G.R. No. L-23623. June 30, 1977.ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,vs. MANILAELECTRIC COMPANY and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

It was previously determined by "then Acting Commissioner of Customs, the late Norberto Romualdez, Jr., that private respondent Manila Electric Company was not exempt from the payment of the special import tax under Republic Act No. 13941for shipment to it of insulating oil." The respondent Court of Tax Appeals reversed this determination, leading to this petition for review.

Manila Electric Co. "claims that it is exempt from the special import tax notonly by virtue of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394, which exempts from said tax equipment and spare parts for use in industries; but also under Paragraph 9, Part Two, of its franchise, which expressly exempts is insulators from all taxes of whatever kind and nature." Petitioner "then made reference to the franchise of private respondentManila Electric Co.: "Par. 9. The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate, buildings, plant (not including poles, wires, transformers, and insulators), machinery and personal property as other persons are or may be hereafter required by law to pay. In consideration of Part Two of the franchise herein granted, to wit, the right to build and maintain in the City of Manila and its suburbs a plant for the conveying and furnishing of electric current for light, heat, and power, and tocharge for the same, the grantee shall pay to the City of Manila two and one-half per centum of the gross earnings received from the business under this franchise in the city and its suburbs: . . . and shall be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatsoever nature, and by whatsoever authority upon the privileges, earnings, income, franchise, and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the grantee, from which taxes and assessments the grantee is hereby expressly exempted."

This Court determined that "There is no question that insulating oils of the type imported by petitioner are 'used for cooling as well as for insulating,' and when used in oil circuit breakers, they are 'required to maintain insulation between the contacts inside the tank and thetank itself' and ruled that "Respondent is ordered to refund to petitioner the sum of P995.00 within thirty days from the date this decision becomes final, without pronouncement as to costs." Citing L-25602, February 18, 1970 31 SCRA 520.the leading caseof Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,13this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes. "It is true that in the construction of tax statutes tax exemptions (and deductions are of this nature) are not favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the legislative intent, the law must be takenas it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. In this case, we find the provision of Section 186-A 'whenever a tax free product is utilized, . . . all encompassing to comprehend taxfree raw materials, even if imported. Where the law provided no qualification for the granting of the privilege, the court is not at liberty to supply any."

G.R. No. L-18566. September 30, 1963.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA.GILBERT R. BREHM and ESTER MIRA BREHM,petitioners-appellees,vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant

"Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at Subic Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married Ester Mira, a Filipina citizen, who had a daughter Elizabeth, by another man. On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth.

They prayed that after the proper proceedings, judgment be entered, freeingthe child Elizabeth Mira from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural father, and be, for all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all the rights pertinent thereto."An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert R. Brehm was registered by the Republic of the Philippines, it appearing that Brehm testified that his residence in the Philippines was merely temporary same being effective only for purposes of his tour of duty with the Navy,thus disqualifying him from making an adoption (Art. 335[4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules of Court), and that being a nonresident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction over him. Petitioners claimed "claim that Art. 335 does not apply in the case,reasoning out that it covers only adoptions for the purpose of establishing a relationship of paternity and filiation, where none existed, but not where the adopting parents are not total strangers to said child; that there is already a relation between the child and Brehm, created by affinity and that Art. 338 of the New Civil Code, expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, in which category petitioner Brehm falls."

Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code as mandatory, stating "Thefollowing cannot adopt : . . . (4) Non-resident aliens". It is, therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated (50 Am. Jur. 51)", while further clarifying that Article 338 was merely directory, and could only be given operation if it does not conflict with the provisions of Article 35, this Court denied the Gilbert R. Brehm's petition to adopt the child Elizabeth Mira.

SYLLABUS1. ADOPTION; NON-RESIDENT ALIEN CANNOT ADOPT. An American citizen serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at Subic Bay, is a non-resident alien and cannot adopt anybody in the Philippines.2. ID.; WHEN STEP-FATHER CANNOT ADOPTSTEP-CHILD. The step father of the minor is disqualified to adopt said step-child when said step- father is a nonresident alien.3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; MANDATORY PROVISIONS PREVAIL OVER DIRECTORY ONES. Article 335 No. 4, of the Civil Code is mandatory because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated. On the other hand, Article 338, No. 3, of the same Code is merely directory, and can only begiven operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of said article 335.

G.R. No. L-14406. June 30, 1961.

MARCELINO BUYCO, petitioner-appellee ,v s . PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, ILOILO BRANCH, ILOILO CITY,respondent-appellant.

"On April 24, 1966, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent in the amount of P5,102.90 plus interest thereon, which represented petitioner's deficit on his 1952-53 crop loan with respondent bank. The said loan was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, dated July 9, 1955, under Rep. Act No. 897 in the amount of P22,227.69 payable in thirty (30) years. On April 24, 1956, petitioner offered to pay respondent bank the deficit of his crop loan for the above mentioned crop year 1952-53 with his said backpay acknowledgment certificate, but on July 18, 1956."Respondent bank said "that since respondent's motion for reconsideration in the case of Marcelino B. Florentino vs. Philippine National Bank L-8782 (52 O.G. 2522) was still under consideration by this Court (S. C.), respondent "cannot yet grant" petitioner's request (Annex A, amended petition)." In an opinion rendered by the bank's Legal Department on April 23, 1957, it "expressed the view that notwithstanding the decision of this Court, the respondent could not accept the certificate because of the amendment of its Charter heretofore mentioned." "The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, on July 24, 1958,granted the petition and ordered the respondent bank "to give due course of the vested right of the petitioner acquired previous to the enactment of Republic Act No. 1576 by accepting his backpay acknowledgment certificate as payment of the obligation of the petitioner with respondent Bank with costs of the proceedings against respondent".

