STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONCase Digests

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

CHUA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC)GR No. 88979

FACTS:

Dec. 2, 1988 – RA 6683 or the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law was approved providing benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the gov’t service as well as for involuntary separation from the gov’t. The Act covers all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least 2 consec. years of gov’t service as of date of separation.

Jan. 30, 1989 – Chua filed an application with the Nat’l Irrigation Administration (NIA), believing that she is qualified to receive benefits under said Act, but application was denied.

Apr. 25, 1989 – Chua filed a plea for reconsideration with the CSC, but was also denied for the reason that contractual employees are not covered by the Act.

Hence, the petition for a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner Chua is qualified to avail the benefits of the program under RA 6683.

HELD:

Yes, petitioner is qualified. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, what is implied in a statute is much a part thereof as that which is expressed. At times, what is thought at the time of enactment of an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future.

The denial of application of contractual employees, such as the petitioner, is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive. If casual and emergency employees were given the benefit of said Act, there is no justifiable reason that contractual or co-terminous employees to be not given same benefit.

Further, the primary purpose of RA 6683 is to trim the bureaucracy, and the inclusion of co-terminous personnel does not, in effect, defeat such purpose.

Thus, petition has been granted.

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

COA v. PROVINCE OF CEBUGR No. 141386

FACTS:

Antecedents:

The Provincial Governor of Cebu appointed teachers not included in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes in public schools. The teachers’ salaries and personnel-related benefits as well as college scholarship grants were charged against the provincial Special Education Fund (SEF).

COA issued Notices of Suspension to the Province of Cebu stating that said disbursements are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

A petition for declaratory relief was filed by the Province of Cebu and was granted by the RTC, declaring the audits of COA as null and void. Hence, COA’s petition for review.

The SEF, created by virtue of RA 5447, shall be constituted from proceeds of an additional 1% real property tax imposition under PD 464 or Real Property Tax Code of the Phils., and a certain portion of taxes on Virginia-type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco.

The salaries and benefits of teachers as well as scholarship grants are included in said Act; however, petitioner avers that the Act has already been repealed with the effectivity of the Local Gov’t Code of 1991 and that the mentioned salaries and benefits of teachers, as well as the scholarship grants, are not anymore included.

The Local Gov’t, as petitioner contends, only stated that the “proceeds shall be allocated for the operation and maintenance of public schools, construction and repair of school buildings, facilities and equipment, educational research, purchase of books and periodicals, and sports development as determined and approved by the local school board” (Sec. 235) and “establishment and maintenance of extension classes where necessary” (Sec. 100).

Petitioner invoked the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius and alleged that since salaries, personnel-related benefits and scholarship grants are not among those authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF under the Local Gov’t Code, they should be excluded.

Furthermore, it alleged that the maintenance and operation of public schools pertain principally to the DECS; therefore, the “establishment and maintenance of extension classes” should be construed only to the upkeep and maintenance of public school buildings, facilities and similar expenses other than personnel-related benefits.

ISSUE:

W/N salaries, personnel-related benefits and scholarship grants are chargeable to the SEF.

HELD:

It is a basic precept in stat con that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.

Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should be compensated for their services. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.

The Court looked into the deliberation during the second reading of the LGC, and it has been expressly stated therefrom that the “payments of salaries, emoluments, allowances, et cetra” is covered by the transfer of the elementary school system to LGUs under the LGC, aside from other supplemental matters.

Indeed, the maintenance and operation of public schools pertain principally to the DECS. This is the reason why only salaries of public school teachers appointed with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes pertain to the supplementary budget of the local school boards. Thus, this may be charged to the SEF.

However, the doctrine of necessary implication cannot be applied with regards to the scholarship grants as such grants are neither necessary nor indispensable to the operation of public schools. Such may then be charged to the General Funds of the province. Here, the court applied casus omissus, as it should be noted that the “granting of gov’t scholarship to poor but deserving students” in RA 5447 was omitted in the LGC.

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

GSIS v. CSCGR No. 96938

FACTS:

May 1981 – GSIS dismissed 6 employees as being allegedly found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials.

Five of the dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissal to be illegal.

GSIS then appealed to the CSC which ruled the same dismissal to be illegal.

Oct. 21, 1987 – CSC promulgated a Resolution directing GSIS to reinstate the 5 dismissed employees with payment of back salaries and benefits due them not later than 10 days from receipt of a copy of the same.

GSIS appealed to the SC.

July 4, 1988 – SC Second Division promulgated a Resolution that there is no abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC, that reinstatement of the 5 employees was proper but w/o prejudice to the right of GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them, and that payment of back salaries shall be eliminated until the outcome of the proceedings is known.

