DIGEST ON DNA CASES:

SUBMITTED TO:

PROFESSOR: DOCTOR LEAL LEGAL MEDICINESUBMITTED BY:

AMELING, PHILIP RAY

CARIASO, SHELLEY ANN

SIRUNO, PAUL NIKKO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VALLEJO

382 SCRA 192(2002)FACTS:

On July 10, 1999 (Rosario, Cavite), at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbors house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisys mom noticed that her child wasnt home yet. She went to Vallejos house and Daisy wasnt there. 7pm, still no word of Daisys whereabouts. The next morning, Daisys body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejos house to question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisys body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejos clothing Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejos Blood Type is O.

Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejos DNA profile.

Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy (including his clothing which in effect is an admission placing him in the crime scene though not discussed in the case) were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines. At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already shown, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing accused-appellants guilt. Their testimonies rule out the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of some other evil mind. These witnesses have not been shown to have been motivated by ill will against accused-appellant.

On the other hand, no other witness not related to accused-appellant was ever called to corroborate his claim. The defense presented only accused-appellants sister, Aimee Vallejo, to corroborate his story. We have held time and again that alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons. It is well settled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For this reason, this Court looks with caution upon the defense of alibi, especially when, as in this case, it is corroborated only by relatives or friends of the accused.

The Supreme Court Affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA

G.R. 158802

November 17, 2004

FACTS:

Aileen Mendoza, 12, was raped by her uncle, Reynaldo de Villa in her home in Pasig. Her pregnancy prompted the filing of charges by her parents against de Villa.

De Villa alleges that because of his sickness and old age rendered him incapable of erection

and the Mendoza's bear a grudge against him. His said he was in his hometown San Luis, Laguna at time of crime.

The RTC found De Villa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death.

Case automatically elevated to SC for automatic review due to penalty imposed.

June de Villa, son of accused, alleged that defense counsel only learned of DNA testing to resolve paternity issue at time of pendency of SC automatic review. His 2 Motion for Reconsiderations of the case praying for DNA tests to be conducted were denied. DNA tests obtained from Billy de Villa, grandson of Reynaldo, and Leahlyn showed that De Villa could not have sired the latter.

June thus filed petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for his father.

ISSUES: Whether or Not Writ of Habeas Corpus is a proper remedy in the instant case.

Whether or not DNA test is relevant in the case.

HELD: No. On the issue of writ of habeas corpus as proper remedy:individual is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint however, cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction

It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of conviction due to said lack of jurisdiction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through Habeas Corpus.

Feria v. CA doctrine allowed HC as post-conviction remedy only when there exists: Deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint; Court had no jurisdiction; Penalty being excessive, is voided.

June did not allege any of the three conditions in Feria to avail of Habeas Corpus. The proper remedy should have been certiorari or appealOn the issue of the relevance of the DNA test as to de Villas guilt:

Pregnancy is not an essential element of crime of rape. Results of DNA test could not conclusively determine de Villas guilt for the crime of rapeThe Supreme Court affirmed RTC decision, modified by awarding moral damages. SC found date of birth of Aileens child, Leahlyn medically consistent with time of rape.Petition for habeas corpus and motion for new trial dismissed.

TOMMIE LEE ANDREWS, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, AppelleeCase No. 87-2166

Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District

533 So. 2d 841; 13 Fla. L. Weekly 2364

October 20, 1988FACTS:

An Orlando,Florida woman awoke during the night of February 21, 1987,when a man jumped on top of her and held a sharp blade against her neck. The intruder threw a sleeping bag over her head and threatened to kill her if she looked at him. The victim struggled and received cuts on her face, neck, legs, and feet. The intruder raped the woman and fled with her purse.The victim could only identify her attacker only as a strong black male.

The State of Florida convicted Tommie Lee Andrews of aggravated battery, sexual battery, and armed burglary of a dwelling. The prosecution offered three types of evidence at trial., including DNA print identification evidence. The DNA test introduced over the defendant's objection, compared DNA from Andrew's blood and DNA obtained from the victim's blood with the DNA found in the victim's vagina. A molecular geneticist from Lifecodes, the commercial laboratory that performed the test,testified to a match between the DNA of Andrews's blood and DNA obtained from the victim's vagina.

Andrews appealed the conviction, challenging the trial court's admittance of DNA identification evidence. The fifth district Court of Appeal upheld the admissibility of the DNA fingerprint. ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA fingerprint is admissibleHELD: Yes

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the test results admissible in this case. In contrast to evidence derived from hypnosis, truth serum and polygraph, evidence derived from DNA print identification appears based on proven scientific principles. Indeed, there was testimony that such evidence has been used to exonerate those suspected of criminal activity. Given the evidence in this case that the test was administered in conformity with accepted scientific procedures so as to ensure to the greatest degree possible a reliable result, appellant has failed to show error on this point.