The findings of Court of First Instance of Iloilo were alleged to have been errors committed by the trial court:(1) That in the letter Annex A, dated July 18, 1956, therespondent hasimpliedly admitted the right of petitioner to apply or offer his certificate in payment of his obligation to respondent.(2) That the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the Florentino case filed by respondent-appellant, did not affect the petitioner's vested right already created and acquired at the time he offered to pay hisobligation with his certificate on April 24, 1956, and before the passage ofRep. Act No. 1576.(3) That Rep. Act No. 1576 does not nullify the right of thepetitioner topay his obligation with his backpay certificate.(4) That the writ of mandamus would lie against the appellant.

"Although the Florentino case was promulgated on April 28, 1956, four (4) days after April 24, 1956, the date the appellee offered to pay with his backpay acknowledgment certificate, it is nevertheless obvious that on or before said April 24, 1956, the right to have his certificate applied for the payment of his obligation with the appellant already existed by virtue of Republic ActNo. 897, which was merely construed and clarified by this Court in the said Florentino case.""A vested right or a vested interest may be held to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established, and is no longer open to doubtor controversy (Graham vs. Great Falls Water Power & Town Site Co. [Mont] 76 Pac. 808, 810, citing Evan-Snider-Buel Co. vs. Mc Fadden, 10 Fed. 293, 44 CCA, 464 L.R.A. 900).""Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4,New Civil Code). These principles also apply to amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive nor such may be implied from its language. The judgment appealed from was affirmed with costs against therespondent-appellant.

SYLLABUS1. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; PAYMENT; BACKPAY CERTIFICATE; PNB REFUSE TO ACCEPT CERTIFICATE; MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS. Following the ruling of this Court in Florentino vs. Philippine National Bank, 98 Phil., 959 Off.Gaz., [5] 2522 the latter can be compelled by mandamus to accept acknowledgment of backpay certificate in payment of petitioner's obligation with the bank.2. WORDS AND PHRASES; VESTED RIGHT OR VESTED INTEREST DEFINED. Avested right or a vested interest may be held to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy (Graham vs. Great Falls Water Power & Town Site Co. [Mont] 76 Pac. 808, 810, citing Evans-Snider- Buel Co. vs. McFadden 10 Fed. 293, 44 CCA, 464 L. R. A. 900).3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LAWS SHALL GENERALLY HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided (art 4, NCC), for it is said that the law looks to the futureonly and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez, et al. vs. Crow, 40 Phil. 997), and that statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose andintention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used, and that in case of doubt the same must be resolved against retrospective effect (Montilla vs. Augustinian Corp., 24Phil. 220).4. STATUTES; EFFECT OF AMENDMENT ON ACCRUED RIGHTS. After an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment (Fairchild vs. G. S. 91 Fed. 297; Hathaway vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. 99 F. 534).

G.R. No. L-19650. September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., petitioner-appellee ,v s . ENRICOPALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,respondent-appellant .

In theyear 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex)conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participantstherein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers"."Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media forpublicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications relativethereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for thecontest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code." "The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, datedOctober 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview ofthe provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance." After issues werejoined upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:"In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petition do (sic) not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails."

"Two basic issues:first , whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief;and, second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law.

"By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised Rules of Court)." "The appellee's insistent assertionof its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue.""Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case atbar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West CoastTheaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350)."

The judgment appealed from isaffirmed. "The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud ordersagainst, or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind"."The proposed contest did not exhibit the element of consideration on the side of those who may want to participate, precluding it from being considered as a form of lottery or gift enterprise.SYLLABUS1. DECLARATORY RELIEF; CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON BEFORERELIEF CAN BEAVAILED OF. In order that a declaratory relief may be available, the following conditions must be present: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the partyseeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G. R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republicof the Philippines, 50 Off. Gaz., No. 2, pp. 578, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G. R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956).2. ID.; ELEMENT OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY; CASE AT BAR. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails forits proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on the part of the appellee and a denial thereof on the part of appellant concerning a real question or issue. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTRUCTION DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). In the present case, the question of whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitiveprovisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as much a question of construction or interpretation as any other.4. ID.; WEIGHT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS. In this jurisdiction, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.5. LOTTERY; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: first, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284, citing Horner vs. United States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S. 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker[1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona,p. 233, ante).6. ID.; GRATUITOUS DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY BY CHANCE; ELEMENT OFCONSIDERATION NOT PRESENT; CASE AT BAR. In respect to the element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra). Under the rules of the proposed contest there is no requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, requestfor the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. The scheme is but a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.7. ID.; TEST TO DETERMINE PRESENCE OF CONSIDERATION. The element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. The true test is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize (People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. [Supp.] 788). The standpoint of the contestant, not thatof the sponsor, is all that matters.8. ID.; MEANING OF TERM "GIFT ENTERPRISE"; PROPOSED SCHEME NOT EMBRACED BY THE TERM. The term "gift enterprise" is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value, but by wayof inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E.. 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar, where there is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser, and where the contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.9. POSTAL LAW; TERM "GIFT ENTERPRISE" IS USED IN ASSOCIATION WITH WORD "LOTTERY". In the Postal Law the term "gift enterprise" is used in association with the word "lottery". Consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis, it is only logical that the term be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not the slightest indicium in the law of any intent to eliminate the element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.10. ID.; MAIL FRAUD ORDERS, PURPOSE OF. Mail fraud orders are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non- mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain.11. ID.; WHEN GIFT ENTERPRISES ARE CONDEMNABLE; CASE AT BAR. Under the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if,like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Because there is none in the contest herein in question, the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

