Cases - Individual Rights

7/25/2019 Cases - Individual Rights

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e/ecutive o7cial, the ma2ority deemed the di erence of no consequence, since inorder to avoid a contempt citation, the newspaper would have to clear futurepublications in advance with the 2udge. 3n other similar cases, the doctrine of priorrestraint was frowned upon by the @. . Court as it struc5 down loosely drawnstatutes and ordinances requiring licenses to hold meetings and parades and to

distribute literature, with uncontrolled discretion in the licensor whether or not toissue them, and as it voided other restrictions on First "mendment rights. !henthere came the doctrine that prior licensing or permit systems were held to beconstitutionally valid so long as the discretion of the issuing o7cial is limited toquestions of times, places and manners. "nd in ew Por5 !imes Company v. @nited

tates, )H( @. . K%(. $%DK%&, the same Court, applying the doctrine of prior restraintfrom ear, considered the claims that the publication of the entagon apersconcerning the Aietnam Ear would interfere with foreign policy and prolong the wartoo speculative. 3t held that such claim could not overcome the strong presumptionagainst prior restraints. Clearly, content-based prior restraint is highly abhorred inevery 2urisdiction.

ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; "ny action of the government by means of whichit might prevent free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutelyessential to prepare the people for an intelligent e/ercise of their rights as citi<ens.

"nother ob2ectionable portion of the !C6s ress :elease is the warning that it willnot hesitate to apply with full force the provisions of the Circulars and theiraccompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations and theirowners1operators. !his is a threat of a subsequent punishment, an equally abhorredform of censorship. !his should not also be countenanced. 3t must be stressed thatthe evils to be prevented are not the censorship of the press merely, but any actionof the government by means of which it might prevent such free and generaldiscussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for

an intelligent e/ercise of their rights as citi<ens. !here is logic in the proposition thatthe liberty of the press will be rendered a 0moc5ery and a delusion? if, while everyman is at liberty to publish what he pleases, the public authorities mightnevertheless punish him for harmless publications. 3n this regard, the fear ofsubsequent punishment has the same e ect as that of prior restraint.

ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; !o prevent the airing of the arci !apes on thepremise that their contents may or may not be true is not a valid reason for itssuppression. !o prevent the airing of the arci !apes on the premise that theircontents may or may not be true is not a valid reason for its suppression. 3n ew Por5 !imes v. ullivan, (K+ @. . '*) $%D+)&, Gustice Eilliam 9rennan, Gr. states thatthe authoritative interpretation of the First "mendment guarantees haveconsistently refused to recogni<e an e/ception for any test of truth whetheradministered by 2udges, 2urists, or administrative o7cials and especially not onethat puts the burden of proving truth on the spea5er. e stressed that 0theconstitutional protection does not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility ofthe ideas and belief which are o ered.? >oreover, the fact that the tapes wereobtained through violation of the "ntiEiretapping Law does not ma5e the broadcastmedia privy to the crime. 3t must be stressed that it was a government o7cial whoinitially released the arci !apes, not the media.

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ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; :ight to 3nformation; u rage; !he right of thepeople to 5now matters pertaining to the integrity of the election process is ofparamount importance election is a sacred instrument of democracy. !he right ofthe people to 5now matters pertaining to the integrity of the election process is ofparamount importance. 3t cannot be sideswiped by the mere speculation that a

public disturbance will ensue. =lection is a sacred instrument of democracy. !hroughit, we choose the people who will govern us. Ee entrust to them our businesses, ourwelfare, our children, our lives. Certainly, each one of us is entitled to 5now how itwas conducted. Ehat could be more disheartening than to learn that there e/ists atape containing conversations that compromised the integrity of the electionprocess. !he doubt will forever hang over our heads, doubting whether those whosit in government are legitimate o7cials. 3n matters such as these, leaving thepeople in dar5ness is not an alternative course. eople ought to 5now the truth. Pes,the airing of the arci !apes may have serious impact, but this is not a valid basisfor suppressing it. "s Gustice 4ouglas e/plained in his concurring opinion in the ew Por5 !imes, 0the dominant purpose of the First "mendment was to prohibit thewidespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. "debate of large proportions goes in the nation over our posture in Aietnam. Opendebate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health.?

ame; ame; ame; !he struggle for freedom of e/pression is as ancient as thehistory of censorship from the ancient time when ocrates was poisoned for hisunorthodo/ views to the more recent >artial Law :egime in our country, the lessonlearned is that censorship is the biggest obstacle to human progress. 9ur5e oncecalled the ress the Fourth =state in the arliament. !his is because its ability toinBuence public opinion made it an important source in the governance of a nation.3t is considered one of the foundations of a democratic society. One sign of itsimportance is that when a tyrant ta5es over a country, his 8rst act is to mu<<le the

press. Courts should therefore be wary in resolving cases that has implication on thefreedom of the press to the end that the freedom will never be curtailed absent arecogni<ed and valid 2usti8cation. 3n 8ne let it be said that the struggle for freedomof e/pression is as ancient as the history of censorship. From the ancient time when

ocrates was poisoned for his unorthodo/ views to the more recent >artial Law:egime in our country, the lesson learned is that censorship is the biggest obstacleto human progress. Let us not repeat our sad history. Let us not be victims againnow and in the future.

C": 3O,G., eparate Concurring Opinion#

Freedom of =/pression; Chilling = ect rinciple; Gudicial :eview; Locus tandi; FacialChallenges; Ehen the issue involves freedom of e/pression, any citi<en has theright to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action inviolation of freedom of e/pression, whether or not the government action is directedat such citi<en the government action may chill into silence those to whom theaction is directed. etitioner has standing to 8le this petition. Ehen the issueinvolves freedom of e/pression, as in the present case, any citi<en has the right tobring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action in violation of

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freedom of e/pression, whether or not the government action is directed at suchciti<en. !he government action may chill into silence those to whom the action isdirected. "ny citi<en must be allowed to ta5e up the cudgels for those who havebeen cowed into inaction because freedom of e/pression is a vital public right thatmust be defended by everyone and anyone. Freedom of e/pression, being

fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is oftranscendental importance that must be defended by every patriotic citi<en at theearliest opportunity. Ee have held that any concerned citi<en has standing to raisean issue of transcendental importance to the nation, and petitioner in this presentpetition raises such issue.

ame; Freedom of e/pression is an indispensable condition to the e/ercise of almostall other civil and political rights; Freedom of e/pression provides a civili<ed way ofengagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnic opponents for if onecannot use his tongue to argue, he might use his 8st instead. Freedom ofe/pression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom ofe/pression is an indispensable condition to the e/ercise of almost all other civil and

political rights. o society can remain free, open and democratic without freedom of e/pression. Freedom of e/pression guarantees full, spirited, and even contentiousdiscussion of all social, economic and political issues. !o survive, a free anddemocratic society must <ealously safeguard freedom of e/pression. Freedom ofe/pression allows citi<ens to e/pose and chec5 abuses of public o7cials. Freedom of e/pression allows citi<ens to ma5e informed choices of candidates for public o7ce.Freedom of e/pression crystalli<es important public policy issues, and allowsciti<ens to participate in the discussion and resolution of such issues. Freedom ofe/pression allows the competition of ideas, the clash of claims and counterclaims,from which the truth will li5ely emerge. Freedom of e/pression allows the airing ofsocial grievances, mitigating sudden eruptions of violence from marginali<ed groups

who otherwise would not be heard by government. Freedom of e/pression providesa civili<ed way of engagement among political, ideological, religious or ethnicopponents for if one cannot use his tongue to argue, he might use his 8st instead.

ame; rior :estraint; Content-9ased :egulations; !he e/ceptions, when e/pressionmay be sub2ect to prior restraint, apply in this 2urisdiction to only four categories ofe/pression, namely# pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy ofimminent lawless action, and danger to national security all other e/pression is notsub2ect to prior restraint; =/pression not sub2ect to prior restraint is protectede/pression or high-value e/pression, and any content-based prior restraint onprotected e/pression is unconstitutional without e/ception. !he e/ceptions, whene/pression may be sub2ect to prior restraint, apply in this 2urisdiction to only fourcategories of e/pression, namely# pornography, false or misleading advertisement,advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security. "ll othere/pression is not sub2ect to prior restraint. "s stated in !urner 9roadcasting ystemv. Federal Communication Commission, *%' @. . +'' $%DD)&, 0 !Jhe First"mendment $Free peech Clause&, sub2ect only to narrow and well understoode/ceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content ofmessages e/pressed by private individuals.? =/pression not sub2ect to priorrestraint is protected e/pression or high-value e/pression. "ny content-based prior

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restraint on protected e/pression is unconstitutional without e/ception. " protectede/pression means what it says it is absolutely protected from censorship. !hus,there can be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal ofe/isting laws, on the rati8cation of treaties, on the imposition of new ta/ measures,or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.

ame; ame; Ehile only unprotected e/pression may be sub2ect to prior restraint,any such prior restraint on unprotected e/pression must hurdle a high barrier 8rst,such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional, and, second, the governmentbears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.=/pression that may be sub2ect to prior restraint is unprotected e/pression or low-value e/pression. 9y de8nition, prior restraint on unprotected e/pression is content-based since the restraint is imposed because of the content itself. 3n this 2urisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected e/pression thatmay be sub2ect to prior restraint. !his Court recogni<ed false or misleadingadvertisement as unprotected e/pression only in October 'HHK. Only unprotectede/pression may be sub2ect to prior restraint. owever, any such prior restraint on

unprotected e/pression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint ispresumed unconstitutional. econd, the government bears a heavy burden ofproving the constitutionality of the prior restraint. Courts will sub2ect to strictscrutiny any government action imposing prior restraint on unprotected e/pression. !he government action will be sustained if there is a compelling tate interest, andprior restraint is necessary to protect such tate interest. 3n such a case, the priorrestraint shall be narrowly drawn only to the e/tent necessary to protect or attainthe compelling tate interest.

ame; ame; ubsequent unishment; Ehile there can be no prior restraint onprotected e/pression, such e/pression may be sub2ect to subsequent punishment,either civilly or criminally; imilarly, if the unprotected e/pression does not warrantprior restraint, the same e/pression may still be sub2ect to subsequent punishment.

Ehile there can be no prior restraint on protected e/pression, such e/pressionmay be sub2ect to subsequent punishment, either civilly or criminally. !hus, thepublication of election surveys cannot be sub2ect to prior restraint, but an aggrievedperson can sue for redress of in2ury if the survey turns out to be fabricated. "lso,while "rticle 'H% $'&$b&$(& of the :evised enal Code punishing 0shows which o endany race or religion? cannot be used to 2ustify prior restraint on religious e/pression,this provision can be invo5ed to 2ustify subsequent punishment of the perpetrator of such o ensive shows. imilarly, if the unprotected e/pression does not warrant priorrestraint, the same e/pression may still be sub2ect to subsequent punishment,civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected e/pression. owever, if the e/pression cannot be sub2ect to the lesser restriction of subsequentpunishment, logically it cannot also be sub2ect to the more severe restriction of priorrestraint. !hus, since profane language or 0hate speech? against a religious minorityis not sub2ect to subsequent punishment in this 2urisdiction, such e/pression cannotbe sub2ect to prior restraint.

ame; ame; rior :estraint; arci !apes; u rage; !he public airing of the arci !apes is a protected e/pression because it does not fall under any of the four

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e/isting categories of unprotected e/pression recogni<ed in this 2urisdiction it isessentially a political e/pression because it e/poses that a presidential candidatehad allegedly improper conversations with a CO>=L=C Commissioner right after theclose of voting in the last presidential elections; 3f ever there is a hierarchy ofprotected e/pressions, political e/pression would occupy the highest ran5, and

among di erent 5inds of political e/pression, the sub2ect of fair and honest electionswould be at the top. !he public airing of the arci !apes is a protected e/pressionbecause it does not fall under any of the four e/isting categories of unprotectede/pression recogni<ed in this 2urisdiction. !he airing of the arci !apes is essentiallya political e/pression because it e/poses that a presidential candidate had allegedlyimproper conversations with a CO>=L=C Commissioner right after the close ofvoting in the last presidential elections. Obviously, the content of the arci !apesa ects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. ublic discussion on the sanctity of theballot is indisputably a protected e/pression that cannot be sub2ect to priorrestraint. ublic discussion on the credibility of the electoral process is one of thehighest political e/pressions of any electorate, and thus deserves the utmostprotection. 3f ever there is a hierarchy of protected e/pressions, political e/pressionwould occupy the highest ran5, and among di erent 5inds of political e/pression,the sub2ect of fair and honest elections would be at the top. 3n any event, publicdiscussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wideopen.

ame; ame; ame; ame; "nti-Eiretapping "ct $:.". o. )'HH&; !he allegedviolation of the "nti-Eiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a priorrestraint on the airing of the arci !apes because the Constitution e/presslyprohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes anti-wiretapping laws,curtailing freedom of e/pression. !he rule, which recogni<es no e/ception, is thatthere can be no content-based prior restraint on protected e/pression. On this

ground alone, the !C press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the courtsdetermine that the sub2ect matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers thesecurity of the tate, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected e/pressionthat may be sub2ect to prior restraint. owever, there is no claim here byrespondents that the sub2ect matter of the arci !apes involves national securityand publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the tate. !he allegedviolation of the "ntiEiretapping Law is not in itself a ground to impose a priorrestraint on the airing of the arci !apes because the Constitution e/presslyprohibits the enactment of any law, and that includes antiwiretapping laws,curtailing freedom of e/pression. !he only e/ceptions to this rule are the fourrecogni<ed categories of unprotected e/pression. owever, the content of the arci

!apes does not fall under any of these categories of unprotected e/pression.ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; :ight to rivacy; :ight to 3nformation; !he airing

of the arci !apes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of thearci !apes is a matter of important public concern the Constitution guarantees

the people6s right to information on matters of public concern. !he airing of thearci !apes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the arci

!apes is a matter of important public concern. !he Constitution guarantees thepeople6s right to information on matters of public concern. !he remedy of any

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person aggrieved by the public airing of the arci !apes is to 8le a complaint forviolation of the "ntiEiretapping Law after the commission of the crime. ubsequentpunishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy available in case of violation ofthe "nti-Eiretapping Law.

ame; ame; ame; ame; "dministrative Law; ational !elecommunicationsCommission; @nless ruled by the courts as a valid prior restraint, governmentagencies cannot implement outright such prior restraint because such restraint ispresumed unconstitutional at inception; "s an agency that allocates frequencies orairwaves, the ational !elecommunications Commission $ !C& may regulate thebandwidth position, transmitter wattage, and location of radio and televisionstations, but not the content of the broadcasts. !he !C has no power to imposecontent-based prior restraint on e/pression. !he charter of the !C does not vest

!C with any content-based censorship power over radio and television stations. 3nthe present case, the airing of the arci !apes is a protected e/pression that cannever be sub2ect to prior restraint. owever, even assuming for the sa5e ofargument that the airing of the arci !apes constitutes unprotected e/pression, only

the courts have the power to ad2udicate on the factual and legal issue of whetherthe airing of the arci !apes presents a clear and present danger of bringing about asubstantive evil that the tate has a right and duty to prevent, so as to 2ustify theprior restraint. "ny order imposing prior restraint on unprotected e/pressionrequires prior ad2udication by the courts on whether the prior restraint isconstitutional. !his is a necessary consequence from the presumption of invalidityof any prior restraint on unprotected e/pression. @nless ruled by the courts as avalid prior restraint, government agencies cannot implement outright such priorrestraint because such restraint is presumed unconstitutional at inception. "s anagency that allocates frequencies or airwaves, the !C may regulate the bandwidthposition, transmitter wattage, and location of radio and television stations, but not

the content of the broadcasts. uch content-neutral prior restraint may ma5eoperating radio and television stations more costly. owever, such content-neutralrestraint does not restrict the content of the broadcast.

"SC@ ",G., eparate Concurring Opinion#

Freedom of =/pression; !elecommunications 3ndustry; Chilling = ect rinciple; !hechallenged ational !elecommunications Commission $ !C& and 4epartment of Gustice $4OG& warnings violate ec. %H, "rt. [A3 of the Constitution the regulatorywarnings involved in this case wor5 against a balanced Bow of information in ourcommunication structures and do so without respecting freedom of speech bycasting a chilling e ect on the media. 3 vote to :" ! the petition on the groundthat the challenged !C and 4OG warnings violate ec. %H, "rt. [A3 of theConstitution which states# ec. %H. !he tate shall provide the policy environmentfor the full development of Filipino capability and the emergency of communicationstructures suitable to the needs and aspirations of the nation and the balanced Bowof information into, out of, and across the country, in accordance with a policy thatrespects the freedom of speech and of the press. / / / !he regulatory warningsinvolved in this case wor5 against a balanced Bow of information in our

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communication structures and do so without respecting freedom of speech bycasting a chilling e ect on the media. !his is de8nitely not the policy environmentcontemplated by the Constitution.

!3 ",G., eparate Opinion $4issenting and Concurring&#

Freedom of =/pression; Freedom of the ress; rior :estraint; arci !apes; !heassailed act of the ational !elecommunications Commission $ !C&, contained inwhat is after all an unenforceable ress :elease, hardly constitutes 0an immediateand irreversible sanction? the issuance does not prohibit the airing of the arcitapes or require that the broadcast station obtain permission from the governmentor the ational !elecommunications Commission $ !C& to air such tapes. Pet priorrestraint 0by contrast and by de8nition, has an immediate and irreversiblesanction.? !he assailed act of the !C, contained in what is after all anunenforceable ress :elease, hardly constitutes 0an immediate and irreversiblesanction.? 3n fact, as earlier noted, the ress :elease does not say that it wouldimmediately sanction a broadcast station which airs the arci tapes. Ehat it doessay is that only 0if it has been subsequently established that the said tapes are falseand1or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate investigation? that the stationscould be sub2ected to possible suspension. 3t is evident that the issuance does notprohibit the airing of the arci tapes or require that the broadcast stations obtainpermission from the government or the !C to air such tapes.

ame; ame; ame; ame; till, without underta5ing a demonstration how the ress:elease actually restrained free e/pression, the ma2ority surprisingly ma5es a leapof logic, concluding as it does that such an informal act as a press statement iscovered by the prior restraint concept; "bsent prior restraint, no presumption ofinvalidity can arise. !he ress :elease does not 8t into any of the acts describedabove in the ma2ority opinion. either can it be identi8ed as an 0o7cial government

restriction? as it simply does not levy any actual restriction on the sub2ects of !Cregulation. till, without underta5ing a demonstration how the ress :eleaseactually restrained free e/pression, the ma2ority surprisingly ma5es a leap of logic,concluding as it does that such an informal act as a press statement is covered bythe prior restraint concept. "s with Gustice Carpio, the ma2ority does not preciselye/plain how the ress :elease could constitute an actual restraint, worded as it waswith nary a notion of restriction and given its lac5 0of an immediate and irreversiblesanction.? "bsent prior restraint, no presumption of invalidity can arise.

ame; ame; ame; Chilling = ect rinciple; " government act that has a chillinge ect on the e/ercise of free e/pression is an infringement within the constitutionalpurview; 3f it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publicationchills speech, prior restraint free<es it at least for the time. " government act thathas a chilling e ect on the e/ercise of free e/pression is an infringement within theconstitutional purview. "s the liberal lion Gustice Eilliam 9rennan announced, in

""C v. 9utton, (K% @. . )%* $%D+(&, 0the threat of restraint, as opposed to actualrestraint itself, may deter the e/ercise of the right to free e/pression almost aspotently as the actual application of sanctions.? uch threat of restraint is perhaps amore insidious, if not sophisticated, means for the tate to trample on free speech.

rotected e/pression is chilled simply by spea5ing softly while carrying a big stic5.

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3n distinguishing chilling e ect from prior restraint, ebras5a ress "ssociation,citing 9ic5el, observed, 0 iJf it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctionsafter publication Nchills6 speech, prior restraint 0free<es? it at least for the time.? "nact of government that chills e/pression is sub2ect to nulli8cation or in2unction fromthe courts, as it violates ection (, "rticle 333 of the Constitution. 09ecause

government retaliation tends to chill an individual6s e/ercise of his right to freee/pression, public o7cials may not, as a general rule, respond to an individual6sprotected activity with conduct or speech even though that conduct or speechwould otherwise be a lawful e/ercise of public authority.

ame; ame; ame; ame; !here appears to be no case in "merican 2urisprudencewhere a First "mendment claim went forward in the absence of evidence thatspeech was actually chilled. On the one hand, Gustice Carpio does not bother toengage in any 0chilling e ect? analysis. On the other hand, the ma2ority doesconclude that the acts of the !C had a chilling e ect. Eas there truly a chillinge ect resulting from the ress :elease of the !CX Ehile the act or issuance itselfmay evince the impression of a chilling e ect, there still must be factual evidence to

support the conclusion that a particular act of government actually engendered achilling e ect. !here appears to be no case in "merican 2urisprudence where a First"mendment claim went forward in the absence of evidence that speech wasactually chilled.

ame; ame; ame; ame; 3t ma5es utter sense to impose even a minimalevidentiary requirement before the Court can conclude that a particular governmentaction has had a chilling e ect on free speech without an evidentiary standard, 2udges will be forced to rely on intuition and even personal or political sentiments asthe basis for determining whether or not a chilling e ect is present. 3t ma5es uttersense to impose even a minimal evidentiary requirement before the Court canconclude that a particular government action has had a chilling e ect on freespeech. Eithout an evidentiary standard, 2udges will be forced to rely on intuitionand even personal or political sentiments as the basis for determining whether ornot a chilling e ect is present. !hat is a highly dangerous precedent, and one thatclearly has not been accepted in the @nited tates. 3n fact, in Sieper v. >et<inger,the @. . 4istrict Court of ew Por5 found it relevant, in ruling against the petitioner,that Sieper 0has stated a7rmatively that his speech was not chilled in any way.?0Ehere a party can show no change in his behavior, he has quite plainly shown nochilling of his First "mendment right to free speech.?

ame; ame; ame; ame; 3n the employment of the 0chilling e ect mode ofanalysis,? disregarding the actual e ects would mean dispensing with any

evidentiary requirement for the constitutional claim, a doctrine which does not bodewell for the Court6s future in constitutional ad2udication, and one 3 e/pect that willbe signi8cantly modi8ed in due time. !he ma2ority states that 0 tJhere is enoughevidence of chilling e ect of the complained acts of record,? alluding to 0thewarnings given to media whichJ came from no less the !C, a regulatory agencythat can cancel the Certi8cate of "uthority of the radio and broadcast media.? Eithdue respect, 3 submit that what the record establishes is merely the presence of thecause for chilling $the ress :elease&, but not the actual chilling e ect itself on the

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broadcast media. 3n that respect, the Goint tatement of the !C and the 9e/ecuted 2ust three $(& days after the issuance of the ress :elease, becomesmaterial. 3n the employment of the 0chilling e ect mode of analysis,? disregardingthe actual e ects would mean dispensing with any evidentiary requirement for theconstitutional claim. !hat is a doctrine which does not bode well for the Court6s

future in constitutional ad2udication, and one 3 e/pect that will be signi8cantlymodi8ed in due time.

ame; ame; ame; ame; 3t is the unequivocal threats to prosecute would-be-o enders, made no less by the head of the principal law agency of the governmentcharged with the administration of the criminal 2ustice system, that constitute theviolation of a fundamental freedom that in turn warrants this Court6s intervention. !he ma2ority and concurring opinions hardly o er any rebu5e to the 4OG ecretaryeven as they vote to grant a7rmative relief against his actions. !his ensued, 3suspect, due to the undue focus placed on the arguments concerning the !C, eventhough the petition itself was not so oriented. 9ut for my part, it is the unequivocalthreats to prosecute would-be-o enders, made no less by the head of the principal

law agency of the government charged with the administration of the criminal 2ustice system, that constitute the violation of a fundamental freedom that in turnwarrants this Court6s intervention.

ame; ame; ame; ame; uite clearly, the 4epartment of Gustice $4OG& ecretarydid infringe on the right to free e/pression by employing 0the threat of restraint,?thus embodying 0government retaliation thatJ tends to chill an individual6s e/erciseof his right to free e/pression.? Eas there an actual infringement of the right tofree e/pression committed by the 4OG ecretaryX 3f so, how was suchaccomplishedX uite clearly, the 4OG ecretary did infringe on the right to freee/pression by employing 0the threat of restraint,? thus embodying 0governmentretaliation thatJ tends to chill an individual6s e/ercise of his right to freee/pression.? !he 4OG ecretary plainly and directly threatened anyone in possessionof the arci tapes, or anyone who aired or disseminated the same, with the e/tremesanction of criminal prosecution and possible imprisonment. e reiterated thethreats as he directed the 93 to investigate the airing of the tapes. e evene/tended the warning of sanction to the =/ecutive ress ecretary. !hese threatswere evidently designed to stop the airing or dissemination of the arci tapes aprotected e/pression which cannot be en2oined by e/ecutive 8at.

ame; ame; ame; ame; !he fact that the 4epartment of Gustice $4OG& ecretaryhas yet to ma5e operational his threats does not dissuade from the conclusion thatthe threats alone already chilled the atmosphere of free speech or e/pression.

!as5ed with underta5ing the defense of the 4OG ecretary, the O o ered not evena ghost of a contest as soon as the bell for the 8rst round rang. 3n ab2ect surrender,it squee<ed in 2ust one paragraph in its 'K-page

Comment for that purpose. !he arguments o ered in that solitary paragraph aremeager. 3t avers that the media reports are without probative value or, at best,inconclusive as the declarations therein may have been quoted inaccurately or outof conte/t. Pet the O does not deny that the statements were made, failing evento o er what may have been the 0accurate conte/t.? !he O also points out that

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the 4OG ecretary has not actually 0made any issuance, order or instruction to the93 to go after such media organi<ations.? Pet the fact that the 4OG ecretary has

yet to ma5e operational his threats does not dissuade from the conclusion that thethreats alone already chilled the atmosphere of free speech or e/pression.

A=L" CO,G:.,G., Concurring and 4issenting Opinion#

Freedom of =/pression; Freedom of the ress; rior :estraint; Chilling = ectrinciple; Eith the view 3 ta5e of the situation, the very fact that the apisanan ng

mga 9rodcasters sa ilipinas $ 9 & agreed to come up with the 2oint pressstatement that 0 !C did not issue any >emorandum CircularJ or order constitutinga restraint of press freedom or censorship? tends to prove, rather than disprove, thethreatening and chilling tone of its Gune %%, 'HH* press release. !he facts on recordare su7cient to support a conclusion that the press release issued by !C with allthe unmista5able threat embodied in it of a possible cancellation of licenses and1orthe 8ling of criminal cases against erring media owners and practitionersconstitutes a clear instance of prior restraint. ot lost on this writer is the fact that8ve $*& days after it made the press release in question, !C proceeded to issue 2ointly with the apisanan ng mga 9roadcasters sa ilipinas $ 9 & another pressrelease to clarify that the earlier one issued was not intended to limit or restrainpress freedom. Eith the view 3 ta5e of the situation, the very fact that the 9agreed to come up with the 2oint press statement that 0 !C did not issue any

>emorandum CircularJ or order constituting a restraint of press freedom orcensorship? tends to prove, rather than disprove, the threatening and chilling toneof its Gune %%, 'HH* press release. 3f there was no prior restraint from the point ofview of media, why was there a need to hold a dialogue with 9 and then issue aclarifying 2oint statementX >oreover, the fact that media owners, operators, andpractitioners appeared to have been fro<en into inaction, not ma5ing any visiblee ort to challenge the validity of the !C press statement, or at least 2oin thepetitioner in his battle for press freedom, can only lead to the conclusion that thechilling e ect of the statement left them threatened.

ame; ame; ame; ame; !here was no proof at all of the possible chilling e ectthat the alleged statements of 4epartment of Gustice $4OG& ecretary on<ales hadon the reporters and media practitioners the 4OG ecretary, as head of theprosecution arm of the government and lead administrator of the criminal 2usticesystem under the "dministrative Code is, to be sure, impliedly empowered to issuereminders and warnings against violations of penal statutes; For the reason that it isunclear as to whether the 4epartment of Gustice $4OG& ecretary e/ceeded hismandate under the premises, the prior-restraint issue in the 4OG aspect of the case

is not yet ripe for ad2udication. Ehile the Court has several pieces of evidence tofall bac5 on and 2udiciously resolve the !C press release issue, the situation isdi erent with respect to the 4epartment of Gustice $4OG& warning issue. Ehat is athand are mere allegations in the petition that, on Gune I, 'HH*, respondent 4OG

ecretary :aul on<ales warned reporters in possession of copies of the compactdisc containing the alleged 0 arci? wiretapped conversation and those broadcastingor publishing its contents that they could be held liable under the "nti-Eiretapping"ct, adding that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a

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continuing o ense, sub2ect to arrest by anybody who had personal 5nowledge of thecrime committed or in whose presence the crime was being committed. !here wasno proof at all of the possible chilling e ect that the alleged statements of 4OG

ecretary on<ales had on the reporters and media practitioners. !he 4OGecretary, as head of the prosecution arm of the government and lead administrator

of the criminal 2ustice system under the "dministrative Code is, to be sure, impliedlyempowered to issue reminders and warnings against violations of penal statutes."nd it is a 5nown fact that ecretary on<ales had issued, and still issues, such 5indof warnings. Ehether or not he e/ceeded his mandate under premises is unclear. 3tis for this main reason that 3 found the prior-restraint issue in the 4OG aspect of thecase not yet ripe for ad2udication.

C 3CO- "S":3O,G., eparate Opinion#

Freedom of =/pression; Freedom of the ress; rior :estraint; Chilling = ectrinciple; "dministrative Law; !he reason escapes me as to why a prohibition, when

it was stated in the ational !elecommunications Commission $ !C& >emorandumCirculars and in the authori<ations and permits, was valid and acceptable, but whenit was reiterated in a mere press statement released by the ational !elecommunications Commission $ !C&, had become a violation of the Constitutionas a prior restraint on free speech. " scrutiny of the 0fair warning? issued by the

!C on %% Gune 'HH* reveals that it is nothing more than that, a fair warning, callingfor sobriety, care, and circumspection in the news reporting and current a airscoverage by radio and television stations. 3t reminded the owners and operators ofthe radio stations and television networ5s of the provisions in !C >emorandumCirculars o. %%-%'-I* and ''-ID, which are also stated in the authori<ations andpermits granted to them by the government, that they shall not use their stationsfor the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation.3t must be emphasi<ed that the !C is merely reiterating the very same prohibitionalready contained in its previous circulars, and even in the authori<ations andpermits of radio and television stations. !he reason thus escapes me as to why saidprohibition, when it was stated in the !C >emorandum Circulars and in theauthori<ations and permits, was valid and acceptable, but when it was reiterated ina mere press statement released by the !C, had become a violation of theConstitution as a prior restraint on free speech.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Ee should be 2udicious in giving too much weight andcredence to press statements it would be a dangerous precedent to rule that pressstatements should be deemed an o7cial act of the administrative agency or publico7cial concerned. Ee should be 2udicious in giving too much weight and credence

to press statements. 3 believe that it would be a dangerous precedent to rule thatpress statements should be deemed an o7cial act of the administrative agency orpublic o7cial concerned. ress statements, in general, can be easily manufactured,prone to alteration or misinterpretation as they are being reported by the media,and may, during some instances, have to be made on the spot without giving thesource much time to discern the rami8cations of his statements. ence, they cannotbe given the same weight and binding e ect of o7cial acts in the form of, say,memorandum orders or circulars.

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Gudicial :eview; Locus tandi; Ehen the issue concerns a public right, it is su7cientthat the petitioner is a citi<en and has an interest in the e/ecution of the laws.

etitioner has standing to 8le the instant petition. !he test is whether the party hasalleged such a personal sta5e in the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the

court so largely depends for illumination of di7cult constitutional questions. Ehensuing as a citi<en, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is aboutto be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he isabout to be sub2ected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or actcomplained of. Ehen the issue concerns a public right, it is su7cient that thepetitioner is a citi<en and has an interest in the e/ecution of the laws.

ame; >oot and "cademic 3ssues; 3t is unnecessary to indulge in academicdiscussion of a case presenting a moot question as a 2udgment thereon cannot haveany practical legal e ect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. !hee/ercise by this Court of the power of 2udicial inquiry is limited to the determinationof actual cases and controversies. "n actual case or controversy means an e/isting

conBict that is appropriate or ripe for 2udicial determination, one that is notcon2ectural or anticipatory, otherwise the decision of the court will amount to anadvisory opinion. !he power does not e/tend to hypothetical questions since anyattempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions andto sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. either will the Court determine amoot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. 3ndeed, it isunnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a mootquestion as a 2udgment thereon cannot have any practical legal e ect or, in thenature of things, cannot be enforced.

ame; ame; Capable of :epetition Pet =vading :eview :ule; Courts shall decide aquestion otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition yet evasive ofreview. 3n the instant case, it is readily observable that the subsequent 2ointstatement of the respondent !C and the O7cers and 9oard of 4irectors of the 9after their Gune %), 'HH* dialogue not only substantially diminished but, in fact,obliterated the e ects of the earlier press warnings, thus rendering the case mootand academic. otably, the 2oint press statement ac5nowledged that 0 !C did notissue any memorandum circular or order constituting a restraint of press freedom orcensorship.? " case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. 9e that as itmay, the Court should discuss and resolve the fundamental issues raised herein, inobservance of the rule that courts shall decide a question otherwise moot andacademic if it is capable of repetition yet evasive of review.

Freedom of =/pression; rior :estraint; "s an aspect of freedom of e/pression, priorrestraint should not be confused with subsequent punishment; !he doctrine of priorrestraint originated in the common law of =ngland where prior restraints of thepress were not permitted, but punishment after publication was. "s an aspect offreedom of e/pression, prior restraint should not be confused with subsequentpunishment. 3n "le/ander v. @. ., petitioner6s complaint was that the :3CO forfeitureprovisions on businesses dealing in e/pressive materials constituted 0priorrestraint? because they may have an improper 0chilling? e ect on free e/pression

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by deterring others from engaging in protected speech. 3n re2ecting the petitioner6scontention and ruling that the forfeiture is a permissible criminal punishment andnot a prior restraint on speech, the @. . upreme Court said# !he term prior restraintis used 0to describe administrative and 2udicial orders forbidding certaincommunications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are

to occur.? !emporary restraining orders and permanent in2unctions i.e., courtorders that actually forbid speech activities are classic e/amples of prior restraints./ / / / Finally, petitioner6s proposed de8nition of the term 0prior restraint? wouldundermine the time-honored distinction between barring speech in the future andpenali<ing past speech. !he doctrine of prior restraint originated in the common lawof =ngland where prior restraints of the press were not permitted, but punishmentafter publication was. !his very limited application of the principle of freedom ofspeech was held inconsistent with our First "mendment as long ago as ros2ean v."merican ress Co. Ehile we may have given a broader de8nition to the term 0priorrestraint? than was given to it in =nglish common law, our decisions havesteadfastly preserved the distinction between prior restraints and subsequentpunishments. !hough petitioner tries to dismiss this distinction as 0neithermeaningful nor useful,? we thin5 it is critical to our First "mendment 2urisprudence.9ecause we have interpreted the First "mendment as providing greater protectionfrom prior restraints than from subsequent punishments, it is important for us todelineate with some precision the de8ning characteristics of a prior restraint. !ohold that the forfeiture order in this case constituted a prior restraint would havethe e/act opposite e ect. 3t would blur the line separating prior restraints fromsubsequent punishments to such a degree that it would be impossible to determinewith any certainty whether a particular measure is a prior restraint or not.

ame; ame; Freedom of the ress; Chilling = ect; Earnings on possible licenserevocation and criminal prosecution are simply what they are, mere warnings they

have no compulsive e ect, as they do not impose a limit on speech or other formsof e/pression nor do they prevent the e/pression of a message. !here is no paritybetween these cases and the case at bench. @nli5e the government acts in theabove-cited cases, what we have before us now is merely a press release not anorder or a circular warning broadcast media on the airing of an alleged tapedconversation, with the caveat that should its falsity be subsequently established,the act could lead to the revocation or cancellation of their licenses, afterappropriate investigation. !he warnings on possible license revocation and criminalprosecution are simply what they are, mere warnings. !hey have no compulsivee ect, as they do not impose a limit on speech or other forms of e/pression nor dothey prevent the e/pression of a message.

ame; ame; ame; ame; "nti-Eiretapping Law $:.". o. )'HH&; Conviction underthe law should 8ttingly be a 2ust cause for the revocation of the license of the erringradio or television station. !he "nti-Eiretapping Law $:epublic "ct )'HH& is a penalstatute. Over the years, no successful challenge to its validity has been sustained.Conviction under the law should 8ttingly be a 2ust cause for the revocation of thelicense of the erring radio or television station. Chave< vs. on<ales, *)* C:"))%$'HHI&J

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43. ')22) *. D *+/, GR N). 181881, 18 O #) "% 9011C !" T+#2" BRICCIO R+ ? A. 'OLLO, "#+#+)-"%, *!.CHAIR'ERSON @ARINA CONSTANTINO DAVID, DIRECTOR IVRAC UEL DE GU:MAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A.CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITEAND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! R+ # #) '%+*

Constitutional Law; 9ill of :ights; :ight to rivacy; !he right to privacy has been

accorded recognition as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee againstunreasonable search and sei<ure under ection ', "rticle 333 of the %DIKConstitution. !he right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this 2urisdictionas a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search andsei<ure under ection ', "rticle 333 of the %DIK Constitution, which provides# ec. '. !he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and e ectsagainst unreasonable searches and sei<ures of whatever nature and for any purposeshall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e/ceptupon probable cause to be determined personally by the 2udge after e/aminationunder oath or a7rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be

sei<ed.:ight to rivacy; !he Civil ervice Commission $C C& had implemented a policy thatput its employees on notice that they have no e/pectation of privacy in anythingthey create, store, send or receive on the o7ce computers, and that the C C maymonitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means.

!he C C in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on noticethat they have no e/pectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send orreceive on the o7ce computers, and that the C C may monitor the use of thecomputer resources using both automated or human means. !his implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were usedonly for such legitimate business purposes.

ame; " search by a government employer of an employee6s o7ce is 2usti8ed atinception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn upevidence that the employee is guilty of wor5-related misconduct. " search by agovernment employer of an employee6s o7ce is 2usti8ed at inception when thereare reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that theemployee is guilty of wor5-related misconduct. !hus, in the 'HH) case decided bythe @ Court of "ppeals =ighth Circuit, it was held that where a government

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agency6s computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographiccontent and in addition e/pressly provided that employees do not have anypersonal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems andtechnology, the government employee had no legitimate e/pectation of privacy asto the use and contents of his o7ce computer, and therefore evidence found during

warrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for childpornography. 3n that case, the defendant employee6s computer hard drive was 8rstremotely e/amined by a computer information technician after his supervisorreceived complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-wor5-related e-mail messages throughout the o7ce. Ehen the supervisor con8rmedthat defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, incontravention of the e/press policy of the agency, his computer tower and Boppydis5s were ta5en and e/amined. " formal administrative investigation ensued andlater search warrants were secured by the police department. !he initial remotesearch of the hard drive of petitioner6s computer, as well as the subsequentwarrantless searches was held as valid under the O6Connor ruling that a publicemployer can investigate wor5-related misconduct so long as any search is 2usti8edat inception and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 2usti8ed itin the 8rst place.

Civil rocedure; "ppeals; ubstantial =vidence; Eell-settled is the rule that the8ndings of fact of quasi-2udicial agencies, li5e the Civil ervice Commission $C C&,are accorded not only respect but even 8nality if such 8ndings are supported bysubstantial evidence. Eell-settled is the rule that the 8ndings of fact of quasi- 2udicial agencies, li5e the C C, are accorded not only respect but even 8nality ifsuch 8ndings are supported by substantial evidence. ubstantial evidence is suchamount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate tosupport a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably

opine otherwise.C": 3O,_G., eparate Concurring Opinion#

:ight to rivacy; Aiew that the Civil ervice Commission $C C& regulation declaring ano-privacy e/pectation on the use of government-owned computers logically followsfrom the statutory rule that government-owned property shall be used 0solely? for apublic purpose. "ny private use of a government property, li5e a government-owned computer, is prohibited by law. Consequently, a government employeecannot e/pect any privacy when he uses a government-owned computer becausehe 5nows he cannot use the computer for any private purpose. !he C C regulationdeclaring a no-privacy e/pectation on the use of government-owned computers

logically follows from the statutory rule that government-owned property shall beused 0solely? for a public purpose.

ame; Aiew that the Civil ervice Commission $C C& o7ce regulation denying C Cemployees privacy e/pectation in 0anything they create, store, send, or receive inthe computer system? is constitutionally in8rm insofar as the regulation e/cludesfrom its ambit the three C C commissioners solely by reason of their ran5, and notby reason of the con8dential nature of the electronic data they generate. !he C Co7ce regulation denying C C employees privacy e/pectation in 0anything they

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create, store, send, or receive in the computer system,? although valid as topetitioner 9riccio ollo, is constitutionally in8rm insofar as the regulation e/cludesfrom its ambit the three C C commissioners solely by reason of their ran5, and notby reason of the con8dential nature of the electronic data they generate.

9ersamin,_G., Concurring and 4issenting Opinion#

:ight to rivacy; Aiew that the right to privacy involved herein is the petitioner6sright to informational privacy in his wor5place, speci8cally his right to wor5 freelywithout surveillance or intrusion. "t the outset, 3 state that the right to privacyinvolved herein is the petitioner6s right to informational privacy in his wor5place,speci8cally his right to wor5 freely without surveillance or intrusion.

ame; Aiew that even without O7ce >emorandum $O>& o. %H, eries of 'HH'being issued by respondent arina Constantino-4avid as Chairman of the Civil

ervice Commission, the employees of the Commission have a reduced e/pectationof privacy in the wor5place. =ven without O7ce >emorandum $O>& o. %H, eriesof 'HH' being issued by respondent arina Constantino-4avid as Chairman of theCivil ervice Commission, the employees of the Commission, including thepetitioner, have a reduced e/pectation of privacy in the wor5place. !he ob2ective ofthe issuance of O> o. %H has been only to formally inform and ma5e aware theemployees of the Commission about the limitations on their privacy while they arein the wor5place and to advise them that the Commission has legitimate reasons tomonitor communications made by them, electronically or not.

ame; Aiew that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable e/pectation of privacy inrespect of the communications created, stored, sent, or received after o7ce hoursthrough the o7ce computer, as to which he must be protected. 3 hold, instead,that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable e/pectation of privacy in respect ofthe communications created, stored, sent, or received after o7ce hours through theo7ce computer, as to which he must be protected.

ame; Aiew that the validity of the sei<ure of the 8les should be limited to the needfor determining whether or not the petitioner un2ustly utili<ed o7cial resources ofthe Commission for personal purposes, and should not e/tend to the reading of the8les6 contents, which would be violative of his right to privacy. !hus, 3 vote touphold the legality of O> o. %H. 3 hasten to add, to be very clear, that the validityof the sei<ure of the 8les should be limited to the need for determining whether ornot the petitioner un2ustly utili<ed o7cial resources of the Commission for personalpurposes, and should not e/tend to the reading of the 8les6 contents, which wouldbe violative of his right to privacy.

ame; Aiew that although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to be en2oyedby the people, the tate cannot 2ust sit bac5 and stand aside when, in the e/erciseof his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment ofthe national interest. 3 adhere to the principle that every man is believed to befree. Freedom gears a man to move about unhampered and to spea5 out fromconviction. !hat is why the right to privacy has earned its worthy place in the 9ill of:ights. owever, although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to be en2oyedby the people, the tate cannot 2ust sit bac5 and stand aside when, in the e/ercise

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of his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment ofthe national interest.

ame; Aiew that the ruling about the decreased e/pectation of privacy in thewor5place may generate an unwanted implication for employers in general tohenceforth consider themselves authori<ed, without ris5ing a collision with theConstitutionally-protected right to privacy, to probe and pry into communicationsmade during wor5 hours by their employees through the use of their computers andother digital instruments of communication. 3 apprehend that the ruling about thedecreased e/pectation of privacy in the wor5place may generate an unwantedimplication for employers in general to henceforth consider themselves authori<ed,without ris5ing a collision with the Constitutionally-protected right to privacy, toprobe and pry into communications made during wor5 hours by their employeesthrough the use of their computers and other digital instruments of communication. !hus, the employers may possibly begin to monitor their employees6 phone calls, toscreen incoming and out-going e-mails, to capture queries made through any of the3nternet6s e7cient search engines $li5e oogle&, or to censor visited websites $li5e

Pahoo`, Faceboo5 or !witter& in the avowed interest of ensuring productivity andsupervising use of business resources. !hat will be unfortunate.

ame; Aiew that a recognition of the limitations of man as a being needful of somee/tent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during wor5 hours, ismost essential in order to fully ma/imi<e the potential by which his services wasobtained in the 8rst place. "lthough the interests of capital or public service domerit protection, a recognition of the limitations of man as a being needful of somee/tent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during wor5 hours, ismost essential in order to fully ma/imi<e the potential by which his services wasobtained in the 8rst place. !he 2ob should not own him the whole time he is in thewor5place. =ven while he remains in the wor5place, he must be allowed to preservehis own identity, to maintain an inner self, to safeguard his beliefs, and to 5eepcertain thoughts, 2udgments and desires hidden. ollo vs. Constantino-4avid, +*D

C:" %ID$'H%%&J

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44. '") 2" *. C) "/, G.R. N). 900334, J$2 30, 9014C !" T+#2" THE 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#

"22"", *!. VICTOR COGAED ROMANA, $!"/"22 -#.

C !" N #$%" A''EAL (%) /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )(A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L C%+ +- 2 '%) "/$%"S" % "! -/ S"+=$%"! EK 2$!+)- % R$2" F%$+# )( # "')+!)-)$! T%""Constitutional Law; :ight to rivacy; !he right to privacy is a fundamental rightenshrined by implication in our Constitution. !he right to privacy is a fundamentalright enshrined by implication in our Constitution. 3t has many dimensions. One ofits dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searchesand sei<ures in "rticle 333, ection ' of the Constitution# !he right of the people to besecure in their persons, houses, papers, and e ects against unreasonable searchesand sei<ures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and nosearch warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e/cept upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the 2udge after e/amination under oath or a7rmation ofthe complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing theplace to be searched and the persons or things to be sei<ed.

ame; Criminal rocedure; earches and ei<ures; !here must be a particulardescription of the place and the things to be searched. "s a general rule, searches

conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision arereasonable. !his warrant requires the e/istence of probable cause that can only bedetermined by a 2udge. !he e/istence of probable cause must be established by the 2udge after as5ing searching questions and answers. robable cause at this stagecan only e/ist if there is an o ense alleged to be committed. "lso, the warrantframes the searches done by the law enforcers. !here must be a particulardescription of the place and the things to be searched.

ame; ame; ame; Earrantless earches; !here are instances when searches arereasonable even when warrantless. !here are instances when searches arereasonable even when warrantless. 3n the :ules of Court, searches incidental tolawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. !his court has ta5en

into account the 0uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose ofthe search or sei<ure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner inwhich the search and sei<ure was made, the place or thing searched, and thecharacter of the articles procured.? !he 5nown 2urisprudential instances ofreasonable warrantless searches and sei<ures are# %. Earrantless search incidentalto a lawful arrest. . . ; '. ei<ure of evidence in 0plain view,? . . . ; (. earch of amoving vehicle. ighly regulated by the government, the vehicle6s inherent mobilityreduces e/pectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares

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furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that theoccupant committed a criminal activity; ). Consented warrantless search; *.Customs search; +. top and fris5; and K. =/igent and emergency circumstances.

ame; ame; ame; ame; earches 3ncidental to a Lawful "rrest; earchesincidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in Bagrante delicto,and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the personarrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve theevidence. One of these 2urisprudential e/ceptions to search warrants is 0stop andfris5.? 0 top and fris5? searches are often confused with searches incidental tolawful arrests under the :ules of Court. earches incidental to a lawful arrest requirethat a crime be committed in Bagrante delicto, and the search conducted within thevicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are noweapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

ame; ame; ame; 0 top and Fris5? earches; !he 0stop and fris5? search shouldbe used 0when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation inthe city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure a searchwarrant.? 0 top and fris5? searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of acrime. For instance, the search in osadas v. Court of "ppeals, %II C:" 'II$%DDH&, was similar 0to a Nstop and fris56 situation whose ob2ect is either todetermine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quomomentarily while the police o7cer see5s to obtain more information.? !his courtstated that the 0stop and fris5? search should be used 0 wJhen dealing with arapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets whereunarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.?

ame; ame; ame; ame; 3t is the police o7cer who should observe facts thatwould lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. !he police o7cer should

not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. 3t is the police o7cer whoshould observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of aperson. !he police o7cer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by anotherperson. !his is necessary to 2ustify that the person suspected be stopped andreasonably searched. "nything less than this would be an infringement upon one6sbasic right to security of one6s person and e ects.

ame; ame; ame; Earrantless earches; For warrantless searches, probablecause was de8ned as 0a reasonable ground of suspicion supported bycircumstances su7ciently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man tobelieve that the person accused is guilty of the o ense with which he is charged.?For warrantless searches, probable cause was de8ned as 0a reasonable ground ofsuspicion supported by circumstances su7ciently strong in themselves to warrant acautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the o ense with whichhe is charged.?

ame; ame; ame; 0 top and Fris5? earches; !he 0stop and fris5? search wasoriginally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerousweapons. olice o7cers cannot 2ustify unbridled searches and be shielded by thise/ception, unless there is compliance with the 0genuine reason? requirement and

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that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. "s stated in >alacat v.Court of "ppeals, 'I( C:" %*D $%DDK&# "J 0stop-and-fris5? serves a two-foldinterest# $%& the general interest of e ective crime prevention and detection, whichunderlies the recognition that a police o7cer may, under appropriate circumstancesand in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating

possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and $'& the more pressinginterest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police o7cer to ta5e stepsto assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadlyweapon that could une/pectedly and fatally be used against the police o7cer.$=mphasis supplied& !he 0stop and fris5? search was originally limited to outerclothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. "s in >analili v. Courtof "ppeals, 'IH C:" )HH $%DDK&, 2urisprudence also allows 0stop and fris5? forcases involving dangerous drugs.

ame; ame; ame; earches 3ncidental to a Lawful "rrest; :ule %'+, ection %( ofthe :ules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. :ule %'+,

ection %( of the :ules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For

there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawfulwarrantless arrest as enumerated in :ule %%(, ection * of the :ules of Court#

ection_*. "rrest without warrant; when lawful. " peace o7cer or a private personmay, without a warrant, arrest a person# $a& Ehen, in his presence, the person to bearrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit ano ense; $b& Ehen an o ense has 2ust been committed and he has probable cause tobelieve based on personal 5nowledge of facts or circumstances that the person tobe arrested has committed it; and $c& Ehen the person to be arrested is a prisonerwho has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving 8nal 2udgment or temporarily con8ned while his case is pending, or has escaped whilebeing transferred from one con8nement to another.

ame; ame; ame; !he implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, couldnot have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating orcoercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purviewof the constitutional guarantee. !here can be no valid waiver of Cogaed6sconstitutional rights even if we assume that he did not ob2ect when the police as5edhim to open his bags. "s this court previously stated# "ppellant6s silence should notbe lightly ta5en as consent to such search. !he implied acquiescence to the search,if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity givenunder intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent atall within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. $Citations omitted& Cogaed6ssilence or lac5 of aggressive ob2ection was a natural reaction to a coerciveenvironment brought about by the police o7cer6s e/cessive intrusion into hisprivate space. !he prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that thewaiver of a constitutional right is one which is 5nowing, intelligent, and free fromany coercion. 3n all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

ame; ame; ame; For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutionalright, it is not su7cient that the police o7cer introduce himself or herself, or be5nown as a police o7cer. !he police o7cer must also inform the person to be

'%I



searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his orher ob2ections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. For avalid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not su7cient thatthe police o7cer introduce himself or herself, or be 5nown as a police o7cer. !hepolice o7cer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or

her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her ob2ections that thecircumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. !he police o7cer mustcommunicate this clearly and in a language 5nown to the person who is about towaive his or her constitutional rights. !here must be an assurance given to thepolice o7cer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. !he fundamentalnature of a person6s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.

ame; ame; ame; =/clusionary :ule; Fruit of the oisonous !ree; =videnceobtained through unlawful sei<ures should be e/cluded as evidence because it is0the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional in2unction againstunreasonable searches and sei<ures.? !he Constitution provides# "ny evidenceobtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and sei<uresJ shall

be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise 5nown as thee/clusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutionalprovision originated from tonehill v. 4io5no, 'H C:" (I( $%D+K&. !his ruleprohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on8shing e/peditions. =vidence obtained through unlawful sei<ures should bee/cluded as evidence because it is 0the only practical means of enforcing theconstitutional in2unction against unreasonable searches and sei<ures.? 3t ensuresthat the fundamental rights to one6s person, houses, papers, and e ects are notlightly infringed upon and are upheld. eople vs. Cogaed, K(% C:" )'K$'H%)&J

45. '") 2" *. E/ -), G.R. N). 188133, J$2 7, 9014

C !" T+#2" 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, "22"", *!.OLIVER RENATO EDA O EBDANE, "22 -#.C !" N #$%" A''EAL (%) # " /" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )(# " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C%+ +- 2 L D - "%)$! D%$ ! A # C +- )(C$!#)/ R$2" EK 2$!+)- % R$2" E*+/"- " F%$+# )( # "')+!-)$! T%""

Constitutional Law; Criminal rocedure; Earrantless "rrests; For a warrantless arrestof an accused caught in Bagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur# $%&the person to be arrested must e/ecute an overt act indicating that he has 2ustcommitted, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and $'& suchovert act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting o7cer. ection*$a&, :ule %%( of the :ules of Criminal rocedure provides that a peace o7cer or aprivate person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, theperson to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to

'%D



commit an o ense. !his is 5nown an arrest in Bagrante delicto. 0For a warrantlessarrest of an accused caught in Bagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites mustconcur# $%& the person to be arrested must e/ecute an overt act indicating that hehas 2ust committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and$'& such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting o7cer.?

Criminal Law; =vidence; !rying to run away when no crime has been overtlycommitted, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. !hat the appellantattempted to run away when O( Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot byitself be construed as adequate to charge the police o7cer with personal 5nowledgethat the appellant had 2ust engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attemptingto engage in criminal activity. "s the Court e/plained in eople v. Aillareal, +D( C:"*)D $'H%(&# Furthermore, appellant6s act of darting away when O( de Leonapproached him should not be construed against him. Flight per se is notsynonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one6s consciousness ofguilt. 3t is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even inhigh crime areas there are many innocent reasons for Bight, including fear of

retribution for spea5ing to o7cers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. !hus, appellant6s attempt to runaway from O( de Leon is susceptible of various e/planations; it could easily havemeant guilt 2ust as it could li5ewise signify innocence. 3n other words, trying to runaway when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot beevidence of guilt.

Constitutional Law; Criminal rocedure; Earrantless "rrests; 3llegal earches andei<ures; Considering that the appellant6s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the

search and sei<ure that resulted from it was li5ewise illegal. Considering that theappellant6s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and sei<ure that resultedfrom it was li5ewise illegal. !hus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystallinesubstances sei<ed from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from aninvalid search and sei<ure.

Criminal Law; 4angerous 4rugs "ct; 3llegal ale of 4angerous 4rugs; 3llegalossession of 4angerous 4rugs; !he e/istence of dangerous drugs is a condition

sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, itbeing the very corpus delicti of the crimes. =ven granting, for the sa5e ofargument, that the appellant6s warrantless arrest was valid, the latter6s acquittal isstill in order due to the prosecution6s failure to establish the evidence of the corpusdelicti with moral certainty. Ee stress that 0 tJhe e/istence of dangerous drugs is acondition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale and possession of

dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crimes.? !hus, the evidenceof the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 3n the presentcase, the various lapses enumerated and discussed below committed by thepolice in the handling, safe5eeping and custody over the sei<ed drug tainted theintegrity and evidentiary value of the con8scated shabu.

ame; ame; >ar5ing; Eords and hrases; >ar5ing, as used in drug cases, meansthe placing by the apprehending o7cer or the poseur-buyer of his1her initials andsignature on the item1s sei<ed. >ar5ing, as used in drug cases, means the placing

''H



by the apprehending o7cer or the poseur-buyer of his1her initials and signature onthe item1s sei<ed. 0Consistency with the Nchain of custody6 rule requires that theNmar5ing6 of the sei<ed items to truly ensure that they are the same items thatenter the chain and are eventually the ones o ered in evidence should be done$%& in the presence of the apprehended violator $'& immediately upon con8scation.?

!he Court clari8ed in eople v. :esurreccion, +H( C:" *%H $'HHD&, that mar5ingupon immediate con8scation contemplates even mar5ing at the nearest policestation or o7ce of the apprehending team. !hus, while mar5ing of the sei<ed drugsat the police station is permitted, the mar5ing should be done by the police, and notby the accused. !he appellant6s participation in the mar5ing procedure should onlybe as a witness. Ehy the police failed to do a basic police procedure truly baRes us.

ame; ame; Chain of Custody :ule; ection '%$a&, "rticle 33 of the 3mplementing:ules and :egulations $3::& o ers some Be/ibility in complying with the e/pressrequirements under paragraph %, ection '%, "rticle 33 of :epublic "ct $:.".& o.D%+*, i.e., 0noncompliance with these requirements under 2usti8able grounds, aslong as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the sei<ed items are properly

preserved by the apprehending o7cer1team, shall not render void and invalid suchsei<ures of and custody over said items.? !o be sure, ection '%$a&, "rticle 33 of the3:: o ers some Be/ibility in complying with the e/press requirements underparagraph %, ection '%, "rticle 33 of :.". o. D%+*, i.e., 0noncompliance with theserequirements under 2usti8able grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiaryvalue of the sei<ed items are properly preserved by the apprehending o7cer1team,shall not render void and invalid such sei<ures of and custody over said items .J? !his saving clause, however, applies only where the prosecution recogni<ed theprocedural lapses and thereafter e/plained the cited 2usti8able grounds, and whenthe prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidencesei<ed had been preserved.

ame; ame; ame; =/clusionary :ule; "lthough the upreme Court $ C& hasrecogni<ed that minor deviations from the procedures under :epublic "ct $:.".& o.D%+* would not automatically e/onerate an accused, it has also declared that whenthere is gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantivelaw $:.". o. D%+*&, serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of thesei<ed items that the prosecution presented in evidence. "lthough the Court hasrecogni<ed that minor deviations from the procedures under :.". o. D%+* wouldnot automatically e/onerate an accused, we have also declared that when there isgross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law $:.".

o. D%+*&, serious uncertainty is generated about the identity of the sei<ed itemsthat the prosecution presented in evidence. !his doubt cannot be remedied bysimply invo5ing the presumption of regularity in the performance of o7cial duties,for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguardse ectively produces an irregularity in the performance of o7cial duties.

ame; ame; ame; ame; =vidence; Fruit of the oisonous !ree; !he upremeCourt $ C& holds that the appellant6s acquittal is in order since the shabupurportedly sei<ed from him is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruitof the poisonous tree. 3n sum, we hold that the appellant6s acquittal is in order

''%



since the shabu purportedly sei<ed from him is inadmissible in evidence for beingthe proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily, the prosecution6s failure tocomply with ection '%, "rticle 33 of :.". o. D%+*, and with the chain of custodyrequirement of this "ct, compromised the identity of the item sei<ed, leading to thefailure to adequately prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged. eople vs.

=daYo, K'D C:" '**$'H%)&J

'''



46. '") 2" *. N , G.R. N). 180459, J -$ % 10, 9011C !" T+#2" 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, 2 +-#+P

"22"", *!. NG YI@ BUN, @ O@ AI CHENG, CHANGCHAUN SHI, CHUA SHILOU H AN, @AN SHUN MIN, -/RAYMOND S. TAN, $!"/ "22 -#!C !" N #$%" A''EAL (%) /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )(A " 2!S 22 + C2 !! E*+/"- " +#-"!!"!