We find no merit in appellant's remaining points on appeal. The objected to comment by the prosecutor was in response to appellant's argument that there was an innocent explanation for appellant's fingerprints found on the window screen. The prosecutor commented in response that no evidence had been presented which provided an innocent explanation. Appellant's reliance on Carawan v. State for the proposition that he could not be convicted on both the aggravated battery and the sexual battery charges is misplaced. Carawan specifically applied only to separate punishments arising from one act, not one transaction. The charges of aggravated battery and sexual battery arose from discrete acts committed during one transaction and separate convictions and punishment are appropriate here. Finding no error, the convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.United States v. Jakobetz

955 F.2d 786 [2d Cir. 1992]

FACTS:

A vermont womanwas kidnapped and raped in a semi-trailer truck. Police identified Randolph Jakobetz,a truck driver, as a suspect in the crime. Officers searched the trailer that Jakobetz had hauled on the night of the crime and found hairs matching those of the victim. After arresting Jakobetz, law enforcement officials sent a sample of his blood to the FBI laboratory in Washington, D.C., for DNA analysis and for comparison with DNA taken from semen found in the victim shortly after the crime.

At Jakobetz's trial, an FBI expert testified that the blood and semen samples were a "match," concluding that there was one chance in 300million that the semen samples could have come from someone other than Jakobetz. Based on this and other strong evidence, Jakobetz was convicted and sentenced to almost 30 years in prison.

Jakobetz appealed the decision, claiming that DNA profiling was unreliable and that it should not be admitted as evidence. In the first major federal decision on DNA profiling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the lower court's decision to admit the DNA evidence

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence is admissible.

HELD: Yes

Judge Billings undertook an overall analysis of the admissibility question under Fed.R.Evid. 403 to determine whether the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to the defendant. He ruled that it was not. Moreover, he concluded that the jury would not be overwhelmed, confused, nor misled by this evidence.

Based on the thorough analysis by the district court, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion by admitting the results of the DNA analysis into evidence. Judge Billings is to be commended for his careful, exhaustive consideration of this issue. We do think, however, that although the district court expressly stated that it was applying the Williams standard, the court's findings would satisfy not only the Frye standard, but the Two Bulls and Castro standard as well. For the purpose of guiding other trial judges in the second circuit who may face this question in the future, we do not think that such extensive hearings and findings should be conducted in every case. Judge Billings, himself, recognized that the general theories of genetics which support DNA profiling are unanimously accepted within the scientific community. In addition, the specific techniques used by the FBI lab in RFLP analysis are commonly used by scientists in microbiology and genetics research .. The U.S. Supreme Court later declined to hear an appeal.State v. Woodall385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989) FACTS:

len Dale Woodall stands convicted of nineteen criminal counts arising from thetwo attacks on women in the Huntington area. Counts one through seven charged first degree sexual assault as to the first victim:

[1] count eight charged first degree sexual abuse as to the first victim;

[2] count nine charged kidnapping of the first victim;

[3] and count ten charged aggravated robbery of the first victim;

[4] Counts eleven through fifteen charged first degree sexual assault of the second victim. Counts sixteen and seventeen charged first degree sexual abuse of the second victim, count eighteen charged kidnapping of the second victim, and count nineteen charged aggravated robbery of the second victim.

The evidence against Mr. Woodall included blood analysis of the defendant, compared to semen samples recovered from the victims; body hair and beard hair from the defendant compared to hair recovered from the car where victim one was attacked; an out-of-court voice identification of the defendant by victim two; a partial visual identification by victim two; a distinctive smell about the assailant noted by both victims, found also at the defendant's workplace; victim two's identification of the assailant's hair color, compared to the defendant's; victim one's identification of the pants worn by the assailant as similar to the defendant's; both victims' testimony that the assailant was uncircumcised, as was the defendant; and, victim two's identification of the defendant's boots and jacket as similar to the assailant's.

Before trial, the defendant sought to have the trial court order an experimental new blood test known as DNA print analysis. Because no expert testimony was offered by the defendant to show the validity or reliability of the DNA test, the trial court refused to order the test. After trial, the defense raised this issue again, and a DNA test was finally performed. The test compared DNA samples from the defendant's own blood with DNA samples recovered from semen of the assailant. The test proved inconclusive.

ISSUE:Whether or not the DNA print analysis tests is admissible.

HELD:

No

As to DNA typing analysis, we find that the reliability of these tests is now generally accepted by geneticists, biochemists, and the like. This does not, however, mean that DNA tests should always be admitted. Expert testimony may be received to impeach the particular procedures employed in a specific test or the reliability of results obtained. For example, in the case at bar the laboratory wasn't able to isolate a DNA print from the semen. There being nothing to compare to the defendant's DNA print, such evidence would not meet the general relevance test for admission of evidence.