G.R. No. L-17915. January 31, 1967.

TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner-appellant ,vs. AMADO DELROSARIO,as Commissioner of Civil Service,DOMINADOR AYTONA,as Secretary of Finance,MELECIO R. DOMINGO,as Commissioner of Internal Revenue,and TOMAS C. TOLEDO, respondents-appellants.

"This is aproceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in theCourt of First Instance of Manila. The controverted position is that of Assistant Regional Revenue Director II, Manila, which became vacant on August 24, 1959, upon the promotion of its occupant, Alfredo Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was appointed in his place, and it is this appointment that is being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding. The Court a quo annulled Toledo's appointment, but did not grantCastro's prayer that respondent officials be ordered to appoint him. Toledo's appointment by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, was made on November 24, 1959, effective as of October 1, 1959.""Theappointment was protested by Castro in a letter he wrote the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on January 19, 1960, wherein he alleged that in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, he was the one who should have been considered for the position." "OnFebruary 8, 1960 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a first endorsement, informed Castro that "the position of Assistant Revenue Regional Director II, R-53, at P6,000.00 adjustedto P6,597.60 per annum, is for Regional District No. 3, Manila, and the appointment thereto had to be issued to the person actually performing the functions of the position," namely, respondent Toledo, who was then acting as Assistant Revenue Regional Officer II, Manila." "The trial court rejected Castro's claim, butat the same time annulled Toledo's appointment this last on the ground that his previous appointment as Chief Revenue Examiner was illegal."

Both sides appealed from the decision.Respondents claim that the lower courtshould not have nullified Toledo's appointment. They contend (1) that the question as to the legality of his previous appointment as Chief Revenue Examiner was neither raised in the pleadings nor proven at the trial with the consent of the parties; (2) that petitioner was precluded by laches from questioning said appointment; and (3) that the same was not contrary to the Revised Administrative Code.On the other hand, petitioner argues that the lower court should haveordered respondents Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Secretary of Finance to appoint him to the controverted position because (1) he was senior in rank to Toledo and was the competent and qualified employee next in line for the position; and (2) the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors I had waived their rights to the position.Castro claims the position by virtue of Section 23, paragraph 3, Republic Act 2260, which provides:"Whenever a vacancy occurs in any competitive or classified position in the government or in any government-owned or controlled corporation or entity, the officer or employee next in rank who is competent and qualified to hold the position and who possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility shall be promoted thereto: Provided, That should there be two or more persons under equal circumstances, seniority shall be given preference: And provided, however, that should there be any special reason or reasons why such officer or employee should not be promoted, such special reason or reasons shall be stated in writing by the appointing official and the officer or employee concerned shall be informed thereof and be given opportunity to be heard by the Commissioner of Civil Service, whose decision in such case shall be final. If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as provided herein, then the same shall be filled by transfer of present employees in the government service, by reinstatement, by re-employment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by certification from appropriate registers of eligibles in accordance with rules promulgated in pursuance of this Act."

"Judgment appealed from is modified by eliminating therefrom thatportion annulling respondent Toledo's appointment to the position in dispute, andis affirmed in other respects." Whether or not Toledo's previous appointment as Chief Revenue Officer was illegal is not the issue, and any questions raised were done beyond the time limit prescribed by law. Castro, on the other hand, failed to prove "either seniority in rank among the nine Assistant Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District or waiver on the part of those who were senior to him Castro has failed to establish". "Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors does not amount to a waiver on their part."

SYLLABUS1. QUO WARRANTO; NATURE OF. A quo warranto proceeding is one to determine the right to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and tooust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.2. ID.; WHO MAY BRING THE ACTION. The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor general or by a fiscal; or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. Where a private person files the action, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a rightto the undisturbed possession of his office. (Acosta vs. Flor, 5 Phil., 18).3. ID.; RIGHT TO AN OFFICE; WAIVER; CASE AT BAR. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the 8 other assistant revenue regional directors doesnot amount to a waiver on their part. Waiver must be predicated on more concrete grounds. The evidence must be sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the intent or waive is unmistakable.4. ID.; PERIOD TO BRING ACTION. The action of quo warrantoinvolving right to an office, must be instituted within the period of one year. This provision is an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment.