Criminal rocedure; Earrantless "rrests; Earrantless arrests is consideredreasonable and valid under :ule %%(, ec. *$a& of the :evised :ules on Criminal

rocedure. !he foregoing proviso refers to arrest in Bagrante delicto. 3n the instantcase, contrary to accused-appellants6 contention, there was indeed a validwarrantless arrest in Bagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediatelyprior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants# $%& the police o7cersreceived information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband;$'& the police o7cers, with the operative, proceeded to Ailla Aicenta :esort in9arangay 9ignay 33, ariaya, ue<on; $(& they observed the goings-on at the resortfrom a distance of around *H meters; and $)& they spotted the si/ accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-(HHvan.

ame; ame; 3n eople v. "lunday, *+) C:" %(* $'HHI&, the Court held that when

a police o7cer sees the o ense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbancescreated thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may e ect and arrestwithout a warrant on the basis of ec. *$a&, :ule %%( of the :ules of Court, as theo ense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. 3n eople v."lunday, *+) C:" %(* $'HHI&, we held that when a police o7cer sees the o ense,although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds atonce to the scene, he may e ect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of ec.*$a&, :ule %%( of the :ules of Court, as the o ense is deemed committed in hispresence or within his view. 3n the instant case, it can plausibly be argued thataccused-appellants were committing the o ense of possessing shabu and were inthe act of loading them in a white van when the police o7cers arrested them. "s

aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of thepolice o7cers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plainview and duly observed by the arresting o7cers. "nd to write 8nis to the issue ofany irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court notes, as it has consistentlyheld, that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their ob2ections to theirarrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea.

ame; ame; Criminal Law; 4angerous 4rugs "ct; 3llegal ossession of 4angerous4rugs; "ccused-appellants were found to be in possession of prohibited drugs

''(



without proof that they were duly authori<ed by law to possess them. aving beencaught in Bagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animuspossidendi on the part of accused-appellants. resent in the instant case are allthe elements of illegal possession of drugs# $%& the accused is in possession of anitem or ob2ect which is identi8ed to be a prohibited drug; $'& such possession is not

authori<ed by law; and $(& the accused freely and consciously possesses the saiddrug. "ccused-appellants were positively identi8ed in court as the individualscaught loading and possessing illegal drugs. !hey were found to be in possession ofprohibited drugs without proof that they were duly authori<ed by law to possessthem. aving been caught in Bagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facieevidence of animus possidendi on the part of accused-appellants. !here is, thus, nomerit to the argument of the defense that a warrant was needed to arrest accused-appellants.

=vidence; Eitnesses; "ppellate courts generally will not disturb the trial court6sassessment of a witness6 credibility unless certain material facts and circumstanceshave been overloo5ed or arbitrarily disregarded. "s no ill motive can be imputed to

the prosecution6s witnesses, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the perfor-mance of o7cial duties and a7rm the trial court6s 8nding that the police o7cers6testimonies are deserving of full faith and credit. "ppellate courts generally will notdisturb the trial court6s assessment of a witness6 credibility unless certain materialfacts and circumstances have been overloo5ed or arbitrarily disregarded. Ee 8nd noreason to deviate from this rule in the instant case. eople vs. g Pi5 9un, +(D

C:" II$'H%%&J

'')



47. '") 2" *. L % , G.R. N). 1;;877, A$ $!# 13, 9019C !" T+#2" 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, 2 +-#+P

"22"", *!. ARTURO LARA ORBISTA, $!"/ "22 -#.

C !" N #$%" AUTOMATIC REVIE )( /" +!+)- )( # "C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C%+ +- 2 L A2+ +Criminal rocedure; Courts; Gurisdiction; Gurisdiction over the person of the accusedmay be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or throughhis voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court."ny ob2ection to the arrest or acquisition of 2urisdiction over the person of theaccused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the ob2ection is deemedwaived. Gurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired throughcompulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntaryappearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. "ny ob2ectionto the arrest or acquisition of 2urisdiction over the person of the accused must bemade before he enters his plea, otherwise the ob2ection is deemed waived. "naccused submits to the 2urisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea andparticipating actively in the trial and this precludes him invo5ing any irregularitiesthat may have attended his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused isnot a su7cient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon acomplaint duly 8led and a trial conducted without error.

ame; Constitutional Law; :ight to Counsel; !he right to counsel is deemed to havearisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to

stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.Contrary to Lara6s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he wasplaced in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to hisconviction. !hat he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel didnot render umulong6s identi8cation of Lara inadmissible. !he right to counsel isdeemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins andbeing made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodialinvestigation.

:emedial Law; =vidence; Circumstantial =vidence; =ven in the absence of directevidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute anunbro5en chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accusedis guilty, to the e/clusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. Eell-settled is therule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matri/wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and 8nding of guilt. =ven in theabsence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstancesconstitute an unbro5en chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis thatthe accused is guilty, to the e/clusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. @nder

ection ), :ule %(( of the :evised :ules on Criminal rocedure, circumstantialevidence su7ced to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites# $a&

''*



there is more than one circumstance; $b& the facts from which the inferences arederived are proven; and $c& the combination of all the circumstances is such as toproduce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Criminal Law; :obbery with omicide; 3n cases of robbery with homicide, the ta5ingof personal property with intent to gain must itself be established beyondreasonable doubt; 3t must be shown that the original criminal design of the culpritwas robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation ofthe robbery by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. 3ndeed, in cases ofrobbery with homicide, the ta5ing of personal property with intent to gain mustitself be established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving thephysical act of asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution. 3tmust be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was robbery and thehomicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery byreason or on the occasion of the robbery. !he mere presence of the accused at thecrime scene is not enough to implicate him. 3t is essential to prove the intent to roband the use of violence was necessary to reali<e such intent.

ame; "libi; 3t is well-settled that positive identi8cation prevails over alibi, which isinherently a wea5 defense. 3n view of umulong6s positive identi8cation of Lara,the C" was correct in denying Lara6s alibi outright. 3t is well-settled that positiveidenti8cation prevails over alibi, which is inherently a wea5 defense. uch is therule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and di7cult to disapprove. >oreover,in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that theaccused was somewhere else when the o ense was committed, but it must li5ewisebe demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to havebeen physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at thetime of its commission. 4ue to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clearand convincing proof. eople vs. Lara, +KI C:" (('$'H%'&J

''+



48. C%"! "- +) * '") 2", G.R. N). 905015, N)*" "% 1;,9014C !" T+#2" MA. MIMIE CRESCENCIO, "#+#+)-"%, *!. 'EO'LEOF THE 'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C%+ +- 2 L F)%"!#% C)/" '"- 2#+"!

"ttorneys; "ttorney-Client :elationship; "s a general rule, the inadvertence ofcounsel cannot be considered as an adequate e/cuse as to call for the appellatecourt6s indulgence e/cept# $a& where the rec5less or gross negligence of counseldeprives the client of due process of law; $b& when application of the rule will resultin outright deprivation of the client6s liberty or property; or $c& where the interests of 2ustice so require. "s a general rule, the inadvertence of counsel cannot beconsidered as an adequate e/cuse as to call for the appellate court6s indulgencee/cept# $a& where the rec5less or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client ofdue process of law; $b& when application of the rule will result in outright deprivationof the client6s liberty or property; or $c& where the interests of 2ustice so require.

ere, the petitioner submits that the inadvertence of her counsel to serve a copy ofthe "ppellant6s 9rief to the O is a persuasive reason or a compelling 2usti8cationto forego the :ules of rocedure as the wanton rec5lessness or gross negligence ofher counsel has deprived her of due process of law which will result in the outrightdeprivation of her liberty. 3n this regard, the Court agrees that the C" should have

ta5en a liberal view of the rules and ruled on the merits of the appeal, especiallywhen what is involved is no less than the petitioner6s liberty.

Constitutional Law; Criminal rocedure; lainview 4octrine; earches and ei<ures;@nder the plain view doctrine, ob2ects falling in the 0plain view? of an o7cer, whohas a right to be in the position to have that view, are sub2ect to sei<ure and may bepresented as evidence. !he Constitution recogni<es the right of the people to besecured in their persons, houses, papers, and e ects against unreasonable searchesand sei<ures. onetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantlesssearches and sei<ures admits of certain e/ceptions, one of which is sei<ure ofevidence in plain view. @nder the plain view doctrine, ob2ects falling in the 0plainview? of an o7cer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, aresub2ect to sei<ure and may be presented as evidence. !here is no question that the4= : personnel were not armed with a search warrant when they went to thehouse of the petitioner. Ehen the 4= : personnel arrived at the petitioner6s house,the lumbers were lying under the latter6s house and at the shoreline about twometers away from the house of the petitioner. 3t is clear, therefore, that the saidlumber is plainly e/posed to sight. ence, the sei<ure of the lumber outside thepetitioner6s house falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.

''K



ame; ame; ame; Earrantless "rrests; Forestry Code; ection IH of the ForestryCode authori<es the forestry o7cer or employee of the 4epartment of =nvironmentand atural :esources $4= :& or any personnel of the hilippine ational olice$ & to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has committed or iscommitting in his presence any of the o enses de8ned by the Forestry Code and to

sei<e and con8scate the tools and equipment used in committing the o ense or theforest products gathered or ta5en by the o ender. !he 4= : personnel had theauthority to arrest the petitioner, even without a warrant. ection IH of the ForestryCode authori<es the forestry o7cer or employee of the 4= : or any personnel ofthe hilippine ational olice to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who hascommitted or is committing in his presence any of the o enses de8ned by theForestry Code and to sei<e and con8scate the tools and equipment used incommitting the o ense or the forest products gathered or ta5en by the o ender.Clearly, in the course of such lawful intrusion, the 4= : personnel had inadvertentlycome across the lumber which evidently incriminated the petitioner. !he fact ofpossession by the petitioner of the ') pieces of magsihagon lumber, as well as hersubsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under e/isting forestlaws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of the Forestry Code.@nder ection +I of the Forestry Code, there are two distinct and separate o ensespunished, namely# $%& cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or otherforest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable publicland, or from private land without any authority; and $'& possession of timber orother forest products without the legal documents required under e/isting forestlaws and regulations.

Criminal Law; Forestry Code; enalties; Aiolation of ection +I of the Forestry Codeis punished as uali8ed !heft under "rticle (%H in relation to "rticle (HD of the:evised enal Code $: C&. "ccordingly, the Court imposes on the petitioner the

minimum penalty under "rticle (HD$+& of the : C, which is arresto mayor in itsminimum and medium periods. owever, considering that violation of ection +I ofthe Forestry Code is punished as uali8ed !heft under "rticle (%H in relation to"rticle (HD of the : C, the statutory penalty shall be increased by two degrees, thatis, to prisi n correccional in its medium and ma/imum periods or within the range of three $(& years, si/ $+& months and twenty-one $'%& days to four $)& years, nine $D&months and ten $%H& days, considering that there are no attending mitigating oraggravating circumstance in the commission of the o ense. Crescencio vs. eople,K)% C:" (%D$'H%)&J

''I



4;. '") 2" *. C) "/, G.R. N). 900334, J$2 30, 9014C !" T+#2" THE 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#

"22"", *!. VICTOR COGAED ROMANA, $!"/"22 -#.

C !" N #$%" A''EAL (%) /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )(A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L C%+ +- 2 '%) "/$%"S" % "! -/ S"+=$%"! EK 2$!+)- % R$2" F%$+# )( # "')+!)-)$! T%""Constitutional Law; :ight to rivacy; !he right to privacy is a fundamental rightenshrined by implication in our Constitution. !he right to privacy is a fundamentalright enshrined by implication in our Constitution. 3t has many dimensions. One ofits dimensions is its protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searchesand sei<ures in "rticle 333, ection ' of the Constitution# !he right of the people to besecure in their persons, houses, papers, and e ects against unreasonable searchesand sei<ures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and nosearch warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e/cept upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the 2udge after e/amination under oath or a7rmation ofthe complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing theplace to be searched and the persons or things to be sei<ed.

ame; Criminal rocedure; earches and ei<ures; !here must be a particulardescription of the place and the things to be searched. "s a general rule, searches

conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision arereasonable. !his warrant requires the e/istence of probable cause that can only bedetermined by a 2udge. !he e/istence of probable cause must be established by the 2udge after as5ing searching questions and answers. robable cause at this stagecan only e/ist if there is an o ense alleged to be committed. "lso, the warrantframes the searches done by the law enforcers. !here must be a particulardescription of the place and the things to be searched.

ame; ame; ame; Earrantless earches; !here are instances when searches arereasonable even when warrantless. !here are instances when searches arereasonable even when warrantless. 3n the :ules of Court, searches incidental tolawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. !his court has ta5en

into account the 0uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose ofthe search or sei<ure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner inwhich the search and sei<ure was made, the place or thing searched, and thecharacter of the articles procured.? !he 5nown 2urisprudential instances ofreasonable warrantless searches and sei<ures are# %. Earrantless search incidentalto a lawful arrest. . . ; '. ei<ure of evidence in 0plain view,? . . . ; (. earch of amoving vehicle. ighly regulated by the government, the vehicle6s inherent mobilityreduces e/pectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares

''D



furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that theoccupant committed a criminal activity; ). Consented warrantless search; *.Customs search; +. top and fris5; and K. =/igent and emergency circumstances.

ame; ame; ame; ame; earches 3ncidental to a Lawful "rrest; earchesincidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in Bagrante delicto,and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the personarrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve theevidence. One of these 2urisprudential e/ceptions to search warrants is 0stop andfris5.? 0 top and fris5? searches are often confused with searches incidental tolawful arrests under the :ules of Court. earches incidental to a lawful arrest requirethat a crime be committed in Bagrante delicto, and the search conducted within thevicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are noweapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

ame; ame; ame; 0 top and Fris5? earches; !he 0stop and fris5? search shouldbe used 0when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation inthe city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure a searchwarrant.? 0 top and fris5? searches are conducted to prevent the occurrence of acrime. For instance, the search in osadas v. Court of "ppeals, %II C:" 'II$%DDH&, was similar 0to a Nstop and fris56 situation whose ob2ect is either todetermine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quomomentarily while the police o7cer see5s to obtain more information.? !his courtstated that the 0stop and fris5? search should be used 0 wJhen dealing with arapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets whereunarguably there is no time to secure . . . a search warrant.?

ame; ame; ame; ame; 3t is the police o7cer who should observe facts thatwould lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. !he police o7cer should

not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. 3t is the police o7cer whoshould observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of aperson. !he police o7cer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by anotherperson. !his is necessary to 2ustify that the person suspected be stopped andreasonably searched. "nything less than this would be an infringement upon one6sbasic right to security of one6s person and e ects.

ame; ame; ame; Earrantless earches; For warrantless searches, probablecause was de8ned as 0a reasonable ground of suspicion supported bycircumstances su7ciently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man tobelieve that the person accused is guilty of the o ense with which he is charged.?For warrantless searches, probable cause was de8ned as 0a reasonable ground ofsuspicion supported by circumstances su7ciently strong in themselves to warrant acautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the o ense with whichhe is charged.?

ame; ame; ame; 0 top and Fris5? earches; !he 0stop and fris5? search wasoriginally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerousweapons. olice o7cers cannot 2ustify unbridled searches and be shielded by thise/ception, unless there is compliance with the 0genuine reason? requirement and

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that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. "s stated in >alacat v.Court of "ppeals, 'I( C:" %*D $%DDK&# "J 0stop-and-fris5? serves a two-foldinterest# $%& the general interest of e ective crime prevention and detection, whichunderlies the recognition that a police o7cer may, under appropriate circumstancesand in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating

possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and $'& the more pressinginterest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police o7cer to ta5e stepsto assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadlyweapon that could une/pectedly and fatally be used against the police o7cer.$=mphasis supplied& !he 0stop and fris5? search was originally limited to outerclothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. "s in >analili v. Courtof "ppeals, 'IH C:" )HH $%DDK&, 2urisprudence also allows 0stop and fris5? forcases involving dangerous drugs.

ame; ame; ame; earches 3ncidental to a Lawful "rrest; :ule %'+, ection %( ofthe :ules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. :ule %'+,

ection %( of the :ules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For

there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawfulwarrantless arrest as enumerated in :ule %%(, ection * of the :ules of Court#

ection_*. "rrest without warrant; when lawful. " peace o7cer or a private personmay, without a warrant, arrest a person# $a& Ehen, in his presence, the person to bearrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit ano ense; $b& Ehen an o ense has 2ust been committed and he has probable cause tobelieve based on personal 5nowledge of facts or circumstances that the person tobe arrested has committed it; and $c& Ehen the person to be arrested is a prisonerwho has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving 8nal 2udgment or temporarily con8ned while his case is pending, or has escaped whilebeing transferred from one con8nement to another.

ame; ame; ame; !he implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, couldnot have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating orcoercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purviewof the constitutional guarantee. !here can be no valid waiver of Cogaed6sconstitutional rights even if we assume that he did not ob2ect when the police as5edhim to open his bags. "s this court previously stated# "ppellant6s silence should notbe lightly ta5en as consent to such search. !he implied acquiescence to the search,if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity givenunder intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent atall within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. $Citations omitted& Cogaed6ssilence or lac5 of aggressive ob2ection was a natural reaction to a coerciveenvironment brought about by the police o7cer6s e/cessive intrusion into hisprivate space. !he prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that thewaiver of a constitutional right is one which is 5nowing, intelligent, and free fromany coercion. 3n all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

ame; ame; ame; For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutionalright, it is not su7cient that the police o7cer introduce himself or herself, or be5nown as a police o7cer. !he police o7cer must also inform the person to be

'(%



searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his orher ob2ections that the circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. For avalid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not su7cient thatthe police o7cer introduce himself or herself, or be 5nown as a police o7cer. !hepolice o7cer must also inform the person to be searched that any inaction on his or

her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her ob2ections that thecircumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. !he police o7cer mustcommunicate this clearly and in a language 5nown to the person who is about towaive his or her constitutional rights. !here must be an assurance given to thepolice o7cer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. !he fundamentalnature of a person6s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.

ame; ame; ame; =/clusionary :ule; Fruit of the oisonous !ree; =videnceobtained through unlawful sei<ures should be e/cluded as evidence because it is0the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional in2unction againstunreasonable searches and sei<ures.? !he Constitution provides# "ny evidenceobtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and sei<uresJ shall

be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise 5nown as thee/clusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutionalprovision originated from tonehill v. 4io5no, 'H C:" (I( $%D+K&. !his ruleprohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on8shing e/peditions. =vidence obtained through unlawful sei<ures should bee/cluded as evidence because it is 0the only practical means of enforcing theconstitutional in2unction against unreasonable searches and sei<ures.? 3t ensuresthat the fundamental rights to one6s person, houses, papers, and e ects are notlightly infringed upon and are upheld. eople vs. Cogaed, K(% C:" )'K$'H%)&J

50. ')22) *. C)-!# -#+-) D *+/, G.R. N). 181881, O #) "%

18, 9011C !" T+#2" BRICCIO R+ ? A. 'OLLO, "#+#+)-"%, *!.CHAIR'ERSON @ARINA CONSTANTINO DAVID, DIRECTOR IVRAC UEL DE GU:MAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A.CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITEAND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.

S 22 + C2 !! R+ # #) '%+*Constitutional Law; 9ill of :ights; :ight to rivacy; !he right to privacy has beenaccorded recognition as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee againstunreasonable search and sei<ure under ection ', "rticle 333 of the %DIKConstitution. !he right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this 2urisdictionas a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search andsei<ure under ection ', "rticle 333 of the %DIK Constitution, which provides# ec. '.

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!he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and e ectsagainst unreasonable searches and sei<ures of whatever nature and for any purposeshall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e/ceptupon probable cause to be determined personally by the 2udge after e/aminationunder oath or a7rmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,

and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to besei<ed.

:ight to rivacy; !he Civil ervice Commission $C C& had implemented a policy thatput its employees on notice that they have no e/pectation of privacy in anythingthey create, store, send or receive on the o7ce computers, and that the C C maymonitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means.

!he C C in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on noticethat they have no e/pectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send orreceive on the o7ce computers, and that the C C may monitor the use of thecomputer resources using both automated or human means. !his implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used

only for such legitimate business purposes.ame; " search by a government employer of an employee6s o7ce is 2usti8ed at

inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn upevidence that the employee is guilty of wor5-related misconduct. " search by agovernment employer of an employee6s o7ce is 2usti8ed at inception when thereare reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that theemployee is guilty of wor5-related misconduct. !hus, in the 'HH) case decided bythe @ Court of "ppeals =ighth Circuit, it was held that where a governmentagency6s computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographiccontent and in addition e/pressly provided that employees do not have anypersonal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems andtechnology, the government employee had no legitimate e/pectation of privacy asto the use and contents of his o7ce computer, and therefore evidence found duringwarrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for childpornography. 3n that case, the defendant employee6s computer hard drive was 8rstremotely e/amined by a computer information technician after his supervisorreceived complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-wor5-related e-mail messages throughout the o7ce. Ehen the supervisor con8rmedthat defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, incontravention of the e/press policy of the agency, his computer tower and Boppydis5s were ta5en and e/amined. " formal administrative investigation ensued andlater search warrants were secured by the police department. !he initial remotesearch of the hard drive of petitioner6s computer, as well as the subsequentwarrantless searches was held as valid under the O6Connor ruling that a publicemployer can investigate wor5-related misconduct so long as any search is 2usti8edat inception and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 2usti8ed itin the 8rst place.

Civil rocedure; "ppeals; ubstantial =vidence; Eell-settled is the rule that the8ndings of fact of quasi-2udicial agencies, li5e the Civil ervice Commission $C C&,

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are accorded not only respect but even 8nality if such 8ndings are supported bysubstantial evidence. Eell-settled is the rule that the 8ndings of fact of quasi- 2udicial agencies, li5e the C C, are accorded not only respect but even 8nality ifsuch 8ndings are supported by substantial evidence. ubstantial evidence is suchamount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivablyopine otherwise.

C": 3O,_G., eparate Concurring Opinion#

:ight to rivacy; Aiew that the Civil ervice Commission $C C& regulation declaring ano-privacy e/pectation on the use of government-owned computers logically followsfrom the statutory rule that government-owned property shall be used 0solely? for apublic purpose. "ny private use of a government property, li5e a government-owned computer, is prohibited by law. Consequently, a government employeecannot e/pect any privacy when he uses a government-owned computer becausehe 5nows he cannot use the computer for any private purpose. !he C C regulationdeclaring a no-privacy e/pectation on the use of government-owned computerslogically follows from the statutory rule that government-owned property shall beused 0solely? for a public purpose.

ame; Aiew that the Civil ervice Commission $C C& o7ce regulation denying C Cemployees privacy e/pectation in 0anything they create, store, send, or receive inthe computer system? is constitutionally in8rm insofar as the regulation e/cludesfrom its ambit the three C C commissioners solely by reason of their ran5, and notby reason of the con8dential nature of the electronic data they generate. !he C Co7ce regulation denying C C employees privacy e/pectation in 0anything theycreate, store, send, or receive in the computer system,? although valid as topetitioner 9riccio ollo, is constitutionally in8rm insofar as the regulation e/cludes

from its ambit the three C C commissioners solely by reason of their ran5, and notby reason of the con8dential nature of the electronic data they generate.

9ersamin,_G., Concurring and 4issenting Opinion#

:ight to rivacy; Aiew that the right to privacy involved herein is the petitioner6sright to informational privacy in his wor5place, speci8cally his right to wor5 freelywithout surveillance or intrusion. "t the outset, 3 state that the right to privacyinvolved herein is the petitioner6s right to informational privacy in his wor5place,speci8cally his right to wor5 freely without surveillance or intrusion.

ame; Aiew that even without O7ce >emorandum $O>& o. %H, eries of 'HH'being issued by respondent arina Constantino-4avid as Chairman of the Civil

ervice Commission, the employees of the Commission have a reduced e/pectationof privacy in the wor5place. =ven without O7ce >emorandum $O>& o. %H, eriesof 'HH' being issued by respondent arina Constantino-4avid as Chairman of theCivil ervice Commission, the employees of the Commission, including thepetitioner, have a reduced e/pectation of privacy in the wor5place. !he ob2ective ofthe issuance of O> o. %H has been only to formally inform and ma5e aware theemployees of the Commission about the limitations on their privacy while they are

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in the wor5place and to advise them that the Commission has legitimate reasons tomonitor communications made by them, electronically or not.

ame; Aiew that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable e/pectation of privacy inrespect of the communications created, stored, sent, or received after o7ce hoursthrough the o7ce computer, as to which he must be protected. 3 hold, instead,that the petitioner is entitled to a reasonable e/pectation of privacy in respect ofthe communications created, stored, sent, or received after o7ce hours through theo7ce computer, as to which he must be protected.

ame; Aiew that the validity of the sei<ure of the 8les should be limited to the needfor determining whether or not the petitioner un2ustly utili<ed o7cial resources ofthe Commission for personal purposes, and should not e/tend to the reading of the8les6 contents, which would be violative of his right to privacy. !hus, 3 vote touphold the legality of O> o. %H. 3 hasten to add, to be very clear, that the validityof the sei<ure of the 8les should be limited to the need for determining whether ornot the petitioner un2ustly utili<ed o7cial resources of the Commission for personalpurposes, and should not e/tend to the reading of the 8les6 contents, which wouldbe violative of his right to privacy.

ame; Aiew that although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to be en2oyedby the people, the tate cannot 2ust sit bac5 and stand aside when, in the e/erciseof his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment ofthe national interest. 3 adhere to the principle that every man is believed to befree. Freedom gears a man to move about unhampered and to spea5 out fromconviction. !hat is why the right to privacy has earned its worthy place in the 9ill of:ights. owever, although the right to privacy is referred to as a right to be en2oyedby the people, the tate cannot 2ust sit bac5 and stand aside when, in the e/erciseof his right to privacy, the individual perilously tilts the scales to the detriment of

the national interest.ame; Aiew that the ruling about the decreased e/pectation of privacy in the

wor5place may generate an unwanted implication for employers in general tohenceforth consider themselves authori<ed, without ris5ing a collision with theConstitutionally-protected right to privacy, to probe and pry into communicationsmade during wor5 hours by their employees through the use of their computers andother digital instruments of communication. 3 apprehend that the ruling about thedecreased e/pectation of privacy in the wor5place may generate an unwantedimplication for employers in general to henceforth consider themselves authori<ed,without ris5ing a collision with the Constitutionally-protected right to privacy, toprobe and pry into communications made during wor5 hours by their employeesthrough the use of their computers and other digital instruments of communication. !hus, the employers may possibly begin to monitor their employees6 phone calls, toscreen incoming and out-going e-mails, to capture queries made through any of the3nternet6s e7cient search engines $li5e oogle&, or to censor visited websites $li5e Pahoo`, Faceboo5 or !witter& in the avowed interest of ensuring productivity andsupervising use of business resources. !hat will be unfortunate.

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ame; Aiew that a recognition of the limitations of man as a being needful of somee/tent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during wor5 hours, ismost essential in order to fully ma/imi<e the potential by which his services wasobtained in the 8rst place. "lthough the interests of capital or public service domerit protection, a recognition of the limitations of man as a being needful of some

e/tent of rest, and of some degree of personal space even during wor5 hours, ismost essential in order to fully ma/imi<e the potential by which his services wasobtained in the 8rst place. !he 2ob should not own him the whole time he is in thewor5place. =ven while he remains in the wor5place, he must be allowed to preservehis own identity, to maintain an inner self, to safeguard his beliefs, and to 5eepcertain thoughts, 2udgments and desires hidden. ollo vs. Constantino-4avid, +*D

C:" %ID$'H%%&J

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51. '"!#+2)! *. G"-"%)!), G.R. N). 189601, N)*" "% 10,9014C !" T+#2" JOEY M. 'ESTILOS, D IGHT MACA'ANAS,MIGUEL GACES, JERRY FERNANDE: -/ RONALD MU O:,

"#+#+)-"%!, *!. MORENO GENEROSO -/ 'EO'LE OF THE'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! R" "/+ 2 L C%+ +- 2 L C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L '%"2+ +- % I-*"!#+ #+)- :emedial Law; Criminal rocedure; "rrests; Earrantless "rrests; robable Cause;

ection *$b&, :ule %%( of the %DI* :ules of Criminal rocedure was further amendedwith the incorporation of the word 0probable cause? as the basis of the arrestingo7cer6s determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed thecrime. ection *$b&, :ule %%( of the %DI* :ules of Criminal rocedure was furtheramended with the incorporation of the word 0probable cause? as the basis of thearresting o7cer6s determination on whether the person to be arrested hascommitted the crime. ence, as presently worded, ection *$b&, :ule %%( of the:evised :ules of Criminal rocedure provides that# Ehen an o ense has 2ust beencommitted, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal 5nowledge offacts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

ame; ame; ame; ame; "s presently worded, the elements under ection *$b&,

:ule %%( of the :evised :ules of Criminal rocedure are# 8rst, an o ense has 2ustbeen committed; and second, the arresting o7cer has probable cause to believebased on personal 5nowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to bearrested has committed it. From the current phraseology of the rules onwarrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of ection *$b&, the following are thenotable changes# 8rst, the contemplated o ense was quali8ed by the word 02ust,?connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to bearrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arrestingo7cer based on his personal 5nowledge of facts and circumstances that the personto be arrested has committed it. 3t is clear that the present rules have NNob2ecti8ed?the previously sub2ective determination of the arresting o7cer as to the $%&

commission of the crime; and $'& whether the person sought to be arrestedcommitted the crime. "ccording to Feria, these changes were adopted to minimi<earrests based on mere suspicion or hearsay. "s presently worded, the elementsunder ection *$b&, :ule %%( of the :evised :ules of Criminal rocedure are# 8rst, ano ense has 2ust been committed; and second, the arresting o7cer has probablecause to believe based on personal 5nowledge of facts or circumstances that theperson to be arrested has committed it.

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ame; ame; ame; ame; 3n determining the e/istence of probable cause, thearresting o7cer should ma5e a thorough investigation and e/ercise reasonable 2udgment. 3n determining the e/istence of probable cause, the arresting o7cershould ma5e a thorough investigation and e/ercise reasonable 2udgment. !hestandards for evaluating the factual basis supporting a probable cause assessment

are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in a case where a warrantis sought from a 2udicial o7cer. !he probable cause determination of a warrantlessarrest is based on information that the arresting o7cer possesses at the time of thearrest and not on the information acquired later. 3n evaluating probable cause,probability and not certainty is the determinant of reasonableness under the Fourth"mendment. robable cause involves probabilities similar to the factual andpractical questions of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent persons act.3t is a pragmatic question to be determined in each case in light of the particularcircumstances and the particular o ense involved.

ame; ame; reliminary 3nvestigations; !he purpose of a preliminary investigationis to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable

cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for trial.!he purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has

been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused isguilty of the crime and should be held for trial. 3n 9uchanan v. Aiuda de =steban, ('

hil. (+( $%D%*&, we de8ned probable cause as the e/istence of facts andcircumstances as would e/cite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the factswithin the 5nowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of thecrime for which he was prosecuted.

ame; ame; robable Cause; Earrant of "rrest; 9efore issuing a warrant of arrest,the 2udge must be satis8ed that based on the evidence submitted, there is su7cientproof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested isprobably guilty thereof. ence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the 2udge mustbe satis8ed that based on the evidence submitted, there is su7cient proof that acrime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guiltythereof. "t this stage of the criminal proceeding, the 2udge is not yet tas5ed toreview in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. 3t issu7cient that he personally evaluates the evidence in determining probable causeto issue a warrant of arrest.

ame; ame; ame; "rrests; Earrantless "rrests; !he arresting o7cer6sdetermination of probable cause under ection *$b&, :ule %%( of the :evised :ulesof Criminal rocedure is based on his personal 5nowledge of facts or circumstances

that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. 3n contrast, thearresting o7cer6s determination of probable cause under ection *$b&, :ule %%( ofthe :evised :ules of Criminal rocedure is based on his personal 5nowledge of factsor circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. !hese facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supportedby circumstances su7ciently strong in themselves to create the probable cause ofguilt of the person to be arrested. " reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded

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on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace o7cers ma5ingthe arrest.

ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; @nder the present rules and 2urisprudence, thearresting o7cer should base his determination of probable cause on his personal5nowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested hascommitted the crime; the public prosecutor and the 2udge must base theirdetermination on the evidence submitted by the parties. 3t is clear therefore thatthe standard for determining 0probable cause? is invariable for the o7cer arrestingwithout a warrant, the public prosecutor, and the 2udge issuing a warrant of arrest.3t is the e/istence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonablydiscreet and prudent person to believe that an o ense has been committed by theperson sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be. owever, whilethe arresting o7cer, the public prosecutor and the 2udge all determine 0probablecause,? within the spheres of their respective functions, its e/istence is inBuencedheavily by the available facts and circumstance within their possession. 3n short,although these o7cers use the same standard of a reasonable man, they possess

dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as set by the rules, upon which theymust determine probable cause. !hus, under the present rules and 2urisprudence,the arresting o7cer should base his determination of probable cause on hispersonal 5nowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to bearrested has committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the 2udge must basetheir determination on the evidence submitted by the parties. 3n other words, thearresting o7cer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence or availableinformation that he must personally gather within a limited time frame.

ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; !he upreme Court $ C& holds that the followingmust be present for a valid warrantless arrest# %& the crime should have been 2ustcommitted; and '& the arresting o7cer6s e/ercise of discretion is limited by thestandard of probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstanceswithin his personal 5nowledge. !he clincher in the element of 0personal 5nowledgeof facts or circumstances? is the required element of immediacy within which thesefacts or circumstances should be gathered. !his required time element acts as asafeguard to ensure that the police o7cers have gathered the facts or perceived thecircumstances within a very limited time frame. !his guarantees that the policeo7cers would have no time to base their probable cause 8nding on facts orcircumstances obtained after an e/haustive investigation. !he reason for theelement of the immediacy is this as the time gap from the commission of thecrime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to becomecontaminated and sub2ected to e/ternal factors, interpretations and hearsay. On theother hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under ection *$b&, :ule %%( of the :evised :ules of Criminal rocedure, the police o7cer6s determination ofprobable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated facts orcircumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time. !hesame provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of probable cause asthe standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police o7cercould e ect a valid warrantless arrest. 3n light of the discussion above on thedevelopments of ection *$b&, :ule %%( of the :evised :ules of Criminal rocedure

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and our 2urisprudence on the matter, we hold that the following must be present fora valid warrantless arrest# %& the crime should have been 2ust committed; and '& thearresting o7cer6s e/ercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable causeto be determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal 5nowledge. !he requirement of the e/istence of probable cause ob2ecti8es the reasonableness

of the warrantless arrest for purposes of compliance with the Constitutionalmandate against unreasonable arrests.

ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; Eith these facts and circumstances that thepolice o7cers gathered and which they have personally observed less than onehour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the policeo7cers had personal 5nowledge of facts or circumstances 2ustifying the petitioners6warrantless arrests. !o summari<e, the arresting o7cers went to the scene of thecrime upon the complaint of "tty. eneroso of his alleged mauling; the policeo7cers responded to the scene of the crime less than one $%& hour after the allegedmauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where "tty. eneroso and the

petitioners reside; "tty. eneroso positively identi8ed the petitioners as thoseresponsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and "tty. eneroso livedalmost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners wereconfronted by the arresting o7cers, they did not deny their participation in theincident with "tty. eneroso, although they narrated a di erent version of whattranspired. Eith these facts and circumstances that the police o7cers gathered andwhich they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that theyhave arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners,we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police o7cers had personal 5nowledgeof facts or circumstances 2ustifying the petitioners6 warrantless arrests. !hesecircumstances were well within then police o7cers6 observation, perception and

evaluation at the time of the arrest. !hese circumstances qualify as the policeo7cers6 personal observation, which are within their personal 5nowledge,prompting them to ma5e the warrantless arrests.

ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; 3t is enough that evidence of the recentcommission of the crime is patent $as in this case& and the police o7cer hasprobable cause to believe based on personal 5nowledge of facts or circumstances,that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. !o reiterate,personal 5nowledge of a crime 2ust committed under the terms of the above citedprovision, does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was beingcommitted; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime ispatent $as in this case& and the police o7cer has probable cause to believe basedon personal 5nowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested hasrecently committed the crime. Considering the circumstances of the stabbing,particularly the locality where it too5 place, its occasion, the personal circumstancesof the parties, and the immediate on-the-spot investigation that too5 place, theimmediate and warrantless arrests of the perpetrators were proper. Consequently,the inquest proceeding that the City rosecutor conducted was appropriate underthe circumstances.

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ame; ame; Gudgments; o less than the Constitution itself provides that it is thedecision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it isbased. 3n resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctlythe reasons therefor. Ee do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse ofdiscretion in this Order. !he :!C, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all

the facts found in the record of the case. 4etailed evidentiary matters, as the :!Cdecreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminaryincidents leading up to the trial. "dditionally, no less than the Constitution itselfprovides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts andthe law on which it is based. 3n resolving a motion, the court is only required to stateclearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. " contrary system would only prolong theproceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. ence, we uphold thevalidity of the :!C6s order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of thepetitioners6 @rgent >otion for :egular reliminary 3nvestigation.

Leonen,QG., 4issenting Opinion#

Constitutional Law; Criminal rocedure; 3llegal earches and ei<ures; Aiew that theright of a person to his or her liberties in the form of protections againstunreasonable searches and sei<ures en2oys a high degree of protection. 3 vote thatthe petition be granted. etitioners are entitled to a preliminary investigationbecause the warrantless arrest was not valid. !he right of a person to his or herliberties in the form of protections against unreasonable searches and sei<uresen2oys a high degree of protection. !he Constitution only allows for reasonablesearches and sei<ures. "s a general rule, courts decide whether there is probablecause to issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest.

ame; ame; Earrantless "rrests; Aiew that the elements of a valid warrantlessarrest under :ule %%(, ection *$b& are the following# $%& the o ense has 2ust been

committed; $'& the arresting o7cer has personal 5nowledge of facts orcircumstances; and $(& these facts and circumstances give rise to probable causethat the person to be arrested has committed the o ense. !he elements of a validwarrantless arrest under :ule %%(, ection *$b& are the following# $%& the o ensehas 2ust been committed; $'& the arresting o7cer has personal 5nowledge of factsor circumstances; and $(& these facts and circumstances give rise to probable causethat the person to be arrested has committed the o ense.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that to ensure that the right person can be put within the 2urisdiction of a court, the rules allow a valid warrantless arrest. !he element thatthe o ense had 02ust been committed? was introduced in the %DI* revision of the:ules of Criminal rocedure. !his element must be read in relation to the generalrequirement that a warrant of arrest must be procured to ensure a more impartialdetermination of the e/istence of facts and circumstances. !his element, however,ac5nowledges the necessities of law enforcement. "t times, the police o7cer arrivesat the scene of the crime after the crime 2ust happened and there are facts andcircumstances such as the sudden Bight of a person or the wielding of a weaponby a person near the incident that reasonably lead the police o7cer to believethat the person is the perpetrator. 3n such cases, to ensure that the right person canbe put within the 2urisdiction of a court, the rules allow a valid warrantless arrest.

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!his necessity is wanting in this case. etitioners themselves, together with abarangay tanod, voluntarily went to the police station. !hey did so after they hadgone to the barangay hall to report the incident and had their own complaintsentered into the barangay blotter. !here was no urgency to arrest petitioners. !heywere not planning to Bee. !hey voluntarily presented themselves as complainants

against private respondent. For reasons not clear in the record, they were sub2ectedto a warrantless arrest and then to inquest. rivate respondent, on the other hand,was allowed to be a respondent in a preliminary investigation. e was not arrested.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the arresting o7cers must obtain personal5nowledge of the facts and circumstances that lead to the conclusion that ano ense has 2ust been committed. !he arresting o7cers must obtain personal5nowledge of the facts and circumstances that lead to the conclusion that ano ense has 2ust been committed. !hey must also perceive facts and circumstancesthat would substantiate the probable liability of the person. !he accused is usuallyidenti8ed when he or she is seen Beeing the scene because the act of Beeingsuggests the attempt to evade authority. " person in possession of a weapon could

also be perceived as the one liable for an o ense.ame; ame; ame; Aiew that in eople v. Cogaed, K(% C:" )'K $'H%)&, theupreme Court $ C& ruled that for there to be a 0genuine reason? to e/ecute a

warrantless arrest or search, there should be more than one suspiciouscircumstance to infer that there was criminal activity. !he plurality in the phrasingsuggests that there should be more than one fact or circumstance. 3n eople v.Cogaed, K(% C:" )'K $'H%)&, we ruled that for there to be a 0genuine reason? toe/ecute a warrantless arrest or search, there should be more than one suspiciouscircumstance to infer that there was criminal activity. 3n most cases that found thevalidity of the warrantless arrest, there was the presence of more than onecircumstance that formed part of the personal 5nowledge of the police o7cers.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that if there is no personal 5nowledge of facts andcircumstances on the part of the police o7cers, a warrantless arrest under :ule%%(, ection *$b& will be unreasonable because there is nothing to base probablecause on that the accused committed the o ense. Flight of the accused is often asign that there is probable cause that he or she committed the o ense. Ehen he orshe attempts to escape from authorities, the authorities must act immediatelybecause not doing so might compromise the investigation. 3f there is no personal5nowledge of facts and circumstances on the part of the police o7cers, awarrantless arrest under :ule %%(, ection *$b& will be unreasonable because thereis nothing to base probable cause on that the accused committed the o ense.

:emedial Law; Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; reliminary 3nvestigation; Aiew thatwith the absence of a valid warrantless arrest, petitioners are entitled to preliminaryinvestigation. Eith the absence of a valid warrantless arrest, petitioners areentitled to preliminary investigation. reliminary investigation is 0an inquiry or aproceeding the purpose of which is to determine whether there is su7cient groundto engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and therespondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.? !he right topreliminary investigation is statutory in character. 9eing mandated by statute, a

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preliminary investigation becomes part of the constitutional due process rightsaccorded to the accused.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Aiew that under :ule %%' of the :ules of Court, apreliminary investigation is required if an o ense has a penalty of at least four $)&years, two $'& months, and one $%& day. owever, under ection + of the same rules,a preliminary investigation is no longer necessary if the person accused wasarrested lawfully without a warrant. @nder :ule %%', a preliminary investigation isrequired if an o ense has a penalty of at least four $)& years, two $'& months, andone $%& day. owever, under ection + of the same rules, a preliminary investigationis no longer necessary if the person accused was arrested lawfully without awarrant. 3f there was a valid warrantless arrest under :ule %%(, ection *, inquestproceedings are required.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Aiew that based on the >anual for rosecutors, inquestsare conducted by a public prosecutor assigned as an 3nquest O7cer. 9ased on the>anual for rosecutors, inquests are conducted by a public prosecutor assigned asan 3nquest O7cer. "n inquest is conducted only at the police stations orheadquarters of the hilippine ational olice, unless otherwise directed. ere,petitioners alleged that they were brought from 9atasan ills olice tation to theO7ce of the rosecutor. "t the O7ce of the rosecutor, it was decided thatpetitioners would be sub2ected to inquest, while respondent would undergopreliminary investigation. !his irregularly conducted inquest aggravates the factthat petitioners were sub2ected to an inquest despite lac5 of a valid warrantlessarrest. estilos vs. eneroso, K(D C:" ((K$'H%)&J

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59. L$ -) *. '") 2", G.R. N). 189555 S" #" "% 7,9010C !" T+#2" LENIDO LUMANOG -/ AUGUSTO SANTOS,

"#+#+)-"%!, *!. 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#.C !" N #$%" 'ETITIONS ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L R" "/+ 2 L H)#'$%!$+# %% -#2"!! A%%"!#Constitutional Law; :emedial Law; Gudgments; Gudges are e/pected to ma5ecomplete 8ndings of fact in their decisions and scrutini<e closely the legal aspectsof the case in the light of the evidence presented. !he Constitution commands that0 nJo decision shall be rendered by any court without e/pressing therein clearly and

distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.? Gudges are e/pected to ma5ecomplete 8ndings of fact in their decisions and scrutini<e closely the legal aspectsof the case in the light of the evidence presented. !hey should avoid the tendencyto generali<e and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which suchconclusions are deduced.

ame; ame; ame; >emorandum 4ecisions; !hough it is not a good practice, Courtsees nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely copying thememorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearly and distinctlystates su7cient 8ndings of fact and the law on which they are based. 3n 9an5 ofthe hilippine 3slands v. Leobrera, (K* C:" I% $'HH'&, we held that though it is nota good practice, we see nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completelycopying the memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearlyand distinctly states su7cient 8ndings of fact and the law on which they are based.3n another case where we upheld the validity of memorandum decisions, wenevertheless too5 occasion to remind 2udges that it is still desirable for an appellate 2udge to endeavor to ma5e the issues clearer and use his own perceptiveness inunraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law. o lessimportantly, he must use his own language in laying down his 2udgment.

ame; :ight to Counsel; Custodial 3nvestigations; Custodial investigation refers tothe critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry intoan unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation isno longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on aparticular person as a suspect. olice o7cers claimed that appellants wereapprehended as a result of 0hot pursuit? activities on the days following theambush-slay of "badilla. !here is no question, however, that when appellants werearrested they were already considered suspects# Goel was pinpointed by securityguard "le2o who went along with the ":"C squad to Fairview on Gune %D, %DD+,while the rest of appellants were ta5en by the same operatives in follow-up

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operations after Goel provided them with the identities of his conspirators and wherethey could be found.

ame; ame; ame; =/tra2udicial Confession; ettled is the rule that the moment apolice o7cer tries to elicit admissions, or confessions or even plain information froma suspect, the latter should, at that 2uncture, be assisted by counsel, unless hewaives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. 13nsp. Castillo admittedthat the initial questioning of Goel began in the morning of Gune 'H, %DD+, the 8rsttime said suspect was presented to him at the C 4C station, even before he wasbrought to the 39 O7ce for the ta5ing of his formal statement. !hus, the possibilityof appellant Goel having been sub2ected to intimidation or violence in the hands ofpolice investigators as he claims, cannot be discounted. !he constitutionalrequirement obviously had not been observed. ettled is the rule that the moment apolice o7cer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information froma suspect, the latter should, at that 2uncture, be assisted by counsel, unless hewaives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. !he purpose of providingcounsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice

of e/tracting a confession that leads appellant to ma5e self-incriminatingstatements.

ame; ame; ame; ame; " confession is not valid and not admissible in evidencewhen it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodialinvestigation. =ven assuming that custodial investigation started only during Goel6se/ecution of his statement before "tty. ansano on Gune 'H, %DD+, still the saidconfession must be invalidated. !o be acceptable, e/tra2udicial confessions mustconform to constitutional requirements. " confession is not valid and not admissiblein evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons undercustodial investigation.

ame; ame; ame; ame; !he phrase 0preferably of his own choice? does notconvey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation ise/clusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys fromhandling the defense; " lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged bythe accused when he does not raise any ob2ection against the counsel6sappointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereaftersubscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing o7cer. !he phrase0preferably of his own choice? does not convey the message that the choice of alawyer by a person under investigation is e/clusive as to preclude other equallycompetent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise thetempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who

can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting alawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. !hus,while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogationcannot a ord the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available

is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the 8nal choice, ashe may re2ect the counsel chosen for him and as5 for another one. " lawyerprovided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does notraise any ob2ection against the counsel6s appointment during the course of the

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investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of thestatement before the swearing o7cer.

ame; ame; ame; ame; "n e ective and vigilant counsel necessarily andlogically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his clientfrom the time the confessant answers the 8rst question as5ed by the investigatingo7cer until the signing of the e/tra2udicial confession. Ee held that the modi8ercompetent and independent in the %DIK Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. 3tstresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions ofa custodial investigation, an informed 2udgment on the choices e/plained to him bya diligent and capable lawyer. "n e ective and vigilant counsel necessarily andlogically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his clientfrom the time the confessant answers the 8rst question as5ed by the investigatingo7cer until the signing of the e/tra2udicial confession. >oreover, the lawyer shouldascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person underinvestigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his e/tra2udicialconfession in relation to his constitutional rights. " contrary rule would undoubtedly

be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to bepresumed innocent.

:emedial Law; =vidence; Eitnesses; Credibility of Eitnesses; Ehen it comes tocredibility of witnesses, the court accords the highest respect, even 8nality, to theevaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presentedbefore it; !he fact alone that the 2udge who heard the evidence was not the onewho rendered the 2udgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does notrender his 2udgment erroneous or irregular. !ime and again, we have held that thetestimony of a sole eyewitness is su7cient to support a conviction so long as it isclear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. 3ndeed, when itcomes to credibility of witnesses, this Court accords the highest respect, even8nality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of thewitnesses presented before it. !his holds true notwithstanding that it was another 2udge who presided at the trial and Gudge Gaime . ala<ar, Gr. who penned thedecision in this case heard only some witnesses for the defense. 3t is a/iomatic thatthe fact alone that the 2udge who heard the evidence was not the one who renderedthe 2udgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does not render his 2udgment erroneous or irregular. !his is so even if the 2udge did not have the fullestopportunity to weigh the testimonies, not having heard all the witnesses spea5 orobserved their deportment and manner of testifying.

ame; ame; "7davits; !he discrepancies between a sworn statement and

testimony in court do not outrightly 2ustify the acquittal of an accused, astestimonial evidence carries more weight than an a7davit. "ppellants ma5e muchof a few inconsistencies in his statement and testimony, with respect to the numberof assailants and his reaction when he was ordered to get down in his guard post.9ut such inconsistencies have already been e/plained by "le2o during cross-e/amination by correcting his earlier statement in using number four $)& to refer tothose persons actually standing around the car and two $'& more persons asloo5outs, and that he got nervous only when the second loo5out shouted at him to

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get down, because the latter actually po5ed a gun at him. 3t is settled thata7davits, being e/-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. !he discrepancies between asworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly 2ustify the acquittal of anaccused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than an a7davit.

ame; ame; Out-of-court 3denti8cation; rocedure for out-of-court identi8cationand the test to determine the admissibility of such identi8cation e/plained in eoplev. !eehan5ee, Gr., ')D C:" *) $%DD*&. 3n eople v. !eehan5ee, Gr., ')D C:" *)$%DD*&, we e/plained the procedure for out-of-court identi8cation and the test todetermine the admissibility of such identi8cation, thus# Out-of-court identi8cation isconducted by the police in various ways. 3t is done thru show-ups where the suspectalone is brought face to face with the witness for identi8cation. 3t is done thru mugshots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. 3t is alsodone thru line-ups where a witness identi8es the suspect from a group of personslined up for the purpose. . . 3n resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identi8cation of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances

test where they consider the following factors, vi<.# $%& the witness6 opportunity toview the criminal at the time of the crime; $'& the witness6 degree of attention atthat time; $(& the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; $)& thelevel of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identi8cation; $*& the length of time between the crime and the identi8cation; and, $+& the suggestiveness of theidenti8cation procedure.

Criminal Law; =vidence; Out-of-Court 3denti8cation; !he inadmissibility of a policeline-up identi8cation should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of anindependent in-court identi8cation. 3n any case, the trial court did not rely solelyon said out-of-court identi8cation considering that "le2o also positively identi8edappellants during the trial. !hus, even assuming arguendo that "le2o6s out-of-courtidenti8cation was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identi8cation in courtcured any Baw that may have attended it. Ee have held that the inadmissibility of apolice line-up identi8cation should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of anindependent in-court identi8cation.

ame; ame; ame; !he presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used andballistic e/amination are not prerequisites for conviction. "s this Court held inAelasco v. eople, )I( C:" +)D $'HH+& "s regards the failure of the police topresent a ballistic report on the seven spent shells recovered from the crime scene,the same does not constitute suppression of evidence. " ballistic report serves onlyas a guide for the courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case. 3t would be

indispensable if there are no credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it iscorroborative in nature. !he presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets usedand ballistic e/amination are not prerequisites for conviction. !he corpus delicti andthe positive identi8cation of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime aremore than enough to sustain his conviction. =ven without a ballistic report, thepositive identi8cation by prosecution witnesses is more than su7cient to proveaccused6s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 3n the instant case, since the identity of

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the assailant has been su7ciently established, a ballistic report on the slugs can bedispensed with in proving petitioner6s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

"libi; !o be valid for purposes of e/oneration from a criminal charge, the defense ofalibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the personcharged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, thereason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. "libi is thewea5est of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and di7cult to disprove, and it isfor this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identi8cation of the accusedby the witnesses. !o be valid for purposes of e/oneration from a criminal charge, thedefense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for theperson charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of itscommission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. !he e/cuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no e/ception. Ehere there isthe least possibility of accused6s presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not holdwater.

Criminal Law; >urder; !reachery; !he essence of treachery is the sudden andune/pected attac5 on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime,depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or to repel the aggression,thus insuring its commission without ris5 to the aggressor and without anyprovocation on the part of the victim. "s regards the presence of treachery as aqualifying circumstance, the evidence clearly showed that the attac5 on theunsuspecting victim who was inside his car on a stop position in the middle ofearly morning tra7c when he was suddenly 8red upon by the appellants wasdeliberate, sudden and une/pected. !here was simply no chance for "badilla tosurvive the ambush-slay, with successive shots quic5ly 8red at close range by two$'& armed men on both sides of his car; and much less to retaliate by using his owngun, as no less than '( gunshot wounds on his head and chest caused hisinstantaneous death. "s we have consistently ruled, the essence of treachery is thesudden and une/pected attac5 on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of thecrime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or to repel theaggression, thus insuring its commission without ris5 to the aggressor and withoutany provocation on the part of the victim.

ame; ame; =vident remeditation; !he essence of evident premeditation is thatthe e/ecution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reBection uponthe resolution to carry out criminal intent within a span of time su7cient to arrive ata calm 2udgment. =vident premeditation was li5ewise properly appreciated by thetrial court, notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Goel de Gesus6s e/tra2udicial

confession disclosing in detail the pre-planned ambush of "badilla, apparently acontract 5illing in which the perpetrators were paid or e/pected to receive paymentfor the 2ob. "s correctly pointed out by the C", "le2o had stressed that as early asK#(H in the morning of Gune %(, %DD+, he already noticed something unusual goingon upon seeing the two $'& loo5outs $appellants Goel de Gesus and Loren<o delos

antos& wal5ing to and fro along atipunan "venue infront of the building he wasguarding. !rue enough, they were e/pecting somebody to pass that way, who wasno other than "badilla driving his onda "ccord. "fter the lapse of more or less one

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$%& hour, he already heard successive gunshots, while in his guard post, from thedirection of the middle lane where "badilla6s car was surrounded by four $)& mencarrying short 8rearms. "ll the foregoing disclosed the e/ecution of a pre-conceivedplan to 5ill "badilla. !he essence of evident premeditation is that the e/ecution ofthe criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reBection upon the resolution to

carry out criminal intent within a span of time su7cient to arrive at a calm 2udgment.

ame; ame; 4eath of a arty; 4amages; 4amages that may be awarded whendeath occurs due to a crime. Ehen death occurs due to a crime, the followingdamages may be awarded# $%& civil indemnity e/ delicto for the death of the victim;$'& actual or compensatory damages; $(& moral damages; $)& e/emplary damages;and $*& temperate damages.

9=: ">3 , G., Concurring Opinion#

Constitutional Law; :emedial Law; !he records of the present case show thatimpermissible suggestion did not precede "lego6s out-of-court identi8cation of 4e Gesus as one of the perpetrators of the crime; !he procedure outlined in eople v.

ineda, )'D C:" )KI $'HH)& and eople v. !eehan5ee, ')D C:" *) $%DD*&, for aproper out-of-court identi8cation was neither disregarded nor violated. 3n contrast,the records of the present case show that impermissible suggestion did not precede"le2o6s out-of-court positive identi8cation of 4e Gesus as one of the perpetrators ofthe crime. "le2o6s testimony on eptember (, %DD+ reveals, on the contrary, that"le2o even categorically declined to identify any suspect by mere loo5ing at aphotograph. Aerily, the procedure outlined in eople v. ineda, )'D C:" )KI $'HH)&and eople v. !eehan5ee, ')D C:" *) $%DD*&, for a proper out-of-courtidenti8cation was neither disregarded nor violated.

ame; ame; 3n any criminal prosecution there are more and better circumstancesto consider other than the initial s5etch of a police artist for determining thereliability of an identi8cation. "t any rate, a discrepancy between a police artist6ss5etch of a perpetrator of a crime based on descriptions of witnesses at the scene of the crime, on one hand, and an actual identi8cation of the perpetrator by aneyewitness given in court, on the other hand, is a very minimal factor of doubt onthe reliability of the identi8cation. 3n any criminal prosecution there are more andbetter circumstances to consider other than the initial s5etch of a police artist fordetermining the reliability of an identi8cation. Ee have to remember that a policeartist6s s5etch of a perpetrator of a crime is initially for purposes of pursuing aninvestigation, and has seldom any impact on the case after that.

ame; ame; !he validity of a decision is not impaired when its writer only too5over from another 2udge who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clearshowing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts. !he validityof a decision is not impaired when its writer only too5 over from another 2udge whohad earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse ofdiscretion in the appreciation of the facts. o such grave abuse of discretion wasshown herein. !he trial records demonstrate, on the contrary, that the factual8ndings of the trial court and the assessment of the credibility of "le2o as an

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eyewitness rested on a most careful and thorough study of the evidence adducedby both parties. 3ndeed, although he did not observe the demeanor of "le2o as awitness, the writing 2udge $Gudge Gaime . ala<ar& was not entirely deprived of aproper sense of "le2o6s demeanor considering that the ! s were replete with thedetailed manifestations on "le2o6s appearance, behavior, deportment, disposition,

and mien during the many days of his testimony that the various counsel of bothparties <ealously put on record for memoriali<ation.

ame; ame; !he mere imputation of ill-motive without proof was speculative atbest. !he mere imputation of ill-motive without proof was speculative at best. !ostart with, that the family of the victim might have e/tended economic or 8nancialsupport to "le2o did not necessarily warrant the presumption of bias on the part of"le2o as a witness. !here was no evidence showing that any such support was forthe purpose of unduly inBuencing his testimony. Li5elier than not, the support wasonly an e/pression of the family6s appreciation for his cooperation in the publicprosecution of the culprits, or for his resolve to ensure the successful prosecution ofthe perpetrators.

Constitutional Law; :emedial Law; resumption of 3nnocence; !he 0presumption ofinnocence? serves to emphasi<e that the prosecution has the obligation to provenot only each element of the o ense beyond reasonable doubt but also the identityof the accused as the perpetrator. !he 0presumption of innocence? serves toemphasi<e that the prosecution has the obligation to prove not only each elementof the o ense beyond reasonable doubt but also the identity of the accused as theperpetrator. !he accused, on the other hand, bears no burden of proof. !heprosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strengthfrom the wea5ness of the defense.

ame; ame; Out-of-Court 3denti8cation; uidelines to determine the admissibility

and reliability of an out-of-court identi8cation laid down in eople v. !eehan5ee, ')DC:" *) $%DD*&. 3n eople v. !eehan5ee, ')D C:" *) $%DD*&, the Court laid down

the guidelines to determine the admissibility and reliability of an out-of-courtidenti8cation, thus# 03n resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-courtidenti8cation of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances testwhere they consider the following factors, vi<.# $%& the witness6 opportunity to viewthe criminal at the time of the crime; $'& the witness6 degree of attention at thetime; $(& the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; $)& the level ofcertainty demonstrated by the witness at the identi8cation; $*& the length of timebetween the crime and the identi8cation; and $+& the suggestiveness of theidenti8cation procedure.?

ame; ame; ame; :ules in proper photographic identi8cation procedure e/plainedin eople v. ineda, )'D C:" )KI $'HH)&. 3n eople v. ineda, )'D C:" )KI$'HH)&, the Court e/plained the rules in proper photographic identi8cationprocedure, to wit# "lthough showing mug shots of suspects is one of the establishedmethods of identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is unacceptable. !he 8rst rule in proper photographic identi8cation procedure is that a series ofphotographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. !he second rule

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directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement anddisplay should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.

ame; ame; ame; !he clear import of :odrigo is that an out-of-courtidenti8cation, made by lone witness, who was sub2ected to impermissiblephotographic suggestion, fatally tainted the subsequent in-court identi8cation madeby the same witness. !he clear import of :odrigo is that an out-of-courtidenti8cation, made by the lone witness, who was sub2ected to impermissiblephotographic suggestion, fatally tainted the subsequent in-court identi8cation madeby the same witness. "ccordingly, the testimony of such witness on theidenti8cation of the accused, by itself, cannot be considered as proof beyondreasonable doubt of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Eithout proofbeyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the perpetrator, the accused deservesan acquittal.

ame; ame; ame; 4ue process dictates that the photographic identi8cation mustbe devoid of any impermissible suggestions in order to prevent a miscarriage of 2ustice. 4ue process dictates that the photographic identi8cation must be devoidof any impermissible suggestions in order to prevent a miscarriage of 2ustice. 3n

eople v. "lcantara, ')H C:" %'' $%DD*&, the Court declared# 4ue processdemands that identi8cation procedure of criminal suspects must be free fromimpermissible suggestions. "s appropriately held in @ vs. Eade, 0the inBuence ofimproper suggestion upon identifying witness probably accounts for moremiscarriages of 2ustice than any other single factor.?

ame; ame; :ight to Counsel; enerally, an accused is not entitled to theassistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a partof custodial investigation; "n e/ception to this rule is when the accused had beenthe focus of police attention at the start of the investigation. "s stated in =scordial,

generally, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-upconsidering that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. "n e/ception tothis rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start ofthe investigation. !he line-up in this case squarely falls under this e/ception. 3t wasestablished that Goel was already a suspect prior to the police line-up. 3n fact, evenbefore Goel6s apprehension, the police had already <eroed in on Goel as one of"badilla6s 5illers. "s such, Goel was entitled to counsel during the police line-up.

ame; ame; ot ursuit; Earrantless "rrest; !he warrantless arrest of Goel, madesi/ days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of 0hot pursuit?; 3n lawenforcement, 0hot pursuit? can refer to an immediate pursuit by the police. !hepolice arrested Goel, without any warrant, on %D Gune %DD+ or si/ days after the5illing. i/ days is de8nitely more than enough to secure an arrest warrant, and yetthe police opted to arrest Goel and the other accused, without any warrant, claimingthat it was conducted in 0hot pursuit.? 3n law enforcement, 0hot pursuit? can refer toan immediate pursuit by the police such as a car chase. Certainly, the warrantlessarrest of Goel, made si/ days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of 0hotpursuit.?