We do find that conviction under five of the nineteen counts must be reversed. Counts XI and XV of the indictment charged the defendant with first-degree sexual assault of the second victim (on 16 February 1987). A conviction for first-degree sexual assault requires proof of non-consensual sexual intercourse when serious bodily injury is inflicted or when the defendant "employs a deadly weapon in the commission of the act.

The prosecution's theory was that the assailant used a knife in both attacks to threaten the victims. The charge was well supported in the case of the first victim. But for the second victim, there was no evidence that a knife was used to threaten the victim or evidence that the defendant had about his person a deadly weapon. Although there was some evidence that the victim's bra was cut, this was insufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant "employed" a deadly weapon. The jury thus should not, as to the second victim, have been instructed on sexual assault in the first degree. A charge of sexual assault in the second degree requires no showing of an injury or a weapon, and thus the jury could have convicted the defendant on five counts of that offense. The error was prejudicial, and requires reversal of those counts. DNA testing at a later date concluded that Woodall was not the perpetrator, which forced the courts to release him from prison

People v. Castro545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989)

FACTS:

In February 1987, Vilma Ponce and her two-year-old daughter were stabbed to death in their Bronx apartment. Police quickly found a suspect, Jose Castro, who was said to have left the scene in a hurry. During their investigation, detectives found a small stain of dried blood on Mr Castro's watch. Lifecodes, one of the few laboratories offering DNA-profiling services at the time, was asked to perform the necessary analysis. The company soon declared a match between the mother's DNA pattern and that found on the watch.But Mr Castro's lawyers questioned Lifecodes' finding.

They enlisted the help of several scientists, including Eric Lander of the Whitehead Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, who went on to become a leading light in the effort to sequence the human genome. The defence team found numerous problems with Lifecodes' procedures. When it compared the mother's profile to that found on the watch, for example, two extra, non-matching bands were discovered that Lifecodes had simply discounted as contamination without further tests. Moreover, on closer inspection, not all the other bands matched after all. Lifecodes' scientists conceded that they had simply compared the profiles by eye, rather than getting a computer to make an objective comparison. The defence also questioned Lifecodes' assertion that the chances were 189m to one against an unrelated person matching the mother's profile. In fact, calculating the probability of a random match with a specific profile can be very complicated, and depends on the rarity of a person's mini-satellite sizes at each locus within a given ethnic population. Under scrutiny, Lifecodes' numbers did not add up. In an unprecedented decision, experts from the prosecution agreed, and both sides deemed the DNA evidence inconclusive.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA evidence is inconclusiveHELD: No

The court determined that DNA identification theory and practice are generally accepted among the scientific community. The court determined that DNA tests could be conducted and allowed into evidence as long as they showed the blood on the defendant's watch was not his, but tests could not be conducted to show the blood belonged to one of the victims .Billy Jack THOMAS v. STATE.

CR-96-0876.

Decided: December 30, 1999FACTS:

The appellant, Billy Jack Thomas, appeals from his convictions for the capital offenses of murder of B.W.L. during a rape in the first degree, (charged in Count I of the indictment) and of murder of B.W.L. during a burglary in the first degree,The jury unanimously recommended death on Thomas's conviction under Count I and recommended, by a vote of 10 to 2, death on Thomas's conviction under Count II. The trial court subsequently sentenced Thomas to death, after considering the jury's recommendations and finding the following aggravating circumstances: that the capital offenses were committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, as evidenced by Thomas's two prior convictions. One of the capital offenses was committed while Thomas was engaged in the commission of rape, one of the capital offenses was committed while Thomas was engaged in the commission of burglary, and the capital offenses were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses, In regard to any possible mitigating circumstances, the trial court's order states: The Court finds that the defendant chose to adopt the testimony of his mother and former wife, offered during the penalty phase, as to his family status as mitigating factors Thomas appealed the decision.ISSUE: Whether or not the DNA evidence is a direct or circumstantial evidence.HELD:

It is circumstantial evidence. The defendant asserted that he was entitled to a circumstantial evidence instruction about the state's DNA evidence. The attorney general,without citing any authority ,responded that Thomas's argument completely ignored very direct evidence presented by the state, such as DNA matching, DNA population statistics and fingerprint evidence.

The court observed that fingerprint evidence was still generally considered circumstantial evidence .The characterization applied well to DNA evidence. The court noted that a limited search of case law on the question of the nature of the DNA evidence as circumstantial than as direct. Because there was some little, legal authority for the conclusion that DNA evidence was non circumstantial or direct evidence, there was some validity to the position that any error in not instructing the jury on the reasonable hypothesis of innocence instruction is not plain,not clear or obvious under the law. Therefore the plain error test was not satisfied.