G.R. No. 137873. April 20, 2001

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC.,petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.

"At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death." "Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floorof the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connectthe chain block with the [p]latform, got loose . . . causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim to death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.""On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego's widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased's employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow's prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. Thedispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego's earning capacity.4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.5. P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.2On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto."

D.M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds: THE APPELLATE COURTERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.

The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule,9among which are entriesin official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides: Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. "Petitioner contendsthat the last requisite (that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.) is not present."

Petitioner's contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of resipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inferencethat the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence maybe established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased's employer damages under the Civil Code. Court ruled that respondent's case fell under the exception, and that the claiming of benefits under the Labor Code was done due to a mistake in fact, because at the time when the respondent applied for benefits, she was not aware that she had the right (neither mandatory or prohibitory) to sue for damages due to negligence of the petitioner causing her husband's death, and not necessarily a waiver of her right to choose between the two remedies available in such cases.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

A.M. No. 53-MJ.January 31, 1974

LOURDES CORPUS, complainant ,vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE CIPRIANO P. CABALUNA, JR., ALIMODIAN, ILOILO, respondent .

"On August 26, 1953, Lourdes Corpus and several others filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a complaint against Tiburcia Brabanco and Felix Amijana docketed as civil case No. 2843 concerning the ownership of two parcels of land located in barrio Bugang, municipality of Alimodian, province of Iloilo. In a decision dated September 5, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs true owners of the parcels of land described in the complaint and ordering the defendants to vacate the same. These case was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the defendants and on February 26, 1963, a judgment was rendered which affirmed the decision of the trial court.""Municipal Judge of Alimodian, Iloilo, Mr. Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., acting as Cadastral Judge, heard several cadastral cases, one of which was Cadastral Case No. N-11, L.R.C. CadastralRecord No. N-387 of the Alimodian Cadastre, which involved a parcel of land described as cadastral lot 1762, with Adriano Camarista as claimant. In the course of the hearing of the case, Adriano Camarista executed a deed of sale in favor of Procopio Cabalfin and the document was ratified by Judge Cabaluna. Jr. After the hearing, cadastral lot 1762 was adjudicated to spouses Procopio and Cleofe Cabalfin on July 30, 1963.""On March 4, 1964, Lourdes Corpus and her co-plaintiffs in civil case 2843 filed in thecadastral case a petition to set aside the decision rendered therein and to order another hearing on the ground that cadastral lot 1762 is the same parcel of land litigated in civil case 2843 which was awarded to them by final judgment of the Court of Appeals." "Lourdes Corpus likewise filed on April 26, 1966, a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against spouses Procopio and Cleofe Cabalfin for annulment of the aforementioned decision rendered in the cadastral case4and there the trial court found that cadastral lot 1762 and the land litigated in civil case 2843 were indeed one and the same." "Lourdes Corpus charged JudgeCabaluna, Jr. before the Secretary of Justice with having committed "gross fraud" in that knowing of the pendency of the above-mentioned civil case before the Court of Appeals, said Judge nonetheless ratified a deed of sale of cadastral lot 1762 in favor of Procopio Cabalfin and awarded said lot to the latter."

"For the charge of "gross fraud"to prosper there is need of clear and convincingevidence that respondent knew that one of the parcels involved in civil case 2843 and adjudicated to complainant was the same property which he awarded to spouses Cabalfin in the cadastral proceeding; suchevidence is, however, wanting in the record of this case." "Fraud is serious charge which cannot be lightly inferred from allegations orcircumstances surrounding a particular situation, but must be supported by clear and convincing proof."

Respondent wasexonerated and the charge dismissed.

G.R. No. L-32743. February 15, 1974

PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,vs. RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE,RIZAL, BRANCH XV, respondents.

"In this petitionfor certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of twoorders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970, sustaining private respondent Ricardo Cipriano's motion to dismiss "on the authority of Republic Act 6126", and the second, dated October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order."The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, byplaintiffs, now petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano for the latter's alleged failure to pay rentals.

"The question before Us involves theretroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126, otherwise known as the Rental Law ("An Act To RegulateRentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof")." Thrust upon Us, therefore, for resolution is the problem of whether Republic Act6126 may be held applicable to the case at bar.Private respondent, however, puts forward the argument that there was no perfected contract covering the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly payments of P30.00 effective January 1969, as he did not give his consent thereto.

"Itis the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is covered by the aforecited law. We rule otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969,1while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been effected." There is nothing in thestipulation of facts to show that his consent to the increase in rentals and change in the manner of payment was essential to its validity.A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the NewCivil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found.2The law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation",3it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No lessor of a dwelling unit or land . . . shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970 , increase the monthlyrental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act."

"We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 isnot applicable to the case at bar.""WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are herebynullifiedand set aside. The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M (12285) on the merits in accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court."

G.R. No. L-30642. April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA...petitioners,vs. PHILEX MININGCORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground.

"A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging thatthe causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case.Petitionersfiled an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:" Art. 2176, Art. 2178, Art. 2231. "After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an orderdated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission."

The issues to be resolved are the following allegations of the petitioners:"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS'COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.II"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT."

"WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case. It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos." "Settled is the rule that inascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test isthe averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100)."Because of the contractual relationship between Philex and the deceased employees, "the alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failurethat amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages." (Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. And Art.2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation,and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. "In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributedto the nonperformance of the obligation.)"Although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act", it does not preclude them from bringing an action before regular courts and seeking payment for damages; "The choiceof the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice."

"The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor." "The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article II of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implementedby Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.""Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R. A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952 ), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by theaforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers."THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; CAUSE OF ACTIONASCERTAINED FROM AVERMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR. It should beunderscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation basedon the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as aconsequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100). In the present case, there existsbetween Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages.

2. CIVIL LAW; AWARD OF COMPENSATION BENEFITS UNDER WORKMEN'SCOMPENSATION ACT; RATIONALE DIFFERS FROM AWARD OF DAMAGES UNDERTHE CIVIL CODE. The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in givingdamages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on thepart of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36). In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).

3. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE N.C.C.; BURDEN OF PROOF. Theclaimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causalrelation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is work-connectedor work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Cario vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER UNDER THE WORKMEN'SACT AND THECIVIL CODE. Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a sociallegislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIMANTS NOT PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING ACTIONBEFORETHE REGULAR COURTS; RATIONALE. We hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant ofthe fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted fromthe damages that may be decreed in their favor.

6. ID.; NEGLIGENCE; RECOVERY OF DAMAGES UNDER THE NEW CIVIL CODE;SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. Recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or theSocial Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code). Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume thesame authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SOCIAL JUSTICE GUARANTEE; EMPLOYER NOTRELIEVED FROM LIABILITY FOR DEATH OF HIS WORKERS. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by thedue process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers whichare inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such grossor wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian. It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of thefundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

8. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR LAW; NO-FAULT LIABILITY OFEMPLOYER UNDER SEC. 5 OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND ART. 173, NEW LABOR CODE. It should be stressed thatthe liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no-fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to theemployee, whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.

MELENCIO-HERERA, J., dissenting:1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTION FOR DAMAGES; DEATH COMPENSATION OF WORKMEN; COMPLAINTREGULATED BY THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW. This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII Damages, that: "Compensation for Workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws." By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation Law.

2. ID.; ID.; OPTIONTO SUE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, FORECLOSED; CASE AT BAR. There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards to the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction." In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a second election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the secondelection he should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election. This was not done in the case before the court.

3. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; REMEDY UNDER THE ACT, EXCLUSIVE. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows: "Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and otherlaws because of said injury." (Paragraphing and underscoring supplied) There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitledto compensation under the Act , cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remediesunder the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the legislative's continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwiseprovided in the Act itself.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; REMOVAL OF EXCLUSORY PROVISION, A LEGISLATIVE CONCERN. To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents tofile damages suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation. Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial revolution wheninjured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.

2. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER PREDETERMINED; RIGHT OF INJUREDWORKER TO FILE TORT SUIT, GIVEN UP. Workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In return for the near certainty of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre-determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation claims. An administrative agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by the compensation system, individual workers who maywant to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire working class.

G.R. No. L-24421. April 30, 1970

MATIAS GONGON, petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THESPOUSES AMADA AQUINO and RUFINO RIVERA, THE OFFICE OFTHE LAND TENUREADMINISTRATION, and THE OFFICE OF THEEXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmedthe dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Manila of Matias Gongon's complaintto set aside the decision of the Land Tenure Administration as affirmed by theOffice of the President awarding Lot 18-B, Block 23 of the Tambobong Estate, toherein private respondent Amada Aquino, wife of her co-respondent Rufino Rivera.Lot 18-B, Block 23, with an area of 274 square meters, is a portion of theTambobong Estate in Malabon, Rizal, which used to belong in its entirety to theRoman Catholic Church. The lot was originally leased to Amada Aquino. who in turnsublet it in 1934 to Matias Gongon for a term of 15 years at a nominal monthlyrental of P6.00. Thesublessee constructed his residential house on the property andsince then has been living there, together with his family.Meanwhile, the Tambobong Estate was purchased by the Government from theRoman Catholic Church on December 31, 1947 under the provisions of Section 1 ofCommonwealth Act No. 539. Matias Gongon filed anapplication with the defunct RuralProgress Administration for the purchase of Lot18-B, Block23, claiming preferential right as bona fide occupant.the Director of Lands the Bureau of Lands having then taken overthe functions of the Rural Progress Administration rendered a decision on May 31,1965approving Gongon's application, he being theactual occupant. On appeal tothe Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this official set aside the order ofthe Director of Lands and gave due course to Amada Aquino's application.Accordingly, on February 24, 1961 the Land Tenure Administrationexecuted a deedof sale of Lot 18-B in favor of Amada Aquino, as a result of which she obtained, onMarch 10, 19761, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84738 in her name.On April 24, 1961 Matias Gongon filed the instant case in the Court of First Instanceof Manila to annul the decisions of the Land Tenure Administration and of not inquestion to him; to cancel its registration in the name of Amada Aquino and to haveit registered in his name instead.

