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Case No. 4 Alvarez, Nandie Joy

MAQUILING VS. COMELEC

( Rule on Succession)

FACTS:

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, but was subsequently naturalized as a citizen of the USA,and subsequently lost his Filipino citizenship. In 2008, he applied for repatriation under RA 9225 and took the

Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. In 2009, he again took his Oath of Allegiance and

executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Later that year, he filed his Certificate of

Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

In 2010, respondent Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel

his COC, claiming that the latter is not a resident of Kauswagan and that he is a foreigner. COMELEC First

Division treated the Petition as one for disqualification and ruled that although Arnado appears to have

substantially complied with the requirements of RA 9225, his act of consistently using his US passport after

renouncing his US citizenship effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation and that this act is a strong

indication that he had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship. The same Resolution also stated that the

order of succession under Section 44 of the LGC of 1991 should take effect.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Maquiling, another candidate for mayoralty and who garnered the second

highest number of votes, intervened and filed before the COMELEC En Banc and argued that while the First

Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of LGC is not applicable.

Consequently, he claims that the cancellation of Arnado's candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation,

Maquiling should be proclaimed as the winner, garnering the highest number of lawful votes. To this, the

COMELEC En Banc agreed with the COMELEC First Division's Resolution that the order of succession inSection 44 of the LGC should be applied. However, the former reversed and set aside the ruling of the latter and

granted Arnado's MR, ruling that the use of a US passport does not operate to un-renounce what he has earlier

on renounced. COMELEC En Banc accepted the explanation of Arnado of the use of his US passport- that he

only used it because his Philippine passport has not been issued.

Hence, Maquiling filed this instant petition to question the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for

public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and to pray that he be proclaimed as the winner in the

2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan.

ISSUE:

W/N the Rule on Succession in the LGC is applicable?

HELD:

No, the rule on succession in the LGC does not applied.

This is not a case of permanent vacancy by the mayor. In the first place, Arnado is a dual citizen disqualified to

run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the LGC. Even if he garnered the highest number of votes cast,

this fact does not cure his ineligibility as a candidate.

With Armados disqualification,Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest

number of votes from among the qualified candidates. As held in Aratea vs Comelec and Jaloslos

vs Comelec , a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the

ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

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Case No. 11 Alvarez, Nandie Joy

PENERA VS. COMELEC

(Premature Campaign)

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao delNorte in 2007 election. The former filed her COC accompanied by her partymates on the day before the

prescribed campaign period. Thereafter, they had motorcade which was consist of two trucks and ten

motorcycles running around the municipality convincing the residents to vote for her and the other candidates of

their political party.

Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her alleging premature campaigning as provided in the

Omnibus Election Code Sec. 80.However, she argued that she is not guilty since she was not yet a candidate

at that time and the campaign period has not yet started when the motorcade was conducted.

ISSUE:

W/N the petitioner is guilty of premature campaign?

HELD:

No. Sec. 80 of the Omnibus Codeprovides for 3 elements: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or

partisan political activity (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidates (3)

the act is done outside the campaign period. A candidate is also defined in Sec. 79, however, from the

deliberation of the Bicameral Conference Committee, one is deemed only a candidate for ballot purposes. RA

9369, Sec.13 states that a person can only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for

which he filed his COC.

Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress stated that any

unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign

period.So, it is lawful if done before the start of the campaign period. This plain language of the law need not

be construed further.

Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate. In Lanot case, it was held that prior to

campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his COC, he is not yet considered as a candidate for purposesother than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the place there is

no candidate to talk about. What she did was an exercise of her freedom of expression.

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Case No.7 Alvarez, Nandie Joy

JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC

(Disqualification of Candidates)

FACTS:

Petitioner Jalosjos was previously convicted of 2 counts of Statutory Rape and 4 counts of Acts ofLasciviousness. He was sentenced to a principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal for the

respective crimes, which carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. His prison

term was commuted by then Pres. GMA and after serving the commuted term, he was released and issued a

Certificate of Discharge from prison.

In 2012, Petitioner applied as a voter in Zamboanga but was denied by the Election Registration Board based of

his prior conviction. This prompted petitioner to file a Petition for Inclusion in the permanent list of voters.

Pending the resolution of his petition, he filed a COC for Mayor of Zamboanga City. In the COC, he stated that

he is a registered voter and eligible for the office. That according to him, the LGC has removed his Absolute

Perpetual Disqualification.

ISSUE:

W/N the petitioner is qualified as candidate for mayor?

HELD:

No. Petitioner argues that Sec. 40 (a) of the LGChas amended Article 30 of the RPC states that the following

persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) those sentenced by final judgment foran offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment within

two years after serving sentence.He argued that by virtue of this provision, he is allowed to run for office since

2 years have already elapsed since he has served his sentence.

Petitioner is incorrect in his argument that Sec. 40 (a) has amended the intended meaning of Art. 30 of the RPC.

A basic rule of statutory construction is that statutes must be construed in harmony wuth each other. Sec.40 (a)

can be constryed in harmony of Art.30, and should be construed as such. It defeats Petitioners argument for

implied amendment.

Those persons who fall under Sec.40(a) may have been only penalized with Temporary Absolute

Disqualification which ends after the prison term. Unlike Perpetual Absolute Disqualification, a person is

disqualified to run for office perpetually.