Case Study: MAIRAINdRd T bMNGO bI...

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6 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2009 MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS Case Study: ©istockphoto.com/cebesdotde By David Rivas is a date that will not escape the memory of the Spaniards. A jihadist Salafist group conducted one of the largest terrorist attacks in European territory on that day. 11 MARCH, 2004 Counter e

Transcript of Case Study: MAIRAINdRd T bMNGO bI...

6 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2009

MAdRId TRAIN bOMbINGs

Case Study:

©istockphoto.com/cebesdotde

by David rivas

is a date that will not escape the memory of the Spaniards. A jihadist Salafist group conducted one of the largest terrorist attacks in European territory on that day.

11 MARch, 2004

Counter The

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2009 7

During the attack, they used a reduced number of operators to put the bombs/bags inside the trains. They used four bags in one train, which two terrorists were probably responsible for placing onboard. it is also possible (but not proven) that they used some vehicles as caches to carry the bags to the final points and for storage.

The terrorist group was formed by Salafist, Muslim extremists born in north Africa. They had created a competent infrastructure with safe houses in the regions of Madrid and Granada, areas with large muslim populations. in fact, Granada was the last city recovered by the Catholic Kings in 1492, moving many Muslims outside of the Spanish borders. Today there are many Muslim immigrants who are sympathetic to “recovering this lost Kingdom”; for this reason it was easy for the terrorists to move without restriction in this area.

between march and April, the terrorists Said berraj, Abdennabi Kounjaa and rachid oulad Akcha rented two houses in Leganés and Morata de Tajuña (madrid), and another one in Albelote (Granada). They also kept in contact with other jihadists in belgium and Holland and family members of the cell who lived in barcelona. To rent the houses, they used fake iD cards made by pakistani criminals living in Spain. To buy the phones (legally) they went to a grey phone shop and didn’t need iD, using pre-paid cards.

One of the key points of interest in the investigation was the failure of one of the bombs to explode. Forensic teams and bomb Squads checking the trains

The first bomb exploded in a train stopped in Atocha station, the center of the city. One minute later, another two explosions shocked the train. chaos and destruction had arrived in Madrid city.

MAdRId TRAIN bOMbINGs

THE TrAIn ATTACkS

adrid, march 11, 2004, at 7:37 local time. The first bomb exploded in a train stopped in

Atocha station, the center of the city. One minute later, another two explosions shocked the train. Chaos and destruction had arrived in madrid city. At 7:38 two bombs exploded in two trains stopped in the stations of El Pozo and Santa eugenia. At 7:39, four more explosions destroyed another train close to Atocha. in about three minutes, 10 bombs rewrote the Spanish terrorist equation. The country’s capital experienced the biggest terrorist attack ever in Spain. One hundred ninety-one people were killed and more than 1500 citizens injured.

Understanding the coordination of the explosions is important to understanding how the perpetrators planned the massacre. All bombs were introduced in regular sport bags and bags for lunch and work equipment. All of the bags carried a bomb, containing an unknown volume of explosives (the official sources say from 5 to 10 kg) of a Spanish explosive called Goma 2 Eco used in carbon mines. The packs were connected with an electrical detonator made of copper or alloy, with wires going to the vibration system of cell phones made by Mitsubishi (Trium model). After the explosions, witnesses said “the air smelled hot and spicy,” a typical odor of this material.

Obviously, in the previous days the killers had time to coordinate the operation and devise the timetable.

M

8 The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2009

for possible WmD or additional bombs found a suspect blue bag in perfect condition in El Pozo station. Two points are key: first, it showed that the terrorists were not conducting a suicide attack like many other attacks around the globe; second, it was a big mistake. One wire of the detonator was alone, out of the cell phone system. it was easy to view in an X-ray machine and, for this reason, the Tedax (bomb squad) evacuated the transit system and gathered valuable evidence for the investigators, including the number of the Sim card that was still in perfect condition.