PEOPLE V. YATAR

428 SCRA 504FACTS:

Kathlyn Uba, was the niece of the wife of accused-appellant Joel Yatar. She used to stay with her grandmother Isabel Dawang. On June 30, 1998, Yatar was seen by Judilyn, a cousin of Kathlyn at the back of the Isabels house and saw him again at 12.30 descending from the second floor of the said house and pacing back and forth. At 1.30, Judilyn saw Yatar wearing a different shirt from earlier and noticed that his eyes were red and sharp. Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of Judilyns husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyns husband arrived.

That night, Isabel Dawang went home and was surprised to see that the lights at her house were off. She tried to ascend to the second floor of her house in an attempt to look for Kathlyn but found that the door was locked and tied therein. Succeeded in opening it with a knife, she went upstairs and felt Kathlyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyns clothes and undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away from Isabels house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyns cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the sperm specimen is identical to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga.

Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quos decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that:

(1) the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found inside the victims (cadaver) vaginal canal;

(2) the blood sample taken from is violative of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as evidence for Yatars conviction?

HELD:

The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used, so long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST. This case was decided three years prior to the Rules on DNA evidence took effect

At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on DNA evidence, which took effect on 2007, provides for the factors to be considered in assessing the probative weight or value to be given on evidence derived or generated from DNA testing. Such factors, are, to wit:

(a) The chain of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples; (b) The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests; (c) The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and credibility shall be properly established; and (d) The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.

DAUBERT TEST: The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the probative value of the DNA test result yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood sample from that of the semen specimen obtained from the cadavers vaginal canal. Accordingly, it held that the DNA evidence is both reliable and relevant.

In ascertaining the relevance of the evidence in a case, it must be determined whether or not the same directly relates to a fact in issue, as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. In this case, the evidence is relevant in determining the perpetrator of the crime;

In giving probative value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood sample from that of the biological sample (semen) obtained from the victims vaginal canal, the trial court considered the qualification of the DNA analyst, the facility or laboratory in which the DNA testing had been performed, and the methodology used in performing the DNA test. In the said case, the DNA test was done at the UP National Science Research Institute (NSRI). The method used was Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a tiny amount of DNA sequence to be replicated exponentially in a span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA analysis may be made easier even with small DNA samples at hand. The analyst who performed the procedure wasDr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria, who is a duly qualified expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.

Hence, apart from the other sets of circumstantial evidence correctly appreciated by the trial court, the said DNA evidence is sufficient to be admitted as evidence to warrant the accused-appellants conviction.

HERRERA V. ALBA

463 SCRA 197

FACTS:

Thirteen year-old Rosendo Alba, being the respondent is represented by his mother Armi Alba, who, prior to this case filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner Rosendo Herrera. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent.Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondents mother.

In the year 2000, The trial court ordered the parties to go under deoxyribonucleic acid testing, or DNA testing to establish whether Rosendo Herrera is the biological father of Rosendo Alba. Petitioner questioned the validity Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether Herrera is correct or not in his plea.

HELD:

No, in People V. Vallejo, where DNA Test result, as decided in this case, already admissible as object evidence in the Philippine courts in 2002.

The Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: (1) how the samples were collected; (2) how they were handled; (3) the possibility of contamination of the samples; (4) the procedure followed in analyzing the samples; (5) whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and (6) the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

The above test is derived from theDaubert Testwhich is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.)The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:

1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested;

2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review;

3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable; and

4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance.

However, the Supreme Court declared that a 99.9% DNA Test result will not be the most concrete evidence and conclusive proof, the Vallejo Guidelines must still be complied with.

Moreover, Herrera cannot invoke self-incrimination on the grounds that, the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial compulsion in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera.

AGUSTIN V CA

460 SCRA 315

FACTS:

Prior to the appeal by Agustin was a petition before the Quezon City Regional Trial court for support and support pende lite by Fe Angela Prollamante representing Martin Prollamante, the alleged son of herein appellant. In their complaint, respondent Fe claimed that she was impregnated by Agustin on her 34th birthday. Agustin advised respondent to have an abortion in which the latter refused. Fe eventually gave birth to Martin, the babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

Demanding for support, Fe has been left with an injured leg by Arnel who sped off with his van, which had been reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

ISSUES:1. Whether the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss.

2. Whether the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search.

HELD:1. No, the complaint by the respondents had a cause of action in which the elements of the cause of action were complied with, to wit, (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.

2. No. the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308 in Ople v. Torres, we said:In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good...

Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

PACE V. STATE

1999 WL 1087018

FACTS:

Convicted by a jury of four counts of malice murder, four counts of felony murder, four counts of rape, and two counts of aggravated sodomy is the 32 year-old Lyndon Fitzgerald Pace. A DNA expert determined that Paces DNA profile matched the DNA profile taken from the sperm in the McAfee, Martin, McLendon and Britt murders. The expert testified that the probability of a coincidental match of this DNA profile is one in 500 million in the McAfee, Martin, and Britt cases, and one in 150 million in the McLendon case.