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ame; ame; ame; ame; !orturing the accused to e/tract incriminatingconfessions is repugnant to the Constitution. !orturing the accused to e/tractincriminating confessions is repugnant to the Constitution. ection %'$'&, "rticle 333of the Constitution e/pressly provides 0 nJo torture, force, violence, threat,intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against an

accusedJ.? !he blatant and unacceptable transgression of the accused6sconstitutional rights, for the sa5e of delivering speedy, but false, 2ustice to theaggrieved, can never be countenanced. !his Court can never tolerate o7cial abusesand perpetuate the gross violation of these rights. !he presumption that a publico7cer had regularly performed his o7cial duty can at no instance prevail over thepresumption of innocence. Lumanog vs. eople, +(H C:" )' $'H%H&J

53. C % )--"2 *. C+*+2 S"%*+ " C) +!!+)-, G.R. N).18768;, 07 S" #" "% 9010C !" T+#2" CLARITA J. CARBONEL, "#+#+)-"%, *!. CIVIL

SERVICE COMMISSION, %"! )-/"-#.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L R+ # #) C)$-!"2C$!#)/+ 2 I-*"!#+ #+)-!:emedial Law; "ppeals; !he perfection of an appeal in the manner and within theperiod prescribed by law is mandatory. 3t is undisputed that petitioner appealedthe C C:O 3A6s decision almost three years from receipt thereof. @ndoubtedly, theappeal was 8led way beyond the reglementary period when the decision had longbecome 8nal and e/ecutory. "s held in 9acsasar v. Civil ervice Commission $*K+

C:" KIK 'HHDJ&, citing !alento v. =scalada, Gr. $**+ C:" )D% 'HHIJ& !heperfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law ismandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the 2udgment 8nal and e/ecutory and beyond the power of the Court6s review. Gurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes 8nal and e/ecutory, itbecomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest. uchdecision or order can no loner be disturbed or re-opened no matter how erroneous itmay have been.

Constitutional Law; :ight to Counsel; Custodial 3nvestigations; !he e/clusionary rule

under paragraph $'&, ection %' of the 9ill of :ights applies only to admissionsmade in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrativeinvestigation. 3t must be remembered that the right to counsel under ection %' of the 9ill of :ights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. !hus,the e/clusionary rule under paragraph $'&, ection %' of the 9ill of :ights appliesonly to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in anadministrative investigation.

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ame; ame; ame; " party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assistedby counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner6s capacity torepresent herself and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person beinginvestigated with counsel. Ehile investigations conducted by an administrativebody may at times be a5in to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under

e/isting laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted bycounsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner6s capacity torepresent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person beinginvestigated with counsel. !he right to counsel is not always imperative inadministrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely todetermine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinarymeasures against erring public o7cers and employees, with the purpose ofmaintaining the dignity of government service. Carbonel vs. Civil erviceCommission, +(H C:" 'H'$'H%H&J

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54. T -"- "" *. '") 2", G.R. N). 17;448, J$-" 96, 9013C !" T+#2" CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, "#+#+)-"%, *!. 'EO'LEOF THE 'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#.

C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C%+ +- 2 L E!# ( T %)$ F 2!+ #+)- )(C) "% + 2 D) $ "-#! '"- 2#+"!

Constitutional Law; Custodial 3nterrogation; Eords and hrases; Custodialinterrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after aperson is ta5en into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in anysigni8cant manner.T!he constitutional proscription against the admissibility ofadmission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of ection %', "rticle 333 of theConstitution, as correctly observed by the C" and the O , is applicable only incustodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated bylaw enforcement authorities after a person is ta5en into custody or otherwisedeprived of his freedom of action in any signi8cant manner. 3ndeed, a person undercustodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon thecommencement thereof, vi<.# $%& to remain silent, $'& to have competent andindependent counsel preferably of his own choice, and $(& to be informed of the twoother rights above. 3n the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gavean uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branchhe managed, the following are clear# $%& the questioning was not initiated by a law

enforcement authority but merely by an internal a airs manager of the ban5; and,$'& petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any signi8cantmanner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be undercustodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogativeduring the ta5ing of his written statement.

ame; :ight to Counsel; 3n :emolona v. Civil ervice Commission, )%) hil. *DH$'HH%&, the upreme Court declared that the right to counsel 0applies only toadmissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in anadministrative investigation.?T3n :emolona v. Civil ervice Commission, (+' C:"(H) $'HH%&, we declared that the right to counsel 0applies only to admissions madein a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.?"mplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case ofCarbonel v. Civil ervice Commission, +(H C:" 'H' $'H%H&# owever, it must beremembered that the right to counsel under ection %' of the 9ill of :ights is meantto protect a suspect during custodial investigation. !hus, the e/clusionary ruleunder paragraph $'&, ection %' of the 9ill of :ights applies only to admissionsmade in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrativeinvestigation. ere, petitioner6s written statement was given during anadministrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an

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anomaly1irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. oerror can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and ingiving due consideration to petitioner6s written statement as there is noconstitutional impediment to its admissibility.

ame; =vidence; Confessions; " confession or admissionJ is presumed voluntaryuntil the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving thecontrary.T0 3Jt is settled that a confession or admissionJ is presumed voluntaryuntil the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving thecontrary.? etitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, hiswritten statement was found to have been e/ecuted freely and consciously. !hepertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality thatonly a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.

ame; ame; =/tra2udicial Confessions; 3t is a settled rule that where the defendantdid not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal oradministrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidenceof violence was presented, his e/tra2udicial statement shall be considered as havingbeen voluntarily e/ecuted.T!he fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper ofprotest and 8le any charges, criminal or administrative, against the investigator andthe two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to signnegate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. 3t is a settled rule thatwhere the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did notinstitute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators,where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his e/tra2udicial statementshall be considered as having been voluntarily e/ecuted. either will petitioner6sassertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before a7/ing hissignature thereon 02ust to get it over with? prop up the instant etition. !o recall,petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and hadbeen a ban5 manager for quite a number of years. e is thus e/pected to fullyunderstand and comprehend the signi8cance of signing an instrument. 3t is 2ustunfortunate that he did not e/ercise due diligence in the conduct of his own a airs.

e can therefore e/pect no consideration for it.

Criminal Law; Forgery; Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by thesigning of another6s name with intent to defraud.T0Forgery is present when anywriting is counterfeited by the signing of another6s name with intent to defraud.? 3tcan be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic orgenuine one. " 8nding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies ofgovernment handwriting e/perts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the

courts. " trial 2udge is not precluded but is even authori<ed by law to conduct anindependent e/amination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at areasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

:emedial Law; Criminal rocedure; "ppeals; " rule of long standing in this 2urisdiction is that 8ndings of a trial court, when a7rmed by the Court of "ppeals,are accorded great weight and respect.T3n this case, the 8nding of forgery on thesignature of :omeo !an $!an& appearing in the promissory notes and cashier6schec5s was not anchored solely on the result of the e/amination conducted by the

'**



ational 9ureau of 3nvestigation $ 93& 4ocument =/aminer. !he trial court alsomade an independent e/amination of the questioned signatures and after analy<ingthe same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of !an appearing in thepromissory notes are di erent from his genuine signatures appearing in his 4eposit"ccount 3nformation and pecimen ignature Cards on 8le with the ban5. !hus, we

8nd no reason to disturb the above 8ndings of the :!C which was a7rmed by theC". " rule of long standing in this 2urisdiction is that 8ndings of a trial court, whena7rmed by the C", are accorded great weight and respect. "bsent any reason todeviate from the said 8ndings, as in this case, the same should be deemedconclusive and binding to this Court.

ame; =vidence; Eitnesses; !he prosecution has the prerogative to choose theevidence or the witnesses it wishes to present.T!he prosecution has theprerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. 3t has thediscretion as to how it should present its case. >oreover, the presumption thatsuppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at thedisposal of both the defense and the prosecution. 3n the present case, if petitioner

believes that !an is the principal witness who could e/culpate him from liability byestablishing that it was !an and not him who signed the sub2ect documents, themost prudent thing to do is to utili<e him as his witness. "nyway, petitioner has theright to have compulsory process to secure !an6s attendance during the trialpursuant to "rticle 333, ection %)$'& of the Constitution. !he records show, however,that petitioner did not invo5e such right. 3n view of these, no suppression ofevidence can be attributed to the prosecution.

Criminal Law; 4enials; 4enials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincingevidence are negative and self-serving evidence. !hey merit no weight in law andcannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesseswho testi8ed on a7rmative matters.T!he Court is also not persuaded by the bareand uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the loans covered by thepromissory notes and the cashier6s chec5s were personally transacted by !anagainst his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw !an a7/ hissignature thereto. "gain, this allegation, as the :!C aptly observed, is not supportedby established evidence. 03t is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated byclear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. !hey meritJno weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimonyof credible witnesses who testi8ed on a7rmative matters.? !he chain of events inthis case, from the preparation of the promissory notes to the encashment of thecashier6s chec5s, as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and based onpetitioner6s own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that hecommitted the unlawful acts alleged in the 3nformations.

ame; Falsi8cation of Commercial 4ocuments; Falsi8cation of documents underparagraph %, "rticle %K' in relation to "rticle %K% of the :evised enal Code refersto falsi8cation by a private individual or a public o7cer or employee, who did notta5e advantage of is o7cial position, of public, private or commercial document.TFalsi8cation of documents under paragraph %, "rticle %K' in relation to "rticle %K%of the :evised enal Code $: C& refers to falsi8cation by a private individual or a

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public o7cer or employee, who did not ta5e advantage of his o7cial position, ofpublic, private or commercial document. !he elements of falsi8cation of documentsunder paragraph %, "rticle %K' of the : C are# $%& that the o ender is a privateindividual or a public o7cer or employee who did not ta5e advantage of his o7cialposition; $'& that he committed any of the acts of falsi8cation enumerated in "rticle

%K% of the : C; and, $(& that the falsi8cation was committed in a public, o7cial orcommercial document. "ll the above-mentioned elements were established in thiscase. First, petitioner is a private individual. econd, the acts of falsi8cationconsisted in petitioner6s $%& counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or signatureof !an and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects;and $'& causing it to appear that !an has participated in an act or proceeding whenhe did not in fact so participate. !hird, the falsi8cation was committed in promissorynotes and chec5s which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, ingeneral, documents or instruments which are 0used by merchants or businessmento promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions.? romissory notes facilitatecredit transactions while a chec5 is a means of payment used in business in lieu ofmoney for convenience in business transactions. " cashier6s chec5 necessarilyfacilitates ban5 transactions for it allows the person whose name and signatureappear thereon to encash the chec5 and withdraw the amount indicated therein.

ame; Comple/ Crimes; Eords and hrases; " comple/ crime may refer to a singleact which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an o ense as anecessary means for committing another.TEhen the o ender commits on a public,o7cial or commercial document any of the acts of falsi8cation enumerated in "rticle%K% as a necessary means to commit another crime li5e estafa, theft ormalversation, the two crimes form a comple/ crime. @nder "rticle )I of the : C,there are two classes of a comple/ crime. " comple/ crime may refer to a single actwhich constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an o ense as a

necessary means for committing another. 3n 4omingo v. eople, +H( C:" )II$'HHD&, we held# !he falsi8cation of a public, o7cial, or commercial document maybe a means of committing estafa, because before the falsi8ed document is actuallyutili<ed to defraud another, the crime of falsi8cation has already beenconsummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of thecrime of falsi8cation of public, o7cial or commercial document. 3n other words, thecrime of falsi8cation has already e/isted. "ctually utili<ing that falsi8ed public,o7cial or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. 9ut the damage iscaused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsi8cation of the document. !herefore, the falsi8cation of the public, o7cial or commercial document is only anecessary means to commit estafa.

ame; =stafa; =stafa is generally committed when $a& the accused defraudedanother by abuse of con8dence, or by means of deceit, and $b& the o ended partyor a third party su ered damage or pre2udice capable of pecuniaryestimation.T0=stafa is generally committed when $a& the accused defraudedanother by abuse of con8dence, or by means of deceit, and $b& the o ended partyor a third party su ered damage or pre2udice capable of pecuniary estimation.?0 4Jeceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words orconduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should

'*K



have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that heshall act upon it to his legal in2ury.? !he elements of estafa obtain in this case. 9yfalsely representing that !an requested him to process purported loans on thelatter6s behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of !an in thecashier6s chec5s. !hrough these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from

the ban5. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the samein =urocan Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to ta5ehold of the money, misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use andbene8t, and these resulted to the damage and pre2udice of the ban5 in the amountof about )( million.

ame; =stafa !hrough Falsi8cation of Commercial 4ocuments; enalties; !he crimeof falsi8cation was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa. ursuantto "rticle )I of the :evised enal Code, the penalty to be imposed in such caseshould be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied inits ma/imum period.T etitioner in this case is found liable for the commission ofthe comple/ crime of estafa through falsi8cation of commercial document. !he

crime of falsi8cation was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa.ursuant to "rticle )I of the Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be

that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in itsma/imum period. !he applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, beingthe more serious o ense than falsi8cation. !anenggee vs. eople, +DD C:"+(D$'H%(&J

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55. M -+2 #"% C) - *. R)! %+), G.R. N). 188747, J -$ % 9;, 9014C !" T+#2" MANILA ATER COM'ANY, "#+#+)-"%, *!.CARLITO DEL ROSARIO, %"! )-/"-#.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! L )% L T"% +- #+)- )( E 2) "-#S" % #+)- ' S) + 2 J$!#+ "Labor Law; !ermination of =mployment; eparation ay; "s a general rule, anemployee who has been dismissed for any of the 2ust causes enumerated under"rticle 'I' of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. "s a general rule,an employee who has been dismissed for any of the 2ust causes enumerated under

"rticle 'I' of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. ection K, :ule 3,9oo5 A3 of the Omnibus :ules implementing the Labor Code provides# ec. K. !ermination of employment by employer. !he 2ust causes for terminating theservices of an employee shall be those provided in "rticle 'I' of the Code. !heseparation from wor5 of an employee for a 2ust cause does not entitle him to thetermination pay provided in the Code, without pre2udice, however, to whateverrights, bene8ts and privileges he may have under the applicable individual orcollective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.

ame; ame; ame; ocial Gustice; 3n e/ceptional cases, the upreme Court hasgranted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of 0social 2ustice?or on 0equitable grounds.? 3n both instances, it is required that the dismissal $%& wasnot for serious misconduct; and $'& did not reBect on the moral character of theemployee. 3n e/ceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay toa legally dismissed employee as an act of 0social 2ustice? or on 0equitable grounds.?3n both instances, it is required that the dismissal $%& was not for seriousmisconduct; and $'& did not reBect on the moral character of the employee. 3n theleading case of hilippine Long 4istance !elephone Company v. L:C, %+) C:"+K% $%DII&, we laid down the rule that separation pay shall be allowed as ameasure of social 2ustice only in the instances where the employee is validlydismissed for causes other than serious misconduct reBecting his moral character.

ame; ame; ame; ame; 3n the subsequent case of !oyota >otor hils. Corp.

Eor5ers "ssociation $!> CE"& v. ational Labor :elations Commission, *(K C:"%K% $'HHK&, the upreme Court e/panded the e/clusions and elucidated thatseparation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social 2ustice only in instanceswhere the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct,willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach oftrust, commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or those reBectingon his moral character. 3n the subsequent case of !oyota >otor hils. Corp.Eor5ers "ssociation $!> CE"& v. ational Labor :elations Commission, *(K C:"

'*D



%K% $'HHK&, we e/panded the e/clusions and elucidated that separation pay shall beallowed as a measure of social 2ustice only in instances where the employee isvalidly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct, willful disobedience,gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, commission of acrime against the employer or his family, or those reBecting on his moral character.

3n the same case, we instructed the labor o7cials that they must be most 2udiciousand circumspect in awarding separation pay or 8nancial assistance as theconstitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be aninstrument to oppress the employers. !he commitment of the court to the cause ofthe labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they areright, as here. 3n 8ne, we should be more cautious in awarding 8nancial assistanceto the undeserving and those who are unworthy of liberality of the law. >anilaEater Company vs. 4el :osario, K%* C:" +K$'H%)&J

'+H



56. '") 2" *. C *"=, G.R. N). 907;50, S" #" "% 99,9014C !" T+#2" 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, 2 +-#+P

"22"", *!. MAR@ JASON CHAVE: BITANCOR 2+ !NOY, $!"/ "22 -#.

C !" N #$%" A''EAL (%) /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )(A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L M+% -/ R+ #! C$!#)/+ 2 I-*"!#+ #+)-! :emedial Law; =vidence; Circumstantial =vidence; !he :ules of Court e/presslyprovides that circumstantial evidence may be su7cient to establish guilt beyondreasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused. Chave< invo5es hisconstitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecution6sevidence is purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certaintyof guilt. !he :ules of Court e/pressly provides that circumstantial evidence may besu7cient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of anaccused# =C. ). Circumstantial evidence, when su7cient. Circumstantial evidenceis su7cient for conviction if# $a& !here is more than one circumstance; $b& !he factsfrom which the inferences are derived are proven; and $c& !he combination of all thecircumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

ame; Criminal rocedure; "ppeals; Factual 8ndings by the trial court on itsappreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even its conclusions derived

from the 8ndings, are generally given great respect and conclusive e ect by thiscourt, more so when these factual 8ndings are a7rmed by the Court of "ppeals$C"&. Factual 8ndings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presentedby the parties, and even its conclusions derived from the 8ndings, are generallygiven great respect and conclusive e ect by this court, more so when these factual8ndings are a7rmed by the Court of "ppeals. evertheless, this court has held that0 wJhat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery withhomicide is for the prosecution to establish the o ender6s intent to ta5e personalproperty before the 5illing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actuallycarried out.? 3n cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove thathomicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can beconvicted of robbery with homicide.

Criminal Law; !heft; Ehen a person has possession of a stolen property, he can bedisputably presumed as the author of the theft. !here is a disputable presumptionthat 0a person found in possession of a thing ta5en in the doing of a recent wrongfulact is the ta5er and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a personpossesses, or e/ercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.? !hus, when aperson has possession of a stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as theauthor of the theft.

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ame; ame; enalties; !he penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value ofthe stolen items. 3n any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on thevalue of the stolen items. !he lower court made no factual 8ndings on the value ofthe missing items enumerated in the information one o5ia cell phone unit, one>otorola cell phone unit, si/ pieces ladies ring, two pieces nec5lace, and one

bracelet.Constitutional Law; >iranda :ights; !he >iranda rights were incorporated in ourConstitution but were modi8ed to include the statement that any waiver of the rightto counsel must be made 0in writing and in the presence of counsel.? !he right tocounsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the >irandarights, which require that# . . . $a& any person under custodial investigation has theright to remain silent; $b& anything he says can and will be used against him in acourt of law; $c& he has the right to tal5 to an attorney before being questioned andto have his counsel present when being questioned; and $d& if he cannot a ord anattorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. !he >irandarights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modi8ed to include the

statement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made 0in writing and inthe presence of counsel.? !he invocation of these rights applies during custodialinvestigation, which begins 0when the police investigation is no longer a generalinquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect ta5eninto custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions tothe person to elicit incriminating statements.?

ame; ame; Custodial 3nvestigation; :epublic "ct $:"& o. K)(I e/panded thede8nition of custodial investigation to 0include the practice of issuing an Ninvitation6to a person who is investigated in connection with an o ense he is suspected tohave committed, without pre2udice to the liability of the Ninviting6 o7cer for anyviolation of law.? :epublic "ct o. K)(I e/panded the de8nition of custodialinvestigation to 0include the practice of issuing an Ninvitation6 to a person who isinvestigated in connection with an o ense he is suspected to have committed,without pre2udice to the liability of the Ninviting6 o7cer for any violation of law.? !hismeans that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police o7cer must beapprised of their >iranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial settinge/ist in this scenario. Chave< is also being questioned by an investigating o7cer ina police station. "s an additional pressure, he may have been compelled tosurrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station. eople vs.Chave<, K(* C:" K'I$'H%)&J

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57. ' +2 ) ! # H)2/+- ! *. S"- #", G.R. N). 180308 , J$-"1;, 9019C !" T+#2" 'HILCOMSAT HOLDINGS COR'ORATION,ENRI UE L. LOCSIN -/ MANUEL D. ANDAL, "#+#+)-"%!,*!. SENATE OF THE RE'UBLIC OF THE 'HILI''INES, SENATECOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT COR'ORATIONS AND 'UBLICENTER'RISES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON 'UBLIC SERVICES,HON. SEN. RICHARD GORDON -/ HON. SEN. JUAN 'ONCEENRILE, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" S'ECIAL CIVIL ACTION +- # " S$ %" " C)$%#.C"%#+)% %+ -/ '%) + +#+)-.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L R+ # #) C)$-!"2Constitutional Law; Congress; ower of 3nquiry; "rticle A3, ection '% of theConstitution, provides as follows# 0!he enate or the ouse of :epresentatives orany of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation inaccordance with its duly published rules of procedure. !he rights of personsappearing in or a ected by such inquiries shall be respected.? !he respondents

enate Committees6 power of inquiry relative to : o. )** has been passed uponand upheld in the consolidated cases of 3n the >atter of the etition for abeasCorpus of Camilo L. abio, which cited "rticle A3, ection '% of the Constitution, asfollows# 0!he enate or the ouse of :epresentatives or any of its respectivecommittees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly

published rules of procedure. !he rights of persons appearing in or a ected by suchinquiries shall be respected.? !he Court e/plained that such conferral of thelegislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case therespondents enate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and properfor its e ective discharge.

ame; :ight to Counsel; !he right to be assisted by counsel can only be invo5ed bya person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, andtherefore attaches only during such custodial investigation. Corollarily, petitionersLocsin and "ndal6s allegation that their constitutionally-guaranteed right to counselwas violated during the hearings held in furtherance of : o. )** is specious. !heright to be assisted by counsel can only be invo5ed by a person under custodialinvestigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches onlyduring such custodial investigation. ince petitioners Locsin and "ndal were invitedto the public hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore validly invo5etheir right to counsel. hilcomsat oldings Corporation vs. enate of the :epublicof the hilippines, +K( C:" +%%$'H%'&J

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58. '") 2" *. L % , G.R. N). 1;;877, A$ $!# 13, 9019C !" T+#2" 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, 2 +-#+P

"22"", *!. ARTURO LARA ORBISTA, $!"/ "22 -#.

C !" N #$%" AUTOMATIC REVIE )( /" +!+)- )( # "C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C%+ +- 2 L A2+ +

Criminal rocedure; Courts; Gurisdiction; Gurisdiction over the person of the accusedmay be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or throughhis voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court."ny ob2ection to the arrest or acquisition of 2urisdiction over the person of theaccused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the ob2ection is deemed

waived. Gurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired throughcompulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his voluntaryappearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. "ny ob2ectionto the arrest or acquisition of 2urisdiction over the person of the accused must bemade before he enters his plea, otherwise the ob2ection is deemed waived. "naccused submits to the 2urisdiction of the trial court upon entering a plea andparticipating actively in the trial and this precludes him invo5ing any irregularitiesthat may have attended his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused isnot a su7cient ground to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon acomplaint duly 8led and a trial conducted without error.

ame; Constitutional Law; :ight to Counsel; !he right to counsel is deemed to havearisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made tostand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.

Contrary to Lara6s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he wasplaced in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to hisconviction. !hat he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel didnot render umulong6s identi8cation of Lara inadmissible. !he right to counsel isdeemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins andbeing made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodialinvestigation.

:emedial Law; =vidence; Circumstantial =vidence; =ven in the absence of direct

evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute anunbro5en chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis that the accusedis guilty, to the e/clusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. Eell-settled is therule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matri/wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and 8nding of guilt. =ven in theabsence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established circumstancesconstitute an unbro5en chain, consistent with each other and to the hypothesis thatthe accused is guilty, to the e/clusion of all other hypothesis that he is not. @nder

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ection ), :ule %(( of the :evised :ules on Criminal rocedure, circumstantialevidence su7ced to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites# $a&there is more than one circumstance; $b& the facts from which the inferences arederived are proven; and $c& the combination of all the circumstances is such as toproduce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Criminal Law; :obbery with omicide; 3n cases of robbery with homicide, the ta5ingof personal property with intent to gain must itself be established beyondreasonable doubt; 3t must be shown that the original criminal design of the culpritwas robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation ofthe robbery by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. 3ndeed, in cases ofrobbery with homicide, the ta5ing of personal property with intent to gain mustitself be established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving thephysical act of asportation by the accused must be presented by the prosecution. 3tmust be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit was robbery and thehomicide was perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery byreason or on the occasion of the robbery. !he mere presence of the accused at the

crime scene is not enough to implicate him. 3t is essential to prove the intent to roband the use of violence was necessary to reali<e such intent.

ame; "libi; 3t is well-settled that positive identi8cation prevails over alibi, which isinherently a wea5 defense. 3n view of umulong6s positive identi8cation of Lara,the C" was correct in denying Lara6s alibi outright. 3t is well-settled that positiveidenti8cation prevails over alibi, which is inherently a wea5 defense. uch is therule, for as a defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and di7cult to disapprove. >oreover,in order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that theaccused was somewhere else when the o ense was committed, but it must li5ewisebe demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to havebeen physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at thetime of its commission. 4ue to its doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clearand convincing proof. eople vs. Lara, +KI C:" (('$'H%'&J

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5;. I )- *. O ) , G.R. N). 90481;, 8 A %+2 9014C !" T+#2" ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH -/ ABDULHUSSEIN M.@ASHIM, "#+#+)-"%!, *!. HON. 'A UITO N. OCHOA, JR.,EK" $#+*" S" %"# % , HON. ENRI UE T. ONA, S" %"# % )(# " D" %# "-# )( H" 2# , -/ HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,S" %"# % )( # " D" %# "-# )( E/$ #+)-, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" S'ECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS +- # " S$ %" "C)$%#. C"%#+)% %+ -/ '%) + +#+)- -/ 'ETITIONS ININTERVENTION.S 22 + C2 !! R" %)/$ #+*" H" 2# L ' %"-# 2 C)-!"-#L@3 !:O, ecretary of the 4epartment of =ducation, respondents.

Constitutional Law; eparation of owers; !he separation of powers is afundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not throughe/press provision but by actual division in our Constitution. 3n many casesinvolving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the =/ecutiveand the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its e/ercise of 2udicialpower and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis ofthe principle of separation of powers. !o be clear, the separation of powers is afundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not throughe/press provision but by actual division in our Constitution. =ach department of thegovernment has e/clusive cogni<ance of matters within its 2urisdiction and issupreme within its own sphere. !hus, the %DIK Constitution provides that# $a& the

legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the hilippines; $b& thee/ecutive power shall be vested in the resident of the hilippines; and $c& the 2udicial power shall be vested in one upreme Court and in such lower courts asmay be established by law. !he Constitution has truly bloc5ed out with deft stro5esand in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.

ame; ame; Gudicial :eview; !he Constitution impresses upon the upreme Courtto respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere ofcompetence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line ofseparation but only at a very limited and speci8c point to determine whetherthe acts of the e/ecutive and the legislative branches are null because they wereunderta5en with grave abuse of discretion. 3n times of social disquietude orpolitical instability, the great landmar5s of the Constitution are apt to be forgottenor marred, if not entirely obliterated. 3n order to address this, the Constitutionimpresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch donewithin its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it tocross the line of separation but only at a very limited and speci8c point todetermine whether the acts of the e/ecutive and the legislative branches are nullbecause they were underta5en with grave abuse of discretion. !hus, while the Courtmay not pass upon questions of wisdom, 2ustice or e/pediency of the : Law, it

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may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretionresults. !he Court must demonstrate its unBinching commitment to protect thosecherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

ame; ame; ame; Gurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of 2udicialreview is limited by four e/acting requisites, vi<.# $a& there must be an actual caseor controversy; $b& the petitioners must possess locus standi; $c& the question ofconstitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and $d& the issue ofconstitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. 3n the scholarly estimation offormer upreme Court Gustice Florentino Feliciano, 02udicial review is essential forthe maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing ofpowers among the three great departments of government through the de8nitionand maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. !o him, 2udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation orinstrument of intervention of the 2udiciary in that balancing operation. Lest it bemisunderstood, it bears emphasi<ing that the Court does not have the unbridledauthority to rule on 2ust any and every claim of constitutional violation.

Gurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of 2udicial review is limited byfour e/acting requisites, vi<.# $a& there must be an actual case or controversy; $b&the petitioners must possess locus standi; $c& the question of constitutionality mustbe raised at the earliest opportunity; and $d& the issue of constitutionality must bethe lis mota of the case.

ame; ame; ame; "ctual Case or Controversy; Eords and hrases; "n actual caseor controversy means an e/isting case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe fordetermination, not con2ectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court wouldamount to an advisory opinion. "n actual case or controversy means an e/istingcase or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not con2ectural oranticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. !herule is that courts do not sit to ad2udicate mere academic questions to satisfyscholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. !he controversy must be 2usticiable de8nite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties havingadverse legal interests. 3n other words, the pleadings must show an activeantagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on theother; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical questionor issue. !here ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting ofspeci8c relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from anopinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

ame; ame; ame; ame; For a case to be considered ripe for ad2udication, it is a

prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by eitherbranch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege thee/istence of an immediate or threatened in2ury to himself as a result of thechallenged action. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy isthe requirement of ripeness. " question is ripe for ad2udication when the act beingchallenged has had a direct adverse e ect on the individual challenging it. For acase to be considered ripe for ad2udication, it is a prerequisite that something hasthen been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come

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into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the e/istence of an immediate orthreatened in2ury to himself as a result of the challenged action. e must show thathe has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct in2ury as aresult of the act complained.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Facial Challenges; Ehile the upreme Court haswithheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it hase/panded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also thoseinvolving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. 3n this 2urisdiction, theapplication of doctrines originating from the @. . has been generally maintained,albeit with some modi8cations. Ehile this Court has withheld the application offacial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has e/panded its scope to coverstatutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,and other fundamental rights. !he underlying reason for this modi8cation is simple.For unli5e its counterpart in the @. ., this Court, under its e/panded 2urisdiction, ismandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involvingrights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether

or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac5 or e/cess of 2urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the overnment. Aerily,the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Gudiciary, ever vigilant withits duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Locus tandi; Eords and hrases; Locus standi or legalstanding is de8ned as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that theparty has sustained or will sustain direct in2ury as a result of the challengedgovernmental act; !he rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality ofthe statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before thecourt. Locus standi or legal standing is de8ned as a personal and substantialinterest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct in2ury as aresult of the challenged governmental act. 3t requires a personal sta5e in theoutcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpensthe presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illuminationof di7cult constitutional questions. 3n relation to locus standi, the 0as appliedchallenge? embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of astatute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. !he rule prohibits one fromchallenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rightsof third persons not before the court. !his rule is also 5nown as the prohibitionagainst third-party standing.

ame; ame; ame; ame; :eproductive ealth Law; !he :eproductive ealth $: &

Law drastically a ects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health,the freedom of religion and e/pression and other constitutional rights. >indful of allthese and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health havealready caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the upremeCourt entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendentalimportance warranting immediate court ad2udication. 3n view of the seriousness,novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench andbar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. "fter all, the : Law

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drastically a ects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, thefreedom of religion and e/pression and other constitutional rights. >indful of allthese and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health havealready caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Courtentertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance

warranting immediate court ad2udication. >ore importantly, considering that it isthe right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Courtneed not wait for a life to be ta5en away before ta5ing action. !he Court cannot, andshould not, e/ercise 2udicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in theConstitution are being imperilled to be violated. !o do so, when the life of either themother or her child is at sta5e, would lead to irreparable consequences.

ame; tatutes; One- ub2ect-One-!itle :ule; !he one sub2ect1one title rule e/pressesthe principle that the title of a law must not be 0so uncertain that the averageperson reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put oninquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicatingone sub2ect where another or di erent one is really embraced in the act, or in

omitting any e/pression or indication of the real sub2ect or scope of the act.? !heone sub2ect1one title rule e/presses the principle that the title of a law must not be0so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of thepurpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which ismisleading, either in referring to or indicating one sub2ect where another or di erentone is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any e/pression or indication of thereal sub2ect or scope of the act.? Considering the close intimacy between0reproductive health? and 0responsible parenthood? which bears to the attainmentof the goal of achieving 0sustainable human development? as stated under itsterms, the Court 8nds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought todeceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

:eproductive ealth Law; !he use of contraceptives and family planning methods inthe hilippines is not of recent vintage. "s e/pounded earlier, the use ofcontraceptives and family planning methods in the hilippines is not of recentvintage. From the enactment of :.". o. )K'D, entitled 0"n "ct !o :egulate !he ale,4ispensation, and1or 4istribution of Contraceptive 4rugs and 4evices? on Gune %I,%D++, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which preventfertili<ation, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and therati8cation of numerous international agreements, the country has long recogni<edthe need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in orderto achieve long-term economic development. !hrough the years, however, the useof contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being acomponent of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion ofpublic health, particularly, reproductive health.

ame; Life begins at fertili<ation. !he ponente, is of the strong view that life beginsat fertili<ation. 3n answering the question of when life begins, focus should be madeon the particular phrase of ection %' which reads# ection %'. !he tate recogni<esthe sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basicautonomous social institution. 3t shall equally protect the life of the mother and the

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life of the unborn from conception. !he natural and primary right and duty ofparents in the rearing of the youth for civic e7ciency and the development of moralcharacter shall receive the support of the overnment. !e/tually, the Constitutiona ords protection to the unborn from conception. !his is undisputable becausebefore conception, there is no unborn to spea5 of. For said reason, it is no surprise

that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when lifebegins. !he problem has arisen because, ama<ingly, there are quarters who haveconveniently disregarded the scienti8c fact that conception is rec5oned fromfertili<ation. !hey are waving the view that life begins at implantation. ence, theissue of when life begins. 3n a nutshell, those opposing the : Law contend thatconception is synonymous with 0fertili<ation? of the female ovum by the malesperm. On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conceptionrefers to the 0implantation? of the fertili<ed ovum in the uterus.

ame; Constitutional Law; =qual rotection of the Laws; 3t is apparent that theFramers of the Constitution emphasi<ed that the tate shall provide equalprotection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of

life, that is, upon fertili<ation or upon the union of the male sperm and the femaleovum. 3t is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasi<ed that the

tate shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child fromthe earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertili<ation or upon the union of themale sperm and the female ovum. 3t is also apparent is that the Framers of theConstitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that wouldallow it determine when life begins.

ame; ame; Contraceptives; !he Framers of the Constitution did not intend to banall contraceptives for being unconstitutional; Contraceptives that 5ill or destroy thefertili<ed ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the femaleovum, and those that similarly ta5e action prior to fertili<ation should be deemednon-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible. !he Framers of theConstitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. 3nfact, Commissioner 9ernardo Aillegas, spearheading the need to have aconstitutional provision on the right to life, recogni<ed that the determination ofwhether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which shouldbe left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. From thediscussions above, contraceptives that 5ill or destroy the fertili<ed ovum should bedeemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actuallyprevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarlyta5e action prior to fertili<ation should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,constitutionally permissible.

ame; Conception; Eords and hrases; >osby6s >edical, ursing, and "llied ealth4ictionary de8nes conception as 0the beginning of pregnancy usually ta5en to bethe instant a spermato<oon enters an ovum and forms a viable <ygote?; !he !e/tboo5 of Obstetrics $ hysiological athological Obstetrics&, used by medicalschools in the hilippines, also concludes that human life $human person& begins atthe moment of fertili<ation with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the

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formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates alldevelopmental stages that ensue. !hat conception begins at fertili<ation is notbereft of medical foundation. >osby6s >edical, ursing, and "llied ealth 4ictionaryde8nes conception as 0the beginning of pregnancy usually ta5en to be the instant aspermato<oon enters an ovum and forms a viable <ygote.? 3t describes fertili<ation

as 0the union of male and female gametes to form a <ygote from which the embryodevelops.? !he !e/tboo5 of Obstetrics $ hysiological athological Obstetrics&, usedby medical schools in the hilippines, also concludes that human life $humanperson& begins at the moment of fertili<ation with the union of the egg and thesperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique geneticcomposition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue. imilarly, recentmedical research on the matter also reveals that# 0 uman development begins afterthe union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process 5nown asfertili<ation $conception&. Fertili<ation is a sequence of events that begins with thecontact of a sperm $spermato<oon& with a secondary oocyte $ovum& and ends withthe fusion of their pronuclei $the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum& and themingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. !his fertili<ed ovum, 5nown as a<ygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a humanbeing.?

ame; ame; 3n all, whether it be ta5en from a plain meaning, or understood undermedical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers ofthe Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a <ygote is a human organismand that the life of a new human being commences at a scienti8cally well-de8nedmoment of conception, that is, upon fertili<ation. 3n all, whether it be ta5en from aplain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly,following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusionis that a <ygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being

commences at a scienti8cally well-de8ned moment of conception, that is, uponfertili<ation.

ame; ame Ehile the upreme Court has opted not to ma5e any determinationwhen life begins, it 8nds that the :eproductive ealth $: & Law itself clearlymandates that protection be a orded from the moment of fertili<ation. !he clearand unequivocal intent of the Framers of the %DIK Constitution in protecting the lifeof the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting ameasure legali<ing abortion. 3t was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret itotherwise. !his intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedingsof the %DI+ Constitutional Commission. / / / " reading of the : Law would showthat it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. Ehile the Court hasopted not to ma5e any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it 8nds thatthe : Law itself clearly mandates that protection be a orded from the moment offertili<ation. "s pointed out by Gustice Carpio, the : Law is replete with provisionsthat embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertili<ed ovum and that it shouldbe a orded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. >oreover, the : Lawrecogni<es that abortion is a crime under "rticle '*+ of the :evised enal Code,which penali<es the destruction or e/pulsion of the fertili<ed ovum.

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ame; "bortifacients; 3n carrying out its declared policy, the :eproductive ealth$: & Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. 3n carrying out its declaredpolicy, the : Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. !o be clear, ection)$a& of the : Law de8nes an abortifacient as# ection ). 4e8nition of !erms/ / / / $a& "bortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the

destruction of a fetus inside the mother6s womb or the prevention of the fertili<edovum to reach and be implanted in the mother6s womb upon determination of theF4". "s stated above, the : Law mandates that protection must be a orded fromthe moment of fertili<ation. 9y using the word 0or,? the : Law prohibits not onlydrugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion andthose that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother6s womb. !hus, anabortifacient is any drug or device that either# $a& 3nduces abortion; or $b& 3nducesthe destruction of a fetus inside the mother6s womb; or $c& revents the fertili<edovum to reach and be implanted in the mother6s womb, upon determination of theF4".

ame; ame; Eords and hrases; "s de8ned by the :eproductive ealth $: & Law,

any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which 5ills or destroys thefertili<ed ovum or prevents the fertili<ed ovum to reach and be implanted in themother6s womb, is an abortifacient. Contrary to the assertions made by thepetitioners, the Court 8nds that the : Law, consistent with the Constitution,recogni<es that the fertili<ed ovum already has life and that the tate has abounden duty to protect it. !he conclusion becomes clear because the : Law, 8rst,prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion $8rst 5ind&, which, as discussede/haustively above, refers to that which induces the 5illing or the destruction of thefertili<ed ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertili<ed ovum toreach and be implanted in the mother6s womb $third 5ind&. 9y e/pressly declaringthat any drug or device that prevents the fertili<ed ovum to reach and be implanted

in the mother6s womb is an abortifacient $third 5ind&, the : Law does not intend tomean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as on. Lagman suggests. 3talso does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, asthe petitioners li5ewise suggest. :ather, it recogni<es that# one, there is a need toprotect the fertili<ed ovum which already has life, and two, the fertili<ed ovum mustbe protected the moment it becomes e/istent all the way until it reaches andimplants in the mother6s womb. "fter all, if life is only recogni<ed and a ordedprotection from the moment the fertili<ed ovum implants there is nothing toprevent any drug or device from 5illing or destroying the fertili<ed ovum prior toimplantation. From the foregoing, the Court 8nds that inasmuch as it a ordsprotection to the fertili<ed ovum, the : Law does not sanction abortion. !o repeat,

it is the Court6s position that life begins at fertili<ation, not at implantation. Ehen afertili<ed ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but thatinstance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. 3t started earlier. "nd asde8ned by the : Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which 5illsor destroys the fertili<ed ovum or prevents the fertili<ed ovum to reach and beimplanted in the mother6s womb, is an abortifacient.

ame; Contraceptives; =vidently, with the addition of the word 0primarily,? inection (.H%$a& and $2& of the 3mplementing :ules and :egulations of the : Law

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$: -3::& is indeed ultra vires. 3t contravenes ection )$a& of the :eproductive ealth$: & Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. !here is danger that theinsertion of the quali8er 0primarily? will pave the way for the approval ofcontraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn fromconception1fertili<ation in violation of "rticle 33, ection %' of the Constitution.

=vidently, with the addition of the word 0primarily,? in ection (.H%$a& and $2& of the: -3:: is indeed ultra vires. 3t contravenes ection )$a& of the : Law and should,therefore, be declared invalid. !here is danger that the insertion of the quali8er0primarily? will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm ordestroy the life of the unborn from conception1fertili<ation in violation of "rticle 33,

ection %' of the Constitution. Eith such quali8cation in the : -3::, it appears toinsinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an 0abortifacient? if its sole5nown e ect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation ofthe fertili<ed ovum. For the same reason, this de8nition of 0contraceptive? wouldpermit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because oftheir fair-sale mechanism.

ame; ame; Consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and inline with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that itsconstitutionality is sustained, the :eproductive ealth $: & Law and itsimplementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion.3ndeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in linewith the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that itsconstitutionality is sustained, the : Law and its implementing rules must beconsistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. !hus, the word 0primarily? in

ection (.H%$a& and $2& of the : -3:: should be declared void. !o uphold the validityof ection (.H%$a& and $2& of the : -3:: and prohibit only those contraceptives thathave the primary e ect of being an abortive would e ectively 0open the Boodgates

to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unbornfrom conception1fertili<ation in violation of "rticle 33, ection %' of the Constitution.?

ame; ame; Eith :.". o. )K'D in place, there e/ists adequate safeguards toensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to thepublic. !he legislative intent in the enactment of the : Law in this regard is toleave intact the provisions of :.". o. )K'D. !here is no intention at all to do awaywith it. 3t is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. !hus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that thee ectivity of the : Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation ofcontraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugsand devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. Eith :.". o.)K'D in place, there e/ists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that onlycontraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.

ame; ame; 3n the distribution by the 4epartment of ealth of contraceptive drugsand devices, it must consider the provisions of :epublic "ct $:.".& o. )K'D, which isstill in e ect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from aduly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actualdispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a

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prescription of a quali8ed medical practitioner. 3n the distribution by the 4O ofcontraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of :.". o. )K'D,which is still in e ect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall befrom a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actualdispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a

prescription of a quali8ed medical practitioner. !he distribution of contraceptivedrugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. !he public health must beprotected by all possible means. "s pointed out by Gustice 4e Castro, a heavyresponsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplyingcontraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any in2ury,illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.

ame; ame; !he upreme Court is of the strong view that Congress cannotlegislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. "t this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannotlegislate that hormonal contraceptives and intrauterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. !he 8rst sentence of ection D that ordains their inclusion by the

ational 4rug Formulary in the =4L by using the mandatory 0shall? is to beconstrued as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approvedby the F4". !he F4", not Congress, has the e/pertise to determine whether aparticular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. !he provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements forthe inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the =4Lsupports this construction.

Constitutional Law; eparation of Church and tate; enerally, the tate cannotmeddle in the internal a airs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmasor dictate upon it. 3t cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. !he principle of separation of Church and tate was, thus, enshrined in "rticle 33,

ection + of the %DIK Constitution, vi<.# ection +. !he separation of Church andtate shall be inviolable. Aerily, the principle of separation of Church and tate is

based on mutual respect. enerally, the tate cannot meddle in the internal a airsof the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. 3t cannotfavor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the churchcannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the tate and the rest of the citi<enry.3t cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes thatthey are good for the country. Consistent with the principle that not any one religionshould ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provisionutili<es the term 0church? in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque,an iglesia, or any other house of od which metaphorically symboli<es a religiousorgani<ation. !hus, the 0Church? means the religious congregations collectively.

ame; :eligious Freedom; Free =/ercise Clause; =stablishment Clause; !heconstitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees# the=stablishment Clause and the Free =/ercise Clause. 3n short, the constitutionalassurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees# the =stablishment Clauseand the Free =/ercise Clause. !he establishment clause 0principally prohibits the

tate from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other

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religions. 3t mandates a strict neutrality in a airs among religious groups.?=ssentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of publicresources for the support or prohibition of a religion. On the other hand, the basis of the free e/ercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.@nder this part of religious freedom guarantee, the tate is prohibited from unduly

interfering with the outside manifestations of one6s belief and faith.ame; ame; ame; 4octrine of 9enevolent eutrality; 3n case of conBict between

the free e/ercise clause and the tate, the upreme Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. 3n case of conBict between the free e/ercise clause and the

tate, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. !his has beenclearly decided by the Court in =strada v. =scritor, )D' C:" % $'HH+&, $=scritor&where it was stated 0that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whethermandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framewor5 underlying the

hilippine Constitution.? 3n the same case, it was further e/plained that# !hebenevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmentalactions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the

government6s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups toe/ercise their religion without hindrance. 0!he purpose of accommodation is toremove a burden on, or facilitate the e/ercise of, a person6s or institution6s religion.?0Ehat is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration ofunconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an e/emption from its application orits Nburdensome e ect,6 whether by the legislature or the courts.? 3n ascertainingthe limits of the e/ercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test isproper. @nderlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free e/erciseis a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be sub2ect to strict scrutiny.

ame; :eproductive ealth Law; :eligious Freedom; Ehile the upreme Courtstands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of theConstitution, it does have authority to determine whether the :eproductive ealth$: & Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom. 3n the case at bench, itis not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use ofcontraceptives or one6s participation in the support of modern reproductive healthmeasures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrongaccording to one6s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealingwith 0faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the provinceof the civil courts.? !he 2urisdiction of the Court e/tends only to public and secularmorality. Ehatever pronouncement the Court ma5es in the case at bench should beunderstood only in this realm where it has authority. tated otherwise, while theCourt stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of theConstitution, it does have authority to determine whether the : Law contravenesthe guarantee of religious freedom.

ame; ame; ame; !he tate is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secularob2ectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. 3n thesame breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can dowith religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the

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government. !hey can neither cause the government to adopt their particulardoctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrictother groups. !o do so, in simple terms, would cause the tate to adhere to aparticular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion. Consequently, thepetitioners are misguided in their supposition that the tate cannot enhance its

population control program through the : Law simply because the promotion ofcontraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. 3ndeed, the tate is notprecluded to pursue its legitimate secular ob2ectives without being dictated upon bythe policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his ta/es simply becauseit will cloud his conscience. !he demarcation line between Church and tatedemands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar6s and unto od thethings that are od6s.

ame; ame; ame; Compelling 3nterest !est; !he conscientious ob2ector6s claim toreligious freedom would warrant an e/emption from obligations under the:eproductive ealth Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a morecompelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular ob2ective.

3n a situation where the free e/ercise of religion is allegedly burdened bygovernment legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with theCourt6s espousal of the 4octrine of 9enevolent eutrality in =scritor, 8ndsapplication. 3n this case, the conscientious ob2ector6s claim to religious freedomwould warrant an e/emption from obligations under the : Law, unless thegovernment succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in theaccomplishment of an important secular ob2ective. ecessarily so, the plea ofconscientious ob2ectors for e/emption from the : Law deserves no less than strictscrutiny.

ame; ame; ame; !he Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed bythe :eproductive ealth Law violates the religious belief and conviction of aconscientious ob2ector. !he Court is of the view that the obligation to referimposed by the : Law violates the religious belief and conviction of aconscientious ob2ector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers apatient see5ing information on modern reproductive health products, services,procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has beencompelled to perform an act against his beliefs. "s Commissioner Goaquin ". 9ernas$Commissioner 9ernas& has written, at the basis of the free e/ercise clause is therespect for the inviolability of the human conscience. !hough it has been said thatthe act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because itma5es pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they 8ndmorally repugnant or o ensive. !hey cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what theycannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abetsthe o ensive act by indirect participation.

ame; ame; ame; 3n case of conBict between the religious beliefs and moralconvictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the tate, on the other,to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services,procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number andspacing of the birth of their children, the upreme Court is of the strong view that

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the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should beaccorded primacy. 3n case of conBict between the religious beliefs and moralconvictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the tate, on the other,to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services,procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and

spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that thereligious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accordedprimacy. "ccordingly, a conscientious ob2ector should be e/empt from compliancewith the mandates of the : Law. 3f he would be compelled to act contrary to hisreligious belief and conviction, it would be violative of 0the principle of non-coercion? enshrined in the constitutional right to free e/ercise of religion.

ame; ame; ame; !he punishment of a healthcare service provider, who failsand1or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductivehealth procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clearinhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the upreme Court cannot allow. !heCourt is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to

ensure compliance. Eithout set consequences for either an active violation or mereinaction, a law tends to be toothless and ine ectual. onetheless, when what isbartered for an e ective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protectedright the Court 8rmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. !he punishment of ahealthcare service provider, who fails and1or refuses to refer a patient to another, orwho declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient becauseincompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guaranteewhich the Court cannot allow.

ame; ame; ame; !he protection accorded to other conscientious ob2ectorsshould equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether theybelong to the public or private sector. !he conscientious ob2ection clause should beequally protective of the religious belief of public health o7cers. !here is noperceptible distinction why they should not be considered e/empt from themandates of the law. !he protection accorded to other conscientious ob2ectorsshould equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether theybelong to the public or private sector. "fter all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic inevery individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free e/ercise is notta5en o even if one acquires employment in the government.

ame; ame; ame; !he upreme Court 8nds no compelling state interest whichwould limit the free e/ercise clause of the conscientious ob2ectors, however few innumber. !he Court 8nds no compelling state interest which would limit the free

e/ercise clause of the conscientious ob2ectors, however few in number. Only theprevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of thecommunity can 2ustify the infringement of religious freedom. 3f the government failsto show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, tate intrusion isconstitutionally unacceptable. Freedom of religion means more than 2ust thefreedom to believe. 3t also means the freedom to act or not to act according to whatone believes. "nd this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act againstone6s belief or is prevented from acting according to one6s belief.

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ame; ame; 3n a conBict situation between the life of the mother and the life of achild, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. 3f, however, it isimpossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. 3n a conBictsituation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morallyobliged always to try to save both lives. 3f, however, it is impossible, the resulting

death to one should not be deliberate. "tty. oche e/plained# rinciple of 4ouble-= ect. >ay we please remind the principal author of the : 9ill in the ouse of:epresentatives of the principle of double-e ect wherein intentional harm on the lifeof either the mother of the child is never 2usti8ed to bring about a 0good? e ect. 3na conBict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, thedoctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. owever, he can act infavor of one $not necessarily the mother& when it is medically impossible to saveboth, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. 3f the above principlesare observed, the loss of the child6s life or the mother6s life is not intentional and,therefore, unavoidable. ence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. !he mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equallyvaluable. "ccordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, proceduresendangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religioussentiments of the medical practitioner. "s quoted above, whatever burden imposedupon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than 2usti8edconsidering the life he would be able to save.

ame; ame; olice ower; "nent the requirement imposed under ection %* as acondition for the issuance of a marriage license, the upreme Court 8nds the sameto be a reasonable e/ercise of police power by the government; "ll the law requiresis for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planningbreastfeeding and infant nutrition. "nent the requirement imposed under ection%* as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court 8nds the same to

be a reasonable e/ercise of police power by the government. " cursory reading ofthe assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at allviolated. "ll the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar onparenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. 3t does not evenmandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar,whether they be natural or arti8cial. "s correctly noted by the O , those whoreceive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are notcompelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to re2ect theinformation they 8nd unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters offamily life without the intervention of the tate.

:eproductive ealth Law; 4ecision-ma5ing involving a reproductive healthprocedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not 2ust one of them.

ection (, "rt. [A of the Constitution espouses that the tate shall defend the 0rightof the spouses to found a family.? One person cannot found a family. !he right,therefore, is shared by both spouses. 3n the same ection (, their right 0toparticipate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that a ectthem? is equally recogni<ed. !he : Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon thismutual decision-ma5ing. 9y giving absolute authority to the spouse who wouldundergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the

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decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result inbitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sa5e ofreducing the population. !his would be a mar5ed departure from the policy of the

tate to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. 4ecision-ma5inginvolving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the

couple, not 2ust one of them. "ny decision they would reach would a ect theirfuture as a family because the si<e of the family or the number of their childrensigni8cantly matters. !he decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongse/clusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart theirown destiny. 3t is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. @nless it pre2udices the

tate, which has not shown any compelling interest, the tate should see to it thatthey chart their destiny together as one family.

ame; arental Consent; =qually deplorable is the debarment of parental consent incases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent orhas had a miscarriage. =qually deplorable is the debarment of parental consent incases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or

has had a miscarriage. ection K of the : law provides# =C. K. "ccess to Familylanning. / / /. o person shall be denied information and access to family

planning services, whether natural or arti8cial# rovided, !hat minors will not beallowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent fromtheir parents or guardian1s e/cept when the minor is already a parent or has had amiscarriage. !here can be no other interpretation of this provision e/cept that whena minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are e/cluded fromthe decision-ma5ing process of the minor with regard to family planning. =ven if sheis not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut o 2ust because thereis a need to tame population growth. 3t is precisely in such situations when a minorparent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. !he tate

cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needsand comfort. !o say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. 3tdoes not promote unity in the family. 3t is an a ront to the constitutional mandate toprotect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

ame; ame; Compelling tate 3nterest; !he tate cannot, without a compellingstate interest, ta5e over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child,whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only acompelling state interest can 2ustify a state substitution of their parental authority. !o insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to e/ercise parentalcontrol over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide onmatters which very well a ect the very purpose of marriage, that is, theestablishment of con2ugal and family life, would result in the violation of one6sprivacy with respect to his family. 3t would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognitionthat the tate a ords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to asone unit in forming the foundation of the family and society. !he tate cannot,without a compelling state interest, ta5e over the role of parents in the care andcustody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a

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miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can 2ustify a state substitution of theirparental authority.

ame; "ccess to 3nformation; rinciple of 4ouble = ect; 3nsofar as access toinformation is concerned, the upreme Court 8nds no constitutional ob2ection to theacquisition of information by the minor referred to under the e/ception in thesecond paragraph of ection K that would enable her to ta5e proper care of her ownbody and that of her unborn child. "fter all, ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitutionmandates the tate to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unbornchild. !here must be a di erentiation between access to information about familyplanning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health proceduresand modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. 3nsofar as access toinformation is concerned, the Court 8nds no constitutional ob2ection to theacquisition of information by the minor referred to under the e/ception in thesecond paragraph of ection K that would enable her to ta5e proper care of her ownbody and that of her unborn child. "fter all, ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitutionmandates the tate to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn

child. Considering that information to enable a person to ma5e informed decisions isessential in the protection and maintenance of ones6 health, access to suchinformation with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. 3n this situation,the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfoundedbecause they are not prohibited to e/ercise parental guidance and control over theirminor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or re2ect the informationreceived.

ame; ame; :ight to Life; o person should be denied the appropriate medicalcare urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life. "s inthe case of the conscientious ob2ector, an e/ception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. 3n suchcases, the life of the minor who has already su ered a miscarriage and that of thespouse should not be put at grave ris5 simply for lac5 of consent. 3t should beemphasi<ed that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgentlyneeded to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life. 3n this connection,the second sentence of ection '($a&$'&$ii& should be struc5 down. 9y e ectivelylimiting the requirement of parental consent to 0only in elective surgicalprocedures,? it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases wherewhat is involved are 0non-surgical procedures.? ave for the two e/ceptionsdiscussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the 8rstsentence of ection '($a&$'&$ii&, the parents should not be deprived of theirconstitutional right of parental authority. !o deny them of this right would be ana ront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

ame; "ny attac5 on the validity of ection %) of the :eproductive ealth $: & Lawis premature because the 4epartment of =ducation, Culture and ports $4=C & hasyet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

u7ce it to state that any attac5 on the validity of ection %) of the : Law ispremature because the 4epartment of =ducation, Culture and ports has yet toformulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can

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only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be usedto educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs ofthe petitioners and validate their apprehensions. !hus, considering the prematurenature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality orvalidity.

tatutes; rinciple of Aoid for Aagueness; " statute or act su ers from the defect ofvagueness when it lac5s comprehensible standards that men of commonintelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and di er as to its application. "statute or act su ers from the defect of vagueness when it lac5s comprehensiblestandards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning anddi er as to its application. 3t is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects# $%& itviolates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted byit, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and $'& it leaves law enforcers unbridleddiscretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary Be/ing of the

overnment muscle. >oreover, in determining whether the words used in a statuteare vague, words must not only be ta5en in accordance with their plain meaning

alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. 3t is a rule that every part ofthe statute must be interpreted with reference to the conte/t, that is, every part ofit must be construed together with the other parts and 5ept subservient to thegeneral intent of the whole enactment.

