by this Court,

could easily be utilized to reduce to a barren form of

words the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.

Precisely, the employee is afforded that protection so

that his means of livelihood is not placed at the mercy of

management. He is just as much a participant in the

industrial process. He is entitled to be considered as

such. Constitutional provisions protecting labor are in

line with the predominant thinking all over the world

safeguarding human dignity. It would then be to ignore

not only a mandate of the fundamental law but also a

counsel of wisdom and fair play to impart to the concept

of loss of confidence such a latitudinarian scope. What

matters the investigation undergone by private

respondent resulting in the affirmation of his innocence,

if thereafter management would just rely on an alleged

loss of confidence? . . ." (Central Textile Mills, Inc. vs.

NLRC, 90 SCRA 9; see also Acda v. Minister of Labor,

119 SCRA 306) 10

The argument that the petitioner could not re-hire the private respondents

because it had no license to operate a security agency must fall against

the admitted fact that it retained 56 of the security guards and later re-

hired two others even without the said license. The solution, at any rate,

was to secure the license if it was really necessary, not to dismiss some of

the security guards while retaining the others. prcd

It remains to say that if the petitioner distrusts the private respondents, it

may still seek to establish its lack of confidence and trust in them by

proving that ground for their dismissal at an investigation conducted in

accordance with the prescribed procedure. But before it can do so, it must

first reinstate all of them as among the personnel of the previous operator

to be absorbed by the grantee of the permit, conformably to its

commitment in the aforesaid Paragraph 7.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 30, 1987, is

AFFIRMED with the modification that the payment of back salaries shall

be limited to only three years. The temporary restraining order dated

January 6, 1986, is LIFTED. The petition is DENIED, with costs against

the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

2. Bernardo vs. Abalos

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a

criminal complaint against respondents for vote buying in violation of

Section 261, paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code

(OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 68

of the OEC. However, the said complaint was dismissed by the

COMELECEn Banc for insufficiency of evidence to establish a prima

facie case. Petitioners, without first submitting a motion for

reconsideration, filed the instant petition for certiorari with this Court.

The petition must fail. Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies

available to them at the COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not seek

a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as

required by Section 1, Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Petitioners' failure to file the required motion for reconsideration utterly

disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to achieve an orderly, just,

expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every

action and proceeding brought before the Commission."

Moreover, petitioners' complaint expressly stated that no supporting

affidavits were submitted by the complaining witnesses to sustain

their charge of vote buying. Suffice it to state that the absence of such

supporting affidavits showed the frailty of petitioners' complaint.

Indeed, it was vulnerable to dismissal.

BERNARDO vs. ABALOS

G.R. No. 137266. December 5, 2001.Sandoval-Gutierrez,

J.

FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of

Mandaluyong City and his son,Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a

candidate for city mayor of the same city for the May 1998

elections.Petitioners herein interposed that respondents

conducted an all-expense-free affair at a resort inQuezon

Province for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers,

registered voters of the saidcity and who are members of the

Board of Election Inspectors therein. The said affair wasalleged

to be staged as a political campaign for Abalos Jr., where his

political jingle was playedall throughout and his shirts being

worn by some participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr. also madean

offer and a promise then to increase the allowances of the

teachers. In this regard,petitioners filed a criminal complaint

with the COMELEC against Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote-

buying, further alleging that they conspired with their co-

respondents in violating theOmnibus Election Code. Pursuant to

the recommendation of the Director of the Law Departmentof the

COMELEC, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for

insufficiency of evidence.Hence, this petition for certiorari

.ISSUE: Whether the petition before the Supreme Court must be

given due course without thepetitioners first submitting a motion

for reconsideration before the COMELEC.

HELD: NO. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can

only be resorted to if there is noappeal, or any plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the

instantcase, it was said that filing of the motion for

reconsideration before the COMELEC is the mostexpeditious

and inexpensive recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was

intended to give theCOMELEC an opportunity to correct the

error imputed to it. As the petitioners then did notexhaust all the

remedies available to them at the COMELEC level, it was held

that their instantpetition is certainly premature. Significantly,

they have not also raised any plausible reason for their direct

recourse to the Supreme Court. As such, the instant petition was

ruled to fail

3. Industrial Enterprises vs CA

SYLLABUS

1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; BUREAU OF ENERGY

DEVELOPMENT (P.D. No. 1206); POWERS AND FUNCTIONS. For the Bureau of Energy Development, (BED), as the successor to the

Energy Development Board (abolished by Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated

6 October 1977) is tasked with the function of establishing a

comprehensive and integrated national program for the exploration,

exploitation, and development and extraction of fossil fuels, such as the

country's coal resources; adopting a coal development program;

regulating all activities relative thereto; and undertaking by itself or

through service contracts such exploitation and development, all in the

interest of an effective and coordinated development of extracted

resources. P.D. No. 1206 further provides that the powers and functions

of the defunct Energy Development Board relative to the implementation

of P.D. No. 972 on coal exploration and development have been

transferred to the BED, provided that coal operating contracts including

the transfer or assignment of interest in said contracts, shall require the

approval of the Secretary (Minister) of Energy (Sec. 12, P.D. No. 1206).