The two issues posed in this appeal are (1) whether or not petitioner has thepreferential right to purchase the lot in question; and (2) if he has, whether or notthe alleged waiver of whatever right he might have had oversaid lot is valid.

The first issue involves a conflict of claims between a lessee and a sublesee insofaras the right to purchase the property is concerned. Several decisions of this Courthave been cited and discussed by the parties. Parenthetically, itmay be noted thatin those cases the concept of possession by a sublessee under the Civil Code, whichaccording to the Court of Appeals in its decision under review was in effectpossession by the lessee sublessor, was not considered by this Courtapplicable at allin construing the term "occupant" under Commonwealth Act No. 539.Justice andequity command that petitioner be given the preferential right to purchase in orderto carry out the avowed policy of the law to give land to the landless.Being contrary to public policy, the alleged waiver of his right made by hereinpetitioner should be considered null andvoid.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. The award of the lot inquestion to respondent Amada Aquino is set aside; transfer certificate of title No.84738 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal is ordered cancelled; and petitioner isdeclared to have the preferential right to purchase the said lot.

SYLLABUS1. LAND REFORM; LANDED ESTATES; POLICY GOVERNING DISPOSITION OFLANDED ESTATES; CASE AT BAR. The intendment of Commonwealth Act No. 539,governing the acquisition and disposition of landed estates is to award lots to thosewho may apply, the first choice to the bona fide "tenants,"the second to the"occupants," and the last, to "private individuals," if the parties affected therebystand on equal footing or under equal circumstances. Where the parties cannot besaid to be in equal footing respondent spouseshave their house on another lotthey already own which is bigger than that where petitioner constructed his house justice and equity command that petitioner be given the preferential right topurchase the lot in question to carry out the avowed policy of the law to give landtothe landless.2. ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF PREFERENTIAL RIGHT, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY.Petitioner's waiver of his preferential right over the lot being contrary to theavowed policy laid down in Commonwealth Act No. 539, such waiver is null andvoid.

G.R. No. 8243. December 24, 1915

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,petitioner-appellee,vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF BINALONAN,objector-appellee,THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA,objector-appellant .

This is a registration proceeding instituted by the Director of Lands underthe provisions of section 61 of Act No. 926, seeking to compel the registration ofall private property within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan,Province of Pangasinan.

A question has arisen in the discussion of this case as to whether section 61of Act No. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedingsagainst private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands.Reference ismade to the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), which specifically authorizes the Directorof Lands to institute compulsoryregistration proceedings against all owners andclaimants of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed andplatted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. No reference is made in Act No. 2259 to therepeal or amendment of section 61 of Act No. 926, and the inference to be drawnfrom this is that, in the view of the Legislature, the latter did not concern thesubject-matter of the new Act. Thus, we have arguments based upon thesupposed exclusive subject-matter of the Public Land Act, upon the failure of thetitle of that Act to indicate that it contains anything relating to compulsoryregistration, and upon a subsequent statute providing forcompulsory registrationof privately owned lands without expressly referring to any previous legislationrelating thereto, all of which point to the absence in Act No. 926 of any provisionfor the compulsory registration of such privately owned lands.

Act No. 2334 provides that certain provisions of the Cadastral Act shall apply to the compulsoryregistration proceedings theretofore instituted under theprovisions of section 61 of Act No. 926, of which this case is one. Thisact is whatis called a curative statute. It does not pretend to confer jurisdiction upon thecourts to entertain compulsory registration proceedings. On the contrary, itassumes jurisdiction to have been granted under section 61 of Act No. 926 andmerelyprovides that certain incidental matters arising in those proceedings shallbe settled in accordance with the provisions of the Cadastral Act.Chapter VI of the Public Land Act, wherein is included section 61, is the onlychapter of the Act containing provisions for the compulsory registration of titlesby means of judicial proceedings.Section 61 reads:"It shall be lawful for the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands,whenever in theopinion of the Chief Executive the public interests shallrequire it, tocause to be filed in the Court of Land Registration, through theAttorney-General, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, oroccupant of any land in the Philippine Islands who shall not have voluntarilycome in under the provisions of thischapter or the Land RegistrationAct... We therefore concludethat section 61 applied to all land in the Philippine Islands, whether public orprivate.Upon the merits we must affirm the judgment of the trial court.SYLLABUS1. REGISTRATION OF LAND; COMPULSORY REGISTRATION OF PRIVATEPROPERTY. Section 61 of the Public Land Act (No. 926) authorizes theinstitution of compulsoryregistration proceedings against private landowners.2. STATUTES; CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION; STATUTES IN PARIMATERIA. The fact that no reference is made in an Act to a prior one, does notnecessarily mean that the two are not in pari materia.3. ID.; EXPRESSION IN TITLE OF SUBJECT OF ACT. The Legislature isnot required to make the title of a public or general Act a completeindex of itscontents. The title of such an Act is only used as guide to ascertain the legislativewill when the language of the Act does not clearly express its purpose.4. ID.; EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION. The interpretation of a law bythe executive department over a considerable period of time is entitled to someweight in the construction and interpretation of a law, especially in this country,where the executive heads of the various Departments are also members of theUpper House of the Legislature.5.ID.; VALIDITY OF ENACTMENT; CURATIVE STATUTES. A legislaturehas no power to make a decree or judgment rendered without jurisdiction a validand binding decree or judgment. But the curing of incidental defects or omissionsin the procedure whereby the jurisdiction is exercised is not within that category.