Constitutional Law; :eproductive ealth Law; =qual rotection of the Law; !oprovide that the poor are to be given priority in the government6s reproductivehealth care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause; 3t should benoted that ection K of the :eproductive ealth $: & Law prioriti<es poor andmarginali<ed couples who are su ering from fertility issues and desire to havechildren. !here is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the : Law only see5sto target the poor to reduce their number. !o provide that the poor are to be givenpriority in the government6s reproductive health care program is not a violation ofthe equal protection clause. 3n fact, it is pursuant to ection %%, "rticle [333 of theConstitution which recogni<es the distinct necessity to address the needs of theunderprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the healthdevelopment of the people. !hus# ection %%. !he tate shall adopt an integratedand comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to ma5eessential goods, health and other social services available to all the people ata ordable cost. !here shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sic5,elderly, disabled, women, and children. !he tate shall endeavor to provide freemedical care to paupers. 3t should be noted that ection K of the : Law prioriti<espoor and marginali<ed couples who are su ering from fertility issues and desire tohave children. !here is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the : Law onlysee5s to target the poor to reduce their number. Ehile the : Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. "s ection ($l&e/plains, the 0promotion and1or stabili<ation of the population growth rate isincidental to the advancement of reproductive health.?

ame; ame; 3nvoluntary ervitude; Clearly, no compulsion, force or threat is madeupon reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service against

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their will. Ehile the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite toaccreditation with hil ealth, the upreme Court does not consider the same to bean unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress inthe furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest. !he O counters that therendition of pro bono services envisioned in ection %K can hardly be considered as

forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providershave the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.>oreover, the O points out that the imposition is within the powers of thegovernment, the accreditation of medical practitioners with hil ealth being aprivilege and not a right. !he point of the O is well-ta5en. 3t should 8rst bementioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interestthat it is both a power and a duty of the tate to control and regulate it in order toprotect and promote the public welfare. Li5e the legal profession, the practice ofmedicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directlyinvolves the very lives of the people. " fortiori, this power includes the power ofCongress to prescribe the quali8cations for the practice of professions or tradeswhich a ect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the publicsafety; and to regu-

late or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revo5ing such rightaltogether. >oreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitudeconnotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means ofcoercion and compulsion. " reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals thatit only encourages private and nongovernment reproductive healthcare serviceproviders to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with hil ealth,no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. rivate and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also en2oy the liberty tochoose which 5ind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to

provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force orthreat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. Ehile therendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with hil ealth,the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, anecessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceivedlegitimate state interest.

ame; ame; From the declared policy of the :eproductive ealth $: & Law, it isclear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that areproven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and e ective in accordance withscienti8c and evidence-based medical research standards. !he functions, powersand duties of the F4" are speci8c to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. 9eing the country6s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety offood and medicines available to the public, the F4" was equipped with thenecessary powers and functions to ma5e it e ective. ursuant to the principle ofnecessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the F4" to ensure public healthand safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes 0service?and 0methods.? From the declared policy of the : Law, it is clear that Congressintended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically

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safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and e ective in accordance with scienti8c andevidence-based medical research standards.

ame; ame; !he fact that the :eproductive ealth $: & Law does not intrude in theautonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the "utonomous :egion of >uslim >indanao $":>>&. !he : Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. !hefact that the : Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can

be equally applied to the ":>>. !he : Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.>oreover, "rticle 333, ections +, %H and %% of :.". o. DH*), or the organic act of the":>>, alluded to by petitioner !illah to 2ustify the e/emption of the operation of the: Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. !hese provisions relied upon by the petitioners simplydelineate the powers that may be e/ercised by the regional government, which can,in no manner, be characteri<ed as an abdication by the tate of its power to enactlegislation that would bene8t the general welfare. "fter all, despite the veritableautonomy granted the ":>>, the Constitution and the supporting 2urisprudence, asthey now stand, re2ect the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship betweenthe national and the regional governments. =/cept for the e/press and impliedlimitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted toe/ercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all sub2ects which e/tends toall matters of general concern or common interest.

ame; ame; "bortion; !he :eproductive ealth $: & Law does not sanction theta5ing away of life. 3t does not allow abortion in any shape or form. 3t only see5s toenhance the population control program of the government by providinginformation and ma5ing non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available tothe public, especially to the poor. @nless, a natural right has been transformed intoa written law, it cannot serve as a basis to stri5e down a law. 3n :epublic v.

andiganbayan, )HK C:" %H $'HH(&, the very case cited by the petitioners, it wase/plained that the Court is not duty-bound to e/amine every law or action andwhether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. :ather, natural lawis to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rightsinherent to man where no law is applicable. "t any rate, as earlier e/pounded, the: Law does not sanction the ta5ing away of life. 3t does not allow abortion in anyshape or form. 3t only see5s to enhance the population control program of thegovernment by providing information and ma5ing non-abortifacient contraceptivesmore readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

ame; ame; 3n general, the upreme Court does not 8nd the :eproductive ealth$: & Law as unconstitutional insofar as it see5s to provide access to medically-safe,non-abortifacient, e ective, legal, a ordable, and quality reproductive healthcareservices, methods, devices, and supplies. 3n general, the Court does not 8nd the: Law as unconstitutional insofar as it see5s to provide access to medically-safe,non-abortifacient, e ective, legal, a ordable, and quality reproductive healthcareservices, methods, devices, and supplies. "s earlier pointed out, however, thereligious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit ofwhat the law hopes to achieve. "fter all, the Constitutional safeguard to religiousfreedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than

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the tate. 3n conformity with the principle of separation of Church and tate, onereligious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society.

hilippine modern society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. "s such,everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony maycontinue to reign as we e/ist alongside each other.

ame; ame; eparation of owers; 3t is not the province of the 2udiciary to loo5 intothe wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch.

or is it the business of this !ribunal to remedy every un2ust situation that may arisefrom the application of a particular law. 3t is for the legislature to enact remediallegislation if that would be necessary in the premises. 3ndeed, at the present, thecountry has a population problem, but the tate should not use coercive measures$li5e the penal provisions of the : Law against conscientious ob2ectors& to solve it.

onetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law./ / /. 9ut this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. 3ts duty isto say what the law is as enacted by the lawma5ing body. !hat is not the same assaying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of

circumstances. 3t is not the province of the 2udiciary to loo5 into the wisdom of thelaw nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. or is it thebusiness of this !ribunal to remedy every un2ust situation that may arise from theapplication of a particular law. 3t is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation ifthat would be necessary in the premises. 9ut as always, with apt 2udicial cautionand cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpretingthe law, guided by the Constitution and e/isting legislation and mindful of settled 2urisprudence. !he Court6s function is therefore limited, and accordingly, mustcon8ne itself to the 2udicial tas5 of saying what the law is, as enacted by thelawma5ing body.

ereno,QCG., Opinyong umasang-ayon at umasalungat#

Constitutional Law; :eproductive ealth Law; ierarchy of :ights; a a5ing pananawsa herar5iya ng mga 5arapatang pantao, walang hihigit pa sa 5arapatang mabuhay,at nasasalamin ng ating aligang 9atas ang ganitong paniniwala; Eala sa ta5da ng

aligang 9atas at :epublic "ct o. %H(*) $!he :esponsible arenthood and:eproductive ealth "ct of 'H%'&, o : Law, ang pag5itil ng buhay. a herar5iyang mga 5arapatang pantao, walang hihigit pa sa 5arapatang mabuhay, atnasasalamin ng ating aligang 9atas ang ganitong paniniwala. "yon dito, pantay napangangalagaan ng pamahalaan ang buhay ng ina at ang buhay na 5anyangdinadala. 9a5as sa adhi5aing ito ang pag5ilala sa mala5ing bahaging ginagampananng ina sa pagbibigay ng buhay. aya6t sasalungatin 5o ang big5asin ng a5ing mga5apatid na >ahistrado, na ang pagpapalaya sa pasiya ng may-5atawan ay 5umi5itilng buhay ng 5apwa-taong isisilang pa lamang. Eala sa ta5da ng aligang 9atas at:epublic "ct o. %H(*) $!he :esponsible arenthood and :eproductive ealth "ct of 'H%'&, o : Law, ang pag5itil ng buhay. gunit inuunawa rin nito ang 5arapatan ngmag-asawa na magpala5i ng 5anilang pamilya ng may dangal sa buhay.

apa5ahalaga din sa pananaw ng aligang 9atas at ng : Law ang 5alusugan ngpamayanan, lalung-lalo na ang 5alusugan ng mga ina o magiging ina ng

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pamayanang ito. aya6t mahalaga na ang bawat interpretasyon ng : Law ay ayonsa i5abubuti ng pamilyang ilipino at 5alusugan ng ina.

ame; ame; Compelling 3nterest !est; :eligious Freedom; a a5ing pananaw hindia5o sumasang-ayon na nararapat gamitin ang compelling state interest test upangtiya5in ang legalidad ng :eproductive ealth $: & Law parti5ular na angpaggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-5aya, de-5alidad, naaayon sabatas at hindi abortifacient na reproductive health care services, methods, devicesat supplies para sa lahat, pati na ang mahalagang 5aalaman u5ol dito sa5adahilanang buo ang pag5ilala ng : Law sa religious freedom, 5aya6t hindi na5ailangan ang test na ito. indi a5o sumasang-ayon na nararapat gamitin angcompelling state interest test upang tiya5in ang legalidad ng : Law parti5ularna ang paggarantiya ng pamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-5aya, de-5alidad,naaayon sa batas at hindi abortifacient na reproductive health care services,methods, devices at supplies para sa lahat, pati na ang mahalagang 5aalaman u5oldito sa 5adahilanang buo ang pag5ilala ng : Law sa religious freedom, 5aya6thindi na 5ailangan ang test na ito.

ame; ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw ginamit ang compelling state interest test sa=strada v. =scritor, )HI C:" % $'HH(&, upang malaman 5ung ang respondent doonay nararapat na bigyan ng e/emption laban sa 5asong administratibo bunga ngpa5i5isama niya sa lala5ing hindi niya asawa ayon sa Civil Code. inamit angcompelling state interest test sa =strada v. =scritor, )HI C:" % $'HH(&, upangmalaman 5ung ang respondent doon ay nararapat na bigyan ng e/emption laban sa5asong administratibo bunga ng pa5i5isama niya sa lala5ing hindi niya asawa ayonsa Civil Code. araniwan, bilang 5awani ng pamahalaan, mahaharap angrespondent sa 5asong disgraceful and immoral conduct. 9ag5us, inilahad ngrespondent na bagama6t walang basbas ng pamahalaang sibil ang 5anilangpagsasama, may basbas naman ito ng 5anilang relihiyon na Gehovah6s Eitnessesand the Eatch !ower and 9ible !ract ociety. aya6t hindi siya nararapat nasampahan ng 5asong administratibo bunga nito.

ame; ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw 5apag hindi nanaig ang interes ngpamahalaan, magbibigay ng e/emption sa pata5aran ang orte uprema para samga mamamayang naninindigan para sa 5anilang religious freedom. >alinaw sa=strada v. =scritor, )HI C:" % $'HH(&, na sa ilalim ng compelling state interest test,ipinagtutunggali ang religious freedom ng mga mamamayan at ang interes ngpamahalaan sa pagpapatupad ng pata5arang sinasabing nagpapahirap sa religiousconvictions ng ilan. apag hindi nanaig ang interes ng pamahalaan, magbibigay nge/emption sa pata5aran ang orte uprema para sa mga mamamayang

naninindigan para sa 5anilang religious freedom. 3sinaad din sa =strada v. =scritorna na5agawian na ng orte uprema na magbigay ng e/emption sa halip namagpawalang-bisa ng mga pata5aran ng pamahalaan pagdating sa usapin ngreligious freedom. indi ito ang sitwasyon sa ilalim ng : Law. "yon sa petitioners,5atumbas ng isang pag5a5asala sa ilalim ng 5anilang relihiyon ang pagsasagawa ngserbisyo u5ol sa modern family planning methods at pagbibigay ng payo u5ol dito.Labag ito sa religious freedom ng mga conscientious health professionals nananiniwalang li5as na masama ang contraception. 4ahil dito, nararapat na

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ipawalang-bisa ang : Law. "t, ayon sa mga 5apatid 5ong >ahistrado, walangcompelling state interest para payagan ang pamahalaang pilitin ang healthprofessionals na lumabag sa 5anilang paniniwala. "ng totoo, walang paglabag sapaniniwala na pinapataw ang : Law.

ame; ame; :eligious Freedom; Opt-Out Clause; a a5ing pananaw sa ilalim ngopt-out clause na na5apaloob sa ection K ng :eproductive ealth $: & Law, hindiobligadong magdulot ng serbisyo 5augnay sa modern family planning methods angmga non-maternity specialty hospitals at mga ospital na pagmamay-ari atpinatata5bo ng mga religious groups. a5alimutan ng petitioners ang 5abuuan ng: Law. 9atid ng ongreso na maaaring ma5asagasa sa paniniwala at i5aligalig ngilang medical professionals ang 5autusang ito sa : Law. 4ahil mismo dito 5ayanag-u5it ang ongreso ng e/emption sa : Law para sa mga conscientiousob2ectors sa pamamagitan ng 0opt-out clause.? a ilalim ng opt-out clause nana5apaloob sa ection K ng : Law, hindi obligadong magdulot ng serbisyo5augnay sa modern family planning methods ang mga non-maternity specialtyhospitals at mga ospital na pagmamay-ari at pinatata5bo ng mga religious groups.

a 5abilang banda, pinahahalagahan sa ilalim ng ection '($a&$(& ng : Law angconscientious ob2ection ng health care service providers batay sa 5anilang ethical oreligious beliefs. "yon dito, e/empted sila sa 5aparusahan na ipapataw sa mgatatangging magdulot ng reproductive health care services at magbigay ngmahalagang 5aalaman u5ol dito.

ame; ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw wala dapat pagtutol sa atas ng :eproductiveealth $: & Law na ituro ng mga conscientious ob2ector ang mga pasyente sa

pina5amalapit na health facility o health care service provider na ma5atutulong sa5anila. "yon sa 4ecision, walang idinudulot na paglabag sa religious freedom angpag-uutos sa mga i5a5asal na dumalo sa mga seminar u5ol sa responsibleparenthood, family planning, breastfeeding at infant nutrition dahil hindi naman silaobligadong sumunod sa mga ituturo dito. indi rin masama ang pagbibigay-daan namabigyan ng mahalagang 5aalaman tung5ol sa family planning services ang mgamenor de edad na may ana5 o nag5aroon ng miscarriage para matutunan nila angmga bagay na ma5atutulong sa 5anila upang pangalagaan ang 5anilang 5atawan atana5 o dinadala. ung gayon, at 5ahalintulad ng nasabing sitwasyon, wala rin dapatpagtutol sa atas ng : Law na ituro ng mga conscientious ob2ector ang mgapasyente sa pina5amalapit na health facility o health care service provider nama5atutulong sa 5anila.

ame; ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw hindi maituturing na dagdag pasanin ngmedical professionals ang duty to refer sa ilalim ng :eproductive ealth $: & Law.

a 5anilang pagpaso5 sa propesyon, tinanggap ng mga medical professionals angmga moral values at 5aa5ibat na 5atung5ulan sa mga pasyente. 3sa dito angnapapanahong duty to refer sa ibang health facility o health care service provider5ung batid nila na dahil sa 5anilang religious beliefs, hindi nila maaaring ihatid angserbisyong hinihingi o 5ina5ailangan ng pasyente. @pang mapanatili ang ethicalpractice, hinihi5ayat ng mga pantas ang mga conscientious ob2ectors namagling5od 5alapit ang ibang medical professionals na hindi conscientious ob2ectorsupang maayos na mapanatili ang isang referral system para masigurado na

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maibibigay sa pasyente ang mga pangangailangan nitong hindi 5ayang tugunan ngconscientious ob2ector. >ahalaga ito upang masiguro na tuloy-tuloy ang serbisyongpang5alusugan para sa mga taong nangangailangan nito. 4ahil dito, hindimaituturing na dagdag pasanin ng medical professionals ang duty to refer sa ilalimng : Law. Li5as na ito sa 5anilang propesyon. a 5atunayan, nasa 5apangyarihan

ng ongreso ang maglatag ng mga alituntunin at dagdag na pasanin sa propesyonng medisina ayon sa police power nito upang isulong ang public health. "t,inuunawa ng : Law na dahil sa religious convictions, hindi maaaring isagawa ngisang medical professional ang serbisyo u5ol sa modern family planning methods5ahit hinihingi pa ng pasyente. 4ahil dito, pinapayagan sila na tumanggi ngpasyente at papuntahin ito sa ibang medical professional na ma5atutulong dito.

ame; ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw 5ung tutuusin, maituturing na paglabag sasinumpaang tung5ulin ng mga medical professionals ang pagtangging magturo ngpasyente sa ibang medical professional. ung tutuusin, maituturing na paglabagsa sinumpaang tung5ulin ng medical professionals ang pagtangging magturo ngpasyente sa ibang mga medical professional. >aaari itong maging basehan ng

disciplinary action laban sa 5anila. "yon sa isang lathalain, dahil ang mga medicalprofessionals ay napapaloob sa isang monopoly sa paghahatid ng serbisyongpang5alusugan, ang ilan sa 5anila na mas pinahahalagahan ang 5anilang religiousinterests nang walang pa5undangan sa 5apa5anan ng 5anilang pasyente aynababalot sa isang matinding conBict of interest. ilala ang da5ilang propesyong itosa pagpapa5asa5it para sa i5abubuti ng ibang tao, 5aya naman ang pagtanggi 5ahitsa pagtuturo na lamang sa ibang health facility o health care service provider aymaituturing na pag5ait ng serbisyong pang5alusugan sa mga pasyente.

ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw ipinagbabawal ng ection '($a&$%& ang pag5a5aitng mahalagang 5aalaman, pagbabawal sa pagpapalaganap nito o sadyaangpagbibigay ng maling impormasyon 5augnay ng mga programa at serbisyo u5ol sareproductive health, 5arapatan ng lahat sa informed choice at ang paggarantiya ngpamahalaan sa ligtas, mabisa, abot-5aya, de-5alidad, naaayon sa batas at hindiabortifacient na family planning methods. a puntong ito, nais 5ong linawin naipinagbabawal ng ection '($a&$%& ang pag5a5ait ng mahalagang 5aalaman,pagbabawal sa pagpapalaganap nito o sadyaang pagbibigay ng malingimpormasyon 5augnay ng mga programa at serbisyo u5ol sa reproductive health,5arapatan ng lahat sa informed choice at ang paggarantiya ng pamahalaan saligtas, mabisa, abot-5aya, de-5alidad, naaayon sa batas at hindi abortifacient nafamily planning methods. a 5abilang banda, ipinagbabawal naman ng ection'($a&$'& ang pagtangging magsagawa ng ligtas at naaayon sa batas nareproductive health procedures dahil lamang sa ang taong naghahangad nito,bagama6t nasa hustong edad, ay hindi ma5apagpa5ita ng pahintulot ng 5anyangasawa o magulang. indi nito ipinagbabawal ang pagtangging magsagawa ngreproductive health procedures dahil sa 5anilang religious beliefs.

ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw bagama6t maaaring parusahan ang iba 5ung sila aytatangging magsagawa ng de-5alidad na health care services o tatanggingmagbigay ng mahalagang 5aalaman u5ol dito, pinapayagan ang mga conscientiousob2ector na tumanggi 5ung wala sa emergency condition o hindi serious case ang

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pasyente. ung conscientious ob2ector ang health care service provider,mapapasailalim siya sa ection '($a&$(& na nagsasabing isasaalang-alang atirerespeto ang 5anilang ethical o religious beliefs. "yon dito, bagama6t maaaringparusahan ang iba 5ung sila ay tatangging magsagawa ng de-5alidad na health careservices o tatangging magbigay ng mahalagang 5aalaman u5ol dito, pinapayagan

ang mga conscientious ob2ector na tumanggi 5ung wala sa emergency condition ohindi serious case ang pasyente. indi parurusahan ng batas ang mgaconscientious ob2ector na tumanggi, at 5abilang ito sa e/emption na inilatag ng :Law para sa 5anila.

ame; ame; 4ue rocess; a a5ing pananaw bu5od sa mga 5arapatangginagarantiya ng 9ill of :ights, sa5law ng due process clause ang lahat ng bahaging buhay ng tao. abilang na rito ang 5arapatan ng sariling pagpapasiya.>ayroong pangunahing 5arapatan, at pangangailangan, ang lahat ng tao sa sarilingpagpapasiya. 9iniyayaan ng 5aisipan ang lahat ng tao upang malayang maipahayagang 5anyang saloobin, ma5abuo ng sariling pananaw at ma5apagpasiya para sa5anyang 5inabu5asan. a ilalim ng ating aligang 9atas, pinangangalagaan ng due

process clause ang garantiya ng 5alayaan sa bawat ilipino. agsasabi ito nawalang sinuman ang maaaring bawian ng buhay, 5alayaan at ari-arian nang hindiayon sa paraang inilatag sa batas. anangga ng mga mamamayan ang due processclause sa hindi ma5atuwirang pamamala5ad at pagsamsam ng pamahalaan.

ayunpaman, 0 tJhe 4ue rocess Clause guarantees more than fair process, and theNliberty6 it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.?

agtata5da ang due process clause ng limitasyon sa 5apangyarihan ng pamahalaanpagdating sa mga 5arapatan ng mamamayan. 9u5od sa mga 5arapatangginagarantiya ng 9ill of :ights, sa5law ng due process clause ang lahat ng bahaging buhay ng tao. abilang na rito ang 5arapatan ng sariling pagpapasiya.

ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw sa ilalim ng :eproductive ealth $: & Law,ihahandog sa lahat ang mahalagang impormasyon u5ol sa modern family planningmethods. 3pinapalagay na paglilimian ng asawang sasailalim sa procedure ang mgamagiging epe5to nito sa 5anya at sa 5anyang mahal sa buhay. a ilalim ng :Law, ihahandog sa lahat ang mahalagang impormasyon u5ol sa modern familyplanning methods. 3pinapalagay din na paglilimian ng asawang sasailalim saprocedure ang mga magiging epe5to nito sa 5anya at sa 5anyang mahal sa buhay.

ung magdesisyon siya na sumailalim sa napiling reproductive health procedure,hindi ito dapat hadlangan ng sinuman. 9ahagi pa rin ito ng informed consent napundasyon ng : Law.

ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw walang anumang na5asulat sa :eproductive ealth

$: & Law na humahadlang sa pagsali ng asawa sa pagtimbang ng mga pagpipiliangmodern family planning methods, at pagpapasiya 5ung ano ang pina5amabuti parasa 5anyang asawa. Ealang anumang na5asulat sa : Law na nag-aalis sa mag-asawa ng 5anilang 5arapatang bumuo ng pamilya. a 5atunayan, tinitiya5 nito naang mga maralita na nagnanais mag5aroon ng ana5 ay ma5i5inabang sa mga payo,5agamitan at nararapat na procedures para matulungan silang maglihi at maparamiang mga ana5. Ealang anumang na5asulat sa batas na nagpapahintulot sapamahalaan na manghimaso5 sa pagpapasiya 0 thatJ belongs e/clusively to, and

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isJ shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny.?Ealang anumang na5asulat sa : Law na humahadlang sa pagsali ng asawa sapagtimbang ng mga pagpipiliang modern family planning methods, at pagpapasiya5ung ano ang pina5amabuti para sa 5anyang asawa. ung may epe5to man ang :Law, ito ay ang pagpapatibay ng ma5atotohanang sanggunian sa pagitan ng mag--

asawang pantay na magpapasiya u5ol sa isang bagay na magtata5da ng 5anilang5inabu5asan.

ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw hindi ang5op na manghimaso5 ang orte upremasa 5atanungan 5ung ang :eproductive ealth $: & Law ay isang population controlmeasure sapag5at ang ongreso lamang ang ma5asasagot sa tanong 5ung ano angnag-udyo5 dito sa pagbuo ng nasabing batas. indi ang5op na manghimaso5 ang

orte uprema sa 5atanungan 5ung ang : Law ay isang population controlmeasure sapag5at ang ongreso lamang ang ma5asasagot sa tanong 5ung ano angnag-udyo5 dito sa pagbuo ng nasabing batas. "ng tanging dapat pagtuunan ngpansin ng orte uprema ay 5ung ang batas at ang mga nilalaman nito ay alinsunodsa itinata5da ng aligang 9atas. >asasabi nating ispe5ulasyon lamang ang

paghusga sa hangarin ng ongreso na handa itong sirain ang parental authorityupang isulong lamang ang population control. asintabi po, hindi maaaring ganitoang tono ng orte uprema patungo sa ongreso.

ame; ame; arental "uthority; a a5ing pananaw pinag-uu5ulan ng ilang5arapatan at tung5ulin ang mga magulang 5augnay sa 5anilang mga ana5 na walapa sa tamang gulang. >aaaring tali5uran o ilipat ang parental authority atresponsibility ayon lamang sa mga halimbawang na5asaad sa batas. 0 Jarentalauthority and responsibility include the caring for and rearing of unemancipatedchildren for civic consciousness and e7ciency and the development of their moral,mental and physical character and well-being.? inag-uu5ulan ng ilang 5arapatan attung5ulin ang mga magulang 5augnay sa 5anilang mga ana5 na wala pa sa tamanggulang. >aaaring tali5uran o ilipat ang parental authority at responsibility ayonlamang sa mga halimbawang na5asaad sa batas. >abibinbin o mapuputol ito ayonlamang sa mga sitwasyong na5asaad sa Family Code.

ame; ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw sa ilalim ng :eproductive ealth $: & Law,hindi pinagbabawalan ang mga menor de edad na may ana5 o nag5aroon ngmiscarriage na humingi ng payo sa 5anilang magulang, at hindi pinagbabawalanang mga magulang na magbigay nito. Ealang anumang na5asulat sa : Law nanagsasabing napuputol ang parental authority 5apag ang menor de edad ay mayana5 na o nag5aroon ng miscarriage. indi nito dinadagdagan ang mgahalimbawang na5asaad sa Family Code u5ol sa pag5awala ng parental authority.

Ealang anumang na5asulat sa batas na nagbibigay 5apangyarihan sa pamahalaanupang humalili sa ina at ama sa pagdamay at pagtugon sa mga pangangailanganng 5anilang mga menor de edad. ailanma6y hindi 5aya at hindi maaaring gawin itong pamahalaan, hindi lamang dahil hindi ito pra5ti5al ngunit dahil walangma5atutumbas sa inaasahang pagmamahal ng magulang. a ganitong pagsubo5 sabuhay ng isang menor de edad, higit lalo niyang 5ailangan ang 0comfort, care,advice and guidance from her own parents.? a ilalim ng : Law, hindipinagbabawalan ang mga menor de edad na may ana5 o nag5aroon ng miscarriage

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na humingi ng payo sa 5anilang magulang, at hindi pinagbabawalan ang mgamagulang na magbigay nito. 3pinapalagay na hangad lamang ng mga magulang angma5abubuti para sa 5anilang ana5.

ame; ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw sa pagsasabi na hindi 5ailangan angparental consent ng mga menor de edad na may ana5 o nag5aroon ng miscarriagebago mabigyan ang mga ito ng modern family planning services,pinanghihimasu5an ng pamahalaan ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng menor de edad atang nilapitan nitong medical health professional. a pagsasabi na hindi 5ailanganang parental consent ng mga menor de edad na may ana5 o nag5aroon ngmiscarriage bago mabigyan ang mga ito ng modern family planning services,pinanghihimasu5an ng pamahalaan ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng menor de edad atang nilapitan nitong medical health professional. adalasan, pinag5a5aitan ngreproductive health services ng mga pribado at pampubli5ong health professionalsang mga menor de edad dahil sa 5aisipang masyado pa silang mga bata paramag5aroon ng 5aalaman sa mga bagay u5ol sa 5anilang se5swalidad. "ng paghinging parental consent ang madalas na dahilan upang tanggihan ang ganitong

pagsangguni ng mga 5abataan. >insan nga, hinihiya pa ang mga ito. gunit5ailangang tandaan na nagdalang-tao na ang mga menor de edad na ito, at hindi namasasabing wala silang muwang pagdating sa mga bagay na se5swal.

ame; ame; "ge and 4evelopment-"ppropriate :eproductive ealth =ducation; aa5ing pananaw upang mapangalagaan ang 5arapatan ng mga 5abataan namag5aroon ng mahalagang 5aalaman u5ol sa 5anilang 5alusugan, ipinag-uutos ng: Law ang pagtuturo ng age- and development-appropriate reproductive healtheducation sa lahat ng pribado at pampubli5ong paaralan. 9ahagi ng : Law angpaninindigan ng pamahalaan na ang mga 5abataan ay active rights holders, at5atung5ulan ng pamahalaan na siguraduhin na matatamasa nila ang 5anilang mga5arapatan nang walang dis5riminasyon. @pang mapangalagaan ang 5arapatan ngmga 5abataan na mag5aroon ng mahalagang 5aalaman u5ol sa 5anilang 5alusugan,ipinag-uutos ng : Law ang pagtuturo ng age-and development-appropriatereproductive health education sa lahat ng pribado at pampubli5ong paaralan.

ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw hindi a5o sang-ayon sa 4ecision na walang totoongpag5a5aiba sa pagitan ng pribado at pampubli5ong health o7cers. aniniwala a5ona napa5ala5i ng pag5a5aiba sa pagitan nila at nagmumula ito sa 5adahilananginaasahan ang mga pampubli5ong health o7cers bilang frontline sa paghahatid ngserbisyong pang5alusugan. indi a5o sang-ayon sa 4ecision na walang totoongpag5a5aiba sa pagitan ng pribado at pampubli5ong health o7cers. aniniwala a5ona napa5ala5i ng pag5a5aiba sa pagitan nila at nagmumula ito sa 5adahilanang

inaasahan ang mga pampubli5ong health o7cers bilang frontline sa paghahatid ngserbisyong pang5alusugan. 9ilang public o7cers, may pananagutan sila sa taong-bayan sa lahat ng oras, at nararapat na magling5od sila nang may dangal,5atapatan, 5ahusayan, ganap-taglay ang pagiging ma5abayan at ma5atarungan, atpaya5 ang pamumuhay. >aaari din nating banggitin na ang sambayanan angnagpapasahod sa 5anila. a pamamagitan ng pagliling5od ng mga pampubli5onghealth o7cers naisasa5atuparan ng pamahalaan ang tung5ulin nito na pangalagaan

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ang 5alusugan ng mga mamamayan, lalo na ang mga maralitang bahagya na ngangma5abili ng sapat na pag5ain sa araw-araw.

ame; ame; =qual rotection of the Law; a a5ing pananaw hindi 5arapat-dapat nasabihing lumalabag sa equal protection clause ng ating aligang 9atas ang:eproductive ealth $: & Law at 3mplementing :ules and :egulations $3::& nito.

a gayon, hindi 5arapat-dapat na sabihing lumalabag sa equal protection clause ngating aligang 9atas ang : Law at 3:: nito. augnay nito, tinutuligsa angsumusunod na bahagi ng ection *.') ng 3:: ng : Law# rovided, !hat s5illedhealth professionals such as provincial, city, or municipal health o7cers, chiefs ofhospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of theiro7ce are speci8cally charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the: : "ct and these :ules, cannot be considered as conscientious ob2ectors.$=mphasis supplied& 3tinatadhana nito na hindi maaaring maging conscientiousob2ectors ang mga pampubli5ong s5illed health professionals na mismong inatasangmagsagawa ng mga 5autusan at programa sa ilalim ng : Law at 3:: nito. >alinawang dahilan nito. Ealang ma5abuluhang pagsasa5atuparan ng : Law, at

pangangalaga sa reproductive health ng sambayanan, 5ung hahayaan ang mgaprovincial, city, o municipal health o7cers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses atsupervising midwives iyong mga itinuturing na nasa frontline ng paghahatid ngserbisyong pang5alusugan na tumangging magbigay ng reproductive health careservices at mahalagang 5aalaman u5ol dito. >a5i5itang hindi discriminatory angnasabing probisyon 5apag inilapat ang test of reasonableness. a5op lamang nitoang mga public s5illed health professionals na inatasang isagawa ang mga 5autusanat programa sa ilalim ng : Law at 3:: nito. >a5i5ita na iyon lamang mga maymanagement prerogative at 5apangyarihang mag-impluwensiya ng pamamala5adng 5anilang institusyon ang hindi maaaring tumangging maghatid ng reproductivehealth care services at mahalagang 5aalaman u5ol dito. >alinaw ang pag5a5aiba

nila sa ibang pampubli5ong health professionals na maaaring maging conscientiousob2ectors.

ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw pagdating sa reproductive health programs,magiging 5ahangalan para sa pamahalaan 5ung hahayaan nito na sariling mga5awani ang humadlang sa pamamagitan ng paglalatag ng mga salungat napata5aran gamit ang ma5inarya ng pamahalaan. 9ilang mga 5awani ngpamahalaan, nalalagay sa isang pambihirang 5atayuan ang mga public o7cers paraisa5atuparan ang mga nilalayon ng pamahalaan. 4ahil dito, mala5i ang na5aatangna responsibilidad sa 5anila upang ilunsad ang mga bala5in ng pamahalaan.

agdating sa reproductive health programs, magiging 5ahangalan para sapamahalaan 5ung hahayaan nito na sariling mga 5awani ang humadlang sapamamagitan ng paglalatag ng mga salungat na pata5aran gamit ang ma5inarya ngpamahalaan. ama5atuwid, hindi dapat payagang tumali5od sa tung5ulin ang isangpublic o7cer na mismong inatasang isagawa ang mga 5autusan at programa sailalim ng : Law at 3:: nito, o biguin nito ang paglulunsad ng isang reproductivehealth program.

ame; ame; hil ealth "ccreditation; a a5ing pananaw alalahanin ng lahat napribilehiyo at hindi 5arapatan ang mag5aroon ng hil ealth accreditation 5aya6t

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tama lang na isu5li ng gynecologists at obstetricians ang )I oras na pro bonoservice sa maralita upang mapangalagaan ang 5anilang reproductive health.>asasabing isa lamang sa family planning information and services angcontraceptives at contraception na tinututulan ng mga conscientious ob2ectors.>ayroon pang labing-isang bahagi ng reproductive health care na 5asunod nito.

>aaaring gamitin ng mga reproductive health care service providers ang mgalibreng serbisyo na mapapaloob sa anumang bahagi ng reproductive health careupang mabuo ang )I oras na 5a5ailanganin nila para sa 5anilang hil ealthaccreditation. >aaari ngang ibuhos ng conscientious ob2ector ang lahat ng )I orassa pagpapalaganap ng natural family planning method. "lalahanin ng lahat napribilehiyo at hindi 5arapatan ang mag5aroon ng hil ealth accreditation 5aya6ttama lang na isu5li ng gynecologists at obstetricians ang )I oras na pro bonoservice sa maralita upang mapangalagaan ang 5anilang reproductive health. ungtutuusin, reproductive health care ng mga pasyente ang pangunahingpinagtutuunan ng pansin ng mga gynecologists at obstetricians. ung bibigyan silang e/emption sa ection %K dahil conscientious ob2ector sila, ang tanging magigingepe5to nito ay hindi nila 5a5ailanganing magbigay ng anumang libreng serbisyo.

ung gayon, mawawalan ng saysay ang layunin ng pamahalaan sa ilalim ng : Lawna ihatid sa mga maralitang mamamayan ang 5adalubhasaan ng mga pribadongreproductive health care service providers.

ame; ame; a a5ing pananaw pinapayagan ang lahat ng methods ofcontraception hangga6t ang mga ito ay ligtas, naaayon sa batas, aprobado ngmedical professionals at alinsunod sa 3slamic hariah. inapayagan ang lahat ngmethods of contraception hangga6t ang mga ito ay ligtas, naaayon sa batas,aprobado ng medical professionals at alinsunod sa 3slamic hariah. Eala ringna5i5itang pagtutol ang hariah sa pa5ahulugan ng 3nternational Conference on

opulation and 4evelopment sa reproductive health, pati na ang mga prinsipyo nito

u5ol sa pagpapasiya sa dami at pag-aagwat ng mga ana5, pag5a5aroon ng5aalaman u5ol sa sariling se5swalidad, pagiging ligtas sa mga sa5it 5augnay sareproduction, at pag5a5aroon ng safe at satisfying se/ life sa pagitan ng mag-asawa. ung susu5atin ang mga adhi5ain ng : Law batay sa religious freedom ngmga >uslim, na bumubuo sa limang porsiyento ng mga ilipino, wala itong hatid naligalig o pasanin.

Carpio,QG., Concurring Opinion#

:eproductive ealth Law; Aiew that the upreme Court is simply not competent todeclare when human life begins, whether upon fertili<ation of the ovum or uponattachment of the fertili<ed ovum to the uterus wall. 3 concur in the ponencia of

Gustice Gose Catral >endo<a. owever, my opinion is that at this stage, the Court issimply not competent to declare when human life begins, whether upon fertili<ationof the ovum or upon attachment of the fertili<ed ovum to the uterus wall. !he issueof when life begins is a scienti8c and medical issue that cannot be decided by thisCourt without the proper hearing and evidence. !his issue has not even beensettled within the scienti8c and medical community.

ame; Aiew that whether life begins upon fertili<ation or upon implantation of thefertili<ed ovum on the uterus wall, :.". o. %H(*) protects both asserted starting

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points of human life. "bsent a de8nitive consensus from the scienti8c and medicalcommunity, the upreme Court cannot venture to pronounce which starting point of human life is correct. :.". o. %H(*), however, protects the ovum upon itsfertili<ation without saying that life begins upon fertili<ation. !his should besu7cient for purposes of resolving this case for whether life begins upon

fertili<ation or upon implantation of the fertili<ed ovum on the uterus wall, :.". o.%H(*) protects both asserted starting points of human life. "bsent a de8nitiveconsensus from the scienti8c and medical community, this Court cannot venture topronounce which starting point of human life is correct. Ee can only reiterate what

ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitution provides, that the tate shall 0equallyprotect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.?

ame; Constitutional Law; Aiew that ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitution isrepeated in ection ' of :.". o. %H(*); :.". o. %H(*) protects the fertili<ed ovumby prohibiting services, methods, devices or supplies that prevent its implantationon the uterus wall. ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitution is repeated in ection 'of :.". o. %H(*). !he law does not provide a de8nition of conception. owever, the

law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the tate to protect thetravel of the fertili<ed ovum to the uterus wall. 3n fact, the law guarantees that the

tate will provide access only to 0medically-safe, non-abortifacient, e ective, legal,a ordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices,supplies which do not prevent the implantation of a fertili<ed ovum as determinedby the Food and 4rug "dministration.? :.". o. %H(*) protects the fertili<ed ovumby prohibiting services, methods, devices or supplies that prevent its implantationon the uterus wall.

Leonardo-4e Castro,QG., Concurring Opinion#

Constitutional Law; tatutes; Facial Challenges; Eords and hrases; Aiew that a

facial challenge is a constitutional challenge asserting that a statute is invalid on itsface as written and authoritatively construed, when measured against theapplicable constitutional doctrine, rather than against the facts and circumstancesor a particular case. 3n general, a facial challenge is a constitutional challengeasserting that a statute is invalid on its face as written and authoritativelyconstrued, when measured against the applicable constitutional doctrine, ratherthan against the facts and circumstances or a particular case. !he inquiry uses thelens of relevant constitutional te/t and principle and focuses on what is within thefour corners of the statute, that is, on how its provisions are worded. !heconstitutional violation is visible on the face of the statute. !hus, a facial challengeis to constitutional law what res ipsa loquitur is to facts in a facial challenge, le/

ipsa loquitur# the law spea5s for itself. !he overnment, invo5ing =strada v.andiganbayan, (+D C:" (D) $'HH%&, argues that legitimate facial attac5s uponlegislation constitute a rare e/ception to the e/ercise of this Court6s 2urisdiction. !hisis the conventional wisdom and it is principally based on the "merican alerno rulethat a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most di7cult challenge to mountsuccessfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances e/istsunder which the law would be valid. 3t has been previously pointed out, however,that the "merican alerno rule has not been met with unanimity in the "merican

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legal community. 3t has also been pointed out that hilippine 2urisprudence 0hastraditionally deigned to nullify or facially invalidate statutes or provisions thereofwithout need of considering whether Nno set of circumstances e/ists under whichthe law or provisionJ would be valid.?6

:eproductive ealth Law; Aiew that the moment of conception is rec5oned fromfertili<ation; that the fertili<ed ovum, 5nown as <ygote, is the beginning of a humanbeing; and that the theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of anylegal or scienti8c mooring or basis as it pertains not to the beginning of life but tothe viability of the fetus. 3 fully concur with the comprehensive and e/haustivediscussion in the ma2ority opinion penned by the onorable Gustice Gose Catral>endo<a, as to the plain meaning and 2urisprudential and medical foundation of theCourt6s conclusion that the moment of conception is rec5oned from fertili<ation; thatthe fertili<ed ovum, 5nown as <ygote, is the beginning of a human being; and thatthe theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scienti8cmooring or basis as it pertains not to the beginning of life but to the viability of thefetus. !he fertili<ed ovum is able to attach or implant itself to the uterine wall

because it is a living human being. !he ma2ority opinion aptly quoted with favor thefollowing statement of the hilippine >edical "ssociation# !he scienti8c evidencesupports the conclusion that a <ygote is a human organism and that the life of anew human being commences at a scienti8cally well de8ned 0moment ofconception.? !his conclusion is ob2ective, consistent with the factual evidence, andindependent of any speci8c ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human lifeor of human embryos.

ame; Aiew that ection D should be read to mean that there is no legal compulsionto include hormonal contraceptives, in2ectables and devices in the ational 4rugFormulary unless they are safe, legal and non-abortifacient, which obligatorypreconditions must be determined by the appropriate government agency, in thiscase the Food and 4rug "dministration $F4"&; !he government should beaccountable or held liable whenever deleterious consequences to the health or lifeof the unborn or the mother result from the latter6s availment of governmentsupplied contraceptive drugs or devices and the government6s inability to provideadequate medical attention or supervision dictated by the individual healthcondition or a woman bene8ciary. ince ection D admits that only safe, legal andnon-abortifacient contraceptives, in2ectables and devices can be lawfully included inthe ational 4rug Formulary, 3 2oin the ma2ority opinion in holding that ection Dshould be read to mean that there is no legal compulsion to include hormonalcontraceptives, in2ectables and devices in the ational 4rug Fomulary unless theyare safe, legal and non-abortifacient, which obligatory preconditions must bedetermined by the appropriate government agency, in this case the Food and 4rug"dministration $F4"&. 3 concur in principle with Gustice >ariano C. del Castillo6sopinion that the F4" must formulate stringent and transparent rules of procedure inthe screening, evaluation and approval of all contraceptive drugs and devices toensure that they are safe, non-abortifacient and legal or compliant with themandate of the Constitution and the law. !he government should be accountable orheld liable whenever deleterious consequences to the health or life of the unborn orthe mother result from the latter6s availment of government supplied contraceptive

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drugs or devices and the government6s inability to provide adequate medicalattention or supervision dictated by the individual health condition of a womanbene8ciary.

ame; Aiew that 3 agree with Gustice >endo<a6s ponencia and Gustice del Castillo6sob2ection to ection (.H% of the :eproductive ealth $: & Law6s 3mplementing :ulesand :egulations $3::& that the latter cannot rede8ne the term 0abortifacient? by theaddition of the word 0primarily.? 3 also agree with Gustice >endo<a6s ponencia and Gustice del Castillo6s ob2ection to ection (.H% of the : Law6s 3mplementing :ulesand :egulations $3::& that the latter cannot rede8ne the term 0abortifacient? by theaddition of the word 0primarily? as follows# ection (.H%. For purposes of these:ules the terms shall be de8ned as follows# a& "bortifacient refers to any drug ordevice that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside themother6s womb or the prevention of the fertili<ed ovum to reach and be implantedin the mother6s womb upon determination of the Food and 4rug "dministration$F4"&. $=mphasis supplied& "s reworded, it will allow the approval of contraceptiveswhich has a secondary e ect of inducing abortion or the destruction of the fetus or

the prevention of implantation of the fertili<ed ovum in the mother6s womb. !hissecondary e ect is the fail-safe mechanism, which is contrary to ection %', "rticle33 of the %DIK Constitution and ection )$a& of the : Law.

ame; recautionary rinciple; Aiew that the precautionary principle see5s toprotect the rights of the present generation as well as to enforce intergenerationalresponsibility, that is, the present generation should promote sustainabledevelopment and act as stewards or careta5ers of the environment for the bene8tof generations yet unborn. !he precautionary principle see5s to protect the rightsof the present generation as well as to enforce intergenerational responsibility, thatis, the present generation should promote sustainable development and act asstewards or careta5ers of the environment for the bene8t of generations yet unborn.3n its essence, the precautionary principle calls for the e/ercise of caution in theface of ris5 and uncertainty. 3t ac5nowledges the pcculiar circumstances surroundingenvironmental cases in that 0scienti8c evidence is usually insu7cient, inconclusiveor uncertain and preliminary scienti8c evaluation indicates that there arereasonable grounds for concern66 that there are potentially dangerous e ects on theenvironment, human, animal, or planet health. For this reason, the precautionaryprinciple requires those who have the means, 5nowledge, power, and resources tota5e action to prevent or mitigate the harm to the environment or to act whenconclusively ascertained understanding by science is not yet available.

ame; ame; rinciple of rudence; Constitutional Law; :ight to Life; :ight to

ealth; Aiew that in the face of the conBicting claims and 8ndings presented by theparties, and considering that the right to health is ine/tricably intertwined with theright to life, it is proper to refer to the principle of prudence, which is the principlerelied on by the framers of the %DIK Constitution on matters a ecting the right tolife. !he right to health, which is an indispensable element of the right to life,deserves the same or even higher degree of protection. !hus, if it is scienti8callyplausible but uncertain that any foreign substance or material ingested or implantedin the woman6s body may lead to threats or serious and irreversible damage to her

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or her unborn child6s right life or health, care should be ta5en to avoid or diminishthat threat. !he principle of prudence requires that such a rule be adopted inmatters concerning the right to life and health. 3n the face of the conBicting claimsand 8ndings presented by the parties, and considering that the right to health isine/tricably intertwined with the right to life, it is proper to refer to the principle of

prudence, which is the principle relied on by the framers of the %DIK Constitution onmatters a ecting the right to life. !hus, any uncertainty on the adverse e ects ofma5ing contraceptives universally accessible on the life and health of the people,especially of women, should be resolved in a way that will promote life and health.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that considering the relevant medical issues and healthconcerns in connection with contraceptives and devices, the regulated framewor5under :epublic "ct o. )K'D where contraceptive drugs and devices are sold,dispensed or distributed only by duly licensed drug stores or pharmaceuticalcompanies pursuant to a doctor6s prescription is no doubt more in harmony with theprinciple of prudence and the precautionary principle than the apparentlyunrestricted or universal access approach under the : Law. :epublic "ct o. )K'D

provides for a controlled access policy and requires that the sale, dispensation ordistribution of any contraceptive drug or device should be made only by a dulylicensed drug store or pharmaceutical company pursuant to a doctor6s prescription.On the other hand, with its thrust of providing universal access to contraceptives,the : Law gives the impression that it requires, under pain of criminal prosecution,even persons other than doctors of medicine $such as nurses, midwives, publichealth wor5ers, and barangay health wor5ers& to distribute contraceptives.Considering the relevant medical issues and health concerns in connection withcontraceptives and devices, the regulated framewor5 under :epublic "ct o. )K'Dwhere contraceptive drugs and devices are sold, dispensed or distributed only byduly licensed drug stores or pharmaceutical companies pursuant to a doctor6s

prescription is no doubt more in harmony with the principle of prudence and theprecautionary principle than the apparently unrestricted or universal accessapproach under the : Law. !his is so as the bodies of women may react di erentlyto said drugs or devices depending on many factors that only a licensed doctor iscapable of determining. !hus, the universal access policy should be read asquali8ed by the regulated framewor5 under :epublic "ct o. )K'D rather than asimpliedly repealing the said law.

ame; Constitutional Law; :eligious Freedom; Aiew that the guarantee of freee/ercise of religion proscribes the imposition of substantial burden upon the saidright absent any compelling state interest to 2ustify the same. !he guarantee offree e/ercise of religion proscribes the imposition of substantial burden upon thesaid right absent any compelling state interest to 2ustify the same. " governmentalrestriction substantially burdens religious freedom when it bans behavior that theob2ectors see as religiously compelled, or mandates behavior that the ob2ectors seeas religiously prohibited. :equiring people to do something that 0is forbidden by

theirJ faith? quali8es as a substantial burden on religious practice. 0Ehile thecompulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free e/ercise is nonethelesssubstantial? and that is so even where the relevant 0conduct proscribed by areligious faith? is indirect complicity in other conduct, and the complicity line that

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the religious claimant draws appears inconsistent or unsound to the reviewing courtbecause 0 iJt is not for secular courtsJ to say that the line the claimantJ drew wasan unreasonable one.? !hus, the law recogni<es that requiring a person to dosomething that he or she sincerely sees as sinful is a 0substantial burden? on his1herreligion, and people6s de8nition of 0sinful? often includes sins of complicity and not

2ust sins of direct action.ame; ame; ame; Freedom of peech; Aiew that ection '($a&$%& requires the

doctor or health care service provider to ma5e a compelled speech, a speech thatmay be against the doctor6s spiritual belief or professional opinion. >oreover, thethreat of criminal sanction enhances the chilling e ect of the law and serves todeter a health care service provider from e/pressing his professional views ore/ercising his religious reservations. ection '($a&$%& e ectively compels thedoctor or health care provider to ma5e a speech that promotes the overnment6s: Law program, particularly the use of contraceptive drugs and devices, regardlessof the doctor6s religious conviction or well-considered professional opinion. ltdictates upon the doctor what should. be said and what should not be said in

matters of reproductive health. 3n other words, ection '($a&$%& requires the doctoror health care service provider to ma5e a compelled speech, a speech that may beagainst the doctor6s spiritual belief or professional opinion. >oreover, the threat ofcriminal sanction enhances the chilling e ect of the law and serves to deter a healthcare service provider from e/pressing his professional views or e/ercising hisreligious reservations.

ame; ame; Freedom of peech; Aiew that the :eproductive ealth $: & Lawdictates upon the doctor what to tell his1her patients in matters of family planning,and threatens the doctor with criminal prosecution in case of noncompliance.3ndeed, 0a society that tells its doctors under pain of criminal penalty what theymay not tell their patients is not a free society.? !he : Law, however, preciselydoes that to our society. 3t dictates upon the doctor what to tell his1her patients inmatters of family planning, and threatens the doctor with criminal prosecution incase of non-compliance. Laws of this sort pose the inherent ris5 that the

overnment see5s not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppressunpopular ideas or information or to manipulate the public debate through coercionrather than persuasion.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that ection '($a&$%& of the :eproductive ealth $: &Law, a tool to promote the universal access policy established in ection K of thatlaw, constitutes an undue and unconstitutional restriction of the freedom of speech.

!he overnment also failed to show that speech may be compelled or restrained

because there is substantial danger that the speech will li5ely lead to an evil thegovernment has a right to prevent. !here is no demonstration of evil consequencessought to be prevented which are substantive, e/tremely serious and highlyimminent. 3n other words, no clear and present danger to be prevented has beenestablished. "ll told, ection '($a&$%& of the : Law, a tool to promote the universalaccess policy established in ection K of that law, constitutes an undue andunconstitutional restriction of the freedom of speech.

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ame; ame; Aiew that the :eproductive ealth $: & Law as worded contradicts theconstitutional te/t of the Family rovisions as well as the established constitutionalprinciples on the family. !he : Law as worded contradicts the constitutional te/tof the Family rovisions as well as the established constitutional principles on thefamily. !he pertinent policy declarations are contained in ection ' of the : Law

quoted hereunder# =C. '. 4eclaration of olicy. / / / >oreover, the taterecogni<es and guarantees the promotion of gender equality, gender equity, womenempowerment and dignity as a health and human rights concern and as a socialresponsibility. !he advancement and protection of women6s human rights shall becentral to the e orts of the tate to address reproductive health care. / / // / / / / / !he tate li5ewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, e ective, legal, a ordable, and quality reproductive health careservices, methods, devices, supplies which do not prevent the implantation of afertili<ed ovum as determined by the Food and 4rug "dministration $F4"& andrelevant information and education thereon according to the priority needs ofwomen, children and other underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access tothose identi8ed through the ational ousehold !argeting ystem for overty:eduction $ ! - :& and other government measures of identifyingmarginali<ation, who shall be voluntary bene8ciaries of reproductive health care,services and supplies for free.

ame; ame; arental Consent; Aiew that the overly liberal stance or the:eproductive ealth $: & Law as regards the access of minors, who are alreadyparents or have had a miscarriage, to modern family planning methods withoutneed of parental consent is contrary to the provision of ection %', "rticle 33 of the%DIK Constitution. !he overly liberal stance or the : Law as regards the access of minors, who are already parents or have had a miscarriage, to modern familyplanning methods without need of parental consent is contrary to the provision of

ection %', "rticle 33 of the %DIK Constitution. 3t is also seriously doubtful if theelimination of the requirement for parental consent with redound to the bestinterest of the class of minors mentioned in the : Law.

ame; ame; Aiew that the constitutionality of the :eproductive ealth $: & Lawought to be 2udged based on its implications on the relevant and treasured values of the Filipino society as shown by the Filipino people6s history and tradition asenshrined in the Constitution. !he constitutionality of the : Law ought to be 2udged based on its implications on the relevant and treasured values of the Filipinosociety as shown by the Filipino people6s history and tradition as enshrined in theConstitution. !hese cherished values are as follows# the sanctity of the family; thenatural 2oint right of the spouses to found a family; the natural and primary rightand duty of parents in the rearing of their children; and the right to health or thepeople, particularly of women; and the fundamental equality before the law ofwomen and men. !hese transcendental values include the protection of the freedomof religion and freedom of speech.

9rion,QG., eparate Concurring Opinion#

Constitutional Law; eparation of owers; Gudicial ower; Aiew that the %DIKConstitution, through the 'nd paragraph of its ection %, con8rms that 2udicial

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power is wider than the power of ad2udication that it traditionally carried $by usingthe word 0includes?& and at the same time incorporated the basic requirements forad2udication in the traditional concept, namely, the presence of 0actualcontroversies,? based on 0rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.?3n addition, the %DIK Constitution, through the

'nd paragraph of its ection %, con8rms that 2udicial power is wider than the powerof ad2udication that it traditionally carried $by using the word 0includes?& and at thesame time incorporated the basic requirements for ad2udication in the traditionalconcept, namely, the presence of 0actual controversies,? based on 0rights which arelegally demandable and enforceable.? !he con8rmation e/pressly mentions that thepower is granted to 0courts of 2ustice? and, aside from being a power, is imposed asa duty of the courts. !hus, the Constitution now lays the courts open to the chargeof failure to do their constitutional duty when and if they violate the obligationsimposed in ection %, "rticle A333 of the %DIK Constitution. ection *, "rticle A333 ofthe %DIK Constitution further Beshes out the irreducible 0powers? of the upremeCourt in terms of its original, appellate, and review ad2udicative powers and its

other non-ad2udicative powers. 3n so doing, ection * also con8rmed the e/tent ofthe constitutionally-granted ad2udicative power of the lower courts that Congresshas the authority to create $by de8ning, prescribing and apportioning their 2urisdictions&, as well as the grant of administrative, e/ecutive and quasi-legislativepowers to the upreme Court, all within the sphere of its 2udicial operations.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that 2udicial power is e/tended over the very powerse/ercised by other branches or instrumentalities of government when grave abuseof discretion is present. " completely new one, to the concept of 2udicial powerunder the %DIK Constitution is the power 0to determine whether or not there hasbeen a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac5 or e/cess of 2urisdiction on thepart of any branch or instrumentality of the overnment.? !his new power isinnovative since its recognition is separate from the traditional ad2udicative powerthat ection % earlier con8rms and which ection * in part Beshes out. 3t is li5ewisea de8nitive e/pansion of 2udicial power as its e/ercise is not over the traditional 2usticiable cases handled by 2udicial and quasi-2udicial tribunals. otably, 2udicialpower is e/tended over the very powers e/ercised by other branches orinstrumentalities of government when grave abuse of discretion is present. 3n otherwords, the e/pansion empowers the 2udiciary, as a matter of duty, to inquire intoacts of lawma5ing by the legislature and into law implementation by the e/ecutivewhen these other branches act with grave abuse of discretion.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that under our constitutional regime, the 2udicial

department is the only organ of government tas5ed to guard and enforce theboundaries and limitations that the people had put in place in governingthemselves. @nder our constitutional regime, the 2udicial department is the onlyorgan of government tas5ed to guard and enforce the boundaries and limitationsthat the people had put in place in governing themselves. !his constitutional duty of the Court has been e/panded by the additional power of 2udicial review under the%DIK Constitution to 0determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of

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discretion amounting to lac5 or e/cess of 2urisdiction on the part of any branch orinstrumentality of the overnment.?

ame; :eproductive ealth Law; rinciple of 4ouble = ect; Aiew that while the:eproductive ealth $: & Law generally protects and promotes the unborn6s right tolife, its ection D and its 3mplementing :ules and :egulations $3::& fail in their8delity to the Constitution and to the very terms of the : Law itself. For one, it failsto adopt the principle of double e ect under ection %', "rticle 33 of the %DIKConstitution. 3 agree with the ponencia that the : law protects and promotes theright to life of the unborn by its continued prohibition on abortion and distribution of abortifacients. 3 do recogni<e, however, that while the : law generally protects andpromotes the unborn6s right to life, its ection D and its 3:: fail in their 8delity to theConstitution and to the very terms of the : Law itself. For one, it fails to adopt theprinciple of double e ect under ection %', "rticle 33 of the %DIK Constitution, asmore fully discussed below. For these reasons, 3 cannot wholly concur that the :law and its 3::, as they came to this Court, were fully protective of the right to lifeof the unborn. 3n fact, the Court should lay down guidelines, culled from a

constitutionally-valid : Law, of what the government can actually procure anddistribute under the : law, consistent with its authority under this law and ection%', "rticle 33 of the Constitution.

ame; ame; Aiew that although ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitution does notconsider the unborn a person, its terms reBect the framers6 clear intent to conveyan utmost respect for human life that is not merely co-e/tensive with civilpersonality. "lthough ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitution does not consider theunborn a person, its terms reBect the framers6 clear intent to convey an utmostrespect for human life that is not merely co-e/tensive with civil personality. !hisintent requires the e/tension of tate protection to the life of the unborn fromconception. !o be precise, ection %', "rticle 33 of the %DIK Constitution provides#

ection %'. !he tate recogni<es the sanctity of family life and shall protect andstrengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. 3t shall equallyprotect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. !henatural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civice7ciency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the

overnment.

ame; ame; Aiew that unli5e the ponencia, 3 ta5e the view that the question ofwhen the life of the unborn begins cannot strictly be answered with reference totime, i.e., the e/act time the sperm cell fertili<ed the egg cell. @nli5e the ponencia,3 ta5e the view that the question of when the life of the unborn begins cannot

strictly be answered with reference to time, i.e., the e/act time the sperm cellfertili<ed the egg cell. 9ut other than this uncertainty, the germinal stage ofprenatal development that transpires $after the union of the sperm cell and the eggcell and the combination of their genetic material materiali<ed to form the fertili<edegg or the <ygote& is not debatable.

ame; ame; Aiew that since the constitutional intent is to protect the life of theunborn, and the fertili<ed egg $or the <ygote& already e/hibits signs andcharacteristics of life, then this fertili<ed egg is already entitled to constitutional

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protection. ince the constitutional intent is to protect the life of the unborn, andthe fertili<ed egg $or the <ygote& already e/hibits signs and characteristics of life,then this fertili<ed egg is already entitled to constitutional protection. 3 say this evenif this fertili<ed egg may not always naturally develop into a baby or a person. 3submit that for purposes of constitutional interpretation, every doubt should be

resolved in favor of life, as this is the rule of life, anywhere, everywhere; any doubtshould be resolved in favor of its protection following a deeper law that came beforeall of us the law commanding the preservation of the human specie. !his musthave been the subconscious reason why even those who voted against the inclusionof the second sentence of ection %' in "rticle 33 of the Constitution conceded that afertili<ed ovum the word originally used prior to its substitution by the word0unborn? is possessed of human life although they disagreed that a right to lifeitself should be e/tended to it in the Constitution.

ame; ame; rinciple of 4ouble = ect; Aiew that the mandate to equally protectthe life of the mother and the life of the unborn child from conception under ection%', "rticle 33 of the Constitution is self-e/ecuting to prevent and prohibit the state

from enacting legislation that threatens the right to life of the unborn child. 3submit that the mandate to equally protect the life of the mother and the life of theunborn child from conception under ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitution is self-e/ecuting to prevent and prohibit the state from enacting legislation that threatensthe right to life of the unborn child. !o my mind, ection %', "rticle 33 should not beread narrowly as a mere policy declaration lest the actual intent of the provision bee ectively negated. Ehile it is indeed a directive to the tate to equally protect thelife of the mother and the unborn child, this command cannot be accomplishedwithout the corollary and indirect mandate to the tate to inhibit itself fromenacting programs that contradict protection for the life of the unborn.

ame; ame; "bortion; Aiew that the clear intent of the Framers was to preventboth Congress and the upreme Court from ma5ing abortion possible. !he framersdid not only intend to prevent the upreme Court from having a hilippineequivalent of a :oe v. Eade, )%H @. . %%( $%DK(& decision, they also unequivocallyintended to deny Congress the power to determine that only at a certain stage ofprenatal development can the constitutional protection intended for the life unbornbe triggered. 3n short, the clear intent of the Framers was to prevent both Congressand the upreme Court from ma5ing abortion possible.

ame; ame; Aiew that since conception was equated with fertili<ation, as borne outby :ecords of the Constitutional Commission, a fertili<ed egg or <ygote, evenwithout being implanted in the uterus, is therefore already entitled to constitutional

protection from the tate. 9ased on paragraph number + of the >edical =/perts64eclaration, abortion is the termination of established pregnancy and thatabortifacients, logically, terminate this pregnancy. @nder paragraph number *,pregnancy is established only after the implantation of the blastocysts or thefertili<ed egg. From this medical viewpoint, it is clear that prior to implantation, it ispremature to tal5 about abortion and abortifacient as there is nothing yet to abort. 3f the constitutional framers simply intended to adopt this medical viewpoint incrafting ection %', "rticle 33, there would have been no real need to insert the

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phrase 0from conception.? !his should be obvious to a discerning reader. inceconception was equated with fertili<ation, as borne out by :ecords of theConstitutional Commission, a fertili<ed egg or <ygote, even without being implantedin the uterus, is therefore already entitled to constitutional protection from the

tate.

ame; ame; rinciple of 4ouble = ect; Aiew that the general rule is that both thelife of the unborn and the life of the mother should be protected. owever, in caseof e/ceptional conBict situations, the life of one may be preferred over the life of theother where it becomes medically necessary to do so. !o me, the general rule isthat both the life of the unborn and the life of the mother should be protected.

owever, in case of e/ceptional conBict situations, the life of one may be preferredover the life of the other where it becomes medically necessary to do so. !heprinciple of double e ect recogni<es that in some instances, the use oradministration of certain drugs that are abortifacient-capable are necessary in orderto save the life of the mother. !he use in administration of these drugs in theseinstances is and should be allowed by ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitution since

the policy is equal protection.:eproductive ealth Law; 4epartment of ealth; Aiew that as the lead agency in theimplementation of the :eproductive ealth $: & Law, the 4epartment of ealth$4O & is tas5ed to ensure people6s access to medically safe, non-abortifacient,legal, quality and a ordable reproductive health goods and services. "s the leadagency in the implementation of the : law, the 4epartment of ealth $4O & istas5ed to 0 eJnsure people6s access to medically safe, non-abortifacient, legal,quality and a ordable reproductive health goods and services .J? !his is consistentwith the : law6s policy which 0guarantees universal access onlyJ to medically-safe

andJ non-abortifacient? contraceptives. !he law also provides that thesecontraceptives 0do not prevent the implantation of a fertili<ed ovum as determinedby the? F4". "ccordingly, 4O is tas5ed to procure and distribute to localgovernment units $L @s& family planning supplies for the whole country and tomonitor their usage. Once delivered to the L @s, the responsible health o7cials0shall assume responsibility for the supplies? and ensure their distribution inaccordance with 4O guidelines. For this purpose, a regional o7cer appointed bythe 4O shall oversee the supply chain management of reproductive healthsupplies and1or health products in his or her respective area. !he : law alsoauthori<es L @s to implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoringprogram 0consistent with the overall provisions of this "ct and the guidelines of the4O .?

ame; "bortion; Aiew that as a matter of e/ception, the government should be ableto procure and distribute abortifacients or drugs with abortifacient properties butsolely for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. "s a matter of e/ception,the government should be able to procure and distribute abortifacients or drugswith abortifacient properties but solely for the purpose of saving the life of themother. peci8cally, the procurement and distribution of these abortifacients maybe allowed only in emergency cases and should thus be made under medicalsupervision. !he 3:: of the : law de8nes an 0emergency? as a condition or state

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of a patient wherein based on the ob2ective 8ndings of a prudent medical o7cer onduty for the day there is immediate danger and where delay in initial support andtreatment may cause loss of life or cause permanent disability to the patient.

ame; arental :ights; >andatory :eproductive ealth =ducation rogram; Aiewthat we cannot declare that the mandatory :eproductive ealth $: & educationprogram does not violate parental rights when the curriculum that could possiblysupplant it is not yet in e/istence. Ee cannot, without 8rst e/amining the actualcontents of the curriculum and the religious beliefs and personal convictions of theparents that it could a ect, declare that the mandatory : education is consistentwith the Constitution. 3n other words, we cannot declare that the mandatory :education program does not violate parental rights when the curriculum that couldpossibly supplant it is not yet in e/istence. iven the primacy of the natural andfundamental rights of parents to raise their children, we should not pre-empt aconstitutional challenge against its possible violation, especially since the scope andcoercive nature of the : mandatory education program could prevent the e/erciseof these rights.

ame; ame; Aiew that pursuant to this natural right and duty of parents over theperson of their minor children, parental authority and responsibility include thecaring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and e7ciency and thedevelopment of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. !herelationship created by and resulting from a family naturally e/tends to and involvesother personal decisions that relate to child rearing and education. arents have thenatural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see totheir proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. !hese array of personal decisions are protected by the constitutional right to privacy to be freefrom unwarranted governmental intrusion. ursuant to this natural right and duty ofparents over the person of their minor children, parental authority and responsibilityinclude the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and e7ciency andthe development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

ame; ame; Aiew that while parents are given a wide latitude of discretion andsupport in rearing their children, their well-being is of course a sub2ect within the

tate6s constitutional power to regulate. Ehile parents are given a wide latitude ofdiscretion and support in rearing their children, their well-being is of course asub2ect within the tate6s constitutional power to regulate. peci8cally, theConstitution tas5ed the tate to promote and protect their moral, spiritual,intellectual and social development, and to recogni<e and support their vital role innation-building. 3n this underta5ing, the tate acts in its capacity as parens patriae.