2.ID.; DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION; CONSTRUED. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine

of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the

special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the

Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which

means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if

the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized

skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because

technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief

must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy

will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper

jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It

applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes

into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of

issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the

special competence of an administrative body; in such case the judicial

process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative

body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352

U.S. 59, emphasis supplied).

3.ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of

what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity

should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a

technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in

possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial

Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning

activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and

extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial

judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when

apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the

primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

4.ID.; ID.; PURPOSE. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It

need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of

the BED are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose

behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.

"Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to an

administrative agency are secured, and the limited function of review by

the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort, for

ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues, to

agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight

gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure" (Far East

Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570).

D E C I S I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:

This petition seeks the review and reversal of the Decision of

respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 12660, 1 which ruled

adversely against petitioner herein. LibLex

Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating

contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development

(BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar.

Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for

another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal

blocks which, together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-

called "Giporlos Area."

IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the

country's over-all coal supply-demand balance . . . the logical coal

operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining

and Industrial corporation (MMIC), which was already developing the

coal deposit in another area (Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and

Giporlos Areas should be awarded to MMIC (Rollo, p. 37). Thus,

Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights

and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal

operating contract.

Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the

Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the then

Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the Regional Trial Court of

Makati, Branch 150, 2 alleging that MMIC took possession of the subject

coal blocks even before the Memorandum of Agreement was finalized

and approved by the BED; that MMIC discontinued work thereon; that

MMIC failed to apply for a coal operating contract for the adjacent coal

blocks; and that MMIC failed and refused to pay the reimbursements

agreed upon and to assume IEI's loan obligation as provided in the

Memorandum of Agreement (Rollo, p. 38). IEI also prayed that the

Energy Minister be ordered to approve the return of the coal operating

contract from MMIC to petitioner, with a written confirmation that said

contract is valid and effective, and, in due course, to convert said contract

from an exploration agreement to a development/production or

exploitation contract in IEI's favor.

Respondent, Philippine National Bank (PNB), was later impleaded as co-

defendant in an Amended Complaint when the latter with the

Development Bank of the Philippines effected extra-judicial foreclosures

on certain mortgages, particularly the Mortgage Trust Agreement, dated

13 July 1981, constituted in its favor by MMIC after the latter defaulted

in its obligation totalling around P22 million as of 15 July 1984.

The Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the case against the PNB

(Resolution, 21 September 1989).llcd

Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and

MMIC.

In a summary judgment, the Trial Court ordered the rescission of the

Memorandum of Agreement, declared the continued efficacy of the coal

operating contract in favor of IEI; ordered the reversion of the two coal

blocks covered by the coal operating contract; ordered BED to issue its

written affirmation of the coal operating contract and to expeditiously

cause the conversion thereof from exploration to development in favor of

IEI; directed BED to give due course to IEI's application for a coal

operating contract; directed BED to give due course to IEI's application

for three more coal blocks; and ordered the payment of damages and

rehabilitation expenses (Rollo, pp. 9-10).

In reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the rendition

of the summary judgment was not proper since there were genuine issues

in controversy between the parties, and more importantly, that the Trial

Court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under

Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide

controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of

coal blocks (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

Hence, this petition, to which we resolved to give due course and to

decide.

Incidentally, the records disclose that during the pendency of the appeal

before the Appellate Court, the suit against the then Minister of Energy

was dismissed and that, in the meantime, IEI had applied with the BED

for the development of certain coal blocks.

The decisive issue in this case is whether or not the civil court has

jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum

of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks. A

corollary question is whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in

holding that it is the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) which has

jurisdiction over said action and not the civil court.

While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be

an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the

Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a

coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to

develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the

reversion of the coal operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI

would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-

development and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all

coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the

rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of

the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of

the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy

of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to give

due course to IEI's application for three (3) more coal blocks. These are

matters properly falling within the domain of the BED. llcd

For the BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board

(abolished by Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated 6 October 1977) is tasked

with the function of establishing a comprehensive and integrated national

program for the exploration, exploitation, and development and

extraction of fossil fuels, such as the country's coal resources; adopting a

coal development program; regulating all activities relative thereto; and

undertaking by itself or through service contracts such exploitation and

development, all in the interest of an effective and coordinated

development of extracted resources.

Thus, the pertinent sections of P.D. No. 1206 provide:

"Sec. 6.Bureau of Energy Development. There is created

in the Department a Bureau of Energy Development,

hereinafter referred to in this Section as the Bureau,

which shall have the following powers and functions,

among others:

"a.Administer a national program for the

encouragement, guidance, and whenever

necessary, regulation of such business activity relative

to the exploration, exploitation, development, and

extraction of fossil fuels such as petroleum, coal, . . .

