[G.R. No. 122166.March 11, 1998]CRESENTE Y. LLORENTE, JR.,petitioner, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN and LETICIA G. FUERTES,respondents.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:In a prosecution for violation of Section 3[e] of the Anti-Graft Law, that is, causing undue injury to any party, the government prosecutors must prove actual injury to the offended party; speculative or incidental injury is not sufficient.The CaseBefore us is a petition for review of the Decision promulgated on June 23, 1995 and the Resolution promulgated on October 12, 1995 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 18343, finding Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. guilty as charged.Llorente, then municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was charged with violation of Sec. 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, under an Information dated October 22, 1992, textually reproduced as follows:[1]That in or about and during the period of July, 1990 to October, 1991, or for sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Sindangan, Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., a public officer, being then the Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in the exercise of his official and administrative functions, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith refuse to sign and approve the payrolls and vouchers representing the payments of the salaries and other emoluments of Leticia G. Fuertes, without just valid cause and without due process of law, thereby causing undue injury to the said Leticia G. Fuertes.CONTRARY TO LAW.Duly arraigned on March 29, 1993, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of NOT GUILTY.[2]After trial in due course, the Sandiganbayan[3]rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:[4]WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; and to pay the costs.Respondent Court denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution, thus:[5]WHEREFORE, accuseds Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.His Motion for Marking of Additional Exhibits Cum Offer of Documentary Exhibits in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial is now rendered moot and academic.Hence, this petition.[6]The FactsVersion of the ProsecutionAs found by Respondent Court, the prosecutions version of the facts of this case is as follows:[7]After appreciating all the evidence on both sides, the following uncontroverted facts may be gleaned:1.Accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., at the time the alleged act was committed, was the Municipal Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.2.Private [C]omplainant, Leticia C. Fuertes, is the duly appointed Assistant Municipal Treasurer in the same municipality since October 18, 1985.3.Starting 1986, private complainant was detailed to different offices, as follows:(a)Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte from April, 1986 to August, 1987 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.(b)Municipality of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte from September, 1987 to March, 1988 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.(c)Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte from April, 1988 to May, 1988.(d)Municipality of Pian, Zamboanga del Norte from June, 1988 to June, 1990 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.4.In July, 1990, she was returned to her post as Assistant Municipal Treasurer in the town of Sindangan.She was not provided with office table and chair nor given any assignment; neither her daily time record and application for leave acted upon by the municipal treasurer per instruction of accused Mayor (Exh. G-2; G-3).5.On July 23, 1990, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, presided by accused Mayor, passed Resolution No. SB 214 (Exh. 3), vehemently objecting to the assignment of complainant as Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Sindangan.6.On March 12, 1991, accused Municipal Mayor received a letter (SB Resolution No. 36) from the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Pian, demanding from the private complainant return of the amount overpaid to her as salaries (par. 9, p. 2 of Exh. 4 counter-affidavit of accused Mayor).7.On May 22, 1991, private complainant filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages (Exh. E) against the accused Mayor and the Municipality of Sindangan before Branch II, Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45, for the alleged unjustified refusal of Mayor Llorente to sign and/or approve her payrolls and/or vouchers representing her salaries and other emoluments as follows: (a) salary for the month of June, 1990 in the amount ofP5,452.00 under disbursement voucher dated September 5, 1990 (Exh. H).Although complainant rendered services at the municipality of Pian during this period, she could not collect her salary there considering that as of that month, Pian had already appointed an Assistant Municipal Treasurer.When she referred the matter to the Provincial Auditor, she was advised to claim her salary for that month with her mother agency, the Municipality of Sindangan, [(]p. 12, TSN of August 9, 1994; 10th paragraph of complainants Supplemental Affidavit marked Exh. G); (b) salary differential for the period from July 1, 1989 to April 30, 1990 in the total amount ofP19,480.00 under disbursement voucher dated August, 1990 (Exh. I); (c) 13th month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance under Supplemental Budget No. 5, CY 1990 in the total amount ofP7,275 per disbursement voucher dated December 4, 1990 (Exh. J); (d) vacation leave commutation for the period from Octoberto December 31, 1990 in the total amount ofP16,356.00 per disbursement voucher dated December 3, 1990 (Exh. K); (e) RATA for the months of July, August and September, 1990, January and February, 1991 in the total amount ofP5,900.00 (par. 12 & 16 of Exh. E); and (f) salaries for January and February, 1991 in the total amount ofP10,904.00 (par. 17 of Exh. E).8.Accused Mayor did not file an answer; instead, he negotiated for an amicable settlement of the case (p. 24, TSN of August 10, 1994).Indeed, a Compromise Agreement (Exh. A) dated August 27, 1991, between the accused and private complainant was submitted to and approved by the court, hereto quoted as follows:COMPROMISE AGREEMENTThat the parties have agreed, as they hereby agree, to settle this case amicably on the basis of the following terms and conditions, to wit:(a)That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. binds himself to sign and/or approve all vouchers and/or payrolls for unpaid salaries, RATA, Cash-gifts, 13th month pay, clothing allowance, salary differentials and other emoluments which the petitioner is entitled is Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte;(b)That the parties herein hereby waive, renounce and relinquish their other claims and counter-claims against each other;(c)That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente Jr. binds himself to sign and/or approve all subsequent vouchers and payrolls of the herein petitioner.9.On August 27, 1991, a Decision (Exh. B) was rendered by Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena on the basis of the aforesaid compromise agreement.10.For his failure to comply with the terms of the compromise agreement, private complainant, thru counsel, filed a Motion for Execution on September 12, 1991.A Writ of Execution (Exh. C) was issued by the Court on September17, 1991, and served [on] the accused on September 23, 1991.11.As shown in the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D), private complainant was paid her salaries for the period from January, 1991 to August, 1991, while the rest of her salaries including the RATA and other emoluments were not paid considering the alleged need of a supplemental budget to be enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sindangan per verbal allegation of the municipal treasurer.12.Complainant was not also paid her salaries from July to December 1990; September and October, 1991; RATA for the period from July 1990 to June 1994 (admission of accused, pp. 8-9, TSN of June 27, 1994, a.m.; Exh. E; p. 17, TSN of June 27, 1994).13.Sometime in 1993, accused municipal mayor received from the Municipality of Pian, Bill No. 93-08 (Exh. 1), demanding from the Municipality of Sindangan settlement of overpayment to complainant Fuertes in the amount of P50,643.93 per SB Resolution No. 6 sent on July 23, 1990.The bill was settled by the Municipality of Sindangan in December, 1993 per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9312487 dated December 2, 1993 (Exh. 2).14.Private complainant was able to receive complete payment of her claims only on January 4, 1993 in the form of checks all dated December 29, 1992 (as appearing on Exhs. H, I, J, K of the prosecution, Exhs. 6, 7, 8, of the defense) except her RATA which was given to her only on July 25, 1994, covering the period from July 1990 to December, 1993 amounting to P55,104.00, as evidenced by Disbursement Voucher dated July 25, 1994 (Exh. 5).Version of the DefenseWhile admitting some delays in the payment of the complainants claims, petitioner sought to prove the defense of good faith -- that the withholding of payment was due to her failure to submit the required money and property clearance, and to the Sangguniang Bayans delayed enactment of a supplemental budget