The information coming from this bag showed the remote initiation system used (not suicidal), the construction of the bombs and the charge of 10 kg with shrapnel (even when no apparent bomb fragments appeared in the victims). All the cell phones were set in alarm mode to activate the system.

LEgAnéS: A FALLEn CoMrAdE

After the bombing, the officers of the intelligence unit of National police and Guardia Civil, plus the National intelligence Center (CNi), captured

the calls to the cell phone discovered in the blue bag. Surprisingly, the terrorists didn’t use the Sim card only for the bomb. Previously, they had used it to call to each other. This had been used to pinpoint the suspects from the phone numbers in the Sim. The technical unit in charge detected several calls to a phone that was linked to a cellular site in the area of the Carmen Martín Gaite street. The police forces started the deployment of undercover teams and located the target in the number 40th block of this street and detected the presence of seven suspects. For this reason they activated the GEO, Special Operations Group of the National police and several other support teams including SiGiNT and imiNT.

At 6:00 p.m., Geo was contacted at their HQ in Guadalajara, about 50 km away from Madrid. They rapidly arrived in leganés with technical equipment and began to subtly isolate the objective. However, a terrorist named Abdelmajid bouchar, who was also a good athlete on a running team, went down to the street to deposit a bag in the garbage container. This man noticed the presence of security forces in the area. They were members of the uCie (exterior information Central unit) of the National police, and bouchar walked directly into them. When close, he suddenly ran, crossed a train track, and evaded the pursuers. He called his comrades inside the house.

The security forces executed tactical operations immediately. They evacuated all the neighbors and residents of the target building. Fifteen GEO officers in full gear, including level iii face shields, prepared to assault and moved toward the terrorist safe house.

When the Geos were ready, they received a call from the intel unit: a phone call was intercepted and the terrorist was talking with his family

©istockphoto.com/Tiniiiii

Two points are key: first, it

showed that the terrorists were

not conducting a suicide attack like

many other attacks around the globe; second, it was a

big mistake.

The Counter Terrorist ~ April/May 2009 9

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human body parts. Two bodies went into a swimming pool and carried rudimentary belt bombs in plastics bags around their hips.

kEy InFo1. one Geo operator was dead, 15

Geo injured, 7 terrorists dead, 3 civilians injured.

2. The explosive used in the attacks, in accordance with the summary, came from Mina Conchita in northern Spain and was supplied by a popular criminal—who is known by information units and who was charged in June 2001 in a counter drug operation called Pipol with his brother-in–law. police were confident and everybody knew that they were involved in illegal trafficking of hachis and explosives. The hachis business probably gave them contact with the terrorists, because most of them were also in drug trafficking.

3. The components of the terrorist cell have their own life system, and don’t depend on foreign money or al-Qaeda financial networks. Some of them even run their own small businesses or make money with drugs and small crimes. The group only needed technical training in Afghanistan before the attacks, and a hotline with ideological, spiritual and extremist thought leaders. For the meetings, the subjects usually went to the mosque and after the service moved to the private facilities to talk about jihad.

4. in fact, most of the terrorists have police records. For example, Jamal Zougan is a Moroccan citizen well known by French and Moroccan intelligence. He was investigated by a National Special Court in Spain in the case of 9/11 Spanish connections. Even the French sent a regulatory commission to Spain in 2001 to interrogate him in relation to the case of Maher and Contelier, two jihadists linked with Ansar al islam.

outside of Spain. “We are under siege and tonight will be dead,” he said. Also the intel heard other calls from the house to morocco explaining that “tonight will be Shahid (martyr).”

The special team used the standard work methods, including a map and house plans. They had luck, too, in that the neighbor wall-to-wall with the target was a police officer and recommended they use his house for an explosive entry through the wall. However, the absolute possibility of a large amount of explosives inside the target apartment was a risk. This officer related to the GEO that, when he was preparing to move outside the building, he heard some “people screaming or praying in Arabic and people moving excitedly.”