Concededly, the tate as parens patriae has the right and duty to minimi<e theris5 of harm, arising from the acquisition of 5nowledge from polluted sources, tothose who are as yet unable to ta5e care of themselves fully. 3n other words, thefamily itself and the rights of parenthood are not completely beyond regulation;parental freedom and authority in things a ecting the child6s welfare, including, tosome e/tent, matters of conscience and religious conviction are not totally beyond

tate authority. 3t is in this area that the parents6 right to raise their children and thetate6s interest in rearing the youth clash

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ame; ame; >andatory :eproductive ealth =ducation rogram; Aiew that amandatory reproductive health education program in public schools does not violateparental privacy if they allow parents to review and e/cuse their children fromattending the program, or if the tate shows a compelling state interest to overridethe parents6 choice and compel them to allow their children to attend the program.

" mandatory reproductive health education program in public schools does notviolate parental privacy if they allow parents to review and e/cuse their childrenfrom attending the program, or if the tate shows a compelling state interest tooverride the parents6 choice and compel them to allow their children to attend theprogram.

ame; Aiew that one obvious discouraging e ect of controlled population growth ison the economy of some of these countries which now have to secure foreign laborto balance their 8nances. !he hilippines to be sure, is not the 8rst country to usecontraceptives and the mi/ed results from countries that have long travelled thisroad are, to my mind, not very encouraging. One obvious discouraging e ect ofcontrolled population growth is on the economy of some of these countries which

now have to secure foreign labor to balance their 8nances. !his development hasbeen a boon for a country li5e the hilippines with a fast-growing population; we areen2oying now the bene8ts of our fast-growing population through the returns ourmigrating Filipino wor5ers bring bac5 to the hilippines from their wor5 in labor-starved countries. !his has become possible because host countries li5e Gapan andthe more economically advanced =uropean countries need wor5ers to man theirindustries and supply their economies. "nother economic e ect is on retirementsystems that have been burdened by predominantly aging populations. For thissame reason, some countries even face impending economic slowdown in themiddle term unless they can e ectively remedy their manpower shortage.

ame; Constitutional Law; Freedom of peech; Aiew that bro5en down to itselements, ection '($a&$%& of the :eproductive ealth $: & Law penali<es healthcare providers who $%& 5nowingly withhold information about programs and serviceson reproductive health; $'& 5nowingly restrict the dissemination of these programsand services; or $(& intentionally provide incorrect information regarding them; 9ypenali<ing these e/pressive acts, ection '( imposes a subsequent punishment onspeech, which as a counterpart to the prohibition against prior restraint, is alsogenerally prohibited under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of e/pression.9ro5en down to its elements, ection '($a&$%& of the : law penali<es health careproviders who $%& 5nowingly withhold information about programs and services onreproductive health; $'& 5nowingly restrict the dissemination of these programs andservices; or $(& intentionally provide incorrect information regarding them. !heseprohibited acts are, by themselves, communicative and e/pressive, and thusconstitute speech. 3ntentionally providing incorrect information cannot be performedwithout uttering, verbally or otherwise, the information that the : Law deems tobe incorrect. !he information that is illegal to withhold or restrict under ection '(also constitutes speech, as it is an e/pression of data and opinions regardingreproductive health services and programs; thus, the prerogative to not utter thesepieces of information also constitutes speech. 9y penali<ing these e/pressive acts,

ection '( imposes a subsequent punishment on speech, which as a counterpart to

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the prohibition against prior restraint, is also generally prohibited under theconstitutional guarantee of freedom of e/pression. Eithout an assurance thatspeech would not be subsequently penali<ed, people would hesitate to spea5 forfear of its consequences; there would be no need for prior restraints because thepunishment itself would e ectively serve as a chilling e ect on speech.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that ection '($a&$%& of the :eproductive ealth Lawviolates the right of health practitioners to spea5 in public about reproductive healthand should simply be struc5 down. Gurisprudence in the @nited tates regardingthe speech of medical practitioners has drawn a distinction between speech in thecourse of their practice of medicine, and speech in public. Ehen a doctor spea5s tohis patient, his speech may be sub2ected to reasonable regulation by the state toensure the accuracy of the information he gives his patient and the quality ofhealthcare he provides. 9ut when the doctor spea5s to the public, his speechbecomes protected speech, and the guarantees against prior restraint andsubsequent punishment applies to his e/pressions that involves medicine or anyother topic. !his distinction is not provided in ection '($a&$%& of the : Law, and

we cannot create a distinction in the law when it provides none. !hus, 3 submit thatection '($a&$%& violates the right of health practitioners to spea5 in public about

reproductive health and should simply be struc5 down.

4el Castillo,QG., Concurring and 4issenting#

Constitutional Law; Gudicial ower; Aiew that the upreme Court cannot remain anidle spectator or a disinterested referee when constitutional rights are at sta5e. !he path that we, as a nation, will ta5e has already been decided by Congress, asrepresentatives of the people, under our system of government. !he tas5 before theCourt, then, is not to say which path we ought to ta5e but to determine if thechosen path treads on unconstitutional grounds. 9ut this is not all. For the Court,

which was once generally a passive organ in our constitutional order, has beengiven e/panded powers under the present Constitution. 3t is now not only its rightbut its bounden duty to determine grave abuse of discretion on the part of anybranch, instrumentality or agency of government, and, equally important, it hasbeen given the power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement ofconstitutional rights. !he Court cannot, therefore, remain an idle spectator or adisinterested referee when constitutional rights are at sta5e. 3t is its duty to protectand defend constitutional rights for otherwise its raison d6etre will cease.

ame; :eproductive ealth Law; Contraceptives; Aiew that absent a clear andunequivocal constitutional prohibition on the manufacture, distribution, and use ofcontraceptives, there is nothing to prevent Congress from adopting a national familyplanning policy provided that the contraceptives that will be used pursuant theretodo not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception, which is synonymousto fertili<ation, under "rticle 33, ection %' of the Constitution. 3 am fully in accordwith the result reached by the ponencia. "bsent a clear and unequivocalconstitutional prohibition on the manufacture, distribution, and use ofcontraceptives, there is nothing to prevent Congress from adopting a national familyplanning policy provided that the contraceptives that will be used pursuant theretodo not harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception, which is synonymous

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to fertili<ation, under "rticle 33, ection %' of the Constitution. !he plain meaning ofthis constitutional provision and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commissionbare this out.

ame; ame; Aiew that history will 2udge the upreme Court on what it did or didnot do to protect the life of the unborn from conception1fertili<ation. !he framersof, and the people who rati8ed the Constitution set in bold and deft stro5es theprotection of the life of the unborn from conception1fertili<ation because it isprecious, sacred and inviolable. For as long as this precept remains written in ourConstitution, our solemn duty is to stay the course in 8delity to the most cherishedvalues and wisdom of those who came before us and to whom we entrusted thewriting and rati8cation of our Constitution. istory will 2udge this Court on what itdid or did not do to protect the life of the unborn from conception1fertili<ation. !hereis, therefore, no other recourse but for this Court to act in defense of the life of theunborn.

ame; ame; Aiew that the framers were unequivocal in their intent to de8ne0conception? as the fertili<ation of the egg by the sperm and to accordconstitutional protection to the life of the unborn from the moment of fertili<ation. !he framers were unequivocal in their intent to de8ne 0conception? as thefertili<ation of the egg by the sperm and to accord constitutional protection to thelife of the unborn from the moment of fertili<ation. !he plain meaning of the term0conception,? as synonymous to fertili<ation, based on dictionaries and medicalte/tboo5s, as aptly and e/tensively discussed by the ponencia, con8rm thisconstruction. 3n addition, petitioners correctly argue that the de8nition of0conception,? as equivalent to fertili<ation, was the same de8nition prevailingduring the %DIH6s or at around the time the %DIK Constitution was rati8ed. ence,under the rule of constitutional construction, which gives weight to how the termwas understood by the people who rati8ed the Constitution, 0conception? should beunderstood as fertili<ation.

ame; ame; Aiew that the protection of the life of the unborn under "rticle 33,ection %' of the Constitution is a self-e/ecuting provision. !he protection of the

life of the unborn under "rticle 33, ection %' is a self-e/ecuting provision because#$%& 3t prevents Congress from legali<ing abortion; from passing laws which authori<ethe use of abortifacients; and from passing laws which will determine when lifebegins other than from the moment of conception1fertili<ation; $'& 3t prevents the

upreme Court from ma5ing a :oe v. Eade, )%H @. . %%( $%DK(& ruling in our 2urisdiction; and $(& 3t obligates the =/ecutive to ban contraceptives which act asabortifacients or those which harm or destroy the unborn from

conception1fertili<ation. "rticle 33, ection %' is, thus, a direct, immediate ande ective limitation on the three great branches of government and a positivecommand on the tate to protect the life of the unborn.

ame; ame; :ight to Life; Aiew that the framers repeatedly treated or referred tothe right to life of the unborn as a fundamental right and thereby ac5nowledgedthat the unborn is a proper sub2ect of a constitutional right. "rticle 33, ection %'recogni<ed a sui generis constitutional right to life of the unborn. !he framersrepeatedly treated or referred to the right to life of the unborn as a fundamental

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right and thereby ac5nowledged that the unborn is a proper sub2ect of aconstitutional right. !hat this right is founded on natural law and is self-e/ecutingfurther provides the unmista5able basis and intent to accord it the status of aconstitutional right. owever, it is sui generis because, unli5e a person whopossesses the right to life, liberty and property, the unborn6s fundamental right is

solely limited to the right to life as was the intention of the framers. Clearly, then,"rticle 33, ection %' recogni<ed a sui generis right to life of the unborn fromconception1fertili<ation and elevated it to the status of a constitutional right.

ame; ame; Aiew that because the unborn has been accorded a constitutionalright to life from conception1fertili<ation under "rticle 33, ection %', this right fallswithin the ambit of the Court6s power to issue rules for the protection andenforcement of constitutional rights under "rticle A333, ection *$*& of theConstitution. 9ecause the unborn has been accorded a constitutional right to lifefrom conception1fertili<ation under "rticle 33, ection %', this right falls within theambit of the Court6s power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement ofconstitutional rights under "rticle A333, ection *$*& of the Constitution# ection_*.

!he upreme Court shall have the following powers# / / / / $*& romulgate rulesconcerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, / / /. :ules ofprocedure of special courts and quasi-2udicial bodies shall remain e ective unlessdisapproved by the upreme Court. !his is signi8cant because it imposes upon thisCourt the duty to protect such right pursuant to its rule-ma5ing powers. 3n recenttimes, the Court ac5nowledged that the right of the people to a balanced andhealthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature under "rticle 33,

ection %+ of the Constitution, though found in the 4eclaration of rinciples andolicies $li5e the sub2ect right to life of the unborn& and not in the 9ill of :ights, may

be given Besh pursuant to the power of the Court to issue rules for the protectionand enforcement of constitutional rights. 3t, thus, proceeded to promulgate the rules

governing the Erit of ali5asan.:eproductive ealth Law; Contraceptives; Aiew that the :eproductive ealth $: &Law repeatedly emphasi<es that the contraceptives which will be made availableunder the law should be non-abortifacient. !he : Law is to be commended for its<ealous protection of the life of the unborn from conception1fertili<ation. 3trepeatedly emphasi<es that the contraceptives which will be made available underthe law should be non-abortifacient. 3t prohibits the use of abortifacients andpenali<es the use thereof. !hus, it cannot be said that the law violates "rticle 33,

ection %' of the Constitution.

ame; ame; "bortifacient; Eords and hrases; Aiew that as de8ned in the

3mplementing :ules and :egulations $3::&, a drug or device is considered anabortifacient if it 0primarily? induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside themother6s womb or the prevention of the fertili<ed ovum to reach and be implantedin the mother6s womb; where 0primarily? means that the drug or device has noother 5nown e ect aside from abortion. 3 agree that the insertion of the quali8er0primarily? will open the Boodgates to the approval of contraceptives which mayharm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception1fertili<ation in violation of"rticle 33, ection %' of the Constitution. "s de8ned in the 3::, a drug or device is

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considered an abortifacient if it 0primarily? induces abortion or the destruction of afetus inside the mother6s womb or the prevention of the fertili<ed ovum to reachand be implanted in the mother6s womb; where 0primarily? means that the drug ordevice has no other 5nown e ect aside from abortion. 3n other words, under the 3::,a contraceptive will only be considered as an 0abortifacient? if its sole 5nown e ect

is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertili<edovum. Consequently, a drug or device which $a& prevents fertili<ation, $b& but doesnot provide a %HHW guarantee of such prevention, and $c& has a fail-safemechanism which will prevent the implantation of the fertili<ed ovum in casefertili<ation still occurs will not be considered an 0abortifacient? because the 5nowne ect thereof is not solely prevention of implantation since $%& it primarily preventsfertili<ation and $'& only secondarily prevents the implantation of the fertili<ed ovumin case fertili<ation still occurs.

ame; ame; Aiew that although the :eproductive ealth $: & Law does not providea de8nition of 0contraceptive,? a reasonable and logical deduction is that0contraceptive? $or allowable contraceptive to be more precise& is the opposite of

0abortifacient? as de8ned under the : Law. "lthough the : Law does notprovide a de8nition of 0contraceptive,? a reasonable and logical deduction is that0contraceptive? $or allowable contraceptive to be more precise& is the opposite of0abortifacient? as de8ned under the : Law. !his seems to be the tac5 adopted bythe 3:: in de8ning 0contraceptive.? owever, the 3::6s de8nition of 0contraceptive?again added the quali8er 0primarily.? For similar reasons with the previousdiscussion on the 3::6s de8nition of 0abortifacient,? this de8nition of0contraceptive? opens the Boodgates to the approval of contraceptives which areactually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. ence, the quali8er0primarily? in ection (.H%$2& is, li5ewise, void.

ame; ame; Constitutional Law; Aiew that the power to disapprove the rules ofprocedure of quasi-2udicial bodies is signi8cant in that it implies the power of the

upreme Court to loo5 into the su7ciency of such rules of procedure insofar as theyadequately protect and enforce constitutional rights. Aiewed in light of the broadpower of the Court to issue rules for the protection and enforcement ofconstitutional rights, the power to disapprove the rules of procedure of quasi-2udicialbodies is signi8cant in that it implies the power of the Court to loo5 into thesu7ciency of such rules of procedure insofar as they adequately protect andenforce constitutional rights. >oreover, the power to disapprove the aforesaid rulesof procedure necessarily includes or implies the power to approve or modify suchrules or, on the one e/treme, require that such rules of procedure be issued whennecessary to protect and enforce constitutional rights. 3n other words, within andbetween the broader power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement ofconstitutional rights and the narrower power to disapprove the rules of procedure of quasi-2udicial bodies, there e/ist penumbras of this power that the Court maye/ercise in order to protect and enforce constitutional rights.

ame; ame; Aiew that the upreme Court must step in by directing the Food and4rug "dministration $F4"& to issue the proper rules of procedure in thedetermination of whether a drug or device is an abortifacient under the

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:eproductive ealth $: & Law. Eithin this framewor5 of implementation, and giventhe unique status of the unborn and the e/ceptional need to protect its right to life,the Court must step in by directing the F4" to issue the proper rules of procedure inthe determination of whether a drug or device is an abortifacient under the : Law.

uch rules must su7ciently safeguard the right to life of the unborn. "s a penumbra

of its power to issue rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights and its powerto disapprove rules of procedure of quasi-2udicial bodies, the Court has the powerand competency to mandate the minimum requirements of due process in order tosu7ciently safeguard the right to life of the unborn in the proceedings that will beconducted before the F4". !his is in line with the declared policy and numerousprovisions of the : Law according utmost respect and protection for the right tolife of the unborn. 3n determining whether a drug or device is an abortifacient, theF4" will necessarily engage in a quasi-2udicial function. 3t will determine whether aset of facts $active properties or mechanisms of a drug or device& comply with alegal standard $de8nition of non-abortifacient& which will ultimately bear upon theright to life of the unborn. Considering that quasi-2udicial bodies involved in, say,rate-8/ing follow the due process requirements of publication, notice and hearing,where the lesser right to property is involved, then with far greater reason shouldthe proceedings before the F4" require publication, notice and hearing.

ame; ame; Aiew that the Food and 4rug "dministration $F4"& should be orderedto immediately inform this Court whether its previously approved and the currentlyavailable contraceptive drugs and devices in our 2urisdiction were screened,evaluated and1or tested against the afore-discussed general and speci8c standards.

!he F4" should be ordered to immediately inform this Court whether itspreviously approved and the currently available contraceptive drugs and devices inour 2urisdiction were screened, evaluated and1or tested against the afore-discussedgeneral and speci8c standards. 3t should be emphasi<ed that the F4" is not being

as5ed to re-screen, re-evaluate or re-test the aforesaid contraceptive drugs anddevices but only to inform this Court if they were screened, evaluated and1or testedagainst the constitutional and statutory standards that the Court upholds in thisdecision. !hus, this will not ta5e an inordinate amount of time to do considering thatthe 8les should be readily available with the F4". !his information will allow theCourt to ta5e immediate remedial action in order to protect and defend the life ofthe unborn from conception1fertili<ation, if the circumstances warrant. !hat is, if thecontraceptive drugs or devices were not screened, evaluated and1or tested againstthe constitutional and statutory standards that the Court upholds in this decision,then it would be necessary to suspend their availability in the mar5et, as aprecautionary measure, in order to protect the right to life of the unborn pending

the proper screening, evaluation and1or testing through the afore-discussed rules ofprocedure that the F4" is directed to issue.

ame; ame; Aiew that pursuant to the e/panded 2urisdiction of the upreme Courtand as a penumbra of its power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement ofthe right to life of the unborn as well as the e/ceptional need to protect such life,the Court can require that, in the promulgation by the 4epartment of ealth $4O &of the sub2ect rules and regulations or guidelines, certain minimum requirements ofdue process shall be followed. ursuant to the e/panded 2urisdiction of this Court

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and as a penumbra of its power to issue rules for the protection and enforcement ofthe right to life of the unborn as well as the e/ceptional need to protect such life,the Court can require that, in the promulgation by the 4O of the sub2ect rules andregulations or guidelines, certain minimum requirements of due process shall befollowed. 3 8nd that, under these premises, publication, notice and hearing should

precede the issuance of the rules and regulations or guidelines which will governthe purchase and distribution of the sub2ect products and supplies. 3n other words,there should be public hearings and1or consultations. !he olicitor eneral shouldbe mandated to represent the unborn and the tate6s interest in the protection ofthe life of the unborn in these proceedings before the 4O . "nd interested partiesshould be allowed to intervene.

ame; ame; Aiew that under the :eproductive ealth $: & Law, there is nothing tosuggest that the contraceptives will be made available without properly informingthe target users of their possible harmful side e ects. Ehile indeed the : Law willma5e available contraceptives that may have harmful side-e ects, it is necessary toremember that the law does not impose their use upon any person.

@nderstandably, from petitioners6 point of view, it would seem 0irrational? for $%& aperson to ta5e contraceptives, which have 5nown harmful side e ects and, in thelong term, even lead to premature death, and $'& the government to subsidi<e thesame in order to prevent pregnancy or to properly space childbearing given thatthere are other safer means and methods of family planning. 9ut the weighing ofwhich value is superior to the other is a matter left to the individual6s sound 2udgment and conscience. 3t is his or her choice; an a/iom of liberty; an attribute offree will. >en and women are free to ma5e choices that harm themselves, li5ecigarette-smo5ing or e/cessive inta5e of alcohol, in order to attain a value that theyperceive is more important than their own health and well-being. For as long asthese choices are made freely $and do not harm the unborn from

conception1fertili<ation insofar as this case is concerned&, the tate cannotintervene beyond ensuring that the choices are well-informed absent a clear andunequivocal constitutional or statutory command permitting it to do so. @nder the: Law, there is nothing to suggest that the contraceptives will be made availablewithout properly informing the target users of their possible harmful side e ects. !he law itself mandates complete information-dissemination and severely penali<esdeliberate misinformation.

ame; ame; Aiew that all persons, who are quali8ed to avail of the bene8tsprovided by the law, shall be given complete and correct information on thereproductive health programs and services of the government under the:eproductive ealth $: & Law. !he duty to inform is embodied in the above-quoted

ection '($a&$%&, which penali<es a public or private health care service provider for#$%& 5nowingly withholding information or restricting the dissemination ofinformation, and1or $'& intentionally providing incorrect information; where0information? pertains to the programs and services on reproductive healthincluding the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and e ective family planning methods. !his provision, thus,see5s to ensure that all persons, who are quali8ed to avail of the bene8ts providedby the law, shall be given complete and correct information on the reproductive

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health programs and services of the government under the : Law. 3t does notprovide any e/ception to the duty to inform. !hus, a conscientious ob2ector ismandated to provide complete and correct information even if this will includeinformation on arti8cial contraceptives to which he or she ob2ects to on religiousgrounds. Otherwise, he or she shall su er the penal liability under the law.

ame; Constitutional Law; :eligious Freedom; Aiew that ection '($a&$(& of the:eproductive ealth $: & Law respects the right of the conscientious ob2ector bypermitting him or her to refuse to perform or provide the health care services towhich he or she ob2ects to on religious or ethical grounds provided that he or sheimmediately refers the person see5ing such care and services to another healthcare service provider within the same facility or one which is convenientlyaccessible. !he duty to refer, on the other hand, is provided in the proviso of

ection '($a&$(&, which is li5ewise quoted above. !his provision penali<es a public orprivate health care service provider for refusing to e/tend quality health careservices and information on account of a person6s marital status, gender, age,religious convictions, personal circumstances, or nature of wor5. owever, it

respects the right of the conscientious ob2ector by permitting him or her to refuse toperform or provide the health care services to which he or she ob2ects to onreligious or ethical grounds provided that he or she immediately refers the personsee5ing such care and services to another health care service provider within thesame facility or one which is conveniently accessible. "s an e/ception to thee/ception, the conscientious ob2ector cannot refuse to perform or provide suchhealth care services if it involves an emergency condition or serious case under:epublic "ct o. I()).

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the law does not command the health serviceprovider to endorse a particular family planning method but merely requires thepresentation of complete and correct information so that the person can ma5e aninformed choice. !he law does not command the health service provider toendorse a particular family planning method but merely requires the presentation of complete and correct information so that the person can ma5e an informed choice." conscientious ob2ector, li5e a Catholic doctor, is, thus, not compelled to endorsearti8cial contraceptives as the preferred family planning method. On its face,therefore, there appears to be no burden imposed on the conscientious ob2ectorunder the duty to inform.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the duty to refer imposed on the conscientiousob2ector under ections K and '($a&$(& of the :eproductive ealth $: & Law isunconstitutional for violating the Free =/ercise of :eligion Clause. 3 8nd that the

duty to refer imposed on the conscientious ob2ector under ections K and '($a&$(&of the : Law is unconstitutional for violating the Free =/ercise of :eligion Clause.Consequently, the phrase, 0 rovided, further, !hat these hospitals shall immediatelyrefer the person see5ing such care and services to another health facility which isconveniently accessible,? in ection K and the phrase, 0however, the conscientiousob2ector shall immediately refer the person see5ing such care and services toanother health care service provider within the same facility or one which isconveniently accessible,? in ection '($a&$(& of the : Law should be declared void.

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Consequently, ections *.')$b& to $e& and *.'* of the 3::, which implements theaforesaid provisions of the : Law, are void.

ame; ame; =qual rotection of the Laws; Aiew that under ection '($a&$(& of the:eproductive ealth $: & Law, both public and private health service providers mayinvo5e the right of a conscientious ob2ector. !he last paragraph of ection *.') ofthe 3mplementing :ules and :egulations $3::& is, thus, void insofar as it deprivesthe s5illed health professionals enumerated therein from the right to conscientiousob2ection. 3 also agree with the ponencia that the last paragraph of ection *.') ofthe 3:: is unconstitutional for being violative of the =qual rotection Clausealthough 3 8nd that the proper standard of review is the strict scrutiny test. !heabove-enumerated s5illed health professionals fall within the de8nition of a 0publichealth care service provider66 under ection )$n& of the : Law. @nder ection '($a&$(& of the : Law, both public and private health service providers may invo5e theright of a conscientious ob2ector. !he last paragraph of ection *.') of the 3:: is,thus, void insofar as it deprives the s5illed health professionals enumerated thereinfrom the right to conscientious ob2ection. 3 also agree with the ponencia that the last

paragraph of ection *.') of the 3:: is unconstitutional for being violative of the=qual rotection Clause although 3 8nd that the proper standard of review is thestrict scrutiny test. !he 3:: e ectively creates two classes with di erentialtreatment with respect to the capacity to invo5e the right of a conscientiousob2ector# $%& s5illed health professionals such as provincial, city, or municipal healtho7cers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, whoby virtue of their o7ce are speci8cally charged with the duty to implement theprovisions of the : Law and its 3::, and $'& s5illed health professionals notbelonging to $%&. !hose belonging to the 8rst class cannot invo5e the right of aconscientious ob2ector while those in the second class are granted that right.

ame; ame; Aiew that the decision-ma5ing process in this area is a delicate andprivate matter intimately related to the founding of a family. !he matter should,thus, be decided by both spouses under the assumption that they will amicablysettle their di erences and forthwith act in the best interest of the marriage andfamily. 3ndeed, the decision-ma5ing process in this area is a delicate and privatematter intimately related to the founding of a family. !he matter should, thus, bedecided by both spouses under the assumption that they will amicably settle theirdi erences and forthwith act in the best interest of the marriage and family. 9ut, asin all relations between and among individuals, irreconcilable disagreements mayarise. !he law, therefore, steps in to brea5 the impasse. !he law, however, settlesthe dispute by giving the spouse, who will undergo the procedure, the absolute and8nal authority to decide the matter. !he rationale seems to be that the spouse, whowill undergo the procedure, should ultimately ma5e the decision since it involves hisor her body. Li5e the ponencia, 3 am of the view that this provision in the : Lawclearly violates "rticle 33, ection %' in relation to "rticle [A, ections % and ($%& ofthe Constitution.

ame; ame; Aiew that the spouse, who will undergo the reproductive healthprocedure, cannot be given the absolute and 8nal authority to decide this matterbecause it will destroy the solidarity of the family, in general, and do violence to the

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equal right of each spouse to found the family in accordance with their religiousconvictions and the demands of responsible parenthood, in particular. !heprovision spea5s of this right as properly belonging to both spouses. !he right is,thus, conferred on both of them and they are to e/ercise this right 2ointly. 3mplicit inthis provision is that the spouses equally possess this right particularly when read in

light of "rticle 33, ection %) of the Constitution which en2oins the tate to ensurethe fundamental equality before the law of women and men. !hus, the spouse, whowill undergo the reproductive health procedure, cannot be given the absolute and8nal authority to decide this matter because it will destroy the solidarity of thefamily, in general, and do violence to the equal right of each spouse to found thefamily in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsibleparenthood, in particular.

ame; ame; Aiew that while 3 agree that ection '($a&$'&$i& of the :eproductiveealth $: & Law is unconstitutional, the declaration of unconstitutionality should not

be construed as giving the non-consenting spouse the absolute and 8nal authorityin the decision-ma5ing process relative to undergoing a reproductive health

procedure by one spouse. !he 5ey principle is that no spouse has the absolute and8nal authority to decide this matter because it will run counter to the constitutionaledict protecting the solidarity of the family and equally conferring the right to foundthe family on both spouses. Consequently, while 3 agree that ection '($a&$'&$i& ofthe : Law is unconstitutional, the declaration of unconstitutionality should not beconstrued as giving the non-consenting spouse the absolute and 8nal authority inthe decision-ma5ing process relative to undergoing a reproductive health procedureby one spouse. !he proper state of the law and rules of procedure on the matter isthat the decision shall require the consent of both spouses, and, in case ofdisagreement, the matter shall be brought before the courts for its 2ust ad2udication.

ame; ame; arental "uthority; Aiew that as a natural right, parental authority isrecogni<ed as an inherent right, not created by the tate or decisions of the courts,but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. !he description of thefamily as a 0basic? social institution is 0an assertion that the family is anterior to thestate and is not a creature of the state? while the reference to the family as0autonomous? is 0meant to protect the family against the instrumentali<ation bythe state.? !his provision is, thus, a guarantee against unwarranted tate intrusionon matters dealing with family life. !he sub2ect of parental authority andresponsibility is speci8cally dealt with in the last sentence of the aboveconstitutional provision which reads# !he natural and primary right and duty ofparents in the rearing of the youth for civic e7ciency and the development of moralcharacter shall receive the support of the overnment. "s a natural right, parentalauthority is recogni<ed as an inherent right, not created by the tate or decisions ofthe courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. >ore important,as pertinent in this controversy, the present Constitution refers to such right as0primary? which 0imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to thatof the state.?

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that because parental authority is a constitutionallyrecogni<ed natural and primary right of the parents, with emphasis on 0primary? as

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giving parents a superior right over the tate, the tate cannot carve out ane/ception to such authority without showing or providing a su7ciently compelling

tate interest to do so. 9ecause parental authority is a constitutionally recogni<ednatural and primary right of the parents, with emphasis on 0primary? as givingparents a superior right over the tate, the tate cannot carve out an e/ception to

such authority without showing or providing a su7ciently compelling tate interestto do so. " limited but blan5et e/ception from parental authority, such as that foundin ection K of the : Law, will undoubtedly destroy the solidarity of the family aswell as foster disrespect and disobedience on the part of the minor. 3t disrupts thenatural state of parent-child relationship and is wholly inconsistent with the purposeand essence of parental authority granting the parents the natural and primary rightin all matters relating to the rearing and care of the minor in order to safeguard hisor her well-being.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the fundamental right involving the parentalauthority of parents over their minor children is unduly limited by the proviso in

ection K of the :eproductive ealth $: & Law, thus, calling for the application of

the strict scrutiny test. !he fundamental right involving the parental authority ofparents over their minor children is unduly limited by the proviso in ection K of the: Law, thus, calling for the application of the strict scrutiny test. !he governmentmust show that a compelling tate interest 2usti8es the curtailment of parentalauthority of parents whose minor children belong to the 8rst group $i.e., minors whoare already parents or have had a miscarriage& vis-]-vis parents whose minorchildren belong to the second group $i.e., minors who are not parents or have nothad a miscarriage&. owever, for reasons already discussed as to the maturity levelof such group of minors and the apparent purpose of the sub2ect legal provision, thegovernment has failed to show such compelling tate interest. ence, the phrase0e/cept when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage? in ection K

of the : Law is, li5ewise, unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the tate or parents of the minor cannot prevent or

restrict access to such information considering that they will be readily available onvarious platforms of media, if they are not already available at present. 3t is onlywhen the minor decides to act on the information by see5ing access to the familyplanning services themselves that parental authority cannot be dispensed with. 3agree with the ponencia that there is nothing unconstitutional about the capacity ofa minor to access information on family planning services under ection K of the :Law for the reasons stated in the ponencia. 3n addition, for practical reasons, the

tate or parents of the minor cannot prevent or restrict access to such informationconsidering that they will be readily available on various platforms of media, if theyare not already available at present. 3t is only when the minor decides to act on theinformation by see5ing access to the family planning services themselves thatparental authority cannot be dispensed with.

ame; ame; "ge- and 4evelopment-"ppropriate :eproductive ealth =ducation;olice ower; Aiew that pursuant to its police power, the tate may regulate the

content of the matters taught to adolescents particularly with respect toreproductive health education in order to, among others, propagate proper attitudes

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and behavior relative to human se/uality and se/ual relations as well as properlyprepare the young for marriage and family life. 3 agree with the ponencia that theconstitutional challenge against ection %) of the : Law is unavailing insofar as itis claimed to violate "rticle 33, ection %' of the Constitution on the natural andprimary right and duty of parents to rear their children. 3ndeed, the tate has a

substantial interest in the education of the youth. ursuant to its police power, thetate may regulate the content of the matters taught to adolescents particularlywith respect to reproductive health education in order to, among others, propagateproper attitudes and behavior relative to human se/uality and se/ual relations aswell as properly prepare the young for marriage and family life. !he topics to becovered by the curriculum include values formation; 5nowledge and s5ills in self-protection against discrimination; se/ual abuse and violence against women andchildren and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical,social and emotional changes in adolescents; women6s rights and children6s rights;responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsibleparenthood. !he curriculum is, thus, intended to achieve valid secular ob2ectives. "sthe ponencia aptly noted, the : Law see5s to supplement, not supplant, thenatural and primary right and duty of parents to rear their children.

ame; ame; ame; :eligious Freedom; Aiew that the constitutional challengeagainst ection %) relative to the Free =/ercise of :eligion Clause is prematurebecause, as noted by the ponencia, the 4epartment of =ducation, Culture and

ports $4=C & has yet to formulate the curriculum on age- and development-appropriate reproductive health education. !he constitutional challenge against

ection %) relative to the Free =/ercise of :eligion Clause is premature because, asnoted by the ponencia, the 4epartment of =ducation, Culture and ports $4=C & hasyet to formulate the curriculum on age- and development-appropriate reproductivehealth education. " Free =/ercise of :eligion Clause challenge would necessarily

require the challenger to state what speci8c religious belief of his or hers isburdened by the sub2ect curriculum as well as the speci8c content of the curriculumhe or she ob2ects to on religious grounds. >oreover, the proper party to mount sucha challenge would be the student and1or his or her parents upon learning of thespeci8c content of the curriculum and upon deciding what aspects of their religiousbeliefs are burdened. 3t would be inappropriate for the Court to speculate on theseaspects of a potential Free =/ercise of :eligion Clause litigation involving acurriculum that has yet to be formulated by the 4=C .

ame; ame; ame; =qual rotection of the Law; Aiew that as to the equalprotection challenge against ection %) of the :eproductive ealth $: & Law, 3agree with the ponencia that there are substantial distinctions between public andprivate educational institutions which 2ustify the optional teaching of reproductivehealth education in private educational institutions. "s to the equal protectionchallenge against ection %), 3 agree with the ponencia that there are substantialdistinctions between public and private educational institutions which 2ustify theoptional teaching of reproductive health education in private educationalinstitutions. $9y giving private educational institutions the option to adopt thecurriculum to be formulated by the 4=C , the : Law e ectively ma5es theteaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions

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optional because the aforesaid institutions may completely discard suchcurriculum&.

ame; ame; ame; ame; "cademic Freedom; Aiew that only institutions of higherlearning en2oy academic freedom. Considering that the students who will besub2ected to reproductive health education are adolescents or 0young peoplebetween the ages of ten $%H& to nineteen $%D& years who are in transition fromchildhood to adulthood,? then this would presumably be taught in elementary andhigh schools which are not covered by academic freedom. 3 disagree that theacademic freedom of private educational institutions should be a basis of such 2usti8cation. "rticle [3A, ection *$'& of the Constitution provides that, 0 aJcademicfreedom shall be en2oyed in all institutions of higher learning.? !hus, onlyinstitutions of higher learning en2oy academic freedom. Considering that thestudents who will be sub2ected to reproductive health education are adolescents or0young people between the ages often $%H& to nineteen $%D& years who are intransition from childhood to adulthood,? then this would presumably be taught inelementary and high schools which are not covered by academic freedom.

onetheless, 3 agree with the ponencia that, by e ectively decreeing optionalteaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions, the :Law see5s to respect the religious belief system of the aforesaid institutions. 3 8ndthis to be a reasonable basis for the di erential treatment between public andprivate educational institutions.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the :eproductive ealth $: & Law is repletewith provisions respecting the religious freedoms of individuals. oticeably, the :Law is replete with provisions respecting the religious freedoms of individuals. 3nfact, one of its central and guiding principles is free and informed choice, thus,negating the imposition of any family planning method on an individual who ob2ectson religious grounds. !he same principle appears to have been carried over relativeto the teaching of reproductive health education in private educational institutions.Congress may have legitimately concluded that the tate interests in societalpeace, tolerance or benevolent-neutrality accommodation, as the case may be, vis-]-vis the various religious belief systems of private educational institutions in ournation will be better served by ma5ing the teaching of reproductive healtheducation $which may touch on or impact delicate or sensitive religious beliefs& asmerely optional in such institutions. Ee can ta5e 2udicial notice of the fact thatma2ority of the private educational institutions in our nation were established andare run by religious groups or sects.

ame; ame; Aiew that the :eproductive ealth $: & Law en2oys the presumption of

constitutionality and should be given a construction which will avoid its nullity. !he: Law en2oys the presumption of constitutionality and should be given aconstruction which will avoid its nullity. !he phrase 0 5Jnowingly withholdinformation or restrict the dissemination thereof, and1or intentionally provideincorrect information regarding programs and services? under ection '($a&$%& ofthe : Law should be reasonably and narrowly construed as merely requiring thehealth care service provider to provide and e/plain to persons the list of thegovernment6s reproductive health programs and services under the : Law. !o

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illustrate, if the government6s reproductive health programs and services under the: Law consists of ", 9, C and 4, then a health care service provider is required totransmit this information to a person quali8ed to avail of the bene8ts under the law.

ame; ame; :eligious Freedom; Aiew that ection %K of the :eproductive ealth$: & Law does not violate the constitutional prohibition against involuntaryservitude and that it is unconstitutional insofar as it imposes a duty to conscientiousob2ectors to render pro bono reproductive health care services to which theconscientious ob2ector ob2ects to on religious or ethical grounds for reasons statedin the ponencia. 3 am fully in accord with the ruling of the ponencia that ection %Kof the : Law does not violate the constitutional prohibition against involuntaryservitude and that it is unconstitutional insofar as it imposes a duty to conscientiousob2ectors to render pro bono reproductive health care services to which theconscientious ob2ector ob2ects to on religious or ethical grounds for reasons statedin the ponencia. Corrorarily, the conscientious ob2ector can be required to renderpro bono reproductive health care services for as long as it involves services that heor she does not ob2ect to on religious or ethical grounds.

ame; atural Law; Aiew that 3 agree with the ponencia that natural law may not,under the particular circumstances of this case, be used to invalidate the:eproductive ealth $: & Law. 3 agree with the ponencia that natural law may not,under the particular circumstances of this case, be used to invalidate the : Law.

owever, 3 disagree with the following statements# Ehile every law enacted by manemananted from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see ifa statute, e/ecutive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. !o begin with, it isnot enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. >oreover, natural laws are merethoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers andtheologists. !he 2urists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as anabstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. !hese statements, 3submit, are not necessary in the disposition of this case and appear to be aninaccurate description of natural law. !he Court need not foreclose the usefulness of natural law in resolving future cases. 3 submit that the statement that natural law isnot applicable in the resolution of this particular case su7ces.

"bad,QG., Concurring Opinion#

:eproductive ealth Law; Constitutional Law; Aiew that :epublic "ct %H(*) or the:esponsible arenthood and :eproductive ealth "ct of 'H%', the :eproductive

ealth $: & Law for short, repeatedly e/tols the principles of gender equality,sustainable human development, health, education, information, the sanctity ofhuman life and the family, improved quality of life, freedom of religious convictions,ethics, and cultural beliefs, freedom from poverty, and other ennobled principles.:emar5ably, :epublic "ct %H(*) or the :esponsible arenthood and :eproductive

ealth "ct of 'H%', the : Law for short, repeatedly e/tols the principles of genderequality, sustainable human development, health, education, information, thesanctity of human life and the family, improved quality of life, freedom of religiousconvictions, ethics, and cultural beliefs, freedom from poverty, and other ennobledprinciples. 9ut these are already part of e/isting laws and no one can ob2ect tothem. Ehat they do is apparently embellish what the : Law see5s to accomplish.

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ame; ame; Facial Challenges; Aiew that a law claimed to threaten a child6s rightto live su7ciently 2usti8es a constitutional facial challenge. !he ponencia is rightthat the procedural challenges to the petitions are unmeritorious. 3n particular,respondents claim that the Court should dismiss these actions since they are a merefacial challenge on the constitutionality of the : Law as opposed to an actual

breach of its provisions and the 8ling of a case in court on account of such breach. !he petitions should not be allowed, they add, since this challenge is not about thee/ercise of the freedom of e/pression, an e/ception to such limitation. 9ut the rightto life of the unborn child, which is at the center of these controversies, cannot becompared with rights that are best e/amined in cases of actual violations.Obviously, the Court cannot wait for the actual e/termination of an unborn childbefore assessing the constitutional validity of the law that petitioners claim topermit such action. " law claimed to threaten a child6s right to live su7ciently 2usti8es a constitutional facial challenge.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that there is no question of course that every coupleplanning their family and every woman of ample, discernment has the right to use

natural or arti8cial methods to avoid pregnancy. !here is no question of coursethat every couple planning their family and every woman of ample discernment hasthe right to use natural or arti8cial methods to avoid pregnancy. !his much is clear.9ut, in see5ing to promote the e/ercise of this right, the : Law must hurdle certainconstitutional barriers# %& the right to life of the unborn child that outlaws abortion;'& the right to health; (& the free e/ercise of religion; )& the right to due process oflaw; and )& the freedom of e/pression.

ame; ame; Aiew that the %DIK Constitution is clear# the life of a child begins0from conception? and the dictionary, which is the 8nal arbiter of the commonmeaning of words, states that 0conception? is 0the act of being pregnant,?speci8cally, the 0formation of a viable <ygote.? ome people believe that theconception of the child begins only from the moment the Beshed embryo implantsitself on the mother6s uterine wall where it will draw the food and nutrition it needsto survive and grow into a fetus. 3t is the termination of the embryo or the fetus atthis stage, painful, bloody, and depressing, that some are quic5 to condemn asabortion. reventing implantation by quietly slaying the <ygote or the embryo withlittle or no blood before it reaches the uterine wall is to them not abortion. 9ut theyare wrong. !he %DIK Constitution is clear# the life of a child begins 0fromconception66 and the dictionary, which is the 8nal arbiter of the common meaning of words, states that 0conception? is 0the act of being pregnant,? speci8cally, the0formation of a viable <ygote.? cience has proved that a new individual comes intobeing from the moment the <ygote is formed. 3ndeed, the <ygote already has agenome $4 " to others& that identi8es it as a human being and determines its se/. !he union of man and woman in the fertili<ed ovum is the beginning of anotherperson6s life.

ame; ame; "bortion; Aiew that with the Constitution, the Filipino people have ine ect covenanted that the fertili<ed ovum or <ygote is a person; "mbushing thefertili<ed ovum as it travels down the fallopian tube to prevent its implantation onthe uterine wall is abortion. Eith the Constitution, the Filipino people have in e ect

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covenanted that the fertili<ed ovum or <ygote is a person. "nd it is a covenant thatbinds. 3ndeed, the : Law accepts this inviolable principle and precisely prohibitsthe use of abortifacient that induces 0the prevention of the fertili<ed ovum to reachand be implanted in the mother6s womb.? "mbushing the fertili<ed ovum as ittravels down the fallopian tube to prevent its implantation on the uterine wall is

abortion.ame; ame; ame; Aiew that since the conception of a child begins from the

fertili<ation of the ovum, it is evident that merely preventing the woman fromovulating to produce ovum or preventing the sperm from fertili<ing it does notconstitute abortion. ince the conception of a child begins from the fertili<ation ofthe ovum, it is evident that merely preventing the woman from ovulating to produceovum or preventing the sperm from fertili<ing it does not constitute abortion.Contraception in this sense does not violate the Constitutional right to life since theunborn has not as yet been conceived. !he law may authori<e or even encouragethis 5ind of contraception since it merely prevents conception. !he life of an unbornchild is not at sta5e.

ame; ame; Contraceptives; 3ntrauterine 4evices; Aiew that the Food and 4rug"dministration $F4"& has been routinely allowing public access to hormonalcontraceptives and 3ntrauterine 4evices $3@4s& even before the passage of the:eproductive ealth $: & Law. !he Food and 4rug "dministration $F4"& has beenroutinely allowing public access to hormonal contraceptives and 3@4s even beforethe passage of the : Law. !he outcry for the law6s passage to ma5e these thingsavailable to whoever wants them is the lament of the unenlightened. 3n reality, thegovernment senses a strong resistance to their use, borne of beliefs that they areunsafe and abortifacient. !he : Law precisely aims to put an end to this resistanceby imposing certain sanctions against hospitals, physicians, nurses, midwives, andother health care providers who communicate to others the view thatcontraceptives and 3@4s are unsafe and abortifacient, refuse to prescribe them, ordecline to perform the required procedures for their use.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Aiew that in any event, 3 agree with the Court6s rulingthat the second sentence of ection D does not authori<e the approval of familyplanning products and supplies that act as abortifacient. Congress fears thathormonal contraceptives and 3@4s perform a third function disabling theendometrium of uterine lining that enable them to serve as weapons of abortion,proof of this is that the : Law provides in the third sentence of ection D thatthese contraceptives and devices may, assuming that they also function asabortifacients, pass F4" approval provided the latter issues a certi8cation that they

are 0not to be used as abortifacient..? !hus# ec. D. / / / "ny product or supplyincluded or to be included in the =4L, must have a certi8cation from the F4" thatsaid product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be usedas an abortifacient. !he above of course ma5es no sense since the two functions gotogether and the user has no way, after ta5ing the contraceptive, of stopping thesecond function from running its course. !he bad simply comes with the good. !hecerti8cation requirement violates the : Law6s tenet that 0reproductive healthrights do not include...access to abortifacients.? 3t also contradicts the : Law6s

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stated policy of guaranteeing universal access to 0non-abortifacient?contraceptives.? "bove all, this position is in breach of the provision of theConstitution that outlaws abortion. 3n any event, 3 agree with the Court6s ruling thatthe second sentence of ection D does not authori<e the approval of family planningproducts and supplies that act as abortifacient.

ame; ame; ame; ame; "dministrative "gencies; Food and 4rug "dministration;Aiew that annulling ection D of the :eproductive ealth $: & Law merely meansthat it is beyond the powers of Congress to legislate the safe and non-abortifacientstatus of certain forms of arti8cial contraceptives. !hat function must remain withthe Food and 4rug "dministration $F4"& which has the required scienti8c andtechnical s5ills for evaluating, testing, and approving each contraceptive before it ispublicly made available. !his is not to say that all contraceptives and 3@4s, presentand future, double as abortifacients and are not to be allowed. "nnulling ection Dmerely means that it is beyond the powers of Congress to legislate the safe andnon-abortifacient status of certain forms of arti8cial contraceptives. !hat functionmust remain with the F4" which has the required scienti8c and technical s5ills for

evaluating, testing, and approving each contraceptive before it is publicly madeavailable. !he manufacturers and distributors have their responsibilities, too. !heyhave to warrant that their products do not function as abortifacients.

ame; ame; :ight to ealth; Family lanning rograms; Aiew that the governmentcannot promote family planning programs that violate the women6s right to health.

Eomen have the right to be free from government-sponsored sic5ness,government-sponsored pain, and government-sponsored defect. ince healthy vitalorgans of the body form part of the right to health, women have the right to havenormally functioning vital organs. !hey have the right to wal5 in the par5 or in themalls free from debilitating illnesses and free from worries and fears overcontraceptives that the government assures them are safe. !he government cannotpromote family planning programs that violate the women6s right to health. " lawthat misleads women and states that hormonal contraceptives and 3@4s are safeviolates their constitutional right to health.

ame; ame; Contraceptives; Aiew that the :eproductive ealth $: & Law itselfrecogni<es that the use of contraceptives produces side e ects or other harmfulresults. ince the law does not de8ne the meaning of the term 0safe,? it is to beunderstood according to its common meaning# 0free from harm, in2ury, or ris5.? !he: Law itself recogni<es that the use of contraceptives produces side e ects orother harmful results. !hus, it directs the F4" in ection %D to issue strict guidelineswith respect to their use, ac5nowledging the need for abundant caution. 4o

warnings of side e ects and possible lasting harm ma5e contraceptives and 3@4ssafeX !he answer is of course no. For instance, a simple warning against pet sna5eswould say, 0Loo5 at this sna5e. 3t is a safe pet to 5eep in the house. 9ut 2ust don6t5eep it hungry. 4on6t forget to close the small door of the cage when you feed it."nd watch those small 5ids.?

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the dangers of those side e ects are more worrisomesince the :eproductive ealth $: & Law fails to provide standards of safe use ofcontraceptives. !he dangers of those side e ects are more worrisome since the :

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Law fails to provide standards of safe use of contraceptives such as# $a& a prescribedstandard of tolerance for side e ects; $b& the service of a quali8ed physician whocan advice the user, especially the poor, of the dangers of contraceptives, not 2ustliterature written in =nglish so she can ma5e intelligent choice; $c& the service of aquali8ed physician who will, while she is under contraceptives, monitor their e ects

on her, treat her for adverse side e ects and complications, and provide her withthe right medicine; and $d& the contraceptives she ta5es do not act at the sametime as abortifacients in case an ovum is fertili<ed despite the use of suchcontraceptives. !he fact is that contraceptives interfere with normal body functions.Eomen have ovaries so these can produce ova or eggs that can be fertili<ed toensure procreation and the continuation of the human race. Contraceptives preventhealthy ovaries from ovulating, which is the reason for their being ovaries. Onecannot disable the woman6s ovaries or mon5ey with its functions for long periodswithout a ecting her health. >edical studies and reports show this to be the case.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the determination of what medicine is safe anduseful to a person is a function of the science of medicine and pharmacy. 3t is not for

the upreme Court or the legislature to determine. !he legislature6s attempt toelevate into law its arbitrary 8nding that hormonal contraceptives and 3@4s are safeand non-abortifacient is irrational. !he determination of what medicine is safe anduseful to a person is a function of the science of medicine and pharmacy. 3t is not forthe Court or the legislature to determine. :aising present-day scienti8c or medicalviews regarding contraceptives to the level of law, when contested by opposingscienti8c or medical views, is an arbitrary e/ercise of legislative power.

ame; ame; :eligious Freedom; Aiew that a health care service provider is not tobe compelled to render the services that would interfere with the natural humanreproduction process if the same conBicts with his conscience. !his is consistentwith ection *, "rticle 333 of the %DIK Constitution which provides that no law shallbe made prohibiting a person6s free e/ercise of his religion. !he law provides,however, that the health care service provider6s ob2ection based on his or herethical or religious beliefs is to be respected. !hus, he or she is not to be compelledto render the services that would interfere with the natural human reproductionprocess if the same conBicts with his conscience. !his is consistent with ection *,"rticle 333 of the %DIK Constitution which provides that no law shall be madeprohibiting a person6s free e/ercise of his religion. 9ut the irony of it is that at thene/t breath the : Law would require the conscientious ob2ector to immediatelyrefer the person, whose wants he declines to serve, to the nearest health careservice provider who will do what he would not. !he penalty for failing to do this isimprisonment for % to + months or payment of a 8ne of %H,HHH to %HH,HHH or bothimprisonment and 8ne. 3f the o ender is a 2uridical person, the penalty shall beimposed on its president or responsible o7cer.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the upreme Court has correctly decided to annulection '($a&$(& and the corresponding provision in the :eproductive ealth $: &

Law-3mplementing :ules and :egulations $: -3::&, particularly section *.'), asunconstitutional insofar as they punish any health care provider who fails and1orrefuses to refer a patient not, in an emergency or life-threatening case, to another

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health care service provider within the same facility or one which is convenientlyaccessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs. @nfortunately, the : Lawrequires him to ta5e steps to ensure that the woman is pointed to another placewhere she could get the 3@4 implantation she wants. 3n e ect, the law compels thedoctor to do more than 2ust 5eep quiet and let alone. 3t compels him at the pains of

going to 2ail to get involved and help in the commission of what his religious beliefregards as amounting to the murder of a child. "nd this is in order to satisfy theneed of the woman and her partner for se/ without pregnancy. :emember, this isnot the case of a bleeding woman needing immediate medical attention. !he Courthas correctly decided to annul ection '($a&$(& and the corresponding provision inthe : -3::, particularly section *.'), as unconstitutional insofar as they punish anyhealth care provider who fails and1or refuses to refer a patient not, in an emergencyor life-threatening case, to another health care service provider within the samefacility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religiousbeliefs.

ame; ame; rinciple of Aoid for Aagueness; Aiew that due process demands that

the terms of a penal statute must be su7ciently clear to inform those who may besub2ected to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties. 4ue processdemands that the terms of a penal statute must be su7ciently clear to inform thosewho may be sub2ected to it what conduct will render them liable to its penalties. "criminal statute that 0fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice thathis contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute,? or is so inde8nite that 0itencourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,? is void for vagueness. "vague or inde8nite statute is unconstitutional because it places the accused on trialfor an o ense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.

ame; ame; Aiew that the tate guarantees under ection ' of the :eproductiveealth $: & Law the right of every woman to consider all available reproductive

health options when ma5ing her decision. !he tate guarantees under ection ' of the : Law the right of every woman to consider all available reproductive healthoptions when ma5ing her decision. !his implies that she has the right to see5 advicefrom anyone she trusts. Consequently, if a woman wanting to space her pregnancysee5s the advice of a Catholic physician she trusts, the latter should not be sent to 2ail for e/pressing his belief that ta5ing oral pills or using copper 3@4s can causeabortion that her faith prohibits. !his is valid even if others do not share the faith.:eligious conscience is precisely a part of the consideration for free choice in familyplanning.

ame; ame; Aiew that for now 3 am satis8ed that ection '($a&$%& has been

declared void and unconstitutional insofar as it punishes any health care providerwho fails or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services onreproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs. 3 concede, however,that my above views on ection '($a&$%& could be better appreciated in actual casesinvolving its application rather than in the present case where 3 go by the areprovisions of the law. For now 3 am satis8ed that ection '($a&$%& has been declaredvoid and unconstitutional insofar as it punishes any health care provider who fails or

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refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services onreproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

:eyes,QG., Concurring and 4issenting Opinion#

:eproductive ealth Law; arental "uthority; Aiew that the authority that is

e/ercised by parents over their unemancipated children includes the right and dutyto enhance, protect, preserve, and maintain their physical and mental health and torepresent them in all matters a ecting their interests. !he authority that ise/ercised by parents over their unemancipated children includes the right and dutyto enhance, protect, preserve, and maintain their physical and mental health and torepresent them in all matters a ecting their interests. !he authority e/ercised byparents over their unemancipated children is terminated, inter alia, uponemancipation of the child. =mancipation ta5es place upon attainment of the age ofma2ority, which commences at the age of eighteen years.

ame; ame; arental Consent; Aiew that the last proviso of ection K restricts theaccess of minors to modern methods of family planning; 3t requires a writtenparental consent before a minor may be allowed access thereto. ection K see5s toma5e modern family planning methods more accessible to the public. !he provisionmandates that no person shall be denied information and access to family planningservices, whether natural or arti8cial. owever, the last proviso of ection K restrictsthe access of minors to modern methods of family planning; it requires a writtenparental consent before a minor may be allowed access thereto. !his is butrecognition of the parental authority that is e/ercised by parents over the persons of their unemancipated children. !hat it is both a duty and a right of the parents toprotect the physical health of their unemancipated children. owever, ection Kprovided an e/ception to the requirement of written parental consent for minors. "minor who is already a parent or has had a miscarriage may be allowed access to

modern methods of family planning notwithstanding the absence of a writtenparental consent therefor. !his runs afoul of the natural and primary right and dutyof parents in the rearing of their children, which, under ection %', "rticle 33 of theConstitution, should receive the support of the government.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that there is no cogent reason to require a writtenparental consent for a minor who see5s access to modern family planning methodsand dispense with such requirement if the minor is already a parent or has had amiscarriage. @nder the Family Code, all minors, generally, regardless of his1hercircumstances, are still covered by the parental authority e/ercised by their parents.

!here e/ists no substantial distinction as between a minor who is already a parentor has had a miscarriage and a minor who is not yet a parent or never had amiscarriage. !here is no cogent reason to require a written parental consent for aminor who see5s access to modern family planning methods and dispense with suchrequirement if the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. @nder theFamily Code, all minors, generally, regardless of his1her circumstances, are stillcovered by the parental authority e/ercised by their parents. !hat a minor is alreadya parent or has had a miscarriage does not operate to divest his1her parents of theirparental authority; such circumstances do not emancipate a minor.

