Abejaron v. Nabasa

Petitioner Aberon avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor of a 118 square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in General Santos City.

In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-sq.m. land. In 1949, petitioner improved their abode and all this time, respondent Nabasa did not oppose or complain about the improvements. Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his house, and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes.

Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-square meter portion of the lot.

Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy. Abejaron merely watched them do the survey and did not thereafter apply for title of the land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government property. Without his knowledge and consent, however, Nabasa “clandestinely, wilfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully applied for and cause the titling in his name” of the entire lot, including petitioner Abejaron’s lot portion. As a result of which, Nabasa was issued a Title over the said lot.

In 1982, an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent was filed before the trial court.

T/C ruled in favour of petitioner.CA: Reversed the ruling of T/C and ruled in favour of respondent, declaring that since Abejaron failed to substantiate the existence of actual fraud and given that the only basis or reconveyans is actual fraud, the title has become indefeasible.

Issue: Should the action for reconveyance prosper?Held: It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously title in another’s name. In the case at bar, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a “preferential right” to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his “open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land for 30 years at least since January 24, 1947”. However, the petitioner was not able to adduce any “well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence of title to the land. Therefore, not being the owner, the reconveyance cannot prosper.

Custodio vs. CA

The private respondent Mabasa, owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment that is surrounded by other immovables owned by the petitioners.

When the respondent purchased the said property, there were tenants occupying the premises, however, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built adobe fence in one of two passageways, making it narrower in width. Petitioners Santoses were the one who first constructed fence along the first passageway followed by petitioner Morato. It was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area.

Petitioner Santos testified that she constructed the said fence because of some inconveniences such as losing pairs of shoes and disturbances by drunk tenants.

T/C: Gave permanent access ingress and egress to the public street and the respondent Mabasa was asked to pay the petitioners for the permanent use of the passageway.

Respondents Mabasa appealed the error of the T/C in not awarding damages. CA: Granted damages.Issues: Should damages, arising from the construction of fences by petitioners proper?Held: No. The mere fact that the respondent suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be a concurrence of (1) a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant (herein petitioner) and (2) damage resulting to the plaintiff (herein respondent) therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action. Why? Because a wrong causes injury, and damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. Thus damages wouldn’t arise in the absence of a wrong which did not in turn produce an injury. The law afford no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. Damage, or the hurt, loss or harm alone is not enough.

The question then is, was there injury caused? In order for the plaintiff (herein respondent) to establish that, he must show that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty or a legal responsibility. Plaintiff (herein respondent) tried to establish injury by invoking Art 21, i.e., the principle of abuse of right. It is essential that the ff. requisites would concur: (1) that the defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) the acts should be wilful; and (3) there was damage to the plaintiff.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury since the act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owner, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right.

Republic v. CA

Feb. 11, 1965- Private respondents Jose de la Rosa applied for registration of a parcel of land in Benguet province which was divided into 9 lots. According to the application Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 were sold to his children in 1964 by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto. Balbalio testified that they received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation while Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 from his mother who enclosed it with barbed wire fence and planted it with bananas, etc.

Benguet Conolidate, Inc. opposed the application as to Lots 1-5, while another corporation Atok Big Wedge Corporation opposed Lots 6-9. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, also opposed the application on Lots 1-9. Benguet claims that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934 by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in 1909. While Atok bought the land from Harrison and Reynold which was covered by Emma and Fredia mineral claims on December 1930.

T/C: denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.CA: Reversed trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok

respecting their mineral claims. In other words, the CA affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed, invoking their superior right of ownership.Issue: Can the de la Rosas have surface rights over the land and at the same time reserve the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim.Held: No. Benguet and Atok have EXCLUSIVE rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands.

The land could not have been transferred by virtue of acquisitive prescription due to insufficiency of evidence of OCENO. But even if there was enough evidence, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not.

CA said that there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the subsurface rights. This is contrary to the well-known principle that the owner of the piee of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral; the classification must be categorical.

Andamo v. IACPetitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land in Cavite adjacent to that of private respondent corporaion, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Sallette, Inc.

Within the lands of the respondent corp., waterpaths and an artificial lake were created, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioner’s crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of the petitioners and their laborers and some other destructions. Issue: Whether spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused on the basis of quasi-delicts.Held: Yes. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, i.e., (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

The act of building waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners due to the inundation of the lands may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

One’s property is not without limitations, Article 431 of the NCC provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. Although the owner has a right to build structure on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature.