Jan. 8, 1990 – Heirs of Namuco and Manuel filed a motion for execution of CSC’s Resolution of Oct. 1987. GSIS argued that said Resolution had already been superseded by SC’s Resolution.

June 20, 1990 – CSC granted the motion for execution filed by the heirs of Namuco and Manuel in an Order. GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration.

Nov. 22, 1990 – By Order, CSC denied the motion.

GSIS again appealed to the SC to nullify CSC’s Orders if June 20 and Nov. 22, 1990, further alleging that CSC has no power to execute its judgments and final orders or resolutions because it varied with SC’s Resolution.

ISSUE:

W/N CSC has the power to execute such orders and resolutions.

HELD:

Yes, it has the power. The CSC is a constitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal.

Even if the decision has been appealed to the SC, the same shall be executor unless the High Court issues a restraining order or preliminary injunction (as pursuant to CSC Reso. 89-779).

It would then be absurd to deny CSC of the authority that it has been exercising for years. Furthermore, such authority to decide cases would be rendered useless unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has been decided on is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency such as the CSC should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgment it thus renders, unless the law provides otherwise.

Hence, the petition has been dismissed.

CASUS OMMISUS

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA v. MUN. OF MARCOSGR No. 169435

FACTS:

June 22, 1963 – RA 3753 or An Act creating the Municipality of Marcos fixed said municipality’s boundaries, including: “On the east, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary” Note: Mt. Province being referred to then is now the province of Apayao.

March 8, 1993 –Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era (being b/w Marcos and the Ilocos-Apayao boundary) formed part of its territory.

However, Nueva Era alleged that Marcos was created out of the barrios of Dingras only; hence, it should not go beyond the territory of the barrios of Dingras. The SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era as Marcos’ territorial claim would also encroach upon a portion of Abra, as it is situated between the eastern boundary of Nueva Era and the Province of Mt. Province.

Furthermore, the SP invoked the principle of Expressio unius est exclusio alterus (those not mentioned are deemed excluded). Since the barrios of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the Act creating Marcos, then those barrios must not be included as part of Marcos’ territory.

When the interpretation of the statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would also lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to spirit and reason, disregarding the letters of the law.

On appeal, RTC affirmed the decision of the SP.

Marcos then filed a petition for review before the CA which was partially granted (re: middle portion only) with the ff. issues:

W/N Brgy. Sto. Nino (northern portion of Nueva Era) shall be part of the Municipality of Marcos.

W/N the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. in Brgy. Sto. Nino (middle portion) is part of the Mun. of Marcos.

Hence, Nueva Era’s petition on certiorari.

ISSUES:

W/N the mode of appeal adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper

W/N the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.

HELD:

Yes, it was proper. Under BP Blg. 129, the CA has the vested appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, etc.

No. The barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. Following the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.

Hence, the petition has been granted and the decision of the CA is partly reversed.

WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, THE COURT MUST NOT DISTINGUISH.

PILAR v. COMELECGR No. 115245

FACTS:

March 22, 1992 – Petitioner Juanito Pilar filed a certificate for candidacy for the position as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Proivince of Isabela.

March 25, 1992 – Petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. Nov. 3, 1993 | Feb. 13, 1994 – COMELEC imposed upon petitioner a fine of P10,000.00 for

failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures as required under RA 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes)

Said Act requires every candidate to file in duplicate with the Office of the COMELEC the full, true, and itemized contributions and expenditures in connection with the election within 30 days after the day of election. Failure to submit such statement will subject the candidate to pay a fine of P1,000 to P30,000 (which shall be paid within 30 days from receipt of such failure notice) in COMELEC’s discretion.

However, petitioner averred that he cannot be considered a candidate having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three (3) days after his filing of the same. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner is liable to pay for the administrative fine imposed upon him.

HELD:

Yes, he is liable. The Court found petitioner’s argument unmeritorious.

RA 7166 states that every candidate has the obligation to file a statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, the courts shall not distinguish. No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated.

Thus, regardless of whether a candidate pursued or withdrew his candidacy or not, he is required to submit such statement.

Furthermore, the word “shall” implies that the statute is mandatory. Such statute seeks to prevent the improper use of money devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions.

Hence, the petition has been dismissed.

WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, THE COURT MUST NOT DISTINGUISH.

SSS v. CITY OF BACOLODGR No. L-35726

FACTS:

SSS failed to pay for the taxes of its 5-storey building and the 4 parcels of land said building occupies from 1968-1970.

April 3, 1970 – the City of Bacolod forfeited said properties in its favor.