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ame; ame; Constitutional Law; Aiew that considering that the last proviso ofection K operates to divest parents of their parental authority over the persons of

their minor child who is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the same mustbe struc5 down for being contrary to the natural and primary right and duty ofparents under ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitution. 3t is cardinal with us that

the custody, care and nurture of the child reside 8rst in the parents, whose primaryfunction and freedom include preparation for obligations the tate can neithersupply nor hinder. >ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to ma5esound 2udgments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical careor treatment. arents can and must ma5e those 2udgments. Considering that thelast proviso of ection K operates to divest parents of their parental authority overthe persons of their minor child who is already a parent or has had a miscarriage,the same must be struc5 down for being contrary to the natural and primary rightand duty of parents under ection %', "rticle 33 of the Constitution.

ame; Constitutional Law; "ge- and 4evelopment-"ppropriate :eproductive ealth=ducation; "cademic Freedom; Aiew that ection *$'&, "rticle [3A of the Constitution

guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. !he petitionersclaim that ection %), by mandating the inclusion of age- and developmentappropriate reproductive health education to adolescents, violates the academicfreedom of educational institutions since they will be compelled to include in theircurriculum a sub2ect, which, based on their religious beliefs, should not be taught tostudents. !he petitioners6 claim is utterly baseless. ection *$'&, "rticle [3A of theConstitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. !heinstitutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decideand adopt its aims and ob2ectives, and to determine how these ob2ections can bestbe attained, free from outside coercion or interference, save possibly when theoverriding public welfare calls for some restraint. !he essential freedoms subsumed

in the term 0academic freedom? encompass the freedom of the school or college todetermine for itself# $%& who may teach; $'& what may be taught; $(& how lessonsshall be taught; and $)& who may be admitted to study. "n analysis of the foregoingclaim requires a dichotomy between public and private educational institutions. !helast sentence of ection %) provides that the age- and development-appropriatereproductive health curriculum that would be formulated by the 4ep=d 0shall beused by public schools and may be adopted by private schools.? !he mandatedreproductive health education would only be compulsory for public schools. !hus, asregards private educational institutions, there being no compulsion, theirconstitutional right to academic freedom is not thereby violated.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Aiew that as regards public educational institutions,though they are mandatorily required to adopt an age- and development-appropriate reproductive health education curriculum, the claimed curtailment ofacademic freedom is still untenable. "s regards public educational institutions,though they are mandatorily required to adopt an age- and development-appropriate reproductive health education curriculum, the claimed curtailment ofacademic freedom is still untenable. ection )$%&, "rticle [3A of the Constitutionprovides that 0 tJhe tate / / / shall e/ercise reasonable supervision and regulationof all educational institutions.? !he constitutional grant of academic freedom does

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not withdraw from the tate the power to supervise and regulate educationalinstitutions, whether public or private. !he only requirement imposed by theConstitution on the tate6s supervision and regulation of educational institutions isthat the e/ercise thereof must be reasonable.

ame; ame; :ight to rivacy; Aiew that although considered a fundamental right,the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to a narrowly drawn governmentregulation, which advances a legitimate and overriding tate interest. Ehen agovernment regulation is claimed to infringe on the right to privacy, courts arerequired to weigh the tate6s ob2ective against the privacy rights of the people."lthough considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may neverthelesssuccumb to a narrowly drawn government regulation, which advances a legitimateand overriding tate interest. "s e/plained earlier, ection %) aims to address theincreasing rate of teenage pregnancies in the country and the ris5s arisingtherefrom, which is undeniably a legitimate and overriding tate interest. !hequestion that has to be as5ed then is whether ection %), in advancing suchlegitimate and overriding tate interest, has employed means, which are narrowly

tailored so as not to intrude into the right to privacy of the people.ame; ame; :eligious Freedom; Aiew that the Constitution guarantees that no law

shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the freee/ercise thereof; that the free e/ercise and en2oyment of religious profession andworship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. 3n order toproperly assess the constitutionality of ections K and '($a&$(&, the provisionsthereof must be considered in its entirety. Gudicial scrutiny of the sub2ect provisionscannot be delimited to a particular provision thereof, i.e., the 0duty to refer,? lestthe Court lose sight of the ob2ectives sought to be achieved by Congress and therami8cations thereof with regard to the free e/ercise clause. !he 0duty to refer?must be construed with due regard to the other provisions in ections K and '($a&$(& and the ob2ectives sought to be achieved by :.". o. %H(*) in its entirety. !heConstitution guarantees that no law shall be made respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the free e/ercise thereof; that the free e/ercise anden2oyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,shall forever be allowed. :eligious freedom forestalls compulsion by law of theacceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, and conversely, itsafeguards the free e/ercise of the chosen form of religion.

ame; ame; ame; Compelling tate 3nterest !est; Aiew that under the 0compellingstate interest test,? a tate regulation, which is challenged as being contrary to thefree e/ercise clause, would only be upheld upon showing that# $%& the regulation

does not infringe on an individual6s constitutional right of free e/ercise; or $'& anyincidental burden on the free e/ercise of an individual6s religion maybe 2usti8ed by acompelling state interest in the regulation of a sub2ect within the tate6sconstitutional power to regulate by means, which imposed the least burden onreligious practices. 3n ascertaining the limits of the e/ercise of religious freedom, incases where government regulations collide with the free e/ercise clause, the Courtfurther declared that, following the benevolent neutrality1accommodation standard,the 0compelling state interest? test should be applied. @nder the 0compelling state

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interest test,? a tate regulation, which is challenged as being contrary to the freee/ercise clause, would only be upheld upon showing that# $%& the regulation doesnot infringe on an individual6s constitutional right of free e/ercise; or $'& anyincidental burden on the free e/ercise of an individual6s religion maybe 2usti8ed by acompelling state interest in the regulation of a sub2ect within the tate6s

constitutional power to regulate by means, which imposed the least burden onreligious practices.

ame; ame; Aiew that primarily, the ob2ective of :.". o. %H(*) is to providemarginali<ed sectors of society, particularly the women and the poor, access toreproductive health care services, and to health care in general, of which they havebeen deprived for many decades due to discrimination and lac5 of access toinformation. articularly, :.". o. %H(*) see5s to provide 0e ective and qualityreproductive health care services and supplies,? which would 0ensure maternal andchild health, the health of the unborn, safe delivery and birth of healthy children,and sound replacement rate, in line with the tate6s duty to promote the right tohealth, responsible parenthood, social 2ustice and full human development.? :.".

o. %H(*), as a corollary measure for the protection of the right to health of thepeople, li5ewise recogni<es necessity to 0promote and provide information andaccess, without bias, to all methods of family planning.? rimarily, the ob2ective of:.". o. %H(*) is to provide marginali<ed sectors of society, particularly the womenand the poor, access to reproductive health care services, and to health care ingeneral, of which they have been deprived for many decades due to discriminationand lac5 of access to information.

ame; ame; :eligious Freedom; =qual rotection of the Law; Aiew that althoughection K provides 0that family planning services shall li5ewise be e/tended by

private health facilities to paying patients,? it nevertheless e/empts 0non-maternityspecialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group? fromproviding full range of modern family planning methods. 3nstead, ection K imposeson non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by areligious group the duty to immediately refer patients see5ing reproductive healthcare and services to another health facility that is conveniently accessible."lthough ection K provides 0that family planning services shall li5ewise bee/tended by private health facilities to paying patients,? it nevertheless e/empts0non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religiousgroup? from providing full range of modern family planning methods. 3nstead,

ection K imposes on non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned andoperated by a religious group the duty to immediately refer patients see5ingreproductive health care and services to another health facility that is convenientlyaccessible. 3n the same manner, the prohibition imposed under ection '($a&$(& isnot absolute; it recogni<es that a health care service provider may validly refuse torender reproductive health services and information if he1she conscientiouslyob2ects thereto 0based on his1her ethical or religious beliefs.? evertheless, ection'($a&$(& li5ewise imposes a corresponding duty on such conscientious ob2ector toimmediately refer the person see5ing reproductive health services to another healthcare service provider within the same facility or one, which is convenientlyaccessible.

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ame; ame; ame; Compelling 3nterest !est; Aiew that the supposed burden on thereligious freedom of conscientious ob2ectors in complying with the 0duty to refer?would have to be weighed against the tate6s interest in promoting the right of thepeople to reproductive health. !he determination of whether there e/ists acompelling state interest that would 2ustify an incidental burden involves balancing

the interest of the tate against religious liberty to determine which is morecompelling under the particular set of facts. 3n assessing the state interest, thecourt will have to determine the importance of the secular interest and the e/tent towhich that interest will be impaired by an e/emption for the religious practice."ccordingly, the supposed burden on the religious freedom of conscientiousob2ectors in complying with the 0duty to refer? would have to be weighed againstthe tate6s interest in promoting the right of the people to reproductive health.

ame; Aiew that Congress recogni<ed that, in enacting regulations to further thereproductive health of the people, including access to modern family planningmethods, resistance thereto based on religious scruples would abound. Congressrecogni<ed that, in enacting regulations to further the reproductive health of the

people, including access to modern family planning methods, resistance theretobased on religious scruples would abound. otwithstanding the presence of acompelling state interest in the promotion and protection of reproductive health,Congress deemed it proper to carve out e/emptions that speci8cally ta5e intoaccount the religious dissensions of conscientious ob2ectors, which e ectivelye/empts them from the requirements imposed under ections K and '($a&$(&. 3n thisregard, it cannot thus be claimed that the said provisions invidiously interfere withthe free e/ercise of religion.

ame; Constitutional Law; :eligious Freedom; Aiew that a health care serviceprovider who conscientiously ob2ects, based on his1her ethical or religious beliefs, toprograms and services regarding reproductive health is e/empted from the e ectsof ection '($a&$%& only insofar as it punishes a health care service provider who5nowingly withholds information on said programs and services. "ccordingly, ahealth care service provider who conscientiously ob2ects, based on his1her ethical orreligious beliefs, to programs and services regarding reproductive health ise/empted from the e ects of ection '($a&$%& only insofar as it punishes a healthcare service provider who 5nowingly withholds information on said programs andservices. ection '($a&$%&, in relation to ection '($a&$(&, recogni<es that aconscientious ob2ector cannot be compelled to provide information on reproductivehealth if the same would go against his1her religious convictions. 3n such cases,however, the conscientious ob2ector, pursuant to ection '($a&$(&, has thecorrelative duty to immediately refer the person see5ing information on programsand services on reproductive health to another health care service provider withinthe same facility or one which is conveniently accessible.

ame; ame; =qual rotection of the Law; Aiew that the purpose of the equalprotection clause is to secure every person within a tate6s 2urisdiction againstintentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the e/press terms of a statute or by its improper e/ecution through the state6s duly constitutedauthorities. =qual protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly

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situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred andresponsibilities imposed. !he purpose of the equal protection clause is to secureevery person within a tate6s 2urisdiction against intentional and arbitrarydiscrimination, whether occasioned by the e/press terms of a statute or by itsimproper e/ecution through the state6s duly constituted authorities. ersons or

things ostensibly similarly situated may, nonetheless, be treated di erently if thereis a basis for valid classi8cation. !he legislature is allowed to classify the sub2ects oflegislation; if the classi8cation is reasonable, the law may operate only on some andnot all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. Classi8cation, tobe valid, must $%& rest on substantial distinctions, $'& be germane to the purpose ofthe law, $(& not be limited to e/isting conditions only, and $)& apply equally to allmembers of the same class.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that there is a substantial distinction as regards aconscientious ob2ector under ection '($a&$(&, who may be a public or privatehealth care service provider, and a public o7cer speci8cally charged with the dutyto implement the provisions of :epublic "ct $:.".& o. %H(*) and its 3mplementing

:ules and :egulations $3::&. !here is a substantial distinction as regards aconscientious ob2ector under ection '($a&$(&, who may be a public or privatehealth care service provider, and a public o7cer speci8cally charged with the dutyto implement the provisions of :.". o. %H(*) and its 3::. !he Constitution providesthat a public o7ce is a public trust. "n important characteristic of a public o7ce isthat its creation and conferment involves a delegation to the individual of some ofthe sovereign functions of government, to be e/ercised by him for the bene8t of thepublic; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative,e/ecutive, or 2udicial, attaches, for the time being, to be e/ercised for the publicbene8t.

ame; pousal Consent; arental Consent; Aiew that ection '($a&$'& does notpenali<e the refusal of a health care service provider to perform reproductive healthprocedures per se. Ehat is being penali<ed by the provision is the refusal of a healthcare service provider to perform such procedures on the ground of lac5 of spousalconsent or parental consent in certain cases. ection '($a&$'& does not penali<ethe refusal of a health care service provider to perform reproductive healthprocedures per se. Ehat is being penali<ed by the provision is the refusal of a healthcare service provider to perform such procedures on the ground of lac5 of spousalconsent or parental consent in certain cases. 3ndeed, for reasons to be e/plained atlength later, a health care service provider cannot avoid the performance ofreproductive health procedure, in case of married persons, solely on the ground oflac5 of spousal consent since there would be no 2usti8able reason for such refusal.

ame; Constitutional Law; :ight to rivacy; Aiew that intimate relations betweenhusband and wife fall within the right of privacy formed by emanations of thevarious guarantees in the 9ill of :ights, to which tate intrusion is proscribed. !heponencia declared ection '($a&$'&$i& as being contrary to ection (, "rticle [A ofthe Constitution, which requires the tate to defend the 0right of the spouses tofound a family,? thus unduly infringing on the right to marital privacy. !he ponenciae/plained that the said provision 0refers to reproductive health procedures li5e tubal

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ligation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, require mutual consent anddecision between the husband and wife as they a ect issues intimately related tothe founding of the family.? !he ponencia pointed out that decision-ma5ingconcerning reproductive health procedure 0falls within the protected <one of maritalprivacy? from which tate intrusion is proscribed. !hus, the ponencia concluded,

dispensing with the spousal consent is 0disruptive of family unity? and 0a mar5eddeparture from the policy of the tate to protect marriage as an inviolable socialinstitution.? 3t is conceded that intimate relations between husband and wife fallwithin the right of privacy formed by emanations of the various guarantees in the9ill of :ights, to which tate intrusion is proscribed. owever, 3 do not agree thatupholding a married individual6s choice to submit to reproductive health proceduredespite the absence of the consent or authori<ation of his1her spouse would bedisruptive of the family.

ame; Aiew that the law, in case of disagreement, recogni<es that the decision ofthe spouse undergoing the reproductive health procedure should prevail. 3t isindeed ideal that the decision whether to submit to reproductive health procedure

be a 2oint underta5ing of the spouses, especially on such a vital and sensitivematter. 3t is inevitable, however, for cases to abound wherein a husband1wife wouldob2ect to the intended procedure of his1her spouse. 3n such cases, the right toreproductive health of a spouse would be rendered e ectively inutile. 3 do not seehow fostering such stalemate, which can hardly be considered as a harmonious andblissful marital relationship, could 0protect the marriage as an inviolable socialinstitution.? !hus, the law, in case of disagreement, recogni<es that the decision ofthe spouse undergoing the reproductive health procedure should prevail. 3n sodeclaring, ection '($a&$'&$i& does not invidiously interfere with the privacy rights of the spouses. 3n dispensing with the spousal consent1authori<ation in case ofdisagreement, the law is not declaring a substantive right for the 8rst time; even in

the absence of such declaration, the decision of the spouse undergoing thereproductive health procedure would still prevail. ection '($a&$'&$i& is but a mererecognition and a7rmation of a married individual6s constitutionally guaranteedpersonal autonomy and his1her right to reproductive health.

ame; hil ealth "ccreditation; Aiew that a health care service provider, his1herreligious ob2ections to certain reproductive health care services aside, may stillrender pro bono reproductive health care service, as a prerequisite for hil ealthaccreditation, by providing information or medical services. !hat a health careservice provider has religious ob2ections to certain reproductive health care servicesdoes not mean that he1she is already e/empted from the requirement under ection%K for hil ealth accreditation. !he requirement under ection %K is stated ingeneral terms and is religion-neutral; it merely states that health care serviceproviders, as a condition for hil ealth accreditation, must render pro bonoreproductive health service. !he phrase 0reproductive health care service? is quitee/pansive and is not limited only to those services, which may be deemedob2ectionable based on religious beliefs. :eproductive health care includes# $%&family planning information and services; $'& maternal, infant and child health andnutrition, including breastfeeding; $(& proscription of abortion and management ofabortion complications; $)& adolescent and youth reproductive health guidance and

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counseling; $*& prevention, treatment, and management of reproductive tractinfections, 3A and "34 , and other se/ually transmittable infections; $+& eliminationof violence against women and children, and other forms of se/ual and gender-based violence; $K& education and counseling on se/uality and reproductive health;$I& treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers, and other gynecological

conditions and disorders; $D& male responsibility and involvement, and men6sreproductive health; $%H& prevention, treatment, and management of infertility andse/ual dysfunction; $%%& reproductive health education for adolescents; and $%'&mental health aspect of reproductive health care. !hus, a health care serviceprovider, his1her religious ob2ections to certain reproductive health care servicesaside, may still render pro bono reproductive health care service, as a prerequisitefor hil ealth accreditation, by providing information or medical services, forinstance, on treatment of breast and reproductive tract cancers, and othergynecological conditions and disorders or on maternal, infant and child health andnutrition.

erlas-9ernabe,QG., Concurring and 4issenting Opinion#

:eproductive ealth Law; Constitutional Law; :eligious Freedom; 9enevolenteutrality; Aiew that with religion loo5ed upon with benevolence and not hostility,

benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certaincircumstances. @nder the benevolent-neutrality theory utili<ed by the ponencia insupport of its position, religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and notmerely a privilege against discriminatory legislation. Eith religion loo5ed upon withbenevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation ofreligion under certain circumstances. "s case law instructs, it is the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test which is most in line with the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach. !his method of analysis operates under three $(&parameters, namely# $a& the sincerity of the religious belief which is burdened by astatute or a government action; $b& the e/istence of a compelling state interestwhich 2usti8es such burden on the free e/ercise of religion; and $c& in thefurtherance of its legitimate state ob2ective, the state has employed the leastintrusive means to such e/ercise of religious beliefs.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that nothing in the law requires the conscientious ob2ectorto refer the patient to a health care service provider capable and willing to performthe reproductive health procedure ob2ected to. either do 3 8nd ection '($a&$%& of the : Law, as well as its : -3:: provision counterpart, invidious of religiousfreedom, particularly, of the Free =/ercise Clause, for the reason that informationdissemination on health advice, including that on reproductive health, constitutes,

as mentioned, an inherent professional responsibility of health care serviceproviders to their patients. 3nforming the patient of his or her health options doesnot, in any way, preclude the conscientious ob2ector from, as also earlier stated,sharing his or her religious beliefs on the matter. "fter disseminating theinformation, and when the patient a7rmatively decides to ta5e the reproductivehealth procedure, then the conscientious ob2ector may opt not to perform suchprocedure himself or herself and, instead, refer the patient to another health careservice provider based only on the quali8cation of accessibility; nothing in the law

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requires the conscientious ob2ector to refer the patient to a health care serviceprovider capable and willing to perform the reproductive health procedure ob2ectedto.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that ection '($b& of the :eproductive ealth $: & Lawmust be construed in the conte/t of its surrounding provisions which a ord theconscientious ob2ector the ability to opt-out from performing reproductive healthpractices on account of his or her religious beliefs. "s 3 see it, the problem lies onlywith ection *.') of the : -3:: going beyond what is provided for in the : Law.

ection *.') of the : -3:: is an erroneous construction of ection '($b& of the :Law which must stand as constitutional. "s earlier mentioned, the latter provisiononly states general prohibitions to public o7cers speci8cally charged with theimplementation of the : Law; nothing in its te/t negates the availability of theconscientious ob2ector e/ception to them, or to 0s5illed health professionals such asprovincial, city, or municipal health o7cers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses,supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their o7ce are speci8callycharged with the duty to implement the provisions of the : Law and the : -3::J.?

ection '($b& of the : Law must be construed in the conte/t of its surroundingprovisions which a ord the conscientious ob2ector the ability to opt-out fromperforming reproductive health practices on account of his or her religious beliefs."s the aforementioned : -3:: provision would be stric5en down as invalid on ultravires grounds, 3 believe that an equal protection analysis is unnecessary.

ame; ame; ame; arental Consent; Aiew that the :eproductive ealth $: & Lawprovision on parental consent does not amount to a negation or even a dilution ofthe parent6s right to care for and rear their minor child who is already a parent orhas undergone an abortion towards the end of developing her physical characterand well-being. !he : Law provision on parental consent does not amount to anegation or even a dilution of the parent6s right to care for and rear their minor childwho is already a parent or has undergone an abortion towards the end ofdeveloping her physical character and well-being. either does the provision inhibitthe minor6s parents from preventing their child from acquiring detrimental healthhabits. :ecogni<ing that these minors have distinct reproductive health needs dueto their e/isting situation, the law simply does away with the necessity of presentingto reproductive health care service providers prior parental consent before they aregiven information and access to modern day methods of family planning. 3n apredominantly conservative culture li5e ours, wherein the thought that premaritalse/ is taboo pervades, a minor who is already a parent or one who has undergone aprevious miscarriage is, more often than not, sub2ect to some 5ind of social stigma.

aid minor, given her predisposition when viewed against social perception, may8nd it di7cult, or rather uncomfortable, to approach her parents on the sensitivesub2ect of reproductive health, and, much more, to procure their consent. !he :Law does away with this complication and ma5es modern methods of familyplanning easily accessible to the minor, all in the interest of her health and physicalwell-being. On all accounts, nothing stops the minor6s parents to, in the e/ercise oftheir parental authority, intervene, having in mind the best interest of their childinsofar as her health and physical well-being are concerned.

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ame; Aiew that ideally and as much as possible, spouses should, as the ponenciaputs it, act as 0one cohesive unit? in the decision-ma5ing process in undergoing areproductive health procedure. owever, when there is a complete disagreementbetween the spouses, the assailed :eproductive ealth $: & Law provision provides,by way of e/ception, a deadloc5-mechanism whereby the decision of the one

undergoing the procedure shall prevail if only to prevent any unsettling conBictbetween the married couple on the issue. !here is nothing in the : Law thatwould completely alienate the other spouse in the decision-ma5ing process norobviate any real dialogue between them. !his is a purely private a air left for thespouses to e/perience for themselves. 3deally and as much as possible, spousesshould, as the ponencia puts it, act as 0one cohesive unit? in the decision-ma5ingprocess in undergoing a reproductive health procedure. owever, when there is acomplete disagreement between the spouses, the assailed : Law provisionprovides, by way of e/ception, a deadloc5-mechanism whereby the decision of theone undergoing the procedure shall prevail if only to prevent any unsettling conBictbetween the married couple on the issue. !o add, the assailed provision, in my view,also provides a practical solution to situations of estrangement which complicatesthe process of procuring the other spouse6s consent.

ame; hil ealth "ccreditation; Aiew that as there is no form of compulsion, thenthe conscientious ob2ector remains free to choose whether to render pro bonoreproductive health care services or not. 3n the event, however, that he or shedecides not to render such services, the tate has the right to deny him or her

hil ealth accreditation. "s there is no form of compulsion, then the conscientiousob2ector remains free to choose whether to render pro bono reproductive healthcare services or not. 3n the event, however, that he or she decides not to rendersuch services, the tate has the right to deny him or her hil ealth accreditation.9eing a mere privilege, the tate, through its e/ercise of police power, is free toimpose reasonable concessions that would further its policies, i.e., dissemination ofinformation and rendering of services on reproductive health, in e/change for thegrant of such accreditation.

Leonen,QG., 4issenting Opinion#

Constitutional Law; Gudicial ower; "ctual Case or Controversy; Aiew that there is acase or controversy when there is a real conBict of rights or duties arising fromactual facts. "n actual case or controversy is 0one which involves a conBict of legalrights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of 2udicial resolution; thecase must not be moot or academic or based on e/tra-legal or other similarconsiderations not cogni<able by a court of 2ustice.? !o be 2usticiable, the issuespresented must be 0Nde8nite and concrete, touching the legal relations of partieshaving adverse legal interest;6 a real and substantial controversy admitting ofspeci8c relief.? !he term 2usticiability refers to the dual limitation of only consideringin an adversarial conte/t the questions presented before courts, and in the process,the courts6 duty to respect its co-equal branches of government6s powers andprerogatives under the doctrine of separation of powers. !here is a case orcontroversy when there is a real conBict of rights or duties arising from actual facts.

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!hese facts, properly established in court through evidence or 2udicial notice,provide the natural limitations upon 2udicial interpretation of the statute. Ehen it isclaimed that a statute is inconsistent with a provision of the Constitution, themeaning of a constitutional provision will be narrowly drawn.

ame; ame; Aiew that it is true that the present Constitution grants the upremeCourt with the e/ercise of 2udicial review when the case involves the determinationof 0grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac5 or e/cess of 2urisdiction on the partof any branch or instrumentality of the overnment.? 3t is true that the presentConstitution grants this court with the e/ercise of 2udicial review when the caseinvolves the determination of 0grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac5 ore/cess of 2urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

overnment.? !his new feature of the %DIK Constitution a ects our politicalquestion doctrine. 3t does not do away with the requirement of an actual case. !herequirement of an actual case is fundamental to the nature of the 2udiciary.

ame; ame; Facial Challenges; Aiew that the only instance when a facial review ofthe law is not only allowed but also essential is 0when the provisions in question areso broad that there is a clear and imminent threat that actually operates or it can beused as a prior restraint of speech.? @nfortunately, the ponencia failed to discusshow several provisions of the : Law became vulnerable to a facial attac5, whereasother provisions must await an actual case or controversy to pass upon itsconstitutionality. !he ponencia e/plained that the# / / / foregoing petitions haveseriously alleged that the constitutional human right to life, speech and religion andother fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailedlegislation, the Court has authority to ta5e cogni<ance of these 5indred petitionsand determine if the : Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. 3 restate, forpurposes of emphasis, parts of my disquisition on facial challenges in my dissentingand concurring opinion in 4isini v. ecretary of Gustice, K%+ C:" '(K $'H%)&. "fterall, the challenges to this present law and the Cybercrime revention "ct of 'H%'are the public6s reaction to the increasingly liberal but disturbing treatment that wehave given on the issue of rigorous analysis for the 2usticiability of controversiesbrought before us. !he invalidation of the statute is either 0on its face? or 0asapplied.? !he only instance when a facial review of the law is not only allowed butalso essential is 0when the provisions in question are so broad that there is a clearand imminent threat that actually operates or it can be used as a prior restraint ofspeech.?

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that a facial challenge only applies to cases where thefree speech and its cognates are asserted before the court. !he prevailing doctrine

today is that# a facial challenge only applies to cases where the free speech and itscognates are asserted before the court. Ehile as a general rule penal statutescannot be sub2ected to facial attac5s, a provision in a statute can be struc5 down asunconstitutional when there is a clear showing that there is an imminent possibilitythat its broad language will allow ordinary law enforcement to cause prior restraintsof speech and the value of that speech is such that its absence will be sociallyirreparable. 9ro5en down into its elements, a facial review should only be allowedwhen# First, the ground for the challenge of the provision in the statute is that it

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violates freedom of e/pression or any of its cognates; econd, the language in thestatute is impermissibly vague; !hird, the vagueness in the te/t of the statute inquestion allows for an interpretation that will allow prior restraints; Fourth, the0chilling e ect? is not simply because the provision is found in a penal statute butbecause there can be a clear showing that there are special circumstances which

show the imminence that the provision will be invo5ed by law enforcers; Fifth, theapplication of the provision in question will entail prior restraints; and i/th, thevalue of the speech that will be restrained is such that its absence will be sociallyirreparable. !his will necessarily mean balancing between the state interestsprotected by the regulation and the value of the speech e/cluded from society.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that facial challenges can only be raised on the basis ofoverbreadth and not on vagueness. Facial challenges can only be raised on thebasis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. outhern emisphere demonstratedhow vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial challengesare raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom ofe/pression. one of these petitions 2ustify a facial review of this social legislation.

!he free e/ercise of one6s religion may be a cognate of the freedom of e/pression.owever, the petitions have not properly alleged the religion, the religious dogma,

the actual application of the religious dogma where a repugnancy can be shown. !hey have also failed to demonstrate that the violation of the amorphous religiousdogmas that they imagine should result in the invalidation of statutory te/t ratherthan simply an ad2ustment in its interpretation and in its application.

:emedial Law; Civil rocedure; Class uits; arties; Aiew that a class suit is allowedunder the rules if those who instituted the action are found to be su7cientlynumerous and representative of the interests of all those they see5 to represent. "class suit is allowed under the rules if those who instituted the action are found tobe su7ciently numerous and representative of the interests of all those they see5 torepresent. !hey must be so numerous that it would be impractical to bring them allto court or 2oin them as parties. Lastly, a common interest in the controversy raisedmust be clearly established. !hese requirements a ord protection for all thoserepresented in the class suit considering that this court6s ruling will be binding on allof them. Ee should be especially cautious when the class represented by a few inan alleged class suit is the 0entire Filipino ation? or all the adherents of a particularreligion. !his court must be convinced that the interest is so common that there canbe no di erence in the positions and points of view of all that belong to that class."nything less than this standard will be an implied acceptance that in this importantad2udication of alleged constitutional rights, the views of a few can be imposed onthe many.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Aiew that class suits require that there is a possibilitythat those represented can a7rm that their interests are properly raised in a classsuit. Class suits require that there is a possibility that those represented can a7rmthat their interests are properly raised in a class suit. !he general rule must be thatthey be real and e/isting. 3n constitutional ad2udication, this court must approachclass suits with caution; otherwise, future generations or an amorphous class will be

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bound by a ruling which they did not participate in. ot all these elements for aproper class suit are present in the petitions 8led in these cases.

Constitutional Law; residency; 3mmunity from uit; Aiew that a sitting presidentcannot be sued. !his immunity e/ists during the resident6s incumbency only. "sitting president cannot be sued. !his immunity e/ists during the resident6sincumbency only. !he purpose is to preserve the dignity of the o7ce that isnecessary for its operations as well as to prevent any disruption in the conduct ofo7cial duties and functions. Eithout this immunity, a proliferation of suits wouldderail the focus of the o7ce from addressing the greater needs of the country toattending each and every case 8led against the sitting resident, including the pettyand harassment suits. !he doctrine of presidential immunity is not a surrender ofthe right to demand accountability from those who hold public o7ce such as the

resident. !he Constitution enumerates the grounds when a resident may beimpeached. !his immunity is also no longer available to a non-sitting resident."fter the end of his or her tenure, he or she can be made criminally and civilly liablein the proper case.

:eproductive ealth Law; Constitutional Law; :ight to Life; Aiew that a law thatmandates informed choice and proper access for reproductive health technologiesshould not be presumed to be a threat to the right to life. !he constitutional rightto life has many dimensions. "part from the protection against harm to one6scorporeal e/istence, it can also mean the 0right to be left alone.? !he right to lifealso congeals the autonomy of an individual to provide meaning to his or her life. 3na sense, it allows him or her su7cient space to determine quality of life. " law thatmandates informed choice and proper access for reproductive health technologiesshould not be presumed to be a threat to the right to life. 3t is an a7rmativeguarantee to assure the protection of human rights.

ame; Aiew that the court cannot ma5e a declaration of when life begins. !hecourt cannot ma5e a declaration of when life begins. uch declaration is notnecessary and is a dictum that will unduly confuse future issues. First, there is, asyet, no actual controversy that can support our deliberation on this speci8c issue.

econd, the court cannot rely on the discussion of a few commissioners during thedrafting of the constitution by the Constitutional Commission.

ame; Aiew that the Constitutional Commission deliberations show that it is not truethat the issue of when life begins is already a settled matter. !he ConstitutionalCommission deliberations show that it is not true that the issue of when life beginsis already a settled matter. !here are several other opinions on this issue. !heConstitutional Commissioners adopted the term 0conception? rather than 0fertili<edovum.? ew discoveries in reproductive science, particularly the possibility ofcloning, provide basis for the possible signi8cance of viable implantation in theuterus as the 0beginning of life and personhood.? 3t is at implantation when a groupof cells gain the potential of progressing into a human being without furtherintervention.

ame; "dministrative "gencies; Food and 4rug "dministration; Aiew that the Foodand 4rug "dministration $F4"& is mandated to e/amine each and every drug,

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contraceptive or technology vis-]-vis the claims made for or against their inclusion.!he law speci8cally grants the Food and 4rug "dministration $F4"& with the

competence to determine the scienti8c validity of the allegations of the petitioners. !he F4" is mandated to e/amine each and every drug, contraceptive or technologyvis-]-vis the claims made for or against their inclusion. 3 agree with the ponencia in

withholding any blan5et pronouncement of any contraceptive absent the e/ercise of the F4" of its functions under this provision. !he F4" is mandated to ensure thesafety and quality of drugs released to the public.

ame; Contraceptives; Aiew that the inclusion of contraceptives in the national drugformulary is not new. !he inclusion of contraceptives in the national drug formularyis not new. !he hilippine 4rug Formulary# =ssential >edicines List, Aolume K, of'HHI already listed it under 0 ormones and ormone "ntagonists.? Contraceptivesare included, following 8ve pillars designed to ma5e available a ordable, safe, ande ective drugs to the public. !hese pillars are# $%& 0the assurance of the safety,e7cacy and usefulness of pharmaceutical products through quality control?; $'&0the promotion of the rational use of drugs by both the health professionals and the

general public?; $(& 0the development of self-reliance in the local pharmaceuticalindustry?; $)& 0 tJhe tailored or targeted procurement of drugs by government withthe ob2ective of ma5ing available to its own clientele, particularly the lower-incomesectors of the society, the best drugs at the lowest possible cost?; and $*& 0peopleempowerment.?

ame; Constitutional Law; :eligious Freedom; Aiew that if a health care serviceprovider6s religious belief does not allow a certain method of family planning, thenthat provider may possibly withhold such information from the patient. 3f a healthcare service provider6s religious belief does not allow a certain method of familyplanning, then that provider may possibly withhold such information from thepatient. 3n doing so, the patient is unable to give voluntary informed consent to allpossible procedures that are necessary for her or his care. !he law, in sections %Kand '( allow accommodation for full care of the patient by requiring referral. !hepatient that see5s health care service from a provider should be able to put his orher trust on the provider that he or she would be referred to the best possibleoption. !here is nothing in the law which prevents the referring health care providerfrom ma5ing 5nown the basis of his or her conscientious ob2ection to an availableprocedure which is otherwise scienti8cally and medically safe and e ective.9etween the doctor or health care provider on the one hand and the patient on theother, it is the patient6s welfare and beliefs which should be primordial. 3t is thepatient that needs the care, and the doctor or health care provider should providethat care in a professional manner.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that it is clear that a conscientious ob2ector provisionwhose coverage is too broad will allow too many to raise e/ception and e ectivelyundermine the purpose sought by the law. !here is a di erence betweenob2ections based on one6s conscience and those based on one6s religion. Conscienceappears to be the broader category. Ob2ections based on conscience can be uniqueto the individual6s determination of what is right or wrong based on ethics orreligion. Ob2ections based on religion, on the other hand, imply a set of beliefs that

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are canonical to an institution or a movement considered as a religion. Others sharereligious belief. Conscientious ob2ection may also include those whose bases areunique only to the person claiming the e/ception. One6s conscience may be shapedby cultural factors other than religion. 3t is clear that a conscientious ob2ectorprovision whose coverage is too broad will allow too many to raise e/ception and

e ectively undermine the purpose sought by the law.ame; ame; ame; Aiew that it is not clear in the ponencia whether the provisions

on referral by conscientious ob2ectors are declared unconstitutional for all religionsor only for speci8c ones. !he petitions do not show a speci8c instance whenconscientious ob2ection was availed of as a result of the e/ercise of a religion. 3n thiscase, we are as5ed to evaluate whether the provision that accommodatesconscientious ob2ectors would, in the future, with unspeci8ed facts, violate theconstitutional provision on religious e/ercise. !hus, it is also not clear in theponencia whether the provisions on referral by conscientious ob2ectors are declaredunconstitutional for all religions or only for speci8c ones. !his is the natural resultfor speculative cases. !his is dangerous constitutional precedent. 3f the declaration

is for all religions, then this might 2ust result in a violation of the non-establishmentclause. " dominant ma2oritarian religion is now aided in imposing its beliefs not onlyon patients but also on all those who have di erent faiths. Conduct which purport tobe religious practice and its relationship to the fundamental tenets of that religion isa question of fact which cannot be part of our 2udicial notice. Otherwise, weimplicitly establish a religion or manifest a bias towards one in violation of the clearand absolute separation between church and state.

ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the upreme Court cannot ma5e any 2udicialdetermination to declare the Catholic Church6s position on contraceptives and se/.

Ee cannot ma5e any 2udicial determination to declare the Catholic Church6sposition on contraceptives and se/. !his is not the forum to do so and there is nopresent controversy no contraceptive and no individual that has come concretelya ected by the law. !his court must avoid entering into unnecessary entanglementswith religion. Ee are apt to do this when, without proof, we assume the beliefs ofone sect or group within a church as de8nitive of their religion. Ee must not assumeat the outset that there might be homogeneity of belief and practice; otherwise, wecontribute to the tate6s endorsement of various forms of fundamentalism.

ame; Aiew that the general rule encourages married persons to discuss and ma5ea con2ugal decision on the matter; !hey are caught in a problem when theydisagree. ection '($a&$'&$i& applies to a speci8c situation# when there is adisagreement between married persons regarding the performance of a 0legal and

medically-safe reproductive health procedure.? !he general rule encouragesmarried persons to discuss and ma5e a con2ugal decision on the matter. !hey arecaught in a problem when they disagree. !his agreement may fester and causeproblems within their family. !he disagreement will not be created by the : Law. 3twill e/ist factually regardless of the law. ection '($a&$'&$i& of the law becomesavailable to brea5 this deadloc5 and privilege the decision of the spouse undergoingthe procedure. !his is logical since the reproductive health procedures involve thebody, health and well being of the one undergoing the procedure. !he marriage may

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be a social contract but is certainly not a talisman that removes the possibility ofpower relationships. >arried persons, especially the woman1wife, can still su erinequality. >arried persons may still e/perience spousal abuse. enerally, it will bethe woman who will as5 to undergo reproductive health procedures. !heinterpretation of the ma2ority therefore a ects her control over her body. :ather

than enhance the <ones of autonomy of a person even in a married state, theinterpretation of the ma2ority creates the woman6s body as a <one of contestationthat gives the upper hand to the husband.

ame; Constitutional Law; =qual rotection of the Law; Aiew that the 0equalprotection? clause in this provision ensures that individuals, even those that enterinto a married state, do not coe/ist and su er under conditions of marital inequality.

!his due process clause implies and congeals a person6s right to life. !his includesthe individual6s right to e/istence as well as her or his right to a quality of life of heror his choosing. !he tate is not to sanction a program or an act that deprives theindividual of her or his control over her or his life and body. !he 0equal protection?clause in this provision ensures that individuals, even those that enter into a

married state, do not coe/ist and su er under conditions of marital inequality.ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the fundamental equality of women and men, the

promotion of an improved quality of life, and the full respect for human rights do note/ist when a spouse is guaranteed control the other spouse6s decisions respectingthe latter6s body. !he fundamental equality of women and men, the promotion ofan improved quality of life, and the full respect for human rights do not e/ist when aspouse is guaranteed control the other spouse6s decisions respecting the latter6sbody. !he autonomy and importance of family should not be privileged over theprivacy and autonomy of a person. >arriage is not bondage that subordinates thehumanity of each spouse. o person should be deemed to concede her or hisprivacy rights and autonomy upon getting married. 9y declaring ection '($a&$'&$i&as unconstitutional, the ma2ority interprets the privacy and autonomy of the familyas also providing insulation of patriarchal or se/ist practices from state scrutiny. !hisis not what the Constitution intends.

ame; arental Consent; Aiew that the wisdom of all the members of the ouse of:epresentatives, the enate, and the resident have determined that it would bebest to give the minor who is already a parent or has undergone a miscarriage allthe leeway to be able to secure all the reproductive health technologies to preventher di7culties from happening again. !hose of us who have not and can never gothrough the actual e/perience of miscarriage by a minor, those of us who cannoteven imagine the pain and stresses of teenage pregnancy, should not proceed to

ma5e blan5et rules on what minors could do in relation to their parents. one of uscan say that in all cases, all parents can be understanding and e/tend sympathy forthe minors that are legally under their care. one of us can say that there areinstances when parents would thin5 that the only way to prevent teenagepregnancy is a tongue lashing or corporeal punishment. Ee cannot understandreality only from the eyes of how we want it to be. Only when we are faced with anactual controversy and when we see the complications of a real situation will we beable to understand and shape a narrowly tailored e/ception to the current rule. 3n

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the meantime, the wisdom of all the members of the ouse of :epresentative, theenate, and the resident have determined that it would be best to give the minor

who is already a parent or has undergone a miscarriage all the leeway to be able tosecure all the reproductive health technologies to prevent her di7culties fromhappening again. Ee must stay our hand for now.

ame; "dministrative "gencies; Food and 4rug "dministration; Aiew that insistingthat we can impose, modify or alter rules of the Food and 4rug "dministration isusurpation of the e/ecutive power of control over administrative agencies. 3t is aviolation of the principle of separation of powers. !he Constitution vests thee/ecutive power upon the resident. e or she, and not the 2udiciary, e/ercises thepower of control over all e/ecutive departments, bureaus and o7ces, including theFood and 4rug "dministration. !he 2udiciary has no administrative power of controlor supervision over the Food and 4rug "dministration. 3nsisting that we can impose,modify or alter rules of the Food and 4rug "dministration is usurpation of thee/ecutive power of control over administrative agencies. 3t is a violation of theprinciple of separation of powers, which recogni<es that 0 eJach department of the

government has e/clusive cogni<ance of matters within its 2urisdiction, and issupreme within its own sphere.? !he system of chec5s and balances only allows usto declare, in the e/ercise of our 2udicial powers, the Food and 4rug "dministration6sacts as violative of the law or as committed with grave abuse of discretion. uchpower is further limited by the requirement of actual case or controversy.

ame; Aiew that the law impliedly accepts that the choice of intimate relationshipsis better left to the individual and the inBuences of their culture, their family, andtheir faiths. @nwanted pregnancies may result in clinical complications and deathsof women during childbirth, of the fetus while inside the womb and of infants soonafter they are born. @nwanted pregnancies may be the result of lac5 of 5nowledgeof the consequences of the se/ual act, or it could be due to the lac5 of informationand access to safe and e ective reproductive technologies. !he law impliedlyaccepts that the choice of intimate relationships is better left to the individual andthe inBuences of their culture, their family, and their faiths.

ame; Constitutional Law; =qual rotection of the Law; Aiew that the lawac5nowledges the di erential impact of lac5 of 5nowledge and access toreproductive health technologies between the rich and the poor. !he lawac5nowledges the di erential impact of lac5 of 5nowledge and access toreproductive health technologies between the rich and the poor. 3t, therefore,requires that proper information and access be made more available to those whoneed it. 3t mandates the government to intervene at least in order to provide the

right information and, when requested and without coercion, provide access.3mbong vs. Ochoa Gr., K'% C:" %)+$'H%)&J

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administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null andvoid and has no e ect. !he Constitution is the basic law to which all laws mustconform; no act shall be valid if it conBicts with the Constitution. 3n the discharge oftheir de8ned functions, the three departments of government have no choice but toyield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Ehatever limits it imposes

must be observed.ame; ame; 4e8nition of the limits on legislative power in the abstract. Congress6

inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are sub2ect to certain limitations."s early as %D'K, in overnment v. pringer, the Court has de8ned, in the abstract,the limits on legislative power in the following wise# omeone has said that thepowers of the legislative department of the overnment, li5e the boundaries of theocean, are unlimited. 3n constitutional governments, however, as well asgovernments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of thedepartments / / / are limited and con8ned within the four walls of the constitutionor the charter, and each department can only e/ercise such powers as arenecessarily implied from the given powers. !he Constitution is the shore of

legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash,but over which it cannot leap.

ame; ame; !he right of a citi<en in the democratic process of election should notbe defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise speci8ed inthe Constitution. 3n the same vein, the CO>=L=C cannot, in the guise of enforcingand administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement

ec. (+$g&, validly impose quali8cations on candidates for senator in addition towhat the Constitution prescribes. 3f Congress cannot require a candidate for senatorto meet such additional quali8cation, the CO>=L=C, to be sure, is also without suchpower. !he right of a citi<en in the democratic process of election should not bedefeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise speci8ed in theConstitution.

ame; ame; ec. (+$g& of :" D%+*, as sought to be implemented by the assailedCO>=L=C resolution, e ectively enlarges the quali8cation requirements enumeratedin the ec. (, "rt. A3 of the Constitution; Ehether or not the drug-free bar set upunder the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really ofno moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume o7cefor non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement ec. (+$g& of :" D%+*, assought to be implemented by the assailed CO>=L=C resolution, e ectively enlargesthe quali8cation requirements enumerated in the ec. (, "rt. A3 of the Constitution."s couched, said ec. (+$g& unmista5ably requires a candidate for senator to be

certi8ed illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of acerti8cate of candidacy for senator or, with li5e e ect, a condition sine qua non tobe voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. !he CO>=L=Cresolution completes the chain with the proviso that 0 nJo person elected to anypublic o7ce shall enter upon the duties of his o7ce until he has undergonemandatory drug test.? Aiewed, therefore, in its proper conte/t, ec. (+$g& of :"D%+* and the implementing CO>=L=C :esolution add another quali8cation layer towhat the %DIK Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the

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enate. Ehether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is tobe hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected wouldbe of little value if one cannot assume o7ce for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

ame; ame; Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of :" D%+*requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students areconstitutional. uided by Aernonia and 9oard of =ducation, the Court is of the viewand so holds that the provisions of :" D%+* requiring mandatory, random, andsuspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. 3ndeed, it is within theprerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. !o be sure,the right to enroll is not absolute; it is sub2ect to fair, reasonable, and equitablerequirements.

ame; ame; " random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools isnot only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of thestudent population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to bepromoted and protected. !he Court can ta5e 2udicial notice of the proliferation ofprohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people,particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims."ccordingly, and until a more e ective method is conceptuali<ed and put in motion,a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not onlyacceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the studentpopulation, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promotedand protected. !o borrow from Aernonia, 0 dJeterring drug use by our ation6sschoolchildren is as important as enhancing e7cient enforcement of the ation6slaws against the importation of drugs?; the necessity for the tate to act ismagni8ed by the fact that the e ects of a drug-infested school are visited not 2ustupon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. eedless to stress,the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that thetesting aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.

ame; ame; !he mandatory but random drug test prescribed by ec. (+ of :"D%+* for o7cers and employees of public and private o7ces is 2usti8able, albeit note/actly for the same reason. Gust as in the case of secondary and tertiary levelstudents, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by ec. (+ of :" D%+* foro7cers and employees of public and private o7ces is 2usti8able, albeit not e/actlyfor the same reason. !he Court notes in this regard that petitioner G , other thansaying that 0sub2ecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is

unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,? has failedto show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under ec.(+$c& and $d& of :" D%+* violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawfuland1or unconsented search under "rt. 333, ecs. % and ' of the Constitution.

etitioner Laserna6s lament is 2ust as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and doesnot merit serious consideration.

ame; ame; 3f :" D%+* passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees,the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional

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61. A2"Q -) *. C $ , 95 A$ $!# 9005C !" T+#2" IN THE MATTER OF THE 'ETITION FOR HABEASCOR'US OF CA'T. GARY ALEJANO, 'N MARINES , CA'T.NICANOR FAELDON, 'N MARINES , CA'T. GERARDOGAMBALA, 'A, LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, 'N, CA'T. MILOMAESTRECAM'O, 'A, LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, 'N,HOMOBONO ADA:A, -/ ROBERTO RAFAEL ROEL 'ULIDO,

"#+#+)-"%!, *!. GEN. 'EDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISOABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, -/ SEC. ROILO GOLE:,%"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! H " ! C)% $! '%" T%+ 2 D"# +-""! R" $ 2+A # N). 7438 R+ # #) C)$-!"2 '"- 2#+"! '$-+! "-#!

)%/! -/ ' % !"! H " ! C)% $!abeas Corpus; 3n a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual

before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition as therespondent must produce the person and e/plain the cause of his detention butsuch order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantivematters covered by the remedy. 3n a habeas corpus petition, the order to presentan individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition.

!he respondent must produce the person and e/plain the cause of his detention.owever, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on thesubstantive matters covered by the remedy. !hus, the Court6s order to the Court of"ppeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an a7rmation of the propriety of theremedy of habeas corpus. For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition forhabeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of theremedy. 3f a court 8nds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it shouldissue the writ and release the detainees. 3n the present case, after hearing the case,the Court of "ppeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. "fter activelyparticipating in the hearing before the Court of "ppeals, petitioners are estoppedfrom claiming that the appellate court had no 2urisdiction to inquire into the meritsof their petition.

ame; !he remedy of habeas corpus is not proper remedy to address the detainees6complaint against the regulations and conditions in the 3 "F 4etention Center thepurpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived ofhis liberty. !he Court of "ppeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpusis not the proper remedy to address the detainees6 complaint against theregulations and conditions in the 3 "F 4etention Center. !he remedy of habeascorpus has one ob2ective# to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. !he

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purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived ofhis liberty. 3f the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders therelease of the person. 3f, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeascorpus proceedings terminate. !he use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. 3t isnot a writ of error. either can it substitute for an appeal.

ame; Case law has e/panded the writ6s application to circumstances where there isdeprivation of a person6s constitutional rights. Case law has e/panded the writ6sapplication to circumstances where there is deprivation of a person6s constitutionalrights. !he writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of oneor more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, wherethe restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where adeprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. owever, a mereallegation of a violation of one6s constitutional right is not su7cient. !he courts wille/tend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present#$a& there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraintof a person; $b& the court had no 2urisdiction to impose the sentence; or $c& an

e/cessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the e/cess. Ehateversituation the petitioner invo5es, the threshold remains high. !he violation ofconstitutional right must be su7cient to void the entire proceedings.

ame; re-!rial 4etainees; :epublic "ct o. K)(I; re-trial detainees do not forfeittheir constitutional rights upon con8nement but the fact the detainees are con8nedma5es their rights more limited than those of the public; :" K)(I e/presslyrecogni<es the power of the detention o7cer to adopt and implement reasonablemeasures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. re-trialdetainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon con8nement. owever, thefact that the detainees are con8ned ma5es their rights more limited than those ofthe public. :" K)(I, which speci8es the rights of detainees and the duties ofdetention o7cers, e/pressly recogni<es the power of the detention o7cer to adoptand implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee andprevent his escape.

ame; ame; !he regulations must be reasonably connected to the government6sob2ective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee. !rue,

ection )$b& of :" K)(I ma5es it an o ense to prohibit a lawyer from visiting adetainee client 0at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night.? owever,the last paragraph of the same ection )$b& ma5es the e/press quali8cation that0notwithstanding? the provisions of ection )$b&, the detention o7cer has the powerto underta5e such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety

of the detainee and prevent his escape. !he last paragraph of ection )$b& of :"K)(I prescribes a clear standard. !he regulations governing a detainee6scon8nement must be 0reasonable measures / / / to secure his safety and preventhis escape.? !hus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to thegovernment6s ob2ective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of thedetainee. !he law grants the detention o7cer the authority to 0underta5e suchreasonable measures? or regulations.

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ame; ame; :ight to Counsel; Ehile the detainee6s lawyer may not visit thedetainees any time they want, the fact the detainees still have face-to-facemeetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is noimpairment of detainees6 right to counsel. 3n our 2urisdiction, the last paragraph of

ection )$b& of :" K)(I provides the standard to ma5e regulations in detention

centers allowable# 0such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure thedetainee6s safety and prevent his escape.? 3n the present case, the visiting hoursaccorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimatepurpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees. Ehilepetitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that thedetainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearlyshows that there is no impairment of detainees6 right to counsel. etitioners ascounsels could visit their clients between I#HH a.m. and *#HH p.m. with a lunchbrea5 at %'#HH p.m. !he visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hourswhen lawyers normally entertain clients in their law o7ces. Clearly, the visitinghours pass the standard of reasonableness. >oreover, in urgent cases, petitionerscould always see5 permission from the 3 "F o7cials to confer with their clientsbeyond the visiting hours. !he scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable accessto the detainees, giving petitioners su7cient time to confer with the detainees. !hedetainees6 right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. =ven in thehearings before the enate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were giventime to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit. !hus, atno point were the detainees denied their right to counsel.

ame; ame; enalties; !he fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrudesinto the detainees6 desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions topunishment. etitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees fromtheir visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to

unusual and e/cessive punishment. !his argument fails to impress us. 9ell v. Eol8shpointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an ad2udication ofguilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with adetainee6s desire to live comfortably. !he fact that the restrictions inherent indetention intrude into the detainees6 desire to live comfortably does not convertthose restrictions into punishment. 3t is when the restrictions are arbitrary andpurposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer intent topunish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternativepurpose if the restriction appears e/cessive in relation to that purpose. Gail o7cialsare thus not required to use the least restrictive security measure. !hey must onlyrefrain from implementing a restriction that appears e/cessive to the purpose it

serves.ame; ame; unishments; Eords and hrases; "n action constitutes a punishment

when $%& that action causes the inmate to su er harm or 0disability,? and $'& thepurpose of the action is to punish the inmate. "n action constitutes a punishmentwhen $%& that action causes the inmate to su er some harm or 0disability,? and $'&the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. unishment also requires that theharm or disability be signi8cantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherentdiscomforts of con8nement.

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ame; ame; ame; unishment cannot be inferred from the separation of thedetainees from their visitors by the iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contactvisits the iron bars prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees tohave visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. 3nthe present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees

from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. !heiron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contactbut still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physicalcontact with their visitors. !he arrangement is not unduly restrictive. 3n fact, it is noteven a strict non-contact visitation regulation li5e in 9loc5 v. :utherford. !helimitation on the detainees6 physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns. !he boarding of the iron grills is for thefurtherance of security within the 3 "F 4etention Center. !his measure intends tofortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contrabandand weapons from one cell to another. !he boarded grills ensure security andprevent disorder and crime within the facility. !he diminished illumination andventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do notconstitute punishments on the detainees.

ame; ame; rivacy of Communications and Correspondence; Ehile letterscontaining con8dential communication between detainees and their lawyers en2oy alimited protection in that prison o7cials can open and inspect the mail forcontraband but could not read the contents thereof without violating the inmates6right to correspondence, letters that are not of that nature could be read by prisono7cials. "merican cases recogni<e that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees6non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to 2ail security. ence, when a detaineeplaces his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee 5nowinglye/poses his letter to possible inspection by 2ail o7cials. " pre-trial detainee has no

reasonable e/pectation of privacy for his incoming mail. owever, incoming mailfrom lawyers of inmates en2oys limited protection such that prison o7cials can openand inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents withoutviolating the inmates6 right to correspond with his lawyer. !he inspection ofprivileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband. !hus,we do not agree with the Court of "ppeals that the opening and reading of thedetainees6 letters in the present case violated the detainees6 right to privacy ofcommunication. !he letters were not in a sealed envelope. !he inspection of thefolded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening ofsealed letters for the inspection of contraband. !he letters alleged to have beenread by the 3 "F authorities were not con8dential letters between the detainees

and their lawyers. !he petitioner who received the letters from detainees !rillanesand >aestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees6 personal courier and not astheir counsel when he received the letters for mailing. 3n the present case, since theletters were not con8dential communication between the detainees and theirlawyers, the o7cials of the 3 "F 4etention Center could read the letters. 3f theletters are mar5ed con8dential communication between the detainees and theirlawyers, the detention o7cials should not read the letters but only open theenvelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.

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ame; ame; ame; !hat a law is required before an e/ecutive o7cer could intrudeon a citi<en6s privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public atlarge but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned by the very fact of theirdetention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminishede/pectation of privacy of rights. !hat a law is required before an e/ecutive o7cer

could intrude on a citi<en6s privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to thepublic at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. !he right toprivacy of those detained is sub2ect to ection ) of :" K)(I, as well as to thelimitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. 9y the very fact of theirdetention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminishede/pectation of privacy rights.

ame; ame; ame; 3n assessing alleged infringements on constitutional rights ofthe detainees and convicted prisoners, @. . courts balance the guarantees of theConstitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators. 3n assessing theregulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe onthe constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, @. . courts

0balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prisonadministrators.? !he deferential review of such regulations stems from the principlethat# sJub2ecting the day-to-day 2udgments of prison o7cials to an inBe/ible strictscrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate securityproblems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prisonadministration.

ame; ame; ame; ince appropriate regulations depend largely on security ris5sinvolved, deferment in the present case to regulations adopted by militarycustodian in absence of patent arbitrariness should be made. !he detainees in thepresent case are 2unior o7cers accused of leading (HH soldiers in committing coupd6etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. !he 2unior o7cers are notordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oa5wood incident involving an armedta5eover of a civilian building in the heart of the 8nancial district of the country. "smembers of the military armed forces, the detainees are sub2ect to the "rticles ofEar. >oreover, the 2unior o7cers are detained with other high-ris5 persons from the"bu ayyaf and the ". !hus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the 3 "F 4etention Center. !hemilitary custodian is in a better position to 5now the security ris5s involved indetaining the 2unior o7cers, together with the suspected "bu ayyaf and "members. ince the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security ris5sinvolved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian inthe absence of patent arbitrariness.

ame; ame; ame; abeas Corpus; !he ruling in this case does not foreclose theright of the detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts forredress of grievances; abeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditionsof con8nement the writ of habeas corpus will not lie if what is challenged is thefact or duration of con8nement. !he ruling in this case, however, does notforeclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courtsfor the redress of grievances. :egulations and conditions in detention and prison

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facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will bereviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. !he courts could a ord in2unctiverelief or damages to the detainees and prisoners sub2ected to arbitrary andinhumane conditions. owever, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to questionconditions of con8nement. !he writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is

challenged is the fact or duration of con8nement. "le2ano vs. Cabuay, )+I C:"%II$'HH*&J

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69. L$ -) *. '") 2", G.R. N). 189555 S" #" "% 7,9010C !" T+#2" LENIDO LUMANOG -/ AUGUSTO SANTOS,

"#+#+)-"%!, *!. 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#.C !" N #$%" 'ETITIONS ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L R" "/+ 2 L H)#'$%!$+# %% -#2"!! A%%"!#Constitutional Law; :emedial Law; Gudgments; Gudges are e/pected to ma5ecomplete 8ndings of fact in their decisions and scrutini<e closely the legal aspectsof the case in the light of the evidence presented. !he Constitution commands that0 nJo decision shall be rendered by any court without e/pressing therein clearly and

distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.? Gudges are e/pected to ma5ecomplete 8ndings of fact in their decisions and scrutini<e closely the legal aspectsof the case in the light of the evidence presented. !hey should avoid the tendencyto generali<e and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which suchconclusions are deduced.

ame; ame; ame; >emorandum 4ecisions; !hough it is not a good practice, Courtsees nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely copying thememorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearly and distinctlystates su7cient 8ndings of fact and the law on which they are based. 3n 9an5 ofthe hilippine 3slands v. Leobrera, (K* C:" I% $'HH'&, we held that though it is nota good practice, we see nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completelycopying the memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearlyand distinctly states su7cient 8ndings of fact and the law on which they are based.3n another case where we upheld the validity of memorandum decisions, wenevertheless too5 occasion to remind 2udges that it is still desirable for an appellate 2udge to endeavor to ma5e the issues clearer and use his own perceptiveness inunraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law. o lessimportantly, he must use his own language in laying down his 2udgment.

ame; :ight to Counsel; Custodial 3nvestigations; Custodial investigation refers tothe critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry intoan unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation isno longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on aparticular person as a suspect. olice o7cers claimed that appellants wereapprehended as a result of 0hot pursuit? activities on the days following theambush-slay of "badilla. !here is no question, however, that when appellants werearrested they were already considered suspects# Goel was pinpointed by securityguard "le2o who went along with the ":"C squad to Fairview on Gune %D, %DD+,while the rest of appellants were ta5en by the same operatives in follow-up

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operations after Goel provided them with the identities of his conspirators and wherethey could be found.

ame; ame; ame; =/tra2udicial Confession; ettled is the rule that the moment apolice o7cer tries to elicit admissions, or confessions or even plain information froma suspect, the latter should, at that 2uncture, be assisted by counsel, unless hewaives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. 13nsp. Castillo admittedthat the initial questioning of Goel began in the morning of Gune 'H, %DD+, the 8rsttime said suspect was presented to him at the C 4C station, even before he wasbrought to the 39 O7ce for the ta5ing of his formal statement. !hus, the possibilityof appellant Goel having been sub2ected to intimidation or violence in the hands ofpolice investigators as he claims, cannot be discounted. !he constitutionalrequirement obviously had not been observed. ettled is the rule that the moment apolice o7cer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information froma suspect, the latter should, at that 2uncture, be assisted by counsel, unless hewaives this right in writing and in the presence of counsel. !he purpose of providingcounsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice

of e/tracting a confession that leads appellant to ma5e self-incriminatingstatements.

ame; ame; ame; ame; " confession is not valid and not admissible in evidencewhen it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons under custodialinvestigation. =ven assuming that custodial investigation started only during Goel6se/ecution of his statement before "tty. ansano on Gune 'H, %DD+, still the saidconfession must be invalidated. !o be acceptable, e/tra2udicial confessions mustconform to constitutional requirements. " confession is not valid and not admissiblein evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of persons undercustodial investigation.

ame; ame; ame; ame; !he phrase 0preferably of his own choice? does notconvey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation ise/clusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys fromhandling the defense; " lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged bythe accused when he does not raise any ob2ection against the counsel6sappointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereaftersubscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing o7cer. !he phrase0preferably of his own choice? does not convey the message that the choice of alawyer by a person under investigation is e/clusive as to preclude other equallycompetent and independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise thetempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the hands of the accused who

can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting alawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. !hus,while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogationcannot a ord the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available

is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the 8nal choice, ashe may re2ect the counsel chosen for him and as5 for another one. " lawyerprovided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does notraise any ob2ection against the counsel6s appointment during the course of the

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investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of thestatement before the swearing o7cer.

ame; ame; ame; ame; "n e ective and vigilant counsel necessarily andlogically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his clientfrom the time the confessant answers the 8rst question as5ed by the investigatingo7cer until the signing of the e/tra2udicial confession. Ee held that the modi8ercompetent and independent in the %DIK Constitution is not an empty rhetoric. 3tstresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions ofa custodial investigation, an informed 2udgment on the choices e/plained to him bya diligent and capable lawyer. "n e ective and vigilant counsel necessarily andlogically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his clientfrom the time the confessant answers the 8rst question as5ed by the investigatingo7cer until the signing of the e/tra2udicial confession. >oreover, the lawyer shouldascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person underinvestigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his e/tra2udicialconfession in relation to his constitutional rights. " contrary rule would undoubtedly

be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to bepresumed innocent.

