Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual259 SCRA 604

Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.

On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered to conduct a “discreet investigation” by the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondent’s sala.

In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice.

In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report:

“On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near

the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day.

At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.

In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between the pages of a blue book on top of his table.

Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subject’s right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).

On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.”

Issue: Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him.

Held: We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction. We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon

consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.

This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of due process.

The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.

It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such vague accusations.

While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a “discreet investigation” of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused before respondent’s court who could possibly be respondent judge’s virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder.

Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case.

But, respondent’s action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was “persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called ‘entrapment operation.’” The opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz’ criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already.

It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he “scoured” the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope.

In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 o’clock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judge’s chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz’ polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judge’s chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondent’s chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing

marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.

Atty. Napoleon S. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo  A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241  January 20, 2000

Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics. 

In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of Withdrawal, in conformity with his client’s decision, Meriam Colapo. Subsequently, he filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country although she was willing to testify at that time. 

Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Court held that it was valid and sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should change her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the charges against him. The only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The complainant’s failure to present his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being placed on the witness stand. 

The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty

of the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.

LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA282 SCRA 125

FACTS:

Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonestydue to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts forreimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00.Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the twocomplaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting toJuly 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel.The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself hadchosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommendedthe dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissingLumiqued.

ISSUE:

Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

HELD:

The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and inthe presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not anabsolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in anadministrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to havecompetent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in theproceedings below. The

investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was forthe purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filedagainst him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or thelaw.There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to berepresented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. Theassistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the dueprocess clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one s side.Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued s appeal andhis subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.

Fabella v. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 110379, 28 November 1997, 282 SCRA 256.

FACTS:On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to allpublic school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws.Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action

assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.

ISSUE:Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

HELD:YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution ofproceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrativecharges against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are

members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.

Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita [GR 130442, 6 April 2000]

Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned byCongressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect.

PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave

Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.

Held: Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without

violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a privatetrip fetching his wife.

Justice Secretary v. Lantion[GR 139465, 17 October 2000]

Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution 11,expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez was

charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process.

Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its

supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is noprovision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the extradition process’ evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

Gov't. of the USA vs. Purganan

G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002

In the case of Government of the United States v. Hon. Purganan the court had the occasion to resolve the issue as to whether or not extraditees are entitled tothe right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Private respondent (extraditee) invoked the constitutional provision under the 1987 Constitution, that persons are entitled to bail except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when evidence of guilt is strong. The court, in rejecting the claim of private respondent held that said constitutional provision is applicable only in criminal cases but not

to extradition proceedings.Again, the court reiterated its pronouncement in the Lantion case that the  Ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether theextradition request complies with the Extradition treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

Equally important, is the pronouncement that the courtof the requested state has the discretion to grant or deny bail and that as a rule bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. But the court enunciated that thereare exceptions to this rule if only to serve the ends of justice, (1) once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or danger to the community; (2) that thereexist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. Having no statutory basis the applicant bears the burden of proving these exceptions with clarity andprecision. Unfortunately, the court exercised its discretion in denying bail to private respondent who considered him as a flight  risk when he fled the  United Statesafter learning of the criminal charges filed against him.  FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

ISSUE: 

1. Whether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest  2. Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings RULING:Held:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to theother.With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel,

the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crimeand evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcendinternational boundaries.Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in thesuppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordancewith municipal and international law.xxxIndeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be anisolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each other s legal system and judicial process.More pointedly, our duly authorized representative s signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other stateto protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to therequesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or wouldhave been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of theaccused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in thecourt of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannotbe invoked by an extradite. There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An

extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminalproceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidenceunder less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while afugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory uponbeing rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. TheUnited States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of thenation s foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite. Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Suchdetermination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistancethrough which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of theassisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determinewhether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries thepresumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paintsa bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extraditiontreaty that hinges on reciprocity.Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to therequesting country if the conditions precedent to

extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, the demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is underobligation to make the surrender. Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothingshort of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would noteven begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right beforethe conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and thatthe crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at allcost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?

Due ProcessIs an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest?It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would berendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and argumentsfrom them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. Thelaw could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.By using the phrase if it appears, the law further

conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make anexhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then availableto it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest anddetention of the accused.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons orthings to be seized.”

To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainantsand the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the actof respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entiresystem. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedurecould convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. Thisscenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of theaccused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent s demonstrated predisposition to flee.

Right to BailExtradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above,

as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of theRules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as hereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply toa case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does notdetract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Hence, the secondsentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken tomean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged.

He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminalcases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion andtyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enoughto include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic andresilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law,bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or adanger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highestcourt in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears theburden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive,not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistanceamongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, sothat the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.

Bail is a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court.Government of Hongkong v. Olalia , 521 SCRA 470   April 19,

2007)

Facts Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and

discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition. Issue  WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail Ruling  A potential extraditee is entitled to bail. Ratio Decidendi

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

Guzman vs. National University,G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699

In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent school was directed to allow the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes.

Facts:                Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol."

In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.                The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.”

Held:                Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.

There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their

own behalf; and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Alcuaz v. PSBA

[GR 76353, 2 May 1988]

Facts: Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma. Remedios Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc, John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY 1986-1987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction.

Issue: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the refusal of PSBA to readmit them.

Held: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and cross-examination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;

(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their

own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the

investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with.The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities in the interest ofjustice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from thehandling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported byevidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.

Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.