SSS sought for reconsideration of the forfeiture proceedings from respondent thru the City Treasurer on the ground that it is exempt from payment of real estate taxes, it being a GOCC. However, no action was instituted by respondent.

SSS filed an action in the CFI Negros Occidental for nullification of the forfeiture proceedings and sought issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain respondent from consolidating its ownership over forfeited properties. Said writ was issued upon petitioner’s posting of a cash bond amounting to P105,000.

After the hearing, the trial court rendered a decision declaring that SSS is not exempt from payment of real property tax as it does not fall under the provisions of Section 29 of the Charter of the City of Bacolod and thus, dismissed the case.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N SSS is exempt from payment of real estate taxes.

HELD:

Yes, it is exempt. The properties of SSS is included in the “lands and buildings owned by the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the City of Bacolod, the Province of Negros Occidental” exempt from taxation as stated under Section 29 of Commonwealth Act No. 326, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Bacolod.

The trial court erred in restricting the scope of exemption exclusively to those GOCCs executing governmental or sovereign functions. Said section of the Act does not qualify or make any distinction in providing for the exemption from taxes of the aforementioned lands and buildings. The legislature intended a broad application of such mandate, regardless of whether the property is devoted to proprietary or governmental purposes. Where the law does not distinguish, neither shall the courts.

Moreover, the act of collecting taxes from a property of the Government merely translates into the transferring of money from one pocket to another, as taxes are imposed for the sole purpose of raising revenues for the operations of the Government as well. Therefore, such tax collection would only entail additional and unnecessary workload, expenses and time.

Hence, the decision has been set aside and the surety bond filed by petitioner cancelled.

EJUSDEM GENERIS

NAPOCOR v. ANGASGR Nos. 6025-26

FACTS:

April 13, 1974 – Petitioner NAPOCOR filed two (2) complaints for eminent domain against private respondents with CFI Lanao del Sur which sought to expropriate certain specified lots for the development of hydroelectric power and production of electricity.

June 15, 1979 – CFI rendered a consolidated decision confirming the mentioned lots as having been lawfully expropriated and ordered petitioner to pay the private respondents certain sums of money as just compensation for their expropriated lands “with legal interest thereon . . . until fully paid.”

May 16, 1980 – One of the private respondents filed an ex-parte motion praying that the unpaid balance due to her be paid, including the legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum (on the basis of Civil Code Article 2209).

Feb. 10, 1981 – Another private respondent filed the same motion, however, praying that the legal interest due to her be computed at 12% per annum by virtue of Central Bank Circ. No. 416 pursuant to PD No. 116. Other private respondents filed motions also praying for the same.

Petitioner moved for a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the main decision had already become final and executor with its compliance of depositing sums of money with legal interest at 6% per annum. However, CFI denied the motion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether the law applicable in the computation of legal rate of interest is Article 2209 of the Civil Code or Central Bank Circular No. 416.

HELD:

Article 2209 of the Civil Code applies.

Central Bank Circ. No. 416 prescribed the rate of interest for the “loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments”. Private respondents claimed that their case must be included in the general term “judgments” alleging that such term refers to any judgment directing the payment of legal interest. However, the court found this to be bereft of merit.

Following the principle of ejusdem generis, the term “judgments” should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. Under this doctrine, where general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same nature as those specifically enumerated. This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended

general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would not have made an enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms.

Wherefore, petition has been granted and the decision of the lower court has been annulled and set aside.

EJUSDEM GENERIS

CITY OF MANILA v. LYRIC MUSIC HOUSE, INC.GR No. 42236

FACTS:

Plaintiff instituted an action for the purpose of recovering the amount of P525.00 as license fees and penalty due the plaintiff from defendant-appellant. The trial court rendered its sentence mandating the defendant to pay aforementioned sum.

Defendant argued that the trial court erred in sentencing it to pay said sum. It averred that it shall be exempt from the payment of taxes as its business of “musical merchandise” is not included among the businesses specifically enumerated in Municipal Ordinance No. 1925 and Act No. 3669 nor is it included as a retailer engaged in the business of “general merchandise” subject to tax.

Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N defendant’s argument is correct.

HELD:

No, it is not.

The principal purpose of Act 3669, as stated in its title, is to grant authority to the municipal board of Manila to tax and fix the amount of license fees upon certain industries, businesses and occupations involving new (not yet used) merchandise not yet subject to the payment of any municipal tax on the date of its enactment. The board, then, has a right to determine which industries must be included and considered as “general merchandise”.

