Libona vs Mangelin .R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989 Facts: Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government and was later elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly. Congressman Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly for consulations and dialogues on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII hopefully resulting to chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission. Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as “our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook … .” In defiance of Petitioner’s advice, After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative. Issue: Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other

words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII? Held: Firstly, We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse. the Decree PD 168 established “internal autonomy” in the two regions “[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national

concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-immolation,” since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of “autonomy.” On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-

immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that “[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services Hence, we assume jurisdiction.

Sultan Maminta M. Radia vs Review Committee under E.O. No. 17

G.R. No. 78973 January 29, 1988

Facts: Petitioner was appointed as City Engineer of Marawi City on 1 May 1985. On 1 April 1986, respondent Basman, OIC of the City Mayor’s Office of Marawi City, issued a Memorandum addressed to all Heads of Offices and Personnel directing the immediate transfer & delivery of all office equipment to, and directing all personnel, to hold office at the New City Hall, Bangon, Marawi City effective April 2, 1986. On 4 April 1986, Basman issued a Memorandum directly addressed to petitioner stating that he had been reliably informed that most of the City Engineering Equipment had been intentionally destroyed by some “bad elements”. He directed petitioner to transfer immediately all equipment to the present City Public Works and Highway Engineer’s Office with the warning that failure to comply would constitute “malfeasance and serious insubordination” and that petitioner would be held responsible for any further loss of or damage to the said City Equipment. On 30 April 1986, respondent Basman terminated petitioner from his position and designated Pangadapun as OIC of the Office of the City Engineer of Marawi City. On 28 May 1986, petitioner wrote to the Regional Director, Regional Office No. 12, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Cotabato City protesting his termination from the service and asking that the Pangadapun’s designation be withdrawn. The CSC Regional Director then withdrew his approval of

Pangadapun’s appointment/designation, but eventually reversed his initial ruling & re-approved Pangadapun’s appointment upon Basman’s Motion for Reconsideration, subject to final resolution of petitioner’s protest by the Review Committee under Executive Order No. 17. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the CSC Regional Director’s last ruling. This request was forwarded to the Minister of Justice for appropriate action under the provisions of EO No. 17. On 10 October 1986, the Review Committee under EO No. 17 dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner then appealed to the Office of the President, but was dismissed by the latter stating that decisions of the Review Committee are final and unappealable under Section 8 of Executive Order No. 17. Issues: WON the following are null and void: (1) The termination of petitioner as City Engineer of by Basman and the designation of Pangadapun as OIC City Engineer (2) The Review Committee’s Resolution affirming the termination of petitioner’s appointment. Held: Article III (2) of of the Provisional Constitution provided as follows: All elective and appointive officials under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

(Emphasis supplied) The above organic provision did not require the existence of any cause for removal/termination of any of the elective and appointive officials under the 1973 Constitution. This being so, petitioner was lawfully terminated from his position as City Engineer upon the designation/appointment and qualification of respondent Pangadapun as his successor. Respondent Basman’s authority, as OIC of the Office of the City Mayor of Marawi City, to appoint/designate the City Engineer cannot be seriously questioned in review of the provisions of Section 185 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 (LGC) which amended the provisions of the City Charter of Marawi City, originally lodging that authority in the President of the Philippines. Although the Provisional Constitution did not require any ground/cause for removal, the Government, in an act of auto-limitation and “to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of personnel in the Career Civil Service whose qualifications and performance meet the standards of public service of the New Government,” issued EO No. 17 which enumerated certain grounds for the separation or replacement of elective and appointive officials authorized under Article III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. These grounds were: 1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law; 2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned; 3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions; 4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; [and] 5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is

unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service. In the instant case, petitioner appealed to the respondent Review Committee established under Section 5 of Executive Order No. 17 precisely to pass upon all petitions for reconsideration filed by any official or employee separated from the service in the course of implementing Article III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. The Review Committee held that petitioner’s persistent failure to comply with lawful orders of respondent Basman fell within Ground No. 5 of Executive Order No. 17. The Solicitor General has pointed out that, although heads of local governments, provincial governors and municipal mayors may be under the supervision of the Secretary of Local Government. Local Governments are not “attached to” the Department of Local Governments in the same sense that bureaus and offices under, for instance, the Department of Justice are attached to that department. Provinces and municipalities are instrumentalities or units of local government vested with their own legislative and executive powers under the Local Government Code. Accordingly, for the limited purposes of Executive Order No. 17, heads of local governments may well be considered as Ministry (department) Heads. Petitioner’s removal was reviewed and confirmed by the Review Committee, a body which is certainly of ministerial rank. Thus, the assumed requirement of EO No. 17 that the removal of petitioner be effected by a “Ministry Head” may be regarded as substantially complied with. EO 17 is a self-limiting act & its provisions are not only non-penal in nature, but also clearly more favorable to petitioner