"The decisions, orders, resolutions or actions of the

Bureau may be appealed to the Secretary whose

decisions are final and executory unless appealed to the

President. (Emphasis supplied.)

That law further provides that the powers and functions of the defunct

Energy Development Board relative to the implementation of P.D. No.

972 on coal exploration and development have been transferred to the

BED, provided that coal operating contracts including the transfer or

assignment of interest in said contracts, shall require the approval of the

Secretary (Minister) of Energy (Sec. 12, P.D. No. 1206).

"Sec. 12.. . . the powers and functions transferred to the

Bureau of Energy Development are:

xxx xxx xxx

"ii.The following powers and functions of the Energy

Development Board under PD No. 910 . . .

"(1)Undertake by itself or through other arrangements,

such as service contracts, the active exploration,

exploitation, development, and extraction of energy

resources . . .

(2)Regulate all activities relative to the exploration,

exploitation, development, and extraction of fossil and

nuclear fuels . . . (P.D. No. 1206) (Emphasis supplied.)

P.D. No. 972 also provides:

"Sec. 8.Each coal operating contract herein authorized

shall . . . be executed by the Energy Development Board.

Considering the foregoing statutory provisions, the jurisdiction of the

BED, in the first instance, to pass upon any question involving the

Memorandum of Agreement between IEI and MMIC, revolving as its

does around a coal operating contract, should be sustained. Cdpr

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine

of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the

special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the

Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which

means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if

the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized

skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because

technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief

must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy

will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper

jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It

applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes

into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of

issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the

special competence of an administrative body; in such case the judicial

process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative

body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352

U.S. 59, emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case

since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed

and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said

areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative

agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The

Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning

activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and

extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial

judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when

apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the

primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency. LLjur

"One thrust of the multiplication of administrative

agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the

determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a

uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our

regular courts" (Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. National

Housing Authority, 153 SCRA 399, at 407).

The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not

call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until

after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and

determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.

"Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of

business entrusted to an administrative agency are

secured, and the limited function of review by the

judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary

resort, for ascertaining and interpreting the

circumstances underlying legal issues, to agencies that

are better equipped than courts by specialization, by

insight gained through experience, and by more flexible

procedure" (Far East Conference v. United States, 342

U.S. 570).

With the foregoing conclusion arrived at, the question as to the propriety

of the summary judgment rendered by the Trial Court becomes

unnecessary to resolve.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

4. GSIS vs CSC

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to review the order of the

Civil Service Commission(CSC) dated June 20, 1990 which

directed the Government Service Insurance System(GSIS) to pay

the compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio

Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up

to the date of their demise. TheOrder dated November 22, 1990,

however, denied herein petitioners motion for reconsideration of CSCs Order dated June 20, 1990. Deceased Elizar Namuco andEusebio Manuel were illegally dismissed by the GSIS for

allegedly being involved inirregularities in the canvass of supplies

and materials.Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission

has the power to execute its judgments, final orders or

resolutions?

Whether or not the writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is

void because itvaries with the Courts Resolution of July 4, 1988?

Ruling: The Civil Service Commission has the power to execute

its judgment, finalorders or resolutions. The CSC is a

constitutional commission invested by theConstitution and

relevant laws not only with the authority to administer the civil

service but is also vested with quasi-judicial powers. It has the

authority to hear and decideadministrative disciplinary cases

instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. Thegrant to a

tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power or the authority to hear

and adjudgecases, normally and logically is deemed to include the

grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus

renders unless the law otherwise provides. It is quiteobvious that

the authority to decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied

by theauthority to see that what has been decided is carried

out.The writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is valid. The

Court upholds thesame, simply because there is no fair and

feasible alternative in the circumstances. The binding force of

Resolution of July 4, 1988, for all intents and purposes, is that it

makesexoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition

precedent to payment of said back salaries, it can not however

exact an impossible performance or decree a uselessexercise such

as that the subsequent disciplinary proceedings is an empty, and

inutile procedure as to the deceased employees, they can not

possibly be bound by anysubstantiation in the said proceedings of

the abovementioned charges

5. Paat vs CA

FACTS

The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized

by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the driver

could not produce the required documents for the forest product found

concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the

confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private

respondents failed to submit required explanation. The DENR Regional

Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugans action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents

brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private

respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner

Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to

dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no

cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The

trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on

certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain

the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure

proceedings.

ISSUE Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the

doctrine.

HELD The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held

that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a

pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of

administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the

administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the

administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter

that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted

first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by

the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings

of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due

process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when

the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of the administrative

agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the

respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the

President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when

to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,

(8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject

matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does

not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are

circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for

the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture

proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended.

Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the

private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of

assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ

ordering the return of the truck.

6. Valmonte vs. Belmonte

Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June

1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the

opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able

to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs.

Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true

copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in

connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to

serious legal implications, President & General Manager

Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General

Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his

opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS

and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the

GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality;

and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this

confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986,

apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government

Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel,

Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure

to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do

whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our

desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June

1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo,

Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo

Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and

Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with

preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray

that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list

of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to

the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans

immediately before the February 7 election thru the

intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos;

and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the

documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow

petitioners access to the public records for the subject

information.

Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and

taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by

the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa

members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political

parties.

Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government

and its employees and the administrator of various insurance

programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds

assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of

PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service

Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay

the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable

to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the

obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or

guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS

is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in

strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations.

Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old

GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at

all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the

Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.] Consequently, as

Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to

grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the

public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the

end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured

government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were

Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves

appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to

be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the

greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above

board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the

GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make

the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and

concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship

exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a

policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination

of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting

the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents

subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based

merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle

policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not

what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy

issues are within the domain of the political branches of the

government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all

State power.

7. Mangubat vs. osmena

8. Pros. Tabao vs. Judge Lilagan

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Leo C. Tabao,

Assistant City Prosecutor of Tacloban, in his capacity as Regional

Chairman of the Region 8 Special Task Force on Environment and

Natural Resources, against (1) Judge Frisco T. Lilagan, presiding judge

of the Leyte Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, for gross ignorance of the

law, gross abuse of judicial authority, and willful disobedience to settled

jurisprudence; and (2) Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar of the Leyte RTC,

Office of the Clerk of Court, for gross irregularity in the performance of

official duties, giving unwarranted benefits to a private individual,

violation of Section 1(b) and (c) of P.D. No. 1829, and conduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

The records of this case reveal the following facts.

On February 24, 1998, a water craft registered under the name M/L

Hadija, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port area of Tacloban

City with a load of around 100 tons of tanbark. Due to previous irregular

and illegal shipments of tanbark from Bongao, agents of the National

Bureau of Investigation in Region 8 (NBI-EVRO #8) decided to verify

the shipments accompanying documents as the M/L Hadija was unloading its cargo to its consignee, a certain Robert Hernandez.

The NBI agents found the documents irregular and incomplete, and

consequently they ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. The

tanbark, the boat M/L Hadija, and three cargo trucks were seized and

impounded.

On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO #8 Regional Director Carlos S.

Caabay filed a criminal complaint for violation of Section 68 (now

Section 78) of P.D. No. 705,[1]

the Forestry Reform Code of the

Philippines (as amended), against the captain and crew of the M/L

Hadija, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, and

Marcial A. Dalimot. Bautista was a forester while Dalimot was a

Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in

Tacloban City. Bautista and Dalimot were, thus, also charged with

violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act,[2]

along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of

the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No.

98-296 at the Prosecutors Office of Tacloban City.

In an order dated March 6, 1998,[3]

complainant directed the seizure

by the DENR of the M/L Hadija, its cargo, and the three trucks pending

preliminary investigation of the case. DENR thus took possession of the

aforesaid items on March 10, 1998, with notice to the consignee Robert

Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director.

On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the Regional Trial Court of

Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR. The

case was raffled off to Branch 34 of said court and docketed as Civil Case

No. 98-03-42.

On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S.

No. 98-296. On March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were

conducted by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office

(PENRO)-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.

On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan

issued a writ of replevin and directed respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V.

Aguilar to take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to

deliver them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days.[4]

Respondent

sheriff served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in

Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March 19, 1998.

Thus, the filing of this administrative complaint against respondents

via a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by

Atty. Tabao.

Complainant avers that replevin is not available where the properties

sought to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings for illegal

logging. He points out that this is a well-settled issue and cites several

decisions[5]

of this Court and the Court of Appeals on the matter. He

argues that respondent judge should have known of the existing

jurisprudence on this issue, particularly since they are subject to

mandatory judicial notice per Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of

Court.

Complainant submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant

of the law and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them. But he avers

that it is respondent judges duty to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence.

Complainant claims that respondent judge cannot claim ignorance of

the proceedings in I.S. No. 98-296 for the following reasons: (1) the

defendants in the replevin case were all DENR officers, which should

have alerted respondent judge to the possibility that the items sought to

be recovered were being held by the defendants in their official

capacities; and (2) the complaint for replevin itself states that the items

were intercepted by the NBI for verification of supporting documents,

which should have made respondent judge suspect that the same were

being held by authority of law.

As regards respondent sheriff Leonardo V. Aguilar, complainant

states that it was incumbent upon Aguilar to safeguard the M/L Hadija

and prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served

a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard. However, on

March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through

respondent sheriffs gross negligence or his direct connivance with interested parties, according to complainant. As of the time of the filing

of the complaint, according to complainant, the whereabouts of the vessel

and its crew were unknown.