:emedial Law; =vidence; Eitnesses; Credibility of Eitnesses; Ehen it comes tocredibility of witnesses, the court accords the highest respect, even 8nality, to theevaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presentedbefore it; !he fact alone that the 2udge who heard the evidence was not the onewho rendered the 2udgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does notrender his 2udgment erroneous or irregular. !ime and again, we have held that thetestimony of a sole eyewitness is su7cient to support a conviction so long as it isclear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. 3ndeed, when itcomes to credibility of witnesses, this Court accords the highest respect, even8nality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of thewitnesses presented before it. !his holds true notwithstanding that it was another 2udge who presided at the trial and Gudge Gaime . ala<ar, Gr. who penned thedecision in this case heard only some witnesses for the defense. 3t is a/iomatic thatthe fact alone that the 2udge who heard the evidence was not the one who renderedthe 2udgment, but merely relied on the record of the case, does not render his 2udgment erroneous or irregular. !his is so even if the 2udge did not have the fullestopportunity to weigh the testimonies, not having heard all the witnesses spea5 orobserved their deportment and manner of testifying.

ame; ame; "7davits; !he discrepancies between a sworn statement and

testimony in court do not outrightly 2ustify the acquittal of an accused, astestimonial evidence carries more weight than an a7davit. "ppellants ma5e muchof a few inconsistencies in his statement and testimony, with respect to the numberof assailants and his reaction when he was ordered to get down in his guard post.9ut such inconsistencies have already been e/plained by "le2o during cross-e/amination by correcting his earlier statement in using number four $)& to refer tothose persons actually standing around the car and two $'& more persons asloo5outs, and that he got nervous only when the second loo5out shouted at him to

(*)



get down, because the latter actually po5ed a gun at him. 3t is settled thata7davits, being e/-parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, butdo not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. !he discrepancies between asworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly 2ustify the acquittal of anaccused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than an a7davit.

ame; ame; Out-of-court 3denti8cation; rocedure for out-of-court identi8cationand the test to determine the admissibility of such identi8cation e/plained in eoplev. !eehan5ee, Gr., ')D C:" *) $%DD*&. 3n eople v. !eehan5ee, Gr., ')D C:" *)$%DD*&, we e/plained the procedure for out-of-court identi8cation and the test todetermine the admissibility of such identi8cation, thus# Out-of-court identi8cation isconducted by the police in various ways. 3t is done thru show-ups where the suspectalone is brought face to face with the witness for identi8cation. 3t is done thru mugshots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. 3t is alsodone thru line-ups where a witness identi8es the suspect from a group of personslined up for the purpose. . . 3n resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identi8cation of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances

test where they consider the following factors, vi<.# $%& the witness6 opportunity toview the criminal at the time of the crime; $'& the witness6 degree of attention atthat time; $(& the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; $)& thelevel of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identi8cation; $*& the length of time between the crime and the identi8cation; and, $+& the suggestiveness of theidenti8cation procedure.

Criminal Law; =vidence; Out-of-Court 3denti8cation; !he inadmissibility of a policeline-up identi8cation should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of anindependent in-court identi8cation. 3n any case, the trial court did not rely solelyon said out-of-court identi8cation considering that "le2o also positively identi8edappellants during the trial. !hus, even assuming arguendo that "le2o6s out-of-courtidenti8cation was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent identi8cation in courtcured any Baw that may have attended it. Ee have held that the inadmissibility of apolice line-up identi8cation should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of anindependent in-court identi8cation.

ame; ame; ame; !he presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used andballistic e/amination are not prerequisites for conviction. "s this Court held inAelasco v. eople, )I( C:" +)D $'HH+& "s regards the failure of the police topresent a ballistic report on the seven spent shells recovered from the crime scene,the same does not constitute suppression of evidence. " ballistic report serves onlyas a guide for the courts in considering the ultimate facts of the case. 3t would be

indispensable if there are no credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it iscorroborative in nature. !he presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets usedand ballistic e/amination are not prerequisites for conviction. !he corpus delicti andthe positive identi8cation of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime aremore than enough to sustain his conviction. =ven without a ballistic report, thepositive identi8cation by prosecution witnesses is more than su7cient to proveaccused6s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 3n the instant case, since the identity of

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the assailant has been su7ciently established, a ballistic report on the slugs can bedispensed with in proving petitioner6s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

"libi; !o be valid for purposes of e/oneration from a criminal charge, the defense ofalibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the personcharged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, thereason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. "libi is thewea5est of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and di7cult to disprove, and it isfor this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identi8cation of the accusedby the witnesses. !o be valid for purposes of e/oneration from a criminal charge, thedefense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for theperson charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of itscommission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time. !he e/cuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no e/ception. Ehere there isthe least possibility of accused6s presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not holdwater.

Criminal Law; >urder; !reachery; !he essence of treachery is the sudden andune/pected attac5 on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime,depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or to repel the aggression,thus insuring its commission without ris5 to the aggressor and without anyprovocation on the part of the victim. "s regards the presence of treachery as aqualifying circumstance, the evidence clearly showed that the attac5 on theunsuspecting victim who was inside his car on a stop position in the middle ofearly morning tra7c when he was suddenly 8red upon by the appellants wasdeliberate, sudden and une/pected. !here was simply no chance for "badilla tosurvive the ambush-slay, with successive shots quic5ly 8red at close range by two$'& armed men on both sides of his car; and much less to retaliate by using his owngun, as no less than '( gunshot wounds on his head and chest caused hisinstantaneous death. "s we have consistently ruled, the essence of treachery is thesudden and une/pected attac5 on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of thecrime, depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or to repel theaggression, thus insuring its commission without ris5 to the aggressor and withoutany provocation on the part of the victim.

ame; ame; =vident remeditation; !he essence of evident premeditation is thatthe e/ecution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reBection uponthe resolution to carry out criminal intent within a span of time su7cient to arrive ata calm 2udgment. =vident premeditation was li5ewise properly appreciated by thetrial court, notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Goel de Gesus6s e/tra2udicial

confession disclosing in detail the pre-planned ambush of "badilla, apparently acontract 5illing in which the perpetrators were paid or e/pected to receive paymentfor the 2ob. "s correctly pointed out by the C", "le2o had stressed that as early asK#(H in the morning of Gune %(, %DD+, he already noticed something unusual goingon upon seeing the two $'& loo5outs $appellants Goel de Gesus and Loren<o delos

antos& wal5ing to and fro along atipunan "venue infront of the building he wasguarding. !rue enough, they were e/pecting somebody to pass that way, who wasno other than "badilla driving his onda "ccord. "fter the lapse of more or less one

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$%& hour, he already heard successive gunshots, while in his guard post, from thedirection of the middle lane where "badilla6s car was surrounded by four $)& mencarrying short 8rearms. "ll the foregoing disclosed the e/ecution of a pre-conceivedplan to 5ill "badilla. !he essence of evident premeditation is that the e/ecution ofthe criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reBection upon the resolution to

carry out criminal intent within a span of time su7cient to arrive at a calm 2udgment.

ame; ame; 4eath of a arty; 4amages; 4amages that may be awarded whendeath occurs due to a crime. Ehen death occurs due to a crime, the followingdamages may be awarded# $%& civil indemnity e/ delicto for the death of the victim;$'& actual or compensatory damages; $(& moral damages; $)& e/emplary damages;and $*& temperate damages.

9=: ">3 , G., Concurring Opinion#

Constitutional Law; :emedial Law; !he records of the present case show thatimpermissible suggestion did not precede "lego6s out-of-court identi8cation of 4e Gesus as one of the perpetrators of the crime; !he procedure outlined in eople v.

ineda, )'D C:" )KI $'HH)& and eople v. !eehan5ee, ')D C:" *) $%DD*&, for aproper out-of-court identi8cation was neither disregarded nor violated. 3n contrast,the records of the present case show that impermissible suggestion did not precede"le2o6s out-of-court positive identi8cation of 4e Gesus as one of the perpetrators ofthe crime. "le2o6s testimony on eptember (, %DD+ reveals, on the contrary, that"le2o even categorically declined to identify any suspect by mere loo5ing at aphotograph. Aerily, the procedure outlined in eople v. ineda, )'D C:" )KI $'HH)&and eople v. !eehan5ee, ')D C:" *) $%DD*&, for a proper out-of-courtidenti8cation was neither disregarded nor violated.

ame; ame; 3n any criminal prosecution there are more and better circumstancesto consider other than the initial s5etch of a police artist for determining thereliability of an identi8cation. "t any rate, a discrepancy between a police artist6ss5etch of a perpetrator of a crime based on descriptions of witnesses at the scene of the crime, on one hand, and an actual identi8cation of the perpetrator by aneyewitness given in court, on the other hand, is a very minimal factor of doubt onthe reliability of the identi8cation. 3n any criminal prosecution there are more andbetter circumstances to consider other than the initial s5etch of a police artist fordetermining the reliability of an identi8cation. Ee have to remember that a policeartist6s s5etch of a perpetrator of a crime is initially for purposes of pursuing aninvestigation, and has seldom any impact on the case after that.

ame; ame; !he validity of a decision is not impaired when its writer only too5over from another 2udge who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clearshowing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts. !he validityof a decision is not impaired when its writer only too5 over from another 2udge whohad earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse ofdiscretion in the appreciation of the facts. o such grave abuse of discretion wasshown herein. !he trial records demonstrate, on the contrary, that the factual8ndings of the trial court and the assessment of the credibility of "le2o as an

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eyewitness rested on a most careful and thorough study of the evidence adducedby both parties. 3ndeed, although he did not observe the demeanor of "le2o as awitness, the writing 2udge $Gudge Gaime . ala<ar& was not entirely deprived of aproper sense of "le2o6s demeanor considering that the ! s were replete with thedetailed manifestations on "le2o6s appearance, behavior, deportment, disposition,

and mien during the many days of his testimony that the various counsel of bothparties <ealously put on record for memoriali<ation.

ame; ame; !he mere imputation of ill-motive without proof was speculative atbest. !he mere imputation of ill-motive without proof was speculative at best. !ostart with, that the family of the victim might have e/tended economic or 8nancialsupport to "le2o did not necessarily warrant the presumption of bias on the part of"le2o as a witness. !here was no evidence showing that any such support was forthe purpose of unduly inBuencing his testimony. Li5elier than not, the support wasonly an e/pression of the family6s appreciation for his cooperation in the publicprosecution of the culprits, or for his resolve to ensure the successful prosecution ofthe perpetrators.

C": 3O,_G., 4issenting Opinion#

Constitutional Law; :emedial Law; resumption of 3nnocence; !he 0presumption ofinnocence? serves to emphasi<e that the prosecution has the obligation to provenot only each element of the o ense beyond reasonable doubt but also the identityof the accused as the perpetrator. !he 0presumption of innocence? serves toemphasi<e that the prosecution has the obligation to prove not only each elementof the o ense beyond reasonable doubt but also the identity of the accused as theperpetrator. !he accused, on the other hand, bears no burden of proof. !heprosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strengthfrom the wea5ness of the defense.

ame; ame; Out-of-Court 3denti8cation; uidelines to determine the admissibilityand reliability of an out-of-court identi8cation laid down in eople v. !eehan5ee, ')D

C:" *) $%DD*&. 3n eople v. !eehan5ee, ')D C:" *) $%DD*&, the Court laid downthe guidelines to determine the admissibility and reliability of an out-of-courtidenti8cation, thus# 03n resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-courtidenti8cation of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances testwhere they consider the following factors, vi<.# $%& the witness6 opportunity to viewthe criminal at the time of the crime; $'& the witness6 degree of attention at thetime; $(& the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; $)& the level ofcertainty demonstrated by the witness at the identi8cation; $*& the length of timebetween the crime and the identi8cation; and $+& the suggestiveness of theidenti8cation procedure.?

ame; ame; ame; :ules in proper photographic identi8cation procedure e/plainedin eople v. ineda, )'D C:" )KI $'HH)&. 3n eople v. ineda, )'D C:" )KI$'HH)&, the Court e/plained the rules in proper photographic identi8cationprocedure, to wit# "lthough showing mug shots of suspects is one of the establishedmethods of identifying criminals, the procedure used in this case is unacceptable. !he 8rst rule in proper photographic identi8cation procedure is that a series of

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photographs must be shown, and not merely that of the suspect. !he second ruledirects that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement anddisplay should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.

ame; ame; ame; !he clear import of :odrigo is that an out-of-courtidenti8cation, made by lone witness, who was sub2ected to impermissiblephotographic suggestion, fatally tainted the subsequent in-court identi8cation madeby the same witness. !he clear import of :odrigo is that an out-of-courtidenti8cation, made by the lone witness, who was sub2ected to impermissiblephotographic suggestion, fatally tainted the subsequent in-court identi8cation madeby the same witness. "ccordingly, the testimony of such witness on theidenti8cation of the accused, by itself, cannot be considered as proof beyondreasonable doubt of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Eithout proofbeyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the perpetrator, the accused deservesan acquittal.

ame; ame; ame; 4ue process dictates that the photographic identi8cation mustbe devoid of any impermissible suggestions in order to prevent a miscarriage of 2ustice. 4ue process dictates that the photographic identi8cation must be devoidof any impermissible suggestions in order to prevent a miscarriage of 2ustice. 3n

eople v. "lcantara, ')H C:" %'' $%DD*&, the Court declared# 4ue processdemands that identi8cation procedure of criminal suspects must be free fromimpermissible suggestions. "s appropriately held in @ vs. Eade, 0the inBuence ofimproper suggestion upon identifying witness probably accounts for moremiscarriages of 2ustice than any other single factor.?

ame; ame; :ight to Counsel; enerally, an accused is not entitled to theassistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a partof custodial investigation; "n e/ception to this rule is when the accused had been

the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation. "s stated in =scordial,generally, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-upconsidering that such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. "n e/ception tothis rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the start ofthe investigation. !he line-up in this case squarely falls under this e/ception. 3t wasestablished that Goel was already a suspect prior to the police line-up. 3n fact, evenbefore Goel6s apprehension, the police had already <eroed in on Goel as one of"badilla6s 5illers. "s such, Goel was entitled to counsel during the police line-up.

ame; ame; ot ursuit; Earrantless "rrest; !he warrantless arrest of Goel, madesi/ days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of 0hot pursuit?; 3n lawenforcement, 0hot pursuit? can refer to an immediate pursuit by the police. !hepolice arrested Goel, without any warrant, on %D Gune %DD+ or si/ days after the5illing. i/ days is de8nitely more than enough to secure an arrest warrant, and yetthe police opted to arrest Goel and the other accused, without any warrant, claimingthat it was conducted in 0hot pursuit.? 3n law enforcement, 0hot pursuit? can refer toan immediate pursuit by the police such as a car chase. Certainly, the warrantlessarrest of Goel, made si/ days after the murder, does not fall within the ambit of 0hotpursuit.?

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ame; ame; ame; ame; !orturing the accused to e/tract incriminatingconfessions is repugnant to the Constitution. !orturing the accused to e/tractincriminating confessions is repugnant to the Constitution. ection %'$'&, "rticle 333of the Constitution e/pressly provides 0 nJo torture, force, violence, threat,intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against an

accusedJ.? !he blatant and unacceptable transgression of the accused6sconstitutional rights, for the sa5e of delivering speedy, but false, 2ustice to theaggrieved, can never be countenanced. !his Court can never tolerate o7cial abusesand perpetuate the gross violation of these rights. !he presumption that a publico7cer had regularly performed his o7cial duty can at no instance prevail over thepresumption of innocence. Lumanog vs. eople, +(H C:" )' $'H%H&J

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63. C % )--"2 *. C+*+2 S"%*+ " C) +!!+)-, G.R. N).18768;, 07 S" #" "% 9010C !" T+#2" CLARITA J. CARBONEL, "#+#+)-"%, *!. CIVILSERVICE COMMISSION, %"! )-/"-#.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L R+ # #) C)$-!"2C$!#)/+ 2 I-*"!#+ #+)-!:emedial Law; "ppeals; !he perfection of an appeal in the manner and within theperiod prescribed by law is mandatory. 3t is undisputed that petitioner appealedthe C C:O 3A6s decision almost three years from receipt thereof. @ndoubtedly, theappeal was 8led way beyond the reglementary period when the decision had long

become 8nal and e/ecutory. "s held in 9acsasar v. Civil ervice Commission $*K+C:" KIK 'HHDJ&, citing !alento v. =scalada, Gr. $**+ C:" )D% 'HHIJ& !heperfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law ismandatory. Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the 2udgment 8nal and e/ecutory and beyond the power of the Court6s review. Gurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes 8nal and e/ecutory, itbecomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest. uchdecision or order can no loner be disturbed or re-opened no matter how erroneous itmay have been.

Constitutional Law; :ight to Counsel; Custodial 3nvestigations; !he e/clusionary ruleunder paragraph $'&, ection %' of the 9ill of :ights applies only to admissionsmade in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrativeinvestigation. 3t must be remembered that the right to counsel under ection %' of the 9ill of :ights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. !hus,the e/clusionary rule under paragraph $'&, ection %' of the 9ill of :ights appliesonly to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in anadministrative investigation.

ame; ame; ame; " party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assistedby counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner6s capacity torepresent herself and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person beinginvestigated with counsel. Ehile investigations conducted by an administrative

body may at times be a5in to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, undere/isting laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted bycounsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner6s capacity torepresent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person beinginvestigated with counsel. !he right to counsel is not always imperative inadministrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely todetermine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinarymeasures against erring public o7cers and employees, with the purpose of

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maintaining the dignity of government service. Carbonel vs. Civil erviceCommission, +(H C:" 'H'$'H%H&J

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64. G)*<# )( H)- @)- *. O2 2+ , 1; A %+2 9007C !" T+#2" GOVERNMENT OF HONG @ONG S'ECIALADMINISTRATIVE REGION, %" %"!"-#"/ # " ' +2+ +-"D" %# "-# )( J$!#+ ", "#+#+)-"%, *!. HON. FELI BERTO T.OLALIA, JR. -/ JUAN ANTONIO MU O:, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" S'ECIAL CIVIL ACTION +- # " S$ %" " C)$%#.C"%#+)% %+.S 22 + C2 !! I-#"%- #+)- 2 L EK#% /+#+)- B +2 H$ -R+ #! D$" '%) "!! U-+*"%! 2 D" 2 % #+)- )( H$ -R+ #! I-#"%- #+)- 2 C)*"- -# )- C+*+2 -/ ')2+#+ 2 R+ #!' # S$-# S"%* -/ S# -/ %/ )( '%))(

3nternational Law; =/tradition; Gurisprudence on e/tradition is but in its infancy inthis 2urisdiction. Gurisprudence on e/tradition is but in its infancy in this 2urisdiction.onetheless, this is not the 8rst time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the

question of whether a prospective e/traditee may be granted bail.

ame; ame; 9ail; uman :ights; !he modern trend in public international law isthe primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of humanrights. "t 8rst glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent6scase. owever, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law# $%&the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, inthe 'Hth century, has gradually attained global recognition; $'& the higher valuenow being given to human rights in the international sphere; $(& the correspondingduty of countries to observe these universal human rights in ful8lling their treatyobligations; and $)& the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individualunder our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on e/tradition, on the other. !he modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth ofthe individual person and the sanctity of human rights. lowly, the recognition thatthe individual person may properly be a sub2ect of international law is now ta5ingroot. !he vulnerable doctrine that the sub2ects of international law are limited onlyto states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. Forone, the uremberg and !o5yo trials after Eorld Ear 33 resulted in theunprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characteri<ed asviolations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity.

:ecently, under the uremberg principle, erbian leaders have been persecuted forwar crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Pugoslavia. !hesesigni8cant events show that the individual person is now a valid sub2ect ofinternational law.

ame; ame; ame; ame; 4ue rocess; @niversal 4eclaration of uman :ights;3nternational Covenant on Civil and olitical :ights; Ehile on a treaty, the principlescontained in the said @niversal 4eclaration of uman :ights are now recogni<ed as

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customarily binding upon the members of the international community;Fundamental among the rights enshrined in the 3nternational Covenant on Civil and

olitical :ights are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process. On amore positive note, also after Eorld Ear 33, both international organi<ations andstates gave recognition and importance to human rights. !hus, on 4ecember %H,

%D)I, the @nited ations eneral "ssembly adopted the @niversal 4eclaration ofuman :ights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rightsof every person were proclaimed. Ehile not a treaty, the principles contained in thesaid 4eclaration are now recogni<ed as customarily binding upon the members ofthe international community. !hus, in >e2o v. 4irector of risons, DH hil. KH$%D*%&, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under theConstitution, the principles set forth in that 4eclaration are part of the law of theland. 3n %D++, the @ eneral "ssembly also adopted the 3nternational Covenant onCivil and olitical :ights which the hilippines signed and rati8ed. Fundamentalamong the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty,and due process.

ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; Ehile this Court in overnment of the @nitedtates of "merica v. urganan, (ID C:" +'( $'HH'&, limited the e/ercise of the

right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various internationaltreaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right tolife and liberty, a ree/amination of this Court6s ruling in urganan is in order. !he

hilippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed touphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity ofevery person. !his commitment is enshrined in ection 33, "rticle 33 of ourConstitution which provides# 0!he tate values the dignity of every human personand guarantees full respect for human rights.? !he hilippines, therefore, has theresponsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and

due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in theproceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality ofthe detention and order their release if 2usti8ed. 3n other words, the hilippineauthorities are under obligation to ma5e available to every person under detentionsuch remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. !hese remediesinclude the right to be admitted to bail. Ehile this Court in urganan limited thee/ercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the variousinternational treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularlythe right to life and liberty, a ree/amination of this Court6s ruling in urganan is inorder.

ame; ame; ame; ame; ame; 3f bail can be granted in deportation cases, theCourt sees no 2usti8cation why it should not also be allowed in e/tradition casesclearly, the right of a prospective e/traditee to apply for bail must be viewed in thelight of the various treaty obligations of the hilippines concerning respect for thepromotion and protection of human rights. 3n >e2o v. 4irector of risons, DH hil.KH $%D*%& and Chirs5o v. Commission of 3mmigration, DH hil. '*+ "$%D*%&, thisCourt ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges havebeen 8led may be released on bail pending the 8nality of an order of deportation. "spreviously stated, the Court in >e2o relied upon the @niversal declaration of

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uman :ights in sustaining the detainee6s right to bail. 3f bail can be granted indeportation cases, we see no 2usti8cation why it should not also be allowed ine/tradition cases. Li5ewise, considering that the @niversal 4eclaration of uman:ights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invo5ed ine/tradition cases. "fter all, both are administrative proceedings where the

innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of aprospective e/traditee to apply for bail in this 2urisdiction must be viewed in thelight of the various treaty obligations of the hilippines concerning respect for thepromotion and protection of human rights. @nder these treaties, the presumptionlies in favor of human liberty. !hus, the hilippines should see to it that the right toliberty of every individual is not impaired.

ame; ame; ame; ame; =/tradition has thus been characteri<ed as the right of aforeign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused orconvicted of a crime within its territorial 2urisdiction, and the correlative duty of theother state to surrender him to the demanding state. ection '$a& of residential4ecree $ .4.& o. %H+D $!he hilippine =/tradition Law& de8nes 0e/tradition? as 0the

removal of an accused from the hilippines with the ob2ect of placing him at thedisposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to holdhim in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or thee/ecution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of therequesting state or government.? =/tradition has thus been characteri<ed as theright of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accusedor convicted of a crime within its territorial 2urisdiction, and the correlative duty ofthe other state to surrender him to the demanding state. 3t is not a criminalproceeding. =ven if the potential e/traditee is a criminal, an e/tradition proceedingis not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though suchpunishment may follow e/tradition. 3t is sui generis, tracing its e/istence wholly to

treaty obligations between di erent nations. 3t is not a trial to determine the guilt orinnocence of the potential e/traditee. or is it a full-blown civil action, but one thatis merely administrative in character. 3ts ob2ect is to prevent the escape of a personaccused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which heBed, for the purpose of trial or punishment.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Ehile e/tradition is not a criminal proceeding, it ischaracteri<ed by the following# $a& it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part ofthe potential e/traditee and $b& the means employed to attain the purpose ofe/tradition is also 0the machinery of criminal law? obviously, an e/traditionproceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmar5s of a criminalprocess. 9ut while e/tradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characteri<ed bythe following# $a& it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potentiale/traditee and $b& the means employed to attain the purpose of e/tradition is also0the machinery of criminal law.? !his is shown by ection + of .4. o. %H+D $!he

hilippine =/tradition Law& which mandates the 0immediate arrest and temporarydetention of the accused? if such 0will best serve the interest of 2ustice.? Ee furthernote that ection 'H allows the requesting state 0in case of urgency? to as5 for the0provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for e/tradition?;and that release from provisional arrest 0shall not pre2udice re-arrest and e/tradition

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of the accused if a request for e/tradition is received subsequently.? Obviously, ane/tradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmar5s of acriminal process. " potential e/traditee may be sub2ected to arrest, to a prolongedrestraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following theproceedings. 0!emporary detention? may be a necessary step in the process of

e/tradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.ame; ame; ame; ame; 9y any standard, detention for an e/tended period of

more than two $'& years is a serious deprivation of a potential e/traditee6sfundamental right to liberty; Ehile our e/tradition law does not provide for the grantof bail to an e/traditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from8ling a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. :ecords showthat private respondent was arrested on eptember '(, %DDD, and remainedincarcerated until 4ecember 'H, 'HH%, when the trial court ordered his admission tobail. 3n other words, he had been detained for over two $'& years without havingbeen convicted of any crime. 9y any standard, such an e/tended period ofdetention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. 3n fact, it was

this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the e/tradition court to granthim bail. Ehile our e/tradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to ane/traditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from 8ling a motionfor bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

ame; ame; ame; ame; 9urden of roof; !he applicable standard of due process,however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings in the latter, thestandard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of theaccused, in the former, the assumption is that such e/traditee is a fugitive from 2ustice; !he prospective e/traditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that heor she is not a Bight ris5 and should be granted bail. !he applicable standard ofdue process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. 3nthe latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocenceof the accused. "s urganan correctly points out, it is from this ma2or premise thatthe ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. 9earing in mind thepurpose of e/tradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrestwarrant and the 0temporary detention? is the possibility of Bight of the potentiale/traditee. !his is based on the assumption that such e/traditee is a fugitive from 2ustice. iven the foregoing, the prospective e/traditee thus bears the onusprobandi of showing that he or she is not a Bight ris5 and should be granted bail.

ame; ame; ame; ame; acta unt ervanda; Ehile the time-honored principleof pacta sunt servanda demands that the hilippines honor its obligations under the

=/tradition !reaty, it does not necessarily mean that in 5eeping with its treatyobligations, the hilippines should diminish a potential e/traditee6s rights to life,liberty, and due process; "n e/traditee should not be deprived of his right to applyfor bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. !hetime-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the hilippines honorits obligations under the =/tradition !reaty it entered into with the ong ong

pecial "dministrative :egion. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setbac5in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of e/tradition. owever, it does not

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necessarily mean that in 5eeping with its treaty obligations, the hilippines shoulddiminish a potential e/traditee6s rights to life, liberty, and due process. >ore so,where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also byinternational conventions, to which the hilippines is a party. Ee should not,therefore, deprive an e/traditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain

standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.ame; ame; ame; ame; tandard of roof; "n e/tradition proceeding being sui

generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither bethe proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof ofpreponderance of evidence in civil cases the potential e/traditee must prove by0clear and convincing proof? that he is not a Bight ris5 and will abide with all theorders and processes of the e/tradition court. "n e/tradition proceeding being suigeneris, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither bethe proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof ofpreponderance of evidence in civil cases. Ehile administrative in character, thestandard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot li5ewise apply

given the ob2ect of e/tradition law which is to prevent the prospective e/traditeefrom Beeing our 2urisdiction. 3n his eparate Opinion in urganan, then "ssociate Gustice, now Chief Gustice :eynato . uno, proposed that a new standard which hetermed 0clear and convincing evidence? should be used in granting bail ine/tradition cases. "ccording to him, this standard should be lower than proofbeyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. !he potentiale/traditee must prove by 0clear and convincing evidence? that he is not a Bight ris5and will abide with all the orders and processes of the e/tradition court. 3n this case,there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he isnot a Bight ris5. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court todetermine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of 0clear

and convincing evidence.? overnment of ong ong pecial "dministrative :egionvs. Olalia, Gr., *'% C:" )KH$'HHK&J

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65. R" "! *. G)-= 2"!, G.R. N). 189161, D" " "% 3,900;C !" T+#2" REVEREND FATHER ROBERT '. REYES,

"#+#+)-"%, *!. COURT OF A''EALS, SECRETARY RAUL M.GON:ALE:, IN HIS CA'ACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THEDE'ARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONERMARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CA'ACITY AS THECOMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,%"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L %+#! )( A %) C%+ +- 2'%) "/$%"Constitutional Law; Erits of "mparo; Coverage of the Erit of "mparo. !he Court, in

ecretary of ational 4efense et al. v. >analo et al., *+I C:" % $'HHI&, made acategorical pronouncement that the "mparo :ule in its present form is con8ned tothese two instances of 0e/tralegal 5illings? and 0enforced disappearances,? or tothreats thereof.

ame; ame; :estriction on right to travel as a result of a pending criminal case isnot unlawful and thus not a valid ground to invo5e issuance of Erit of "mparo. !herestriction on petitioner6s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the

criminal case 8led against him was not unlawful. etitioner has also failed toestablish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the e/tent thatit amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for whichthere e/ists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

ame; ame; Criminal rocedure; Gurisdiction; "dministrative Law; etition to lift anold 4eparture Order $ 4O& issued by the ec. of Gustice should be 8led in the court

where criminal case against petitioner is pending. Ee quote with approval the C"6sruling on this matter# !he said provision ection ''J is an a7rmation by the

upreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo v. >ogul that once a complaint orinformation is 8led in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or itscontinuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. 4espite the denial ofrespondent6s >: of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court hasnot lost control over Criminal Case o. HK-(%'+ which is still pending before it. 9yvirtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertainincidents in the instant case to the e/clusion of even this Court. !he relief petitionersee5s which is the lifting of the 4O was and is available by motion in the criminalcase. $ ec. '', :ule on the Erit of "mparo, supra&.

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ame; ame; ame; "bsence of actual controversy renders it unnecessary forupreme Court to pass upon constitutionality of 4epartment of Gustice $4OG& Circularo. %( $On old 4eparture Orders&. etitioner is see5ing the e/traordinary writ of

amparo due to his apprehension that the 4OG may deny his motion to lift the 4O.etitioner6s apprehension is at best merely speculative. !hus, he has failed to show

any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ ofamparo. !he absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us onthis occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of 4OG Circular o. %K, eries of%DDI $ rescribing :ules and :egulations overning the 3ssuance of old 4epartureOrders&; and Circular o. %I, eries of 'HHK $ rescribing :ules and :egulations

overning the 3ssuance and 3mplementation of Eatchlist Orders and for Otherurposes&. :eyes vs. Court of "ppeals, +H+ C:" *IH$'HHD&J

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66. S" %"# % )( N #+)- 2 D"("-!" *. M - 2), 07 O #) "%9008, G.R. N). 180;06C !" T+#2" THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THECHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE 'HILI''INES,

"#+#+)-"%!, *!. RAYMOND MANALO -/ REYNALDOMANALO, %"! )-/"-#!C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! %+# )( A %) Erit of "mparo; upreme Court; Eords and hrases; 0=/tralegal illings? and0=nforced 4isappearances,? 4e8ned; !he promulgation of the "mparo :ule was ane/ercise for the 8rst time of the upreme Court6s e/panded power to promulgaterules to protect our people6s constitutional rights, which made its maidenappearance in the %DIK Constitution in response to the Filipino e/perience of themartial law regime; !he "mparo :ule was intended to address the intractableproblem of 0e/tralegal 5illings? and 0enforced disappearances?; 0=/tralegal 5illings?are 05illings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or 2udicial proceedings,? while enforced disappearances? are 0attended by thefollowing characteristics# an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by agovernment o7cial or organi<ed groups or private individuals acting with the director indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the tate to disclose thefate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to ac5nowledge thedeprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.? On

October '), 'HHK, the Court promulgated the "mparo :ule 0in light of theprevalence of e/tralegal 5illing and enforced disappearances.? 3t was an e/ercise forthe 8rst time of the Court6s e/panded power to promulgate rules to protect ourpeople6s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the %DIKConstitution in response to the Filipino e/perience of the martial law regime. "s the"mparo :ule was intended to address the intractable problem of 0e/tralegal5illings? and 0enforced disappearances,? its coverage, in its present form, iscon8ned to these two instances or to threats thereof. 0=/tralegal 5illings? are05illings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or 2udicial proceedings.? On the other hand, 0enforced disappearances? are 0attendedby the following characteristics# an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a

government o7cial or organi<ed groups or private individuals acting with the director indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the tate to disclose thefate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to ac5nowledge thedeprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.?

ame; Eords and hrases; !he writ of "mparo originated in >e/ico and 0"mparo?literally means 0protection? in panish. !he writ of "mparo originated in >e/ico.0"mparo? literally means 0protection? in panish. 3n %I(K, de !ocqueville6s4emocracy in "merica became available in >e/ico and stirred great interest. 3ts

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description of the practice of 2udicial review in the @. . appealed to many >e/ican 2urists. One of them, >anuel Crescencio :e2 n, drafted a constitutional provision forhis native state, Pucatan, which granted 2udges the power to protect all persons inthe en2oyment of their constitutional and legal rights. !his idea was incorporatedinto the national constitution in %I)K, vi<.# !he federal courts shall protect any

inhabitant of the :epublic in the e/ercise and preservation of those rights granted tohim by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attac5s bythe Legislative and =/ecutive powers of the federal or state governments, limitingthemselves to granting protection in the speci8c case in litigation, ma5ing nogeneral declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated theviolation.

ame; urposes of the Erit of "mparo; 3n Latin "merican countries, e/cept Cuba,the writ of "mparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against humanrights abuses especially committed in countries under military 2untas. !he writ ofamparo then spread throughout the Eestern emisphere, gradually evolving intovarious forms, in response to the particular needs of each country. 3t became, in the

words of a 2ustice of the >e/ican Federal upreme Court, one piece of >e/ico6s self-attributed 0tas5 of conveying to the world6s legal heritage that institution which, asa shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived.? Ehat began as aprotection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation ofconstitutional rights later evolved for several purposes# $%& amparo libertad for theprotection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; $'& amparocontra leyes for the 2udicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; $(& amparocasacion for the 2udicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a 2udicialdecision; $)& amparo administrativo for the 2udicial review of administrative actions;and $*& amparo agrario for the protection of peasants6 rights derived from theagrarian reform process. 3n Latin "merican countries, e/cept Cuba, the writ of

"mparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abusesespecially committed in countries under military 2untas. 3n general, these countriesadopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutionalrights, including socio-economic rights. Other countries li5e Colombia, Chile,

ermany and pain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ ofamparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.

ame; rave "buse Clause; abeas Corpus; Ehile constitutional rights can beprotected under the rave "buse Clause through remedies of in2unction orprohibition under :ule +* of the :ules of Court and a petition for habeas corpusunder :ule %H', these remedies may not be adequate to address the pesteringproblem of e/tralegal 5illings and enforced disappearances the swiftness requiredto resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and theavailability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the "mparo :uleo ers a better remedy to e/tralegal 5illings and enforced disappearances andthreats thereof; !he writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles inaddressing the problem of e/tralegal 5illings and enforced disappearancespreventive in that it brea5s the e/pectation of impunity in the commission of theseo enses, and, curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment ofperpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.

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Ehile constitutional rights can be protected under the rave "buse Clausethrough remedies of in2unction or prohibition under :ule +* of the :ules of Courtand a petition for habeas corpus under :ule %H', these remedies may not beadequate to address the pestering problem of e/tralegal 5illings and enforceddisappearances. owever, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ

of "mparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interimand permanent reliefs under the "mparo :ule, this hybrid writ of the common lawand civil law traditions borne out of the Latin "merican and hilippine e/perienceof human rights abuses o ers a better remedy to e/tralegal 5illings and enforceddisappearances and threats thereof. !he remedy provides rapid 2udicial relief as itparta5es of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to ma5ethe appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determinecriminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damagesrequiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiringsubstantial evidence that will require full and e/haustive proceedings. !he writ of"mparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem ofe/tralegal 5illings and enforced disappearances. 3t is preventive in that it brea5s thee/pectation of impunity in the commission of these o enses; it is curative in that itfacilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leadsto subsequent investigation and action. 3n the long run, the goal of both thepreventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of e/tralegal5illings and enforced disappearances.

ame; =vidence; Eith the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and thetorture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much ofthe information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves,and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness intheir written and1or oral statements. 3n Orti< v. uatemala, Case %H.*'+, :eport

o. (%1D+, 3nter-"m.C. .:.,O="1 er.L1A133.D* 4oc. K rev. at ((' $%DDK&, a casedecided by the 3nter-"merican Commission on uman :ights, the Commissionconsidered similar evidence, among others, in 8nding that complainant ister 4ianaOrti< was abducted and tortured by agents of the uatemalan government. 3n thiscase, ister Orti< was 5idnapped and tortured in early ovember %DID. !heCommission6s 8ndings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and crediblestatements, written and oral, made by ister Orti< regarding her ordeal. !hesestatements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they too5when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.

he was also e/amined by a medical doctor whose 8ndings showed that the %%%circular second degree burns on her bac5 and abrasions on her chee5 coincided with

her account of cigarette burning and torture she su ered while in detention. Eiththe secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on thevictim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidenceof the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of theiraccount will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and1or oralstatements. !heir statements can be corroborated by other evidence such asphysical evidence left by the torture they su ered or landmar5s they can identify inthe places where they were detained. Ehere powerful military o7cers are

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implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes asno surprise.

ame; :ight to ecurity; earches and ei<ures; !he right to security or the right tosecurity of person 8nds a te/tual hoo5 in "rticle 333, ection ' of the %DIKConstitution, and at the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one6s person,including the e/tensions of his1her person houses, papers, and e ects againstgovernment intrusion. Let us put this right to security under the lens to determineif it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. !he right to security or theright to security of person 8nds a te/tual hoo5 in "rticle 333, ection ' of the %DIKConstitution which provides, vi<.# ec. '. !he right of the people to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers and e ects against unreasonable searches and sei<ures ofwhatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant orwarrant of arrest shall issue e/cept upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by the 2udge. . . "t the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one6sperson, including the e/tensions of his1her person houses, papers, and e ectsagainst government intrusion. ection ' not only limits the state6s power over a

person6s home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy andsanctity of the person himself. !he purpose of this provision was enunciated by theCourt in eople v. CF3 of :i<al, 9ranch 3[, ue<on City, %H% C:" I+ $%DIH&, vi<.# !hepurpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and sei<uresis to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawfulinvasion of the security of the home by o7cers of the law acting under legislative or 2udicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted.$"dams v. ew Por5, %D' @. . I*I; "lvero v. 4i<on, K+ hil. +(K %D)+J&. !he right toprivacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace andsecurity of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons andcorrespondence. $!aYada and Carreon, olitical Law of the hilippines, Aol. ', %(D

%D+'J&. !he constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right againstunreasonable searches and sei<ures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closerto a man6s soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personalsecurity. "ny interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.

ame; 4ue rocess Clause; Ehile the right to life under "rticle 333, ection % of theConstitution gurantees essentially the right to be alive, the right to security ofperson is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life; 3n a broad sense, the right tosecurity of person 0emanates in a person6s legal and uninterrupted en2oyment of hislife, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation, including the right to e/ist,and the right to en2oyment of life while e/isting, and it is invaded not only by adeprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the en2oyment oflife according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.?Ehile the right to life under "rticle 333, ection % guarantees essentially the right tobe alive upon which the en2oyment of all other rights is preconditioned the rightto security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, vi<.# 0!he life towhich each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and propertymay be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. :ather, it is a life lived with theassurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect thesecurity of his person and property. !he ideal of security in life and property. . .

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pervades the whole history of man. 3t touches every aspect of man6s e/istence.? 3na broad sense, the right to security of person 0emanates in a person6s legal anduninterrupted en2oyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and hisreputation. 3t includes the right to e/ist, and the right to en2oyment of life whilee/isting, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things

which are necessary to the en2oyment of life according to the nature, temperament,and lawful desires of the individual.?

ame; :ight to ecurity; ermutations of the :ight to ecurity; " closer loo5 at theright to security of person would yield various permutations of the e/ercise of thisright# First, the right to security of person is 0freedom from fear,? econd, the rightto security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security,and, !hird, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one6s rightsby the government. " closer loo5 at the right to security of person would yieldvarious permutations of the e/ercise of this right. First, the right to security ofperson is 0freedom from fear.? 3n its 0whereas? clauses, the @niversal 4eclaration of

uman :ights $@4 :& enunciates that 0a world in which human beings shall en2oy

freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimedas the highest aspiration of the common people.? $emphasis supplied& omescholars postulate that 0freedom from fear? is not only an aspirational principle, butessentially an individual international human right. 3t is the 0right to security ofperson? as the word 0security? itself means 0freedom from fear.? "rticle ( of the@4 : provides, vi<.# =veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.$emphasis supplied& econd, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodilyand psychological integrity or security. "rticle 333, ection 33 of the %DIK Constitutionguarantees that, as a general rule, one6s body cannot be searched or invadedwithout a search warrant. hysical in2uries inBicted in the conte/t of e/tralegal5illings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of

the body. 3t may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painfulphysical intrusion. "s the degree of physical in2ury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. otably, in criminal law, physical in2uries constitute a crime againstpersons because they are an a ront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. !hird, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one6s rights bythe government. 3n the conte/t of the writ of "mparo, this right is built into theguarantees of the right to life and liberty under "rticle 333, ection % of the %DIKConstitution and the right to security of person $as freedom from threat andguarantee of bodily and psychological integrity& under "rticle 333, ection '. !he rightto security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the tate0guarantees full respect for human rights? under "rticle 33, ection %% of the %DIK

Constitution. "s the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, theConstitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person isrendered ine ective if government does not a ord protection to these rightsespecially when they are under threat. rotection includes conducting e ectiveinvestigations, organi<ation of the government apparatus to e/tend protection tovictims of e/tralegal 5illings or enforced disappearances $or threats thereof& and1ortheir families, and bringing o enders to the bar of 2ustice.

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ame; ame; Eords and hrases; 3n the "mparo conte/t, it is more correct to saythat the 0right to security? is actually the 0freedom from threat? 0freedom fromfear? is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is theactionable wrong. 3n the conte/t of ection % of the "mparo :ule, 0freedom fromfear? is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the

actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause ofaction. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react di erently. !he degree of fear can vary from one person toanother with the variation of the proli8cacy of their imagination, strength ofcharacter or past e/perience with the stimulus. !hus, in the "mparo conte/t, it ismore correct to say that the 0right to security? is actually the 0freedom fromthreat.? Aiewed in this light, the 0threatened with violation? Clause in the latter partof ection % of the "mparo :ule is a form of violation of the right to securitymentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

ame; ame; !here need not necessarily be a depravation of liberty for the right tosecurity of person to be invo5ed. !his third sense of the right to security of person

as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by the @nitedations6 uman :ights Committee in not a few cases involving "rticle D of the

3CC :. Ehile the right to security of person appears in con2unction with the right toliberty under "rticle D, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of personcan e/ist independently of the right to liberty. 3n other words, there need notnecessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to beinvo5ed.

ame; roduction Orders; earches and ei<ures; !he production order under the"mparo :ule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcementunder "rticle 333, ection ' of the %DIK Constitution this Constitutional provision is aprotection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not aprotection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents; !he amparo production order may be li5ened to the production of documents orthings under ection %, :ule 'K of the :ules of Civil rocedure. 3n the case at bar,however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vagueallegations made by respondent :aymond >analo in his unveri8ed declaration anda7davit, the documents respondents see5 to be produced are only mentionedgenerally by name, with no other supporting details. !hey also argue that therelevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true inthe present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not beenshown. etitioners6 arguments do not hold water. !he production order under the"mparo :ule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcementunder "rticle 333, ection ' of the %DIK Constitution. !his Constitutional provision is aprotection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not aprotection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents.3nstead, the "mparo production order may be li5ened to the production ofdocuments or things under ection %, :ule 'K of the :ules of Civil rocedure.

ame; !he writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns andprisoners behind secret walls. 3n blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to

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life, liberty and security, these rights are snu ed out from victims of e/tralegal5illings and enforced disappearances. !he writ of amparo is a tool that gives voiceto preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls. ecretary of ational4efense vs. >analo, *+I C:" %$'HHI&J

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67. B 2 ) *. A%%) ), G.R. N). 186050, D" " "% 13, 9011C !" T+#2" ARTHUR BALAO, INSTON BALAO, NONETTEBALAO, JONILYN BALAO STRUGAR -/ BEVERLY LONGID,

"#+#+)-"%!, *!. GLORIA MACA'AGAL ARROYO, EDUARDOERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO 'UNO, NORBERTOGON:ALES, G"-. ALE ANDER YANO, G"-. JESUS VER:OSA,B%+ . G"-. REYNALDO MA'AGU, L#. ' D+%. EDGARDODOROMAL, M Q. G"-. ISAGANI CACHUELA, C) -/+-O "% )( # " AF' ISU !"/ +- B $+) C+# , 'SS EUGENEMARTIN -/ !"*"% 2 JOHN DOES, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( /" +!+)- )( # " R" +)- 2 T%+ 2 C)$%# )( L T%+-+/ /,B"- $"#, B%. 63.S 22 + C2 !! %+# )( A %) EK#% 2" 2 @+22+- ! E-()% "/D+! " % - "! C) -/ R"! )-!+ +2+# '%"!+/"-#+ 2I $-+#Erit of "mparo; =/tralegal illings; =nforced 4isappearances; >eaning of =/tralegal

illings and =nforced 4isappearances. !he :ule on the Erit of "mparo waspromulgated on October '), 'HHK amidst rising incidence of 0e/tralegal 5illings?and 0enforced disappearances.? 3t was formulated in the e/ercise of this Court6se/panded rule-ma5ing power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights enshrined in the %DIK Constitution, albeit limited to these two situations.0=/tralegal 5illings? refer to 5illings committed without due process of law, i.e.,without legal safeguards or 2udicial proceedings. On the other hand, 0enforceddisappearances? are attended by the following characteristics# an arrest, detention,or abduction of a person by a government o7cial or organi<ed groups or privateindividuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; therefusal of the tate to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or arefusal to ac5nowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outsidethe protection of law.

ame; ame; ame; uch documented practice of targeting activists in themilitary6s counter-insurgency program by itself does not ful8ll the evidentiarystandard provided in the "mparo :ule to establish an enforced disappearance. Eehold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the military6s counter-insurgency program by itself does not ful8ll the evidentiary standard provided in the"mparo :ule to establish an enforced disappearance. 3n the case of :o/as v.>acapagal-"rroyo, +(H C:" '%% $'H%H&, the Court noted that the similaritybetween the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with thosesurrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily,carry su7cient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction.

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"ccordingly, the trial court in this case cannot simply infer government involvementin the abduction of Games from past similar incidents in which the victims alsowor5ed or a7liated with the C " and other left-leaning groups.

ame; ame; ame; !he inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility inan amparo proceeding does not by any measure preclude impleading military orpolice commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition werecommitted with their direct or indirect acquiescence. ubsequently, we haveclari8ed that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in anamparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military orpolice commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition werecommitted with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may thereforebe impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibility but rather onthe ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.

ame; ame; ame; 4e8nition of :esponsibility and "ccountability. 3n :a<on, Gr. v. !agitis, +H+ C:" *DI $'HHD&, the Court de8ned responsibility and accountability asthese terms are applied to amparo proceedings, as follows# / / / :esponsibilityrefers to the e/tent the actors have been established by substantial evidence tohave participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforceddisappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them,the directive to 8le the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsibleparties in the proper courts. "ccountability, on the other hand, refers to themeasure of remedies that should be addressed to those who e/hibited involvementin the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to thelevel of responsibility de8ned above; or who are imputed with 5nowledge relating tothe enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those whocarry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of e/traordinary diligence in theinvestigation of the enforced disappearance. / / /. $=mphasis supplied.&

ame; ame; ame; :eports of top police o7cials indicating the personnel and unitsthey directed to investigate can never constitute e/haustive and meaningfulinvestigation or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities underta5en tosearch for the victim. 3n view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondentsclearly failed to discharge their burden of e/traordinary diligence in theinvestigation of Games6s abduction. uch ine ective investigation e/tant in therecords of this case prevents us from completely e/onerating the respondents fromallegations of accountability for Games6 disappearance. !he reports submitted by the

:egional O7ce, !as5 Force 9alao and 9aguio City olice tation do not containmeaningful results or details on the depth and e/tent of the investigation made. 3n

:a<on, Gr. v. !agitis, +H+ C:" *DI $'HHD&, the Court observed that such reports oftop police o7cials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigatecan never constitute e/haustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailedinvestigative reports of the activities underta5en to search for the victim. 3n thesame case we stressed that the standard of diligence required the duty of publico7cials and employees to observe e/traordinary diligence called for e/traordinarymeasures e/pected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent

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handling and investigation of e/tra-2udicial 5illings and enforced disappearancecases.

ame; ame; ame; residential 3mmunity; !he trial court clearly erred in holdingthat presidential immunity cannot be properly invo5ed in an amparo proceeding."s to the matter of dropping resident "rroyo as party-respondent, though notraised in the petitions, we hold that the trial court clearly erred in holding thatpresidential immunity cannot be properly invo5ed in an amparo proceeding. "spresident, then resident "rroyo was en2oying immunity from suit when the petitionfor a writ of amparo was 8led. >oreover, the petition is bereft of any allegation as towhat speci8c presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violatepetitioners6 protected rights.

ame; ame; ame; " basic requirement before an amparo court may grant aninspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable fromthe allegations of the party see5ing the order. "n inspection order is an interimrelief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparopetition, in order to aid the court before ma5ing a decision. " basic requirementbefore an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to beinspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party see5ing theorder. 3n this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied since thepetitioners speci8ed several military and police establishments based merely on theallegation that the testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents ofsimilar abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used asdetention centers.

=:= O, _G., 4issenting Opinion#

Erit of "mparo; =/tralegal illings; =nforced 4isappearances; Ehile the substantialevidence rule remains the standard in amparo proceedings, Be/ibility should beobserved; Courts must consider evidence adduced in its totality including that whichwould otherwise be deemed inadmissible if consistent with the admissible evidenceadduced. ection %K of the :ule on the Erit of "mparo prescribes the threshold ofsubstantial evidence as necessary for establishing the claims of petitioners in .:.

o. %I+H*H. Ehile the substantial evidence rule remains the standard in amparoproceedings, Be/ibility should be observed. Courts must consider evidence adducedin its totality, including that which would otherwise be deemed inadmissible ifconsistent with the admissible evidence adduced.

ame; ame; ame; Command :esponsibility; !he doctrine of commandresponsibility is not mutually e/clusive with the standard of responsibility and

accountability in amparo cases. !he ponencia re2ects the use of commandresponsibility in amparo proceedings on the ground that the manner of impleadingcommanders must be on the basis of their responsibility or accountability. 3t mustbe pointed out that the doctrine of command responsibility is not mutually e/clusivewith the standard of responsibility and accountability in amparo cases.

ame; ame; ame; ame; !he doctrine of command responsibility may be used inamparo proceedings to the e/tent of identifying the superiors accountable for theenforced disappearance or e/tra2udicial 5illing. !he doctrine of command

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responsibility may be used in amparo proceedings to the e/tent of identifying thesuperiors accountable for the enforced disappearance or e/tra2udicial 5illing, andthose who may be directed to implement the processes and reliefs in the amparocase.

ame; ame; ame; ame; residential 3mmunity; " non-sitting resident does noten2oy immunity from suit even for acts committed during the latter6s tenure. !hema2ority 4ecision states that former resident loria >acapagal-"rroyo $former

resident "rroyo& should have been accorded presidential immunity, as she was theincumbent resident when the present etitions were 8led. !his position is not inaccord with the ruling of this Court in =strada v. 4esierto, (*( C:" )*' $'HH%&, inwhich it was e/plicitly held that a non-sitting resident does not en2oy immunityfrom suit even for acts committed during the latter6s tenure.

ame; ame; ame; ame; residential immunity from suit e/ists only inconcurrence with the resident6s incumbency. 3n this Court6s :esolution in =stradav. 4esierto, (*+ C:" %HI $'HH%&, it was emphasi<ed that presidential immunityfrom suit e/ists only in concurrence with the resident6s incumbency.

ame; ame; ame; ranting the privilege of the writ may include an orderinstructing respondents to conduct further investigation if such a directive isdeemed as an appropriate remedial measure under the premises to protect therights under the writ. !he ponencia orders the referral of this case bac5 to the trialcourt for further investigation by the and C34 . "s previously discussed, ane/plicit 8nding of absence of a fair and e ective investigation should have beensu7cient to grant the privilege of the writ of amparo. "fter all, there is no 8nding ofcriminal, civil or administrative liability in amparo proceedings. 3n fact, granting theprivilege of the writ may include an order instructing respondents to conduct furtherinvestigation, if such a directive is deemed as an appropriate remedial measure

under the premises to protect the rights under the writ. 9alao vs. >acagagal-"rroyo, ++' C:" (%'$'H%%&J

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68. R)/%+ $"= *. M 2 A%%) ), G.R. N). 1;1805,N)*" "% 15, 9011C !" T+#2" IN THE MATTER OF THE 'ETITION FOR THE

RIT OF AM'ARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIELH. RODRIGUE:, NORIEL H. RODRIGUE:, "#+#+)-"%, *!.GLORIA MACA'AGAL ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO,'DG JESUS AME VERSO:A, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ.GEN. NESTOR :. OCHOA, ' CSU'T. AMETO G. TOLENTINO,' SSU'T. JUDE . SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, -) "% - "/ MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE'ALAC'AC $-/"% # " - " HARRY, ANTONIO CRU:,ALD IN BONG 'ASICOLAN -/ VINCENT CALLAGAN,%"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %#+ 2 %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ -/'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # " /" +!+)-! )( # "C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! %+# )( A %) C) -/ R"! )-!+ +2+#

Erit of "mparo; !he writ of amparo is an e/traordinary and independent remedythat provides rapid 2udicial relief, as it parta5es of a summary proceeding that

requires only substantial evidence to ma5e the appropriate interim and permanentreliefs available to the petitioner. !he writ of amparo is an e/traordinary andindependent remedy that provides rapid 2udicial relief, as it parta5es of a summaryproceeding that requires only substantial evidence to ma5e the appropriate interimand permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. 3t is not an action to determinecriminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damagesrequiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiringsubstantial evidence that will require full and e/haustive proceedings. :ather, itserves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of e/tra2udicial5illings and enforced disappearances. 3t is preventive in that it brea5s thee/pectation of impunity in the commission of these o enses, and it is curative in

that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leadingto subsequent investigation and action.

Erit of abeas 4ata; !he writ of habeas data provides a 2udicial remedy to protect aperson6s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instanceswhere such information is being collected through unlawful means in order toachieve unlawful ends. !he writ of habeas data provides a 2udicial remedy toprotect a person6s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly ininstances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in

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order to achieve unlawful ends. "s an independent and summary remedy to protectthe right to privacy especially the right to informational privacy the proceedingsfor the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any 8nding of criminal,civil or administrative culpability. 3f the allegations in the petition are proventhrough substantial evidence, then the Court may $a& grant access to the database

or information; $b& en2oin the act complained of; or $c& in case the database orinformation contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction orrecti8cation.

Erit of "mparo; Erit of abeas 4ata; !here is no determination of administrative,civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings. 3t bears stressingthat since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability inamparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertainingresponsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or e/tra2udicial5illing.

ame; Command :esponsibility; othing precludes this Court from applying thedoctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertainresponsibility and accountability in e/tra2udicial 5illings and enforceddisappearances. !he doctrine of command responsibility may be used todetermine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to addressthe abduction of :odrigue< in order to enable the courts to devise remedialmeasures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applyingthe doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertainresponsibility and accountability in e/tra2udicial 5illings and enforceddisappearances.

ame; ame; "mparo proceedings determine $a& responsibility, or the e/tent theactors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in

whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and $b&accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those $i&who e/hibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the levelof their complicity to the level of responsibility de8ned above; or $ii& who areimputed with 5nowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry theburden of disclosure; or $iii& those who carry, but have failed to discharge, theburden of e/traordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforceddisappearance. "mparo proceedings determine $a& responsibility, or the e/tent theactors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated inwhatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and $b&accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those $i&

who e/hibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the levelof their complicity to the level of responsibility de8ned above; or $ii& who areimputed with 5nowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry theburden of disclosure; or $iii& those who carry, but have failed to discharge, theburden of e/traordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforceddisappearance. !hus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil oradministrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless

(I'



be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoingde8nitions.

ame; ame; !he president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,necessarily possesses control over the military that quali8es him as a superiorwithin the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. aving established theapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, itmust now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military,can be held responsible or accountable for e/tra2udicial 5illings and enforceddisappearances. Ee rule in the a7rmative. !o hold someone liable under thedoctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain# a. thee/istence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superiorand the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior 5new or hadreason to 5now that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and c. thesuperior failed to ta5e the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent thecriminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. !he president, being thecommander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the

military that quali8es him as a superior within the purview of the commandresponsibility doctrine.

ame; ame; !he :ule on the Erit of "mparo e/plicitly states that the violation of orthreat to the right to life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act oran omission of a public o7cial. !he :ule on the Erit of "mparo e/plicitly statesthat the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security may be causedby either an act or an omission of a public o7cial. >oreover, in the conte/t ofamparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of therespondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. :odrigue< vs.>acapagal-"rroyo, ++H C:" I)$'H%%&J

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6;. G ) *. C -, G.R. N). 1;3636, J$2 94, 9019C !" T+#2" MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, "#+#+)-"%, *!.' SSU'T. MARLOU C. CHAN, IN HIS CA'ACITY AS THE 'N''ROVINCIAL DIRECTOR OF ILOCOS NORTE, -/ ' SU'T.

ILLIAM O. FANG, IN HIS CA'ACITY AS CHIEF,INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, 'N' 'ROVINCIAL OFFICE, ILOCOSNORTE, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( /" +!+)- )( # " R" +)- 2 T%+ 2 C)$%# )( L ) C+# , B%. 13.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L '%+* #" A% +"!

Constitutional Law; :ight to rivacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must meanmore than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy aswell, if it is to be a repository of freedom. !he right to be let alone is indeed thebeginning of all freedom. !he right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty,has long been recogni<ed as a constitutional right. !his Court, in >orfe v. >utuc, ''

C:" )') $%D+I&, thus enunciated# !he due process question touching on analleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of theob2ections raised by plainti that the provision on the periodical submission of asworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right toprivacy. !here is much to be said for this view of Gustice 4ouglas# 0Liberty in theconstitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental

restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. !heright to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.? "s a matter of fact, thisright to be let alone is, to quote from >r. Gustice 9randeis 0the most comprehensiveof rights and the right most valued by civili<ed men.? !he concept of liberty wouldbe emasculated if it does not li5ewise compel respect for his personality as a uniqueindividual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.

ame; ame; !he right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must beprotected from intrusion or constraint. Clearly, the right to privacy is considered afundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. owever, in

tandard Chartered 9an5 v. enate Committee on 9an5s, *)% C:" )*+ $'HHK&, thisCourt underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, vi<.# Eith respect to theright of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, su7ce it to statethat privacy is not an absolute right. Ehile it is true that ection '%, "rticle A3 of theConstitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons a ected by the legislativeinvestigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed tothwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. 3n abio v. ordon, we have held that theright of the people to access information on matters of public concern generallyprevails over the right to privacy of ordinary 8nancial transactions. 3n that case, wedeclared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding

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compelling state interest. =mploying the rational basis relationship test, as laiddown in >orfe v. >utuc, there is no infringement of the individual6s right to privacyas the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, toensure that the government agencies involved in regulating ban5ing transactionsadequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. u7ce it to state that

this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailedlegislative investigation.

ame; Erit of abeas 4ata; !he writ of habeas data is an independent andsummary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, andfreedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one6sright to the truth and to informational privacy. !he writ of habeas data is anindependent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum toenforce one6s right to the truth and to informational privacy. 3t see5s to protect aperson6s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances inwhich such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to

achieve unlawful ends. 3t must be emphasi<ed that in order for the privilege of thewrit to be granted, there must e/ist a ne/us between the right to privacy on the onehand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

ame; rivate "rmies; !he Constitution e/plicitly mandates the dismantling ofprivate armies and other armed groups not recogni<ed by the duly constitutedauthority. !he Constitution e/plicitly mandates the dismantling of private armiesand other armed groups not recogni<ed by the duly constituted authority. 3t alsoprovides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope andcivilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national policecommission. amboa vs. Chan, +KK C:" (I*$'H%'&J

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70. '") 2" *. F+"2/ /, G.R. N). 1;6005, O #) "% 1, 9014C !" T+#2" 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, "22"", *!.CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, -/ EDGAR 'IMENTEL,

"22 -#!.C !" N #$%" A''EAL (%) /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )(A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C%+ +- 2 L D "! I-#"%"!# R #"! Criminal Law; ualifying Circumstances; !reachery; !here is treachery when theo ender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods,or forms in the e/ecution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure itse/ecution, without ris5 to himself arising from the defense which the o ended partymight ta5e. Fieldad argues that there can be no treachery since 0the 2ail guards

were all issued with 8rearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintainpeace and order within the compound.? !his argument is untenable. !here istreachery when the o ender commits any of the crimes against the person,employing means, methods, or forms in the e/ecution thereof which tend directlyand specially to insure its e/ecution, without ris5 to himself arising from the defensewhich the o ended party might ta5e.