The defendant, while under investigation for another murder, of one Mary Hudson, had signed a consent form that states, I fully understand that these hair and bodily fluid samples are to be used against me in the court of law and I am in agreement to give those hair samples for further use in this particular investigation. The form further stated that pace was a suspect in a murder that occurred on September 17, 1992 and the name of the murder victim in this case is Mary Hudson. There was no mention of the foregoing four murders. The FBI and the GBI crime labs were subsequently unable to match Paces DNA or hair to any evidence from the Hudson murder, but were able to obtain matches with evidence from the McAfee, McLendon, Martin and Britt Case.

Pace claimed that he did not voluntarily consent to the drawing of his blood for use in the investigation of the four murders for which he was convicted, and argued that the police thus exceeded the bounds of his consent by using his blood for investigations of murders other than the Hudson murder. However, the court observed, unlike an implied consent warning, the form does not limit the use of blood or hair to only the Hudson murder investigation or to any other purpose, and there is no evidence that Pace placed any limits on the scope of his consent. The police were not required to explain to pace that his blood or hair could be used in prosecutions. Further, like a fingerprint, DNA remains the same no matter how many times blood is drawn and tested and a DNA profile can be used to inculpate or exculpate suspects in other investigations without additional invasive procedures. It would not be reasonable to require law enforcement personnel to obtain additional consent or another search warrant every time a validly obtained DNA profile is used for comparison in another investigation.

The rapid judicial acceptance of DNA identification technologies does not mean that all legal issues involving it are resolved. It must be remembered that DNA evidence, as powerful and definitive as it is characterized is just evidence nonetheless. It is typically categorized as circumstantial evidence, like fingerprints, ballistics, hair, fiber and the rest of the forensic evidence corpus, as opposed to direct evidence of the the fact which it is offered, normally presence and participation at a crime scene. This is an important conceptual difference which may be belied in the eyes of juries by the reputation that DNA, like fingerprints has gained over the past decade.

SURREPTITIOUS DNA COLLECTING

CALIFORNIA V. GREENWOOD

FACTS:

When investigator Investigator Jenny Stracner of Laguna Beach Police Department learned from various sources that Billy Greenwood might be selling illegal drugs out of his single-family home, Stracner asked the neighborhood's regulartrash collector to pick up the plasticgarbage bagsthat Greenwood left on the curb in front of his house. In the garbage, she found evidence of drug use. She used that information to obtain a warrant to search Greenwood's home. When officers searched the house, they foundcocaine andmarijuana. Greenwood and Dyanne Van Houten were arrested for narcotics trafficking based upon evidence obtained as a result of a police search of his trash. that the California Constitution declared such searches as unconstitutional. The lower courts overturned the conviction by stating that the search of the trash bags without warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. The State petitioned for review.

ISSUE:

Whether a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage, that society accepts as objectively reasonable.

HELD:Justice Byron White held that no such subjective expectation of privacy existed. An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment constitutional protection unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable. The respondent exposed his garbage to the public to sufficiently defeat the claim to Fourth Amendment constitutional protection. Garbage left at the side of the road is readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover, the garbage was placed at the curb for the purpose of conveying it to a third party. Therefore, the respondent could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the items discarded. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment constitutional protection.

POST CONVICTION DNA TESTING

KIRK NOBLE BLOODSWORTH CASE

FACTS:

9-year-old Dawn Hamilton was playing with her cousin on sometime July 1984. As she was looking for her cousin, she stopped by the lake to watch two boys fishing by the lake. Dawn was approached by a young man who told her that he would help her look for her cousin. The two boys watched Dawn and the stranger enter the woods next to the lake. When Dawn had not returned home three hours later, her friends and relatives launched a search. The police soon discovered her body in the woods where she had last been seen alive.She had been abducted, strangled, sexually molested and beaten to death with a rock.

The principal evidence purporting to link Bloodsworth to the 1984 crime was the testimony of five witnesses who placed him either with the victim or near the scene of the crime at the time it was believed to have occurred. In addition, the prosecution introduced forensic evidence purporting to link a pair of his shoes to marks on the victims body.

The Maryland Court of Appeals overturned Bloodsworths conviction in 1986 after finding that the prosecution had illegally withheld potentially exculpatory evidence from the defense, Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164 (1986). However, Bloodsworth was retried, again convicted, and sentenced to two life terms. That conviction and sentence was affirmed on appeal, Bloodsworth v. State, 76 Md. App. 23 (1988).