Peope v. PletchaThe accused is Tito Pletacha, Jr. who is a civic-conscious farmer. He invoked “self-help” in defense of the land he owns for 19 years, when he fought off and prevented a corporation’s crew of 8 men who without any court order was insisting to fence 4 hectares of his land, as a result of which he was prosecuted and convicted of grave coercion.

On appeal, Pletcha invokes the protective mantle of Art. 429, seeking the reversal of the judgment on the ground that he, as the owner of the lot have a right to exclude any person from

the enjoyment and disposition thereof and for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent the actual or threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation of his property.

The People asks that the ruling be affirmed on the ground that the appellant should not have done anything by himself to resist but should have gone to court instead to enjoin the group of 8 men from disturbing his ownership.

Issue: Did Pletcha properly invoke Art. 429?Held: Yes. In view of the presumption that Pletcha is the owner of the land in lieu of Art. 436, which states that actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership, his right over the land must be respected. Hence, Pletcha is justified to retaliate in self-defense, especially in the absence of evidence he used force in so doing.

The TC claims that he should have ventilated his case in the proper agencies. The Court held, however, citing Dr. Tolentino, that actual invasion of property may consist of a mere disturbance of possession or of a real dispossession.

- A. If disturbance of possession- force may be used against it at anytime as long as it continues.

- B. If real dispossession- force to regain possession can be used only immediately after the dispossession.

But once possession has been lost, even if wrongfully or illegally, and the usurper’s possession has become firm by the lapse of time, the lawful possessor must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property (Art. 433).

In the case at bar, the usurper’s possession has not yet become complete and the complainants were in the act of building a fence. Such an act constitutes force in contemplation of law.

Caisip v. People

The complainant, Gloria Cabalag, and her husband Marcelino Guevarra cultivated a parcel of land which used to be tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant. This parcel of land is part of Hacienda Palico which is owned by Roxas y Cia and the overseer is the accused Felix Caisip.

The owners of Hacienda Palico filed an action against the husband of the complainant for forcible entry and the court granted it and Guevarra was given 20 days within which to leave the premises. Due to the tenacious attitude of Cabalag, the accused Caisip sought the help of co-accused policemen.

While complainant Cabalag was weeding a portion of the ricefield, she was approached by Caisip and the policemen. Her right hand was twisted by one of the policemen while her left was likewise grabbed, and together, the policemen forcibly dragged her.

The trial court prosecuted and convicted the accused with grave coercion. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

On appeal, the accused is invoking Article 429 as his defense.Issue: Does Article 429 apply in this case?Held: No. The complaint did not within the 20-day period to leave the premises—invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof. Appellants did not “repel or prevent in actual or threatened xxx physical invasion or usurpation.

German Mngt. & Services, Inc. v. CAThe registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Rizal, who were based in the US, authorized the petitioner German

Mngt. & Services, Inc. to develop their property into a residential subdivision. Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents Gernale and 20 other persons, German Mngt. advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents. In so doing, the petitioner forcibly removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing the private respondents’ farmholdings, bulldozing rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and other crops.

Private respondents sued the petitioner for forcible entry.MTC/ RTC: dismissed the actionCA: Since Gernale, et al. were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly eject, they have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of the entry.Issues: (1)Are the “mountain side farmers” allowed by law to commence an action for forcible entry.(2) Can German Mngt. & Services validly invoke the doctrine of self-help?Held:

(1) Yes. Even if German Mngt. was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property, the actual possessors can commence a forcible entry case against the former because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. Gernale, et al were already in peaceable possession of the property at the time petitioner entered the property, manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn, and fruit bearing trees 12 to 15 years prior to German Management’s act of destroying the crops.

Moreover, a prior possessor has security to remain in property until lawfully ejected by person having better right by accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria.

(2) No. Art. 429 can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession, which is absent in the present case. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.

Isaguirre vs. De LaraThe respondent De Lara has lot where a two-story

residential-commercial apartment stands.In 1953, respondent obtained several loans from

the PNB. When she encountered financial difficulties, she approached petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre, who was married to her niece for assistance.

In 1960, a document denominated as “Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” was executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250-sq.m. portion of the lot together with the 2-story bldg.

Sometime in 1968, the sons of the respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of the two-story building. However, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on the basis of the deed of sale. His application was approved in 1984, resulting in the issuance of an original certificate of title in the name of the petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over a parcel of land which also covers the property in question was also

given due course, resulting in the issuance of an OCT in the name of the respondent.

Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and damages with the RTC.

RTC: Petitioner is lawful owner.CA: reversed RTC decision, because the transaction entered into by the parties, as evidence by their contract, was an equitable mortgage, not a sale. Issue: Is the petitioner entitled to retain possession of the subject property until payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful improvements he made upon such property?Held: No. A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfilment of a principal obligation. The only right granted by law in favour of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security because the mortgage directly and immediately will be subjected to the fulfilment of the obligation. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds there from will be given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan.

A simply mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to the possession of the property unless the mortgage should contain some special provision to that effect. Regrettably for petitioner, this was not shown.

Rodil Enterprises v. CA

Petitioner Rodil enterprises is the lessee of the ORACCA building, the owner being the Republic of the Philippines. Rodil entered into a sublease contract with respondents who are members of the tenants association (THE ASSOCIATION).

In 1987, the petitioner offered to purchase the property, pending action on the offer to purchase the property, RODIL requested for another renewal of the lease contract for another 5 year. While an offer to purchase was made by Rodil, THE ASSOCIATION offered to lease the same building. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Department of Gen. Services and Real Estate Property Mngt. (DGSREPM), thinking that the offer of the ASSOCIATION was more beneficial to the REPUBLI, disapproved of the renewal contract.

A renewal contract, however, was approved by the DENR Secretary, which would extend the lease for 10 more years. RODIL then filed an action for unlawful detainer against herein respondents.MTC/RTC: upheld RODIL’s right to reject.CA 2nd and 4th division: renewal contract is null and void.

Issue: (1) Is the renewal contract between RODIL and the

REPUBLIC is valid ?(2) May Rodil validly eject the respondents even

though the former is not in actual possession of the property?

Held:1. Yes. The owner has a right to enjoy and dispose

of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Every owner has the freedom

of disposition over his property, which is an attribute of ownership.

2. Yes. In an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with the owner, the Republic, which can alienate the said property to anyone it chooses. Unfortunately for respondents, the Republic chose to alienate the said property to RODIL by virtue of a contract of lease. Resultantly, the petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful detainer.

Garcia v. CAThe parents of the petitioner, Atty. Pedro and Remedios Garcia, sold their lot in Bel Air Village, Makati to their dauther and her husband, the Magpayos. Thereafter, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to PBCom to secure a loan. The Magpayos failed to pay their loand upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was foreclosed and sold to PBCom as the highest bidder. The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired hence title over the land was consolidated in favour of PBCom.

PBCOM filed at the RTC a writ of possession over the land. Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo’s brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia, who was in possession of the land, refuse to honor it and filed a suit for recovery of realty and damages, claiming that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother and that PBCom acquired no right over it.RTC: the mortgage is voidCA: Reversed RTC because the sale was consummated. When the land is registered in the vendor’s name, and the public instrument of sale is also registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer may exercise the actions of an owner. Moreover, the plaintiff only entered into possession only upon the demise of his mother. Issue: Whether Garcia’s possession is in a concept of an owner.Held: No. The record shows that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. In addition, petitioner’s subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother’s share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the estate submitted by his father to the intestate court.

NOTE: Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others.

Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: (a) possession in the concept of an owner and (b) possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

Javier v. VeridianoThe petitioner Javier filed for forcible entry against Ben Babol for entering a portion of his lot. The case was dismissed since the court considered the portion outside of the said lot. The case became final and executory.

Subsequently, Javier was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original Certificate of Title was issued in her favour. Meanwhile, Babol sold the portion he was

occupying to Rosete. Four (4) years after the finality of the aforementioned Civil Case , Javier instituted another Civil Case for quieting of title and recovery of possession. Rosete moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The CFI dismissed the case.Issue: Whether res judicata is applicable in the case.Held: No. The following are requisites of res judicata: a) there is final judgment or order; b) the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter; c) former judgment is a judgment on merits; and d) identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. The first three are present. There is identity of parties in the case. What is required is not absolute but substantial identity of parties. In the case, Rosete is a successor interest of Babol by title. Nevertheless, there is no identity of cause of action. The first CC is a complaint for forcible entry or accion interdictal where the issue is physical or material possession over the land without asserting title. The second CC is an action to recover a parcel of land or accion reinvindicatoria. In this case, Javier expressly alleged ownership and specifically prayed that she be declared the rightful owner and be given possession of the disputed portion. A judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declared only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.