Bill TangCase Rulings3/26/2015

Wall of Separation v. Dearborn Michigan 2015

In this case, I have decided to rule in favor of the Wall of Separation. It is clear that using public tax money to fund transportation to private Muslim institutions is in clear violations of at two parts of the Lemon test, and also coerces citizens to support religion while supporting one specific religion unfairly above others. Based on the precedent cases presented, it is clear that this action is in violation of the establishment clause. This situation is remarkably similar to the 1971 Lemon vs Kurtzman case, where public funding of secular teachers at religious private schools. In both cases, public tax money is being directed towards a secular purpose at a religious institution, however, it was rule in the Lemon vs Kurtzman case that such action still “furthered a process of religious inculcation”, and that the supervision of distributing such funds is excessive entanglement of government. This would clearly apply in this case, where money is directed at a secular portion at the Muslim schools, namely transportation, but doing so is saving the Muslim schools money that they would have spent on transportation that they can now spend on whatever they want, including religious purposes. Also, in the same way as the Lemon case, the government would become entangled with religious institutions as they would have to work with them on the budget. Other precedent cases continue to support the Wall of Separation arguments. In the 1992 Lee vs Weisman case involving the rabbi’s graduation speech at a middle school. the court stated that “the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise...” In Dearborn, every citizen who voted against the bill but is still being forced to pay taxes towards funding Muslim institutions is being forced to support those institutions. The 1984 Lynch vs Donelly and 1989 Allegheny vs ACLU cases also support the Wall of Separation’s side. In Lynch vs Donelly, the court ruled that a religious display was allowed because it was simply a passive representation and accommodation of a religious symbol that held historical and cultural significance. In Allegheny vs ACLU, the court decided that simply displaying the words “Glory to God for the Birth of Jesus Christ” overstepped the bounds of accommodation and passive representation. Therefore, it should be obvious that using public funds to help fund a religious institution is far from passive, and far from accommodation. Accommodation would be providing students of all religions equal access to busing in public schools, which is already being done. The 1961 Engel v. Vitale cases doesn’t share a great deal of similarity with this one, but it does reinforce the idea that government cannot pass laws that unfairly established one specific religion, which is being done in this case. No other religious private schools are receiving and funding, only the Muslim ones. With all these precedent cases in mind, I believe it is only possible to conclude that the funding of transportation for Muslim schools is unconstitutionally, as a violation of two parts of the lemon test, and an unfair coercion of citizens to support a specific religious institution that is beyond mere passive representation or accommodation.

American Atheists vs Port Authority of New Jersey

In this case I have decided to rule in favor of the Port Authority of New Jersey. I think it is clear that in this context, the display of the Christian cross is part of a display that serves a clear secular purpose, does

not participate in furthering or inhibiting any religion, and also does not excessively entangle government with religion. I think this case is very similar to the 1984 Lynch v. Donelly case. The cross in the museum is being displayed with a clear secular purpose, and is also clearly a passive representation. I think it also clearly fits under the umbrella of accommodation and acknowledgement of historical significance. The cross is not being displayed to suggest that Christianity is in any way superior to any other religion or nonreligion, and it plays no part in furthering the Christian message. It is simply a historical display of a religious symbol that happened to bring hope to workers at the 9/11 wreckage site. This fact clearly contrasts this situation from the one ruled unconstitutional in Allegheny v. ACLU. In that case, a display was created for the purpose of spreading a Christian message, not for showing historical and cultural significance. To say that this display is unconstitutional would mean that any display of religious history or artifacts related to religion in any public museum or other facility would be illegal. That would be suggesting that if a museum were to create an exhibit that depicted a history of the world, they would have to leave out all parts of it that mentioned religion. The only relevance that the 1992 Lee vs Weisman case has in this situation is the idea that citizens cannot be coerced to support or participate in religion. I think it is impossible to argue in this case that anyone is being forced to go look at this specific display and soak in its religious meaning. The Engel v. Vitale case also does not seem very relevant. There is no religious activity being officially mandated by the government in this display, and the display of the cross does not lead to the establishment or official approval of the Christian religion. Finally, the Lemon v. Kurtzman case leaves us with the Lemon Test, which this display clearly passes. As I stated earlier, I think it is clear that there is a secular purpose, as the display is meant to show a historical example of one of the symbols that people found hope in after 9/11. It also does not support Christianity or inhibit any other religion. There is no message suggesting that Christianity is good or that any other religion is bad; the message is that this Christian symbol was relevant to some at a point in history. The final clause of the Lemon Test is the only one requires some deliberation. By inviting a priest in to consecrate the ground on with the cross stands, it could be argued that that action was excessive entanglement with religion. However, since that event, there has been no ongoing relationship between the government and any religious institution in maintaining this display. Therefore, even if the action of inviting a priest could be considered a violation of the Lemon Test, the display that is left now is clearly not. Due to these reasonings based on precedent cases, I think it can be concluded that the cross display is an example of passive accommodation and a display that shows the historical significance of religion, not a display that supports religion in any way or entangles the government with religion.