In 1992, however, Centurion Ministries of Princeton, New Jersey, helped Bloodsworth obtain court approval for testing of biological material preserved from the crime with a then-emerging DNA technology known as PCR (polymerase chain reaction). The tests, performed by Edward T. Blake, of Forensic Science Associates, in Richmond, California, incontrovertibly established Bloodsworths innocence. After the FBI confirmed the results, Bloodsworth was released June 28, 1993. He was the first U.S. death row prisoner to be exonerated by DNA. In December 1994, Maryland Governor William Donald Schaefer granted Boodsworth a full pardon based on innocence.

Nine years later, in the spring of 2003, a Baltimore County forensic biologist who was studying evidence from the case found stains on a sheet that had not been analyzed. Investigators ordered DNA testing and ran the results through the national DNA database, which linked Ruffner to the crime. Bloodsworth, who had been the prison librarian in his later years of incarceration, had regularly delivered books to Ruffner and the two had lifted weights together. Ruffner arrived in prison just a month after Bloodsworth and knew about Bloodsworths case, his attempts to win a new trial, and his claim of actual innocence. However, Ruffner said nothing to lead Bloodsworth to suspect that Ruffner had killed Dawn Hamilton. Bloodsworth learned the news from prosecutors shortly before Ruffner was formally charged with the crime on September 5, 2003.

HARVEY V. HORANFACTS:

April 30, 1990, James Harvey was convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years for the rape and fifteen years for forcible sodomy. The rape kit revealed the presence of spermatazoa on the victim's mouth smear, vaginal smear, thigh smear and in two swab samples. The court granted the plaintiff an extension of time until January 24, 1991 to file a petition for appeal, but the latter failed to do so.

As the respondent failed to order DNA testing the biological evidence constituted a deprivation of due process, alleging that a failure to order DNA testing on the biological evidence constituted a deprivation of due process, the plaintiff filed a action against the Governor of Virginia in the court on February 25, 1994. Court ruled that the plaintiff should refile his 1983 claims as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, plaintiff did so, alleging that the Governor had refused to order the DNA test which could prove plaintiff's innocence. The court dismissed plaintiff's petition on July 25, 1995, finding that plaintiff had failed to fully exhaust state remedies, as required by their state.

The Innocence Project, representing the herein petitioner, requested from the Fairfax County Commonwealth's Attorney's office for the evidence. In February 1998 the Innocence Project contacted Ray Morrogh, a Commonwealth's Attorney for Fairfax County, with a request for assistance in locating the biological evidence, in which the latter did not respond and thereafter made another request Todd Sauders, Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney for Fairfax County. Mr. Saunders stated in an October 1999 letter that in his opinion, if that one of the perpetrators of the rape did not ejaculate, as plaintiff contends happened, and plaintiff was excluded as the contributor of the genetic material this would not prove the plaintiff's innocence and his case did not warrant post-conviction DNA testing. However, plaintiff insists that the victim identified him at trial as the first assailant. He contends that the victim testified that the first assailant did ejaculate and that the second assailant did not ejaculate. The plaintiff asserts that he is a perfect candidate for post-conviction DNA testing, contending that the results could provide exculpatory results, which could be a basis for proving innocence.

Plaintiff alleged in his present case that defendant, Commonwealth's Attorney Horan, acting under color of state law, has deprived him of his constitutional right especially of DNA testing and the production of the rape kit for the same. Defendant moved for the dismissal of the case, stating that the plaintiff was not violated of substantive due process when the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney disagreed with plaintiff's request for post-conviction DNA testing. The plaintiff contends that his request is not in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus because he is not seeking immediate or more speedy release. Nor does he necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction, so therefore, the plaintiff appropriately brought this action under 1983. The plaintiff concedes that his rape conviction may indeed be valid; he merely requests access to and testing of the biological evidence in order to determine if it is exculpatory. The plaintiff also asserts that defendant Horan is a proper defendant because he is responsible for formulating the policy relating to access to evidence and because of the instruction the defendant has provided his assistant attorneys in this case. The plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations has not run because each denial of access to the biological evidence constitutes an ongoing constitutional violation and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the violation ends. The plaintiff alleges that he has also stated a claim for deprivation of substantive due process.

Held:

Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied. The plaintiff does not seek immediate release from prison and disclaims any challenge to his conviction at this time, conceding that the DNA tests may show his conviction was valid. The denial by the Commonwealth's Attorney, to whom Virginia authorities have directed persons acting on plaintiff's behalf, of access to possibly exculpatory evidence states a claim of denial of due process and gives this court jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which, unlike a petition for writ of habeas corpus, has no exhaustion requirement. If the evidence turns out to be exculpatory, it may support a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, the timeliness of which can be addressed by the state court at that timePEOPLE V. CALLACEFACTS:

In January 1985 a teenage girl was walking to her car in the parking lot of a shopping center. She was accosted by two men at knife point and forced into a nearby car. One man, allegedly Callace, sexually assaulted the victim repeatedly while the other man watched from the front seat. The second man was never identified.