to cover the claims.He adds that such delays did not result in undue injury to complainant.In his memorandum, petitioner restates the facts as follows:[8]1.Complainant xxx was appointed assistant municipal treasurer of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte on October 18, 1985.However, starting 1986 until July 1990, or for a period of about four (4) and one half (1/2) years, she was detailed in other municipalities and in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte.She returned as assistant treasurer of Sindangan in July 1990. (Decision, pp. 5-6).2.As complainant had been working in municipallities and offices other than in Sindangan for more than four (4) years, her name was removed from the regular payroll of Sindangan, and payment of past salaries and other emoluments had to be done by vouchers.When complainant xxx presented her vouchers to petitioner, the latter required her to submit clearances from the different offices to which she was detailed, as well as a certificate of last payment as required by COA regulations (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994).Instead of submitting the required documents, Mrs. Fuertes said that what I did, I endorsed my voucher to the mayor through the municipal treasurer (Tsn, p. 13, June 27, 1994).The municipaltreasurer could not, however, process the vouchers and certify as to the availability of funds until after the Sangguniang Bayan had passed a supplemental budget for the purpose(Exhs. D and 6-c Motion), which came only in December 1992.3.Petitioner, in the meanwhile, received on March 12, 1991 SB Resolution No. 36 from the Municipality of Pinan, demanding from Mrs. xxx Fuertes the reimbursement ofP105,915.00, and because of this demand, he needed time to verify the matter before acting on Mrs. Fuertes claims (Exh. 4).Mrs. Fuertes admitted that she had at the time problems of accountability with the Municipality of Pinan.She testified:Q.Counsel now is asking you, when you went back to Sindangan there was [sic] still problems of the claims either against you or against the Municipality of Sindangan by the municipalities had, [sic] in their minds, overpaid you?A.Yes, your Honor, that was evidence[d] by the bill of the Municipality of Pinan to the Municipality of Sindangan. (Tsn, p. 18, Aug. 3, 194).4.Petitioner also stated that he could not act on complainants claims because she had not submitted the required money and property accountability clearance from Pinan (Tsn, 11, Aug. 10, 1994) and that at the time the Sangguniang Bayan had not appropriated funds for the purpose. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43, Aug. 10, 1994).Nonetheless, petitioner included Mrs. Fuertes name in the regular annual budget beginning 1991 (Exhs. 4-b, 4-d, 4-f), as a result of which she had been since then receiving her regular monthly salary.5.On May 21, 1991, Mrs. Fuertes filed a complaint xxx.Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint, alleging as a defense, that plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies. (Annex B, p. 3, Petition; Exh. 1-Motion).On August 27, 1991, the parties entered into a compromise agreement, which the trial court approved (Exh. B).x x x.6. Upon motion of counsel for Mrs. Fuertes, the trial court issued a writ of execution of the compromise judgment.However, the writ of execution was addressed only to petitioner; it was not served on the municipal Sangguniang Bayan.x x x.Thus, Mrs. Fuertes had been receiving her regular salary from January, 1991 because petitioner had included her name in the regular budget beginning 1991, which fact complainant did not dispute.With respect to her other claims for past services in other offices, Municipal Treasurer, Mrs. Narcisa Caber, informed that a supplemental budget for such purpose to be passed by the Sangguniang Bayan was necessary before she could be paid thereof.Being the municipal treasurer, Mrs. Caber knew that without such supplemental budget, payment of Mrs. Fuertes other claims could not be made because the law requires that disbursements shall be made in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations (Sec. 346, RA 7160) and that no money shall be disbursed unless xxx the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. (Sec. 344, RA 7160).7.Petitioner had instructed the municipal budget officer to prepare the supplemental budget for payment of complainants unpaid claims for submission to the Sangguniang [Bayan] for enactment. (Tsn, pp. 32-33, Aug. 10, 1994).The budget officer, Mr. Narciso Siasico stated as follows:1.I am the budget officer for the Municipality of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a position I have held since 1981.xxxxxxxxx3.Immediately after said mandamus case was settled through a compromise agreement, Mayor Llorente instructed me to prepare the necessary budget proposals for the deliberation and approval of the Sangguniang Bayan;xxxxxxxxx.8.Instead of waiting for the Sangguniang Bayan to enact the budget or of securing analiaswrit of execution to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to pass the same, Mrs. Fuertes filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman under date of October 28, 1991, admitting receipt of her salaries from January 1991 and saying she had not been paid her other claims in violation of the compromise judgment.(Exh. F).She had thus made the Office of the Ombudsman a collecting agency to compel payment of the judgment obligation.9.While the budget proposal had been prepared and submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for action, it took time for the Sangguniang Bayan to pass the supplemental budget and for the Provincial Board to approve the same.It was only on December 27, 1992 that the municipal treasurer and the municipal accountant issued a certification of availability of funds for the purpose.Petitioner approved the vouchers immediately, and in a period of one week, Mrs. Fuertes was paid all claims, as evidenced by the prosecutions Exhs. H, I, J and K, which were the four vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes, xxxx.xxxxxxxxx11.Petitioner testified that he could not immediately sign or approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes for the following reasons:a)The Sangguniang Bayan had not appropriated the amounts to pay Mrs. Fuertes. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43, Aug. 10, 1994).b)Municipal Treasurer Caber, to whom Mrs. Fuertes endorsed her vouchers for processing, and the Municipal Accountant issued the certificate of availability of funds only on December 27, 1992 (Tsn, p. 42, Aug. 10, 1994; Exhs. H, I, J and K); and the delay in the issuance of the certificate of availability of funds was due to the delay by the Provincial Board to approve the supplemental budget. (Tsn, p. 43, Aug. 10, 1994).[c])He received on March 12, 1991 a demand from the Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte, where Mrs. Fuertes last worked, for the reimbursement of P105,915.00, and the matter had to be clarified first. (Exh. 4).Mrs. Fuertes admitted that she had some problem of accountability with the Municipality of Pinan. (Tsn, p. 18, 1994).It took time before this matter could be clarified by the Municipality of Pinan reducing its claim to P50,647.093 and the Municipality of Sindangan paying said claim. (Exh. 2; Decision, p. 9).[d])Mrs. Fuertes had not submitted the required clearance from the Municipality of Pinan. (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994).He did not insist on this requirement after the trial court issued the writ of execution to implement the compromise judgment. (Tsn, p. 23, Aug. 10, 1994).Nonetheless, in the post audit of Mrs. Fuertes accountability, the Commission on Audit issued a notice of suspension of the amount of P5,452.00 from Mrs. Fuertes for her failure to submit: 1. Clearance for money & property accountability from former office. 2. Certification as [sic] last day of service in former office. 3. Certification of last salary received & issued by the disbursing officer in former office, certified by chief accountant and verified by resident auditor. (Exh. 2-Motion).12.The Information dated October 12, 1992 filed against petitioner alleged that petitioner as mayor did not sign and approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes for payment of her salaries and other emoluments from July 1, 1990 to October 1991, which caused her undue injury.However, the prosecutions Exh. D, the sheriffs return dated November 19, 1991, stated that Mrs. Fuertes had received her salary from January 1, 1991 up to the present, which meant that even before the information was filed, she had been paid her regular salaries from January 1, 1991 to October 1991.The supplemental budget to cover payment of her other claims for past services was passed only in December 1992 and the municipal treasurer and accountant issued the certificate of availability of funds only on December 27, 1992, and Mrs. Fuertes got paid of [sic] all her other claims, including those not claimed in the Information, within one week therefrom. (Exhs. H, I, J, and K).xxxxxxxxx.Ruling of the SandiganbayanRespondent Court held that the delay or withholding of complainants salaries and emoluments was unreasonable and caused complainant undue injury.Being then the sole breadwinner in their family, the withholding of her salaries caused her difficulties in meeting her familys financial obligations like paying for the tuition fees of