Moreover, complainant points out that respondent sheriff released

the seized tanbark to Hernandez on March 20 and 21, 1998, or within the

five-day period that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the

writ. Complainant argues that the tanbark formed part of the peoples evidence in the criminal complaint against Hernandez and the others. By

his act, respondent sheriff effectively altered, suppressed, concealed, or

destroyed the integrity of said evidence. For this act, complainant

contends that respondent sheriff may be held liable under Section 1(b) of

P.D. 1829, Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of

Criminal Offenders.[6]

Respondent sheriffs acts also constitute gross irregularity in the performance of his duty as a court employee.

Complainant notes that respondent sheriff was absent from his office

from March 20 to March 24, 1998. This period included the dates he was

supposed to have released the tanbark to Hernandez. Complainant

contends that respondent sheriff not only unlawfully released the tanbark,

he also made it appear that he was not physically present when such act

was done.

In separate indorsements dated September 9, 1998, then Court

Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred this administrative matter to

both respondents for comment.

In his comment dated October 12, 1998,[7]

respondent judge calls the

attention of the Office of the Court Administrator to a pending motion to

dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case that effectively

prevented him from commenting on the issue. The discussions that

would have to be included in the comment, he says, would also resolve

the pending motion to dismiss. Respondent judge contends that

complainant should have been prudent enough to wait for the resolution

of the motion to dismiss before filing the instant administrative case.

Respondent judge claims that he was unaware of the existence of I.S.

No. 98-296. He only learned of the criminal case from an urgent

manifestation dated March 20, 1998, filed by complainant. He argues

that he issued an order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to

Hernandez of possession of the subject items, pending resolution of the

urgent manifestation.

Respondent judge stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in

strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule 60 of the

Revised Rules of Court. He also points out that said writ was issued

provisionally and was not intended to be the final disposition of the

replevin case.

Respondent judge avers that the charge of gross ignorance of the law

is premature since he has not made a ruling yet on the motion to dismiss

filed in the replevin case. He contends that it was too much to ask from

him to take note of the fact that the defendants in said case were officials

of DENR and make assumptions based on such fact. Moreover,

respondent judge submits that while the complaint alleged that the cargo

of tanbark was intercepted by the NBI, it also alleged that the consignee

thereof produced documents to prove that the shipment was legal.

In conclusion, respondent judge points out that no apprehension

report was issued by the NBI regarding the shipment. Neither did the

DENR issue a seizure report. Respondent judge contends that the

validity of the seizure of the subject items by the DENR is a matter that

will have to be resolved in relation to the motion to dismiss.

For his part, respondent sheriff submits[8]

that he served the writ of

replevin on the Coast Guard precisely to prevent the departure of the

subject vessel, since he does not have the means to physically prevent

said vessel from sailing. The Coast Guard commander should have

examined the vessel and its crew after being served the writ, to determine

whether or not they were engaged in any illegal activity.

Respondent sheriff narrates that no cargo was on board the vessel

when he served the writ on the Coast Guard. He verified the cargos status with DENR, which furnished him a copy of a fax transmission

stating that the tanbark came from legitimate sources except that the

shipment documents were not in order.[9]

Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve

the writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary. He argues

further that since the items subject of the writ are in the custody of the

court and could be disposed of only through court order, there could not

be any unwarranted benefit to a private individual as claimed by

complainant.

Noting that the questioned shipment of tanbark was not covered by

either an NBI apprehension report or a DENR seizure report, respondent

sheriff contends that complainant should have taken steps to protect the

integrity of the shipment instead of heaping blame upon others for his

own negligence. Respondent sheriff avers that it was not his intention to

obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, contrary

to complainants claim.

Respondent sheriff refutes complainants claim that he was absent from his office from March 20 to March 24, 1998, and alleges that it was

complainant who was absent from court hearings on several occasions, in

violation of his duty as a prosecutor.

Respondent submitted two supplemental comments dated October

30, 1998,[10]

and May 3, 1999,[11]

(1) reiterating his contention that the

tanbark seized by the DENR and subject of the replevin case had been

found to come from a legitimate source, per an order signed by the

Regional Director (Region 8) of the DENR,[12]

and (2) informing the

OCA that the main replevin case was dismissed per an order of

respondent judge dated November 27, 1998.[13]

As required by resolution of the Court dated January 24, 2001, the

parties herein separately manifested that they are willing to have the

present case resolved based on the record on hand.

We note that in its report dated April 8, 1999, the OCA, after

reviewing the case, recommended that respondent judge be fined in the

amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. At the same time,

the OCA recommended that the charges against respondent sheriff be

dismissed for lack of merit.

The recommendation of the OCA is well taken, except for the

amount of the fine to be imposed on said respondent judge.

The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark

as well as the vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for

verification of supporting documents.[14]

It also states that the NBI turned

over the seized items to the DENR for official disposition and appropriate action.[15] A copy of the document evidencing the turnover to DENR was attached to the complaint as Annex D.[16] To our mind, these allegations would have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that

the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative

proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the

shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take

cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special

competence.[17]

Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks

to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the

administrative remedies available to him.[18]

The prudent thing for

respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.

Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR

secretary or his authorized representatives may order the confiscation of

forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or

abandoned, including the conveyances used in the commission of the

offense.

In this regard, we declared in Paat v. Court of Appeals:

the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the

primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR

should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to

determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The

assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by

private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the

domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the

authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially

lodged with an administrative body of special competence. xxx[19]

Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the

standard set forth in Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,

that a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and

independence. To measure up to this standard, judges are expected to

keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence.[20]

Judges are duty

bound to have more than just a cursory acquaintance with laws and

jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross

ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a

judge.[21]

We find, however, that respondent judge had already vacated the

Writ of Seizure he issued on March 19, 1998, in a subsequent Order

dated November 27, 1998, dismissing the Civil Complaint for replevin

filed by Robert Hernandez against the Regional Director of the DENR

and other officers. He also directed in said order the sheriff to return to

CENRO, Tacloban City, all the chattels confiscated by virtue of the Writ

of Seizure.[22]

Further, we find that Sheriff Aguilar in his Final Return of the Writ,

dated December 15, 1998, had already delivered to CENRO the 102 tons

and 120 kilos of tanbark duly receipted by CENRO representative

Marcial A. Dalimot on the same date.[23]

The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined in the amount

of P15,000.00. Under the circumstances, considering that this is the first

complaint against him, we deem a fine of P10,000.00 to be sufficient.

Regarding the charges against respondent sheriff, we agree with the

OCA that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied

with his ministerial duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to

execute it promptly in accordance with its mandates.[24]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan is hereby found

liable for gross ignorance of the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a

FINE of P10,000.00, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a

similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The complaint against

respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

9. Arrow transportation vs BOT

FACTS Petitioner Arrow and private respondent Sultan are both domestic

corporations. Petitioner is a holder of a Certificate of Public Convenience

to operate a public utility bus. Private respondent applied for the issuance

of a CPC to operate a similar service. Without the required publication,

public respondent Board granted a provisional permit to operate.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration and cancellation of the provisional

permit. Before resolution of the motion, petitioner filed for herein petition

arguing that there must be publication before a provisional permit can be

issued, with reference made to PD 101, which authorized the Board to

grant provisional permits when warranted.

ISSUE Whether or not the issuance of the provisional permit was legal.

HELD

The Court held in the affirmative. For a provisional permit to

operate a public utility, an ex parte hearing would suffice. The decisive

consideration is the existence of public need. That was shown in this

case, respondent Board, on the basis of demonstrable data, being satisfied

of the pressing necessity for the grant of the provisional permit sought.

Petition dismissed.

10. Kbmpbm vs Dominguez

11. National development corp. vs hervilla

12. Atlas consolidated mining vs factoran

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside the decision

rendered by public respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S.

Factoran, Jr., by authority of the President, reinstating and confirming the

decision dated April 17, 1978 of the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences,

and setting aside the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources.

The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:

On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development

Corporation registered the location of its "Master VII Fr." mining claim

with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City. On September 10, 1973,

private respondent Asterio Buqueron registered the declarations of

location of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the

same Mining Recorder. On October 15, 1973, Atlas registered the

declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with the

same Mining Recorder.

Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the

survey plans thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines and

Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application was published in

the February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post.

During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim

against private respondent's mining claims on the ground that they

allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.

After hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, dated April 17,

1978, the dispositive portion of which reads:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING,

respondent (Buqueron) is hereby given the preferential

right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and operate the

areas covered by his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr."

mining claims, except the area covered thereby which is in

conflict with adverse claimant's (Atlas) "Master VII Fr."

Adverse claimant (Atlas) on the other hand, is given the

preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and

operate the area covered by its "Master VII Fr." case.

Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources who rendered a

decision dated November 10, 1978, the dispositive portion of which reads

as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the derision of the Director

of Mines dated April 17, 1978, should be, as hereby it is,

set aside. In lieu thereof, it is hereby decision that the "St.

Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims of Asterio

Buqueron are null and void, that the "Carmen I Fr. " to

"Carmen V. Fr. " mining claims of Atlas Consolidated

Mining and Development Corporation are valid, and that it

be given the preferential right to possesses, explore,

exploit, lease and operate the areas covered thereby.

(Decision, Office of the President; Rollo, pp. 52-57;

Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, Rollo, pp.

47-51; Comment of Public Respondent, Rollo, pp. 88-90;

Decision, Director of Mines, Rollo, pp. 157-160).

As aforestated, on further appeal, the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office

of the President, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural

Resources and reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines and Geo

Sciences.

Hence, this petition.

Briefly stated, petitioner's assignment of errors may be combined into the

following issues:

(1) Whether or not private respondent's appeal to the

Office of the President was time-barred;

(2) Whether or not there was a valid location and

discovery of the disputed mining claims.

The Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the

petition, required respondents to comment in the resolution of October 6,

1986 (Rollo, p. 76). Both private respondent and public respondent filed

their respective comments on November 17, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 81-86; pp.

88-95).

On December 8, 1986 (Rollo, p. 104) this Court required the respondents

to file a rejoinder to the consolidated reply filed by counsel for petitioner

dated November 4, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 97-102). Said rejoinder was filed on

February 6, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 108-111), by the Solicitor General for public

respondent, after which petitioner filed a sur-rejoinder thereto on March

13, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 113-116). Thereafter the Court in the resolution of

March 30, 1987 gave due course to the petition and required both parties

to file their respective memoranda.

Counsel for public respondent filed a Manifestation/Motion praying to be

allowed to adopt its comment dated November 2, 1986 and Rejoinder

dated February 4, 1987 as the memorandum for public respondent.

Petitioner filed its memorandum on May 25,1987 (Rollo, p. 136).

The petition is devoid of merit.

I.

It is not disputed that private respondent received a copy of the decision

of the Minister of Natural Resources dated November 10, 1978 on

November 27, 1978 and that under Section 50 of Presidential Decree No.

463, the decision of the Minister is appealable to the Office of the

President within five (5) days from receipt thereof. In the case at bar, the

5-day period expired on December 2, 1978, a Saturday, private

respondent filed his appeal on December 4, 1978, a Monday.

Petitioner contends that the appeal was filed out of time and therefore, the

Office of the President did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and

should have dismissed the same outright (Rollo, pp. 20-21).

This contention is untenable.

Petitioner and private respondent are in accord on the fact that at the time

of the filing of the questioned appeal, Saturday was observed as a legal

holiday in the Office of the President pursuant to Section 29 of the

Revised Administrative Code as amended.

The same law provides:

Section 31. Pretermission of holiday. Where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law

falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next

succeeding business day.

Apart from the fact that the law is clear and needs no interpretation, this

Court in accordance therewith has invariably held that in case the last day

for doing an act is a legal holiday, it does not have the effect of making

the preceding day, the last day for doing the same; the act may be done

on the next succeeding business day (Gonzaga vs. Ce David, 110 Phil.

463-464 [1960]; Calano vs. Cruz, 91 Phil. 247 [1952]; Austria, et al. vs.

The Solicitor General, et al., 71 Phil. 288 [1941]).

Coming back to the case at bar, as the next working day after December

2,1978 was December 4, 1978 a Monday, it is evident that private respondent's appeal was filed on time.

II.

It is apparent that the second issue as to whether or not there was a valid

location and discovery of the disputed mining claims is a question of fact

best left to the determination of the administrative bodies charged with

the implementation of the law they are entrusted to enforce. As uniformly

held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are

supported by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings

of fact are not shown to be unsupported by evidence. Substantial

evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact,

and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Ang Tibay vs. Court

of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission vs. Lood,

127 SCRA 762 [1984]).

In the case at bar, the record amply shows that the Director of Mines'

decision was supported by substantial evidence.

Petitioner claimed that it is a registered surface land owner and locator of

six (6) lode claims duly registered with the Office of the Mining Recorder

as above stated and that in derogation of its permission, caused the

"table" location and survey and applied for the lease of his alleged mining

claims known as "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr. " lode claims.

In his answer, private respondent denied the material allegations of the

adverse claim and by way of affirmative defense alleged that all of

petitioner's claims including a portion of Master VII Fr. are null and void

for having been located in areas which were closed to mining location in

open and gross violation of paragraph 1 (d) of Section 28 and of Section

60 of the Mining Act as amended.

The main thrust of petitioner's claim is that all of the mining claims of

both petitioner and private respondent are located inside the premises or

properties of the former, so that it is hardly possible for private

respondent to have conducted the requisite location and survey without

having been seen or noticed by petitioner and its personnel.

The Director of Mines established that there is in fact an overlapping of

mining claims of petitioner and private respondent and that as a matter of

record petitioner's mining claims were registered subsequent to those of

private respondent with the exception of Master VII Fr. which was

registered on February 9, 1972 or prior to the registration of the mining

claims of private respondent.

In ruling as to who, between the parties shall be given preferential right to

lease the area in question, the Director of Mines' findings are as follows:

Adverse claimant in its attempt to impugn the validity of

the mining claims of respondent alleged that said mining

claims were the result of table locations and survey and in

support thereof submitted the sworn statements of its

Chief Geologist and Chief Security.

On the other hand, respondent asserted that he, through his

authorized representative actually and validly performed

all the acts of discovery and location required by law and

the field survey of his mining claims was actually

conducted by Geodetic Engineer Salvador Aligaen from

December 16 to 18, 1974. In support of this assertion,

respondent submitted in evidence affidavit of the

authorized agent (Annex "D" of the answer) and another

affidavit of Geodetic Engineer Salvador Aligaen (Annex

"F" of the answer). Respondent also submitted in evidence

Bureau of Forestry map and Bureau of Coast and Geodetic

Survey map of the total area (Exhs. "9" to "10") which

embraces the area in question. These maps tend to prove

that the Atlas main gate is not the only point of ingress and

egress such that one can enter the area in question for the

purpose of mining location and survey without being

noticed by any of the personnel of Atlas.

