NITAFAN VS CIR

Posted by kaye lee on 10:16 PMG.R. No. 78780 July 23 1987 [Salaries of the members of Judiciary, Tax Exemption]

FACTS:Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.HELD:No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSISFacts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.Issue(s):Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per share and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

ALFREDO M. DE LEON vs. HON. BENHAMIN B. ESGUERRA (153 SCRA 602) Case DigestFacts:In 1982, Alfredo M. De Leon was elected as Baranggay Captain along with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Baranggay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, he received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986, signed on February 8, 1987 by OIC Gov. Benhamin B. Esguerra designating Florentino Magno as new Barangay Captain. A separate Memorandum with the same dates was also issued by Hon. Esguerra replacing the Barangay Councilmen. De Leon along with the other petitioners filed a petition to declare the subject Memorandum null and void and prevent the respondents from taking over their positions in the Barangay. The petitioners maintained that OIC Gov. Esguerra no longer have the authority to replace them under the 1987 Constitution and that they shall serve a term of six (6) years in pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982.Issue:Was the designation of the new Barangay Officials valid?

Ruling:The effectivity of the Memorandum should be based on the date when it was signed, February 8, 1987. By that time, the 1987 Constitution was already in effect, thus superseding all previous constitution as provided in Section 27 of its Transitory Provisions. Respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern since it is not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution.Wherefore, the designation by the OIC Governor of new Barangay Officials was declared NO LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT and the Writ for Prohibition is GRANTED enjoining respondents perpetually from ouster/take-over of petitioners position subject of this petition.

Lambino Vs. Comelec Case DigestG.R. No. 174153Lambino Vs. ComelecG.R. No. 174153Oct. 25 2006Facts:Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition tochange the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18.the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral-parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.Issue:Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to theLambino Groups petition.Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through InitiativesThe framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petitionviolated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complyingwith RA 6735Petition is dismissed.

Imbong v Comelec Case Digest (consti-1)Imbong v Comelec September 11, 1970 RA 6132: delegates in Constitutional Convention

Petitioner: ImbongRespondents: Ferrer (Comelec Chair), Patajo, Miraflor (Comelec Members)Petitioner: GonzalesRespondent: ComelecPonente: MakasiarRELATED LAWS:Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall be elected in November, 1970.RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned among existing representative districts according to the population. Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2 & 4.Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they file their candidacySec 2: apportionment of delegatesSec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public office in the election or from assuming any appointive office/position until the final adournment of the ConCon.Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from giving support/representing a delegate to the convention.FACTS:This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE:Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional.HOLDING:The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.RATIO:- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention.- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)Facts:Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.Issues:(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution.

Held:Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

Tolentino vs COMELEC41 SCRA 702Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINORespondents: Commission on Election, and the Chief Accountant, the Auditor and the Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor dela Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguin Reyna, Victor F. Ortega and Juan V. BorraFactsThe case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.IssueIs it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?DecisionThe Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.

JAVELLANA VS. COMELEC50 SCRA 30 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question Validity of the 1973 Constitution Restriction to Judicial PowerIn 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election there being intimidation and fraud.ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.HELD: The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such acquiescence.

655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is ConstitutionalIn March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describesthe Philippine waters as archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our waterslandward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.ISSUE:Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle onoccupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution ofmultilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles(sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)If any, the baselines law is a notice to theinternational communityof the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.