her four children.Petitioners defense that complainant failed to attach the required money and property clearance to her vouchers was held to be an afterthought that was brought about, in the first place, by his own failure to issue any memorandum requiring its submission.That the voucher form listed the clearance as one of the requirements for its approval had neither been brought to complainants attention, nor raised by petitioner as defense in his answer.In any event, the payment of complainants salary from January to November 1991, confirmed by the sheriffs return, showed that the clearance was not an indispensable requirement, because petitioner could have acted upon or approved the disbursement even without it.The alleged lack of a supplemental budget was also rejected, because it was petitioners duty as municipal mayor to prepare and submit the executive and supplemental budgets under Sections 318, 320, and 444 (3)(ii) of the Local Government Code,[9]and the complainants claims as assistant municipal treasurer, a permanent position included in the plantilla for calendar year 1990 and 1991, were classified as current operating expenditures for the same calendar years, which were chargeable against the general funds of the town of Sindangan.Except for the representation and transportation allowance, Fuertes claims for thirteenth month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance were already covered by Supplemental Budget No. 5 for calendar year 1990.Petitioners contention that funds covering complainants claims were made available only in December 1992 was unbelievable, considering that an ordinance enacting a supplemental budget takes effect upon its approval or on the date fixed therein under Sec. 320 of the Local Government Code.The Sandiganbayan also ruled that the petitioners evident bad faith was the direct and proximate cause of Fuertes undue injury.Complainants salaries and allowances were withheld for no valid or justifiable reasons.Such delay was intended to harass complainant, because petitioner wanted to replace her with his political protege whom he eventually designated as municipal treasurer, bypassing Fuertes who was next in seniority.Bad faith was further evidenced by petitioners instructions to the outgoing municipal treasurer not to give the complaining witness any work assignment, not to provide her with office table and chair, not to act on her daily time record and application for leave of absence, instructions which were confirmed in the municipal treasurers certification. (Exh. G-2).The IssuesIn his memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues:[10]1.Could accused be held liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the discharge of his official administrative duties, a positive act, when what was imputed to him was failing and refusing to sign and/or approve the vouchers of Mr[s]. Fuertes on time or by inaction on his obligation under the compromise agreement(ibid., p. 19), a passive act?Did not the act come under Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019, of [sic] which accused was not charged with?2.Assuming,arguendo,that his failure and refusal to immediately sign and approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes comes [sic] under Sec. 3(e), the questions are:(a)Did not the duty to sign and approve the same arise only after the Sangguniang Bayan had passed an appropriations ordinance, and not before?In other words, was the non-passage of the appropriation ordinance a justifiable reason for not signing the vouchers?(b)Did Mrs. Fuertes suffer undue injury, as the term is understood in Sec. 3(e), she having been paid all her claims?(c)Did petitioner not act in good faith in refusing to immediately sign the vouchers and implement the compromise agreement until the Sangguniang Bayan had enacted the appropriation ordinance and until Mrs. Fuertes submitted the clearance from the Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte?Restated, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of undue injury and bad faith.Additionally, petitioner submits that a violation of Section 3[e] of RA 3019 cannot be committed through nonfeasance.The Courts RulingThe petition is meritorious.After careful review of the evidence on record and thorough deliberation on the applicable provision of the Anti-Graft Law, the Court agrees with the solicitor generals assessment that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime charged.First Issue:Undue InjuryPetitioner was charged with violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, which states:SEC. 3.Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:xxxxxxxxx(e)Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and(4)that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[11]The solicitor general, in his manifestation,[12]points out that undue injury requires proof of actual injury or damage, citing our ruling inAlejandro vs. People[13]andJacinto vs. Sandiganbayan.[14]Inasmuch as complainant was actually paid all her claims, there was thus no undue injury established.This point is well-taken.Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established.Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime.In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section.Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.In jurisprudence, undue injury is consistently interpreted as actual damage.Unduehas been defined as more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal; andinjuryas any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property[;] [that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another.Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.[15]In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by Article 2199 of the Civil Code as follows:Art. 2199.Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.Fundamental in the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of a contract, or by awrongful or negligent act or omissionshall have a fair and just compensation commensurate to the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendants act.Actual pecuniary compensation is awarded as a general rule, except where the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages.[16]Actual damages are primarily intended to simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong.[17]Furthermore, damages must not only be capable of proof, but must be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.They cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork.[18]They cannot include speculative damages which are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate of the loss or injury.In this case, the complainant testified that her salary and allowance for the period beginning July 1990 were withheld, and that her family underwent financial difficulty which resulted from the delay in the satisfaction of her claims.[19]As regards her money claim, payment of her salaries from January 1991 until November 19, 1991 was evidenced by the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D).She also admitted having been issued a check on January 4, 1994 to cover her salary from June 1 to June 30, 1990; her salary differential from July 1, 1989 to April 30, 1990; her thirteenth-month pay; her cash gift; and her clothing allowances.Respondent Court found that all her monetary claims were satisfied.After she fully received her monetary claims, there is no longer any basis for compensatory damages or undue injury, there being nothing more to compensate.Complainants testimony regarding her familys financial stress was inadequate and largely speculative.Without giving specific details, she made only vague references to the fact that her four children were all going to school and that she was the breadwinner in the family.She, however, did not say that she was unable to pay their tuition fees and the specific damage brought by such nonpayment.The fact that the injury to her family was unspecified or unquantified does not satisfy the element of undue injury, as akin to actual damages.As in civil cases, actual damages, if not supported by evidence on record, cannot be considered.[20]Other than the amount of the withheld salaries and allowances which were eventually received, the prosecution failed to specify and to prove any other loss or damage sustained by the complainant.Respondent Court insists that complainant suffered by reason of the long period of time that her emoluments were withheld.This inconvenience, however, is not constitutive of undue injury.InJacinto,this Court held that the injury suffered by the complaining witness, whose salary was eventually released and whose position was restored in the plantilla, was negligible; undue injury entails damages that are more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal.[21]InAlejandro,the Court held that the hospital employees were not caused undue injury, as they were in fact paid their salaries.[22]Second Issue:No Evident Bad FaithIn the challenged Decision, Respondent Court found evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner, holding that, without any valid or justifiable reason, accused withheld the payment of complainants salaries and other benefits for almost two (2) years, demonstrating a clear manifestation of bad faith.