:emedial Law; =vidence; Eitnesses; 3t is a settled rule that the evaluation of thecredibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best underta5en by the trialcourt because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses 8rsthand and tonote their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling e/amination. 3t is asettled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies

is a matter best underta5en by the trial court because of its unique opportunity toobserve the witnesses 8rsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitudeunder grilling e/amination. ositive identi8cation of the accused is entitled togreater weight than the bare denial and e/planation by the accused.

Criminal Law; "libi; "libi is the wea5est of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive anddi7cult to disprove. 3n light of the positive testimony of 9adua, Fieldad6s self-serving defense of denial and alibi must fail. "libi is the wea5est of all defenses, asit is easy to contrive and di7cult to disprove. !rue, the conviction of an accusedmust rest not on the wea5ness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecutionevidence. ence, when the prosecution evidence has 8rmly established the guilt ofaccused beyond reasonable doubt, conviction is in order.

Constitutional Law; :ight "gainst elf-3ncrimination; !he ta5ing of para7n castsdoes not violate the right of the accused against self-incrimination. !o be sure, theta5ing of para7n casts does not violate the right of the accused against self-incrimination. 3n eople v. amboa, %D) C:" (K' $%DD%&, we held# "s to thepara7n test to which the appellant was sub2ected to he raises the question, underthe si/th assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. !his right is a orded to any person under investigation for the commission of an

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o ense whose confession or admission may not be ta5en unless he is informed ofhis right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of hisown choice. is right against self-incrimination is not violated by the ta5ing of thepara7n test of his hands. !his constitutional right e/tends only to testimonialcompulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be e/amined as in

this case. 3ndeed, the para7n test proved positively that he 2ust recently 8red agun. "gain, this 5ind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.

Criminal Law; Conspiracy; " conspiracy e/ists when two $'& or more persons cometo an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. "conspiracy e/ists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning thecommission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred fromand established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a 2oint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Onceconspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.

ame; ualifying Circumstances; !reachery; enalties; arole; ince treacheryquali8ed the 5illings to murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigatingcircumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. owever, itmust be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to ection ( of:epublic "ct $:"& o. D()+ or the "ct rohibiting the 3mposition of 4eath enalty.

ince treachery quali8ed the 5illings to murder and there being no aggravating normitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.

owever, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to ection( of :epublic "ct o. D()+ or the "ct rohibiting the 3mposition of 4eath enalty.

ame; Carnapping; Eords and hrases; Carnapping is the ta5ing, with intent to gain,of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by means of violenceagainst or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. Carnapping is the

ta5ing, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent,or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force uponthings. !he elements of the crime of carnapping are that# $%& there is an actualta5ing of the vehicle; $'& the o ender intends to gain from the ta5ing of the vehicle;$(& the vehicle belongs to a person other than the o ender himself; and $)& theta5ing is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. "ll theelements of carnapping are present in this case. 9oth appellants admitted that theyboarded the !amaraw 2eep and drove away in it. !he owner of the vehicle, 9en2amin9au<on, testi8ed that he did not consent to the ta5ing of his vehicle by appellants.

ame; ame; 3ntent to ain; 3ntent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act,presumed from the unlawful ta5ing of the motor vehicle. "s for intent to gain, weheld in eople v. 9ustinera, )(% C:" 'I) $'HH)&# 3ntent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the unlawful ta5ing of the motor vehicle. "ctualgain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. !he term0gain? is not merely limited to pecuniary bene8t but also includes the bene8t whichin any other sense may be derived or e/pected from the act which is performed. !hus, the mere use of the thing which was ta5en without the owner6s consentconstitutes gain.

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ame; =/empting Circumstances; 3mpulse of an @ncontrollable Fear of an =qual orreater 3n2ury; " person invo5ing uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion

was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will butagainst his will as well. !o escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellantsclaim that Leal forced them to ta5e the !amaraw 2eep to facilitate his Bight from 2ail.

@nder "rticle %' of the :evised enal Code, a person is e/empt from criminalliability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greaterin2ury. For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must bepresent, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. " personinvo5ing uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that itreduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will aswell. 3t is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave noopportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.

:emedial Law; =vidence; !estimonial =vidence; !o be believed, testimony must notonly proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such

as the common e/perience and observation of man5ind can approve as probableunder the circumstance. !o be believed, testimony must not only proceed from themouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the commone/perience and observation of man5ind can approve as probable under thecircumstance. !he circumstances under which appellants participated in thecommission of the carnapping would not 2ustify in any way their claim that theyacted under an uncontrollable fear of being 5illed by their fellow carnapper. :ather,the circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their Bight from 2ail,consciously concurred with the other malefactors to ta5e the !amaraw 2eep withoutthe consent of its owner.

Criminal Law; Carnapping; enalties; !he penalty for carnapping is provided inection %) of :epublic "ct $:"& o. +*(D; !he imposable penalty is imprisonment

for not less than fourteen $%)& years and eight $I& months and not more thanseventeen $%K& years and four $)& months. !he penalty for carnapping is providedin ection %) of :epublic "ct o. +*(D# =C!3O %). enalty for Carnapping. "nyperson who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is de8ned in ection !wo ofthis "ct, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle ta5en, be punished byimprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more thanseventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed withoutviolence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment fornot less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation ofany person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to deathshall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motorvehicle is 5illed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or onthe occasion thereof. $=mphasis supplied& 3n this case, the imposable penalty isimprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more thanseventeen years and four months. @nder the 3ndeterminate entence Law, asapplied to an o ense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence theaccused to an indeterminate sentence e/pressed at a range whose ma/imum term

(II



shall not e/ceed the ma/imum 8/ed by the special law, and the minimum term notbe less than the minimum prescribed. ence, the penalty imposed by the trial courtof imprisonment from fourteen years and eight months to si/teen years and twomonths is in order.

ame; 4amages; ominal 4amages; >oral 4amages; o proof of pecuniary loss isnecessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be ad2udicated. o proofof pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may bead2udicated. ominal damages are ad2udicated in order that a right of the plainti ,which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated orrecogni<ed, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plainti for any losssu ered by him. >oral damages include physical su ering, mental anguish, fright,serious an/iety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shoc5, socialhumiliation, and similar in2ury.

ame; ame; 3nterest :ates; 3n addition to the damages awarded in the murdercases and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damagesan interest at the legal rate of +W per annum from the date of 8nality of this 2udgment until fully paid. 3n addition to the damages awarded in the murder casesand in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages aninterest at the legal rate of +W per annum from the date of 8nality of this 2udgmentuntil fully paid. eople vs. Fieldad, K(K C:" )**$'H%)&J

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71. D"2 C%$= *. '") 2", G.R. N). 900748, J$2 93, 9014C !" T+#2" JAIME D. DELA CRU:, "#+#+)-"%, *!. 'EO'LE OFTHE 'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#.

C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C%+ +- 2 L D - "%)$! D%$ ! A #M -/ #)% D%$ T"!#+-Criminal Law; 4angerous 4rugs "ct; 0" person apprehended or arrested? cannotliterally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime. !he phrase mustbe read in conte/t and understood in consonance with :epublic "ct $:.".& o. D%+*.

0 "J person apprehended or arrested? cannot literally mean any personapprehended or arrested for any crime. !he phrase must be read in conte/t and

understood in consonance with :.". o. D%+*. ection %* comprehends personsarrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under "rticle 33 of the law. ence, adrug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, amongothers, the 0importation,? 0sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,distribution and transportation,? 0manufacture? and 0possession? of dangerousdrugs and1or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof0during parties, social gatherings or meetings?; being 0employees and visitors of aden, dive or resort?; 0maintenance of a den, dive or resort?; 0illegal chemicaldiversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals?; 0manufacture ordelivery? or 0possession? of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and otherparaphernalia for dangerous drugs and1or controlled precursors and essentialchemicals; possession of dangerous drugs 0during parties, social gatherings ormeetings?; 0unnecessary? or 0unlawful? prescription thereof; 0cultivation or cultureof plants classi8ed as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof?; and 0maintenanceand 5eeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and1or controlledprecursors and essential chemicals.? !o ma5e the provision applicable to all personsarrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under "rticle 33 is tantamount tounduly e/panding its meaning. ote that accused appellant here was arrested in thealleged act of e/tortion.

ame; ame; >andatory 4rug !esting; >a5ing the phrase 0a person apprehended orarrested? in ection %* applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended forunlawful acts, not only under :epublic "ct $:.".& o. D%+* but for all other crimes, is

tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested forany crime. >a5ing the phrase 0a person apprehended or arrested? in ection %*applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under:.". D%+* but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of allpersons apprehended or arrested for any crime. !o overe/tend the application ofthis provision would run counter to our pronouncement in ocial Gustice ociety v.4angerous 4rugs 9oard and hilippine 4rug =nforcement "gency, *KH C:" )%H$'HHI&, to wit# / / / >Jandatory drug testing can never be random and

(DH



suspicionless. !he ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical totheir being made defendants in a criminal complaint. !hey are not randomly pic5ed;neither are they beyond suspicion. Ehen persons suspected of committing a crimeare charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. !he personsthus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor6s o7ce and

peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do notnecessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. !oimpose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness amedical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated ob2ectives of:" +%D*. 4rug testing in this case would violate a person6s right to privacyguaranteed under ec. ', "rt. 333 of the Constitution. Eorse still, the accused personsare veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

Constitutional Law; =/clusionary :ule; :ight "gainst elf-3ncrimination; Ehat theConstitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to e/tortcommunication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence,when it may be material. 3n the utang v. eople, ((* C:" )KD $'HHH& case, the

Court clari8ed that 0what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moralcompulsion to e/tort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of hisbody in evidence, when it may be material.? !he situation in utang wascategori<ed as falling among the e/emptions under the freedom from testimonialcompulsion since what was sought to be e/amined came from the body of theaccused. !he Court said# !his was a mechanical act the accused was made toundergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physicalattributes determinable by simple observation. 3n fact, the record shows thatpetitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine butthey in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a drugtest. "ssuming arguendo that the urine samples ta5en from the petitioner are

inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is replete withother pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of theprosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.

Criminal Law; 4angerous 4rugs "ct; >andatory 4rug !esting; !he upreme Court$ C& cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime oro ense for which the arrest is being made. 3t is incontrovertible that petitionerrefused to have his urine e/tracted and tested for drugs. e also as5ed for a lawyerprior to his urine test. e was adamant in e/ercising his rights, but all of his e ortsproved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testingunder those circumstances. !he pertinent provisions in "rticle 333 of the Constitutionare clear# ection '. !he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers, and e ects against unreasonable searches and sei<ures of whatever natureand for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrestshall issue e/cept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the 2udgeafter e/amination under oath or a7rmation of the complainant and the witnesseshe may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and thepersons or things to be sei<ed. ection %K. o person shall be compelled to be awitness against himself. 3n the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot

(D%



condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or o ense forwhich the arrest is being made. 4ela Cru< vs. eople, K(H C:" +**$'H%)&J

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for not less than fourteen $%)& years and eight $I& months and not more thanseventeen $%K& years and four $)& months. !he penalty for carnapping is providedin ection %) of :epublic "ct o. +*(D# =C!3O %). enalty for Carnapping. "nyperson who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is de8ned in ection !wo ofthis "ct, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle ta5en, be punished byimprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more thanseventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed withoutviolence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment fornot less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation ofany person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to deathshall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motorvehicle is 5illed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or onthe occasion thereof. $=mphasis supplied& 3n this case, the imposable penalty isimprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more thanseventeen years and four months. @nder the 3ndeterminate entence Law, asapplied to an o ense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence theaccused to an indeterminate sentence e/pressed at a range whose ma/imum term

(D*



shall not e/ceed the ma/imum 8/ed by the special law, and the minimum term notbe less than the minimum prescribed. ence, the penalty imposed by the trial courtof imprisonment from fourteen years and eight months to si/teen years and twomonths is in order.

ame; 4amages; ominal 4amages; >oral 4amages; o proof of pecuniary loss isnecessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be ad2udicated. o proofof pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may bead2udicated. ominal damages are ad2udicated in order that a right of the plainti ,which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated orrecogni<ed, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plainti for any losssu ered by him. >oral damages include physical su ering, mental anguish, fright,serious an/iety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shoc5, socialhumiliation, and similar in2ury.

ame; ame; 3nterest :ates; 3n addition to the damages awarded in the murdercases and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damagesan interest at the legal rate of +W per annum from the date of 8nality of this 2udgment until fully paid. 3n addition to the damages awarded in the murder casesand in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the amounts of damages aninterest at the legal rate of +W per annum from the date of 8nality of this 2udgmentuntil fully paid. eople vs. Fieldad, K(K C:" )**$'H%)&J

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73. '") 2" *. N = %"-), G.R. N). 168;89, A$ $!# 5, 900;C !" T+#2" 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, "#+#+)-"%, *!.DIR. GEN. CESAR '. NA:ARENO, DIR. EVERLINO NARTATE:,DIR. NICASIO MA. S. CUSTODIO, -/ THE SANDIGANBAYAN

FIFTH DIVISION , %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( /" +!+)- )( # " S -/+ - - F+(# D+*.S 22 + C2 !! C)$%#! A " 2!Criminal Law; 4ouble Geopardy; :equisites; " 2udgment of acquittal is 8nal and is nolonger reviewable it is also immediately e/ecutory and the tate may not see5 itsreview without placing the accused in double 2eopardy. 4ouble 2eopardy e/istswhen the following requisites are present# $%& a 8rst 2eopardy attached prior to the

second; $'& the 8rst 2eopardy has been validly terminated; and $(& a second 2eopardy is for the same o ense as in the 8rst. " 8rst 2eopardy attaches only $a&after a valid indictment; $b& before a competent court; $c& after arraignment; $d&when a valid plea has been entered; and $e& when the accused was acquitted orconvicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his e/pressconsent. " 2udgment of acquittal is 8nal and is no longer reviewable. 3t is alsoimmediately e/ecutory and the tate may not see5 its review without placing theaccused in double 2eopardy.

ame; ame; !he absolute and inBe/ible rule is that the tate is proscribed fromappealing the 2udgment of acquittal through either a regular appeal under :ule )%of the :ules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under :ule)* of the same :ules.

!he Constitution has e/pressly adopted the double 2eopardy policy and thus barsmultiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would beunfair if the innocence of the accused has been con8rmed by a previous 8nal 2udgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from a 2udgment of acquittal is li5ewisebarred because the government has already been a orded a complete opportunityto prove the criminal defendant6s culpability; after failing to persuade the court toenter a 8nal 2udgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting theconstitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. !he reason isnot only the defendant6s already established innocence at the 8rst trial where he

had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and pre2udicialconsequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal allthe powers and resources of the tate. @nfairness and pre2udice would necessarilyresult, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade asecond trier of the defendant6s guilt while strengthening any wea5nesses that hadattended the 8rst trial, all in a process where the government6s power andresources are once again employed against the defendant6s individual means. !hatthe second opportunity comes via an appeal does not ma5e the e ects any less

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pre2udicial by the standards of reason, 2ustice and conscience. !hus, the absoluteand inBe/ible rule is that the tate is proscribed from appealing the 2udgment ofacquittal through either a regular appeal under :ule )% of the :ules of Court, or anappeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under :ule )* of the same :ules.

ame; Criminal rocedure; Certiorari; "ppeals; "n instance when the tate canchallenge a 2udgment of acquittal is pursuant to the e/ercise of our 2udicial power0to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amountingto lac5 or e/cess of 2urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

overnment,? as implemented through the e/traordinary writ of certiorari under:ule +* of the :ules of Court. "n instance when the tate can challenge a 2udgment of acquittal is pursuant to the e/ercise of our 2udicial power 0to determinewhether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac5 ore/cess of 2urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

overnment,? as implemented through the e/traordinary writ of certiorari under:ule +* of the :ules of Court. 3n such instance, however, no review of facts and lawon the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually ta5es place; the focus of

the review is on whether the 2udgment is per se void on 2urisdictional grounds, i.e.,whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no 2urisdiction; or where thecourt has appropriate 2urisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretionamounting to lac5 or e/cess of 2urisdiction. 3n other words, the review is on thequestion of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on the questionof the decision6s error or correctness. @nder the e/ceptional nature of a :ule +*petition, the burden a very heavy one is on the shoulders of the party as5ing forthe review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious e/ercise of 2udgmentequivalent to lac5 of 2urisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretionamounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a dutyimposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an e/ercise of power in an

arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.Courts; "ppeals; >isapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusionsbased on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to thelevel of grave abuse of discretion, and the mere fact, too, that a court erroneouslydecides a case does not necessarily deprive it of 2urisdiction. Ee add that any errorthat the andiganbayan might have committed in appreciating the evidencepresented at the trial are mere errors of 2udgment and do not rise to the level of 2urisdictional errors despite the allegation that the andiganbayan had 0gravelyerred? in appreciating the evidence. >isapplication of facts and evidence, anderroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors werecommitted, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. !hat an abuse itself mustbe 0grave? must be amply demonstrated since the 2urisdiction of the court, no less,will be a ected. !he mere fact, too, that a court erroneously decides a case doesnot necessarily deprive it of 2urisdiction. Ee have consistently ruled that a :ule +*certiorari does not involve the correction of errors of 2udgment. eople vs.

a<areno, *D* C:" )(I$'HHD&J

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74. O ) *. A -/), G.R. N). 176830, F" %$ % 11,9014C !" T+#2" VICENTE '. LADLAD, "#+#+)-"%, *!. HON.THELMA BUNYI MEDINA, +- "% +# ! '%"!+/+- J$/ ")( # " R" +)- 2 T%+ 2 C)$%# )( M -+2 , B% - 39, -/ # "'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" S'ECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS +- # " S$ %" "C)$%#. C"%#+)% %+ -/ '%) + +#+)-.S 22 + C2 !! I-#"%- #+)- 2 L C%+ "! A +-!#I-#"%- #+)- 2 H$ -+# %+ - L , G"-) +/" -/ O# "%C%+ "! A +-!# H$ -+# R.A. N). ;851 C%+ +- 2 LR" "22+)-:emedial Law; Criminal rocedure; reliminary 3nvestigations; 4ue rocess; Ehilethe right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather thanconstitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in theadministration of criminal 2ustice. " preliminary investigation is 0not a casuala air.? 3t is conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, e/penseand an/iety of a public trial. Ehile the right to have a preliminary investigationbefore trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and acomponent of due process in the administration of criminal 2ustice. 3n the conte/t ofa preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the opportunity tobe heard. 3t serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent6s

side with regard to the accusation. "fterwards, the investigating o7cer shall decidewhether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime hasbeen committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, theinvestigating o7cer is bound to dismiss the complaint.

4ue rocess; !he essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard andsubmit evidence in support of one6s defense. 0!he essence of due process isreasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one6sdefense.? Ehat is proscribed is lac5 of opportunity to be heard. !hus, one who hasbeen a orded a chance to present one6s own side of the story cannot claim denialof due process.

:emedial Law; Criminal rocedure; reliminary 3nvestigations; "s long as e orts toreach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to presentcountervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. ection ($d&,:ule %%' of the :ules of Court, allows rosecutor Aivero to resolve the complaintbased on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. "s longas e orts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity topresent countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. !he

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rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delaythe prosecution of o enses.

ame; ame; rosecution of O enses; !he upreme Court has previously cautionedthat 0litigants represented by counsel should not e/pect that all they need to do issit bac5, rela/ and await the outcome of their case.? Ee have previously cautionedthat 0litigants represented by counsel should not e/pect that all they need to do issit bac5, rela/ and await the outcome of their case.? aving opted to remainpassive during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counselcannot now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to 8le a counter-a7davit was of their own doing.

ame; ame; >otion for :econsideration; 3t must be pointed out that the period for8ling a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the ecretary of Gustice isrec5oned from the date of receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from thedate of the resolution. "s to his claim that he was denied the right to 8le a motionfor reconsideration or to appeal the :esolution of rosecutor Aivero due to the %D-day delay in the service of the :esolution, it must be pointed out that the period for8ling a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the ecretary of Gustice isrec5oned from the date of receipt of the

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resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. !his is clear fromection ( of the 'HHH ational rosecution ervice :ule on "ppeal# ec. (. eriod to

appeal. !he appeal shall be ta5en within 8fteen $%*& days from receipt of theresolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration1reinvestigation if onehas been 8led within 8fteen $%*& days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Onlyone motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.

ame; ame; Earrants of "rrest; earch Earrants; o search warrant or warrant ofarrest shall issue e/cept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the 2udge after e/amination under oath or a7rmation of the complainant and thewitnesses he may produce. "rticle 333, ection ' of the Constitution provides that0no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e/cept upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the 2udge after e/amination under oath or a7rmation ofthe complainant and the witnesses he may produce.?

ame; ame; ame; robable Cause; "lthough the Constitution provides thatprobable cause shall be determined by the 2udge after an e/amination under oath oran a7rmation of the complainant and the witnesses, the upreme Court has ruledthat a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. robable cause forthe issuance of a warrant of arrest has been de8ned as 0such facts andcircumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believethat an o ense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.? "lthoughthe Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the 2udgeafter an e/amination under oath or an a7rmation of the complainant and thewitnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determinationthereof. 3n fact, the 2udge6s personal e/amination of the complainant and the

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witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness ofissuing a warrant of arrest.

ame; ame; ame; ame; 3t is enough that the 2udge personally evaluates theprosecutor6s report and supporting documents showing the e/istence of probablecause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, onthe basis of his evaluation, he 8nds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor6sresolution and require the submission of additional a7davits of witnesses to aid himin determining its e/istence. 3t is enough that the 2udge personally evaluates theprosecutor6s report and supporting documents showing the e/istence of probablecause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, onthe basis of his evaluation, he 8nds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor6sresolution and require the submission of additional a7davits of witnesses to aid himin determining its e/istence. etitioners =chanis and 9aylosis claim that, had Gudge"bando painsta5ingly e/amined the records submitted by rosecutor Aivero, the 2udge would have inevitably dismissed the charge against them. "dditionally,petitioner Ocampo alleges that Gudge "bando did not point out facts and evidence in

the record that were used as bases for his 8nding of probable cause to issue awarrant of arrest. !he determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrantsof arrest against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Gudge "bando asthe trial 2udge. Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial 2udges in theissuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in arigumba v. andiganbayan,)*% C:" *(( $'HH*&.

ame; ame; rosecution of O enses; olitical O ense 4octrine; @nder the politicalo ense doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political o ense,are divested of their character as 0common? o enses and assume the politicalcomple/ion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal o ense, orcomple/ed with the same, to 2ustify the imposition of a graver penalty. @nder thepolitical o ense doctrine, 0common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a politicalo ense, are divested of their character as 0common? o enses and assume thepolitical comple/ion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal o ense, orcomple/ed with the same, to 2ustify the imposition of a graver penalty.? "nyordinary act assumes a di erent nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. !hus, when a 5illing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the 5illing is nothomicide or murder. :ather, the 5illing assumes the political comple/ion of rebellionas its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Ehen the political o ense doctrine is asserted as adefense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether theact of 5illing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motiveof the act to be conclusively demonstrated; !he burden of demonstrating politicalmotivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mindwhich only the accused 5nows. Ehen the political o ense doctrine is asserted as adefense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether theact of 5illing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive

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of the act to be conclusively demonstrated. etitioners aver that the records showthat the alleged murders were committed in furtherance of the C 1 "1 4Frebellion, and that the political motivation behind the alleged murders can beclearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the C 1 "1 4Fas co-conspirators. Ee had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political

motivation must be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mindwhich only the accused 5nows. !he proof showing political motivation is adducedduring trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidencesupporting his defense. 3t is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in theinstant petitions.

ame; ame; ame; ame; "s held in the case of O7ce of the rovincial rosecutorof Samboanga 4el orte v. Court of "ppeals, ()I C:" K%) $'HHH&, if during trial,petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed infurtherance of rebellion, ection %), :ule %%H of the :ules of Court provides theremedy. "s held in the case of O7ce of the rovincial rosecutor of Samboanga4el orte v. Court of "ppeals, ()I C:" K%) $'HHH&, if during trial, petitioners are

able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance ofrebellion, ection %), :ule %%H of the :ules of Court provides the remedy, to wit#

=C!3O %). "mendment or substitution. " complaint or information may beamended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before theaccused enters his plea. "fter the plea and during the trial, a formal amendmentmay only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causingpre2udice to the rights of the accused. owever, any amendment before plea, whichdowngrades the nature of the o ense charged in or e/cludes any accused from thecomplaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, withnotice to the o ended party and with leave of court. !he court shall state itsreasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties,

especially the o ended party. $n& 3f it appears at any time before 2udgment that amista5e has been made in charging the proper o ense, the court shall dismiss theoriginal complaint or information upon the 8ling of a new one charging the propero ense in accordance with ection %D, :ule %%D, provided the accused shall not beplaced in double 2eopardy. !he court may require the witnesses to give bail for theirappearance at the trial.

ame; ame; ame; ame; 4ouble Geopardy; 3f it is shown that the proper chargeagainst petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismissthe murder charges upon the 8ling of the 3nformation for simple rebellion, as long aspetitioners would not be placed in double 2eopardy. 3f it is shown that the propercharge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court shalldismiss the murder charges upon the 8ling of the 3nformation for simple rebellion,as long as petitioners would not be placed in double 2eopardy. ection K, :ule %%K of the :ules of Court, states# =C. K. Former conviction or acquittal; double 2eopardy.Ehen an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against himdismissed or otherwise terminated without his e/press consent by a court ofcompetent 2urisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal chargesu7cient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused hadpleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of

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the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the o ense charged, or for anyattempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any o ense whichnecessarily includes or is necessarily included in the o ense charged in the formercomplaint or information. 9ased on the above provision, double 2eopardy onlyapplies when# $%& a 8rst 2eopardy attached; $'& it has been validly terminated; and

$(& a second 2eopardy is for the same o ense as in the 8rst. " 8rst 2eopardyattaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case hasbeen dismissed or otherwise terminated without his e/press consent, by acompetent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a validplea during arraignment.

Leonen,_G., Concurring Opinion#

Criminal Law; 3nternational Law; :ebellion; Crimes "gainst 3nternationalumanitarian Law, enocide and Other Crimes "gainst umanity $:.". o. DI*%&;

Aiew that acts committed in violation of :epublic "ct o. DI*%, even in the conte/tof armed conBicts of a non-international character and in view of the declarations of the Communist arty of the hilippines and the ational 4emocratic Front, cannotbe deemed to be acts in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion. !he3nformations and Earrants were issued for the crime of multiple murder. etitionersassert that they have a pending criminal charge of rebellion and that the acts raisedin their petitions should be dismissed because they are deemed to be a ected bythe political o ense doctrine. !he political o ense doctrine states that certaincrimes, such as murder, are already absorbed by the charge of rebellion whencommitted as a necessary means and in connection with or in furtherance ofrebellion. 3 agree that this case should be remanded because there has been noevidence yet to prove that the acts imputed to the petitioners actually happened orare attributable to them. Gudicial economy, however, requires that we state thatthere are certain acts which have been committed on the occasion of a rebellionwhich should no longer be absorbed in that crime. "cts committed in violation of:epublic "ct o. DI*%, even in the conte/t of armed conBicts of a non-internationalcharacter and in view of the declarations of the Communist arty of the hilippinesand the ational 4emocratic Front, cannot be deemed to be acts in connection withor in furtherance of rebellion.

ame; ame; ame; ame; Aiew that the most serious crimes of concern to theinternational community as a whole must not go unpunished and their e ectiveprosecution must be ensured by ta5ing measures at the national level, in order toput an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute tothe prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of every tate to e/ercise its

criminal 2urisdiction over those responsible for international crimes. 3nternationalhumanitarian law $3 L& is the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed conBicts, whether of an international or non-international character. !hisbody of law see5s to limit the e ects of the conBict on individuals. !he %D)D enevaConventions and its "dditional rotocols are the main instruments that govern 3 L.

evertheless, 3 L and the rules and principles contained in the eneva Conventionsare largely regarded in the international sphere as having the character of generalor customary international law given the fundamental nature of the rules and

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0because they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.?3n the hilippines, :epublic "ct o. DI*% was enacted in view of its policy to0 renounceJ war / / /, adoptJ the generally accepted principles of international lawas part of the law of the land and adhereJ to a policy of peace, equality, 2ustice,freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.? "ccordingly, 0 tJhe most serious

crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not gounpunished and their e ective prosecution must be ensured by ta5ing measures atthe national level, in order to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of thesecrimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty ofevery tate to e/ercise its criminal 2urisdiction over those responsible forinternational crimes.?

ame; ame; ame; ame; Gus Cogens; Aiew that 2us cogens norms under theAienna Convention of Law of the !reaties are 0norm sJ accepted and recogni<ed bythe international community of tates as a whole as normsJ from which noderogation is permitted and which can be modi8ed only by a subsequent norm ofgeneral international law having the same character.? Gus cogens norms under the

Aienna Convention of Law of the !reaties are 0norm sJ accepted and recogni<ed bythe international community of tates as a whole as normsJ from which noderogation is permitted and which can be modi8ed only by a subsequent norm ofgeneral international law having the same character.? !he principles embedded inCommon "rticle ( have been held to apply even to international armed conBict,thus, depicting a universal character. 3t lays down fundamental standards which areapplicable at all times, in all circumstances and to all tates and from which noderogation at any time is permitted. "s was stated, it 0sets forth a minimum core ofmandatory rules andJ, reBects the fundamental humanitarian principles whichunderlie international humanitarian law as a whole, and upon which the enevaConventions in their entirety are based. !hese principles, the ob2ect of which is the

respect for the dignity of the human person, developed as a result of centuries ofwarfare and had already become customary law at the time of the adoption of theeneva Conventions because they reBect the most universally recogni<ed

humanitarian principles.? $=mphasis provided& ence, nonobservance of theminimum standard provided for in Common "rticle ( triggers a violation of well-accepted principles of international law.

3nternational Law; 3nternational umanitarian Law; 3nternational uman :ights Law;Aiew that international humanitarian law and international human rights law are twosets of regimes in international law. 3nternational humanitarian law andinternational human rights law are two sets of regimes in international law. !he tworegimes have been compared and contrasted with each other, to wit# !he two setsof rules certainly have a di erent history and often a di erent 8eld of application,both ratione personae and ratione temporis. uman rights thus apply to all peopleand humanitarian law applies to certain groups of persons $for e/ample, to thewounded, to prisoners o fJ war, to civilians& and, furthermore, humanitarian lawapplies only in times of armed conBict. On the other hand, Nhuman rights6 andNhumanitarian law6 regulate, ratione materiae, similar rights at least insofar thatthey all intend to increase the protection of individuals, alleviate pain and su eringand secure the minimum standard of persons in various situations. $=mphasis in the

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original& !hus, all persons are protected in both times of war and peace. !heprotection accorded by human rights laws does not cease to apply when armedconBict ensues. till, some 0human rights? are allowed to be derogated in times of0emergency which threatens the life of the nation.? evertheless, provisions on theright to life, prohibition from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and slavery

remain free from any derogation whatsoever, having acquired a 2us cogenscharacter.

ame; Crimes "gainst 3nternational umanitarian Law, enocide and Other Crimes"gainst umanity $:.". o. DI*%&; Criminal Law; :ebellion; Aiew that :epublic "ct

o. DI*% de8nes and provides for the penalties of crimes against humanity, seriousviolations of 3nternational umanitarian Law $3 L&, genocide, and other crimesagainst humanity; !hese crimes are separate from or independent from the crime of rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or argued to be connected with thearmed uprisings. :ep. "ct o. DI*% de8nes and provides for the penalties ofcrimes against humanity, serious violations of 3 L, genocide, and other crimesagainst humanity. !his law provides for the non-prescription of the prosecution of

and e/ecution of sentences imposed with regard to the crimes de8ned in the "ct. 3talso provides for the 2urisdiction of the :egional !rial Court over the crimes de8nedin the "ct. !hese crimes are, therefore, separate from or independent from thecrime of rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or argued to be connectedwith the armed uprisings.

ame; ame; Aiew that spies and civilians suspected of being spies are alsoaccorded protection under :epublic "ct o. DI*%. =ven spies are accordedprotection under Common "rticle ( of the eneva Conventions. Common "rticle (and "dditional rotocol 33 are broad enough to secure fundamental guarantees topersons not granted prisoner of war or civilian status, such as protection fromsummary e/ecution and right to fair trial. !hese fundamental guarantees are alsofound in "rticle K*, in relation to "rticles )* and )+ of "dditional rotocol 3. piesand civilians suspected of being spies are also accorded protection under :ep. "ct

o. DI*%.

ame; ame; Aiew that persons committing crimes against humanity or seriousviolations of international humanitarian law, international human rights laws, and:epublic "ct o. DI*% must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted torecogni<e the di erent nature of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent.Concomitantly, persons committing crimes against humanity or serious violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights laws, and :ep. "ct o.DI*% must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to recogni<e the

di erent nature of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent. !he contemporaryview is that these can never be considered as acts in furtherance of armed conBictno matter what the motive. 3ncidentally, this is the view also apparently shared bythe C 1 "1 4F and ma2or insurgent groups that are part of the presentgovernment6s peace process.

ame; ame; Aiew that torture and summary e/ecution in any conte/t areshameful, na5ed brutal acts of those who may have simply been transformed intodesperate cowards. !hose who may have su ered or may have died because of

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these acts deserve better than to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel. !he rebel, in his or her e ort to assert a better view of humanity, cannot negatehimself or herself. !orture and summary e/ecution of enemies or allies are neveracts of courage. !hey demean those who sacri8ced and those who gave their livesso that others may live 2ustly and en2oy the blessings of more meaningful freedoms.

!orture and summary e/ecution in any conte/t are shameful, na5ed brutal actsof those who may have simply been transformed into desperate cowards. !hosewho may have su ered or may have died because of these acts deserve better thanto be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel. Ocampo vs. "bando, K%* C:"+K($'H%)&J

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75. C !#+22) *. C%$=, G.R. N). 189165, 95 N)*" "% 900;C !" T+#2" ' SU'T. FELI BERTO CASTILLO, 'OLICEOFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RU'ERTO BORLONGAN,EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA,

-/ GILBERTO 'UN:ALAN, ENGR. RICASOL '. MILLAN,ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRU:, MR. ANASTACIO L.BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, TISOY, -/ JOHNDOES, "#+#+)-"%!, *!. DR. AMANDA T. CRU:, NI ON T.CRU:, -/ FERDINAND T. CRU:, %"! )-/"-#!.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION +- # " S$ %" " C)$%# ()% I!!$ - ")( %+#! )( A %) -/ H " ! D # .S 22 + C2 !! %+# )( A %) %+# )( H " ! D #Erit of "mparo; Erit of abeas 4ata; !he coverage of the writs is limited to theprotection of rights to life, liberty and security; !he writs cover not only actual butalso threats of unlawful acts or omissions. !he coverage of the writs is limited tothe protection of rights to life, liberty and security. "nd the writs cover not onlyactual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

ame; ame; !o be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondent must meet thethreshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated orthreatened with an unlawful act or omission. !o thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life,liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.=vidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the

rovincial overnment and respondents. "bsent any considerable ne/us betweenthe acts complained of and its e ect on respondents6 right to life, liberty andsecurity, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners6 entry into theproperty.

ame; ame; "bsent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there isundue and continuing restraint on their liberty and1or that there e/ists threat orintimidation that destroys the e7cacy of their right to be secure in their persons,the issuance of the writ cannot be 2usti8ed. "lthough respondents6 release fromcon8nement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent

any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue andcontinuing restraint on their liberty, and1or that there e/ists threat or intimidationthat destroys the e7cacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be 2usti8ed.

ame; ame; etitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are e/traordinaryremedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the e/ecution of a 8nal ande/ecutory decision in a property dispute. 3t need not be underlined thatrespondents6 petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are e/traordinary

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remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the e/ecution of a 8nal ande/ecutory decision in a property dispute.

ame; ame; Aalidity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is adefense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition forwrits of amparo and habeas data. "t all events, respondents6 8ling of the petitionsfor writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminalproceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in Bagrantedelicto and proceeded against in accordance with ection +, :ule %%' of the :ules of Court. Aalidity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defensethat may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs ofamparo and habeas data. !he reliefs a orded by the writs may, however, be madeavailable to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings. Castillo vs.Cru<, +H* C:" +'I$'HHD&J

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76. N *+ *. ' %/+ ), J$-" 1;, 9019, GR N)!. 184467C !" T+#2" EDGARDO NAVIA,1 RUBEN DIO,9 -/ ANDREBUISING, "#+#+)-"%!, *!. VIRGINIA 'ARDICO, ()% -/ +-

" 2( -/ +- %" %"!"-# #+)- )( BENHUR V. 'ARDICO,%"! )-/"-#.C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L %+#! )( A %)E-()% "/ D+! " % - "! I-#"%- #+)- 2 L )%/! -/' % !"!Constitutional Law; Erits of "mparo; =nforced 4isappearances; ".>. o. HK-D-%'- Cor !he :ule on the Erit of "mparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant e/tralegal5illings and enforced disappearances in the country. ".>. o. HK-D-%'- C or !he:ule on the Erit of "mparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant e/tralegal5illings and enforced disappearances in the country. 3ts purpose is to provide ane/peditious and e ective relief 0to any person whose right to life, liberty andsecurity is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of apublic o7cial or employee, or of a private individual or entity.?

ame; ame; ame; 3nternational Law; 3nternational Covenant on Civil and olitical:ights; "rticle + of the 3nternational Covenant on Civil and olitical :ightsrecogni<es every human being6s inherent right to life, while "rticle D thereof ordainsthat everyone has the right to liberty and security. !he right to life must be

protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired e/cepton grounds provided by and in accordance with law. "rticle + of the 3nternationalCovenant on Civil and olitical :ights recogni<es every human being6s inherent rightto life, while "rticle D thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty andsecurity. !he right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty andsecurity cannot be impaired e/cept on grounds provided by and in accordance withlaw. !his overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and securitywithout due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.

ame; ame; ame; ame; 3nternational Convention for the rotection of "ll ersonsfrom =nforced 4isappearance; Eords and

hrases; !he 3nternational Convention for the rotection of "ll ersons from=nforced 4isappearance de8nes enforced disappearances, as 0the arrest, detention,abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the tate or bypersons or groups of persons acting with the authori<ation, support or acquiescenceof the tate, followed by a refusal to ac5nowledge the deprivation of liberty or byconcealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which placesuch a person outside the protection of the law.? !he budding 2urisprudence onamparo blossomed in :a<on, Gr. v. !agitis, +H+ C:" *DI $'HHD&, when this Court

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de8ned enforced disappearances. !he Court in that case applied the generallyaccepted principles of international law and adopted the 3nternational Conventionfor the rotection of "ll ersons from =nforced 4isappearance6s de8nition ofenforced disappearances, as 0the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form ofdeprivation of liberty by agents of the tate or by persons or groups of persons

acting with the authori<ation, support or acquiescence of the tate, followed by arefusal to ac5nowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate orwhereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside theprotection of the law.?

ame; ame; ame; ame; Eords and hrases; ection ($g& of :.". o. DI*%de8nes enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows# 0=nforced or involuntarydisappearance of persons? means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by,or with the authori<ation, support or acquiescence of, a tate or a politicalorgani<ation followed by a refusal to ac5nowledge that deprivation of freedom or togive information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention ofremoving from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. "nother

signi8cant development a ecting ".>. o. HK-D-%'- C came about after Congressenacted :epublic "ct $:"& o. DI*% on 4ecember %%, 'HHD. ection ($g& thereofde8nes enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows# $g& 0=nforced orinvoluntary disappearance of persons? means the arrest, detention, or abduction ofpersons by, or with the authori<ation, support or acquiescence of, a tate or apolitical organi<ation followed by a refusal to ac5nowledge that deprivation offreedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, withthe intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period oftime.

ame; ame; ame; =lements of =nforced 4isappearances. From the statutoryde8nition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elementsthat constitute it# $a& that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form ofdeprivation of liberty; $b& that it be carried out by, or with the authori<ation, supportor acquiescence of, the tate or a political organi<ation; $c& that it be followed bythe tate or political organi<ation6s refusal to ac5nowledge or give information onthe fate or whereabouts of the person sub2ect of the amparo petition; and, $d& thatthe intention for such refusal is to remove sub2ect person from the protection of thelaw for a prolonged period of time.

ame; ame; ame; !he petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving bysubstantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation. 3t isnow clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof thatthe persons sub2ect thereof are missing are not enough. 3t must also be shown andproved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or withthe authori<ation, support or acquiescence of, the tate or a political organi<ation,followed by a refusal to ac5nowledge the same or give information on the fate orwhereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from theprotection of the law for a prolonged period of time. imply put, the petitioner in an

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amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensableelement of government participation.

ame; ame; ame; 3n an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is notenough. 3t is li5ewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried outwith the direct or indirect authori<ation, support or acquiescence of thegovernment. 9ut lest it be overloo5ed, in an amparo petition, proof ofdisappearance alone is not enough. 3t is li5ewise essential to establish that suchdisappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authori<ation, support oracquiescence of the government. !his indispensable element of tate participationis not present in this case. !he petition does not contain any allegation of tatecomplicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the governmentor any of its agents orchestrated 9en6s disappearance. 3n fact, none of its agents,o7cials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Airginia6s amparo petitionwhether as responsible or accountable persons. !hus, in the absence of anallegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in 9en6sdisappearance or that they failed to e/ercise e/traordinary diligence in investigating

his case, the Court will de8nitely not hold the government or its agents either asresponsible or accountable persons.

ame; ame; ame; " writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity.9ut even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparopetition is a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in thedisappearance remains an indispensable element. Ee are aware that under

ection % of ".>. o. HK-D-%'- C a writ of amparo may lie against a privateindividual or entity. 9ut even if the person sought to be held accountable orresponsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, governmentinvolvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. ere,petitioners are mere security guards at rand :oyale ubdivision in 9rgy. Lugam,>alolos City and their principal, the "sian Land, is a private entity. !hey do not wor5for the government and nothing has been presented that would lin5 or connectthem to some covert police, military or governmental operation. "s discussedabove, to fall within the ambit of ".>. o. HK-D-%'- C in relation to :" o. DI*%, thedisappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. !his hallmar5of tate participation di erentiates an enforced disappearance case from anordinary case of a missing person. avia vs. ardico, +K( C:" +%I$'H%'&J

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77. G"-"% 2 *. U%%), G.R. N). 1;1560, M % 9;, 9011C !" T+#2" HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, C) +!!+)-"%,N #+)- 2 ')2+ " C) +!!+)-, "#+#+)-"%, *!. HON.ALEJANDRO S. URRO, +- +! +# ! # " -" )+-#""*+ " "%"+- "#+#+)-"% HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL,N #+)- 2 ')2+ " C) +!!+)-, %"! )-/"-#.C !" N #$%" S'ECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS +- # " S$ %" "C)$%#. $) %% -#), C"%#+)% %+ -/ '%) + +#+)-.S 22 + C2 !! $) %% -#)"dministrative Law; "ppointments; "ppointments may be classi8ed into two# 8rst,as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made. "ppointmentsmay be classi8ed into two# 8rst, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner inwhich it is made. @nder the 8rst classi8cation, appointments can either bepermanent or temporary $acting&. " basic distinction is that a permanent appointeecan only be removed from o7ce for cause; whereas a temporary appointee can beremoved even without hearing or cause. @nder the second classi8cation, anappointment can either be regular or ad interim. " regular appointment is one madewhile Congress is in session, while an ad interim appointment is one issued duringthe recess of Congress. 3n strict terms, presidential appointments that require nocon8rmation from the Commission on "ppointments cannot be properlycharacteri<ed as either a regular or an ad interim appointment.

ame; ame; Constitutional Law; !he power to appoint vested in the resident

includes the power to ma5e temporary appointments, unless he is otherwisespeci8cally prohibited by the Constitution or by the law. enerally, the power toappoint vested in the resident includes the power to ma5e temporaryappointments, unless he is otherwise speci8cally prohibited by the Constitution orby the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the o7ceinvolved. !he resident6s power to issue an acting appointment is particularlyauthori<ed by the "dministrative Code of %DIK $=/ecutive Order o. 'D'&.

ame; ame; !he purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent ahiatus in the discharge of o7cial functions by authori<ing a person to dischargethose functions pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. !hepurpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the

discharge of o7cial functions by authori<ing a person to discharge those functionspending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. "n acting appointeeaccepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the o7ce once he iscalled to do so by the appointing authority. !herefore, his term of o7ce is not 8/edbut endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

ame; ame; " staggered term of o7ce is not a statutory prohibition against theissuance of acting or temporary appointment. enerally, the purpose for

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staggering the term of o7ce is to minimi<e the appointing authority6s opportunity toappoint a ma2ority of the members of a collegial body. 3t also intended to ensure thecontinuity of the body and its policies. " staggered term of o7ce, however, is not astatutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporaryappointment. 3t does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary

appointments that the "dministrative Code grants.ame; ame; ational olice Commission $ " OLCO>&; othing in the enumeration

of functions of the members of the ational olice Commission $ " OLCO>& wouldbe subverted or defeated by the resident6s appointment of an acting " OLCO>Commissioner pending the selection and quali8cation of a permanent appointee.Ee 8nd nothing in this enumeration of functions of the members of the " OLCO>that would be subverted or defeated by the resident6s appointment of an acting

" OLCO> Commissioner pending the selection and quali8cation of a permanentappointee. Aiewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and e/ecutiveissuances will show that the " OLCO> has always remained as an o7ce under orwithin the =/ecutive 4epartment. Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the

petitioner6s acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the" OLCO> Commissioners or of the " OLCO> as an institution, on the other.

uo Earranto; uo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to apublic o7ce. uo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to apublic o7ce. enerally, quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the

overnment as the proper party-plainti . owever, under ection *, :ule ++ of the:ules of Court, an individual may commence such action if he claims to be entitledto the public o7ce allegedly usurped by another.

ame; !he petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who see5s reinstatement to ano7ce, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right

to the o7ce for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail. ince thepetitioner merely holds an acting appointment $and an e/pired one at that&, heclearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. !heessence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequentrevocability at any time by the appointing authority. !he petitioner in a quowarranto proceeding who see5s reinstatement to an o7ce, on the ground ofusurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the o7ce for his suitto succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail. eneral vs. @rro, +)+ C:" *+K$'H%%&J

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78. T -"- "" *. '") 2", G.R. N). 17;448, J$-" 96, 9013C !" T+#2" CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, "#+#+)-"%, *!. 'EO'LEOF THE 'HILI''INES, %"! )-/"-#.

C !" N #$%" 'ETITION ()% %"*+" )- "%#+)% %+ )( # "/" +!+)- -/ %"!)2$#+)- )( # " C)$%# )( A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C%+ +- 2 L E!# ( T %)$ F 2!+ #+)- )(C) "% + 2 D) $ "-#! '"- 2#+"!Constitutional Law; Custodial 3nterrogation; Eords and hrases; Custodialinterrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after aperson is ta5en into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in anysigni8cant manner.T!he constitutional proscription against the admissibility ofadmission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of ection %', "rticle 333 of the

Constitution, as correctly observed by the C" and the O , is applicable only incustodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated bylaw enforcement authorities after a person is ta5en into custody or otherwisedeprived of his freedom of action in any signi8cant manner. 3ndeed, a person undercustodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon thecommencement thereof, vi<.# $%& to remain silent, $'& to have competent andindependent counsel preferably of his own choice, and $(& to be informed of the twoother rights above. 3n the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gavean uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branchhe managed, the following are clear# $%& the questioning was not initiated by a lawenforcement authority but merely by an internal a airs manager of the ban5; and,$'& petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any signi8cantmanner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be undercustodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogativeduring the ta5ing of his written statement.

ame; :ight to Counsel; 3n :emolona v. Civil ervice Commission, )%) hil. *DH$'HH%&, the upreme Court declared that the right to counsel 0applies only toadmissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in anadministrative investigation.?T3n :emolona v. Civil ervice Commission, (+' C:"(H) $'HH%&, we declared that the right to counsel 0applies only to admissions madein a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.?"mplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case of

Carbonel v. Civil ervice Commission, +(H C:" 'H' $'H%H&# owever, it must beremembered that the right to counsel under ection %' of the 9ill of :ights is meantto protect a suspect during custodial investigation. !hus, the e/clusionary ruleunder paragraph $'&, ection %' of the 9ill of :ights applies only to admissionsmade in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrativeinvestigation. ere, petitioner6s written statement was given during anadministrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with ananomaly1irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. o

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error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and ingiving due consideration to petitioner6s written statement as there is noconstitutional impediment to its admissibility.

ame; =vidence; Confessions; " confession or admissionJ is presumed voluntaryuntil the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving thecontrary.T0 3Jt is settled that a confession or admissionJ is presumed voluntaryuntil the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving thecontrary.? etitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, hiswritten statement was found to have been e/ecuted freely and consciously. !hepertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality thatonly a perpetrator of the crime could furnish.

ame; ame; =/tra2udicial Confessions; 3t is a settled rule that where the defendantdid not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal oradministrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidenceof violence was presented, his e/tra2udicial statement shall be considered as havingbeen voluntarily e/ecuted.T!he fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper ofprotest and 8le any charges, criminal or administrative, against the investigator andthe two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to signnegate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. 3t is a settled rule thatwhere the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did notinstitute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators,where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his e/tra2udicial statementshall be considered as having been voluntarily e/ecuted. either will petitioner6sassertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before a7/ing hissignature thereon 02ust to get it over with? prop up the instant etition. !o recall,petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and hadbeen a ban5 manager for quite a number of years. e is thus e/pected to fullyunderstand and comprehend the signi8cance of signing an instrument. 3t is 2ustunfortunate that he did not e/ercise due diligence in the conduct of his own a airs.

e can therefore e/pect no consideration for it.

Criminal Law; Forgery; Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by thesigning of another6s name with intent to defraud.T0Forgery is present when anywriting is counterfeited by the signing of another6s name with intent to defraud.? 3tcan be established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic orgenuine one. " 8nding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies ofgovernment handwriting e/perts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind thecourts. " trial 2udge is not precluded but is even authori<ed by law to conduct an

independent e/amination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at areasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

:emedial Law; Criminal rocedure; "ppeals; " rule of long standing in this 2urisdiction is that 8ndings of a trial court, when a7rmed by the Court of "ppeals,are accorded great weight and respect.T3n this case, the 8nding of forgery on thesignature of :omeo !an $!an& appearing in the promissory notes and cashier6schec5s was not anchored solely on the result of the e/amination conducted by the

ational 9ureau of 3nvestigation $ 93& 4ocument =/aminer. !he trial court also

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made an independent e/amination of the questioned signatures and after analy<ingthe same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of !an appearing in thepromissory notes are di erent from his genuine signatures appearing in his 4eposit"ccount 3nformation and pecimen ignature Cards on 8le with the ban5. !hus, we8nd no reason to disturb the above 8ndings of the :!C which was a7rmed by the

C". " rule of long standing in this 2urisdiction is that 8ndings of a trial court, whena7rmed by the C", are accorded great weight and respect. "bsent any reason todeviate from the said 8ndings, as in this case, the same should be deemedconclusive and binding to this Court.

ame; =vidence; Eitnesses; !he prosecution has the prerogative to choose theevidence or the witnesses it wishes to present.T!he prosecution has theprerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. 3t has thediscretion as to how it should present its case. >oreover, the presumption thatsuppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at thedisposal of both the defense and the prosecution. 3n the present case, if petitionerbelieves that !an is the principal witness who could e/culpate him from liability by

establishing that it was !an and not him who signed the sub2ect documents, themost prudent thing to do is to utili<e him as his witness. "nyway, petitioner has theright to have compulsory process to secure !an6s attendance during the trialpursuant to "rticle 333, ection %)$'& of the Constitution. !he records show, however,that petitioner did not invo5e such right. 3n view of these, no suppression ofevidence can be attributed to the prosecution.

Criminal Law; 4enials; 4enials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincingevidence are negative and self-serving evidence. !hey merit no weight in law andcannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesseswho testi8ed on a7rmative matters.T!he Court is also not persuaded by the bareand uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the loans covered by thepromissory notes and the cashier6s chec5s were personally transacted by !anagainst his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw !an a7/ hissignature thereto. "gain, this allegation, as the :!C aptly observed, is not supportedby established evidence. 03t is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated byclear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. !hey meritJno weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimonyof credible witnesses who testi8ed on a7rmative matters.? !he chain of events inthis case, from the preparation of the promissory notes to the encashment of thecashier6s chec5s, as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and based onpetitioner6s own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that hecommitted the unlawful acts alleged in the 3nformations.

ame; Falsi8cation of Commercial 4ocuments; Falsi8cation of documents underparagraph %, "rticle %K' in relation to "rticle %K% of the :evised enal Code refersto falsi8cation by a private individual or a public o7cer or employee, who did notta5e advantage of is o7cial position, of public, private or commercialdocument.TFalsi8cation of documents under paragraph %, "rticle %K' in relation to"rticle %K% of the :evised enal Code $: C& refers to falsi8cation by a privateindividual or a public o7cer or employee, who did not ta5e advantage of his o7cial

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position, of public, private or commercial document. !he elements of falsi8cation ofdocuments under paragraph %, "rticle %K' of the : C are# $%& that the o ender is aprivate individual or a public o7cer or employee who did not ta5e advantage of hiso7cial position; $'& that he committed any of the acts of falsi8cation enumerated in"rticle %K% of the : C; and, $(& that the falsi8cation was committed in a public,

o7cial or commercial document. "ll the above-mentioned elements wereestablished in this case. First, petitioner is a private individual. econd, the acts offalsi8cation consisted in petitioner6s $%& counterfeiting or imitating the handwritingor signature of !an and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in allrespects; and $'& causing it to appear that !an has participated in an act orproceeding when he did not in fact so participate. !hird, the falsi8cation wascommitted in promissory notes and chec5s which are commercial documents.Commercial documents are, in general, documents or instruments which are 0usedby merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions.?

romissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a chec5 is a means of paymentused in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. "cashier6s chec5 necessarily facilitates ban5 transactions for it allows the personwhose name and signature appear thereon to encash the chec5 and withdraw theamount indicated therein.

ame; Comple/ Crimes; Eords and hrases; " comple/ crime may refer to a singleact which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an o ense as anecessary means for committing another.TEhen the o ender commits on a public,o7cial or commercial document any of the acts of falsi8cation enumerated in "rticle%K% as a necessary means to commit another crime li5e estafa, theft ormalversation, the two crimes form a comple/ crime. @nder "rticle )I of the : C,there are two classes of a comple/ crime. " comple/ crime may refer to a single actwhich constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an o ense as a

necessary means for committing another. 3n 4omingo v. eople, +H( C:" )II$'HHD&, we held# !he falsi8cation of a public, o7cial, or commercial document maybe a means of committing estafa, because before the falsi8ed document is actuallyutili<ed to defraud another, the crime of falsi8cation has already beenconsummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of thecrime of falsi8cation of public, o7cial or commercial document. 3n other words, thecrime of falsi8cation has already e/isted. "ctually utili<ing that falsi8ed public,o7cial or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. 9ut the damage iscaused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsi8cation of the document. !herefore, the falsi8cation of the public, o7cial or commercial document is only anecessary means to commit estafa.

ame; =stafa; =stafa is generally committed when $a& the accused defraudedanother by abuse of con8dence, or by means of deceit, and $b& the o ended partyor a third party su ered damage or pre2udice capable of pecuniaryestimation.T0=stafa is generally committed when $a& the accused defraudedanother by abuse of con8dence, or by means of deceit, and $b& the o ended partyor a third party su ered damage or pre2udice capable of pecuniary estimation.?0 4Jeceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words orconduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should

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have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that heshall act upon it to his legal in2ury.? !he elements of estafa obtain in this case. 9yfalsely representing that !an requested him to process purported loans on thelatter6s behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of !an in thecashier6s chec5s. !hrough these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from

the ban5. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the samein =urocan Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to ta5ehold of the money, misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use andbene8t, and these resulted to the damage and pre2udice of the ban5 in the amountof about )( million.

ame; =stafa !hrough Falsi8cation of Commercial 4ocuments; enalties; !he crimeof falsi8cation was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa. ursuantto "rticle )I of the :evised enal Code, the penalty to be imposed in such caseshould be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied inits ma/imum period.T etitioner in this case is found liable for the commission ofthe comple/ crime of estafa through falsi8cation of commercial document. !he

crime of falsi8cation was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa.ursuant to "rticle )I of theCode, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be

that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in itsma/imum period. !he applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, beingthe more serious o ense than falsi8cation. !anenggee vs. eople, +DD C:"+(D$'H%(&J

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7;. '") 2" *. C *"=, G.R. N). 907;50, S" #" "% 99,9014C !" T+#2" 'EO'LE OF THE 'HILI''INES, 2 +-#+P

"22"", *!. MAR@ JASON CHAVE: BITANCOR 2+ !NOY, $!"/ "22 -#.

C !" N #$%" A''EAL (%) /" +!+)- )( # " C)$%# )(A " 2!.S 22 + C2 !! C)-!#+#$#+)- 2 L M+% -/ R+ #! C$!#)/+ 2 I-*"!#+ #+)-!

:emedial Law; =vidence; Circumstantial =vidence; !he :ules of Court e/pressly

provides that circumstantial evidence may be su7cient to establish guilt beyondreasonable doubt for the conviction of an accused. Chave< invo5es hisconstitutional right to be presumed innocent, especially since the prosecution6sevidence is purely circumstantial and a conviction must stand on a moral certaintyof guilt. !he :ules of Court e/pressly provides that circumstantial evidence may besu7cient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of anaccused# =C. ). Circumstantial evidence, when su7cient. Circumstantial evidenceis su7cient for conviction if# $a& !here is more than one circumstance; $b& !he factsfrom which the inferences are derived are proven; and $c& !he combination of all thecircumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

ame; Criminal rocedure; "ppeals; Factual 8ndings by the trial court on itsappreciation of evidence presented by the parties, and even its conclusions derivedfrom the 8ndings, are generally given great respect and conclusive e ect by thiscourt, more so when these factual 8ndings are a7rmed by the Court of "ppeals$C"&. Factual 8ndings by the trial court on its appreciation of evidence presentedby the parties, and even its conclusions derived from the 8ndings, are generallygiven great respect and conclusive e ect by this court, more so when these factual8ndings are a7rmed by the Court of "ppeals. evertheless, this court has held that0 wJhat is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery withhomicide is for the prosecution to establish the o ender6s intent to ta5e personalproperty before the 5illing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actuallycarried out.? 3n cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that

homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can beconvicted of robbery with homicide.

Criminal Law; !heft; Ehen a person has possession of a stolen property, he can bedisputably presumed as the author of the theft. !here is a disputable presumptionthat 0a person found in possession of a thing ta5en in the doing of a recent wrongfulact is the ta5er and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a personpossesses, or e/ercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.? !hus, when a

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person has possession of a stolen property, he can be disputably presumed as theauthor of the theft.

ame; ame; enalties; !he penalty for the crime of theft is based on the value ofthe stolen items. 3n any case, the penalty for the crime of theft is based on thevalue of the stolen items. !he lower court made no factual 8ndings on the value ofthe missing items enumerated in the information one o5ia cell phone unit, one>otorola cell phone unit, si/ pieces ladies ring, two pieces nec5lace, and onebracelet.

Constitutional Law; >iranda :ights; !he >iranda rights were incorporated in ourConstitution but were modi8ed to include the statement that any waiver of the rightto counsel must be made 0in writing and in the presence of counsel.? !he right tocounsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the >irandarights, which require that# . . . $a& any person under custodial investigation has theright to remain silent; $b& anything he says can and will be used against him in acourt of law; $c& he has the right to tal5 to an attorney before being questioned andto have his counsel present when being questioned; and $d& if he cannot a ord anattorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. !he >irandarights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modi8ed to include thestatement that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made 0in writing and inthe presence of counsel.? !he invocation of these rights applies during custodialinvestigation, which begins 0when the police investigation is no longer a generalinquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect ta5eninto custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions tothe person to elicit incriminating statements.?

ame; ame; Custodial 3nvestigation; :epublic "ct $:"& o. K)(I e/panded thede8nition of custodial investigation to 0include the practice of issuing an Ninvitation6

to a person who is investigated in connection with an o ense he is suspected tohave committed, without pre2udice to the liability of the Ninviting6 o7cer for anyviolation of law.? :epublic "ct o. K)(I e/panded the de8nition of custodialinvestigation to 0include the practice of issuing an Ninvitation6 to a person who isinvestigated in connection with an o ense he is suspected to have committed,without pre2udice to the liability of the Ninviting6 o7cer for any violation of law.? !hismeans that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police o7cer must beapprised of their >iranda rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial settinge/ist in this scenario. Chave< is also being questioned by an investigating o7cer ina police station. "s an additional pressure, he may have been compelled tosurrender by his mother who accompanied him to the police station. eople vs.

Chave<, K(* C:" K'I$'H%)&J

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for not less than fourteen $%)& years and eight $I& months and not more thanseventeen $%K& years and four $)& months. !he penalty for carnapping is providedin ection %) of :epublic "ct o. +*(D# =C!3O %). enalty for Carnapping. "nyperson who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is de8ned in ection !wo ofthis "ct, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle ta5en, be punished by

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