Although musical merchandise was not specifically included in the enumerated industries and businesses, the doctrine of ejusdem generis and Expressio unius est exclusive alterius shall not be invoked when it is clear that the legislature intended to go beyond the specific class mentioned. To uphold the contention of the defendant would result to discrimination and injustice.

Furthermore, an exemption from taxation may be excused if done to aid or encourage a struggling industry. However, the musical merchandise industry cannot be considered as struggling when the purchase of musical instruments is prevalent in the Philippines due to the barangays’ and barrios’ bands and orchestras.

Hence, the judgment of the trial court has been affirmed.

EJUSDEM GENERIS

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v. SSSGR No. L-15045

FACTS:

Sept. 1, 1958 – RC Archbishop of Manila filed a request with the SSS to be exempt from compulsory coverage of RA 1161, but said request was denied by SSS.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N Catholic charities and all religious and charitable institutions and organizations shall be exempt from said Act.

HELD:

No. There is no express exception in the Act.

The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty.

EXPRESS MENTION and IMPLIED EXCLUSION / EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

CENTENO v. VILLALON-PORNILLOSGR No. 113092

FACTS:

Last quarter of 1985 – Officers of the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive for the renovation of the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno and Vicente Yco approached Judge Adoracion Angeles, a resident of said barrio, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500 w/o a permit from the DSWD.

Judge Angeles then filed a complaint before MTC Malolos against aforementioned officers together with Religio Evaristo on the ground of violating PD 1564 otherwise known as the Solicitation Permit Law.

Petitioner moved to quash the information, alleging that PD 1564 covered only solicitations for charitable and/or public welfare purposes while their solicitation was made for a religious purpose. This was denied by the trial court. Petitioner then filed for a motion for reconsideration and such was also denied.

Dec. 29, 1992 – The trial court found Centeno and Yco both guilty and ordered them to pay a fine of P200. Both accused appealed to the RTC, but Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal.

May 21, 1993 – Respondent Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but increased the penalty to imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1,000.

Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N the phrase “charitable or public purposes” as enumerated in PD 1564 should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.

HELD:

No. It is an elementary rule of Stat Con that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others (expressio unius est exclusio alterius). The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning to those expressly mentioned.

The court observed that in the Constitution and in other statutes, the terms “charitable” and “religious” are being treated separately and independently of each other. However, in PD 1564, the statement “charitable or public purposes” merely means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.

While it is true that there is no religious purpose w/c is not also a charitable purpose, yet the opposite is not equally true for there may be a charitable purpose w/c is not religious in its legal sense. The two terms are not interchangeable.

Furthermore, it is a well-known rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.

Thus, the decision appealed from has been reversed and set aside, and petitioner has been acquitted.

EXPRESS MENTION and IMPLIED EXCLUSION / EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

MANABAT v. AQUINOGR No. L-5558

FACTS:

Petitioners spouses Enrique and Rufina Manabat were sued on a promissory note. However, they denied liability and alleged usury of creditors respondents Claudio and Alejandra Roxas. They failed to appear and present evidence at the hearing, thus, they were ordered to pay P1,261.74 plus interest.

Sept. 7, 1951 – Petitioners were notified of the decision.

Sept. 22, 1951 – Petitioners sent their notice of appeal via mail together w/ the postal money order of P16 as docket fees and P30 as appeal bond, payable to the Justice of the Peace.

Sept. 24, 1951 – Peace Court of Tarlac received the papers.

Respondents Roxases submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that 1) the appeal docs ad been received by the inferior court 2 days after the expiration of the prescribed time (15-day period) for appeal and 2) the appeal was frivolous (useless) and was interposed obviously for delay.

Petitioners asserted the use of Sec. 1 Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the “date of the mailing” of court papers “shall be considered as the date of filing” in court for the timeliness of their submission of papers. However, respondent judge refused to apply such rule, opining that such only applied to “inferior courts” as it expressly provided, pursuant to Sec. 19 Rule 4.

Hence, this petition for mandamus.

ISSUE:

W/N the appeal had been perfected within 15 days as required by Sec. 2 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

Yes, it was. Sec. 1 Rule 27 of the Rules of Court shall be applied.

The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in this case, as other circumstances indicate the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive.

If Sec. 19 Rule 4 is exclusive, as what was being posited by the respondents, then the other provisions in the Rules of Court would likewise exclude inferior courts (Rule 123, Rule 131, Rule 3).

Furthermore, the Court based their decision on Viola Fernando v. Aragon. In said case, the municipal court stated that, “Although Rule 17 has not been made applicable to justice of the peace courts, such omission cannot be interpreted as a prohibition to apply.”

Hence, the writ has been issued for the respondent judge to hear and decide the appeal.