A Suffolk County jury took one hour to convict Leonard Callace of sodomy (four counts), sexual abuse (three counts), wrongful imprisonment, and criminal possession of a weapon. Callace rejected a plea bargain that would have given him four months in prison if he pled to a lesser charge. On March 24, 1987, Callace was sentenced to 25 to 50 years in prison.

The prosecution based its case on several points: (1) A sketch by police artists resembled Callace; (2) The victim identified Callace from a photo array and made an in-court identification; (3) The blood group of the semen was type A, the same as Callace's; and (4) Callace's alibi was uncorroborated.

Callace's conviction was affirmed on appeal and leave to appeal to the court of appeals was denied. While in prison, Callace learned about DNA testing and how it was used to free a former inmate. He asked his attorney about the original trial evidence.

Callace's attorney remembered two things from the original trial record. First, the victim had just picked up her jeans from the cleaners. Second, the victim spit out semen onto the jeans after one of the assaults. Therefore, any semen on those jeans would have come from the assailant; if it did not match Callace's, he could be freed. The defense used this information to secure the jeans from the prosecution for DNA testing at Lifecodes, Inc. On June 27, 1991, a Suffolk County Court judge granted Callace's motion to consider DNA tests as "new evidence" . The judge also ruled that if the samples did not match, he would hold a hearing to consider post conviction relief for Callace.

The RFLP analysis performed by Lifecodes, Inc., on the victim's jeans showed that DNA in the semen stains did not match Callace's.

ISSUE: Whether or not Callace is guilty.

HELD: No.On October 5, 1992, Callace was released from prison. The prosecution dismissed all charges against Callace and declined to prosecute in a new trial because of the DNA evidence and the reluctance of the victim to endure another trial. Callace served almost six years of his sentence.

In Re: Petition to take the 1999 Bar Exams, B.M. No. 984 (25 June 2002)

Facts:

Julius R. Cesar passed the 1999 Bar Examinations but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath on 3 May 2000 in view of the Letter-Complaint dated 24 January 2000 of Tuesday Marie Castro charging him with Immorality and Grave Misconduct.

Castro alleged that she and petitioner were former lovers; that she bore him a son named Michael Angelo Castro on 5 May 1999; that even prior to Michael's birth petitioner acknowledged paternity of Michael in an Amicable Settlement dated 13 March 1999 executed before the Lupong Tagapayapa, Office of the Barangay Captain, Cogon District, Tagbilaran City, and promised to give him financial support until he reached the age of majority; that petitioner again acknowledged paternity of Michael in the latter's Certificate of Live Birth; and that petitioner at first gave financial support immediately after Michael's birth but had recently refused to do so on the ground that he did not father the child.

Issue:

Whether petitioner possesses the good moral character required to be admitted to the Philippine Bar.

Held:

Yes. In paternity disputes, the DNA extracted from a biological sample (e.g. blood, muscle tissue) of an individual is analyzed to generate what is known as the "DNA profile" which is unique for all individuals except those derived from identical twins. By analyzing the DNA profile paternity can be determined because of the fact that the DNA of each child/person has two copies, one obtained from the mother and the other, from the father.

Once the DNA from the mother has been established, the remaining DNA fragment must be consistent with that observed from the alleged father. Otherwise if the child possesses a copy not observed in the alleged father, then the alleged father cannot be the father of the child. n such case, because of the scientific impossibility of the alleged father being the father of the child, the result of the DNA test is to be accorded conclusiveness in the same way that traditional blood typing is conclusive as to non-paternity as held in Jao v. Court of Appeals since to hold otherwise would be tantamount to rejecting a scientific fact.

Courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said results is to deny progress. Considering the foregoing and the fact that petitioner promised to abide by the result of the DNA test as well as to shoulder the expenses therefor, we find petitioner's proposal for a DNA testing to be quite reasonable and complainant's aversion to the test surprising. If her claim that petitioner fathered her child is really true, she has no reason to fear the result of the test for it would be another evidence in her favor. Moreover this case should be decided on a strong foundation of truth and justice rather than on blind adherence to prima facie rules. We prefer to regard this administrative case as a quest for truth and justice rather than as a mere game of rules. No rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of justice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth.

Tecson v Comelec, 424 SCRA 277

Facts:

Victorino X. Fornier, peititoner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poewas a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimatebirth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.Issue:

Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.Held:

It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is anatural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in hiscertificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

Herrera v Alba, 460 SCRA 197 (2005)

Facts:

In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armis allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.Issue:

Whether or not Herrera is correct.Held:

No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002).

In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides, which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data:

1. how the samples were collected,

2. how they were handled,

3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,

4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,

5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,

6. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:

1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested,

2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,

3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable,

4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance

In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological father. However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% ) does not immediately result in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.

What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological father?

Then the evidence is merely corroborative.

Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is no testimonial compulsion in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.

Agustin v CA, 460 SCRA 315, GR No. 162571, (15 June 2005)

Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.Issue:

Whether the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search.

Held:

No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

People v Umanito, GR No. 172607 (26 October 2007; 16 April 2009)

Facts:

Around 9PM, private complainant AAA was accosted by a young male (whom she later knew as Umanito). He waited for her by the creek, and he pointed as knife at her abdomen. He dragged her into the Home Economics Building of Daramuangan Elementary School. He undressed her while still holding the knife. He set her down on a bench, put down the knife, and had sex with her. He dressed up and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident. Six months later, AAA s mother noticed the prominence on her stomach, and it was then that she divulged to her mother the alleged rape. Her mother brought her to the police station. (Umanito s alibi: He was at home all day. Re: AAA, he admitted that he courted her but she spurned him. He conjectured that she had a crush on him since she frequently visited him.)

RTC rendered judgment against Umanito and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. Umanito s appeal was transferred to the CA for intermediate review (as per Mateo ruling), and CA affirmed RTC. Umanito seeks acquittal on reasonable doubt, with the belated filing of the case and AAA s questionable credibility as grounds. He also said that AAA filed the complaint only upon her mother s insistence; this supports his claim that AAA had sex with another (a married man). Also, he claimed that there were several inconsistencies in her assertions.Issue:

Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].Held:

The fact that AAA bore a child because of the purported rape may provide the definitive key to Umanito s absolution, since it can now be determined with reasonable certainty WON he is the father of her child. AAA and her child are directed to submit themselves to DNA testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (AM No. 06-11-5-SC) which took effect on 15 Oct 2007 (a few days before promulgation of this case).

DNA print / identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available. The groundwork for acknowledging the strong weight of DNA testing was first laid out in Tijing v. CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed DNA analysis as evidence and traced the development of its admissibility in our jurisdiction. Tecson v. COMELEC said that in case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to establish, DNA testing could be resorted to.

The determination of WON Umanito is the father (through DNA testing) is material to the fair and correct adjudication of his appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5-SC, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, since SC is not a trier of facts, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to RTC for reception of evidence.

The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the standards set. RTC should order the DNA testing if it finds it to be feasible in this case. RTC shall determine the institution to undertake the testing, and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice. After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the results in accordance with the rules of evidence, which shall be assessed by RTC in keeping with Sections 7 (Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence) and 8 (Reliability of DNA testing methodology). RTC is also enjoined to observe confidentiality and preservation of DNA evidence.

To facilitate the execution of this resolution, although the parties are primarily bound to bear the expenses for DNA testing, such costs may be advanced by SC if needed.

Estate of Ong v Diaz, GR No. 171713 (17 December, 2007)

Facts:

The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court formerly rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died during the pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute."

Issue:

Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.Held:

Yes because the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In case of establishing thepaternity or filiation, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent, could be resorted to.

The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic material originating from the person's body, ie., blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing.

State of Arizona v Bogan:

How a Palo Verde Tree Became a Botanical Witness for the Prosecution

Facts:

One Sunday morning, a boy riding his dirt bike through a dry wash in the desert saw the nude body of a woman, lying face down in the brush near a cluster of palo verde trees. She had been strangled to death. A man in the vicinity volunteered that he had seen a white truck leave the area "pretty quick" at about 1:30 that morning. The police found a pager a few feet from the body. It was registered to Earl Bogan, but used primarily by his son, Mark, who drove a white pickup truck and lived about 18 minutes from the scene. In the bed of the truck, police found two seed pods from a palo verde tree. Still other evidence suggested that Mark Bogan was the culprit. Bogan maintained that a female hitchhiker had "swiped" his pager from the truck and run away. He denied having been in the area where the body was found.

An enterprising detective observed that one of the palo verde trees -- later designated as "PV-30" -- had a fresh abrasion on one of its lower branches. He contacted Dr. Timothy Helentjaris, a professor of molecular genetics at the University of Arizona, who compared DNA from the seed pods found in the truck with the DNA in seed pods from the palo verde trees at the crime scene. He also analyzed DNA from other palo verde seed pods collected at various sites around the county. He concluded that the seed pods found in the truck originated from PV-30.

Issue:

Whether Bogan is guilty with the crime of Murder.Held:

Yes. The samples from the truck bed "matched completely with ... PV-30," that he felt "quite confident in concluding that these two samples ... most likely did come from [PV-30]," and that he was "quite comfortable" in concluding that PV-30's DNA would be distinguishable from that of "any tree that might be furnished" to him. Reasoning that forensic scientists routinely testify about "matches" in hair, fingerprints, and other items without giving statistics, and that there was no disagreement about the generally acceptance of the laboratory techniques used to ascertain the DNA "match" here, the court of appeals affirmed the conviction.