G.R. No. L-28089. October 25, 1967BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent .

The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections1is this: Is RepublicAct 4790,which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in theProvince of Lanao delSur," but which includes barrios located in another province -Cotabato - to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that"No bill which maybe enacted into law shallembrace more than one subject whichshall be expressed in the title of the bill? " Comelec'sanswer is in the affirmative.Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari andprohibition.On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known asRepublic Act 4790,now in dispute. Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August15, 1967, thepertinent portions of which are:"For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and forother electionpurposes, the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to R.A.4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise thebarrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung,Losain, Matimos and Magolatung situated in the municipality of Balabagan,Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipalityof Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan andKabamakawansituated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato."Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President,through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that theoperation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation,declared that the statute "should be implemented unless declared unconstitutionalby the Supreme Court."

The Court is tasked to ascertain whether or not the title of a statute conforms with theconstitutional requirement. "Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged withreference to the nine barrios in the municipalities ofButig and Balabagan in Lanaodel Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took away thetwelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province ofCotabato." "Respondent's pose is thatpetitioner is not the realparty in interest."

"The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading." "In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than itsform should be considered, and thepurpose of the constitutionalrequirement,of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept inmind by the court.""The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton." "The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read withoutsubtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive." "We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.""The general rule is that where part of the statute is void, as repugnant tothe Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separablefrom the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, thevalid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it isfair topresume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they hadsupposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other . . . . Enoughmust remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carriesout the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of thestatute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, andwhat remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part,since the court has no power to legislate.. .""Republic Act 4790 is thus inseparable, and it is accordingly null and void in itstotality."The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislationcreating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place ofresidence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this jurisdiction."For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and toprohibit respondent Commission from implementing the same for electoralpurposes."

SYLLABUS1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILLS MUST NOT EMBRACE MORE THAN ONESUBJECT EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE This constitutional provision contains duallimitations upon legislative power: (1) Congress is to refrain from conglomeration,under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects; (2) the title to the bills is to becouched in a language sufficient to notify the . . . and those concerned of the importofthe single subject thereof.2. ID.; BILLS, SUBJECT MUST BE EXPRESSED IN TITLE OF. This constitutionrequirement breathes the spirit of command. Compliance is imperative, given thefact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read duringits deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247,which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to itsfinal approval in the House where the same, being of local application,originated.3. ID.; ID.; MISLEADING AND DECEPTIVE TITLE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Wherethe title of the statute reads "An Act Creating The Municipality of Dianaton, in TheProvince of Lanao del Sur" which projects the impression that solely the province ofLanao del Sur is affected by such creation although, in fact, the two-prongedpurpose is to create such municipality purportedly from twenty-one barrios in thetowns of Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, and to dismember at the same timetwo municipalities inCotabato, different from the province of Lanao del Sur, suchtitle is misleading and deceptive, because (1) it did not inform the members ofCongress as to the full impact of the law; (2) it did not apprise the people in thetowns of Buldon and Parang inCotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself thatpart of their territory was being taken away from their towns and province andbeing added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur; and (3) it kept the public inthe dark as to what towns and provinceswere actually affected by the bill. Theseare the pressures which weigh heavily against the constitutionality of Republic Act4790.4. ID.; ID; SIZEABLE TERRITORIAL TRANSFER MUST BE REFLECTED IN TITLE. Respondent's stance that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting inthe substantial diminution of the territorial limits of Cotabato province is merely theincidental legal results of the definition of the boundary of the municipality ofDianaton and that, therefore, reference to said diminution need not be expressed inthe title of the law, such posture but emphasizes the error of constitutionaldimensions in writing down the title of the bill, as transfer of a sizeable portion ofterritory from one province to another of necessity involves reduction of area,population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of theother.This is as important as the creation of a municipality; yet, the title failed toreflect this fact.5. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN FELWA VS'. SALAS NOT APPLICABLE; GERMANEMATTERS NEED NOT BE REFLECTED IN TITLE OF BILL. (64 Off. Gaz. [35] 8822)where the constitutionality of the statute reading "An Act Creating The Provinces ofBenguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao" has been upheld by theCourt despite the fact that no reference had been made as to the elective officials ofthe provinces thuscreated, is not in focus, "for surely, an Act creating said provincesmust be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" whichis "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation, as set forth in its title. Thestatute atbar stands altogether on a different footing. The lumpingtogether ofbarrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural norlogical consequence of the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton, for achange of boundariesof the two provinces may be made without necessarilycreating a new municipality and vice versa.6. ID.; STATUTES; RULE OF SEPARABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ANDUNCONSTITUTIONAL PORTIONS. Although the general rule is that where part ofa statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, thevalid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced; yet, whereparts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,considerations, inducements, orcompensations for each other, as to warrant a beliefthat the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carriedinto effect, the legislature would not pass the residueindependently, then, if someparts are unconstitutional, allthe provisions which are thusdependent, conditionalor connected, must fall with them.7. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Where the explanatory note to House Bill 1247,now Republic Act 4790 states that the twenty-one barrios (only 9 in Lanao del Surand 12in Cotabato, with the seat of government in Togaig, Cotabato) comprisingthe new municipality of Dianaton "is now a progressive community; the aggregatepopulation is large; and the collective income is sufficient to maintain anindependent municipality"and that "if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitantsconcerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal autonomy,"unquestionably the totality of 21 barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof,and the Court may not now say thatCongress intended to create Dianaton withonly nine out of twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to beconjectured, for this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intentbeyond credibility point, and to do so indeed,is to pass the line which circumscribesthe judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditionalseparation of powers, the Court may not now melt andrecast Republic Act 4790 toread a Dianaton town of nine instead of the originally intendedtwenty-one barrios,and if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function ofCongress, not the Court's, to spell out that congressional will. Republic Act 4790 isthus indivisible and it is accordingly null and voidin its totality.