After a careful appraisal of the evidence submitted, and

cognizance as we are of the provisions of Presidential

Decree No. 99-A, we are of the view that adverse claimant

failed to adduce sufficient evidence to nullify the prior

claims of respondent. Stated differently, the evidence

submitted are not sufficient to destroy the prima

facie character of the sworn declarations of location of

respondent's mining claims which were duly registered on

the date herein before stated. Thus "A location notice

certificate or statement when re-examine accorded

is prima facie evidence of all the facts the statute requires

it to contain and which were sufficiently set forth" (40 C.J.

pp. 811-812) and constitute notice to all persons and to the

whole world of the contents of the same (Sec. 56 of the

Mining Act, as amended).

It is, therefore, pertinent to quote hereunder Sections 28(d)

and 60 of the Mining Act, as amended, as well as Section

1 of Presidential Decree No. 99-A:

SEC. 28 No Prospecting shall be allowed:

(d)-In lands which have

been located for mining

leases by other prospectors

under the provisions of this

Act.

SEC. 60. No valid mining claim or any part

thereof, may be located by

others until the original

locator or his successors in

interest abandons the claim

or forfeits his rights on the

same under the provisions of

this Act.

SEC. 1 Whenever there is any conflict between claim

owners over any mining

claims whether mineral or

non-mineral, the locator of

the claim who first

registered his claim with the

proper mining registrar,

notwithstanding any defect

in form or technicality, shall

have the exclusive right to

possess, exploit, explore,

develop and operate such

mining claims. ...

In the light of the aforequoted provisions of

law applicable on the matter, and in view of

our findings, earlier discussed, the

subsequent mining claims of adverse

claimant insofar as they conflict the prior

claims of respondent are hereby declared

nun and void.

On the other hand, it is also our view that

respondent failed to adduce sufficient

evidence to prove that the prior claim of

adverse claimant (Master VII Fr.) is null

and void. Considering that this mining

claim is prior in point of location and

registration, it follows that this claim will

have to prevail over that of respondent. For

the same reason, therefore, that the

subsequent claims of adverse claimant were

declared null and void insofar as they

conflict with the prior claims of respondent,

the mining claims of respondent insofar as

they conflict with "Master VII Fr." claim of

adverse claimant are likewise declared null

and void. (Decision, Director of Mines;

rollo pp. 157-160).

As earlier stated the above findings, although reversed by the Minister of

Natural Resources, were affirmed by the Office of the President.

However, petitioner would have this Court look into the said findings

because of the open divergence of views and findings by the adjudicating

authorities in this mining conflict involving highly contentious issues

which warrant appellate review (Rollo, p. 18).

This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an

administrative official is of course subject to certain guide posts laid

down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such

decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but

review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or

mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative

proceeding (L-21588-Atlas Development and Acceptance Corp. vs.

Gozon, etc. et al., 64 O.G. 11511 [1967]), where the procedure which led

to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or

when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is

manifest (Ateneo de Manila University vs. CA, 145 SCRA 100-101

[1986]; International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines vs.

Leogardo, 117 SCRA 967; Baguio Country Club Corporation vs.

National Labor Relations Commission, 118 SCRA 557; Sichangco vs.

Commissioner of Immigration, 94 SCRA 61; and Eusebio vs. Sociedad

Agricola de Balarin, 16 SCRA 569).

A careful study of the records shows that none of the above

circumstances is present in the case at bar, which would justify the

overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines which were

affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance

with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions,

the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as

if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that was

not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of

fact in this case must be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be

disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if

not overwhelming or preponderant (Police Commission vs. Lood, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DENIED and the

assailed decision of the Office of the President, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

13. Carpio vs exe. Sec In 1990, RA 6975 entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES was passed. Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution,

assailed the constitutionality of the said law for he figured that it only

interferes with the control power of the president. He advances the

view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission by

limiting its power to administrative control over the PNP thus,

control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over

the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.

HELD: The President has control of all executive departments,

bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the

executive branch of government extends over all executive officers

from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted,

as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in

person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet

members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single

executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various

executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief

Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required

by the Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the

situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive

and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by

and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries

of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular

course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief

Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and

by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their

respective jurisdictions in the executive department. Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are

placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative

realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and

cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated

law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under

the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized

by the national government.

14. Heirs of eugenio vs roxas

15. Industrial power sales vs sinsuat

NARVASA, J.:

Certain universally accepted axioms govern judicial review through the

extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of determinations of

administrative officers or agencies: first, that before said actions may be

entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that all the

administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been

exhausted; and second, that the administrative de