[23]It then brushed aside the petitioners defenses that complainant failed to submit money and property clearances for her vouchers, and that an appropriation by the Sangguniang Bayan was required before complainants vouchers could be approved.It said:[24]Secondly, his reliance on the failure of complainant to submit the clearances which were allegedly necessary for the approval of vouchers is futile in the light of the foregoing circumstances:xxxxxxxxxb.The evidence on record shows that complainants salaries for the period from January to November 1991 (included as subject matter in the mandamus case) were duly paid, as confirmed in the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D).This means that accused, even without the necessary clearance, could have acted upon or approved complainants disbursement vouchers if he wanted to.c.It may be true that a clearance is an indispensable requirement before complainant will be paid of her claims, but accused could not just hide behind the cloak of the clearance requirement in order to exculpate himself from liability.As the approving officer, it was his duty to direct complainant to submit the same.Moreover, accused could not just set aside the obligation he voluntarily imposed upon himself when he entered into a compromise agreement binding himself to sign complainants vouchers without any qualification as to the clearance requirement.Perforce, he could have seen to it that complainant secured the same in order that he could comply with the said obligation.xxxxxxxxxFourthly, accuseds contention that the delay in the release of complainants claim could not be attributed to him because the vouchers were only submitted to him for his signature on December 24-27, 1992; that the approval of the budget appropriations/resolutions depends on the Sangguniang Bayan, Budget Officer and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is unavailing.As revealed in the alleged newly discovered evidence themselves, particularly x x x SB Res. No. 202 and Appropriation Ordinance No. 035, both dated May 21, 1990 (Exh. 5-a- Motion), the Sangguniang Bayan appropriated a budget ofP5M in the General Fund for calendar year 1991 [the Budget Officer does not approve the budget but assists the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan in the preparation of the budget (Sec. 475, Local Government Code of 1991)].Complainants claims consisted of her salaries and other benefits for 1990 and 1991 which were classified as Current Operating Expenditures chargeable against the General Fund.It is undisputed that she was holding her position as Assistant Municipal Treasurer in a permanent capacity (her position was also designated Assistant Department Head), which was included in the plantilla for calender years 1990 and 1991 (Exhs. 4-a & '4-b', Motion).In Program Appropriation and Obligation by Object (Exhs. 4-c & 4-c, Motion), appropriations were made for current operating expenditures to which complainants claims properly appertained.xxx.Verily, complainants claims were covered by appropriations duly approved by the officials concerned, signifying that adequate funds were available for the purpose.In fact, even complainants claims for her 13thmonth pay, cash gift and clothing allowance, subject matter of Disbursement Voucher marked Exhibit J which would need a supplemental budget was covered by Supplemental Budget No. 5 for CY 1990 duly approved by the authorities concerned as shown in the voucher itself.This means that the said claim was already obligated (funds were already reserved for it) as of calendar year 1990. xxxx.It is clear, then, that as regards availability of funds, there was no obstacle for the release of all the complainants claims.The Court disagrees.Respondent Court cannot shift the blame on the petitioner, when it was the complainant who failed to submit the required clearance.This requirement, which the complainant disregarded, was even printed at the back of the very vouchers sought to be approved.As assistant municipal treasurer, she ought to know that this is a condition for the payment of her claims.This clearance is required by Article 443 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991:Art. 443.Property Clearances When an employee transfers to another government office, retires, resigns, is dismissed, or is separated from the service, he shall be required to secure supplies or property clearance from the supply officer concerned, the provincial or city general services officer concerned, the municipal mayor and the municipal treasurer, or the punong barangay and the barangay treasurer, as the case may be.The local chief executive shall prescribe the property clearance form for this purpose.For her own failure to submit the required clearance, complainant is not entirely blameless for the delay in the approval of her claims.Also, given the lack of corresponding appropriation ordinance and certification of availability of funds for such purpose, petitioner had the duty not to sign the vouchers.As chief executive of the municipality Llorente could not have approved the voucher for the payment of complainants salaries under Sec. 344, Local Government Code of 1991.[25]Also, Appropriation Ordinance No. 020[26]adding a supplemental budget for calendar year 1990 was approved on April 10, 1989, or almost a year before complainant was transferred back to Sindangan.Hence, she could not have been included therein.SB Resolution No. 202 and Appropriation Ordinance No. 035,[27]which fixed the municipal budget for calendar year 1991, was passed only on May 21, 1990, or almost another year after the transfer took effect.The petitioners failure to approve the complainants vouchers was therefore due to some legal obstacles,[28]and not entirely without reason.Thus, evident bad faith cannot be completely imputed to him.Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2ndSeries, 895, 1007).It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167).Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.[29]InJacinto,evident bad faith was not appreciated because the actions taken by the accused were not entirely without rhyme or reason; he refused to release the complainants salary because the latter failed to submit her daily time record; he refused to approve her sick-leave application because he found out that she did not suffer any illness; and he removed her name from the plantilla because she was moonlighting during office hours.Such actions were measures taken by a superior against an erring employee who studiously ignored, if not defied, his authority.[30]InAlejandro,evident bad faith was ruled out, because the accused gave his approval to the questioned disbursement after relying on the certification of the bookkeeper onthe availability of funds for such disbursement.[31]Third Issue:Interpretation ofCausingThe Court does not completely agree with petitioners assertion that the imputed act does not fall under Sec. 3[e] which, according to him, requires a positive act -- a malfeasance or misfeasance.Causingmeans to be the cause or occasion of, to effect as an agent, to bring into existence, to make or to induce, to compel.[32]Causingis, therefore, not limited to positive acts only.Even passive acts or inaction may cause undue injury.What is essential is that undue injury, which is quantifiable and demonstrable, results from the questioned official act or inaction.In this case, the prosecution accused petitioner of failing or refusing to pay complainants salaries on time, while Respondent Court convicted him of unduly delaying the payment of complainants claims.As already explained, both acts did not, however, legally result in undue injury or in giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, [or] administrative x x x functions.Thus, these acts are not punishable under Sec. 3[e].It would appear that petitioners failure or refusal to act on the complainants vouchers, or the delay in his acting on them more properly falls under Sec. 3[f]:(f)Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.Here, the neglect or refusal to act within a reasonable time is the criminal act, not the causing of undue injury.Thus, its elements are:1)The offender is a public officer;2)Said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made on him;3)Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and4)Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another.[33]However, petitioner is not charged with a violation of Sec. 3[f].Hence, further disquisition is not proper.Neither may this Court convict petitioner under Sec. 3[f] without violating his constitutional right to due process.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.Petitioner is ACQUITTED of violating Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, as amended.No costs.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, VitugandQuisumbing, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. 