than those of Article III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. As such, there is no legal nor moral obstacle to the retrospective application of EO No. 17 which expressly envisaged its application to “those already separated from the service on the issuance of this Order, including those whose resignations were accepted or whose Basco vs PAGCOR GR 91649 (May 14, 1991) GR 91649 197 SCRA 52, 65 May 14, 1991 FACTS: Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869 – for being allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward “crony economy”, waiving the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes & license fees, and violating the equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the Constitution. ISSUES: Whether PD 1869 is valid. HELD: Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine. The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771, and is now vested exclusively on the National Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license fees is no longer vested in the City of Manila. LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is therefore exempt from local taxes. The National Government is supreme over local

governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies using the power to tax as a “tool for regulation”. The power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by Congress. The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it simply means decentralization. A law doesn’t have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal protection clause doesn’t preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that some gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws unconstitutional.

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,defendants-appellants. Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that “Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.” Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high school playgrounds, burleighs, and hydro-electric sites. On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte

and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided “Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.” However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that, “All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.” This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del Norte of property without due process and just compensation. Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.

Held: No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public property. The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties in question? Civil Code The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property; ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service

paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase “public works for public service” for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category. Law of Municipal Corporations On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc. Final Ruling The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than along

that of Civil Law. If municipal property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private property, then that would mean they can be levied upon and attached; they can even be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the detriment of the local community. It is wrong to consider those properties as ordinary private property. Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is “… without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.” For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special laws”. Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby entered as follows:. (1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and (2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiff’s 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally

adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.

urigao Electric Co., Inc.vs. Municipality of Surigao Posted on October 23, 2012 No. L-22766 August 30, 1968 FACTS: On June 18,1960, Congress amended the Public Service Act and introduced doing away with the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission for “public services owned or operated by government entities or government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC),” but at the same time affecting its power of regulation which while exempting public services owned or operated by any instrumentality of the government or any GOCC from its supervision, jurisdiction and control stops short of including “the fixing of rates”.

Surigao Electric Co., and Arturo Lumanlan filed a petition for review challenging the validity of the order of respondent Public Service Commission, dated July 11, 1963, wherein it held that it had “no alternative but to approve the tentative schedule of rates submitted by the applicant”, the Municipality of Surigao. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain & operate an electric plant without obtaining a specific franchise for the purpose and without a certificate of public convenience and necessity duly issued by the PSC. HELD: Yes. The Municipality of Surigao is not a GOCC. However, it cannot be said that it is not a government entity. As early as 1916, in Mendoza v. de Leon (33 Phil. 508), the dual character of a municipal corporation has long been recognized: (1) as Governmental, being a branch of the general administration of the State, and (2) as Quasi-Private and Corporate. It is an undeniable fact that “legislative and government powers” are “conferred upon a municipality…to enable it to aid a state in properly governing that portion of the people residing within its municipality, such powers (being) in their nature public, xxx (1 Dilon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., p.68 [1911]). “Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments…to preserve

the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and so on is to administer government, whether it be done by the central government itself or is shifted to a local organization.” (Mendoza v. de Leon). A municipal corporation is a government entity and functions as an extension of the national government, and, therefore, it is an instrumentality of the latter. By express provisions of Sec.14(e) of RA 2677, an instrumentality of the national government is exempted from the jurisdiction of the PSC except with respect to the fixing of rates. A legislative franchise cannot override the specific constitutional restriction that no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual or corporation except under a condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress (Art.XIV, Sec.8, Constitution). Such amendment/alteration may be implied from a latter act of general applicability. A legislative franchise cannot be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power. In the American case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837): “the continued existence of a government would be of no great value if…it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation; and the functions it was designed to perform, transferred to the hands of privileged corporations. xxx while the rights of private property are sacredly guarded…the community also have rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.”

GANZON VS CA Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials. HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that

subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.