8. ID.; A QUALIFIED VOTER AS PARTY IN INTEREST. Where the Commissionon Elections has resolved to implement Republic Act 4790 unless declaredunconstitutional despite recommendation until "clarified by correcting legislation,"and wherethe right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected bylegislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so created is not dismemberinghis place of residence has been recognized in thisjurisdiction, a qualified voter whoexpects to vote in the elections in his own barrio before its annexation to the newlycreated town, is an affected party, as he may not want to vote in a town differentfrom his actual residence; may not desire to be considered a part of hithertodifferent communities which are formed into the new town; may prefer to remainin the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rightsand benefits he acquired therein; may not even know the candidates of the newtown; may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them; may feel that hisvote should be cast for the officials in the town beforedismemberment, and itstands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of anycitizen of that community is affected, hemay become a suitor to challenge theconstitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.cdasiaFERNANDO, J ., dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; NO BILL SHOULD EMBRACE MORE THANONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE EXPRESSED IN ITS TITLE. Theconstitutionalrequirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more thanone subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. This provision is similarto those found in the Constitution of many American States. It is aimed against theevil of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and againstsurreptitious or unconsidered enactments. Where the subject of a bill is limited to aparticular matter, the members of the legislature as well as the people shouldbeinformed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutionalprovision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being aprovision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT SATISFIED IF ALL PARTS OF THE ACT WHICHRELATES TO THE SUBJECT FINDS EXPRESSION IN ITS TITLE. It is not to benarrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. Theconstruction must be reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title becomprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statuteseeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for theaccomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. Thelegislative isnot required to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. Theconstitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of all act which relates to its subjectfind expression in its title.3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSTRUCTION TO BE GIVEN TO REPUBLICACT 4790. Toavoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to excludefrom Dianaton all of such barrios mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found inmunicipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can meet thetest of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent.What was created was a new municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao delSur. This construction assures precisely that.4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ADOPTION OF INTERPRETATION TO SUPPORT THECONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION. Both Philippine and American decisionsunite in the view that a legislative measure, in the language of Van Devanter"should not be given a construction which will imperil its validity where it isreasonably open to construction free from such peril." (Chippewa Indians v. UnitedStates (1937) 301 US. 358, 376). Republic Act No.4790 as above construed incursno such risk and is free from the peril of nullity.

[G.R. No. L-30061.February 27, 1974.]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellees,v s .JOSEJABINAL Y CARMEN,defendant-appellant.

"That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in thepoblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, aperson not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully andfeloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal..22, RG-8 German made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) emptyshells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess thesame."At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of notguilty, after which trial was accordingly held.The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of therevolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisitelicense or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exonerationbecause,although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent fromthe Provincial Governor of Batangas(December10, 1962)and an appointment as Confidential Agent fromthe PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried withthem the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.His appointment from Gov. Leviste reads: "...In accordancewith the decision of the SupremeCourt in G.R.No. L-12088 dated December23, 1969, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly describedbelow, for use in connection with the performance of your duties.""On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC ProvincialCommander of Batangas as Confidential Agent... in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized topossess an ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for hispersonal protectionwhilein the performance of official duties."

"The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentionedappointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess thefirearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basisof the Supreme Court's decisions in Peoplev. Macarandang2and People v. Lucero."The trial court "held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminallyliable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that therulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversedand abandoned in People v. Mapa, supra." This raises in issue thevalidity of his conviction based on a retroactive application ofthe Court'sruling in People v.Mapa.

"In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court'sjudgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the timehe was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license orpermit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent toassist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, withauthority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We there held thatwhile it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license orpermit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that"peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance oflicense to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent toassist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficientlyplaced him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of themunicipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code areexempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possessfirearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the grantingof the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carryout the lawful purpose of the battalion commander and must be deemedincident toor necessarily included in the duty and power of said military commander to effectthe capture of a Huk leader." Mapa was convicted in 1967, on the following ground: ""The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, 'it shall beunlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts offirearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used orintended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, orammunition. (Sec. 878, as amendedby Republic Act No. 4, RevisedAdministrative Code.) The next section provides that 'firearms andammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, ormarines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the PhilippineConstabulary, guards in the employment of