164015 February 26, 2009RAMON A. ALBERT,Petitioner,vs.THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseThis is a petition for certiorari1of the Resolutions dated 10 February 20042and 3 May 20043of the Sandiganbayan. The 10 February 2004 Resolution granted the prosecutions Motion to Admit the Amended Information. The 3 May 2004 Resolution denied the Motion For Reconsideration of petitioner Ramon A. Albert (petitioner).The FactsOn 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231. The Information alleged:The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land, and by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount ofP4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.4On 26 March 1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and his co-accused.On 25 May 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the following grounds: (1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of law; (2) the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases and to a speedy trial were violated; and (4) the resolution dated 26 February 1999 finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is not supported by evidence.5On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the condition that petitioner would be "provisionally" arraigned.6On 12 March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The following day, or on 13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of "not guilty." In the Resolution dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel.On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner. In a Memorandum dated 6 January 2003, the SPO who conducted the reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that the indictment against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause. However, the Ombudsman, in an Order dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the Memorandum and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman.In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the order of the Ombudsman, the arraignment was reset to 2 October 2003.In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the Ombudsmans denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte motion was withdrawn by the prosecution with the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The scheduled arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003.7On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The Amended Information reads:The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I of the Office of Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partialityand/orgrossinexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land, and by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount ofP4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.8Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment.The Ruling of the SandiganbayanIn its Resolution of 10 February 2004,9the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecutions Motion to Admit Amended Information. At the outset, the Sandiganbayan explained that "gross neglect of duty" which falls under Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross inexcusable negligence" under Section 3(e), and held thus:In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it is not a requirement that such neglect or refusal causes undue injury compared to an information alleging gross inexcusable negligence where undue injury is a constitutive element. A change to this effect constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended.It may be considered however, that there are three modes by which the offense for Violation of Section 3(e) may be committed in any of the following:1. Through evident bad faith;2. Through manifest partiality;3. Through gross inexcusable negligence.Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under said section of the law should suffice to warrant conviction.10However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of the information be formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same in the event that the accused had not yet undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely "provisional," then the prosecution may still amend the information either in form or in substance.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 3 May 2004. Hence this petition.The IssuesThe issues raised in this petition are:1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED INFORMATION; AND2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FURTHER PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.The Ruling of the CourtThe petition has no merit.On Whether the SandiganbayanShould Admit the Amended InformationSection 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:Sec. 14.Amendment or Substitution.--A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.x x xPetitioner contends that under the above section, only a formal amendment of the information may be made after a plea. The rule does not distinguish between a plea made during a "provisional" or a "permanent" arraignment. Since petitioner already entered a plea of "not guilty" during the 13 March 2001 arraignment, then the information may be amended only in form.An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him.11The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.12The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or "conditional" arraignments is not sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Court.13However, inPeople v. Espinosa,14this Court tangentially recognized such practice, provided that the alleged conditions attached thereto should be "unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." Moreover, the conditions must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment; otherwise, the arraignment should be deemed simple and unconditional.15In the present case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes of the Sandiganbayan Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which merely states that the "[a]ccused when arraigned entered a plea of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is granted subject to the usual terms and conditions imposed on accused persons travelling (sic) abroad."16In the Resolution of 16 April 2001,17the Sandiganbayan mentioned the arraignment of petitioner and granted his Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the conditions attendant thereto which, however, were limited only to petitioners itinerary abroad; the setting up of additional bailbond; the required appearance before the clerk of court; and written advice to the court upon return to the Philippines. Nothing on record is indicative of the provisional or conditional nature of the arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine laid down inEspinosa, the arraignment of petitioner should be deemed simple and unconditional.The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of the Information may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.Petitioner contends that replacing "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence" is a substantial amendment of the Information which is prejudicial to his rights. He asserts that under the amended information, he has to present evidence that he did not act with "gross inexcusable negligence," evidence he was not required to present under the original information. To bolster his argument, petitioner refers to the 10 February 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the change "constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended."18lawphil.netWe are not convinced.Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides as follows:SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:x x x(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.This crime has the following essential elements:191. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."20InUriarte v. People,21this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.22"Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.23"Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.24"Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.25The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty." The amended information, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence."Simply, the amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence."Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA 3019specifically, "gross neglect of duty" is under Section 3(f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is under Section 3(e) of the statutethe question remains whether or not the amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.26On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.27lavvphilIn this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase "gross neglect of duty" from the Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused.28As a replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence" would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense. This Court believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in form. InSistoza v. Desierto,29the Information charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but specified only "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as the modalities in the commission of the offense charged. "Gross inexcusable negligence" was not mentioned in the Information. Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is committed bydoloorculpa, and although the Information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof.30In so ruling, this Court applied by analogy the pronouncement inCabello v. Sandiganbayan31where an accused charged with willful malversation was validly convicted of the same felony of malversation through negligence when the evidence merely sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense. The Court held that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. Thus, we hold that the inclusion of "gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information, which merely alleges "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as modalities in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in form.On Whether PetitionersRight to a Speedy Trial was ViolatedPetitioner contends that the complaint-affidavit against him was filed on 15 June 1992, but it was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao only on 26 February 1999, or after a period of almost seven (7) years. Four (4) years thereafter, the SPO, upon reinvestigation of the case, recommended that the case against petitioner be dismissed for lack of probable cause, but this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman. A Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information was later filed by the prosecution and granted by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution of 10 February 2004. Thus, petitioner maintains that it took the Office of the Ombudsman twelve (12) years since the initial filing of the complaint-affidavit in 1992 to charge accused with the offense under the Amended Information, in violation of petitioners right to a speedy trial.Petitioners contentions are futile.The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the Philippine Constitution which provides: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This right, however, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.32A simple mathematical computation of the period involved is not sufficient. We concede that judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life.33After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of petitioner to a speedy trial was not infringed upon. The issue on the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint-affidavit filed against petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the original Information against petitioner was raised in petitioners Motion to Dismiss, and was duly addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution denying the said motion. It appears that the said delays were caused by the numerous motions for extension of time to file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by petitioners co-accused, and that no actual preliminary investigation was conducted on petitioner. The Sandiganbayan properly held that a reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner was in order. Although the reinvestigation inadvertently resulted to further delay in the proceedings, this process could not have been dispensed with as it was done for the protection of the rights of petitioner himself. It is well-settled that although the conduct of an investigation may hold back the progress of a case, it is necessary so that the accused's right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.34The succeeding events appear to be parts of a valid and regular course of judicial proceedings not attended by delays which can be considered vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. Hence, petitioners contention of violation of his right to a speedy trial must fail.WHEREFORE, weDISMISSthe petition. WeAFFIRMthe Resolutions dated 10 February 2004 and 3 May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25231.SO ORDERED.

DEMIE L. URIARTE,G.R. No. 169251Petitioner,Present:

PANGANIBAN,C.J.,Chairperson,*- versus -YNARES-SANTIAGO,**AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR., andCHICO-NAZARIO,JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Promulgated:Respondent.December 20, 2006x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is a Petition for Review onCertiorariof the Decision[1]of the Sandiganbayan in A.R. No. 058 and its Resolution[2]denying the motion for partial reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed with modification the Decision[3]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCantilan,SurigaodelSur, Branch 41, convicting petitionerDemieL.Uriartefor violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019.Petitioner was the Municipal Assessor of theMunicipalityofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur. In 1948,JoventinoCorreosdeclared for taxation purposes a .9434-hectare parcel of land under Tax Declaration (TD) No. 3352.[4]The pertinent entries read:Location:Batong,Carrascal,SurigaoArea:.9434 hectaresBoundaries:North:CarrascalRiver;South:MaximoLevaandBotongRill;East:BotongCreek;West:CarrascalRiverIn 1974, TD No. 3352 was cancelled by TD No. 5249.[5]In 1980, the previous tax declaration was revised by TD No. 116,[6]where the entry pertaining to the location of the property was changed from Batong,Carrascal,SurigaodelSur to (S)Botong, (B)Doyos,Carrascal,SurigaodelSur.In 1985, TD No. 116 was cancelled by TD No. 121,[7]where the boundaries of the property were also changed, as follows:Boundaries:North:CarrascalRiverSouth:BotongRillEast:BotongCreekWest:AntiocoUriarteTD No. 121 thus contained significant revisions. The subsequent tax declarations, however, no longer contained alterations: TD No. 132[8]which canceled T.D. No. 121; ARP No. 93-08-00344[9]in 1994; and ARP No. 96-08-00349[10]in 1997. However, in ARP No. 96-08-00328[11]filed in 2000, the entries in the original tax declarationTD No. 3352were restored.Meantime, in 1954,AntiocoUriarte, petitioners father, declared a two-hectare lot for taxation purposes under TD No. 4642.[12]The pertinent entries are the following:Area: 2 hectaresLocation:Doot,Poblacion,Carrascal,SurigaoBoundaries:North:CarrascalRiver;South:MaximoLeva;East:BotongRill;West:MaximoLevaandCarrascalRiverIn 1974, TD No. 4642 was canceled by TD No. 1534,[13]and the entries regarding the boundaries of the property were also altered.[14]In 1980, TD No. 1534 was cancelled by TD No. 243,[15]where Embarcadero was inserted on the entry pertaining to the location of the property.In 1985 TD No. 243 was canceled by TD No. 247.[16]This time, the area of the property was changed from two (2) to three (3) hectares, and the boundary in the east became JoventinoCorreos. The subsequent tax declarations, TD No. 270[17]which canceled TD No. 247 and ARP No. 96-09-00290[18]effective 1997, did not contain any further alterations. Thus, the boundaries of the lot becameNorth:CarrascalRiver;South:PantaleonCervantes;East:JoventinoCorreos;West:MaximoLevaThe above alterations were allegedly committed by petitioner when she was the Municipal Assessor and Deputy Provincial Assessor ofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur. OnMay 21, 1999, EvelynArpilleda, through counsel, sent a letter[19]informing petitioner of the alterations that had been made on the tax declarations of her predecessor,JoventinoCorreos. She requested that the erroneous and prejudicial entries be rectified.Petitioner complied with the request. Thus, in ARP No. 96-08-00328, the original entries were restored.OnJuly 5, 1999,Arpilleda, through counsel, sent a letter[20]to the Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) stating the alleged unlawful acts of petitioner in altering the tax declarations ofJoventinoCorreosandAntiocoUriarte. It was alleged that the alterations prejudiced her since they became the basis of petitioners forceful and unlawful possession of the subject property.The Office of the Ombudsman requestedArpilledato formalize the charges.[21]She later complied by filing a Sworn Complaint[22]datedAugust 19, 1999.Petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit,[23]to whichArpilledafiled her Reply-Affidavit[24]onOctober 28, 1999.The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao later filed an Information[25]datedNovember 24, 1999before the RTC[26]ofTandag,SurigaodelSuragainst petitioner for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019.OnDecember 15, 1999, the Administrative Officer of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor ofTandag,SurigaodelSurforwarded[27]the entire case record to the RTC ofCantilan,SurigaodelSur, Branch 41.OnMarch 13, 2000, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to SuspendPendenteLite,[28]alleging that the immediate suspension of petitioner is proper in view of the provisions of R.A. 3019 and existing jurisprudence.[29]Petitioner was arraigned onMarch 14, 2000, and pleaded not guilty.On even date, the trial court ordered[30]his preventive suspension.The case was then set for pre-trial and the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs.OnJune 15, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension,[31]pointing out that he had already served three months suspension. The trial court granted the motion onJune 16, 2000.[32]OnOctober 2, 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information.