The team deployed a jammer inside the building and prepared the tactical positions. They tried to negotiate with the terrorists and requested that one of them appear naked in the upstairs window in order to mitigate the risk of an explosive belt or vest. The operational chief requested the surrender: “We are around…nothing will happen to you if you cooperate…” Close to him, two other officers gave cover and the full team split into two cells, with the first going over the landing and the other under. At this moment, the terrorists shot and screamed in Arabic and Spanish. They said, “enter you, mother fucker, enter!”.

The surrender option was impossible. At about 9:00 p.m., the Geo used detcord to breach the door and launched tear gas. The terrorists said, “okay, we are sending an emissary.” The Geo accepted the proposal and responded, “Naked and show me your hands.” in accordance with the official declaration of the operational chief, “after a few seconds, the house came down.” At 9:03, the explosion was aired from the TV channels live.

The police took several days to recover

5. The American and israeli intelligence services were informed before the attacks about the presence of a jihadist cell ready for attack in the Spanish territory. The israelis were not happy with the government because they thought the possible target for the big massacre was the Jewish community in Spain.

6. one of the questions that can take the attention of the reader is the option of negotiation by the Spanish authorities when dealing with jihadist terrorists when their typical tactics involve suicide bombers. Maybe the attacks on the trains, where no martyrs were discovered, pushed the option of negotiation thinking with islamic terrorists not ready for suicide.

7. in another way, a dark point never cleared in court when processing the large amount of suspects arrested after the attacks was the use of communication jammers by security forces. Nobody understands how they called Morocco with the jammer working. However, intelligence has the call records.

8. it’s important to understand the situation in Madrid after the bombings, where the alarm was total. Terrorists even attempted to attack the high velocity train in Toledo some days after March 11.

9. This situation can explain the presence of other information units besides the uCie in the leganés area where the suspects were located on April 3. maybe too many officers made it easier for the terrorists to discover the police presence in the area, even accidentally.

10. in the demolished building of Leganés, some body parts of the terrorists were located. DNA signs of other suspects who were arrested later, 10 kg of explosive Goma 2 Eco not detonated, some packs of explosives with the fuse inside and 200 copper detonators like those used in the

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trains were also found.

11. The Muslim immigrants moved freely and easily in Spain, even if they were illegal. We have a crescent number (more than 1.5 million) and they have their own support network, including safe houses rented by legals and used for temporary sleeping quarters. We have noticed more than 70 people sleeping in a house of 70 meters. These houses are used for some weeks and the illegals move from one safe house to another until they obtain a good residence. in this house, the presence of two terrorist suspects who attempted to enter the U.S. from Mexico and were refused was detected. After that attempt, they moved to south Madrid on their way to other points. However, the notice arrived later to Spain and these two people escaped.

12. even today, after the National Audience judiciary sentence, the intellectual chief of the massacre is

unknown and nobody knows if they selected the targets or if someone else was in charge.

nAMESGEO—Grupo Especial de

intervention is a CT top team in the Spanish National police, founded in 1978 with the assistance of GSG9 and SAS. in the last few years they have specialized in ship interdiction against drug smugglers on the Atlantic Ocean.

uCie—unidad Central de informacion exterior is the top intelligence unit of the National police focused on foreign terrorist groups. They have experience in the fight against jihadist groups since 1987 when an iranian cell attacked a restaurant in Madrid that was used by American forces and diplomats.

CNi—Centro Nacional de inteligencia is the former CeSiD, the equivalent of

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the CiA, and has relevant experience in the Middle East. Seven operators were killed in iraq in 2003 when driving 30 km south of baghdad in support of u.S. and Spanish operations in the country. Traditionally, the Centro has very good links in the middle east and North Africa.

GOMA 2 Eco—A type of commercial dynamite used in the mines. On the illegal market it is used in small, illegal mines or fishing. •AbouT THE AuTHor

Mr. Rivas is a sergeant in the Spanish Navy (reserves), a University Expert in Intelligence Services from University Institute Gutiérrez Mellado, and holder of a Bachelor’s Degree in Security from Almeria University. He is president of the Spanish firm High Security Solutions and vice president of the U.S. company H3.

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