[33]He claimed that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because in the first place, the special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao had no authority to file the information. To support his claim, petitioner citedUyv.Sandiganbayan,[34]where it was held that the authority to file the corresponding information before the RTC rests in the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, and that the latter exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The trial court provisionally dismissed[35]the case and ordered the cancellation of petitioners bail bond.OnJuly 12, 2001, the private prosecutor moved to reinstate the case,[36]claiming that the Supreme Court likewise declared in a Resolution inUyv.Sandiganbayan[37]that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and to prosecute all criminal cases involvingpublic employeesnot only those involving public officers within the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayanbut also those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.OnNovember 6, 2001, the trial court ordered the case reinstated. Since the bail bond of petitioner had been cancelled, the trial court further ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest.Petitioner posted bail.Private complainant filed a Reservation to File Civil Action[38]which the trial court granted in an Order[39]datedMarch 15, 2002.She likewise filed a Manifestation and/or Motion for Inhibition,[40]which was however denied in an Order[41]datedJuly 3, 2002.Trial on the merits ensued, and the prosecution presented the following witnesses: private complainantArpilleda, who testified that petitioner, as Municipal Assessor, took advantage of his position and caused changes in the location and boundaries of various tax declarations ofJoventinoCorreosandAntiocoUriarte, and that these changes were designed to promote petitioners own interest, thus causing damage and prejudice to her and her co-heirs;[42]TremyCorreoswho corroborated private complainants testimony, specifically on the damage they sustained when petitioner evicted them from the land they had been occupying;[43]RichardPaniamoganwho, asbarangaycaptain of Embarcadero, issued a certification thatBotongis located in thatbarangayand testified thereon;[44]CharmelindaA.Yaez, then the provincial assessor who testified on the limitations of the powers of the municipal assessor;[45]SPO2SaturninoCubero, whose testimony was, however, dispensed with in view of the parties admission of the copy of the police blotter on the alleged eviction of private complainant and her co-heirs from the lot;[46]andCarlitoA.Ladromawho likewise testified thatBotongis part ofbarangayEmbarcadero.[47]On the other hand, the defense presented four (4) witnesses, namely:LeovinoConstantino, an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources who testified that the land covered by the subject tax declarations had not been surveyed and no title had been issued by the City Environment and Natural Resources Office;[48]Florida Coma who was once thebarangaycaptain ofBarangayEmbarcadero and testified thatSitioorPurokDoot,Pelongbelongs toBarangayEmbarcadero, whileBotongbelongs toBarangayDoyos;[49]andGaudiosaTolentinowho testified on the creation ofbarangaysEmbarcadero andDoyosas well as the existingsitios.[50]Petitioner, for his part, admitted that he had made changes on the tax declarations. He however justified the changes, stating that they were the result of the general revision made in 1978. He also claimed that as municipal assessor, he has absolute authority to determine thebarangayto which a particular property belongs. He further asserted that the prosecution failed to cite any law that prohibits a municipal assessor from making revisions on (a) the location of the property according tobarangay;(b) the names of the adjoining owner; or (c) the boundaries of the property. Petitioner likewise insisted that the case is civil and not criminal in nature.[51]Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to file Demurrer to Evidence[52]datedJune 25, 2003.However, the trial court denied the motion in its Order[53]datedAugust 1, 2003.After the parties rested their respective cases, the RTC, onApril 29, 2004, rendered a decision[54]convicting petitioner of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.Thefalloreads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds DEMIE URIARTE Y LIMGUANGCO, Municipal Assessor ofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court imposes upon the accused the penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; perpetual disqualification from holding public office and forfeiture of all retirement benefits or gratuity benefits under any law and in the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits shall be liable to restitute the same to the government.The bail bond put up by the accused for his temporary liberty is ordered cancelled.Accused shall serve his sentence at theDavaoPrison and Penal Farm,PanaboCity,Davaodel Norte pursuant to Circular No. 63-97 of the Supreme Court datedOctober 6, 1997.To pay the cost.SO ORDERED.[55]OnApril 29, 2004, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[56]to the Court of Appeals (CA), which was later withdrawn.[57]OnMay 6, 2004, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal[58]before theSandiganbayanon the following grounds:I.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING DEMIE L. URIARTE FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(E) OF R.A. 3019 UNDER THE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT CHARGED (SIC) SUCH AN OFFENSE.II.EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT (THAT) THE INFORMATION CHARGES THE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (E) OF R.A. 3019, STILL, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED ON FACTS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AND NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.III.ASSUMING FURTHER THAT THE INFORMATION CHARGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (E) OF R.A. 3019, AGAIN, THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO SPECIFY, QUANTIFY AND PROVE THE ELEMENT OF UNDUE INJURY PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT INLLORENTE V. SANDIGANAYAN(SIC) [G.R. NO. 122166.MARCH 11, 1998].IV.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO OVERCOME THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS AS MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR.[59]Petitioner averred that the prosecution failed to allege in the information any prohibited act which he had committed in the performance of his official duties or in relation to his public position. He further averred that no mention was made of the injury caused to any party, which is essential in a charge under Section 3(e), R.A. 3019; this violated his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him.[60]Petitioner also claimed that the RTC erred in concluding that he had intended to dispossess private complainant of their property, since this was not alleged in the information.[61]He pointed out that private complainant could not prove, much less impute, any undue injury because the original entries in the tax declarations had already been restored.He also invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official function as an additional ground.OnApril 15, 2005, the Sandiganbayan affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.[62]Thefalloreads:WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds no cogent reason to disturb or reverse, and therefore AFFIRMS, the findings and conclusion of the trial court, with modification of the imposable penalty, such that the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.The clause and forfeiture of all retirement benefits or gratuity benefits under any law and in the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits shall be liable to restitute the same to the government is hereby ordered deleted.SO ORDERED.[63]The anti-graft court held that all the elements of violation of the offense had been alleged in the information; the allegation that the appellant willfully changed the location and boundaries of the subject properties was the prohibited act, while the element of undue injury was alleged in the phrase to the damage and prejudice of the said heirs. The facts that had not been alleged in the information were evidentiary matters.As to the prosecutions alleged failure to specify the element of undue injury, the anti-graft court held that the injury caused by petitioner was not in terms of money but, on the part of private complainant, the deprivation of three-fourths of her property. Lastly, the court held that under the General Instructions Governing the Conduct and Procedures in the General Revision of Real Property Assessment,[64]the municipal assessor had no discretion to change the entries in tax declarations. Moreover, the failure of petitioner to notifyJoventinoCorreosof the changes in the entries defies the provision therein that owners should participate in the revision. Lastly, the presumption of regularity has been overcome by petitioners unilateral act of restoring the original boundaries and location of the property owned byJoventinoCorreos.Petitioner comes before this Court on the following issues:I.CAN AN ACCUSED BE CONVICTED UNDER AN INFORMATION THAT CHARGES AN OFFENSE WHICH THE COURT ADMITTED THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE AS A VIOLATION OF ANY LAW?II.CAN AN ACCUSED BE CONVICTED OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3 (E) OF R.A. 3019 BASED ON CONCLUSION OF FACTS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT HE COMMITTED LANDGRABBING AND/OR DISPOSSESSING THE COMPLAINANT OF HER PROPERTY, WHICH OFFENSES WERE NOT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION?[65]The resolution of the issues raised by petitioner hinges on the interpretation of the elements of the crime of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019, in relation to the facts alleged in the information and those proven during trial. The provision reads:Section 3.Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.xxxx(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.The essential elements of this crime have been enumerated in several cases[66]decided by this Court, as follows:1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;2.He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and3.That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.A perusal of the Information filed against petitioner shows that all these elements were sufficiently alleged, as correctly ruled upon by both the RTC andSandiganbayan. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:That in 1993, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality ofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused DEMIE L. URIARTE, a public officer being the Municipal Assessor ofCarrascal,SurigaodelSur, while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of his position, acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the change of the location and boundaries of the property of oneJoventinoCorreosas indicated in Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 121 and 132 despite knowing fully well that in the previously issued TD Nos. 3352 and 5249, of the same property state different location and boundaries and also, cause the change of the location and boundaries of the property of his own father,AntiocoUriarte, particularly, to make it appear that the property is adjacent to the property ofJoventinoCorreos, in order to favor his own interest being an heir ofAntiocoUriarteand occupant of the land subject of the application of the heirs ofJoventinoCorreos, to the damage and prejudice of the said heirs.CONTRARY TO LAW.[67]Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either bydolo,as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or byculpaas when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.[68]Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.[69]It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[70]Gross inexcusable negligencerefers to negligence characterized by the want of even theslightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[71]From the evidence adduced by the parties, petitioner indeed acted with evident bad faith in making the alteration on the entries in the tax declarations of bothJoventinoCorreosandAntiocoUriarte. The fact of alteration is shown not only in the tax declarations presented in evidence; petitioner also admitted that he made the alterations himself. Petitioner even attempted to justify his act by stating that such changes were made pursuant to the General Instructions issued in 1978 for the general revision of tax declarations, and that he was authorized to make the alterations because municipal assessors were mandated to identify the properties according to thebarangaywhere the property is located.Petitioner likewise justified his act of changing the boundaries of the property covered by the tax declarations ofJoventinoandAntiocobecause of the alleged instruction that the boundaries should be designated using the name of the landowner.Paragraph 28 of the General Instructions Governing the Conduct and Procedures in the General Revision of Real Property Assessments[72]provides:28) The boundaries which will appear in the field sheets shall be the name of persons, streets, rivers or natural boundaries adjoining the property subject of revision.The technical descriptions of the land to be revised should not be written down on the field sheets, not only to follow the prescribed form but also to avoid additional or unnecessary typing costs.Tax declarations are issued for taxation purposes and they are not titles to lands.In case boundary conflict arises, the parties can refer to the titles.[73]Thus, contrary to petitioners contention that the boundaries should be designated only according to the names of persons, the provision clearly allows the streets, rivers, and natural boundaries of the property to be placedon the tax declarations. Petitioner was aware of the consequences of altering the entries in the tax declarations, particularly in the untitled properties. Petitioners bad faith is further strengthened by the fact that he did not informJoventinoCorreosor the private complainant of the alterations, including his act of restoring the original entries in the tax declarations. Assuming for the sake of argument that he was not motivated by ill will but merely committed a mistake in the interpretation of the wording of the Instructions, petitioners act is nevertheless unjustified. We cannot fathom why a municipal assessor would think that the boundaries of a particular property should only be designated by persons names. Even one of ordinary intelligence would know that a property may be bounded by a street, a river, or a mountain. In any event, therefore, petitioner may still be considered guilty of inexcusable negligence.Petitioner contends that due to the prosecutions failure to cite any law that prohibits the municipal assessor from altering tax declarations, the presumption is that he regularly performed his official duties. However, the very Instructions petitioner relies upon to justify his acts outlines the limitations on the authority of municipal assessors to revise tax declarations.Paragrah27 provides:27) Utmost care should be taken that the fullchristianand surname appearing in the existing 1978 tax declaration must exactly be the samechristianand surname which has to be carried forward to the field sheets.For obvious reasons,no transfer or change of ownership of real property be made by assessors or appraisers in the process of general revision.The primary purpose of general revision is not to transfer or change ownership of property from one person to another during the period of revision but to update or upgrade property values for real property taxation purposes.However, real property declared for the first time shall be appraised and assessed for taxation purposes.Lands declared for the first time shall be accepted provided the declaration is supported by corresponding certification of the Bureau of Forest Development and the Bureau of Lands that the land so declared is in the alienable or disposable area (emphasis supplied).The third element provides for the modalities in which the crimemay be committed, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government;or(b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.[74]The use of the disjunctive term or connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), or as aptly held inSantiago v.Garchitorena,[75]as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not, however, indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, rather, that an accused may be charged undereithermode or underboth.We affirm theSandiganbayansfinding that there was substantial compliance with the requirement. The wording of the information shows that petitioner, in willfully changing the boundaries of the tax declarations ofJoventinoCorreosandAntiocoUriarte, both caused undue injury to private complainant and gave himself and his father unwarranted benefit. In jurisprudence,[76]undue injury is consistently interpreted as actual damage.Unduehas been defined as more than necessary, not proper, or illegal; andinjuryas any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property, that is, the invasion of any legally protected interest of another. On the other hand, inGallegov. Sandiganbayan,[77]the Court ruled thatunwarrantedmeans lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized; or without justification or adequate reasons.Advantagemeans a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from course of action.Preferencesignifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.[78]From the foregoing definitions, petitioners act of altering the boundaries of the property in question as stated in the tax declaration clearly falls under the very act punishable by Section 3(e), R.A. 3019.It bears stressing that it is beyond the power of this Court to settle the issue of who, between petitioner and private complainant, has the better rightto own and possess the subject property. This Court has no jurisdiction over the issue, and the evidence presented is not sufficient to make a definite determination of ownership. Suffice it to state that the alteration of the entries in the subject tax declarations, especially on the boundaries of the property, caused undue injury to private complainant as an heir ofJoventinoCorreos. The alteration substantially changed the identity of the property. Considering that the property in question was not titled and no survey had yet been conducted to settle the actual areas and boundaries of the properties, the tax declarations constitute important evidence of thedeclarantspossession and ownership, though not conclusive.Indeed, the alterations made by petitioner are too substantial to ignore.It was made to appear that petitioners property is between theCarrascalRiverand that of the private complainant. In the original tax declaration, no such property existed. The new entries in effect lessened the area of private complainants property, which would have been evident had the lot been surveyed. Moreover, the deletion of the entry MaximoLeva in the south boundary ofJoventinoCorreos property was also prejudicial, since this alteration had the effect of deleting the property entirely.Petitioner in fact admitted that while he declared that the subject property was in the name ofJoventinoCorreos, he was in possession thereof; he later stated that the property in his possession was declared for taxation in the name of his father.[79]From this testimony, it can be inferred that the identities of the properties in his possession, the lot in his fathers name and that declared underJoventinoCorreos name, are not certain.While tax declarations are indicia of a valid claim of ownership, they do not constitute conclusive evidence thereof. They areprima facieproofs of ownership or possession of the pro